garrison 0.9.0

Garrison - 面向 Rust 生态的一站式身份认证鉴权框架
Documentation
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// Copyright (c) 2026 Kirky.X🌠
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

//! JwtHandler 与 GarrisonJwtClaims 单元测试。

use super::*;
use crate::error::GarrisonError;

// 测试确定性工具:墙钟 NTP 回跳容错

/// 宿主墙钟 NTP 校时会整秒回跳(WSL2 门禁实测每 ~31s 回跳 ~1.35s):`verify`
/// 的 leeway=0(严格安全默认,见 handler.rs `verify`)下,`sign` 盖戳 nbf=now 后
/// 墙钟回跳会让紧随的 verify 误报 `jwt-not-yet-valid`(token 本身有效,属环境
/// 噪声)。下面两个包装仅对该误报做有限重试(每 35s 一次、至多 2 次);其余
/// 错误(签名不符/过期/算法不匹配等)原样立即 panic,不掩盖任何真实缺陷。
const NBF_RETRY_WAIT_SECS: u64 = 35;
const NBF_RETRY_ATTEMPTS: usize = 3;

/// verify 成功路径:nbf 回跳误报时有限重试,其余错误立即 panic。
///
/// `pub(crate)`:stp/mfa 与 stp/session 的 JWT 单测复用本包装。
pub(crate) fn verify_ok(handler: &JwtHandler, token: &str) -> GarrisonJwtClaims {
    for attempt in 0..NBF_RETRY_ATTEMPTS {
        match handler.verify(token) {
            Ok(claims) => return claims,
            Err(GarrisonError::InvalidToken(msg)) if msg.contains("jwt-not-yet-valid") => {
                if attempt + 1 < NBF_RETRY_ATTEMPTS {
                    std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(NBF_RETRY_WAIT_SECS));
                } else {
                    panic!("verify 在墙钟回跳重试后仍 nbf 未生效: {msg}");
                }
            },
            Err(e) => panic!("verify 失败(非 nbf 回跳场景,不重试): {e:?}"),
        }
    }
    unreachable!("重试循环内必然 return 或 panic")
}

/// refresh 成功路径:对旧 token 的 nbf 回跳误报有限重试(新 token 由调用方
/// 经 [`verify_ok`] 断言)。
fn refresh_ok(handler: &JwtHandler, token: &str, timeout: i64) -> String {
    for attempt in 0..NBF_RETRY_ATTEMPTS {
        match handler.refresh(token, timeout) {
            Ok(new_token) => return new_token,
            Err(GarrisonError::InvalidToken(msg)) if msg.contains("jwt-not-yet-valid") => {
                if attempt + 1 < NBF_RETRY_ATTEMPTS {
                    std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(NBF_RETRY_WAIT_SECS));
                } else {
                    panic!("refresh 在墙钟回跳重试后仍 nbf 未生效: {msg}");
                }
            },
            Err(e) => panic!("refresh 失败(非 nbf 回跳场景,不重试): {e:?}"),
        }
    }
    unreachable!("重试循环内必然 return 或 panic")
}

// GarrisonJwtClaims 测试

/// GarrisonJwtClaims 完整字段序列化。
#[test]
fn claims_serializes_full_fields() {
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: 1700000000,
        exp: 1700003600,
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: Some("web".to_string()),
        jti: Some("test-jti".to_string()),
        nbf: Some(1700000000),
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: None,
    };
    let json = serde_json::to_string(&claims).unwrap();
    assert!(json.contains("\"sub\":\"1001\""));
    assert!(json.contains("\"iat\":1700000000"));
    assert!(json.contains("\"exp\":1700003600"));
    assert!(json.contains("\"login_id\":\"1001\""));
    assert!(json.contains("\"device\":\"web\""));
    assert!(json.contains("\"jti\":\"test-jti\""));
    assert!(json.contains("\"nbf\":1700000000"));
}

/// GarrisonJwtClaims device 字段为 None 时序列化为 null。
#[test]
fn claims_device_none_serializes_as_null() {
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: 1700000000,
        exp: 1700003600,
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: None,
        nbf: None,
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: None,
    };
    let json = serde_json::to_string(&claims).unwrap();
    assert!(json.contains("\"device\":null"));
    // jti=None 时应跳过序列化(skip_serializing_if)
    assert!(!json.contains("jti"), "jti=None 时不应序列化 jti 字段");
    // nbf=None 时应跳过序列化(skip_serializing_if)
    assert!(!json.contains("nbf"), "nbf=None 时不应序列化 nbf 字段");
}

/// jti=None 时序列化结果不含 jti 字段(`skip_serializing_if`)。
#[test]
fn claims_jti_none_skipped_in_json() {
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: 1700000000,
        exp: 1700003600,
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: None,
        nbf: None,
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: None,
    };
    let json = serde_json::to_string(&claims).unwrap();
    assert!(!json.contains("jti"));
    assert!(!json.contains("nbf"));
}

/// sign 生成的新 token 包含唯一的 jti(UUID v4)。
#[test]
fn sign_generates_unique_jti() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let t1 = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let t2 = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    // 同一秒内同一用户的 token 应不同(jti 保证唯一性)
    assert_ne!(t1, t2, "jti 应保证同一秒内签发的 token 唯一");
    let c1 = verify_ok(&handler, &t1);
    let c2 = verify_ok(&handler, &t2);
    assert!(c1.jti.is_some(), "sign 生成的 token 应包含 jti");
    assert!(c2.jti.is_some());
    assert_ne!(c1.jti, c2.jti, "两个 token 的 jti 应不同");
}

/// 无 jti 字段的 claims 仍可反序列化(RFC 7519 中 jti 为可选 claim)。
#[test]
fn claims_without_jti_deserializes() {
    let json =
        r#"{"sub":"1001","iat":1700000000,"exp":1700003600,"login_id":"1001","device":"web"}"#;
    let claims: GarrisonJwtClaims = serde_json::from_str(json).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(claims.sub, "1001");
    assert_eq!(claims.jti, None, "无 jti 字段时应反序列化为 None");
}

