hashtree-lmdb 0.2.91

use crate::{managed_env::ManagedEnv, map_heed_error};
use hashtree_core::store::StoreError;
use hashtree_core::types::Hash;
use heed::types::Bytes;
use heed::{Database, EnvFlags, EnvOpenOptions};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

// The audit retains independent source-reconciliation and target-body proof
// B-trees. At the 4 GiB reusable-evidence bound, each can contain roughly
// 107 million hash/size rows; 32 GiB leaves room for both trees plus LMDB page
// split overhead. This is a virtual address-space cap and grows on demand.
const AUDIT_MAP_SIZE: usize = 32 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
// The fourth named DB quarantines target evidence until the complete external
// manifest has been authenticated. Keep one spare so older environments can
// still fail on their authority binding rather than MDB_DBS_FULL.
const AUDIT_DATABASE_COUNT: u32 = 5;
const BINDING_KEY: &[u8] = b"authority-binding-v1";
const TARGET_CURSOR_KEY: &[u8] = b"target-catalog-cursor-v1";
const TARGET_FENCE_BINDING_KEY: &[u8] = b"target-fence-binding-v1";
const TARGET_IMPORT_STAGING_AUTHORITY_KEY: &[u8] = b"target-import-staging-authority-v1";
const TARGET_IMPORT_AUTHENTICATED_KEY: &[u8] = b"target-import-authenticated-v1";
const TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTION_CURSOR_KEY: &[u8] = b"target-import-promotion-cursor-v1";
const TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTED_KEY: &[u8] = b"target-import-promoted-v1";

/// Exact summary of a durable online migration verified set.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PoolMigrationAuditSummary {
    pub entries: u64,
    pub bytes: u64,
    pub content_sha256: Hash,
}

/// Durable, provenance-separated source reconciliation and target body proofs.
///
/// A source entry means root independently observed the exact source key and a
/// terminal `Stored` target catalog location whose catalog supplied the size.
/// It is not a source-body or target-body proof. A target entry means the
/// target body was independently hash-verified. The root controller owns the
/// writable instance. Workers open it read-only.
pub struct PoolMigrationAuditStore {
    path: PathBuf,
    env: ManagedEnv,
    source_reconciled: Database<Bytes, Bytes>,
    target_verified: Database<Bytes, Bytes>,
    target_import_staging: Database<Bytes, Bytes>,
    metadata: Database<Bytes, Bytes>,
    binding: Hash,
    writable: bool,
}

impl PoolMigrationAuditStore {
    pub fn open(path: &Path, binding: Hash) -> Result<Self, StoreError> {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(path).map_err(StoreError::Io)?;
        let mut options = EnvOpenOptions::new();
        options
            .map_size(AUDIT_MAP_SIZE)
            .max_dbs(AUDIT_DATABASE_COUNT);
        let env = unsafe { ManagedEnv::open(&options, path) }.map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let mut wtxn = env.write_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let source_reconciled = env
            .create_database(&mut wtxn, Some("source_reconciled"))
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let target_verified = env
            .create_database(&mut wtxn, Some("target_verified"))
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let target_import_staging = env
            .create_database(&mut wtxn, Some("target_import_staging"))
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let metadata = env
            .create_database(&mut wtxn, Some("metadata"))
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        match metadata.get(&wtxn, BINDING_KEY).map_err(map_heed_error)? {
            Some(actual) if actual != binding => {
                return Err(StoreError::Other(
                    "online migration audit store belongs to a different authority binding".into(),
                ))
            }
            Some(_) => {}
            None => metadata
                .put(&mut wtxn, BINDING_KEY, binding.as_slice())
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?,
        }
        wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        env.force_sync().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        Ok(Self {
            path: path.to_path_buf(),
            env,
            source_reconciled,
            target_verified,
            target_import_staging,
            metadata,
            binding,
            writable: true,
        })
    }

