hardware-enclave 0.1.5

Hardware-backed key management — macOS Secure Enclave, Windows TPM 2.0, Linux TPM/keyring — plus in-process memory protection
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
// Copyright 2026 Jay Gowdy
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

#![allow(unsafe_code)]

use std::ptr::NonNull;

use rand::TryRngCore;
use zeroize::Zeroize;

use super::memcall::{os_alloc, os_free, os_lock, os_protect, os_unlock, page_size, Protection};
use crate::error::Error;

const CANARY_LEN: usize = 32;

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(super) enum State {
    Mutable,
    Frozen,
    Dead,
}

/// A page-guarded, mlock'd buffer for secret material.
///
/// Layout: [guard page (PROT_NONE)] [inner region, mlock'd] [guard page (PROT_NONE)]
///
/// Guard pages are filled with random canary bytes. On drop, canaries are verified
/// (detects overflow), inner region is zeroized, and all pages are unmapped.
pub struct SecureBuffer {
    /// Pointer to the start of the full allocation (first guard page).
    alloc_ptr: NonNull<u8>,
    /// Total allocation length (guard + inner + guard), page-aligned.
    alloc_len: usize,
    /// Pointer to the start of the inner (data) region.
    inner_ptr: NonNull<u8>,
    /// Requested data length.
    inner_len: usize,
    /// Copy of canary bytes placed in guard pages.
    pre_canary: [u8; CANARY_LEN],
    post_canary: [u8; CANARY_LEN],
    page_size: usize,
    pub(super) state: State,
    mlocked: bool,
}

// Safety: exclusive ownership of the allocation.
unsafe impl Send for SecureBuffer {}

impl std::fmt::Debug for SecureBuffer {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        f.debug_struct("SecureBuffer")
            .field("inner_len", &self.inner_len)
            .field("state", &self.state)
            .finish()
    }
}

impl SecureBuffer {
    /// Allocate a new mutable, mlock'd, guard-paged buffer.
    pub fn new(size: usize) -> crate::error::Result<Self> {
        let ps = page_size();
        // Round inner region up to page boundary.
        let inner_rounded = size.div_ceil(ps) * ps;
        let alloc_len = ps + inner_rounded + ps;

        let alloc_ptr = unsafe { os_alloc(alloc_len) }
            .map_err(|e| Error::Memory(format!("SecureBuffer::new alloc: {e}")))?;

        // SAFETY: alloc_ptr is a freshly allocated page from os_alloc. The offset ps is
        // exactly one page, which is within the multi-page allocation
        // (alloc_len = ps + inner_rounded + ps). The pointer is non-null because os_alloc
        // returns NonNull and we are adding a positive, in-bounds offset.
        let inner_ptr = unsafe { NonNull::new_unchecked(alloc_ptr.as_ptr().add(ps)) };

        // Generate random canaries.
        let mut pre_canary = [0_u8; CANARY_LEN];
        let mut post_canary = [0_u8; CANARY_LEN];
        if rand::rngs::OsRng.try_fill_bytes(&mut pre_canary).is_err() {
            pre_canary.fill(0xAB);
        }
        if rand::rngs::OsRng.try_fill_bytes(&mut post_canary).is_err() {
            post_canary.fill(0xCD);
        }

        // Write canaries into guard pages (must be writable at this point).
        unsafe {
            let pre_guard = alloc_ptr.as_ptr();
            std::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(pre_canary.as_ptr(), pre_guard, CANARY_LEN.min(ps));
            let post_guard = alloc_ptr.as_ptr().add(ps + inner_rounded);
            std::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(post_canary.as_ptr(), post_guard, CANARY_LEN.min(ps));
        }

        // mlock the inner region.
        let mlocked = unsafe { os_lock(inner_ptr.as_ptr(), inner_rounded) }.is_ok();

        // Set guard pages to PROT_NONE.
        drop(unsafe { os_protect(alloc_ptr.as_ptr(), ps, Protection::NoAccess) });
        drop(unsafe {
            os_protect(
                alloc_ptr.as_ptr().add(ps + inner_rounded),
                ps,
                Protection::NoAccess,
            )
        });

        Ok(Self {
            alloc_ptr,
            alloc_len,
            inner_ptr,
            inner_len: size,
            pre_canary,
            post_canary,
            page_size: ps,
            state: State::Mutable,
            mlocked,
        })
    }

