heddle-crypto 0.25.6

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//! Client mint for protocol-1 owner roots and ClaimDeferredHuman.
//!
//! Self-rooted users retain their keys; custodial users have dedicated account keys.
//! Sequence-0 of a
//! claimable deferred-human root is the same device/proof key CreateSpool
//! pins as spool genesis. Claim advances authority with ClaimDeferredHuman
//! and must not mint a replacement human sequence-0.

use crate::{Signer, SignerError, verify_payload_signature};
use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
use api::heddle::api::v1alpha2::{
    AuthorizationKeyAlgorithm, AuthorizationSignature, AuthorizationVerificationKey,
    OwnerKeyBinding, OwnerKeyBindingKind, OwnerKeyTransition, OwnerKeyTransitionKind, OwnerRoot,
    RecoveryPolicy, SignedOwnerKeyTransition, SignedOwnerRoot, SignedSpoolOwnerGenesis,
};
use heddleco_capability_verifier::{
    VerificationLimits, apply_transition, verify_owner_key_binding, verify_owner_root,
    verify_spool_owner_genesis,
};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

/// Protocol-2 self-signature for a newly minted spool owner.
pub fn sign_spool_owner_genesis(
    signer: &impl Signer,
    spool_uuid: [u8; 16],
) -> Result<SignedSpoolOwnerGenesis, SignerError> {
    use api::heddle::api::v1alpha2::SpoolOwnerGenesis;
    let owner_public_key = AuthorizationVerificationKey {
        algorithm: AuthorizationKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519 as i32,
        public_key: signer.public_key().to_vec(),
    };
    let mut key_id_body = Vec::with_capacity(4 + owner_public_key.public_key.len());
    key_id_body.extend_from_slice(&owner_public_key.algorithm.to_be_bytes());
    key_id_body.extend_from_slice(&owner_public_key.public_key);
    let signer_key_id = Sha256::new()
        .chain_update(OWNER_KEY_ID_DOMAIN)
        .chain_update(key_id_body)
        .finalize()
        .to_vec();
    let digest = Sha256::new()
        .chain_update(&owner_public_key.public_key)
        .chain_update(spool_uuid)
        .finalize();
    Ok(SignedSpoolOwnerGenesis {
        delegated_creation: None,
        genesis: Some(SpoolOwnerGenesis {
            spool_uuid: spool_uuid.to_vec(),
            owner_public_key: Some(owner_public_key),
        }),
        owner_signature: Some(AuthorizationSignature {
            signer_key_id,
            signature: signer.sign(&digest)?,
        }),
    })
}

const OWNER_KEY_ID_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"heddle-key-v1";
const OWNER_ROOT_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"heddle-owner-root-v1";
/// Domain separator shared by Heddle, tapestry, and weft for owner transitions.
pub const OWNER_TRANSITION_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"heddle-owner-key-transition-v1";
const OWNER_BINDING_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"heddle-owner-key-binding-v1";
const REGISTRATION_BINDING_NONCE_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"heddle-owner-registration-binding-nonce-v1";
const OWNER_ROOT_FORMAT_VERSION: u32 = 1;
const DEFAULT_RECOVERY_WINDOW_SECS: u64 = 604_800;

/// Claim window for an agent-rooted deferred human root.
pub const CLAIMABLE_DEFERRED_HUMAN_TTL_SECS: i64 = 90 * 24 * 60 * 60;

/// Protocol-1 claimable deferred-human owner root.
///
/// Authority is the caller's device/proof key. Recovery is empty: the verifier
/// allows that only while `claimable_deferred_human` is set. `nonce` must be
/// 32 random bytes. `now_unix_seconds` plus [`CLAIMABLE_DEFERRED_HUMAN_TTL_SECS`]
/// is the claim deadline.
pub fn sign_claimable_deferred_human_root(
    signer: &impl Signer,
    account_uuid: [u8; 16],
    nonce: [u8; 32],
    now_unix_seconds: i64,
) -> Result<SignedOwnerRoot> {
    if now_unix_seconds <= 0 {
        bail!("claimable owner-root clock must be a positive unix timestamp");
    }
    let claimable_until_unix_seconds = now_unix_seconds
        .checked_add(CLAIMABLE_DEFERRED_HUMAN_TTL_SECS)
        .context("claimable owner-root deadline overflows")?;
    let authority_key = ed25519_verification_key(signer.public_key())?;
    let mut root = OwnerRoot {
        format_version: OWNER_ROOT_FORMAT_VERSION,
        owner_id: Vec::new(),
        account_uuid: account_uuid.to_vec(),
        authority_key: Some(authority_key),
        recovery_policy: Some(RecoveryPolicy {
            threshold: 0,
            guardians: Vec::new(),
            window_secs: None,
        }),
        claimable_deferred_human: true,
        nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
        claimable_until_unix_seconds,
    };
    root.owner_id = domain_digest(OWNER_ROOT_DOMAIN, &owner_root_without_id(&root)?).to_vec();
    let body = owner_root_body(&root)?;
    let authority_proof = sign_canonical(signer, OWNER_ROOT_DOMAIN, &body)?;
    let signed = SignedOwnerRoot {
        root: Some(root),
        authority_proof: Some(authority_proof),
        recovery_key_proofs: Vec::new(),
    };
    verify_owner_root(&signed).context("minted claimable owner root failed local verify")?;
    Ok(signed)
}

