gm-crypto-rs

Constant-time-designed pure-Rust SM2 / SM3 / SM4 SDK for Chinese national cryptography (GB/T 32905 / 32918 / 32907 / GM/T 0009). Sign / verify, public-key encrypt / decrypt, SM4-CBC, HMAC-SM3, PBKDF2-HMAC-SM3 — all secret-touching paths guarded by an in-CI dudect-bencher detectable-leak regression harness.

Personal project notice: not affiliated with, endorsed by, sponsored by, or certified by any upstream cryptography project, payment gateway, standards body, or vendor.

What this is

A small, auditable, pure-Rust SM2 / SM3 / SM4 SDK whose central differentiating commitment is that secret-touching code paths are constant-time-designed and guarded by an in-CI dudect-bencher detectable-leak regression harness with 12 gates at |tau| < 0.20.

The harness reports timing-leak detection events. It does not prove constant-time. Low |tau| values mean the test could not detect a leak with the budget given, not that no leak exists. Language taken directly from dudect-bencher's own docs.

v0.3's harness covers 12 secret-touching code paths: SM2 sign (split by both private key d and nonce k magnitude, with both retry nonces class-tied), SM2 decrypt (split by recipient d_B), SM4 key schedule and encrypt (split by master key), HMAC-SM3 (split by key), the new v0.3 ct_pkcs8_decrypt (split by password bytes — both classes' blobs valid for their class's password so both succeed via identical control flow), plus direct Fn::invert and Fp::invert diagnostics. The ct_sign_k_class target closes v0.1's structural blind spot to nonce-only leaks. The crypto-bigint 0.6 → 0.7.3 upgrade resolved the v0.6-era ConstMontyForm::invert leak directly: at 100K samples on 0.7.3 both direct invert diagnostics measure under |tau| ≈ 0.01, two orders of magnitude below the gate. See SECURITY.md for the full posture.

The differentiator vs. existing Rust SM2 crates (notably RustCrypto/sm2, which already aims for constant-time secret-dependent operations in its design) is the in-CI regression gate, not the design intent in isolation.

What this isn't

• Not a TLS/TLCP implementation.
• Not SM9, ZUC, post-quantum.
• Not an HSM/SDF/SKF integration.
• Not a certified cryptographic module.
• Not constant-time on CPUs with data-dependent multiply latencies (some older x86, some embedded).
• Not a comprehensive SM-crypto library yet — see the milestone roadmap.

v0.3 scope (shipped)

Builds on v0.2 (SM4 + SM4-CBC + HMAC-SM3 + PBKDF2-HMAC-SM3 + SM2 encrypt/decrypt + dudect harness expansion to 11 targets). v0.3 adds the wire-format / interop / streaming / performance work that v0.2 deliberately deferred:

• Reusable strict-canonical DER reader / writer subset (gmcrypto_core::asn1::{reader, writer, oid}) — W1. asn1::sig and asn1::ciphertext ported on top; wire output and accept/reject behavior byte-identical to v0.2.
• PEM + encrypted PKCS#8 + X.509 SPKI + SEC1 codecs (gmcrypto_core::{pem, pkcs8, spki, sec1}) — W2. Hand-rolled, no_std, zero-runtime-deps. PBES2 with PBKDF2-HMAC-SM3 + SM4-CBC for encrypted PKCS#8.
• Full bidirectional gmssl interop — W3. SM2 sign / verify, SM2 encrypt / decrypt (GM/T 0009 DER), and SM4-CBC all cross-validated in both directions against gmssl 3.1.1 (gated on GMCRYPTO_GMSSL=1).
• Raw byte-concat SM2 ciphertext helpers (gmcrypto_core::sm2::raw_ciphertext) — W4. Modern C1 || C3 || C2 emit + decode; legacy C1 || C2 || C3 decrypt-only.
• Streaming HmacSm3 + Sm4Cbc{En,De}cryptor — W5. In-crate Hash / Mac / BlockCipher trait surface (gmcrypto_core::traits). RustCrypto trait fit deferred to v0.4 behind an opt-in feature flag.
• Comb-table mul_g optimization (~5× sign-side speedup) — W6. 64 sub-tables of 16 entries each, lazily built once per process via spin::Once. mul_g's public signature is unchanged; constant-time-designed lookup preserved. Adds one runtime dep (spin = "0.10", no_std, ~4 KB lib).