    pub fn open_read_only(path: &Path, binding: Hash) -> Result<Self, StoreError> {
        let mut options = EnvOpenOptions::new();
        options.max_dbs(AUDIT_DATABASE_COUNT);
        unsafe {
            options.flags(EnvFlags::READ_ONLY | EnvFlags::NO_READ_AHEAD);
        }
        let env = unsafe { ManagedEnv::open(&options, path) }.map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let rtxn = env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let source_reconciled = env
            .open_database(&rtxn, Some("source_reconciled"))
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .ok_or_else(|| {
                StoreError::Other(
                    "online migration source reconciliation database is missing".into(),
                )
            })?;
        let target_verified = env
            .open_database(&rtxn, Some("target_verified"))
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .ok_or_else(|| {
                StoreError::Other("online migration target audit database is missing".into())
            })?;
        let target_import_staging = env
            .open_database(&rtxn, Some("target_import_staging"))
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .ok_or_else(|| {
                StoreError::Other(
                    "online migration target import staging database is missing".into(),
                )
            })?;
        let metadata = env
            .open_database(&rtxn, Some("metadata"))
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .ok_or_else(|| {
                StoreError::Other("online migration audit metadata database is missing".into())
            })?;
        let actual = metadata
            .get(&rtxn, BINDING_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .ok_or_else(|| {
                StoreError::Other("online migration audit lost its authority binding".into())
            })?;
        if actual != binding {
            return Err(StoreError::Other(
                "online migration audit store belongs to a different authority binding".into(),
            ));
        }
        rtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        Ok(Self {
            path: path.to_path_buf(),
            env,
            source_reconciled,
            target_verified,
            target_import_staging,
            metadata,
            binding,
            writable: false,
        })
    }

    pub fn path(&self) -> &Path {
        &self.path
    }

    pub fn binding(&self) -> Hash {
        self.binding
    }

    /// Return whether each sorted source candidate already has an exact
    /// durable hash/size reconciliation. A conflicting size is corruption,
    /// never a cache miss.
    pub fn contains_source_reconciled_exact_sorted(
        &self,
        candidates: &[(Hash, u64)],
    ) -> Result<Vec<bool>, StoreError> {
        self.contains_exact_sorted_in(self.source_reconciled, candidates, "source reconciliation")
    }

    pub fn contains_target_exact_sorted(
        &self,
        candidates: &[(Hash, u64)],
    ) -> Result<Vec<bool>, StoreError> {
        self.contains_exact_sorted_in(self.target_verified, candidates, "target")
    }

    /// Root-commit exact source-to-target catalog reconciliations.
    ///
    /// These entries deliberately do not enter `target_verified`: the
    /// exhaustive target audit must still read and hash every target body.
    pub fn record_reconciled_source(&self, entries: &[(Hash, u64)]) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        self.require_writable()?;
        require_sorted_candidates(entries)?;
        if entries.is_empty() {
            return Ok(());
        }
        let mut wtxn = self.env.write_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.put_verified_txn(
            &mut wtxn,
            self.source_reconciled,
            entries,
            "source reconciliation",
        )?;
        wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.env.force_sync().map_err(map_heed_error)
    }

    /// Start or resume the target-fenced certification epoch. Existing
    /// hash/size body proofs remain valid under Pool's content-addressed,
    /// non-replacing write contract. The raw catalog cursor is reset on the
    /// first transition so every final catalog row is revisited under the
    /// exact held fence.
    pub fn begin_target_fenced_epoch(&self, fence_binding: Hash) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        self.require_writable()?;
        let mut wtxn = self.env.write_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        match self
            .metadata
            .get(&wtxn, TARGET_FENCE_BINDING_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
        {
            Some(actual) if actual == fence_binding => {}
            Some(_) => {
                return Err(StoreError::Other(
                    "online migration target fence authority changed; use a new rollout".into(),
                ))
            }
            None => {
                self.metadata
                    .delete(&mut wtxn, TARGET_CURSOR_KEY)
                    .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
                self.metadata
                    .put(
                        &mut wtxn,
                        TARGET_FENCE_BINDING_KEY,
                        fence_binding.as_slice(),
                    )
                    .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            }
        }
        wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.env.force_sync().map_err(map_heed_error)
    }

    pub fn target_fence_binding(&self) -> Result<Option<Hash>, StoreError> {
        let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.metadata
            .get(&rtxn, TARGET_FENCE_BINDING_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .map(|bytes| {
                bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
                    StoreError::Other(
                        "online migration audit target fence binding has an invalid length".into(),
                    )
                })
            })
            .transpose()
    }

    /// Commit exact target content proofs and their raw catalog cursor in one
    /// force-synced transaction. The cursor can therefore never become
    /// durable ahead of the proofs that allowed it to advance.
    pub fn record_verified_target_page(
        &self,
        entries: &[(Hash, u64)],
        cursor: Hash,
    ) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        self.require_writable()?;
        require_sorted_candidates(entries)?;
        let mut wtxn = self.env.write_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.put_verified_txn(&mut wtxn, self.target_verified, entries, "target")?;
        self.metadata
            .put(&mut wtxn, TARGET_CURSOR_KEY, cursor.as_slice())
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.env.force_sync().map_err(map_heed_error)
    }

