harn-stdlib 0.10.129

Embedded Harn standard library source catalog
Documentation
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// std/agent/judge_internals — private helpers shared by `std/agent/judge`
// (verify_completion + turn_end_condition) and `std/agent/step_judge`. NOT
// intended as a public surface: every export is prefixed `__judge_` and
// the file is excluded from the docs sweep. Keep shared judge plumbing here:
// LLM-option overrides, structured-output schema field names, the shared
// checkpoint-invocation preamble, and the "raw_verdict -> {vetoed, feedback}"
// classifier.
import { agent_typed_output_checkpoint } from "std/agent/primitives"
import { agent_emit_event } from "std/agent/state"

/**
 * Keys on `judge_cfg` that override `opts.llm_options` when present.
 * Listed once here so adding (or renaming) an LLM tuning knob is a
 * single-line change instead of a 2x sweep.
 */
const __JUDGE_LLM_OVERRIDE_KEYS = ["temperature", "max_tokens", "top_p", "tool_format", "effort"]

const __COMPLETION_JUDGE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 60000

const __COMPLETION_JUDGE_DEFAULT_DEADLINE_RESERVE_MS = 5000

pub type CompletionJudgeAdmission = {
  schema?: "harn.completion_judge_admission.v1",
  checkpoint_name?: string,
  admitted: bool,
  remaining_ms: int?,
  operation_budget_ms: int?,
  deadline_reserve_ms: int?,
  provider_timeout_ms?: int?,
  prompt_chars?: int,
  prompt_token_estimate?: int | float,
  outcome: string,
  duration_ms?: int | float,
}

pub type JudgeCheckpointRun = {
  checkpoint: dict,
  duration_ms: int | float,
  admission: CompletionJudgeAdmission,
}

pub type JudgeCheckpointRequest = {
  judge_cfg: dict,
  opts: dict,
  payload: dict,
  checkpoint_name: string,
  system: string,
  user: string,
  schema: dict,
}

/**
 * Open the completion-judge window. Paired with `__judge_emit_decision`, which
 * closes it.
 *
 * A judge call is a model round trip with no tool row and no streamed text, so
 * without this a host has nothing to show between the agent's last edit and the
 * verdict. Fires after the invocation cap but before deadline admission: a
 * refused admission therefore closes the window with an unavailable decision.
 *
 * @effects: [agent]
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 */
pub fn __judge_emit_started(
  agent: HarnessAgent,
  session_id: string,
  iteration: int,
  trigger: string?,
) -> nil {
  agent_emit_event(agent, session_id, "judge_started", {iteration: iteration, trigger: trigger})
  return nil
}

/**
 * Close the completion-judge window with its normalized host projection.
 *
 * @effects: [agent]
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 */
pub fn __judge_emit_decision(
  agent: HarnessAgent,
  session_id: string,
  iteration: int,
  verdict: dict,
) -> nil {
  agent_emit_event(
    agent,
    session_id,
    "judge_decision",
    {
      iteration: iteration,
      verdict: verdict?.verdict
        ?? if verdict.vetoed {
          "continue"
        } else {
          "done"
        },
      reasoning: verdict?.reasoning ?? "",
      next_step: verdict?.next_step ?? "",
      judge_duration_ms: verdict?.judge_duration_ms ?? 0,
      source: verdict?.source ?? "unknown",
      trigger: verdict?.trigger,
      reason: verdict?.reason,
      gap_class: verdict?.gap_class,
      confirm: verdict?.confirm ?? !verdict.vetoed,
      converted_from: verdict?.converted_from,
      escalation_recommended: verdict?.escalation_recommended,
      escalation_target: verdict?.escalation_target,
      judge_outcome: verdict?.judge_outcome,
      terminal_evidence_preserved: verdict?.terminal_evidence_preserved ?? false,
    },
  )
  return nil
}

/**
 * Pure completion-judge deadline admission core.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 */
pub fn __judge_completion_admission(
  now_ms: int,
  deadline_at_ms: int?,
  operation_budget_ms: int,
  reserve_ms: int,
) -> CompletionJudgeAdmission {
  const remaining_ms = if deadline_at_ms == nil {
    nil
  } else {
    to_int(deadline_at_ms) - to_int(now_ms)
  }
  const admitted = remaining_ms == nil
    || remaining_ms
      >= to_int(operation_budget_ms) + to_int(reserve_ms)
  return {
    admitted: admitted,
    remaining_ms: remaining_ms,
    operation_budget_ms: operation_budget_ms,
    deadline_reserve_ms: reserve_ms,
    outcome: if admitted {
      "admitted"
    } else {
      "deadline_budget_insufficient"
    },
  }
}

/**
 * Apply per-judge LLM overrides on top of an already-built `llm_opts`
 * dict. Mirrors the `for key in [...]` block that lived inline at both
 * call sites before v0.8.43.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 */
pub fn __judge_apply_llm_overrides(llm_opts: dict, judge_cfg: dict) -> dict {
  let out = llm_opts
  for key in __JUDGE_LLM_OVERRIDE_KEYS {
    if judge_cfg[key] != nil {
      out = out + {[key]: judge_cfg[key]}
    }
  }
  return out
}