/// GarrisonJwtClaims 可反序列化。
#[test]
fn claims_deserializes() {
    let json =
        r#"{"sub":"1001","iat":1700000000,"exp":1700003600,"login_id":"1001","device":"web"}"#;
    let claims: GarrisonJwtClaims = serde_json::from_str(json).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(claims.sub, "1001");
    assert_eq!(claims.iat, 1700000000);
    assert_eq!(claims.exp, 1700003600);
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "1001");
    assert_eq!(claims.device, Some("web".to_string()));
}

// JwtHandler 构造测试

/// new 默认采用 HS256 算法。
#[test]
fn new_defaults_to_hs256() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    assert_eq!(handler.algorithm, Algorithm::HS256);
    assert_eq!(handler.secret, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    assert!(handler.device.is_none());
}

/// with_algorithm 切换为 HS512。
#[test]
fn with_algorithm_switches_to_hs512() {
    let handler =
        JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef").with_algorithm(Algorithm::HS512);
    assert_eq!(handler.algorithm, Algorithm::HS512);
}

/// with_device 设置设备标识。
#[test]
fn with_device_sets_device() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef").with_device("ios-app");
    assert_eq!(handler.device, Some("ios-app".to_string()));
}

// sign 测试

/// sign 返回三段 Base64URL。
#[test]
fn sign_returns_three_segment_jwt() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let parts: Vec<&str> = token.split('.').collect();
    assert_eq!(parts.len(), 3, "JWT 应由三段组成");
    assert!(!parts[0].is_empty());
    assert!(!parts[1].is_empty());
    assert!(!parts[2].is_empty());
}

/// sign 空密钥返回 Config 错误。
#[test]
fn sign_rejects_empty_secret() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("");
    let result = handler.sign("1001", 3600);
    assert!(result.is_err());
    match result.err() {
        Some(GarrisonError::Config(msg)) => assert!(msg.contains("secret")),
        other => panic!("期望 Config 错误,实际: {:?}", other),
    }
}

/// sign 负数 timeout 返回 Config 错误。
#[test]
fn sign_rejects_negative_timeout() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let result = handler.sign("1001", -1);
    assert!(result.is_err());
    match result.err() {
        Some(GarrisonError::Config(msg)) => assert!(msg.contains("timeout")),
        other => panic!("期望 Config 错误,实际: {:?}", other),
    }
}

/// sign 带 device 写入 payload。
#[test]
fn sign_with_device_includes_device_in_claims() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef").with_device("ios-app");
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = verify_ok(&handler, &token);
    assert_eq!(claims.device, Some("ios-app".to_string()));
}

// verify 测试

/// verify 有效 token 返回 claims。
#[test]
fn verify_valid_token_returns_claims() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = verify_ok(&handler, &token);
    assert_eq!(claims.sub, "1001");
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "1001");
    assert!(claims.exp > claims.iat);
}

/// verify 篡改 payload 返回错误。
#[test]
fn verify_tampered_payload_fails() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let parts: Vec<&str> = token.split('.').collect();
    // 篡改 payload 段(替换为另一个 base64url 串)
    let tampered = format!("{}.{}.{}", parts[0], "ZmFrZS1wYXlsb2Fk", parts[2]);
    let result = handler.verify(&tampered);
    assert!(result.is_err());
}

/// verify 错误密钥返回错误。
#[test]
fn verify_wrong_secret_fails() {
    let signer = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = signer.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let verifier = JwtHandler::new("fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210");
    let result = verifier.verify(&token);
    assert!(result.is_err());
}

/// verify 已过期 token 返回 ExpiredToken。
#[test]
fn verify_expired_token_returns_expired_error() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    // 手构 exp 已过期的 token(leeway=0,过期立即拒绝):不依赖
    // sign(timeout=1)+sleep 的墙钟推进,避免 NTP 整秒回跳导致漏判。
    let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
        .unwrap()
        .as_secs() as i64;
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: now - 20,
        exp: now - 10, // 已过期 10 秒
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()),
        nbf: Some(now - 20),
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: None,
    };
    let header = jsonwebtoken::Header::new(Algorithm::HS256);
    let key = jsonwebtoken::EncodingKey::from_secret(b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = jsonwebtoken::encode(&header, &claims, &key).unwrap();
    let result = handler.verify(&token);
    assert!(result.is_err());
    match result.err() {
        Some(GarrisonError::ExpiredToken(_)) => {},
        other => panic!("期望 ExpiredToken,实际: {:?}", other),
    }
}

/// verify 算法不匹配返回错误。
#[test]
fn verify_algorithm_mismatch_fails() {
    let signer =
        JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef").with_algorithm(Algorithm::HS512);
    let token = signer.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let verifier = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"); // 默认 HS256
    let result = verifier.verify(&token);
    assert!(result.is_err());
}

// nbf 校验测试

/// verify 拒绝 nbf 为未来时间的 token。
#[test]
fn verify_future_nbf_returns_invalid_token() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    // 手动构造 nbf = now + 10 的 token
    let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
        .unwrap()
        .as_secs() as i64;
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: now,
        exp: now + 3600,
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()),
        nbf: Some(now + 10), // 未来 10 秒生效
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: None,
    };
    let header = jsonwebtoken::Header::new(Algorithm::HS256);
    let key = jsonwebtoken::EncodingKey::from_secret(b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = jsonwebtoken::encode(&header, &claims, &key).unwrap();
    // 立即 Verify 应返回 Err(InvalidToken)
    let result = handler.verify(&token);
    assert!(result.is_err(), "未来 nbf 应被拒绝: {:?}", result.ok());
    match result.err() {
        Some(GarrisonError::InvalidToken(msg)) => {
            assert!(
                msg.contains("nbf") || msg.contains("ImmatureSignature") || msg.contains("未生效"),
                "错误消息应包含 nbf/ImmatureSignature/未生效,实际: {}",
                msg
            );
        },
        other => panic!("期望 InvalidToken,实际: {:?}", other),
    }
}