/// Establish a new server-rooted human account using its two dedicated keys.
/// The caller must persist both keys in that account's isolated custody before
/// committing the root. Existing accounts must replay their original root.
pub fn sign_custodial_owner_root(
    authority: &impl Signer,
    recovery: &impl Signer,
    account_uuid: [u8; 16],
    nonce: [u8; 32],
) -> Result<SignedOwnerRoot> {
    use api::heddle::api::v1alpha2::{RecoveryGuardian, RecoveryGuardianKind};
    if authority.public_key() == recovery.public_key() {
        bail!("custodial recovery requires a dedicated account guardian key");
    }
    let mut root = OwnerRoot {
        format_version: OWNER_ROOT_FORMAT_VERSION,
        account_uuid: account_uuid.to_vec(),
        authority_key: Some(ed25519_verification_key(authority.public_key())?),
        recovery_policy: Some(RecoveryPolicy {
            threshold: 1,
            guardians: vec![RecoveryGuardian {
                kind: RecoveryGuardianKind::Weft as i32,
                key: Some(ed25519_verification_key(recovery.public_key())?),
            }],
            window_secs: Some(DEFAULT_RECOVERY_WINDOW_SECS),
        }),
        nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
        ..Default::default()
    };
    root.owner_id = domain_digest(OWNER_ROOT_DOMAIN, &owner_root_without_id(&root)?).to_vec();
    let body = owner_root_body(&root)?;
    let signed = SignedOwnerRoot {
        root: Some(root),
        authority_proof: Some(sign_canonical(authority, OWNER_ROOT_DOMAIN, &body)?),
        recovery_key_proofs: vec![sign_canonical(recovery, OWNER_ROOT_DOMAIN, &body)?],
    };
    verify_owner_root(&signed).context("custodial owner root failed local verification")?;
    Ok(signed)
}

/// Bind an original server-rooted owner to its stable account, using the exact
/// nonce retained by the admitted signup ceremony. No host attestation is added.
pub fn sign_custodial_owner_binding(
    authority: &impl Signer,
    signed_root: &SignedOwnerRoot,
    challenge_nonce: [u8; 32],
) -> Result<OwnerKeyBinding> {
    let state = verify_owner_root(signed_root).context("verify original custodial root")?;
    let root = signed_root
        .root
        .as_ref()
        .context("custodial root has no body")?;
    if root.claimable_deferred_human || state.authority_key().public_key != authority.public_key() {
        bail!("custodial binding must use the original account authority");
    }
    let account: [u8; 16] = root
        .account_uuid
        .as_slice()
        .try_into()
        .context("owner account UUID")?;
    let mut binding = OwnerKeyBinding {
        format_version: OWNER_ROOT_FORMAT_VERSION,
        stable_owner_uuid: account.to_vec(),
        root_public_key: Some(ed25519_verification_key(authority.public_key())?),
        root_state_hash: state.state_hash().to_vec(),
        kind: OwnerKeyBindingKind::ServerRootedCustody as i32,
        binding_epoch: 1,
        challenge_nonce: challenge_nonce.to_vec(),
        root_proof_of_possession: None,
    };
    binding.root_proof_of_possession = Some(sign_canonical(
        authority,
        OWNER_BINDING_DOMAIN,
        &owner_binding_body(&binding)?,
    )?);
    verify_owner_key_binding(&binding, &state, &account)
        .context("custodial binding failed local verification")?;
    Ok(binding)
}

