genfile 0.6.0

CLI for genfile_core template archive management - create, manage, and materialize code generation templates.
Documentation
# Invariant: Security

### Scope

- **Purpose**: Prevents path traversal attacks and injection vulnerabilities in file generation.
- **Responsibility**: Documents security constraints and the validation mechanisms enforcing them.
- **In Scope**: Path traversal prevention, no shell injection, safe binary file handling.
- **Out of Scope**: Network security (no external communication in CLI mode), authentication.

### Invariant Statement

All user-supplied file paths must be validated via a path validation function to reject `..` segments. No shell commands may be constructed from user input. Binary file content must be safely encoded without data leakage. Sensitive parameter values must not appear in logs or error messages.

### Enforcement Mechanism

A path validation function is called on all paths received from command arguments before use. No shell execution occurs with user-supplied data. Security-focused integration tests verify traversal rejection. Code review enforces no injection patterns.

### Violation Consequences

Path traversal allows an attacker to overwrite arbitrary files outside the intended output directory during materialization, potentially overwriting system files or source code.

### Features

| File | Relationship |
|------|--------------|
| [`feature/006_template_materialization.md`]../feature/006_template_materialization.md | Feature where path validation constraint is most critical |

### Sources

| File | Relationship |
|------|--------------|
| [`src/handlers/materialize.rs`]../../src/handlers/materialize.rs | Primary path validation call site |