    /// Prepare a quarantined import bound to the complete certification and
    /// evidence authority. Returns `true` when the caller must rebuild the
    /// staging database, or `false` when an authenticated promotion can be
    /// resumed (or has already completed).
    ///
    /// Unauthenticated staging rows are never consulted by target queries or
    /// exports. A changed authority fails closed for the lifetime of this
    /// rollout-bound audit store.
    pub fn prepare_target_import(&self, authority: Hash) -> Result<bool, StoreError> {
        self.require_writable()?;
        let mut wtxn = self.env.write_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        if let Some(actual) = self
            .metadata
            .get(&wtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTED_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
        {
            require_exact_import_authority(actual, authority)?;
            wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            return Ok(false);
        }
        if let Some(actual) = self
            .metadata
            .get(&wtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_AUTHENTICATED_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
        {
            require_exact_import_authority(actual, authority)?;
            wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            return Ok(false);
        }
        self.target_import_staging
            .clear(&mut wtxn)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.metadata
            .delete(&mut wtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTION_CURSOR_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.metadata
            .put(
                &mut wtxn,
                TARGET_IMPORT_STAGING_AUTHORITY_KEY,
                authority.as_slice(),
            )
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.env.force_sync().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        Ok(true)
    }

    /// Append exact hash/size rows to the untrusted quarantine. This never
    /// changes the target proof set visible to migration workers.
    pub fn stage_target_import_entries(
        &self,
        authority: Hash,
        entries: &[(Hash, u64)],
    ) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        self.require_writable()?;
        require_sorted_candidates(entries)?;
        if entries.is_empty() {
            return Ok(());
        }
        let mut wtxn = self.env.write_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.require_staging_authority(&wtxn, authority)?;
        if self
            .metadata
            .get(&wtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_AUTHENTICATED_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .is_some()
        {
            return Err(StoreError::Other(
                "authenticated target import staging is immutable".into(),
            ));
        }
        self.put_verified_txn(
            &mut wtxn,
            self.target_import_staging,
            entries,
            "staged target import",
        )?;
        wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.env.force_sync().map_err(map_heed_error)
    }

    /// Make a completely validated staging database eligible for promotion.
    /// The caller may invoke this only after authenticated EOF and exact
    /// receipt-summary validation. The marker and all prior staging batches
    /// are ordered by force-synced LMDB commits.
    pub fn authenticate_target_import(&self, authority: Hash) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        self.require_writable()?;
        let mut wtxn = self.env.write_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.require_staging_authority(&wtxn, authority)?;
        match self
            .metadata
            .get(&wtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_AUTHENTICATED_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
        {
            Some(actual) => require_exact_import_authority(actual, authority)?,
            None => self
                .metadata
                .put(
                    &mut wtxn,
                    TARGET_IMPORT_AUTHENTICATED_KEY,
                    authority.as_slice(),
                )
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?,
        }
        wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.env.force_sync().map_err(map_heed_error)
    }

    /// Promote at most one authenticated staging batch into the visible proof
    /// set. Returns `true` once promotion and quarantine cleanup are durable.
    ///
    /// A crash can expose only a prefix whose complete source manifest was
    /// already authenticated. The promotion cursor and target writes share one
    /// LMDB transaction. Each promoted staging row is deleted in that same
    /// transaction, so promotion never needs a second full-size copy of the
    /// imported proof set. The authenticated marker makes destructive draining
    /// safe, while the cursor makes retries exact and idempotent.
    pub fn promote_authenticated_target_import_batch(
        &self,
        authority: Hash,
        batch_size: usize,
    ) -> Result<bool, StoreError> {
        self.require_writable()?;
        if batch_size == 0 {
            return Err(StoreError::Other(
                "target import promotion batch size must be non-zero".into(),
            ));
        }
        {
            let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            if let Some(actual) = self
                .metadata
                .get(&rtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTED_KEY)
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            {
                require_exact_import_authority(actual, authority)?;
                rtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
                return Ok(true);
            }
            require_exact_import_authority(
                self.metadata
                    .get(&rtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_AUTHENTICATED_KEY)
                    .map_err(map_heed_error)?
                    .ok_or_else(|| {
                        StoreError::Other(
                            "target import cannot promote before authenticated EOF".into(),
                        )
                    })?,
                authority,
            )?;
            rtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        }

