gmcrypto-core 0.4.0

//! Streaming SM4-CBC encrypt / decrypt (v0.3 W5).
//!
//! Single-shot v0.2 [`super::mode_cbc::encrypt`] / [`super::mode_cbc::decrypt`]
//! still ship unchanged; this module adds an `update`/`finalize` shape
//! for callers who can't materialize the full plaintext / ciphertext
//! up front.
//!
//! # Equivalence with v0.2 single-shot
//!
//! For any plaintext `M` partitioned into chunks `M = c_0 || c_1 || ...
//! || c_n`, the streaming encryptor's concatenated output equals
//! `super::mode_cbc::encrypt(key, iv, M)` byte-for-byte. Same goes
//! for the decryptor.
//!
//! # Padding-oracle posture
//!
//! Same as v0.2's single-shot decrypt — see the
//! [`super::mode_cbc`] module-doc. Wrap with HMAC-SM3 + encrypt-then-
//! MAC if you need integrity in the presence of network attackers.
//! The streaming decryptor's PKCS#7 strip on `finalize` reuses the
//! v0.2 constant-time scan idiom — it does not reimplement it.
//!
//! # Streaming decrypt buffer-back-by-one rule
//!
//! [`Sm4CbcDecryptor::update`] holds the **most recent decrypted
//! block** back from emission so that `finalize` can apply PKCS#7
//! strip to it — even on a chunked-input call where the boundary
//! between "last block" and "not last block" is only known at
//! `finalize` time. This avoids an early-emit padding oracle: the
//! caller sees plaintext bytes only after `finalize` confirms the
//! overall structure is consistent.
//!
//! # Failure-mode invariant
//!
//! [`Sm4CbcDecryptor::finalize`] returns `Option<Vec<u8>>` — `None`
//! on any decrypt-side failure (length not multiple of 16, invalid
//! PKCS#7). Single uninformative shape per `CLAUDE.md`.

use crate::sm4::cipher::{BLOCK_SIZE, KEY_SIZE, Sm4Cipher};
use alloc::vec::Vec;
use subtle::{ConditionallySelectable, ConstantTimeEq, ConstantTimeGreater};

/// Streaming SM4-CBC encryptor with PKCS#7 padding.
///
/// Construct with `new(&key, &iv)`, feed plaintext via `update`,
/// finalize with `finalize` (returns the full ciphertext as a
/// `Vec<u8>`). The IV must be **caller-supplied unpredictable**
/// per NIST SP 800-38A Appendix C — same contract as
/// [`super::mode_cbc::encrypt`].
///
/// `update` may be called any number of times with arbitrary chunk
/// sizes. `finalize` must be called exactly once; after `finalize`
/// the instance is consumed.
pub struct Sm4CbcEncryptor {
    cipher: Sm4Cipher,
    /// Most recent ciphertext block (or IV before the first block
    /// is emitted).
    prev: [u8; BLOCK_SIZE],
    /// Buffered partial-block bytes from the tail of the most
    /// recent `update` call.
    buffer: [u8; BLOCK_SIZE],
    /// Number of valid bytes in `buffer`. Always `< BLOCK_SIZE`.
    buffer_len: usize,
    /// Accumulated ciphertext so far (full blocks only).
    output: Vec<u8>,
}