    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
        self.inner_len
    }

    pub fn is_alive(&self) -> bool {
        self.state != State::Dead
    }

    pub fn is_mutable(&self) -> bool {
        self.state == State::Mutable
    }

    /// Get a mutable slice to the inner region. Requires Mutable state.
    pub fn bytes(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
        assert!(
            self.state == State::Mutable,
            "SecureBuffer: bytes() called in non-mutable state"
        );
        // SAFETY: state == Mutable ensures the inner region has PROT_READ|WRITE. inner_ptr
        // was set at construction to alloc_ptr + page_size, which is within alloc_len.
        // inner_len is the caller-requested size, <= inner_rounded which is within alloc_len.
        // &mut self guarantees no aliasing.
        unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(self.inner_ptr.as_ptr(), self.inner_len) }
    }

    /// Get a read-only slice. Requires non-Dead state.
    pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
        assert!(
            self.state != State::Dead,
            "SecureBuffer: as_slice() on dead buffer"
        );
        // SAFETY: state != Dead ensures the allocation is still live. inner_ptr
        // was set at construction to alloc_ptr + page_size, within alloc_len.
        // If state == Frozen the protection is ReadOnly, which permits reads.
        // If state == Mutable the protection is ReadWrite, which also permits reads.
        unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(self.inner_ptr.as_ptr(), self.inner_len) }
    }

    /// Make the buffer read-only.
    pub fn freeze(&mut self) -> crate::error::Result<()> {
        if self.state == State::Dead {
            return Err(Error::Memory("SecureBuffer::freeze on dead buffer".into()));
        }
        let inner_rounded = self.alloc_len - 2 * self.page_size;
        unsafe { os_protect(self.inner_ptr.as_ptr(), inner_rounded, Protection::ReadOnly) }
            .map_err(|e| Error::Memory(format!("freeze: {e}")))?;
        self.state = State::Frozen;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Make the buffer writable again.
    pub fn melt(&mut self) -> crate::error::Result<()> {
        if self.state == State::Dead {
            return Err(Error::Memory("SecureBuffer::melt on dead buffer".into()));
        }
        let inner_rounded = self.alloc_len - 2 * self.page_size;
        unsafe {
            os_protect(
                self.inner_ptr.as_ptr(),
                inner_rounded,
                Protection::ReadWrite,
            )
        }
        .map_err(|e| Error::Memory(format!("melt: {e}")))?;
        self.state = State::Mutable;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Verify guard-page canaries, zeroize, unlock, and free the allocation.
    ///
    /// Idempotent — returns `Ok(())` immediately if already `Dead`.
    pub fn destroy(&mut self) -> crate::error::Result<()> {
        if self.state == State::Dead {
            return Ok(());
        }

        let ps = self.page_size;
        let inner_rounded = self.alloc_len - 2 * ps;

        // Temporarily make guard pages readable for canary verification.
        let pre_guard = self.alloc_ptr.as_ptr();
        let post_guard = unsafe { self.alloc_ptr.as_ptr().add(ps + inner_rounded) };

        drop(unsafe { os_protect(pre_guard, ps, Protection::ReadOnly) });
        drop(unsafe { os_protect(post_guard, ps, Protection::ReadOnly) });

        // Read canaries from guard pages.
        let pre_guard_slice = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(pre_guard, CANARY_LEN) };
        let post_guard_slice = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(post_guard, CANARY_LEN) };

        // Constant-time comparison.
        let pre_ok = pre_guard_slice
            .iter()
            .zip(self.pre_canary.iter())
            .fold(0_u8, |acc, (a, b)| acc | (a ^ b))
            == 0;
        let post_ok = post_guard_slice
            .iter()
            .zip(self.post_canary.iter())
            .fold(0_u8, |acc, (a, b)| acc | (a ^ b))
            == 0;

        // Restore write access to inner region for zeroization.
        drop(unsafe {
            os_protect(
                self.inner_ptr.as_ptr(),
                inner_rounded,
                Protection::ReadWrite,
            )
        });

        // Zeroize inner region.
        unsafe {
            let s = std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(self.inner_ptr.as_ptr(), inner_rounded);
            s.zeroize();
        }

        // Unlock inner region.
        if self.mlocked {
            drop(unsafe { os_unlock(self.inner_ptr.as_ptr(), inner_rounded) });
        }

        // Free entire allocation.
        // The guard pages remain PROT_NONE (set at construction); no need to restore
        // them to ReadWrite before freeing — the OS reclaims the entire mapping on
        // munmap/VirtualFree regardless of protection state. Restoring write access on
        // guard pages before free is unnecessary and was removed (SG-E).
        drop(unsafe { os_free(self.alloc_ptr.as_ptr(), self.alloc_len) });

        self.state = State::Dead;

        if !pre_ok || !post_ok {
            return Err(Error::Memory(
                "SecureBuffer: guard page canary corrupted — buffer overflow detected".into(),
            ));
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Fill with random bytes (stays mutable).
    pub fn scramble(&mut self) -> crate::error::Result<()> {
        if self.state != State::Mutable {
            self.melt()?;
        }
        let buf = self.bytes();
        rand::rngs::OsRng
            .try_fill_bytes(buf)
            .map_err(|e| Error::Memory(format!("scramble OsRng: {e}")))
    }
}