/// verify 接受 nbf = now 的 token(边界场景)。
#[test]
fn verify_present_nbf_returns_ok() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    // sign 自动设置 nbf = now,verify 应通过(墙钟回跳误报经 verify_ok 容错)
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = verify_ok(&handler, &token);
    assert!(claims.nbf.is_some(), "sign 应设置 nbf");
}

/// verify 接受 nbf = now - 10 的 token(过去时间)。
#[test]
fn verify_past_nbf_returns_ok() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
        .unwrap()
        .as_secs() as i64;
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: now - 10,
        exp: now + 3600,
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()),
        nbf: Some(now - 10), // 过去 10 秒已生效
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: None,
    };
    let header = jsonwebtoken::Header::new(Algorithm::HS256);
    let key = jsonwebtoken::EncodingKey::from_secret(b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = jsonwebtoken::encode(&header, &claims, &key).unwrap();
    let result = handler.verify(&token);
    assert!(result.is_ok(), "nbf = 过去应通过校验: {:?}", result.err());
}

/// verify 接受无 nbf 字段的 token(RFC 7519 中 nbf 为可选 claim)。
#[test]
fn verify_token_without_nbf_field_returns_ok() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
        .unwrap()
        .as_secs() as i64;
    // 手动构造无 nbf 字段的 JSON(模拟旧 token)
    let claims_json = serde_json::json!({
        "sub": "1001",
        "iat": now,
        "exp": now + 3600,
        "login_id": "1001",
        "device": null,
        "jti": uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()
    });
    let header = jsonwebtoken::Header::new(Algorithm::HS256);
    let key = jsonwebtoken::EncodingKey::from_secret(b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = jsonwebtoken::encode(&header, &claims_json, &key).unwrap();
    let result = handler.verify(&token);
    assert!(result.is_ok(), "无 nbf 字段应通过校验: {:?}", result.err());
    let claims = result.unwrap();
    assert!(claims.nbf.is_none(), "无 nbf 字段时 claims.nbf 应为 None");
}

// refresh 测试

/// refresh 返回新 token 且可 verify。
#[test]
fn refresh_issues_new_valid_token() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let new_token = refresh_ok(&handler, &token, 7200);
    assert_ne!(token, new_token);
    let claims = verify_ok(&handler, &new_token);
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "1001");
}

/// refresh 旧 token 无效时返回错误。
#[test]
fn refresh_invalid_token_fails() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let result = handler.refresh("invalid.token.here", 3600);
    assert!(result.is_err());
}

// LoginId newtype 接入(impl Into<LoginId>)

/// 验证 `JwtHandler::sign` 接受 String 形式 login_id。
#[test]
fn sign_accepts_login_id_numeric() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler.sign("1001".to_string(), 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = verify_ok(&handler, &token);
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "1001");
}

// JWT 密钥最小长度校验

/// `sign` 拒绝 < 32 字节密钥,返回 Config 错误。
#[test]
fn sign_rejects_short_secret() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("short-key"); // 9 bytes < 32
    let result = handler.sign("1001", 3600);
    assert!(result.is_err(), "短密钥 sign 应返回错误");
    match result.err() {
        Some(GarrisonError::Config(msg)) => {
            assert!(
                msg.contains("jwt-secret-too-short"),
                "错误应包含 jwt-secret-too-short,实际: {}",
                msg
            );
        },
        other => panic!("期望 Config 错误,实际: {:?}", other),
    }
}

/// `verify` 拒绝 < 32 字节密钥,返回 Config 错误。
#[test]
fn verify_rejects_short_secret() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("short-key"); // 9 bytes < 32
    let result = handler.verify("eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMDAxIn0.fake");
    assert!(result.is_err(), "短密钥 verify 应返回错误");
    match result.err() {
        Some(GarrisonError::Config(msg)) => {
            assert!(
                msg.contains("jwt-secret-too-short"),
                "错误应包含 jwt-secret-too-short,实际: {}",
                msg
            );
        },
        other => panic!("期望 Config 错误,实际: {:?}", other),
    }
}

/// 恰好 32 字节密钥应正常工作(边界值)。
#[test]
fn sign_accepts_exactly_32_byte_secret() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"); // exactly 32 bytes
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = verify_ok(&handler, &token);
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "1001");
}

// alg confusion 对抗测试(行为锁定:攻击输入必须全部拒绝)

/// `alg=none`(无签名)token 必须被拒绝——防 JWT none 算法攻击。
#[test]
fn verify_rejects_none_algorithm_token() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    // header {"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"},无签名段
    let none_token = "eyJhbGciOiAibm9uZSIsICJ0eXAiOiAiSldUIn0.eyJzdWIiOiAidXNlcjEyMyIsICJsb2dpbl9pZCI6ICJ1c2VyMTIzIiwiZXhwIjo5OTk5OTk5OTk5LCJpYXQiOjE3MDAwMDAwMDB9.";
    let result = handler.verify(none_token);
    assert!(result.is_err(), "alg=none token 必须被拒绝");
}

/// header alg=RS256 与 handler 配置 HS256 不符的 token 必须被拒绝——防算法替换攻击。
#[test]
fn verify_rejects_algorithm_swap_token() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    // header {"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"},payload 合法但签名无效("fakesign")
    let swapped = "eyJhbGciOiAiUlMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogIkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiAidXNlcjEyMyIsICJsb2dpbl9pZCI6ICJ1c2VyMTIzIiwiZXhwIjo5OTk5OTk5OTk5LCJpYXQiOjE3MDAwMDAwMDB9.ZmFrZXNpZ24";
    let result = handler.verify(swapped);
    assert!(
        result.is_err(),
        "header alg 与配置算法不符的 token 必须被拒绝"
    );
}