impl Sm4CbcEncryptor {
    /// Construct a new streaming encryptor. The IV must be
    /// CSPRNG-derived per the SM4-CBC IV contract.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(key: &[u8; KEY_SIZE], iv: &[u8; BLOCK_SIZE]) -> Self {
        Self {
            cipher: Sm4Cipher::new(key),
            prev: *iv,
            buffer: [0u8; BLOCK_SIZE],
            buffer_len: 0,
            output: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Absorb plaintext bytes. Emits ciphertext for every full
    /// 16-byte block; trailing partial bytes are buffered until the
    /// next `update` or `finalize`.
    pub fn update(&mut self, mut data: &[u8]) {
        // Top up the buffer first if it's partially filled.
        if self.buffer_len > 0 {
            let need = BLOCK_SIZE - self.buffer_len;
            let take = need.min(data.len());
            self.buffer[self.buffer_len..self.buffer_len + take].copy_from_slice(&data[..take]);
            self.buffer_len += take;
            data = &data[take..];
            if self.buffer_len == BLOCK_SIZE {
                let block = self.buffer;
                self.encrypt_one(&block);
                self.buffer_len = 0;
            }
        }
        // Drain whole blocks straight from the input.
        while data.len() >= BLOCK_SIZE {
            let mut block = [0u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
            block.copy_from_slice(&data[..BLOCK_SIZE]);
            self.encrypt_one(&block);
            data = &data[BLOCK_SIZE..];
        }
        // Buffer any trailing partial block.
        if !data.is_empty() {
            self.buffer[..data.len()].copy_from_slice(data);
            self.buffer_len = data.len();
        }
    }

    /// Apply PKCS#7 padding to the buffered tail and emit the final
    /// ciphertext block(s). Consumes the encryptor.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn finalize(mut self) -> Vec<u8> {
        // PKCS#7: append `pad_len = BLOCK_SIZE - buffer_len` copies
        // of `pad_len`. When buffer_len == 0, that's a full block of
        // `0x10` per RFC 5652 §6.3.
        #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)]
        let pad_len = (BLOCK_SIZE - self.buffer_len) as u8;
        for i in self.buffer_len..BLOCK_SIZE {
            self.buffer[i] = pad_len;
        }
        let block = self.buffer;
        self.encrypt_one(&block);
        self.output
    }

    fn encrypt_one(&mut self, plaintext_block: &[u8; BLOCK_SIZE]) {
        let mut block = *plaintext_block;
        for (b, p) in block.iter_mut().zip(self.prev.iter()) {
            *b ^= *p;
        }
        self.cipher.encrypt_block(&mut block);
        self.prev = block;
        self.output.extend_from_slice(&block);
    }
}

/// Streaming SM4-CBC decryptor with PKCS#7 strip.
///
/// Construct with `new(&key, &iv)`, feed ciphertext via `update`,
/// finalize with `finalize` (returns `Option<Vec<u8>>`).
///
/// **Buffer-back-by-one:** `update` decrypts every full 16-byte
/// block but holds the **most recent decrypted block** back from
/// emission until `finalize` confirms it is the last block. This
/// keeps the PKCS#7 strip uniform — no early-emit padding-oracle
/// surface during the streaming phase. Callers see plaintext only
/// after `finalize` validates the trailing-block padding.
///
/// Same single-`None` failure-mode posture as the v0.2 single-shot
/// [`super::mode_cbc::decrypt`].
pub struct Sm4CbcDecryptor {
    cipher: Sm4Cipher,
    /// Most recent ciphertext block (or IV before the first block).
    prev: [u8; BLOCK_SIZE],
    /// Buffered partial-block ciphertext bytes from the tail of the
    /// most recent `update` call.
    buffer: [u8; BLOCK_SIZE],
    buffer_len: usize,
    /// Accumulated plaintext from "definitely-not-the-last" blocks.
    output: Vec<u8>,
    /// The **last decrypted block** held back from emission. None if
    /// no full block has been processed yet.
    held_back: Option<[u8; BLOCK_SIZE]>,
}

impl Sm4CbcDecryptor {
    /// Construct a new streaming decryptor.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(key: &[u8; KEY_SIZE], iv: &[u8; BLOCK_SIZE]) -> Self {
        Self {
            cipher: Sm4Cipher::new(key),
            prev: *iv,
            buffer: [0u8; BLOCK_SIZE],
            buffer_len: 0,
            output: Vec::new(),
            held_back: None,
        }
    }