/// Browser proof material for a ClaimDeferredHuman transition.
///
/// Sequence-0 stays the agent key. The browser owns the next authority and
/// guardian private keys; this device receives only their public material and
/// signatures over the canonical transition body.
pub struct ClaimDeferredHuman<'a, C> {
    pub current_authority: &'a C,
    pub signed_root: &'a SignedOwnerRoot,
    pub next_authority_key: AuthorizationVerificationKey,
    pub next_authority_key_proof: AuthorizationSignature,
    pub next_recovery_policy: RecoveryPolicy,
    pub next_recovery_key_proofs: Vec<AuthorizationSignature>,
    pub valid_from_unix_seconds: i64,
    pub nonce: [u8; 32],
}

/// Co-sign ClaimDeferredHuman with the sequence-0 agent proof key.
///
/// The human authority and every next guardian proof are verified before the
/// agent key signs. The transition is rebuilt from the verified sequence-0
/// root, so browser-supplied owner ids, state hashes, or sequences never cross
/// this seam. The complete co-signed transition is then applied locally with
/// the shared verifier before it may be sent to weft.
pub fn sign_claim_deferred_human<C>(
    claim: ClaimDeferredHuman<'_, C>,
) -> Result<SignedOwnerKeyTransition>
where
    C: Signer,
{
    let state = verify_owner_root(claim.signed_root).context("verify claimable sequence-0 root")?;
    let root = claim
        .signed_root
        .root
        .as_ref()
        .context("signed owner root has no body")?;
    let current_key = root
        .authority_key
        .as_ref()
        .context("signed owner root has no authority")?;
    if current_key.public_key != claim.current_authority.public_key() {
        bail!("claim current authority is not the sequence-0 device/proof key");
    }
    if claim.next_authority_key.public_key == claim.current_authority.public_key() {
        bail!("claim next authority must be the human device root, not the agent key");
    }
    let transition = claim_deferred_human_transition(
        claim.signed_root,
        claim.next_authority_key,
        claim.next_recovery_policy,
        claim.valid_from_unix_seconds,
        claim.nonce,
    )?;
    let body = owner_key_transition_body(&transition)?;
    verify_browser_claim_proofs(
        &transition,
        &claim.next_authority_key_proof,
        &claim.next_recovery_key_proofs,
        &body,
    )?;
    let current_proof = sign_canonical(claim.current_authority, OWNER_TRANSITION_DOMAIN, &body)?;
    let signed = SignedOwnerKeyTransition {
        transition: Some(transition),
        authorizations: vec![current_proof],
        next_authority_key_proof: Some(claim.next_authority_key_proof),
        next_recovery_key_proofs: claim.next_recovery_key_proofs,
    };
    let limits = VerificationLimits::new(MAX_CAPABILITY_TTL_SECONDS)
        .context("construct claim transition verifier limits")?;
    apply_transition(&state, &signed, claim.valid_from_unix_seconds, limits)
        .context("minted ClaimDeferredHuman failed local verify")?;
    Ok(signed)
}

/// Co-sign an exact browser-produced account-claim proposal. The browser
/// remains the enrolling request signer; this function returns only the owner
/// transition and never submits registration or handles the browser private key.
pub fn sign_proposed_account_claim(
    current_authority: &impl Signer,
    signed_root: &SignedOwnerRoot,
    proposed: &SignedOwnerKeyTransition,
    registration_public_key: &[u8],
) -> Result<SignedOwnerKeyTransition> {
    if !proposed.authorizations.is_empty() {
        bail!("account claim proposal must not contain originating authorizations");
    }
    let transition = proposed
        .transition
        .as_ref()
        .context("account claim has no transition")?;
    let next = transition
        .next_authority_key
        .as_ref()
        .context("account claim has no next authority")?;
    if registration_public_key.len() != 32 || next.public_key != registration_public_key {
        bail!("account claim next authority must equal the browser registration key");
    }
    let policy = transition
        .next_recovery_policy
        .as_ref()
        .context("account claim has no recovery policy")?;
    let nonce = transition
        .nonce
        .as_slice()
        .try_into()
        .context("account claim nonce must contain 32 bytes")?;
    let expected = claim_deferred_human_transition(
        signed_root,
        next.clone(),
        policy.clone(),
        transition.valid_from_unix_seconds,
        nonce,
    )?;
    if transition != &expected {
        bail!("account claim must preserve the exact verified owner, previous state and sequence");
    }
    sign_claim_deferred_human(ClaimDeferredHuman {
        current_authority,
        signed_root,
        next_authority_key: next.clone(),
        next_authority_key_proof: proposed
            .next_authority_key_proof
            .clone()
            .context("account claim has no next authority proof")?,
        next_recovery_policy: policy.clone(),
        next_recovery_key_proofs: proposed.next_recovery_key_proofs.clone(),
        valid_from_unix_seconds: transition.valid_from_unix_seconds,
        nonce,
    })
}