/// HS256 签发的 token 送 HS512 配置的 handler 必须被拒绝——防跨算法重放。
#[test]
fn verify_rejects_cross_algorithm_replay() {
    let secret = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
    let hs256_handler = JwtHandler::new(secret);
    let hs512_handler = JwtHandler::new(secret).with_algorithm(Algorithm::HS512);

    let token = hs256_handler.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();
    let result = hs512_handler.verify(&token);
    assert!(
        result.is_err(),
        "HS256 签发的 token 送 HS512 handler 必须被拒绝"
    );
}

/// 篡改 payload 后签名校验必须失败。
#[test]
fn verify_rejects_tampered_payload() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();

    // 拆三段,篡改 payload(翻转 login_id),重组
    let parts: Vec<&str> = token.split('.').collect();
    assert_eq!(parts.len(), 3);
    let mut payload = base64_decode_urlsafe(parts[1]);
    // 翻转 payload 中一个字节(不影响 base64 结构)
    payload[4] ^= 0x01;
    let tampered = format!(
        "{}.{}.{}",
        parts[0],
        base64_encode_urlsafe(&payload),
        parts[2]
    );

    let result = handler.verify(&tampered);
    assert!(result.is_err(), "篡改 payload 后的 token 必须被拒绝");
    // 原始 token 仍须可验证(排除测试自身构造错误)
    let _ = verify_ok(&handler, &token);
}

/// URL-safe Base64 解码(无 padding)。
fn base64_decode_urlsafe(s: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
    use base64::Engine;
    base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
        .decode(s)
        .expect("测试辅助 base64 解码")
}

/// URL-safe Base64 编码(无 padding)。
fn base64_encode_urlsafe(data: &[u8]) -> String {
    use base64::Engine;
    base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(data)
}

// 非对称签名:RSA(RS256/RS384/RS512)

/// 测试专用 RSA 2048 私钥(PKCS#8 PEM,仅用于单元测试,非真实凭证)。
// nosemgrep: generic.secrets.security.detected-private-key.detected-private-key —— CI 已验证的测试夹具 PEM(假钥,非真实凭证)
const TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
";

/// RSA 构造器 + RS256 sign/verify 全链路。
#[test]
fn rsa_pem_rs256_sign_verify_roundtrip() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder-secret-not-used")
        .with_rsa_private_pem(TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::RS256)
        .unwrap();

    let token = handler.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = verify_ok(&handler, &token);
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "user123");
}

/// RS384 / RS512 算法族同样可用。
#[test]
fn rsa_pem_rs384_rs512_sign_verify_roundtrip() {
    for alg in [Algorithm::RS384, Algorithm::RS512] {
        let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder-secret-not-used")
            .with_rsa_private_pem(TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM)
            .unwrap()
            .try_with_algorithm(alg)
            .unwrap();
        let token = handler.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();
        let claims = verify_ok(&handler, &token);
        assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "user123");
    }
}

/// 非法 PEM 在构造期 fail-fast(不延迟到 sign)。
#[test]
fn rsa_pem_invalid_pem_fails_fast() {
    let result = JwtHandler::new("placeholder").with_rsa_private_pem("not-a-pem");
    assert!(result.is_err(), "非法 PEM 必须在构造期报错");
}

/// RSA 密钥 + HS 系算法的组合被 validate_algorithm_match 拒绝(fail-closed)。
#[test]
fn rsa_pem_rejects_hs_algorithm() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_rsa_private_pem(TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    let err = match handler.try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::HS256) {
        Err(e) => e,
        Ok(_) => panic!("RSA 密钥配 HS256 应被拒绝"),
    };
    assert!(
        matches!(err, GarrisonError::Config(ref m) if m.contains("jwt-key-algorithm-mismatch")),
        "RSA 密钥配 HS256 应报 jwt-key-algorithm-mismatch,实际: {:?}",
        err
    );
}

/// KeyMaterial 的 Debug 输出脱敏:PEM 私钥内容不得出现。
#[test]
fn rsa_key_material_debug_redacts_pem() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_rsa_private_pem(TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    let debug = format!("{:?}", handler.key_material);
    assert!(
        !debug.contains("PRIVATE KEY") && !debug.contains("MIIEvg"),
        "KeyMaterial Debug 输出不得包含 PEM 内容,实际: {}",
        debug
    );
}

// 非对称签名:EC(ES256/ES384)

/// 测试专用 P-256 EC 私钥(PKCS#8 PEM,仅用于单元测试,非真实凭证)。
// nosemgrep: generic.secrets.security.detected-private-key.detected-private-key —— CI 已验证的测试夹具 PEM(假钥,非真实凭证)
const TEST_EC_PRIVATE_PEM: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgHu89Emnr1D+OpkZF
T2f/jZRjQNl9Q6AyVEnsI2rH+tihRANCAARSS8Qlg3TwbmWk6ICPdeHxy/X0LARI
FTcfYH6rUSsxJH2JD7Adnx1iw7UhnOZXVf8YOnDrqaXJkQcXNWPSUBqA
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
";

/// EC 构造器 + ES256 sign/verify 全链路。
#[test]
fn ec_pem_es256_sign_verify_roundtrip() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder-secret-not-used")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::ES256)
        .unwrap();

    let token = handler.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = handler.verify(&token).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "user123");
}

/// 非法 EC PEM 在构造期 fail-fast。
#[test]
fn ec_pem_invalid_pem_fails_fast() {
    let result = JwtHandler::new("placeholder").with_ec_pem("not-a-pem");
    assert!(result.is_err(), "非法 EC PEM 必须在构造期报错");
}

