hashiverse-lib 1.0.7-rc2

Core protocol library for Hashiverse — your open-source decentralized X/Twitter replacement.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
//! # Password-based authenticated encryption with multi-recipient key wrapping
//!
//! Symmetric encryption for data that must be readable by one *or more* passwords. Used
//! chiefly for at-rest protection of sensitive material (key lockers, encrypted
//! persistence) and for payloads where a small group of recipients needs shared access
//! without each receiving a copy.
//!
//! ## Construction
//!
//! 1. A random 32-byte *file key* is generated per encryption.
//! 2. The body (plaintext) is encrypted in-place with `ChaCha20Poly1305` using that file key
//!    and a fresh nonce — one authentication tag covers the whole body.
//! 3. For each recipient password, an Argon2id KDF produces a wrap key; the file key is
//!    then wrapped (AEAD-encrypted) under that wrap key with its own nonce and tag and
//!    appended to the header as a "slot".
//!
//! On decrypt, the caller's password is Argon2id-derived once and trial-decrypted against
//! each slot until one authenticates; the recovered file key unwraps the body. Tampering
//! anywhere after the Argon2 header is caught by one of the two AEAD tag layers.
//!
//! ## Strong vs weak
//!
//! Both flavours use Argon2id / ChaCha20Poly1305 — they differ only in the memory cost of
//! the KDF (encoded into the header):
//!
//! - [`encrypt_strong`] — `m_cost = 19 MiB`. For private, sensitive-at-rest data. Expensive
//!   enough to resist offline brute-force of weak passphrases.
//! - [`encrypt_weak`] — `m_cost = 4 MiB`. For public-at-rest data where throughput matters
//!   more than passphrase resistance (the secret itself is typically high-entropy).
//!
//! [`decrypt`] reads the algorithm parameters from the header, so a single function
//! decrypts either flavour.
//!
//! ## DoS hardening
//!
//! The header parser rejects absurd Argon2 parameters (`m_cost > 256 MiB`, `t_cost > 16`,
//! `p_cost > 4`) and absurd recipient counts (`> MAX_RECIPIENTS`) *before* running the KDF,
//! so a crafted ciphertext can't make a peer burn gigabytes of RAM trying to validate it.

use anyhow::anyhow;
use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, AeadCore, AeadInPlace, KeyInit, OsRng};
use chacha20poly1305::{ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce};

const HEADER_FORMAT_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const HEADER_SIZE: usize = 15;
const MAX_RECIPIENTS: usize = 32;
const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 12;
const FILE_KEY_SIZE: usize = 32;
const WRAPPED_KEY_SIZE: usize = FILE_KEY_SIZE + 16; // 32 key bytes + 16 poly1305 tag
const RECIPIENT_SLOT_SIZE: usize = NONCE_SIZE + WRAPPED_KEY_SIZE; // 60 bytes per slot

/// Serialisable description of the Argon2 parameters used during encryption.
/// Written as a fixed 15-byte prefix so any future `decrypt` call can reconstruct the
/// exact hasher that was used.
///
/// Layout (all numeric fields big-endian):
///   [0]      format version  (u8)  – always 1
///   [1]      algorithm       (u8)  – 0=Argon2d, 1=Argon2i, 2=Argon2id
///   [2]      argon2 version  (u8)  – 16=V0x10,  19=V0x13
///   [3..7]   m_cost          (u32)
///   [7..11]  t_cost          (u32)
///  [11..15]  p_cost          (u32)
struct Argon2Config {
    algorithm: u8,
    version: u8,
    m_cost: u32,
    t_cost: u32,
    p_cost: u32,
}

impl Argon2Config {
    /// Strong encryption – for private / sensitive data.
    fn strong() -> Self {
        Self { algorithm: 2, version: 19, m_cost: 19 * 1024, t_cost: 2, p_cost: 1 }
    }

