Group messaging for HIDE identities, over MLS (RFC 9420).
Everything HIDE does elsewhere protects objects at rest. This is different:
a live group where members join and leave, and where a message sent today
must stay unreadable to a member removed yesterday and to one who joins
tomorrow. That is a ratchet problem, not a file-format problem, so the
protocol machinery is mls-rs and this crate adds no cryptography.
What it does add is the join between an MLS group and a HIDE identity: the
credential carried in the group is a device from an [IdentityLog], so
"who is in this group" and "which devices does this person trust" are
answered from the same place, and revoking a device is not silently
independent of removing it from a group.
Honest limits
mls-rshas no third-party security audit, and neither does HIDE.- The cipher suite here is classical X25519, not post-quantum. MLS's PQ
ciphersuites are still an IETF draft and no Rust provider implements them
yet; see [
PQ_STATUS]. HIDE's own object encryption is hybrid PQ, so a group message is protected differently from a sealed file. Saying that plainly matters more than implying uniform protection. - Removing a device from an identity does not by itself evict it from every
group; [
GroupSession::remove_device] must be called. The link is checked, not automatic.