gunnar-grpc 2.0.0

//! **Company single sign-on** (owner, 2026-10-05): an account's own identity
//! provider — OIDC or SAML 2.0 — SCIM 2.0 provisioning and a CSV import.
//!
//! The pieces:
//!
//! * [`plane`] — the storage seam ([`plane::SsoPlane`]); the identity table
//!   behind it is `gunnar_core::AuthTable`'s.
//! * [`SsoState`] — what one listener holds in memory: the flows begun and
//!   not yet finished (single use, ten minutes), the second-factor tickets
//!   (single use, five minutes), the SAML assertion ids already consumed, the
//!   IdPs' discovery documents and keys (an hour), and the rate windows.
//! * [`oidc`] and [`saml`] — the two protocols, over edda's verifiers
//!   (`nornir_auth_oidc::rp`, `nornir_auth_saml::sp`).
//! * [`scim`] — SCIM 2.0 Users and Groups, and the CSV import.
//! * [`Egress`] — the one way gunnar reaches an IdP over the network, handed
//!   in by `gunnar-server` (its blocking `ureq`): https only, no redirects,
//!   bounded size and time, and never a loopback or private address unless the
//!   operator turned on the test door.

pub mod directory;
pub mod idp_ca;
pub mod oidc;
pub mod plane;
pub mod saml;
pub mod scim;

use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};

/// How long a begun flow may wait for the IdP: ten minutes.
pub const FLOW_TTL_MS: i64 = 10 * 60_000;
/// How long a second-factor ticket lives: five minutes.
pub const SECOND_TTL_MS: i64 = 5 * 60_000;
/// The most flows a listener holds open at once.
pub const MAX_FLOWS: usize = 10_000;
/// The most flows ONE account holds open at once.
pub const MAX_FLOWS_PER_ACCOUNT: usize = 500;
/// Clock skew tolerated on IdP timestamps: two minutes.
pub const SKEW_SECS: i64 = 120;
/// How long an IdP's discovery document and keys are trusted: an hour.
pub const IDP_CACHE_MS: i64 = 60 * 60_000;
/// The most bytes an IdP answer may be.
pub const MAX_IDP_BODY: usize = 1 << 20;
/// Logins begun per account per minute.
pub const BEGINS_PER_MINUTE: u32 = 120;
/// SCIM requests per bearer per minute.
pub const SCIM_PER_MINUTE: u32 = 600;
/// Failed finishes per account per minute before the account's logins are
/// held back for the rest of the minute.
pub const FAILURES_PER_MINUTE: u32 = 60;

/// **The network, as gunnar reaches an IdP.** Blocking (called from
/// `spawn_blocking`); the implementation enforces [`url_allowed`] again,
/// follows no redirect, and reads at most [`MAX_IDP_BODY`].
pub trait Egress: Send + Sync {
    /// `GET url` → (status, body).
    fn get(&self, url: &str) -> Result<(u16, String), String>;
    /// `POST url` with a form body and an `Authorization` header →
    /// (status, body).
    fn post_form(
        &self,
        url: &str,
        authorization: &str,
        body: &str,
    ) -> Result<(u16, String), String>;
    /// [`Egress::get`] trusting `ca` (DER certificates: ONE account's IdP CA,
    /// `gunnar_core::sso::parse_idp_ca`) beside the public roots. An egress
    /// that cannot add a trust anchor refuses a call that names one.
    fn get_trusting(&self, url: &str, ca: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<(u16, String), String> {
        if ca.is_empty() {
            return self.get(url);
        }
        Err("this server's egress cannot trust an identity provider's own CA".to_owned())
    }
    /// [`Egress::post_form`] trusting `ca`, as [`Egress::get_trusting`].
    fn post_form_trusting(
        &self,
        url: &str,
        authorization: &str,
        body: &str,
        ca: &[Vec<u8>],
    ) -> Result<(u16, String), String> {
        if ca.is_empty() {
            return self.post_form(url, authorization, body);
        }
        Err("this server's egress cannot trust an identity provider's own CA".to_owned())
    }
}