/// EC 密钥 + HS 系算法的组合被 validate_algorithm_match 拒绝。
#[test]
fn ec_pem_rejects_hs_algorithm() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    let result = handler.try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::HS256);
    assert!(result.is_err(), "EC 密钥配 HS256 应被拒绝");
}

/// 测试专用 P-384 EC 私钥(PKCS#8 PEM,仅用于单元测试,非真实凭证)。
// nosemgrep: generic.secrets.security.detected-private-key.detected-private-key —— CI 已验证的测试夹具 PEM(假钥,非真实凭证)
const TEST_EC_P384_PRIVATE_PEM: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIG2AgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiBIGeMIGbAgEBBDA7FBewvmXSGqCaqiUM
8WJE3UDFs8aHiXNcnz4TzkYW5FHiZKVufY2cGbuu68R71VGhZANiAAQN57zuQF41
RG768ifH35dHUGaCy0FFgEq/LpAQHQGafVI/DVkmz21C4uezJg4dId/PhuhhXgiR
kNTRzfBIl0uPVyBJA2hncDTiVcKiOHfdyZ678wwtTNpxsnL3oEm1h+8=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
";

/// ES384(P-384 曲线)sign/verify 全链路。
#[test]
fn ec_pem_es384_sign_verify_roundtrip() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder-secret-not-used")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_P384_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::ES384)
        .unwrap();

    let token = handler.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = handler.verify(&token).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "user123");
}

// 非对称签名:Ed25519(EdDSA)

/// 测试专用 Ed25519 私钥(PKCS#8 PEM,RFC 8410,仅用于单元测试,非真实凭证)。
// nosemgrep: generic.secrets.security.detected-private-key.detected-private-key —— CI 已验证的测试夹具 PEM(假钥,非真实凭证)
const TEST_ED_PRIVATE_PEM: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIOChr1YQD9KWBWWGBLFFjHQiHx9+OznRi69Gh25Uhv8H
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
";

/// Ed 构造器 + EdDSA sign/verify 全链路。
#[test]
fn ed_pem_eddsa_sign_verify_roundtrip() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder-secret-not-used")
        .with_ed_pem(TEST_ED_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::EdDSA)
        .unwrap();

    let token = handler.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = handler.verify(&token).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "user123");
}

/// 非法 Ed PEM 在构造期 fail-fast。
#[test]
fn ed_pem_invalid_pem_fails_fast() {
    let result = JwtHandler::new("placeholder").with_ed_pem("not-a-pem");
    assert!(result.is_err(), "非法 Ed PEM 必须在构造期报错");
}

/// 非对称算法 + 空 jwt_secret 占位:config 允许该配置(密钥强度由 PEM 决定,
/// `validate_jwt_secret` 对 RS/ES/EdDSA 跳过对称长度校验),sign 与 verify
/// 语义必须对称(都不误拒)。
#[test]
fn asymmetric_empty_secret_placeholder_sign_verify_symmetric() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("")
        .with_ed_pem(TEST_ED_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::EdDSA)
        .unwrap();
    let token = handler
        .sign("user123", 3600)
        .expect("空 secret 占位 + EdDSA 的 sign 不应误拒");
    let claims = handler
        .verify(&token)
        .expect("空 secret 占位 + EdDSA 的 verify 不应误拒(修复前 Err(jwt-secret-empty))");
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "user123");
}

// 跨密钥类型 alg confusion(KeyMaterial 齐备后的交叉验证)

/// 跨密钥类型令牌交叉使用全部必须被拒绝:
/// RS 签发 → HS 验证、HS 签发 → RS 验证、HS 签发 → EC 验证、HS 签发 → Ed 验证。
#[test]
fn cross_key_type_tokens_always_rejected() {
    let hs = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let hs_token = hs.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();

    let rsa = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_rsa_private_pem(TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::RS256)
        .unwrap();
    let rsa_token = rsa.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();

    let ec = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::ES256)
        .unwrap();
    let ec_token = ec.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap();

    let ed = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ed_pem(TEST_ED_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::EdDSA)
        .unwrap();

    // HS token → RS / EC / Ed handler(签名族不匹配)
    assert!(
        rsa.verify(&hs_token).is_err(),
        "HS token 送 RS handler 必须被拒绝"
    );
    assert!(
        ec.verify(&hs_token).is_err(),
        "HS token 送 EC handler 必须被拒绝"
    );
    assert!(
        ed.verify(&hs_token).is_err(),
        "HS token 送 Ed handler 必须被拒绝"
    );

    // RS token → HS / EC / Ed handler
    assert!(
        hs.verify(&rsa_token).is_err(),
        "RS token 送 HS handler 必须被拒绝"
    );
    assert!(
        ec.verify(&rsa_token).is_err(),
        "RS token 送 EC handler 必须被拒绝"
    );
    assert!(
        ed.verify(&rsa_token).is_err(),
        "RS token 送 Ed handler 必须被拒绝"
    );

    // EC / Ed token → HS handler
    assert!(
        hs.verify(&ec_token).is_err(),
        "EC token 送 HS handler 必须被拒绝"
    );
    assert!(
        hs.verify(ed.sign("user123", 3600).unwrap().as_str())
            .is_err(),
        "Ed token 送 HS handler 必须被拒绝"
    );

    // 正向路径 sanity:同 handler 验证自身签发的 token 必须通过
    assert!(rsa.verify(&rsa_token).is_ok());
    assert!(ec.verify(&ec_token).is_ok());
    assert!(hs.verify(&hs_token).is_ok());
}

// sign_claims 测试(crate 内部自定义 claims 签发通道)

/// sign_claims 以同一密钥签发自定义 claims,且与 GarrisonJwtClaims 签发路径
/// 共享密钥校验(空密钥 fail-closed)。
#[test]
fn sign_claims_signs_custom_claims_verifiable_with_same_secret() {
    use serde::Serialize;