        let cursor = {
            let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            let cursor: Option<Hash> = self
                .metadata
                .get(&rtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTION_CURSOR_KEY)
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?
                .map(|bytes| {
                    bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
                        StoreError::Other(
                            "target import promotion cursor has an invalid length".into(),
                        )
                    })
                })
                .transpose()?;
            rtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            cursor
        };
        let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(batch_size);
        if let Some(cursor) = cursor {
            use std::ops::Bound::{Excluded, Unbounded};
            let range = (Excluded(cursor.as_slice()), Unbounded);
            for item in self
                .target_import_staging
                .range(&rtxn, &range)
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?
                .take(batch_size)
            {
                let (hash, encoded) = item.map_err(map_heed_error)?;
                entries.push((
                    hash.try_into().map_err(|_| {
                        StoreError::Other(
                            "target import staging contains an invalid hash key".into(),
                        )
                    })?,
                    decode_size(encoded)?,
                ));
            }
        } else {
            for item in self
                .target_import_staging
                .iter(&rtxn)
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?
                .take(batch_size)
            {
                let (hash, encoded) = item.map_err(map_heed_error)?;
                entries.push((
                    hash.try_into().map_err(|_| {
                        StoreError::Other(
                            "target import staging contains an invalid hash key".into(),
                        )
                    })?,
                    decode_size(encoded)?,
                ));
            }
        }
        rtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;

        let mut wtxn = self.env.write_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.require_staging_authority(&wtxn, authority)?;
        require_exact_import_authority(
            self.metadata
                .get(&wtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_AUTHENTICATED_KEY)
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?
                .ok_or_else(|| {
                    StoreError::Other(
                        "target import authentication disappeared during promotion".into(),
                    )
                })?,
            authority,
        )?;
        if entries.is_empty() {
            self.target_import_staging
                .clear(&mut wtxn)
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            for key in [
                TARGET_IMPORT_STAGING_AUTHORITY_KEY,
                TARGET_IMPORT_AUTHENTICATED_KEY,
                TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTION_CURSOR_KEY,
            ] {
                self.metadata
                    .delete(&mut wtxn, key)
                    .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            }
            self.metadata
                .put(&mut wtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTED_KEY, authority.as_slice())
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        } else {
            self.put_verified_txn(
                &mut wtxn,
                self.target_verified,
                &entries,
                "promoted target import",
            )?;
            for (hash, _) in &entries {
                self.target_import_staging
                    .delete(&mut wtxn, hash.as_slice())
                    .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            }
            self.metadata
                .put(
                    &mut wtxn,
                    TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTION_CURSOR_KEY,
                    entries
                        .last()
                        .expect("nonempty target import batch")
                        .0
                        .as_slice(),
                )
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        }
        wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.env.force_sync().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        Ok(entries.is_empty())
    }

    pub fn promoted_target_import_authority(&self) -> Result<Option<Hash>, StoreError> {
        let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.metadata
            .get(&rtxn, TARGET_IMPORT_PROMOTED_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .map(|bytes| {
                bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
                    StoreError::Other(
                        "promoted target import authority has an invalid length".into(),
                    )
                })
            })
            .transpose()
    }

    pub fn target_cursor(&self) -> Result<Option<Hash>, StoreError> {
        let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.metadata
            .get(&rtxn, TARGET_CURSOR_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .map(|bytes| {
                bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
                    StoreError::Other(
                        "online migration audit target cursor has an invalid length".into(),
                    )
                })
            })
            .transpose()
    }

    pub fn reset_target_cursor(&self) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        self.require_writable()?;
        let mut wtxn = self.env.write_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.metadata
            .delete(&mut wtxn, TARGET_CURSOR_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        wtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        self.env.force_sync().map_err(map_heed_error)
    }

    /// Stream every reconciled source hash/size record in canonical order.
    pub fn for_each_source_reconciled_batch(
        &self,
        batch_size: usize,
        visit: impl FnMut(&[(Hash, u64)]) -> Result<(), StoreError>,
    ) -> Result<PoolMigrationAuditSummary, StoreError> {
        self.for_each_verified_batch_in(self.source_reconciled, batch_size, visit)
    }

    pub fn for_each_target_verified_batch(
        &self,
        batch_size: usize,
        visit: impl FnMut(&[(Hash, u64)]) -> Result<(), StoreError>,
    ) -> Result<PoolMigrationAuditSummary, StoreError> {
        self.for_each_verified_batch_in(self.target_verified, batch_size, visit)
    }