Everything v0.2 shipped is unchanged:

• SM3 hash function (#![no_std] + alloc).
• SM2 sign / verify with custom signer ID (default 1234567812345678 per GM/T 0009).
• SM2 public-key encrypt / decrypt with GM/T 0009-2012 ciphertext DER (SEQUENCE { x, y, hash, ciphertext }). Invalid-curve attack defense via on-curve check on C1 before scalar mult; non-branching KDF-zero detection so a chosen-ciphertext attacker cannot distinguish it from a normal MAC failure.
• SM4 block cipher (GB/T 32907-2016) and SM4-CBC (PKCS#7 padding, caller-supplied unpredictable IV per NIST SP 800-38A Appendix C). Constant-time-designed subtle linear-scan S-box (~1-2M blocks/s); bitsliced fast-path deferred to v0.4. PKCS#7 strip uses a constant-time scan over the final block; decrypt collapses every failure mode to a single None against padding-oracle attacks.
• HMAC-SM3 per RFC 2104, gmssl-cross-validated KAT vectors. Hash-first long-key path. v0.3 adds the streaming HmacSm3 shape alongside single-shot hmac_sm3.
• PBKDF2-HMAC-SM3 per RFC 8018 §5.2. Caller-supplied output buffer (no internal allocation, no iteration-count default).
• Constant-time-designed Fp and Fn field arithmetic via crypto-bigint = 0.7.3.
• Renes-Costello-Batina complete addition formulas for the SM2 curve (a=-3 specialized).
• Fixed-base (v0.3 comb-table) and variable-base scalar multiplication, both constant-time-designed with subtle::ConditionallySelectable linear-scan table lookup.
• Fixed-K masked-select signing retry: the retry loop runs K=2 iterations unconditionally, regardless of which iteration produced a valid signature. The constant-time contract holds for any RNG that respects CryptoRng; pathological RNGs cannot leak the secret via observable retry count.
• Strict canonical ASN.1 DER for SEQUENCE { r, s } (signatures), the GM/T 0009 SM2 ciphertext SEQUENCE, and all v0.3 PEM / PKCS#8 / SPKI / SEC1 wire formats. Rejects non-canonical leading-zero padding, sign-bit-set first bytes, empty content, and (for ciphertext coordinates) values ≥ p.
• KAT vectors from GB/T 32905-2016 (SM3), GB/T 32918.2-2017 / .5-2017 (SM2), GB/T 32907-2016 Appendix A.1 (SM4 single-block + 1M-round), GM/T 0042-2015 (HMAC-SM3), GM/T 0091-2020 (PBKDF2-HMAC-SM3).
• gmssl CLI cross-validation for HMAC-SM3, PBKDF2-HMAC-SM3, and (new in v0.3) SM2 sign/verify, SM2 encrypt/decrypt, and SM4-CBC in both directions. Gated on GMCRYPTO_GMSSL=1.
• dudect-bencher harness with 12 targets at |tau| < 0.20 — PR-smoke 10⁴ samples; nightly 10⁵ samples (more samples = tighter empirical confidence at the same threshold). Plus a deliberately- leaky negative control that proves the harness can detect leaks.
• Failure-mode invariant: error types collapse to single uninformative variants (SignError::Failed, DecryptError::Failed, EncryptError::Failed, pem::Error::Failed, pkcs8::Error::Failed); verify_with_id returns bool; DER decode returns Option. Defense against padding-oracle, malleability, and invalid-curve attacks.
• Zeroization on private keys, SM4 round keys, HMAC K' / K' XOR ipad / K' XOR opad, PBKDF2 intermediates, SM2 KDF buffers, and PKCS#8 inner-key scratch.

Roadmap

Quick-start

use gmcrypto_core::sm2::{
    sign_with_id, verify_with_id, Sm2PrivateKey, Sm2PublicKey, DEFAULT_SIGNER_ID,
};
use crypto_bigint::U256;
use getrandom::SysRng;
use rand_core::UnwrapErr;

let d = U256::from_be_hex(
    "3945208F7B2144B13F36E38AC6D39F95889393692860B51A42FB81EF4DF7C5B8",
);
let key = Sm2PrivateKey::new(d).expect("d in [1, n-2]");
let public = Sm2PublicKey::from_point(key.public_key());

let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
let sig = sign_with_id(&key, DEFAULT_SIGNER_ID, b"hello", &mut rng).unwrap();
assert!(verify_with_id(&public, DEFAULT_SIGNER_ID, b"hello", &sig));

Threat model

See SECURITY.md. Briefly: server-side use, dedicated host, operator-trusted, network MITM in scope, side-channel attacks beyond what the dudect harness covers are NOT in scope.

Build & test

cargo test --workspace                                # unit + integration
cargo bench --bench timing_leaks                      # local timing harness (~75s)
DUDECT_SAMPLES=10000 cargo bench --bench timing_leaks # match CI smoke budget

gmssl interop test (gated; install gmssl v3.1.1 to enable):

GMCRYPTO_GMSSL=1 cargo test --test interop_gmssl

License

Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.

Some reference outputs use the upstream gmssl tool. This project is independent of that project.