    #[derive(Serialize)]
    struct Probe {
        iss: String,
        aud: String,
    }

    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler
        .sign_claims(&Probe {
            iss: "https://op.example.com".to_string(),
            aud: "client-a".to_string(),
        })
        .expect("sign_claims 应成功");
    let parts: Vec<&str> = token.split('.').collect();
    assert_eq!(parts.len(), 3, "JWT 应由三段组成");

    // 自定义 claims 不含标准 exp,跳过 exp 校验只验签名
    let mut validation = jsonwebtoken::Validation::new(jsonwebtoken::Algorithm::HS256);
    validation.validate_exp = false;
    validation.validate_aud = false;
    validation.required_spec_claims.clear();
    let payload = jsonwebtoken::decode::<serde_json::Value>(
        &token,
        &jsonwebtoken::DecodingKey::from_secret(b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"),
        &validation,
    )
    .expect("同密钥解码应成功");
    assert_eq!(payload.claims["iss"], "https://op.example.com");
    assert_eq!(payload.claims["aud"], "client-a");
}

/// sign_claims 空密钥 fail-closed(与 sign 同一校验源)。
#[test]
fn sign_claims_rejects_empty_secret() {
    use serde::Serialize;

    #[derive(Serialize)]
    struct Probe {
        iss: String,
    }

    let handler = JwtHandler::new("");
    let result = handler.sign_claims(&Probe {
        iss: "https://op.example.com".to_string(),
    });
    match result.err() {
        Some(GarrisonError::Config(msg)) => assert!(msg.contains("secret")),
        other => panic!("期望 Config 错误,实际: {:?}", other),
    }
}

// amr / auth_time claim 映射(MFA 因子账本 → RFC 8176)

/// claims 含 amr/auth_time 时序列化输出对应字段,且可反序列化往返。
#[test]
fn claims_amr_auth_time_serialize_and_deserialize() {
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: 1700000000,
        exp: 1700003600,
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: None,
        nbf: None,
        amr: Some(vec!["pwd".to_string(), "otp".to_string()]),
        auth_time: Some(1700000000),
        tid: None,
    };
    let json = serde_json::to_string(&claims).unwrap();
    assert!(
        json.contains(r#""amr":["pwd","otp"]"#),
        "amr 应按 RFC 8176 输出字符串数组,实际: {}",
        json
    );
    assert!(
        json.contains(r#""auth_time":1700000000"#),
        "auth_time 应输出 Unix 秒,实际: {}",
        json
    );
    let parsed: GarrisonJwtClaims = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(parsed.amr, Some(vec!["pwd".to_string(), "otp".to_string()]));
    assert_eq!(parsed.auth_time, Some(1700000000));
}

/// amr/auth_time 为 None 时跳过序列化(签发路径未接线时载荷与历史格式一致)。
#[test]
fn claims_amr_none_skipped_in_json() {
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: 1700000000,
        exp: 1700003600,
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: None,
        nbf: None,
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: None,
    };
    let json = serde_json::to_string(&claims).unwrap();
    assert!(!json.contains("amr"), "amr=None 不应序列化,实际: {}", json);
    assert!(
        !json.contains("auth_time"),
        "auth_time=None 不应序列化,实际: {}",
        json
    );
}

/// 不含 amr/auth_time 字段的历史载荷仍可反序列化(serde default 兼容)。
#[test]
fn claims_without_amr_fields_deserialize_as_none() {
    let json =
        r#"{"sub":"1001","iat":1700000000,"exp":1700003600,"login_id":"1001","device":"web"}"#;
    let claims: GarrisonJwtClaims = serde_json::from_str(json).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(claims.amr, None, "无 amr 字段应反序列化为 None");
    assert_eq!(claims.auth_time, None, "无 auth_time 字段应反序列化为 None");
}

/// tid=None 跳过序列化(无租户上下文签发不带 tid,载荷与既有格式逐字节一致);
/// 旧格式载荷(无 tid 字段)反序列化为 None(serde default 向后兼容)。
#[test]
fn claims_tid_none_skipped_and_legacy_payload_parses_as_none() {
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: 1700000000,
        exp: 1700003600,
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: None,
        nbf: None,
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: None,
    };
    let json = serde_json::to_string(&claims).unwrap();
    assert!(!json.contains("tid"), "tid=None 不应序列化,实际: {}", json);
    let parsed: GarrisonJwtClaims = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(parsed.tid, None);
    // 旧格式 token(tid 字段引入前的签发):载荷无 tid,解析为 None
    let legacy =
        r#"{"sub":"1001","iat":1700000000,"exp":1700003600,"login_id":"1001","device":"web"}"#;
    let legacy_claims: GarrisonJwtClaims = serde_json::from_str(legacy).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(legacy_claims.tid, None, "旧格式载荷无 tid 应解析为 None");
}

/// tid=Some 往返:序列化输出十进制 i64,反序列化读回。
#[test]
fn claims_tid_roundtrips_when_present() {
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "1001".to_string(),
        iat: 1700000000,
        exp: 1700003600,
        login_id: "1001".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: None,
        nbf: None,
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: Some(7),
    };
    let json = serde_json::to_string(&claims).unwrap();
    assert!(
        json.contains(r#""tid":7"#),
        "tid 应输出十进制 i64,实际: {}",
        json
    );
    let parsed: GarrisonJwtClaims = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(parsed.tid, Some(7));
}

/// sign(无租户上下文口径)签发载荷不含 tid,verify 读回 None(签发格式不变对照)。
#[test]
fn sign_without_tenant_omits_tid_and_verifies() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
    use base64::Engine;
    let payload = token.split('.').nth(1).unwrap();
    let json = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
        .decode(payload)
        .map(|b| String::from_utf8(b).unwrap())
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        !json.contains("\"tid\""),
        "无租户签发载荷不应含 tid,实际: {}",
        json
    );
    let claims = handler.verify(&token).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(claims.tid, None);
}