#[allow(clippy::panic)]
impl Drop for SecureBuffer {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        if let Err(e) = self.destroy() {
            // A canary corruption means a buffer overflow has occurred — the process
            // memory may be in an unsafe state. Log at error level.
            tracing::error!(error = %e, "SecureBuffer canary corruption detected — possible buffer overflow");
            // In debug/test builds, panic to make the violation visible.
            // clippy::panic is intentional: a corrupted canary in Drop is a
            // security-critical event that must not be silenced in debug builds.
            #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
            panic!("SecureBuffer canary corrupted: {e}");
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    // Tests ported from asherah-ffi (godaddy/asherah-ffi/asherah/src/memguard.rs)

    #[test]
    fn canary_corruption_detected() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(64).unwrap();

        // Temporarily enable write access on the post-guard page and corrupt the canary.
        let ps = page_size();
        let inner_rounded = 64_usize.div_ceil(ps) * ps;
        let post_guard = unsafe { buf.alloc_ptr.as_ptr().add(ps + inner_rounded) };

        unsafe {
            os_protect(post_guard, ps, Protection::ReadWrite).unwrap();
            *post_guard = !*post_guard; // flip first byte
        }

        // destroy() should detect the canary mismatch.
        let result = buf.destroy();
        assert!(
            result.is_err(),
            "destroy should report canary failure but returned Ok"
        );
        let msg = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
        assert!(
            msg.contains("canary"),
            "error should mention canary, got: {msg}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn new_buffer_is_mutable() {
        let buf = SecureBuffer::new(32).unwrap();
        assert!(buf.is_mutable());
        assert!(buf.is_alive());
    }

    #[test]
    fn freeze_and_melt() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(32).unwrap();
        buf.freeze().unwrap();
        assert!(!buf.is_mutable());
        buf.melt().unwrap();
        assert!(buf.is_mutable());
    }

    #[test]
    fn bytes_writes_and_reads_back() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(64).unwrap();
        buf.bytes()[0] = 0xAA_u8;
        buf.bytes()[63] = 0xBB_u8;
        assert_eq!(buf.as_slice()[0], 0xAA_u8);
        assert_eq!(buf.as_slice()[63], 0xBB_u8);
    }

    #[test]
    fn scramble_produces_non_zero() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(64).unwrap();
        buf.scramble().unwrap();
        // After OsRng fill, extremely unlikely all bytes are zero.
        let all_zero = buf.as_slice().iter().all(|&b| b == 0_u8);
        assert!(!all_zero, "scramble should produce non-zero bytes");
    }

    #[test]
    fn destroy_returns_ok_on_clean_buffer() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(32).unwrap();
        buf.destroy().unwrap();
        assert!(!buf.is_alive());
    }

    #[test]
    fn drop_without_explicit_destroy_does_not_panic() {
        // Should not leak or panic.
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(128).unwrap();
        buf.bytes()[0] = 1_u8;
        drop(buf);
    }

    #[test]
    fn freeze_twice_is_idempotent() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(32).unwrap();
        buf.freeze().unwrap();
        // Second freeze must not error.
        buf.freeze().unwrap();
        assert!(!buf.is_mutable());
    }

    #[test]
    fn melt_twice_is_idempotent() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(32).unwrap();
        buf.freeze().unwrap();
        buf.melt().unwrap();
        buf.melt().unwrap();
        assert!(buf.is_mutable());
    }

    #[test]
    fn frozen_buffer_is_readable() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(16).unwrap();
        buf.bytes()[0] = 0x99;
        buf.freeze().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(buf.as_slice()[0], 0x99);
    }

    #[test]
    fn scramble_on_frozen_buffer_melts_first() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(32).unwrap();
        buf.freeze().unwrap();
        // scramble() must succeed even from Frozen state.
        buf.scramble().unwrap();
        assert!(buf.is_mutable());
    }

    #[test]
    fn destroy_twice_is_safe() {
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(32).unwrap();
        buf.destroy().unwrap();
        assert!(!buf.is_alive());
        // Second destroy must return immediately (Dead state guard).
        buf.destroy().unwrap();
        assert!(!buf.is_alive());
    }