/// Assemble the canonical sequence-0-to-human transition a browser signs.
///
/// The device calls the same builder again while co-signing; any browser body
/// that substituted the owner id, previous state hash, or sequence therefore
/// produces proofs that fail verification.
pub fn claim_deferred_human_transition(
    signed_root: &SignedOwnerRoot,
    next_authority_key: AuthorizationVerificationKey,
    next_recovery_policy: RecoveryPolicy,
    valid_from_unix_seconds: i64,
    nonce: [u8; 32],
) -> Result<OwnerKeyTransition> {
    let state = verify_owner_root(signed_root).context("verify claimable sequence-0 root")?;
    let root = signed_root
        .root
        .as_ref()
        .context("signed owner root has no body")?;
    if state.sequence() != 0 || !root.claimable_deferred_human {
        bail!("claim must bind to a claimable sequence-0 owner root");
    }
    if valid_from_unix_seconds <= 0 {
        bail!("claim clock must be a positive unix timestamp");
    }
    if valid_from_unix_seconds > root.claimable_until_unix_seconds {
        bail!("claim valid_from exceeds the sequence-0 claimable deadline");
    }
    Ok(OwnerKeyTransition {
        format_version: OWNER_ROOT_FORMAT_VERSION,
        owner_id: state.owner_id().to_vec(),
        previous_state_hash: state.state_hash().to_vec(),
        sequence: 1,
        kind: OwnerKeyTransitionKind::ClaimDeferredHuman as i32,
        next_authority_key: Some(next_authority_key),
        next_recovery_policy: Some(next_recovery_policy),
        valid_from_unix_seconds,
        previous_key_valid_until_unix_seconds: 0,
        nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
    })
}

/// Sequence-0 authority public key from a verified owner root.
pub fn seq0_authority_public_key(signed: &SignedOwnerRoot) -> Result<&[u8]> {
    let root = signed
        .root
        .as_ref()
        .context("signed owner root has no body")?;
    let key = root
        .authority_key
        .as_ref()
        .context("signed owner root has no authority")?;
    Ok(key.public_key.as_slice())
}

/// CreateSpool genesis owner public key.
pub fn genesis_owner_public_key(signed: &SignedSpoolOwnerGenesis) -> Result<&[u8]> {
    let genesis = signed
        .genesis
        .as_ref()
        .context("signed spool genesis has no body")?;
    let key = genesis
        .owner_public_key
        .as_ref()
        .context("signed spool genesis has no owner key")?;
    Ok(key.public_key.as_slice())
}

/// Nonce weft hashes as `registration_binding_nonce(client_operation_id)`.
pub fn registration_binding_nonce(client_operation_id: &str) -> [u8; 32] {
    Sha256::new()
        .chain_update(REGISTRATION_BINDING_NONCE_DOMAIN)
        .chain_update(client_operation_id.as_bytes())
        .finalize()
        .into()
}

/// Self-asserted AgentClaim binding of the claimable seq-0 root to the account UUID.
///
/// `challenge_nonce` is [`registration_binding_nonce`]. The proof must verify
/// with `verify_owner_key_binding` against the same root.
pub fn sign_agent_claim_binding(
    signer: &impl Signer,
    signed_root: &SignedOwnerRoot,
    client_operation_id: &str,
) -> Result<OwnerKeyBinding> {
    let state = verify_owner_root(signed_root).context("verify claimable sequence-0 root")?;
    let root = signed_root
        .root
        .as_ref()
        .context("signed owner root has no body")?;
    let account_uuid: [u8; 16] = root
        .account_uuid
        .as_slice()
        .try_into()
        .context("owner root account_uuid must be 16 bytes")?;
    if root
        .authority_key
        .as_ref()
        .is_none_or(|key| key.public_key != signer.public_key())
    {
        bail!("owner-key binding signer is not the sequence-0 device/proof key");
    }
    let mut binding = OwnerKeyBinding {
        format_version: OWNER_ROOT_FORMAT_VERSION,
        stable_owner_uuid: account_uuid.to_vec(),
        root_public_key: Some(ed25519_verification_key(signer.public_key())?),
        root_state_hash: state.state_hash().to_vec(),
        kind: OwnerKeyBindingKind::AgentClaim as i32,
        binding_epoch: 1,
        challenge_nonce: registration_binding_nonce(client_operation_id).to_vec(),
        root_proof_of_possession: None,
    };
    let body = owner_binding_body(&binding)?;
    binding.root_proof_of_possession = Some(sign_canonical(signer, OWNER_BINDING_DOMAIN, &body)?);
    verify_owner_key_binding(&binding, &state, &account_uuid)
        .context("minted AgentClaim binding failed local verify")?;
    Ok(binding)
}