/// **The operator's internal networks an IdP may live on** (owner 2026-10-06:
/// a private gunnar whose company IdP is on the company's own network).
/// Set per ESTATE by its operator (the installer's feed,
/// `sso_private_idp_cidrs`), never by an account admin; empty — today's guard
/// — unless set. Only private ranges may be named (RFC 1918, carrier-grade
/// NAT, unique-local IPv6): loopback, link-local (the cloud's metadata
/// service), multicast, documentation and public ranges are refused when the
/// list is read, so no list can open them. An address inside a listed network
/// passes the egress guard; every other address is judged as before, and the
/// pinned resolver still connects to exactly what was checked.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PrivateNets(Vec<(std::net::IpAddr, u8)>);

impl PrivateNets {
    /// Read a list (`10.0.2.100/32, fd00::/8`; commas or white space).
    pub fn parse(text: &str) -> Result<PrivateNets, String> {
        use std::net::IpAddr;
        let mut nets = Vec::new();
        for word in text.split(|c: char| c == ',' || c.is_whitespace()).filter(|w| !w.is_empty()) {
            let (addr, len) = word
                .split_once('/')
                .ok_or_else(|| format!("{word:?} is not a network: name it as address/length (10.0.2.100/32)"))?;
            let ip: IpAddr = addr.parse().map_err(|_| format!("{word:?}: {addr:?} is not an address"))?;
            let len: u8 = len.parse().map_err(|_| format!("{word:?}: {len:?} is not a prefix length"))?;
            let private = match ip {
                IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
                    len <= 32 && PRIVATE_V4.iter().any(|(net, plen)| len >= *plen && v4_in(v4, *net, *plen))
                }
                IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
                    // An IPv4 network is named as itself, not smuggled in IPv6.
                    v6.to_ipv4_mapped().is_none()
                        && (7..=128).contains(&len)
                        && v6.segments()[0] & 0xfe00 == 0xfc00
                }
            };
            if !private {
                return Err(format!(
                    "{word:?} is not inside a private network: an operator may list RFC 1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, \
                     192.168/16), carrier-grade NAT (100.64/10) or unique-local IPv6 (fc00::/7) ranges only — never \
                     loopback, link-local (the cloud's metadata service), documentation or public ones"
                ));
            }
            nets.push((ip, len));
        }
        Ok(PrivateNets(nets))
    }

    /// No network is listed.
    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
        self.0.is_empty()
    }

    /// Is `ip` inside a listed network? (An IPv4 address carried in IPv6 is
    /// judged as the IPv4 address.)
    pub fn contains(&self, ip: std::net::IpAddr) -> bool {
        use std::net::IpAddr;
        let ip = match ip {
            IpAddr::V6(v6) => v6.to_ipv4_mapped().map_or(ip, IpAddr::V4),
            v4 => v4,
        };
        self.0.iter().any(|(net, len)| match (ip, net) {
            (IpAddr::V4(a), IpAddr::V4(n)) => v4_in(a, *n, *len),
            (IpAddr::V6(a), IpAddr::V6(n)) => {
                let mask = if *len == 0 { 0 } else { u128::MAX << (128 - u32::from(*len)) };
                u128::from(a) & mask == u128::from(*n) & mask
            }
            _ => false,
        })
    }
}

/// The IPv4 ranges an operator may list: RFC 1918 and carrier-grade NAT.
const PRIVATE_V4: [(std::net::Ipv4Addr, u8); 4] = [
    (std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 0, 0), 8),
    (std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(172, 16, 0, 0), 12),
    (std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 0, 0), 16),
    (std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(100, 64, 0, 0), 10),
];

fn v4_in(ip: std::net::Ipv4Addr, net: std::net::Ipv4Addr, len: u8) -> bool {
    let mask = if len == 0 { 0 } else { u32::MAX << (32 - u32::from(len)) };
    u32::from(ip) & mask == u32::from(net) & mask
}

impl std::fmt::Display for PrivateNets {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        let words: Vec<String> = self.0.iter().map(|(ip, len)| format!("{ip}/{len}")).collect();
        f.write_str(&words.join(","))
    }
}