/// with_tid 签发写 tid claim,verify 读回(签发-校验同构往返,租户上下文签发口径)。
#[test]
fn sign_with_tid_roundtrips_through_verify() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef").with_tid(7);
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    let claims = verify_ok(&handler, &token);
    assert_eq!(claims.tid, Some(7), "with_tid 签发应写 tid claim");
    assert_eq!(claims.login_id, "1001", "既有 claim 不受 tid 接线影响");
}

/// sign_with_amr 签发后 verify 读回的 claim 内容一致(单一签发路径)。
#[test]
fn sign_with_amr_and_auth_time_maps_claims() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler
        .sign_with_amr(
            "1001",
            3600,
            &["pwd".to_string(), "otp".to_string(), "webauthn".to_string()],
            Some(1700000000),
        )
        .unwrap();
    let claims = handler.verify(&token).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        claims.amr,
        Some(vec![
            "pwd".to_string(),
            "otp".to_string(),
            "webauthn".to_string()
        ])
    );
    assert_eq!(claims.auth_time, Some(1700000000));
}

/// 未设置 amr/auth_time 的签发路径:载荷不含对应字段,verify 读回 None
/// (与历史签发格式字节兼容——载荷即旧格式 token)。
#[test]
fn sign_without_amr_omits_claims_and_still_verifies() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
    let token = handler.sign("1001", 3600).unwrap();
    use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
    use base64::Engine;
    let payload = token.split('.').nth(1).unwrap();
    let json = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
        .decode(payload)
        .map(|b| String::from_utf8(b).unwrap())
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        !json.contains("\"amr\""),
        "未接线时载荷不应含 amr,实际: {}",
        json
    );
    assert!(!json.contains("\"auth_time\""));
    let claims = handler.verify(&token).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(claims.amr, None);
    assert_eq!(claims.auth_time, None);
}

// JWKS 公钥导出(export_public_jwk_parts)与 from_algorithm_parts 构造分派

/// 测试专用 RSA 2048 私钥(PKCS#1 传统格式 PEM,仅用于单元测试,非真实凭证)。
/// 覆盖 extract_rsa_public_components 的 PKCS#1 分支(`BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY`)。
// nosemgrep: generic.secrets.security.detected-private-key.detected-private-key —— CI 已验证的测试夹具 PEM(假钥,非真实凭证)
const TEST_RSA_PKCS1_PRIVATE_PEM: &str = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
";

/// 测试专用 P-256 EC 私钥(PKCS#8,RFC 5915 结构**不含**内嵌公钥位串),
/// 覆盖 extract_ec_public_sec1 的曲线 OID 分派 + P-256 标量乘法路径。
// nosemgrep: generic.secrets.security.detected-private-key.detected-private-key —— CI 已验证的测试夹具 PEM(假钥,非真实凭证)
const TEST_EC_NO_PUB_PEM: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
ME0CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcEMzAxAgEBBCCi+olhcIeXdliGiFfC
hhSoxgLJoyTjnNhg/4ZvBAAdAKAKBggqhkjOPQMBBw==
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
";

use base64::Engine as _;

/// RSA PKCS#8 PEM:export_public_jwk_parts 返回 JWK 口径 (n, e)。
#[test]
fn export_public_jwk_rsa_pkcs8() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_rsa_private_pem(TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    let jwk = handler.export_public_jwk_parts().unwrap();
    match jwk {
        Some(JwkPublicKey::Rsa { n, e }) => {
            assert_eq!(e, "AQAB", "RSA 公钥指数 65537 的 base64url 为 AQAB");
            let n_bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                .decode(&n)
                .expect("n 必须是合法 base64url");
            assert_eq!(n_bytes.len(), 256, "RSA-2048 模数应为 256 字节");
            assert!(
                !n.contains('=') && !n.contains('+') && !n.contains('/'),
                "JWK 口径必须 base64url 无 padding"
            );
        },
        other => panic!("RSA 密钥应导出 Rsa JWK,实际: {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// RSA PKCS#1 传统 PEM:`BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY` 分支同样可提取公钥组件。
#[test]
fn export_public_jwk_rsa_pkcs1_traditional() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_rsa_private_pem(TEST_RSA_PKCS1_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    let jwk = handler.export_public_jwk_parts().unwrap();
    match jwk {
        Some(JwkPublicKey::Rsa { n, e }) => {
            let n_bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                .decode(&n)
                .expect("n 必须是合法 base64url");
            assert_eq!(n_bytes.len(), 256, "RSA-2048 模数应为 256 字节");
            assert_eq!(e, "AQAB");
        },
        other => panic!("PKCS#1 RSA 应导出 Rsa JWK,实际: {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// EC P-256(PEM 内嵌公钥位串):直接取用位串,x/y 各 32 字节、crv=P-256。
#[test]
fn export_public_jwk_ec_p256_embedded_pubkey() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    match handler.export_public_jwk_parts().unwrap() {
        Some(JwkPublicKey::Ec { crv, x, y }) => {
            assert_eq!(crv, "P-256");
            assert_eq!(
                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(&x)
                    .unwrap()
                    .len(),
                32,
                "P-256 x 坐标应为 32 字节"
            );
            assert_eq!(
                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(&y)
                    .unwrap()
                    .len(),
                32,
                "P-256 y 坐标应为 32 字节"
            );
        },
        other => panic!("EC P-256 应导出 Ec JWK,实际: {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// EC P-256(RFC 5915 无内嵌公钥):按曲线 OID 分派做标量乘法计算公钥点,
/// 结果与内嵌路径同构(x/y 各 32 字节)。
#[test]
fn export_public_jwk_ec_p256_scalar_mult_when_pubkey_absent() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_NO_PUB_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    match handler.export_public_jwk_parts().unwrap() {
        Some(JwkPublicKey::Ec { crv, x, y }) => {
            assert_eq!(crv, "P-256", "P-256 OID 应分派到 P-256 标量乘法");
            assert_eq!(
                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(&x)
                    .unwrap()
                    .len(),
                32
            );
            assert_eq!(
                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(&y)
                    .unwrap()
                    .len(),
                32
            );
        },
        other => panic!("无内嵌公钥的 EC 应经标量乘法导出 Ec JWK,实际: {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// EC P-384:crv=P-384,x/y 各 48 字节。
#[test]
fn export_public_jwk_ec_p384_embedded_pubkey() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_P384_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    match handler.export_public_jwk_parts().unwrap() {
        Some(JwkPublicKey::Ec { crv, x, y }) => {
            assert_eq!(crv, "P-384");
            assert_eq!(
                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(&x)
                    .unwrap()
                    .len(),
                48,
                "P-384 x 坐标应为 48 字节"
            );
            assert_eq!(
                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(&y)
                    .unwrap()
                    .len(),
                48
            );
        },
        other => panic!("EC P-384 应导出 Ec JWK,实际: {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// Ed25519:导出 OKP 口径公钥 x(32 字节)。
#[test]
fn export_public_jwk_ed25519_okp() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ed_pem(TEST_ED_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    match handler.export_public_jwk_parts().unwrap() {
        Some(JwkPublicKey::Okp { x }) => {
            assert_eq!(
                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(&x)
                    .unwrap()
                    .len(),
                32,
                "Ed25519 公钥应为 32 字节"
            );
        },
        other => panic!("Ed25519 应导出 Okp JWK,实际: {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// 对称密钥(Hs)无可公开成分 → Ok(None)。
#[test]
fn export_public_jwk_hs_returns_none() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("symmetric-secret");
    assert!(handler.export_public_jwk_parts().unwrap().is_none());
}