/**
 * Shared checkpoint-invocation preamble for the completion (`std/agent/judge`)
 * and step (`std/agent/step_judge`) judges: build the per-judge `llm_opts`
 * (base `opts.llm_options` + model/provider/schema/session/system, then the
 * `__judge_apply_llm_overrides` tuning knobs) and time the named
 * `agent_typed_output_checkpoint` call. Returns `{checkpoint, duration_ms}`;
 * the callers keep their own divergent fail-open defaults and verdict shaping.
 *
 * @effects: [llm.call]
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 */
/**
 * The setting that names the model a judge grades with.
 *
 * One string, defined once, because it appears in the refusal a caller reads
 * and in the receipt a host inspects, and those two must not drift.
 */
const __JUDGE_MODEL_SETTING = "model"

/**
 * The catalog ladder that names one default judge model per provider family.
 *
 * Owned by the runtime model catalog, not by this module: volatile model
 * identity belongs in catalog source data, and policy code carries only the
 * stable role name.
 */
const __JUDGE_ROLE_LADDER = "judge"

/**
 * The provider family a judge grades in.
 *
 * The judge's own configured provider wins; otherwise the run's provider. This
 * is the ACTOR's provider, deliberately, and it is not the same thing as the
 * actor's model: a cheap judge from the same family is a real second opinion,
 * whereas the actor's own model asked its own question twice is not. When
 * neither is set, the provider inferred from the actor's model id is the last
 * resort; `model_info` returns nil rather than throwing for an unknown id.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __judge_provider_family(harness.llm, judge_cfg, opts)
 */
pub fn __judge_provider_family(llm: HarnessLlm, judge_cfg: dict, opts: dict) -> string? {
  const declared = trim(to_string(judge_cfg?.provider ?? opts?.provider ?? ""))
  if declared != "" {
    return declared
  }
  const actor_model = trim(to_string(opts?.model ?? ""))
  if actor_model == "" {
    return nil
  }
  const inferred = trim(to_string(llm.model_info(actor_model)?.provider ?? ""))
  if inferred == "" {
    return nil
  }
  return inferred
}

/**
 * The catalog's default judge model for one provider family, or `nil`.
 *
 * The `judge` ladder is a per-family table, not a fallback chain: resolution
 * matches the family and stops. Falling through to another provider's row
 * would dispatch a judge against a provider the caller never chose, and a
 * caller who set no key for it would read a credential error as a verdict.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __judge_catalog_role_model(harness.llm, "anthropic")
 */
pub fn __judge_catalog_role_model(llm: HarnessLlm, provider: string?) -> string? {
  if provider == nil || provider == "" {
    return nil
  }
  const ladder = llm.model_ladder(__JUDGE_ROLE_LADDER)
  for step in ladder?.steps ?? [] {
    if to_string(step?.provider ?? "") == provider {
      const model = trim(to_string(step?.model ?? ""))
      if model != "" {
        return model
      }
    }
  }
  return nil
}

/**
 * The model this judge will grade with, and where that decision came from.
 *
 * Two sources, in order, and `nil` when neither answers:
 *
 *   1. `judge_cfg.model` — what the caller asked for, source `judge_config`.
 *   2. the catalog `judge` role for this provider family, source
 *      `catalog_role`.
 *
 * It deliberately never falls back to `opts.model`, which is the ACTOR's model
 * for this run: a run graded by the model that produced it is not a check, it
 * is the same model asked the same question twice, and it is the mechanical
 * cause of a cheap judge accepting a blocked run as done (harn#7937,
 * harn#7910).
 *
 * Rung 2 exists so that the simplest possible harness — `turn_end_condition:
 * true` and nothing else — still grades, which is the whole point of the
 * shorthand. It is a real rung, not a placeholder: the `judge` ladder ships
 * with a row for every provider family Harn routes to.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __judge_resolve_model(harness.llm, judge_cfg, opts)
 */
pub fn __judge_resolve_model(
  llm: HarnessLlm,
  judge_cfg: dict,
  opts: dict,
) -> {model: string, source: string}? {
  const configured = trim(to_string(judge_cfg?.[__JUDGE_MODEL_SETTING] ?? ""))
  if configured != "" {
    return {model: configured, source: "judge_config"}
  }
  const family = __judge_provider_family(llm, judge_cfg, opts)
  const role_model = __judge_catalog_role_model(llm, family)
  if role_model != nil {
    return {model: role_model, source: "catalog_role"}
  }
  return nil
}