/// **May gunnar call this URL?** `https` to a named host or a public
/// address; never a loopback, private, link-local or unspecified literal —
/// an account admin types these URLs, and the box must not be made to probe
/// its own network. `allow_loopback_http` (the operator's test door) admits
/// `http://127.0.0.1|localhost|[::1]` and nothing else.
pub fn url_allowed(url: &str, allow_loopback_http: bool) -> Result<(), String> {
    url_allowed_in(url, allow_loopback_http, &PrivateNets::default())
}

/// `http://` to the loopback host only (`127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, `[::1]`, any
/// port): the operator's test door. The rule `nornir_auth_oidc::rp::endpoint_ok`
/// applies, here so it holds without the `sso` feature too.
fn loopback_http(url: &str) -> bool {
    let lower = url.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
    let Some(rest) = lower.strip_prefix("http://") else { return false };
    let host = rest.split(['/', '?', '#']).next().unwrap_or_default();
    let host = match host.rsplit_once(':') {
        Some((h, port)) if port.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) => h,
        _ => host,
    };
    matches!(host, "127.0.0.1" | "localhost" | "[::1]")
}

/// [`url_allowed`] on an estate whose operator listed internal networks an
/// IdP may live on ([`PrivateNets`]): an https literal inside one passes.
pub fn url_allowed_in(url: &str, allow_loopback_http: bool, nets: &PrivateNets) -> Result<(), String> {
    if allow_loopback_http
        && loopback_http(url)
        && url.to_ascii_lowercase().starts_with("http://")
    {
        return Ok(());
    }
    let lower = url.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
    let Some(rest) = lower.strip_prefix("https://") else {
        return Err(format!("{url:?} is not an https URL"));
    };
    let authority = rest.split(['/', '?', '#']).next().unwrap_or_default();
    if authority.contains('@') {
        return Err(format!("{url:?} carries credentials"));
    }
    let host = if let Some(v6) = authority.strip_prefix('[') {
        v6.split(']').next().unwrap_or_default().to_owned()
    } else {
        authority
            .rsplit_once(':')
            .map_or(authority, |(h, _)| h)
            .to_owned()
    };
    if host.is_empty() {
        return Err(format!("{url:?} names no host"));
    }
    if host == "localhost"
        || host.ends_with(".localhost")
        || host.ends_with(".internal")
        || host.ends_with(".local")
    {
        return Err(format!("{url:?} is a local name"));
    }
    if let Ok(ip) = host.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
        if let Some(why) = address_forbidden_in(ip, false, nets) {
            return Err(format!("{url:?} is a {why} address"));
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// **Why an address is no IdP's**, or `None` when it may be dialled: a
/// loopback, private, link-local (the cloud metadata service's
/// 169.254.169.254 among them), carrier-grade NAT, unspecified, broadcast,
/// multicast, documentation or reserved address — and the same inside an
/// IPv6 address that carries an IPv4 one (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`, NAT64
/// `64:ff9b::/96`). `allow_loopback` (the operator's test door) admits
/// loopback alone.
pub fn address_forbidden(ip: std::net::IpAddr, allow_loopback: bool) -> Option<&'static str> {
    use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr};
    let v6 = match ip {
        IpAddr::V4(v4) => return v4_forbidden(v4, allow_loopback),
        IpAddr::V6(v6) => v6,
    };
    if v6.is_loopback() {
        return (!allow_loopback).then_some("loopback");
    }
    if v6.is_unspecified() {
        return Some("unspecified");
    }
    // An IPv4 address carried inside IPv6 is judged as the IPv4 address it
    // is: mapped (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`), compatible (`::a.b.c.d`), NAT64
    // (`64:ff9b::/96`).
    if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped() {
        return v4_forbidden(v4, allow_loopback);
    }
    let s = v6.segments();
    let embedded = Ipv4Addr::from((u32::from(s[6]) << 16) | u32::from(s[7]));
    if s[..6] == [0; 6] || (s[0] == 0x64 && s[1] == 0xff9b && s[2..6] == [0; 4]) {
        return v4_forbidden(embedded, allow_loopback);
    }
    match s[0] {
        x if x & 0xfe00 == 0xfc00 => Some("unique-local (private)"),
        x if x & 0xffc0 == 0xfe80 => Some("link-local"),
        x if x & 0xffc0 == 0xfec0 => Some("site-local"),
        x if x & 0xff00 == 0xff00 => Some("multicast"),
        0x2001 if s[1] == 0x0db8 => Some("documentation"),
        _ => None,
    }
}