    /// Weak encryption – for public-at-rest data where speed matters more.
    fn weak() -> Self {
        Self { algorithm: 2, version: 19, m_cost: 4 * 1024, t_cost: 2, p_cost: 1 }
    }

    fn to_argon2(&self) -> anyhow::Result<argon2::Argon2<'static>> {
        let algorithm = match self.algorithm {
            0 => argon2::Algorithm::Argon2d,
            1 => argon2::Algorithm::Argon2i,
            2 => argon2::Algorithm::Argon2id,
            _ => anyhow::bail!("unknown argon2 algorithm byte: {}", self.algorithm),
        };
        let version = match self.version {
            16 => argon2::Version::V0x10,
            19 => argon2::Version::V0x13,
            _ => anyhow::bail!("unknown argon2 version byte: {}", self.version),
        };
        let params = argon2::Params::new(self.m_cost, self.t_cost, self.p_cost, None)
            .map_err(|e| anyhow!("argon2 params error: {}", e))?;
        Ok(argon2::Argon2::new(algorithm, version, params))
    }

    fn write_header_to(&self, out: &mut Vec<u8>) {
        out.push(HEADER_FORMAT_VERSION);
        out.push(self.algorithm);
        out.push(self.version);
        out.extend_from_slice(&self.m_cost.to_be_bytes());
        out.extend_from_slice(&self.t_cost.to_be_bytes());
        out.extend_from_slice(&self.p_cost.to_be_bytes());
    }

    fn from_header_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
        if bytes.len() < HEADER_SIZE {
            anyhow::bail!("ciphertext too short to contain argon2 header: {} < {}", bytes.len(), HEADER_SIZE);
        }
        if bytes[0] != HEADER_FORMAT_VERSION {
            anyhow::bail!("unknown argon2 header format version: {}", bytes[0]);
        }
        let m_cost = u32::from_be_bytes(bytes[3..7].try_into().map_err(|_| anyhow!("m_cost slice error"))?);
        let t_cost = u32::from_be_bytes(bytes[7..11].try_into().map_err(|_| anyhow!("t_cost slice error"))?);
        let p_cost = u32::from_be_bytes(bytes[11..15].try_into().map_err(|_| anyhow!("p_cost slice error"))?);

        // Reject unreasonable parameters that could cause OOM or CPU exhaustion.
        // Strong config uses m_cost=19456, t_cost=2, p_cost=1 — allow generous headroom.
        if m_cost > 256 * 1024 {
            anyhow::bail!("argon2 m_cost too large: {} (max 256 MiB)", m_cost);
        }
        if t_cost > 16 {
            anyhow::bail!("argon2 t_cost too large: {} (max 16)", t_cost);
        }
        if p_cost > 4 {
            anyhow::bail!("argon2 p_cost too large: {} (max 4)", p_cost);
        }

        Ok(Self { algorithm: bytes[1], version: bytes[2], m_cost, t_cost, p_cost })
    }
}

/// Derive a 32-byte ChaCha20Poly1305 key from `password` using the given argon2 instance.
fn derive_wrap_key(argon2: &argon2::Argon2, password: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<Key> {
    let mut key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
    argon2
        .hash_password_into(password, b"hashiverse-key-wrap", &mut key_bytes)
        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("key derivation error: {}", e))?;
    Ok(*Key::from_slice(&key_bytes))
}

fn encrypt_with_config(config: &Argon2Config, plaintext: &[u8], passwords: &[Vec<u8>]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
    if passwords.is_empty() {
        anyhow::bail!("at least one password required");
    }
    if passwords.len() > MAX_RECIPIENTS {
        anyhow::bail!("too many recipients: {} > {}", passwords.len(), MAX_RECIPIENTS);
    }

    let argon2 = config.to_argon2()?;
    let file_key = ChaCha20Poly1305::generate_key(&mut OsRng);

    let mut out = Vec::new();
    config.write_header_to(&mut out);
    out.push(passwords.len() as u8);

    // Wrap the file key for each recipient
    for password in passwords {
        let wrap_key = derive_wrap_key(&argon2, password)?;
        let wrap_nonce = ChaCha20Poly1305::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
        let wrapped = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&wrap_key)
            .encrypt(&wrap_nonce, file_key.as_slice())
            .map_err(|_| anyhow!("key wrap failed"))?;
        out.extend_from_slice(&wrap_nonce);
        out.extend_from_slice(&wrapped);
    }