    /// Absorb ciphertext bytes.
    pub fn update(&mut self, mut data: &[u8]) {
        if self.buffer_len > 0 {
            let need = BLOCK_SIZE - self.buffer_len;
            let take = need.min(data.len());
            self.buffer[self.buffer_len..self.buffer_len + take].copy_from_slice(&data[..take]);
            self.buffer_len += take;
            data = &data[take..];
            if self.buffer_len == BLOCK_SIZE {
                let block = self.buffer;
                self.decrypt_one(&block);
                self.buffer_len = 0;
            }
        }
        while data.len() >= BLOCK_SIZE {
            let mut block = [0u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
            block.copy_from_slice(&data[..BLOCK_SIZE]);
            self.decrypt_one(&block);
            data = &data[BLOCK_SIZE..];
        }
        if !data.is_empty() {
            self.buffer[..data.len()].copy_from_slice(data);
            self.buffer_len = data.len();
        }
    }

    /// Strip PKCS#7 padding from the held-back final block and emit
    /// the full plaintext. Returns `None` if any failure mode is
    /// hit — length not multiple of 16, no full blocks ever seen,
    /// or padding-strip rejection.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn finalize(mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
        // Any partial buffered ciphertext at finalize time is invalid
        // (overall ciphertext length must be a multiple of 16).
        if self.buffer_len != 0 {
            return None;
        }
        let last = self.held_back?;
        let stripped = strip_pkcs7_block(&last)?;
        self.output.extend_from_slice(&last[..stripped]);
        Some(self.output)
    }

    fn decrypt_one(&mut self, ciphertext_block: &[u8; BLOCK_SIZE]) {
        let mut block = *ciphertext_block;
        let saved = block;
        self.cipher.decrypt_block(&mut block);
        for (b, p) in block.iter_mut().zip(self.prev.iter()) {
            *b ^= *p;
        }
        self.prev = saved;

        // Move any previously-held-back block to the output (it's
        // now confirmed-not-the-last) and replace it with the
        // freshly-decrypted block.
        if let Some(prev_held) = self.held_back.take() {
            self.output.extend_from_slice(&prev_held);
        }
        self.held_back = Some(block);
    }
}

/// Constant-time PKCS#7 strip on a 16-byte block. Returns the byte
/// count that should be retained (`BLOCK_SIZE - pad_len`) on success,
/// `None` on any malformed padding.
///
/// Same scan logic as [`super::mode_cbc::decrypt`]'s helper —
/// re-implemented here to avoid making the v0.2 helper public, but
/// byte-identical in behavior.
fn strip_pkcs7_block(block: &[u8; BLOCK_SIZE]) -> Option<usize> {
    let last = block[BLOCK_SIZE - 1];
    let pad_nonzero = !last.ct_eq(&0u8);
    #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)]
    let pad_le_block = !last.ct_gt(&(BLOCK_SIZE as u8));
    let pad_in_range = pad_nonzero & pad_le_block;

    let mut acc: u8 = 0;
    for (i, byte) in block.iter().enumerate() {
        #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)]
        let pos_from_end = (BLOCK_SIZE - i) as u8;
        let in_padding = !pos_from_end.ct_gt(&last);
        let diff = *byte ^ last;
        let masked = u8::conditional_select(&0u8, &diff, in_padding);
        acc |= masked;
    }
    let acc_zero = acc.ct_eq(&0u8);
    let valid = pad_in_range & acc_zero;
    if bool::from(valid) {
        Some(BLOCK_SIZE - last as usize)
    } else {
        None
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::sm4::mode_cbc;

    /// Equivalence with single-shot encrypt for a no-chunking call.
    #[test]
    fn encrypt_single_chunk_matches_v02() {
        let key = [0x42u8; KEY_SIZE];
        let iv = [0x33u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
        let plaintext = b"streaming round trip";
        let mut enc = Sm4CbcEncryptor::new(&key, &iv);
        enc.update(plaintext);
        let stream_ct = enc.finalize();
        let oneshot_ct = mode_cbc::encrypt(&key, &iv, plaintext);
        assert_eq!(stream_ct, oneshot_ct);
    }