fn v4_forbidden(v4: std::net::Ipv4Addr, allow_loopback: bool) -> Option<&'static str> {
    let o = v4.octets();
    if v4.is_loopback() {
        return (!allow_loopback).then_some("loopback");
    }
    if v4.is_private() {
        return Some("private");
    }
    if v4.is_link_local() {
        return Some("link-local — the cloud's metadata service lives here");
    }
    if v4.is_unspecified() || o[0] == 0 {
        return Some("unspecified");
    }
    if v4.is_broadcast() {
        return Some("broadcast");
    }
    if v4.is_multicast() {
        return Some("multicast");
    }
    if o[0] == 100 && (64..=127).contains(&o[1]) {
        return Some("carrier-grade NAT (shared, private)");
    }
    if v4.is_documentation() {
        return Some("documentation");
    }
    if o[0] == 198 && (o[1] == 18 || o[1] == 19) {
        return Some("benchmarking");
    }
    if o[0] == 192 && o[1] == 0 && o[2] == 0 {
        return Some("IETF protocol assignments");
    }
    if o[0] >= 240 {
        return Some("reserved");
    }
    None
}

/// **Every address a host name resolved to must be one an IdP may have**
/// ([`address_forbidden`]) — one bad answer among good ones refuses the
/// name, because the connection may land on any of them. No answer at all is
/// a refusal too.
pub fn addresses_allowed(host: &str, addrs: &[std::net::SocketAddr], allow_loopback: bool) -> Result<(), String> {
    addresses_allowed_in(host, addrs, allow_loopback, &PrivateNets::default())
}

/// [`address_forbidden`], with the operator's internal networks admitted.
pub fn address_forbidden_in(ip: std::net::IpAddr, allow_loopback: bool, nets: &PrivateNets) -> Option<&'static str> {
    if nets.contains(ip) {
        return None;
    }
    address_forbidden(ip, allow_loopback)
}

/// [`addresses_allowed`], with the operator's internal networks admitted.
pub fn addresses_allowed_in(host: &str, addrs: &[std::net::SocketAddr], allow_loopback: bool, nets: &PrivateNets) -> Result<(), String> {
    if addrs.is_empty() {
        return Err(format!("{host} resolves to no address"));
    }
    for addr in addrs {
        if let Some(why) = address_forbidden_in(addr.ip(), allow_loopback, nets) {
            return Err(format!("{host} resolves to {} ({why}): an identity provider is never on this box's own network", addr.ip()));
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// A begun flow, waiting for the IdP.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct Flow {
    pub account: String,
    pub saml: bool,
    pub console_origin: String,
    pub expires_ms: i64,
    /// OIDC: the nonce and the PKCE verifier (never logged).
    pub nonce: String,
    pub verifier: String,
    pub redirect_uri: String,
    /// SAML: the AuthnRequest's ID (`InResponseTo`).
    pub request_id: String,
}

/// A login verified by the IdP, waiting for its passkey.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct Second {
    pub account: String,
    pub principal_id: String,
    pub register: bool,
    pub session_openssh: String,
    pub session_expires_ms: i64,
    pub expires_ms: i64,
}