    // Copy plaintext into out then encrypt in-place — no intermediate buffer
    let body_nonce = ChaCha20Poly1305::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
    out.extend_from_slice(&body_nonce);
    let plaintext_start = out.len();
    out.extend_from_slice(plaintext);
    let tag = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&file_key)
        .encrypt_in_place_detached(&body_nonce, b"", &mut out[plaintext_start..])
        .map_err(|_| anyhow!("body encryption failed"))?;
    out.extend_from_slice(&tag);

    Ok(out)
}

/// Strong encrypt data with one or more passwords – for private / sensitive data.
pub fn encrypt_strong(plaintext: &[u8], passwords: &[Vec<u8>]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
    encrypt_with_config(&Argon2Config::strong(), plaintext, passwords)
}

/// Weak encrypt data with one or more passwords - for public-at-rest data where speed matters more.
pub fn encrypt_weak(plaintext: &[u8], passwords: &[Vec<u8>]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
    encrypt_with_config(&Argon2Config::weak(), plaintext, passwords)
}

/// Decrypt ciphertext produced by `encrypt_strong` or `encrypt_weak` (or any future variant) using the associated password.
///
/// The argon2 parameters and recipient count are read from the prepended header.
pub fn decrypt(ciphertext: &[u8], password: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let config = Argon2Config::from_header_bytes(ciphertext)?;
    let argon2 = config.to_argon2()?;

    let mut pos = HEADER_SIZE;

    if ciphertext.len() <= pos {
        anyhow::bail!("ciphertext too short: missing recipient count");
    }
    let num_recipients = ciphertext[pos] as usize;
    pos += 1;

    if num_recipients == 0 || num_recipients > MAX_RECIPIENTS {
        anyhow::bail!("invalid recipient count: {}", num_recipients);
    }

    let recipients_end = pos + num_recipients * RECIPIENT_SLOT_SIZE;
    if ciphertext.len() < recipients_end + NONCE_SIZE + 16 {
        anyhow::bail!("ciphertext too short for claimed recipient count");
    }

    // Derive this password's wrap key and try each slot
    let wrap_key = derive_wrap_key(&argon2, password)?;
    let wrap_cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&wrap_key);

    let mut file_key: Option<Key> = None;
    for i in 0..num_recipients {
        let slot = pos + i * RECIPIENT_SLOT_SIZE;
        let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&ciphertext[slot..slot + NONCE_SIZE]);
        let wrapped = &ciphertext[slot + NONCE_SIZE..slot + RECIPIENT_SLOT_SIZE];
        if let Ok(key_bytes) = wrap_cipher.decrypt(nonce, wrapped) {
            file_key = Some(*Key::from_slice(&key_bytes));
            break;
        }
    }

    let file_key = file_key.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("password did not match any recipient"))?;

    let body_nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&ciphertext[recipients_end..recipients_end + NONCE_SIZE]);
    let body_ciphertext = &ciphertext[recipients_end + NONCE_SIZE..];

    ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&file_key)
        .decrypt(body_nonce, body_ciphertext)
        .map_err(|_| anyhow!("body decryption failed"))
}


#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use std::sync::Arc;
    use log::info;
    use crate::tools::encryption::*;

    #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
    extern crate wasm_bindgen_test;
    #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
    use wasm_bindgen_test::*;
    use crate::tools::time_provider::stop_watch::StopWatch;
    use crate::tools::time_provider::time_provider::RealTimeProvider;

    #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
    wasm_bindgen_test::wasm_bindgen_test_configure!(run_in_browser);

    #[cfg_attr(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")), tokio::test)]
    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen_test)]
    async fn test_multiple_encryption_strong() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        test_multiple_encryption(encrypt_strong).await
    }