    #[test]
    fn boundary_sizes() {
        let ps = page_size();
        for size in [
            1_usize,
            15,
            16,
            31,
            32,
            33,
            63,
            64,
            ps - 1,
            ps,
            ps + 1,
            ps * 2,
        ] {
            let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(size).unwrap();
            assert_eq!(buf.size(), size);
            // Fill with known pattern.
            buf.bytes().fill(0xAB);
            assert!(buf.as_slice().iter().all(|&b| b == 0xAB));
            buf.destroy().unwrap();
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn canary_pre_guard_corruption_detected() {
        // Corrupt the PRE-guard page and verify destroy() detects it.
        let ps = page_size();
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(64).unwrap();
        // The pre-guard is at alloc_ptr (before inner_ptr).
        // Temporarily make it writable and flip a byte.
        let pre_guard = buf.alloc_ptr.as_ptr();
        unsafe {
            os_protect(pre_guard, ps, Protection::ReadWrite).unwrap();
            *pre_guard = !*pre_guard;
        }
        let result = buf.destroy();
        assert!(
            result.is_err(),
            "pre-guard canary corruption must be detected"
        );
        let msg = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
        assert!(msg.contains("canary"), "error must mention canary: {msg}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn drop_zeroes_inner_region() {
        // Write a known pattern, destroy, verify the buffer reports Dead
        // and the drop chain ran without panicking.
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(64).unwrap();
        buf.bytes().fill(0xDE);
        buf.destroy().unwrap();
        assert!(!buf.is_alive());
    }

    // ── OS-level guard-page enforcement (fork-based) ──────────────────────────
    //
    // These tests verify that freeze() (PROT_NONE inner region) and the
    // permanent guard pages actually cause SIGSEGV/SIGBUS at the OS level when
    // accessed incorrectly. Ported from asherah-ffi's memcall_protection.rs
    // which tested the same property on the underlying MemBuf primitive.

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn frozen_buffer_write_segfaults_in_child() {
        // Fill while mutable, freeze (inner → PROT_READ), fork a child that
        // attempts to WRITE — it must be killed by SIGSEGV or SIGBUS.
        // (Reading a frozen buffer is allowed; writing is not.)
        let mut buf = SecureBuffer::new(4096).unwrap();
        buf.bytes().fill(0x42);
        buf.freeze().unwrap();

        let ptr: *mut u8 = buf.as_slice().as_ptr().cast_mut();

        // SAFETY: fork is unsafe; child exits unconditionally.
        unsafe {
            let pid = libc::fork();
            assert!(pid >= 0, "fork failed");
            if pid == 0 {
                // Child: write to PROT_READ region → should SIGSEGV/SIGBUS.
                std::ptr::write_volatile(ptr, 0xFF);
                // Must never reach here.
                libc::_exit(0);
            } else {
                let mut status: i32 = 0;
                libc::waitpid(pid, &mut status, 0);
                assert!(
                    libc::WIFSIGNALED(status),
                    "child should have been killed by a signal (status={status})"
                );
                let sig = libc::WTERMSIG(status);
                assert!(
                    sig == libc::SIGSEGV || sig == libc::SIGBUS,
                    "expected SIGSEGV or SIGBUS on frozen-buffer write, got {sig}"
                );
            }
        }

        buf.melt().unwrap();
        buf.destroy().unwrap();
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn guard_page_write_segfaults_in_child() {
        // The pre/post guard pages are permanently PROT_NONE. Fork a child
        // that writes one byte past the inner region (into the post guard) —
        // it must be killed by SIGSEGV or SIGBUS.
        let ps = page_size();
        let buf = SecureBuffer::new(ps).unwrap();

        // inner_ptr points to the inner region; inner_ptr + ps is the post guard.
        let post_guard_ptr: *mut u8 = unsafe { buf.inner_ptr.as_ptr().add(ps).cast() };

        // SAFETY: fork is unsafe; child exits unconditionally.
        unsafe {
            let pid = libc::fork();
            assert!(pid >= 0, "fork failed");
            if pid == 0 {
                // Child: write to PROT_NONE guard page → should SIGSEGV/SIGBUS.
                std::ptr::write_volatile(post_guard_ptr, 0xFF);
                // Must never reach here.
                libc::_exit(0);
            } else {
                let mut status: i32 = 0;
                libc::waitpid(pid, &mut status, 0);
                assert!(
                    libc::WIFSIGNALED(status),
                    "child should have been killed by a signal (status={status})"
                );
                let sig = libc::WTERMSIG(status);
                assert!(
                    sig == libc::SIGSEGV || sig == libc::SIGBUS,
                    "expected SIGSEGV or SIGBUS on guard-page write, got {sig}"
                );
            }
        }
        // Buffer remains intact in the parent — guard pages are still PROT_NONE.
        drop(buf);
    }
}