/// Refuse CreateSpool genesis whose owner key is not the stored sequence-0 key.
pub fn require_genesis_matches_seq0(
    genesis: &SignedSpoolOwnerGenesis,
    seq0_public_key: &[u8],
) -> Result<()> {
    let verified =
        verify_spool_owner_genesis(genesis).context("verify CreateSpool owner genesis")?;
    if verified.owner_public_key().public_key != seq0_public_key {
        bail!(
            "CreateSpool genesis owner key does not match the account sequence-0 owner root; refusing to pin a different key"
        );
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Ed25519 verification key for a 32-byte public key.
pub fn ed25519_verification_key(
    public_key: &[u8],
) -> Result<AuthorizationVerificationKey, SignerError> {
    if public_key.len() != 32 {
        return Err(SignerError::InvalidKey(format!(
            "authorization public key must be 32 bytes, got {}",
            public_key.len()
        )));
    }
    Ok(AuthorizationVerificationKey {
        algorithm: AuthorizationKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519 as i32,
        public_key: public_key.to_vec(),
    })
}

/// SHA-256("heddle-key-v1" || algorithm || public_key).
pub fn authorization_key_id(key: &AuthorizationVerificationKey) -> [u8; 32] {
    let mut body = Vec::with_capacity(4 + key.public_key.len());
    body.extend_from_slice(&key.algorithm.to_be_bytes());
    body.extend_from_slice(&key.public_key);
    domain_digest(OWNER_KEY_ID_DOMAIN, &body)
}

/// Sign a domain-separated canonical body the way the verifier checks it.
pub fn sign_canonical(
    signer: &impl Signer,
    domain: &[u8],
    body: &[u8],
) -> Result<AuthorizationSignature, SignerError> {
    let key = ed25519_verification_key(signer.public_key())?;
    Ok(AuthorizationSignature {
        signer_key_id: authorization_key_id(&key).to_vec(),
        signature: signer.sign(&domain_digest(domain, body))?,
    })
}

const MAX_CAPABILITY_TTL_SECONDS: i64 = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60;

fn verify_browser_claim_proofs(
    transition: &OwnerKeyTransition,
    next_authority_key_proof: &AuthorizationSignature,
    next_recovery_key_proofs: &[AuthorizationSignature],
    body: &[u8],
) -> Result<()> {
    verify_canonical_signature(
        transition
            .next_authority_key
            .as_ref()
            .context("transition has no next authority key")?,
        next_authority_key_proof,
        OWNER_TRANSITION_DOMAIN,
        body,
    )
    .context("verify browser human authority proof")?;
    let policy = transition
        .next_recovery_policy
        .as_ref()
        .context("transition has no next recovery policy")?;
    if next_recovery_key_proofs.len() != policy.guardians.len() {
        bail!(
            "claim guardian proof count {} does not match next recovery policy {}",
            next_recovery_key_proofs.len(),
            policy.guardians.len()
        );
    }
    for (guardian, proof) in policy.guardians.iter().zip(next_recovery_key_proofs) {
        verify_canonical_signature(
            guardian
                .key
                .as_ref()
                .context("next recovery guardian has no key")?,
            proof,
            OWNER_TRANSITION_DOMAIN,
            body,
        )
        .context("verify browser next guardian proof")?;
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn verify_canonical_signature(
    key: &AuthorizationVerificationKey,
    proof: &AuthorizationSignature,
    domain: &[u8],
    body: &[u8],
) -> Result<()> {
    if key.algorithm != AuthorizationKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519 as i32 {
        bail!("claim proof key must use Ed25519");
    }
    if proof.signer_key_id != authorization_key_id(key) {
        bail!("claim proof signer key id does not match its public key");
    }
    verify_payload_signature(
        &domain_digest(domain, body),
        "ed25519",
        &key.public_key,
        &proof.signature,
    )
    .context("claim proof signature is invalid")
}