/**
 * What a caller is told when no judge model is configured.
 *
 * Names the setting and the reason, so the reader does not have to guess which
 * of three judge configurations is missing one, and does not read the refusal
 * as a transient failure worth retrying.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __judge_model_unconfigured_message("agent.completion_judge")
 */
pub fn __judge_model_unconfigured_message(checkpoint_name: string, provider: string?) -> string {
  const family = if provider == nil || provider == "" {
    "this run's provider could not be determined"
  } else {
    "provider `" + to_string(provider) + "` has no `" + __JUDGE_ROLE_LADDER
      + "` role in the model catalog"
  }
  return checkpoint_name
    + " did not run: no judge model is configured and "
    + family
    + ". Set `"
    + __JUDGE_MODEL_SETTING
    + "` on this judge's configuration (verify_completion_judge, turn_end_condition, or step_judge), "
    + "or add a `[model_ladders."
    + __JUDGE_ROLE_LADDER
    + "]` step for that provider. "
    + "A judge deliberately does not inherit the run's own model: a run graded by the model that produced it is not a check."
}

pub fn __judge_run_checkpoint(
  harness: Harness,
  request: JudgeCheckpointRequest,
) -> JudgeCheckpointRun {
  const judge_cfg = request.judge_cfg
  const opts = request.opts
  const payload = request.payload
  const checkpoint_name = request.checkpoint_name
  const system = request.system
  const user = request.user
  const schema = request.schema
  const base = opts?.llm_options ?? {}
  // Resolve the judge's model BEFORE anything else this function does. A
  // refusal has to happen before the deadline receipt, the window event, and
  // the provider call, or the run pays for a judge that was never eligible to
  // grade it.
  const resolved_judge = __judge_resolve_model(harness.llm, judge_cfg, opts)
  if resolved_judge == nil {
    const refusal = {
      schema: "harn.completion_judge_admission.v1",
      checkpoint_name: checkpoint_name,
      admitted: false,
      judge_model: nil,
      judge_model_source: "unconfigured",
      outcome: "model_unconfigured",
    }
    if checkpoint_name == "agent.completion_judge" {
      agent_emit_event(harness.agent, payload.session_id, "typed_checkpoint", refusal)
    }
    return {
      checkpoint: {
        ok: false,
        status: "model_unconfigured",
        error: __judge_model_unconfigured_message(
          checkpoint_name,
          __judge_provider_family(harness.llm, judge_cfg, opts),
        ),
        receipt: refusal,
      },
      duration_ms: 0,
      admission: refusal,
    }
  }
  const mock_scope = if checkpoint_name == "agent.completion_judge" {
    "completion.judge"
  } else if checkpoint_name == "agent.step_judge" {
    "step.judge"
  } else {
    "default"
  }
  const operation_budget_ms = if checkpoint_name == "agent.completion_judge" {
    max(1, to_int(judge_cfg?.operation_timeout_ms) ?? __COMPLETION_JUDGE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS)
  } else {
    nil
  }
  const provider_timeout_ms = if checkpoint_name == "agent.completion_judge" {
    min(
      operation_budget_ms,
      max(1, to_int(judge_cfg?.timeout_ms ?? base?.timeout_ms) ?? operation_budget_ms),
    )
  } else {
    to_int(judge_cfg?.timeout_ms ?? base?.timeout_ms)
  }
  const deadline_reserve_ms = if checkpoint_name == "agent.completion_judge" {
    max(
      0,
      to_int(judge_cfg?.deadline_reserve_ms)
        ?? __COMPLETION_JUDGE_DEFAULT_DEADLINE_RESERVE_MS,
    )
  } else {
    nil
  }
  const deadline_at_ms = to_int(opts?._deadline_at_ms)
  const admission_now_ms = harness.clock.monotonic_ms()
  const deadline_admission = if checkpoint_name == "agent.completion_judge" {
    __judge_completion_admission(
      admission_now_ms,
      deadline_at_ms,
      operation_budget_ms,
      deadline_reserve_ms,
    )
  } else {
    {
      admitted: true,
      remaining_ms: nil,
      operation_budget_ms: nil,
      deadline_reserve_ms: nil,
      outcome: "not_applicable",
    }
  }
  const admitted = deadline_admission.admitted
  const admission = deadline_admission
    + {
      schema: "harn.completion_judge_admission.v1",
      checkpoint_name: checkpoint_name,
      admitted: admitted,
      provider_timeout_ms: provider_timeout_ms,
      prompt_chars: len(system) + len(user),
      prompt_token_estimate: ceil((len(system) + len(user)) / 4.0),
      // Which model actually graded this run, on the receipt a host already
      // reads. Without it, "the judge agreed" cannot be told apart from "the
      // actor agreed with itself" after the fact.
      judge_model: resolved_judge.model,
      judge_model_source: resolved_judge.source,
    }
  if checkpoint_name == "agent.completion_judge" {
    agent_emit_event(harness.agent, payload.session_id, "typed_checkpoint", admission)
  }
  if !admitted {
    return {
      checkpoint: {
        ok: false,
        status: "admission_refused",
        error:
          "completion judge was not started because its request budget cannot fit before the terminal deadline",
        receipt: admission,
      },
      duration_ms: 0,
      admission: admission,
    }
  }
  const completion_timeout_opts = if checkpoint_name == "agent.completion_judge" {
    {timeout_ms: provider_timeout_ms, operation_timeout_ms: operation_budget_ms}
  } else {
    {}
  }
  const llm_opts = __judge_apply_llm_overrides(
    base
      + {
        model: resolved_judge.model,
        provider: judge_cfg?.provider ?? opts?.provider,
        output: {schema: schema, strict: true, validation: "error"},
        session_id: payload.session_id,
        system: system,
        mock_scope: base?.mock_scope ?? mock_scope,
        _call_stage: "verify",
      }
      + completion_timeout_opts,
    judge_cfg,
  )
  const started = harness.clock.monotonic_ms()
  const checkpoint = agent_typed_output_checkpoint(
    harness.agent,
    harness.llm,
    checkpoint_name,
    user,
    schema,
    llm_opts,
  )
  const duration_ms = harness.clock.monotonic_ms() - started
  if checkpoint_name == "agent.completion_judge" {
    const usage = checkpoint?.usage ?? checkpoint?.final_result?.usage ?? {}
    const cache_read_tokens = usage?.cache_read_tokens ?? 0
    const cache_write_tokens = usage?.cache_write_tokens ?? 0
    agent_emit_event(
      harness.agent,
      payload.session_id,
      "typed_checkpoint",
      {
        schema: "harn.completion_judge_cache.v1",
        eligible: system != "" && llm_opts?.cache != false,
        stable_prefix_hash: "sha256:" + sha256(system),
        stable_prefix_chars: len(system),
        cache_read_tokens: cache_read_tokens,
        cache_write_tokens: cache_write_tokens,
        cache_used: cache_read_tokens > 0,
      },
    )
    agent_emit_event(
      harness.agent,
      payload.session_id,
      "typed_checkpoint",
      admission
        + {
          outcome: if checkpoint?.ok ?? false {
            "completed"
          } else {
            to_string(checkpoint?.status ?? "error")
          },
          duration_ms: duration_ms,
        },
    )
  }
  return {checkpoint: checkpoint, duration_ms: duration_ms, admission: admission}
}