#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct CachedIdp {
    #[cfg(feature = "sso")]
    pub discovery: nornir_auth_oidc::rp::Discovery,
    pub jwks: String,
    pub fetched_ms: i64,
}

#[derive(Default)]
struct Windows {
    /// key → (minute, count)
    counts: HashMap<String, (i64, u32)>,
}

/// **One listener's SSO memory.** Every map is bounded and swept on use.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct SsoState {
    egress: RwLock<Option<Arc<dyn Egress>>>,
    allow_loopback_http: AtomicBool,
    /// The operator's internal networks an IdP may live on (the feed's
    /// `sso_private_idp_cidrs`); shared with the server's resolver.
    private_nets: Arc<RwLock<PrivateNets>>,
    flows: Mutex<HashMap<String, Flow>>,
    seconds: Mutex<HashMap<String, Second>>,
    saml_seen: Mutex<HashMap<String, i64>>,
    idps: Mutex<HashMap<String, CachedIdp>>,
    windows: Mutex<Windows>,
}

fn lock<T>(m: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
    match m.lock() {
        Ok(g) => g,
        Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
    }
}

impl SsoState {
    /// Hand in the network (`gunnar-server` does, at start).
    pub fn set_egress(&self, egress: Arc<dyn Egress>) {
        *self.egress.write().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()) = Some(egress);
    }

    pub fn egress(&self) -> Option<Arc<dyn Egress>> {
        self.egress
            .read()
            .unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner())
            .clone()
    }

    /// The operator's test door: an IdP on this box's loopback, over http.
    pub fn set_allow_loopback_http(&self, allow: bool) {
        self.allow_loopback_http.store(allow, Ordering::SeqCst);
    }

    pub fn allow_loopback_http(&self) -> bool {
        self.allow_loopback_http.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
    }

    /// The operator's internal networks an IdP may live on (estate config).
    pub fn set_private_nets(&self, nets: PrivateNets) {
        *self.private_nets.write().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()) = nets;
    }

    pub fn private_nets(&self) -> PrivateNets {
        self.private_nets.read().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()).clone()
    }

    /// The same list, shared: the server's resolver reads it per lookup.
    pub fn private_nets_handle(&self) -> Arc<RwLock<PrivateNets>> {
        Arc::clone(&self.private_nets)
    }

    /// Store a begun flow under the hash of its state. Refused when the
    /// listener or the account holds too many.
    pub fn begin(&self, state_hash: String, flow: Flow, now: i64) -> Result<(), String> {
        let mut flows = lock(&self.flows);
        flows.retain(|_, f| f.expires_ms > now);
        if flows.len() >= MAX_FLOWS {
            return Err(
                "too many sign-ins are waiting for their identity providers; try again in a minute"
                    .to_owned(),
            );
        }
        if flows.values().filter(|f| f.account == flow.account).count() >= MAX_FLOWS_PER_ACCOUNT {
            return Err(format!(
                "too many sign-ins to {} are waiting; try again in a minute",
                flow.account
            ));
        }
        flows.insert(state_hash, flow);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Take a flow by the hash of its state: single use, whatever happens
    /// next; `None` when unknown or expired.
    pub fn take_flow(&self, state_hash: &str, now: i64) -> Option<Flow> {
        let mut flows = lock(&self.flows);
        flows.remove(state_hash).filter(|f| f.expires_ms > now)
    }

    pub fn park_second(&self, ticket_hash: String, second: Second, now: i64) -> Result<(), String> {
        let mut seconds = lock(&self.seconds);
        seconds.retain(|_, s| s.expires_ms > now);
        if seconds.len() >= MAX_FLOWS {
            return Err("too many sign-ins are waiting for their passkeys".to_owned());
        }
        seconds.insert(ticket_hash, second);
        Ok(())
    }

    pub fn take_second(&self, ticket_hash: &str, now: i64) -> Option<Second> {
        lock(&self.seconds)
            .remove(ticket_hash)
            .filter(|s| s.expires_ms > now)
    }