fn domain_digest(domain: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
    Sha256::new()
        .chain_update(domain)
        .chain_update(body)
        .finalize()
        .into()
}

struct Encoder {
    bytes: Vec<u8>,
}

impl Encoder {
    const fn new() -> Self {
        Self { bytes: Vec::new() }
    }

    fn finish(self) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.bytes
    }

    fn raw(&mut self, value: &[u8]) {
        self.bytes.extend_from_slice(value);
    }

    fn bool(&mut self, value: bool) {
        self.bytes.push(u8::from(value));
    }

    fn u32(&mut self, value: u32) {
        self.bytes.extend_from_slice(&value.to_be_bytes());
    }

    fn i32(&mut self, value: i32) {
        self.bytes.extend_from_slice(&value.to_be_bytes());
    }

    fn u64(&mut self, value: u64) {
        self.bytes.extend_from_slice(&value.to_be_bytes());
    }

    fn i64(&mut self, value: i64) {
        self.bytes.extend_from_slice(&value.to_be_bytes());
    }

    fn bytes(&mut self, value: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
        let len = u32::try_from(value.len()).context("canonical collection exceeds u32 length")?;
        self.u32(len);
        self.raw(value);
        Ok(())
    }
}

fn verification_key(encoder: &mut Encoder, key: &AuthorizationVerificationKey) -> Result<()> {
    encoder.i32(key.algorithm);
    encoder.bytes(&key.public_key)
}

fn guardian(
    encoder: &mut Encoder,
    guardian: &api::heddle::api::v1alpha2::RecoveryGuardian,
) -> Result<()> {
    encoder.i32(guardian.kind);
    let key = guardian
        .key
        .as_ref()
        .context("recovery guardian has no key")?;
    verification_key(encoder, key)
}

fn recovery_policy(encoder: &mut Encoder, policy: &RecoveryPolicy) -> Result<()> {
    let ids = policy
        .guardians
        .iter()
        .map(|value| {
            value
                .key
                .as_ref()
                .map(authorization_key_id)
                .unwrap_or([0; 32])
        })
        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
    if ids.windows(2).any(|pair| pair[0] >= pair[1]) {
        bail!("recovery guardians are not unique and sorted by key id");
    }
    encoder.u32(policy.threshold);
    encoder
        .u32(u32::try_from(policy.guardians.len()).context("guardian count exceeds u32 length")?);
    for value in &policy.guardians {
        guardian(encoder, value)?;
    }
    encoder.u64(policy.window_secs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_RECOVERY_WINDOW_SECS));
    Ok(())
}

fn owner_binding_body(binding: &OwnerKeyBinding) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut encoder = Encoder::new();
    encoder.u32(binding.format_version);
    encoder.bytes(&binding.stable_owner_uuid)?;
    verification_key(
        &mut encoder,
        binding
            .root_public_key
            .as_ref()
            .context("OwnerKeyBinding.root_public_key")?,
    )?;
    encoder.bytes(&binding.root_state_hash)?;
    encoder.i32(binding.kind);
    encoder.u64(binding.binding_epoch);
    encoder.bytes(&binding.challenge_nonce)?;
    Ok(encoder.finish())
}

fn owner_root_without_id(root: &OwnerRoot) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut encoder = Encoder::new();
    encoder.u32(root.format_version);
    encoder.bytes(&root.account_uuid)?;
    verification_key(
        &mut encoder,
        root.authority_key
            .as_ref()
            .context("OwnerRoot.authority_key")?,
    )?;
    recovery_policy(
        &mut encoder,
        root.recovery_policy
            .as_ref()
            .context("OwnerRoot.recovery_policy")?,
    )?;
    encoder.bool(root.claimable_deferred_human);
    encoder.bytes(&root.nonce)?;
    encoder.i64(root.claimable_until_unix_seconds);
    Ok(encoder.finish())
}

fn owner_root_body(root: &OwnerRoot) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut encoder = Encoder::new();
    encoder.u32(root.format_version);
    encoder.bytes(&root.owner_id)?;
    encoder.bytes(&root.account_uuid)?;
    verification_key(
        &mut encoder,
        root.authority_key
            .as_ref()
            .context("OwnerRoot.authority_key")?,
    )?;
    recovery_policy(
        &mut encoder,
        root.recovery_policy
            .as_ref()
            .context("OwnerRoot.recovery_policy")?,
    )?;
    encoder.bool(root.claimable_deferred_human);
    encoder.bytes(&root.nonce)?;
    encoder.i64(root.claimable_until_unix_seconds);
    Ok(encoder.finish())
}