    fn for_each_verified_batch_in(
        &self,
        database: Database<Bytes, Bytes>,
        batch_size: usize,
        mut visit: impl FnMut(&[(Hash, u64)]) -> Result<(), StoreError>,
    ) -> Result<PoolMigrationAuditSummary, StoreError> {
        if batch_size == 0 {
            return Err(StoreError::Other(
                "online migration audit export batch size must be non-zero".into(),
            ));
        }
        let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
        hasher.update(b"hashtree-pool-migration-source-content/v3\0");
        let mut entries = 0u64;
        let mut bytes = 0u64;
        let mut batch = Vec::with_capacity(batch_size);
        for item in database.iter(&rtxn).map_err(map_heed_error)? {
            let (key, encoded) = item.map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            let hash: Hash = key.try_into().map_err(|_| {
                StoreError::Other("online migration audit contains an invalid hash key".into())
            })?;
            let size = decode_size(encoded)?;
            batch.push((hash, size));
            if batch.len() == batch_size {
                visit(&batch)?;
                batch.clear();
            }
            hasher.update(hash);
            hasher.update(size.to_be_bytes());
            entries = entries.checked_add(1).ok_or_else(|| {
                StoreError::Other("online migration audit entry count overflow".into())
            })?;
            bytes = bytes.checked_add(size).ok_or_else(|| {
                StoreError::Other("online migration audit byte count overflow".into())
            })?;
        }
        if !batch.is_empty() {
            visit(&batch)?;
        }
        rtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        Ok(PoolMigrationAuditSummary {
            entries,
            bytes,
            content_sha256: hasher.finalize().into(),
        })
    }

    /// Find the first source key not covered by this durable set.
    ///
    /// This scans only the authoritative raw blob keys. It never reads source
    /// values, metadata sizes, external file lengths, or payload bodies.
    pub fn first_unreconciled_source_key(
        &self,
        source: &crate::LmdbBlobReader,
        page_size: usize,
    ) -> Result<Option<Hash>, StoreError> {
        self.first_unreconciled_source_key_parallel(source, page_size, 1)
    }

    /// Find the first source key not covered by this durable set using an
    /// ordered, coherent-snapshot parallel raw-key scan.
    ///
    /// Only source keys are prefetched. LMDB values, metadata sizes, external
    /// file lengths, and payload bodies are never requested.
    pub fn first_unreconciled_source_key_parallel(
        &self,
        source: &crate::LmdbBlobReader,
        page_size: usize,
        concurrency: usize,
    ) -> Result<Option<Hash>, StoreError> {
        if page_size == 0 {
            return Err(StoreError::Other(
                "online migration audit coverage page size must be non-zero".into(),
            ));
        }
        let mut scanner = source.parallel_raw_key_scanner(None, concurrency)?;
        loop {
            let hashes = scanner.next_page(page_size)?;
            if hashes.is_empty() {
                return Ok(None);
            }
            let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
            for hash in &hashes {
                if self
                    .source_reconciled
                    .get(&rtxn, hash)
                    .map_err(map_heed_error)?
                    .is_none()
                {
                    return Ok(Some(*hash));
                }
            }
        }
    }

    pub fn validate_binding(&self) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        let actual = self
            .metadata
            .get(&rtxn, BINDING_KEY)
            .map_err(map_heed_error)?
            .ok_or_else(|| {
                StoreError::Other("online migration audit lost its authority binding".into())
            })?;
        if actual != self.binding {
            return Err(StoreError::Other(
                "online migration audit authority binding changed".into(),
            ));
        }
        rtxn.commit().map_err(map_heed_error)
    }

    fn contains_exact_sorted_in(
        &self,
        database: Database<Bytes, Bytes>,
        candidates: &[(Hash, u64)],
        proof_kind: &str,
    ) -> Result<Vec<bool>, StoreError> {
        require_sorted_candidates(candidates)?;
        let rtxn = self.env.read_txn().map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        candidates
            .iter()
            .map(|(hash, size)| {
                let Some(encoded) = database.get(&rtxn, hash).map_err(map_heed_error)? else {
                    return Ok(false);
                };
                let actual = decode_size(encoded)?;
                if actual != *size {
                    return Err(StoreError::Other(format!(
                        "online migration {proof_kind} audit size for {} changed from {actual} to {size}",
                        hashtree_core::to_hex(hash)
                    )));
                }
                Ok(true)
            })
            .collect()
    }

    fn put_verified_txn(
        &self,
        wtxn: &mut heed::RwTxn<'_>,
        database: Database<Bytes, Bytes>,
        entries: &[(Hash, u64)],
        proof_kind: &str,
    ) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        for (hash, size) in entries {
            if let Some(encoded) = database.get(wtxn, hash).map_err(map_heed_error)? {
                let actual = decode_size(encoded)?;
                if actual != *size {
                    return Err(StoreError::Other(format!(
                        "online migration {proof_kind} audit size for {} changed from {actual} to {size}",
                        hashtree_core::to_hex(hash)
                    )));
                }
                continue;
            }
            database
                .put(wtxn, hash, &size.to_be_bytes())
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?;
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    fn require_writable(&self) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        if !self.writable {
            return Err(StoreError::Other(
                "online migration audit store is read-only".into(),
            ));
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    fn require_staging_authority(
        &self,
        txn: &heed::RoTxn<'_>,
        authority: Hash,
    ) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
        require_exact_import_authority(
            self.metadata
                .get(txn, TARGET_IMPORT_STAGING_AUTHORITY_KEY)
                .map_err(map_heed_error)?
                .ok_or_else(|| {
                    StoreError::Other("target import staging has no authority".into())
                })?,
            authority,
        )
    }
}