    #[cfg_attr(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")), tokio::test)]
    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen_test)]
    async fn test_multiple_encryption_weak() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        test_multiple_encryption(encrypt_weak).await
    }

    type EncryptFn = fn(&[u8], &[Vec<u8>]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>>;

    async fn test_multiple_encryption(encrypt_fn: EncryptFn) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let plaintext = "Jimme was here and then some...".as_bytes();
        let passwords = vec!["alice".to_string().into_bytes(), "bob".to_string().into_bytes(), "charlie".to_string().into_bytes()];
        let encrypted = encrypt_fn(plaintext, &passwords)?;

        {
            let decrypted = decrypt(&encrypted, &passwords[0])?;
            assert_eq!(plaintext, &decrypted);
        }
        {
            let decrypted = decrypt(&encrypted, &passwords[1])?;
            assert_eq!(plaintext, &decrypted);
        }
        {
            let decrypted = decrypt(&encrypted, &passwords[2])?;
            assert_eq!(plaintext, &decrypted);
        }
        {
            assert!(decrypt(&encrypted, &"incorrect password".to_string().into_bytes()).is_err());
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    #[cfg_attr(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")), tokio::test)]
    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen_test)]
    async fn test_encryption_speeds() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        // configure_logging();

        let plaintext = "Jimme was here and then some...".as_bytes();
        let passwords = vec!["alice".to_string().into_bytes(), "bob".to_string().into_bytes(), "charlie".to_string().into_bytes()];
        let encrypted_strong = encrypt_strong(plaintext, &passwords)?;
        let encrypted_weak = encrypt_weak(plaintext, &passwords)?;
        assert_ne!(encrypted_strong, encrypted_weak, "weak and strong encryption should not be identical");

        const ITERATIONS: usize = 128;
        let time_provider = Arc::new(RealTimeProvider);

        let stopwatch_strong = StopWatch::new(time_provider.clone());
        for _ in 0..ITERATIONS {
            let decrypted = decrypt(&encrypted_strong, &passwords[0])?;
            assert_eq!(plaintext, &decrypted);
        }
        let elapsed_strong = stopwatch_strong.elapsed_time_millis();
        info!("Strong encryption took {}", elapsed_strong);

        let stopwatch_weak = StopWatch::new(time_provider.clone());
        for _ in 0..ITERATIONS {
            let decrypted = decrypt(&encrypted_weak, &passwords[0])?;
            assert_eq!(plaintext, &decrypted);
        }
        let elapsed_weak = stopwatch_weak.elapsed_time_millis();
        info!("Weak encryption took {}", elapsed_weak);

        assert!(elapsed_weak < elapsed_strong, "Weak encryption should be faster than strong encryption");

        Ok(())
    }

    #[cfg_attr(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")), tokio::test)]
    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen_test)]
    async fn test_zero_recipients_rejected() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let result = encrypt_weak(b"test", &[]);
        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("at least one password"));
        Ok(())
    }

    #[cfg_attr(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")), tokio::test)]
    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen_test)]
    async fn test_too_many_recipients_rejected() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let passwords: Vec<Vec<u8>> = (0..=MAX_RECIPIENTS).map(|i| format!("password{}", i).into_bytes()).collect();
        let result = encrypt_weak(b"test", &passwords);
        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("too many recipients"));
        Ok(())
    }

    #[cfg_attr(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")), tokio::test)]
    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen_test)]
    async fn test_max_recipients() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let plaintext = b"test";
        let passwords: Vec<Vec<u8>> = (0..MAX_RECIPIENTS).map(|i| format!("password{}", i).into_bytes()).collect();
        let encrypted = encrypt_weak(plaintext, &passwords)?;