    /// Equivalence with single-shot encrypt across chunk boundaries.
    #[test]
    fn encrypt_chunked_matches_v02() {
        let key = [0x42u8; KEY_SIZE];
        let iv = [0x33u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
        // 100-byte plaintext, mid-multi-block.
        let pt: Vec<u8> = (0..100u8).collect();
        // Several arbitrary chunkings.
        for chunk_size in [1usize, 7, 16, 17, 31, 32, 100] {
            let mut enc = Sm4CbcEncryptor::new(&key, &iv);
            for chunk in pt.chunks(chunk_size) {
                enc.update(chunk);
            }
            let stream_ct = enc.finalize();
            let oneshot_ct = mode_cbc::encrypt(&key, &iv, &pt);
            assert_eq!(stream_ct, oneshot_ct, "chunk_size={chunk_size}");
        }
    }

    /// Round-trip through streaming encrypt + streaming decrypt.
    #[test]
    fn streaming_round_trip() {
        let key = [0x42u8; KEY_SIZE];
        let iv = [0x33u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
        for len in [0usize, 1, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 100, 256] {
            #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)]
            let pt: Vec<u8> = (0..len).map(|i| (i as u8).wrapping_mul(13)).collect();
            let mut enc = Sm4CbcEncryptor::new(&key, &iv);
            enc.update(&pt);
            let ct = enc.finalize();

            // Decrypt across multiple chunkings.
            for chunk_size in [1usize, 7, 16, 17, 31, 32, ct.len().max(1)] {
                let mut dec = Sm4CbcDecryptor::new(&key, &iv);
                for chunk in ct.chunks(chunk_size) {
                    dec.update(chunk);
                }
                let recovered = dec.finalize().expect("decrypt");
                assert_eq!(recovered, pt, "len={len} chunk_size={chunk_size}");
            }
        }
    }

    /// Decrypt rejects truncated stream (length not multiple of 16).
    #[test]
    fn decrypt_rejects_truncated() {
        let key = [0x42u8; KEY_SIZE];
        let iv = [0x33u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
        let mut dec = Sm4CbcDecryptor::new(&key, &iv);
        dec.update(&[0xAB; 31]); // 31 bytes = 1 full block + 15 buffered
        assert!(dec.finalize().is_none());
    }

    /// Decrypt rejects empty stream (no full blocks at all).
    #[test]
    fn decrypt_rejects_empty() {
        let key = [0x42u8; KEY_SIZE];
        let iv = [0x33u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
        let dec = Sm4CbcDecryptor::new(&key, &iv);
        assert!(dec.finalize().is_none());
    }

    /// Decrypt rejects bad padding (tampered final block).
    #[test]
    fn decrypt_rejects_bad_padding() {
        let key = [0x42u8; KEY_SIZE];
        let iv = [0x33u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
        let pt = b"this is a test message that spans multiple blocks";
        let mut enc = Sm4CbcEncryptor::new(&key, &iv);
        enc.update(pt);
        let mut ct = enc.finalize();
        let last = ct.len() - 1;
        ct[last] ^= 0x01;
        let mut dec = Sm4CbcDecryptor::new(&key, &iv);
        dec.update(&ct);
        assert!(dec.finalize().is_none());
    }

    /// Cross-validation: streaming encrypt of a decryption of a
    /// streaming encrypt is a fixed point. (Stronger sanity check
    /// than just round-trip — exercises both paths against each
    /// other on the same instance.)
    #[test]
    fn streaming_decrypt_matches_v02_oneshot() {
        let key = [0x42u8; KEY_SIZE];
        let iv = [0x33u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
        let pt = b"test message for cross-validation";
        let canonical = mode_cbc::encrypt(&key, &iv, pt);

        // Decrypt the canonical ciphertext via streaming decryptor.
        let mut dec = Sm4CbcDecryptor::new(&key, &iv);
        dec.update(&canonical);
        let stream_pt = dec.finalize().expect("streaming decrypt");
        assert_eq!(stream_pt, pt);

        // And vice versa: oneshot decrypt of streaming ciphertext.
        let mut enc = Sm4CbcEncryptor::new(&key, &iv);
        enc.update(pt);
        let blob = enc.finalize();
        let recovered = mode_cbc::decrypt(&key, &iv, &blob).expect("oneshot decrypt");
        assert_eq!(recovered, pt);
    }
}