    /// **A SAML assertion id, once.** False when it was seen before (a
    /// replay); remembered until `until_ms`.
    pub fn first_sight(&self, assertion_id: &str, until_ms: i64, now: i64) -> bool {
        let mut seen = lock(&self.saml_seen);
        seen.retain(|_, until| *until > now);
        if seen.contains_key(assertion_id) {
            return false;
        }
        if seen.len() >= 100_000 {
            // Full of live ids: refuse rather than forget one.
            return false;
        }
        seen.insert(assertion_id.to_owned(), until_ms.max(now + FLOW_TTL_MS));
        true
    }

    pub fn cached_idp(&self, issuer: &str, now: i64) -> Option<CachedIdp> {
        lock(&self.idps)
            .get(issuer)
            .filter(|c| now - c.fetched_ms < IDP_CACHE_MS)
            .cloned()
    }

    pub fn cache_idp(&self, issuer: &str, idp: CachedIdp) {
        let mut idps = lock(&self.idps);
        if idps.len() >= 4096 {
            idps.clear();
        }
        idps.insert(issuer.to_owned(), idp);
    }

    /// **A rate window**: count one event for `key` in the current minute;
    /// false when that makes more than `limit`.
    pub fn allow(&self, key: &str, limit: u32, now: i64) -> bool {
        let minute = now / 60_000;
        let mut w = lock(&self.windows);
        if w.counts.len() > 50_000 {
            w.counts.retain(|_, (m, _)| *m == minute);
        }
        let entry = w.counts.entry(key.to_owned()).or_insert((minute, 0));
        if entry.0 != minute {
            *entry = (minute, 0);
        }
        entry.1 += 1;
        entry.1 <= limit
    }

    /// How many events `key` counted this minute (without counting one).
    pub fn counted(&self, key: &str, now: i64) -> u32 {
        let minute = now / 60_000;
        lock(&self.windows)
            .counts
            .get(key)
            .filter(|(m, _)| *m == minute)
            .map_or(0, |(_, n)| *n)
    }
}

/// `2026-10-05T12:00:00Z` for a unix second (UTC, proleptic Gregorian).
pub fn rfc3339(unix: i64) -> String {
    let days = unix.div_euclid(86_400);
    let secs = unix.rem_euclid(86_400);
    // Howard Hinnant's civil_from_days.
    let z = days + 719_468;
    let era = z.div_euclid(146_097);
    let doe = z - era * 146_097;
    let yoe = (doe - doe / 1460 + doe / 36_524 - doe / 146_096) / 365;
    let y = yoe + era * 400;
    let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100);
    let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153;
    let d = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1;
    let m = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 };
    let y = if m <= 2 { y + 1 } else { y };
    format!(
        "{y:04}-{m:02}-{d:02}T{:02}:{:02}:{:02}Z",
        secs / 3600,
        secs % 3600 / 60,
        secs % 60
    )
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn urls_an_admin_types_cannot_reach_inside() {
        assert!(url_allowed("https://login.example.com/x", false).is_ok());
        for bad in [
            "http://login.example.com/",
            "https://127.0.0.1/",
            "https://10.0.0.5:8443/",
            "https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data",
            "https://[::1]/",
            "https://[fd00::1]/",
            "https://localhost/",
            "https://user:pw@login.example.com/",
            "https://100.64.1.1/",
            "ftp://login.example.com/",
        ] {
            assert!(url_allowed(bad, false).is_err(), "{bad} was allowed");
        }
        assert!(url_allowed("http://127.0.0.1:9000/x", true).is_ok());
        assert!(url_allowed("http://10.0.0.5/x", true).is_err());
        assert!(
            url_allowed("https://127.0.0.1/", true).is_err(),
            "the test door is http loopback only"
        );
    }