/// Canonical transition body signed by owner authorities and recovery keys.
///
/// The field order and counted byte encoding are shared with tapestry's
/// `transitionBody` and weft's owner-transition verifier.
pub fn owner_key_transition_body(transition: &OwnerKeyTransition) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut encoder = Encoder::new();
    encoder.u32(transition.format_version);
    encoder.bytes(&transition.owner_id)?;
    encoder.bytes(&transition.previous_state_hash)?;
    encoder.u64(transition.sequence);
    encoder.i32(transition.kind);
    verification_key(
        &mut encoder,
        transition
            .next_authority_key
            .as_ref()
            .context("OwnerKeyTransition.next_authority_key")?,
    )?;
    recovery_policy(
        &mut encoder,
        transition
            .next_recovery_policy
            .as_ref()
            .context("OwnerKeyTransition.next_recovery_policy")?,
    )?;
    encoder.i64(transition.valid_from_unix_seconds);
    encoder.i64(transition.previous_key_valid_until_unix_seconds);
    encoder.bytes(&transition.nonce)?;
    Ok(encoder.finish())
}

/// Issue spool genesis only with the authority active in the verified owner
/// history. Transport possession alone does not establish owner-key authority.
pub fn sign_current_spool_owner_genesis(
    signer: &impl Signer,
    spool_uuid: uuid::Uuid,
    observed: &api::heddle::api::v1alpha2::OwnerState,
    now_unix_seconds: i64,
) -> Result<SignedSpoolOwnerGenesis> {
    if spool_uuid.is_nil() {
        bail!("spool identity must not be nil");
    }
    let verified = verify_observed_owner(observed, now_unix_seconds)?;
    if verified.authority_key().public_key != signer.public_key() {
        bail!(
            "spool creation needs the current owner authority signer; this device proof key is not that authority"
        );
    }
    Ok(sign_spool_owner_genesis(signer, *spool_uuid.as_bytes())?)
}

fn verify_observed_owner(
    observed: &api::heddle::api::v1alpha2::OwnerState,
    now_unix_seconds: i64,
) -> Result<heddleco_capability_verifier::VerifiedOwnerState> {
    let owner = observed
        .owner
        .as_ref()
        .context("owner identity is required")?;
    let account = uuid::Uuid::parse_str(&owner.id).context("owner account must be a UUID")?;
    let signed_root = observed
        .root
        .as_ref()
        .context("signed owner root is required")?;
    if account.is_nil()
        || signed_root
            .root
            .as_ref()
            .context("owner root body missing")?
            .account_uuid
            != account.as_bytes()
    {
        bail!("owner account differs from the signed root");
    }
    if observed.accepted_transitions.len() > VerificationLimits::MAX_TRANSITIONS {
        bail!("owner transition history exceeds the verification bound");
    }
    let limits = VerificationLimits::new(30 * 24 * 60 * 60)?;
    let mut verified = verify_owner_root(signed_root).context("verify owner root")?;
    for transition in &observed.accepted_transitions {
        verified = heddleco_capability_verifier::apply_accepted_transition(
            &verified,
            transition,
            now_unix_seconds,
            limits,
        )
        .context("verify accepted owner transition")?;
    }
    if observed.version != verified.state_hash() {
        bail!("observed owner version differs from verified current authority");
    }
    Ok(verified)
}

/// Verify an account observation's original binding and exact accepted state.
/// The caller still establishes which account is expected for its request.
struct OwnerObservationCache {
    second: i64,
    owners: std::collections::BTreeMap<[u8; 32], heddleco_capability_verifier::VerifiedOwnerState>,
}
static OWNER_OBSERVATION_CACHE: std::sync::OnceLock<std::sync::Mutex<OwnerObservationCache>> =
    std::sync::OnceLock::new();

pub fn owner_observation_cache_entries() -> Result<usize> {
    let Some(cache) = OWNER_OBSERVATION_CACHE.get() else {
        return Ok(0);
    };
    Ok(cache
        .lock()
        .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("owner verification cache poisoned"))?
        .owners
        .len())
}