/**
 * JSON structural characters can never be part of a legitimate verdict
 * token, so a captured verdict containing one was mangled upstream.
 */
const __JUDGE_VERDICT_JSON_JUNK = ["\"", ",", "{", "}", ":", "\\"]

/**
 * Normalize a captured judge verdict to its leading token. Structured
 * judges occasionally emit sloppy JSON (double commas, run-on key/value
 * pairs) that the structured-call repair layer salvages by capturing
 * trailing JSON junk into the verdict string — observed live in
 * `judge_decision` events as `continue",,` and `continue",  "reasoning":`.
 * Cut at the first JSON structural character and trim; verdicts without
 * JSON junk (including multi-word prose verdicts) pass through unchanged.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __judge_verdict_token("continue\",,")
 */
pub fn __judge_verdict_token(raw_verdict: string?) {
  const normalized = lowercase(trim(to_string(raw_verdict ?? "")))
  let cut = len(normalized)
  for junk in __JUDGE_VERDICT_JSON_JUNK {
    const idx = normalized.index_of(junk)
    if idx >= 0 && idx < cut {
      cut = idx
    }
  }
  if cut == len(normalized) {
    return normalized
  }
  return trim(normalized[0:cut])
}

/**
 * Punctuation that cheap models hang off the leading verdict word
 * (`"done."`, `"done!"`, `"pass:"`, `"(done)"`, quotes/asterisks from
 * markdown emphasis). Stripped from both ends of the leading token before
 * the allow-list compare so a decorated `done` still classifies as DONE.
 */
const __JUDGE_TOKEN_PUNCT = ".,;:!?\"'`*_-)("

/**
 * Reduce a normalized verdict to its leading whitespace-delimited word with
 * surrounding punctuation stripped. Cheap models decorate enum values
 * (`"done."`, `"yes, complete"`, `"done — all tests pass"`); the verdict's
 * *intent* is its first word, so classification keys on that word instead of
 * requiring whole-string equality. `"not done yet"` reduces to `"not"`
 * (still a veto), while `"done."` reduces to `"done"` (a pass).
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __judge_leading_word("done.")
 */
pub fn __judge_leading_word(normalized: string) {
  let first = ""
  for piece in normalized.split(" ") {
    if first == "" && trim(piece) != "" {
      first = trim(piece)
    }
  }
  // Strip leading punctuation.
  let start = 0
  while start < len(first) && __JUDGE_TOKEN_PUNCT.contains(first.char_at(start)) {
    start = start + 1
  }
  // Strip trailing punctuation.
  let stop = len(first)
  while stop > start && __JUDGE_TOKEN_PUNCT.contains(first.char_at(stop - 1)) {
    stop = stop - 1
  }
  return first[start:stop]
}

/**
 * Classify a raw verdict string against an allow-list of pass tokens and
 * compose the `{vetoed, feedback?}` outcome. `feedback_candidates` is
 * tried in order: the first non-nil, non-empty entry wins. Falls back
 * to `feedback_default` when nothing else is set.
 *
 * Used by `agent_step_judge` (pass tokens like "pass"/"yes"/"approve") and
 * by `agent_evaluate_completion` (pass tokens like "done"/"complete").
 * The raw verdict is normalized through `__judge_verdict_token` first, then
 * reduced to its leading word so a decorated enum value (`"done."`,
 * `"done — all tests pass"`) still classifies. The stored/emitted `verdict`
 * field carries the clean leading word.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __judge_classify_verdict("pass", ["pass", "yes"], [critique], default)
 */
pub fn __judge_classify_verdict(
  raw_verdict: string?,
  pass_tokens: any,
  feedback_candidates: list,
  feedback_default: any,
) {
  const normalized = __judge_leading_word(__judge_verdict_token(raw_verdict))
  if contains(pass_tokens, normalized) {
    return {vetoed: false, verdict: normalized}
  }
  let feedback = ""
  for candidate in feedback_candidates {
    if feedback == "" && candidate != nil && to_string(candidate) != "" {
      feedback = to_string(candidate)
    }
  }
  if feedback == "" {
    feedback = feedback_default
  }
  return {vetoed: true, feedback: feedback, verdict: normalized}
}