fn require_exact_import_authority(actual: &[u8], expected: Hash) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
    if actual != expected {
        return Err(StoreError::Other(
            "target import authority changed; use a new rollout".into(),
        ));
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn require_sorted_candidates(candidates: &[(Hash, u64)]) -> Result<(), StoreError> {
    if candidates.windows(2).any(|pair| pair[0].0 >= pair[1].0) {
        return Err(StoreError::Other(
            "online migration audit candidates must be unique and strictly sorted".into(),
        ));
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn decode_size(encoded: &[u8]) -> Result<u64, StoreError> {
    let bytes: [u8; 8] = encoded.try_into().map_err(|_| {
        StoreError::Other("online migration audit contains an invalid size value".into())
    })?;
    Ok(u64::from_be_bytes(bytes))
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::{
        migrate_lmdb_hashes_with_max_buffer_bytes_and_authorizer, LmdbBlobReader, LmdbBlobStore,
        PoolMemberConfig, PoolStore, PoolStoreConfig,
    };
    use hashtree_core::sha256;

    #[test]
    fn verified_set_is_durable_exact_and_authority_bound() {
        let temp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temporary audit root");
        let path = temp.path().join("online-audit");
        let binding = sha256(b"rollout/source/pool authority");
        let first = sha256(b"first verified body");
        let second = sha256(b"second verified body");
        let mut entries = vec![(first, 19), (second, 20)];
        entries.sort_unstable_by_key(|(hash, _)| *hash);
        {
            let audit = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&path, binding).expect("create audit");
            audit
                .record_reconciled_source(&entries)
                .expect("record verified entries");
        }
        let audit = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&path, binding).expect("reopen audit");
        assert_eq!(
            audit
                .contains_source_reconciled_exact_sorted(&entries)
                .expect("query exact entries"),
            vec![true, true]
        );
        assert_eq!(
            audit
                .contains_target_exact_sorted(&entries)
                .expect("query target provenance"),
            vec![false, false]
        );
        audit
            .record_verified_target_page(&entries, entries.last().expect("last entry").0)
            .expect("record independent target-body proof");
        assert_eq!(
            audit
                .contains_target_exact_sorted(&entries)
                .expect("query independent target provenance"),
            vec![true, true]
        );
        assert!(audit
            .contains_source_reconciled_exact_sorted(&[(first, 18)])
            .expect_err("conflicting size must fail")
            .to_string()
            .contains("changed"));
        drop(audit);
        let error = match PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&path, sha256(b"different authority")) {
            Ok(_) => panic!("different authority must fail"),
            Err(error) => error,
        };
        assert!(error.to_string().contains("different authority"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn coverage_scan_reads_only_keys_and_finds_only_unreconciled_source() {
        let temp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temporary migration root");
        let source_path = temp.path().join("source");
        let source = LmdbBlobStore::new(&source_path).expect("create source");
        let first_body = b"first source body";
        let second_body = b"second source body";
        let first = sha256(first_body);
        let second = sha256(second_body);
        source
            .put_sync(first, first_body)
            .expect("put first source");
        source
            .put_sync(second, second_body)
            .expect("put second source");
        drop(source);
        let reader = LmdbBlobReader::open(&source_path, None).expect("open source reader");

        let audit = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(
            &temp.path().join("online-audit"),
            sha256(b"coverage authority"),
        )
        .expect("create online audit");
        audit
            .record_reconciled_source(&[(first, first_body.len() as u64)])
            .expect("record first source");
        assert_eq!(
            audit
                .first_unreconciled_source_key_parallel(&reader, 1, 4)
                .expect("scan coverage"),
            Some(second)
        );
        audit
            .record_reconciled_source(&[(second, second_body.len() as u64)])
            .expect("record second source");
        assert_eq!(
            audit
                .first_unreconciled_source_key_parallel(&reader, 1, 4)
                .expect("scan complete coverage"),
            None
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn durable_verified_set_resumes_real_explicit_pool_migration() {
        let temp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temporary migration root");
        let source_path = temp.path().join("source");
        let source = LmdbBlobStore::new(&source_path).expect("create source");
        let bodies = [
            b"online migration body zero".as_slice(),
            b"online migration body one".as_slice(),
            b"online migration body two".as_slice(),
        ];
        for body in bodies {
            source
                .put_sync(sha256(body), body)
                .expect("write source body");
        }
        source.force_sync().expect("sync source");
        drop(source);
        let source = LmdbBlobReader::open(&source_path, None).expect("open source reader");
        let hashes = source.scan_hashes_after(None, 16).expect("scan source");
        let sizes = source
            .sizes_for_sorted_hashes(&hashes)
            .expect("read source sizes");