/// Memoize only identical pure verifier inputs. Current revocations, resource
/// scope and request caveats remain separate uncached admission checks.
pub fn verify_account_owner_observation(
    observed: &api::heddle::api::v1alpha2::OwnerState,
    now_unix_seconds: i64,
) -> Result<heddleco_capability_verifier::VerifiedOwnerState> {
    use prost::Message as _;
    let cache = OWNER_OBSERVATION_CACHE.get_or_init(|| {
        std::sync::Mutex::new(OwnerObservationCache {
            second: i64::MIN,
            owners: Default::default(),
        })
    });
    let encoded = observed.encode_to_vec();
    if encoded.len() > 64 * 1024 {
        return verify_account_owner_observation_uncached(observed, now_unix_seconds);
    }
    let digest = *blake3::hash(&encoded).as_bytes();
    {
        let guard = cache
            .lock()
            .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("owner verification cache poisoned"))?;
        if guard.second == now_unix_seconds
            && let Some(verified) = guard.owners.get(&digest)
        {
            return Ok(verified.clone());
        }
    }
    let verified = verify_account_owner_observation_uncached(observed, now_unix_seconds)?;
    let mut guard = cache
        .lock()
        .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("owner verification cache poisoned"))?;
    if guard.second != now_unix_seconds {
        guard.owners.clear();
        guard.second = now_unix_seconds;
    }
    if guard.owners.len() < 128 {
        guard.owners.insert(digest, verified.clone());
    }
    Ok(verified)
}

fn verify_account_owner_observation_uncached(
    observed: &api::heddle::api::v1alpha2::OwnerState,
    now_unix_seconds: i64,
) -> Result<heddleco_capability_verifier::VerifiedOwnerState> {
    let current = verify_observed_owner(observed, now_unix_seconds)?;
    let root = current.signed_root();
    let initial = verify_owner_root(root)?;
    let account: [u8; 16] = root
        .root
        .as_ref()
        .context("owner root body missing")?
        .account_uuid
        .as_slice()
        .try_into()
        .context("owner account UUID must be 16 bytes")?;
    heddleco_capability_verifier::verify_owner_key_binding(
        observed
            .binding
            .as_ref()
            .context("original owner binding missing")?,
        &initial,
        &account,
    )?;
    Ok(current)
}

/// Verify portable immutable resource ownership before source materialization.
/// Current account authority and historical transfer witnesses must agree; a
/// host observation alone cannot establish or replace an owner root.
pub fn verify_spool_owner_observation(
    genesis: &SignedSpoolOwnerGenesis,
    observed: &api::heddle::api::v1alpha2::OwnerState,
    spool_uuid: uuid::Uuid,
    now_unix_seconds: i64,
) -> Result<heddleco_capability_verifier::VerifiedCloneKeyring> {
    if spool_uuid.is_nil() {
        bail!("spool identity must not be nil");
    }
    let current = verify_observed_owner(observed, now_unix_seconds)?;
    let keyring = observed
        .resource_keyring
        .as_ref()
        .context("resource ownership keyring is required")?;
    if keyring.spool_uuid != spool_uuid.as_bytes()
        || keyring.owner_genesis.as_ref() != Some(genesis)
    {
        bail!("resource keyring differs from the fetched spool genesis");
    }
    let verified = heddleco_capability_verifier::verify_clone_keyring(
        keyring.clone(),
        now_unix_seconds,
        VerificationLimits::new(30 * 24 * 60 * 60)?,
        &[],
    )
    .context("verify complete spool ownership history")?;
    let account = uuid::Uuid::parse_str(&observed.owner.as_ref().context("owner required")?.id)?;
    if verified.current_owner_uuid() != *account.as_bytes() {
        bail!("observed owner is not the current resource owner");
    }
    let (historical_root, transitions) = if let Some(last) = keyring.ownership_transfers.last() {
        let handoff = last
            .transfer
            .as_ref()
            .and_then(|value| value.acceptance.as_ref())
            .and_then(|value| value.signed_handoff.as_ref())
            .and_then(|value| value.handoff.as_ref())
            .context("verified transfer handoff missing")?;
        let witness = keyring
            .transfer_owner_histories
            .iter()
            .find(|history| {
                history.state_hash == handoff.destination_owner_key_state_hash
                    && history
                        .root
                        .as_ref()
                        .and_then(|signed| signed.root.as_ref())
                        .is_some_and(|root| root.account_uuid == account.as_bytes())
            })
            .context("current resource owner history is missing")?;
        (witness.root.as_ref(), &witness.accepted_transitions)
    } else {
        (keyring.owner_root.as_ref(), &keyring.accepted_transitions)
    };
    if historical_root != Some(current.signed_root())
        || !observed.accepted_transitions.starts_with(transitions)
    {
        bail!("current owner authority does not descend from the resource ownership proof");
    }
    Ok(verified)
}