// -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

// Completion-gate policy (pure). These implement the deterministic veto
// arithmetic that `std/agent/judge::completion_gate` rides on `verify_completion`.
// They are PURE (no store / no LLM / no host calls) so the parity fixtures can
// pin the source policy's decisions on synthetic verdict sets. All host facts
// (source-vs-cosmetic write classification, verifier verdict) enter as data —
// the split from the ownership principle "Harn owns orchestration
// policy; hosts supply facts". NEVER key any decision on a done-sentinel string
// (ledger ⛔#3): the gate reads only write/verify facts.

// -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/**
 * Reduce a list of host write facts to `{source_write_count, cosmetic_write_count,
 * other_write_count}`. Each write is classified by `classify_write(path, diff?)`
 * when the callback is supplied, else by the write's own `kind` field, else
 * conservatively as `"source"` (an unclassified write counts as source progress,
 * so the evidence gate never manufactures a false veto — ledger ⛔#5's spirit).
 * Only the literal kind `"cosmetic"` is excluded from source progress; any other
 * non-`"source"` kind (e.g. `"test"`, `"doc"`) is counted as `other`.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 */
pub fn __completion_gate_classify_writes(writes: list?, classify_write: any) {
  let source = 0
  let cosmetic = 0
  let other = 0
  for write in writes ?? [] {
    const path = to_string(write?.path ?? "")
    const kind = if classify_write != nil && path != "" {
      to_string(classify_write(path, write?.diff) ?? "source")
    } else {
      to_string(write?.kind ?? "source")
    }
    if kind == "cosmetic" {
      cosmetic = cosmetic + 1
    } else if kind == "source" {
      source = source + 1
    } else {
      other = other + 1
    }
  }
  return {source_write_count: source, cosmetic_write_count: cosmetic, other_write_count: other}
}

/**
 * Combine one or more host verifier verdicts (`{ok, findings?}`) into a single
 * verdict. A caller-supplied `veto_combine(verdicts)` overrides the default; the
 * default is explicit AND-of-oracles arithmetic — the combined verdict is green
 * only when EVERY verdict is green, and red findings are concatenated. Returns
 * nil when there is no verdict to combine (verifier state unknown).
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 */
pub fn __completion_gate_combine_verify(verify: any, veto_combine: any) {
  if verify == nil {
    return nil
  }
  const verdicts = if type_of(verify) == "list" {
    verify
  } else {
    [verify]
  }
  if len(verdicts) == 0 {
    return nil
  }
  if veto_combine != nil {
    return veto_combine(verdicts)
  }
  let all_ok = true
  let findings = []
  let command = ""
  for verdict in verdicts {
    if command == "" {
      command = trim(to_string(verdict?.command ?? ""))
    }
    if !(verdict?.ok ?? false) {
      all_ok = false
      const finding = to_string(verdict?.findings ?? "")
      if finding != "" {
        findings = findings.appending(finding)
      }
    }
  }
  return {ok: all_ok, findings: join(findings, "; "), command: command}
}

/** What a deterministic verifier oracle was observed to do, or that it did not run. */
pub type CompletionVerificationObservation = "passed" | "failed" | "not_run"

/**
 * The deterministic completion gate's own reading of the verifier oracle for one
 * boundary. It is threaded onto the evidence snapshot so a model judge is SHOWN
 * the answer the runtime already computed rather than asked to infer it from a
 * bounded packet that may not carry the verifying call at all.
 *
 * `observed` is a positive reading only when it says `passed`. `not_run` covers
 * both "no oracle was configured" and "the gate could not read facts", which is
 * why no consumer may treat the gate's `confirm` as a substitute for this field.
 */
pub type CompletionVerificationState = {
  oracle_expected: bool,
  command: string,
  observed: CompletionVerificationObservation,
  observed_at_evidence_index?: int?,
}

/**
 * The kind of gap a `continue` names. This is what CONSTRAINS a refusal: the
 * judge keeps sole authority over artifacts, manner and negative clauses, and
 * authorization. It loses authority only over `failed_verification`, the single
 * question a deterministic oracle may already have answered. An absent or
 * unrecognized value reads as `other`, which never yields authority.
 */
pub type CompletionJudgeGapClass = "missing_artifact" \
  | "unmet_manner_clause" \
  | "failed_verification" \
  | "unresolved_authorization" \
  | "other"

/** The gap classes a model `continue` may name. See `CompletionJudgeGapClass`. */
pub const COMPLETION_JUDGE_GAP_CLASSES = [
  "missing_artifact",
  "unmet_manner_clause",
  "failed_verification",
  "unresolved_authorization",
  "other",
]