        let pool = PoolStore::open(temp.path().join("catalog"), PoolStoreConfig::default())
            .expect("open target Pool");
        pool.add_member(PoolMemberConfig::new(
            temp.path().join("member"),
            64 * 1024 * 1024,
        ))
        .expect("add target member");
        let mut authorize = |_: Option<Hash>, _: usize| Ok(());
        let first = migrate_lmdb_hashes_with_max_buffer_bytes_and_authorizer(
            &source,
            &pool,
            &hashes[..2],
            None,
            usize::MAX,
            &mut authorize,
        )
        .expect("migrate first explicit page");
        pool.force_sync().expect("sync target");

        let audit_path = temp.path().join("online-audit");
        let binding = sha256(b"resumable real migration authority");
        let audit = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&audit_path, binding).expect("create audit");
        audit
            .record_reconciled_source(&first.verified_source_entries)
            .expect("record first verified page");
        drop(audit);

        let audit = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&audit_path, binding).expect("reopen audit");
        let entries = hashes
            .iter()
            .copied()
            .zip(sizes.iter().copied())
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        assert_eq!(
            audit
                .contains_source_reconciled_exact_sorted(&entries)
                .expect("query resumed coverage"),
            vec![true, true, false]
        );
        let resumed = migrate_lmdb_hashes_with_max_buffer_bytes_and_authorizer(
            &source,
            &pool,
            &hashes[2..],
            hashes.get(1).copied(),
            usize::MAX,
            &mut authorize,
        )
        .expect("resume only missing explicit body");
        pool.force_sync().expect("sync resumed target");
        audit
            .record_reconciled_source(&resumed.verified_source_entries)
            .expect("record resumed page");
        assert_eq!(
            audit
                .contains_source_reconciled_exact_sorted(&entries)
                .expect("query complete coverage"),
            vec![true, true, true]
        );
        assert_eq!(pool.stats().expect("target stats").count, 3);
    }

    #[test]
    fn target_fence_rescans_catalog_but_retains_root_verified_content_proofs() {
        let temp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temporary audit root");
        let path = temp.path().join("online-audit");
        let binding = sha256(b"root ledger authority");
        let pre_fence = sha256(b"pre-fence target");
        let fenced = sha256(b"fenced target");
        let root = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&path, binding).expect("create root ledger");
        root.record_reconciled_source(&[(pre_fence, 16)])
            .expect("record source reconciliation before target fence");
        assert_eq!(
            root.contains_target_exact_sorted(&[(pre_fence, 16)])
                .expect("query target proof before target audit"),
            vec![false]
        );
        root.record_verified_target_page(&[(pre_fence, 16)], pre_fence)
            .expect("record pre-fence target page");
        assert_eq!(
            root.contains_target_exact_sorted(&[(pre_fence, 16)])
                .expect("query pre-fence target proof"),
            vec![true]
        );
        assert_eq!(
            root.target_cursor().expect("read pre-fence cursor"),
            Some(pre_fence)
        );

        let fence = sha256(b"exact persistent mask authorities");
        root.begin_target_fenced_epoch(fence)
            .expect("begin target proof epoch");
        assert_eq!(
            root.target_cursor().expect("read reset target cursor"),
            None
        );
        root.record_verified_target_page(&[(fenced, 13)], fenced)
            .expect("record root target proof");
        drop(root);
        let worker =
            PoolMigrationAuditStore::open_read_only(&path, binding).expect("open worker ledger");
        assert_eq!(
            worker.target_fence_binding().expect("read fence"),
            Some(fence)
        );
        let mut target_entries = vec![(pre_fence, 16), (fenced, 13)];
        target_entries.sort_unstable_by_key(|(hash, _)| *hash);
        assert_eq!(
            worker
                .contains_target_exact_sorted(&target_entries)
                .expect("read exact target provenance"),
            vec![true, true]
        );
        assert!(worker
            .record_reconciled_source(&[(pre_fence, 16)])
            .expect_err("worker ledger writes must fail")
            .to_string()
            .contains("read-only"));
        drop(worker);
        let root = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&path, binding).expect("reopen root ledger");
        assert!(root
            .begin_target_fenced_epoch(sha256(b"changed masks"))
            .expect_err("fence authority change must fail closed")
            .to_string()
            .contains("changed"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn certified_target_import_is_quarantined_resumable_and_authority_bound() {
        let temp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temporary audit root");
        let mut entries = (0_u64..17)
            .map(|index| {
                let body = format!("prior target body {index}");
                (sha256(body.as_bytes()), body.len() as u64)
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        entries.sort_unstable_by_key(|(hash, _)| *hash);
        let promotion_batch_size = 4;
        let imported_path = temp.path().join("imported-audit");
        let binding = sha256(b"new source, binary, and parent-cert authority");
        let import_authority = sha256(b"exact certification plus evidence authority");
        let changed_authority = sha256(b"different certification authority");