    /// ★ **A name that resolves inside the box is no IdP** — loopback,
    /// private, link-local (the metadata service), CGNAT, and the same
    /// smuggled inside IPv6; a public address is one.
    #[test]
    fn addresses_inside_the_box_are_refused() {
        use std::net::IpAddr;
        for bad in [
            "127.0.0.1", "127.8.9.10", "10.1.2.3", "172.16.0.1", "192.168.1.1", "169.254.169.254", "100.64.0.1",
            "0.0.0.0", "255.255.255.255", "224.0.0.1", "192.0.2.10", "198.18.0.1", "240.0.0.1",
            "::1", "::", "fd00::1", "fe80::1", "ff02::1", "2001:db8::1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1", "::ffff:10.0.0.1",
            "::ffff:169.254.169.254", "64:ff9b::a00:1", "fec0::1",
        ] {
            let ip: IpAddr = bad.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(address_forbidden(ip, false).is_some(), "{bad} was allowed");
        }
        for good in ["93.184.216.34", "1.1.1.1", "2606:4700:4700::1111", "2a00:1450:4001::200e"] {
            let ip: IpAddr = good.parse().unwrap();
            assert_eq!(address_forbidden(ip, false), None, "{good} was refused");
        }
        // The test door admits loopback and nothing else private.
        assert_eq!(address_forbidden("127.0.0.1".parse().unwrap(), true), None);
        assert_eq!(address_forbidden("::1".parse().unwrap(), true), None);
        assert!(address_forbidden("10.0.0.1".parse().unwrap(), true).is_some());
        assert!(address_forbidden("169.254.169.254".parse().unwrap(), true).is_some());
    }

    #[test]
    fn every_resolved_address_must_pass() {
        let a = |s: &str| -> std::net::SocketAddr { s.parse().unwrap() };
        assert!(addresses_allowed("idp.example.test", &[a("93.184.216.34:443")], false).is_ok());
        let mixed = addresses_allowed("idp.example.test", &[a("93.184.216.34:443"), a("10.0.0.7:443")], false);
        assert!(mixed.unwrap_err().contains("10.0.0.7"), "one private answer among public ones passed");
        assert!(addresses_allowed("idp.example.test", &[], false).is_err());
    }

    /// ★ **The operator's internal networks** (owner 2026-10-06): only
    /// private ranges may be listed — never loopback, link-local (the
    /// metadata service), multicast, documentation, public or a range that
    /// reaches outside a private one.
    #[test]
    fn only_private_networks_may_be_listed() {
        let nets = PrivateNets::parse("10.0.2.100/32, 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.7.0/24,100.64.0.0/10\nfd00::/8").expect("private ranges");
        assert_eq!(nets.to_string(), "10.0.2.100/32,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.7.0/24,100.64.0.0/10,fd00::/8");
        assert_eq!(PrivateNets::parse("").expect("empty"), PrivateNets::default());
        assert_eq!(PrivateNets::parse("  ").expect("blank"), PrivateNets::default());
        for bad in [
            "127.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.1/32", "169.254.169.254/32", "169.254.0.0/16", "0.0.0.0/0", "8.8.8.0/24",
            "10.0.0.0/7", "192.0.2.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1/128", "fe80::/10", "::/0", "2001:db8::/32",
            "10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.0/33", "fd00::/129", "not-a-net", "::ffff:10.0.0.0/104",
        ] {
            assert!(PrivateNets::parse(bad).is_err(), "{bad} was accepted");
        }
    }