        // Every password should decrypt successfully, including from the last slot
        for password in &passwords {
            let decrypted = decrypt(&encrypted, password)?;
            assert_eq!(plaintext, decrypted.as_slice());
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    #[cfg_attr(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")), tokio::test)]
    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen_test)]
    async fn test_nonce_uniqueness() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let plaintext = b"same plaintext every time";
        let passwords = vec![b"key".to_vec()];
        // Body nonce sits after: argon2 header (15) + num_recipients byte (1) + one recipient slot (60)
        let body_nonce_start = HEADER_SIZE + 1 + RECIPIENT_SLOT_SIZE;

        let mut seen_nonces = std::collections::HashSet::new();
        let mut seen_ciphertexts = std::collections::HashSet::new();
        for _ in 0..256 {
            let encrypted = encrypt_weak(plaintext, &passwords)?;
            let nonce = encrypted[body_nonce_start..body_nonce_start + NONCE_SIZE].to_vec();
            assert!(seen_nonces.insert(nonce), "body nonce was reused");
            assert!(seen_ciphertexts.insert(encrypted), "ciphertext was reused");
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    #[cfg_attr(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")), tokio::test)]
    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen_test)]
    async fn test_tamper_detection() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let plaintext = b"tamper me if you dare";
        let passwords = vec![b"key".to_vec()];
        let encrypted = encrypt_weak(plaintext, &passwords)?;

        // Flip every byte after the argon2 header and verify decryption always fails.
        // Recipient slots are protected by their own ChaCha20Poly1305 tag;
        // the body is protected by a second tag. Any single-byte corruption must be detected.
        for i in HEADER_SIZE..encrypted.len() {
            let mut tampered = encrypted.clone();
            tampered[i] ^= 0xff;
            assert!(decrypt(&tampered, &passwords[0]).is_err(), "tamper at byte {} was not detected", i);
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    #[cfg_attr(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")), tokio::test)]
    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen_test)]
    async fn test_dos_rejection() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        // A crafted ciphertext claiming too many recipients must be rejected
        // before any expensive crypto is attempted
        let mut crafted = vec![0u8; HEADER_SIZE + 1];
        crafted[0] = HEADER_FORMAT_VERSION;
        crafted[1] = 2; // Argon2id
        crafted[2] = 19; // V0x13
        crafted[3..7].copy_from_slice(&(4u32 * 1024).to_be_bytes()); // m_cost
        crafted[7..11].copy_from_slice(&2u32.to_be_bytes());          // t_cost
        crafted[11..15].copy_from_slice(&1u32.to_be_bytes());         // p_cost
        crafted[HEADER_SIZE] = (MAX_RECIPIENTS + 1) as u8;

        let result = decrypt(&crafted, b"any");
        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("invalid recipient count"));

        Ok(())
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_argon2_params_reject_excessive_m_cost() {
        let mut header = vec![0u8; HEADER_SIZE + 100];
        header[0] = HEADER_FORMAT_VERSION;
        header[1] = 2; // Argon2id
        header[2] = 19; // V0x13
        header[3..7].copy_from_slice(&(u32::MAX).to_be_bytes()); // absurd m_cost
        header[7..11].copy_from_slice(&2u32.to_be_bytes());
        header[11..15].copy_from_slice(&1u32.to_be_bytes());
        let result = decrypt(&header, b"any");
        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("m_cost too large"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_argon2_params_reject_excessive_t_cost() {
        let mut header = vec![0u8; HEADER_SIZE + 100];
        header[0] = HEADER_FORMAT_VERSION;
        header[1] = 2;
        header[2] = 19;
        header[3..7].copy_from_slice(&(4u32 * 1024).to_be_bytes());
        header[7..11].copy_from_slice(&1000u32.to_be_bytes()); // absurd t_cost
        header[11..15].copy_from_slice(&1u32.to_be_bytes());
        let result = decrypt(&header, b"any");
        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("t_cost too large"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_argon2_params_reject_excessive_p_cost() {
        let mut header = vec![0u8; HEADER_SIZE + 100];
        header[0] = HEADER_FORMAT_VERSION;
        header[1] = 2;
        header[2] = 19;
        header[3..7].copy_from_slice(&(4u32 * 1024).to_be_bytes());
        header[7..11].copy_from_slice(&2u32.to_be_bytes());
        header[11..15].copy_from_slice(&100u32.to_be_bytes()); // absurd p_cost
        let result = decrypt(&header, b"any");
        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("p_cost too large"));
    }
}