        {
            let imported =
                PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&imported_path, binding).expect("create new audit");
            assert_eq!(
                imported.env.info().map_size,
                AUDIT_MAP_SIZE,
                "fresh audit must reserve capacity for both full proof trees"
            );
            assert!(imported
                .prepare_target_import(import_authority)
                .expect("prepare quarantine"));
            imported
                .stage_target_import_entries(import_authority, &entries[..3])
                .expect("stage unauthenticated prefix");
            assert_eq!(
                imported
                    .contains_target_exact_sorted(&entries)
                    .expect("query proof set before authenticated EOF"),
                vec![false; entries.len()],
                "unmarked staging must remain invisible"
            );
        }

        {
            let imported = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&imported_path, binding)
                .expect("reopen after pre-marker crash");
            assert!(imported
                .prepare_target_import(import_authority)
                .expect("discard untrusted prefix"));
            imported
                .stage_target_import_entries(import_authority, &entries)
                .expect("stage complete authenticated input");
            imported
                .authenticate_target_import(import_authority)
                .expect("publish authenticated marker");
        }

        {
            let imported = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&imported_path, binding)
                .expect("reopen after post-marker crash");
            assert!(!imported
                .prepare_target_import(import_authority)
                .expect("resume authenticated staging"));
            assert!(!imported
                .promote_authenticated_target_import_batch(import_authority, promotion_batch_size,)
                .expect("promote one production batch"));
            let rtxn = imported.env.read_txn().expect("read staged row count");
            assert_eq!(
                imported
                    .target_import_staging
                    .len(&rtxn)
                    .expect("count remaining staged rows"),
                (entries.len() - promotion_batch_size) as u64,
                "each promoted row must drain from staging in the same transaction"
            );
            assert_eq!(
                imported
                    .contains_target_exact_sorted(&entries)
                    .expect("query partially promoted proofs"),
                [
                    vec![true; promotion_batch_size],
                    vec![false; entries.len() - promotion_batch_size]
                ]
                .concat(),
                "only an authenticated prefix may become visible"
            );
        }

        let imported = PoolMigrationAuditStore::open(&imported_path, binding)
            .expect("reopen during promotion");
        assert_eq!(
            imported.env.info().map_size,
            AUDIT_MAP_SIZE,
            "reopened audit must retain the full proof-tree capacity"
        );
        let rtxn = imported
            .env
            .read_txn()
            .expect("read staged rows after reopen");
        assert_eq!(
            imported
                .target_import_staging
                .len(&rtxn)
                .expect("count staged rows after reopen"),
            (entries.len() - promotion_batch_size) as u64,
            "a crash/reopen must preserve the exact drained prefix"
        );
        drop(rtxn);
        while !imported
            .promote_authenticated_target_import_batch(import_authority, promotion_batch_size)
            .expect("resume exact idempotent promotion")
        {}
        let rtxn = imported
            .env
            .read_txn()
            .expect("read final staged row count");
        assert_eq!(
            imported
                .target_import_staging
                .len(&rtxn)
                .expect("count final staged rows"),
            0,
            "completed promotion must leave no duplicate staging tree"
        );
        drop(rtxn);
        assert_eq!(
            imported
                .promoted_target_import_authority()
                .expect("read durable import provenance"),
            Some(import_authority)
        );
        assert_eq!(
            imported
                .contains_target_exact_sorted(&entries)
                .expect("query promoted body proofs"),
            vec![true; entries.len()]
        );
        assert_eq!(
            imported.target_cursor().expect("query imported cursor"),
            None,
            "imported body evidence must not skip the new rollout's catalog scan"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            imported
                .contains_source_reconciled_exact_sorted(&entries)
                .expect("query source provenance"),
            vec![false; entries.len()],
            "target evidence must not become source reconciliation evidence"
        );
        assert!(imported
            .prepare_target_import(changed_authority)
            .expect_err("changed parent authority must fail closed")
            .to_string()
            .contains("authority changed"));
    }
}