/**
 * Normalize a judge-reported gap class. Absent, blank, and unrecognized values
 * all read as `other` — the class that grants no authority — so the tolerant
 * direction and the safe direction are the same direction.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __completion_judge_gap_class("Failed_Verification")
 */
pub fn __completion_judge_gap_class(value: string?) -> CompletionJudgeGapClass {
  const named = lowercase(trim(to_string(value ?? "")))
  if named == "missing_artifact"
    || named == "unmet_manner_clause"
    || named == "failed_verification"
    || named == "unresolved_authorization" {
    return named
  }
  return "other"
}

/**
 * Normalize a gate-reported verification reading. The gate is a host-supplied
 * closure, so its result is untrusted: an unrecognized `observed` is refused
 * outright rather than defaulted, because the only value that grants authority
 * downstream is a positive one and a coerced default could manufacture it.
 * Returns nil when there is no usable reading.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __completion_verification_state_read({observed: "passed"})
 */
pub fn __completion_verification_state_read(value: unknown) -> CompletionVerificationState? {
  if type_of(value) != "dict" {
    return nil
  }
  const named = lowercase(trim(to_string(value?.observed ?? "")))
  const observed = if named == "passed" {
    "passed"
  } else if named == "failed" {
    "failed"
  } else if named == "not_run" {
    "not_run"
  } else {
    nil
  }
  if observed == nil {
    return nil
  }
  return {
    oracle_expected: value?.oracle_expected == true,
    command: to_string(value?.command ?? ""),
    observed: observed,
    observed_at_evidence_index: nil,
  }
}

/**
 * Where in a bounded packet the verification observation sits, or nil when the
 * packet selected no verification action. A nil here alongside a `passed`
 * reading is the exact diagnostic shape of a host that declared no
 * `completion_evidence_role`: the gate saw the verifier, the packet did not.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __completion_verification_evidence_index([])
 */
pub fn __completion_verification_evidence_index(selected_actions: list) -> int? {
  let index = nil
  for selection in selected_actions {
    if selection?.evidence_role == "verification" {
      index = selection?.evidence_index
    }
  }
  return index
}

/**
 * Does a model `continue` naming a failed verification lose to the deterministic
 * gate's reading?
 *
 * Every clause is required, and each blocks one specific way of getting this
 * wrong:
 *
 * 1. `deterministic_invoked` — the gate stage actually ran. A declared plan is
 *    not proof that anyone answered, and an evaluation nobody adjudicated is
 *    not vetoed either, so silence would otherwise read as approval.
 * 2. `observed == "passed"` — a POSITIVE reading. The gate also confirms when
 *    it could not read facts at all; keying on that confirm would let a gate
 *    that never looked overrule a legitimate refusal, which is the blanket
 *    weakening this arbitration exists to avoid, arriving from the other side.
 * 3. `deterministic_reason != "facts_unavailable"` — the same hazard named
 *    directly, so a future gate that reports both a reading and that reason
 *    still cannot convert.
 * 4. `gap_class == "failed_verification"` — the judge is only overruled on the
 *    one question a deterministic oracle has already answered.
 *
 * Anything short of all four leaves the judge's `continue` standing.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __completion_arbitration_converts("failed_verification", true, "verified", "passed")
 */
pub fn __completion_arbitration_converts(
  gap_class: string,
  deterministic_invoked: bool,
  deterministic_reason: string,
  observed: string,
) -> bool {
  return gap_class == "failed_verification"
    && deterministic_invoked
    && deterministic_reason != "facts_unavailable"
    && observed == "passed"
}

/**
 * Default rendered feedback strings for each vetoing ladder rule. The MECHANISM
 * (evidence gate + post-write-verify gate) is generic; these strings are host
 * DOMAIN content (host-authored coding prose), so `completion_gate`'s
 * `feedback_templates` option lets a host override any of them by key. Keys:
 *   - `no_source_write_cosmetic` — evidence gate tripped, only cosmetic writes seen.
 *   - `no_source_write_absent`   — evidence gate tripped, no writes seen.
 *   - `verification_after_write_red` — a red verifier after a write. The `{findings}`
 *     token is substituted with the rendered findings detail (` Findings: <x>.` or
 *     empty), so an override keeps the dynamic findings unless it drops the token.
 *   - `failed_verification` — the opt-in streak-aware form before escalation.
 *   - `repeated_verification_failures` — the opt-in escalated form. Supports both
 *     `{attempts}` and `{findings}` tokens.
 *   - `missing_verification`     — a source write with a configured-but-unrun verifier.
 */
const __COMPLETION_GATE_FEEDBACK_DEFAULTS = {
  failed_verification:
    "Verification is still failing after your change.{findings} Fix the specific failure and re-run the verifier before finishing.",
  missing_verification:
    "You changed source but have not run the verifier yet. Run the narrowest verification for your change before finishing.",
  no_source_write_absent:
    "This task expects a source-code change, but no source file has been written yet. Make the required change before finishing.",
  no_source_write_cosmetic:
    "This task expects a source-code change, but only cosmetic / non-source writes have been made. Make the required change to a source file before finishing.",
  repeated_verification_failures:
    "Verification has failed {attempts} consecutive times after your changes.{findings} Stop re-running the same check unchanged: inspect the failure, make a targeted repair, then verify again.",
  verification_after_write_red:
    "Verification is still failing after your change.{findings} Fix the specific failure and re-run the verifier before finishing.",
}