    /// ★ **An address inside a listed network passes; nothing else changes.**
    #[test]
    fn a_listed_network_admits_its_addresses_and_no_other() {
        use std::net::IpAddr;
        let nets = PrivateNets::parse("10.0.2.100/32,fd00:aa::/32").expect("nets");
        let ip = |s: &str| -> IpAddr { s.parse().unwrap() };
        assert!(nets.contains(ip("10.0.2.100")));
        assert!(nets.contains(ip("::ffff:10.0.2.100")), "v4-in-v6 is judged as v4");
        assert!(nets.contains(ip("fd00:aa::7")));
        assert!(!nets.contains(ip("10.0.2.101")));
        assert_eq!(address_forbidden_in(ip("10.0.2.100"), false, &nets), None);
        assert!(address_forbidden_in(ip("10.0.2.101"), false, &nets).is_some());
        assert!(address_forbidden_in(ip("169.254.169.254"), false, &nets).is_some());
        assert!(address_forbidden_in(ip("127.0.0.1"), false, &nets).is_some());
        assert_eq!(address_forbidden_in(ip("93.184.216.34"), false, &nets), None, "public stays public");
        assert!(url_allowed_in("https://10.0.2.100:8443/realms/cov", false, &nets).is_ok());
        assert!(url_allowed_in("https://10.0.2.101:8443/realms/cov", false, &nets).is_err());
        assert!(url_allowed_in("http://10.0.2.100:8443/realms/cov", false, &nets).is_err(), "still https only");
        assert!(url_allowed("https://10.0.2.100:8443/realms/cov", false).is_err(), "no list: today's guard");
        let a = |s: &str| -> std::net::SocketAddr { s.parse().unwrap() };
        assert!(addresses_allowed_in("idp.corp.internal.example", &[a("10.0.2.100:8443")], false, &nets).is_ok());
        assert!(addresses_allowed_in("idp.corp.internal.example", &[a("10.0.2.100:8443"), a("10.9.9.9:8443")], false, &nets).is_err());
        let s = SsoState::default();
        assert!(s.private_nets().is_empty());
        s.set_private_nets(nets.clone());
        assert_eq!(*s.private_nets_handle().read().unwrap(), nets, "the resolver's handle sees the list");
    }

    #[test]
    fn flows_are_single_use_and_expire() {
        let s = SsoState::default();
        let flow = |account: &str| Flow {
            account: account.into(),
            saml: false,
            console_origin: String::new(),
            expires_ms: 1_000 + FLOW_TTL_MS,
            nonce: String::new(),
            verifier: String::new(),
            redirect_uri: String::new(),
            request_id: String::new(),
        };
        s.begin("a".into(), flow("acme"), 1_000).unwrap();
        assert!(s.take_flow("a", 2_000).is_some());
        assert!(s.take_flow("a", 2_000).is_none(), "a flow was taken twice");
        s.begin("b".into(), flow("acme"), 1_000).unwrap();
        assert!(
            s.take_flow("b", 1_000 + FLOW_TTL_MS + 1).is_none(),
            "an expired flow was taken"
        );
        for i in 0..MAX_FLOWS_PER_ACCOUNT {
            s.begin(format!("x{i}"), flow("acme"), 1_000).unwrap();
        }
        assert!(s.begin("over".into(), flow("acme"), 1_000).is_err());
        assert!(s.begin("other".into(), flow("globex"), 1_000).is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_assertion_is_consumed_once() {
        let s = SsoState::default();
        assert!(s.first_sight("_a1", 10_000_000, 1_000));
        assert!(
            !s.first_sight("_a1", 10_000_000, 2_000),
            "a replayed assertion was accepted"
        );
        assert!(s.first_sight("_a2", 10_000_000, 2_000));
    }

    #[test]
    fn rate_windows_count_per_minute() {
        let s = SsoState::default();
        for _ in 0..3 {
            assert!(s.allow("k", 3, 60_000));
        }
        assert!(!s.allow("k", 3, 61_000));
        assert!(s.allow("k", 3, 120_000), "a new minute starts afresh");
    }

    #[test]
    fn rfc3339_is_utc() {
        assert_eq!(rfc3339(0), "1970-01-01T00:00:00Z");
        assert_eq!(rfc3339(1_800_000_000), "2027-01-15T08:00:00Z");
        assert_eq!(rfc3339(951_782_400), "2000-02-29T00:00:00Z");
    }
}