/**
 * The recognized `completion_gate` `feedback_templates` keys (the vetoing ladder
 * rules a host may override). Exposed so `std/agent/judge` can validate an override
 * dict loudly at config time.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 */
pub fn __completion_gate_feedback_keys() {
  return keys(__COMPLETION_GATE_FEEDBACK_DEFAULTS)
}

/**
 * Resolve one ladder feedback string: the host override (if any) else the default,
 * with the `{findings}` and `{attempts}` tokens substituted. Only red-verifier
 * rules pass non-empty values; for the other rules the defaults carry no tokens, so
 * the substitutions are no-ops.
 */
fn __completion_gate_render_feedback(
  templates: any,
  key: any,
  findings: string,
  attempts: string = "",
) {
  return replace(
    replace(to_string(templates[key] ?? ""), "{findings}", findings),
    "{attempts}",
    attempts,
  )
}

/** Build the strict red-verifier verdict, including opt-in streak escalation. */
fn __completion_gate_red_verdict(derived: dict, templates: any, detail: string) {
  if derived?.consecutive_failed_after_write == nil {
    return {
      ok: false,
      reason: "verification_after_write_red",
      strict: true,
      feedback: __completion_gate_render_feedback(
        templates,
        "verification_after_write_red",
        detail,
      ),
    }
  }
  const streak = max(to_int(derived?.consecutive_failed_after_write ?? 0) ?? 0, 0)
  const threshold = max(to_int(derived?.escalation_threshold ?? 3) ?? 3, 1)
  const converging = derived?.verification_failures_converging ?? false
  const escalation_recommended = streak >= threshold && !converging
  const reason = if escalation_recommended {
    "repeated_verification_failures"
  } else {
    "failed_verification"
  }
  let verdict = {
    ok: false,
    reason: reason,
    strict: true,
    escalation_recommended: escalation_recommended,
    feedback: __completion_gate_render_feedback(templates, reason, detail, to_string(streak)),
  }
  if escalation_recommended && derived?.escalation_target != nil {
    verdict = verdict + {escalation_target: derived.escalation_target}
  }
  return verdict
}

/**
 * The default completion-gate veto arithmetic: an ordered precedence ladder over
 * derived facts, ported from the source `completion_gate_uncapped_status`. First
 * matching rule wins.
 *
 * `derived` fields: `source_known` (whether write facts were supplied),
 * `source_write_count`, `cosmetic_write_count`, `requires_write` (task needs a
 * source change), `verify` (`{ok, findings}` or nil = unknown), `oracle_expected`
 * (a verifier is configured), and optional streak-aware escalation facts:
 * `consecutive_failed_after_write`, `verification_failures_converging`,
 * `escalation_threshold`, and `escalation_target`.
 *
 * Returns `{ok, reason, strict?, feedback?}`. `strict: true` marks a veto that the
 * per-session veto budget may NEVER convert to an allow — every post-write-not-green
 * class (a red verifier, or a source write whose expected verifier has not produced a
 * green verdict yet). This matches the source carve-out: budget exhaustion refuses to
 * release the whole `saw_write && !verification_after_last_write` set, because a source
 * write always needs a fresh green verifier before completion.
 *
 * `feedback_templates` (optional) overrides the rendered feedback string per rule
 * (see `__COMPLETION_GATE_FEEDBACK_DEFAULTS`); nil/absent keeps the byte-identical
 * defaults.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 */
pub fn __completion_gate_ladder(derived: dict, feedback_templates: dict? = nil) {
  const templates = __COMPLETION_GATE_FEEDBACK_DEFAULTS + (feedback_templates ?? {})
  const source_known = derived?.source_known ?? false
  const source_writes = to_int(derived?.source_write_count ?? 0) ?? 0
  const cosmetic_writes = to_int(derived?.cosmetic_write_count ?? 0) ?? 0
  const saw_source = source_known && source_writes > 0
  const requires_write = derived?.requires_write ?? true
  const verify = derived?.verify
  const verify_known = verify != nil
  const verify_ok = verify_known && (verify?.ok ?? false)
  const findings = to_string(verify?.findings ?? "")
  const oracle_expected = derived?.oracle_expected ?? false
  // 1. Evidence requirement (ledger ⛔#5): a task that must change source may not
  // finish with zero SOURCE writes. Cosmetic/test-scaffold writes are not progress.
  if source_known && requires_write && !saw_source {
    const key = if cosmetic_writes > 0 {
      "no_source_write_cosmetic"
    } else {
      "no_source_write_absent"
    }
    const message = __completion_gate_render_feedback(templates, key, "")
    return {ok: false, reason: "no_source_write", strict: false, feedback: message}
  }
  // 2. Post-write verification: a source write (or an unclassified write set) with
  // a RED verifier blocks, and this class is strict — the budget can never let it
  // through; only a fresh green verifier ends it.
  if verify_known && !verify_ok && (saw_source || !source_known) {
    const detail = if findings != "" {
      " Findings: " + findings + "."
    } else {
      ""
    }
    return __completion_gate_red_verdict(derived, templates, detail)
  }
  // 3. Green verifier -> completion is honorable.
  if verify_ok {
    return {
      ok: true,
      reason: if saw_source {
        "verified_after_write"
      } else {
        "verified"
      },
    }
  }
  // 4. Source written, a verifier is configured, but it has not run yet. Strict:
  // Never budget-release a post-write state without a fresh green verifier
  // (`saw_write && !verification_after_last_write`), so this class — like the red
  // one above — is never converted to an allow. Only a green verifier ends it.
  if saw_source && oracle_expected && !verify_known {
    return {
      ok: false,
      reason: "missing_verification",
      strict: true,
      feedback: __completion_gate_render_feedback(templates, "missing_verification", ""),
    }
  }
  // 5. Nothing left to gate.
  if source_known && !saw_source && !requires_write {
    return {ok: true, reason: "no_workspace_write"}
  }
  if saw_source {
    return {ok: true, reason: "wrote_source_no_oracle"}
  }
  // Facts too thin for a deterministic verdict (unknown writes, no verifier
  // signal): the deterministic gate ABSTAINS and lets any configured LLM judge
  // decide. Never a silent fabricated pass — the caller surfaces the degraded mode.
  return {ok: true, reason: "gate_abstain"}
}

/**
 * Apply the per-session veto budget to a ladder verdict. Pure: the caller reads
 * `vetoes_used` from the store and persists the charge. After `max_vetoes`
 * non-strict vetoes the gate converts a would-be veto into an attributable allow
 * (`veto_budget_exhausted`), so a run that a weak model can never satisfy still
 * ends with a named reason instead of riding vetoes to the wall-clock timeout.
 * A `strict` veto (post-write-red) is NEVER converted. `max_vetoes <= 0` disables
 * the budget (unbounded vetoes).
 *
 * Returns `{verdict, charge}` — `charge: true` means the caller should increment
 * the session veto counter.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 */
pub fn __completion_gate_apply_budget(verdict: dict, vetoes_used: int, max_vetoes: int) {
  if verdict?.ok ?? false {
    return {verdict: verdict, charge: false}
  }
  const strict = verdict?.strict ?? false
  if !strict && max_vetoes > 0 && vetoes_used >= max_vetoes {
    return {
      verdict: {ok: true, reason: "veto_budget_exhausted", converted_from: verdict?.reason ?? ""},
      charge: false,
    }
  }
  return {verdict: verdict, charge: true}
}

// A judge that cannot be STARTED is a scheduling fact the caller already
// terminates on. A judge that ran and could not be READ is different, and it is
// the one this bound exists for: its reply may be malformed for a turn and
// well-formed on the next attempt.
//
// One re-ask, not more. The sibling deadline path retries zero times, and a
// judge whose reply does not parse is usually broken the same way every time,
// so further attempts buy a recovery that rarely happens at the price of real
// provider calls on every run that is already failing.
const __COMPLETION_JUDGE_ERROR_ATTEMPTS: int = 2

/**
 * True when the judge never produced a reading because it could not run inside
 * its deadline, as opposed to running and returning something unreadable.
 *
 * @effects: []
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __judge_checkpoint_unavailable(checkpoint)
 */
pub fn __judge_checkpoint_unavailable(checkpoint: dict) -> bool {
  return checkpoint?.status == "admission_refused"
    || checkpoint?.status == "model_unconfigured"
    || checkpoint?.status == "timeout"
    || checkpoint?.error_category == "timeout"
    || checkpoint?.error?.status == "timeout"
}

// A missing setting never becomes present on a retry, and a bounded
// retry loop that treats it as readable spends three refusals to reach
// the same answer.
/**
 * Run a judge checkpoint, retrying a reply that could not be read up to a fixed
 * bound.
 *
 * An exit authority that cannot answer must still be able to end a run. Before
 * this bound existed, an unreadable reply was recorded and then read as
 * `continue`, so a judge that never parsed could veto forever and the run could
 * only stop by exhausting an unrelated budget. Retrying is bounded and the
 * caller turns exhaustion into a typed terminal.
 *
 * A checkpoint that succeeded, or that could not be started at all, returns on
 * the first attempt: neither is retryable here.
 *
 * @effects: [llm, event]
 * @errors: []
 * @api_stability: internal
 * @example: __judge_run_checkpoint_bounded(harness, request)
 */
pub fn __judge_run_checkpoint_bounded(
  harness: Harness,
  request: JudgeCheckpointRequest,
) -> JudgeCheckpointRun {
  let ran = __judge_run_checkpoint(harness, request)
  let attempt = 1
  while attempt < __COMPLETION_JUDGE_ERROR_ATTEMPTS {
    if (ran.checkpoint?.ok ?? false) || __judge_checkpoint_unavailable(ran.checkpoint) {
      return ran
    }
    ran = __judge_run_checkpoint(harness, request)
    attempt = attempt + 1
  }
  return ran
}