/// KeyMaterial Debug 脱敏覆盖 EC / Ed 变体:输出 `<redacted>` 且无 PEM 原文。
#[test]
fn key_material_debug_redacts_ec_and_ed() {
    let ec = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    let s = format!("{:?}", ec.key_material);
    assert!(s.contains("EcPem(<redacted>"), "EC Debug 应脱敏: {s}");
    assert!(!s.contains("MIGHAgEA"), "不得泄露 PEM 内容: {s}");

    let ed = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ed_pem(TEST_ED_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    let s = format!("{:?}", ed.key_material);
    assert!(s.contains("EdPem(<redacted>"), "Ed Debug 应脱敏: {s}");
    assert!(!s.contains("MC4CAQ"), "不得泄露 PEM 内容: {s}");
}

/// from_algorithm_parts:config 白名单算法名全量分派(HS/RS/ES/Ed)。
#[test]
fn from_algorithm_parts_builds_each_algorithm() {
    assert!(JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts("HS256", "secret", None, None, None).is_ok());
    assert!(JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts("HS384", "secret", None, None, None).is_ok());
    assert!(JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts("HS512", "secret", None, None, None).is_ok());
    assert!(JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts(
        "RS256",
        "placeholder",
        Some(TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM),
        None,
        None
    )
    .is_ok());
    assert!(JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts(
        "ES256",
        "placeholder",
        None,
        Some(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_PEM),
        None
    )
    .is_ok());
    assert!(JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts(
        "EdDSA",
        "placeholder",
        None,
        None,
        Some(TEST_ED_PRIVATE_PEM)
    )
    .is_ok());
}

/// from_algorithm_parts:未知算法名 fail-fast(config-jwt-algorithm-unsupported)。
#[test]
fn from_algorithm_parts_rejects_unknown_algorithm() {
    let err = match JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts("HS1024", "secret", None, None, None) {
        Err(e) => e,
        Ok(_) => panic!("未知算法应被拒绝"),
    };
    assert!(
        matches!(err, GarrisonError::Config(ref m) if m.contains("config-jwt-algorithm-unsupported")),
        "未知算法应报 config-jwt-algorithm-unsupported,实际: {err:?}"
    );
}

/// from_algorithm_parts:非对称算法缺对应 PEM → 构造期报错(不静默回退 HS)。
#[test]
fn from_algorithm_parts_asymmetric_requires_pem() {
    assert!(JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts("RS256", "placeholder", None, None, None).is_err());
    assert!(JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts("ES256", "placeholder", None, None, None).is_err());
    assert!(JwtHandler::from_algorithm_parts("EdDSA", "placeholder", None, None, None).is_err());
}

/// 过期 token verify → ExpiredSignature 映射为 GarrisonError::ExpiredToken
/// (错误消息只含错误类别 + jwt-expired 前缀,不含 token 内容)。
#[test]
fn verify_expired_token_maps_to_expired_token_error() {
    use crate::protocol::jwt::GarrisonJwtClaims;
    use jsonwebtoken::{encode, EncodingKey, Header};
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("expired-token-secret-0123456789abcdef")
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::HS256)
        .unwrap();
    // sign 拒绝负 timeout(Config 校验),故手工签发一枚已过期 token:
    // exp 在过去、nbf 更早(避免 nbf 误报抢在 exp 之前触发)
    let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
    let claims = GarrisonJwtClaims {
        sub: "user-exp".to_string(),
        iat: now - 7_200,
        exp: now - 3_600,
        login_id: "user-exp".to_string(),
        device: None,
        jti: Some("expired-jti".to_string()),
        nbf: Some(now - 7_200),
        amr: None,
        auth_time: None,
        tid: None,
    };
    let token = encode(
        &Header::new(jsonwebtoken::Algorithm::HS256),
        &claims,
        &EncodingKey::from_secret("expired-token-secret-0123456789abcdef".as_bytes()),
    )
    .unwrap();
    let err = handler.verify(&token).unwrap_err();
    assert!(
        matches!(err, GarrisonError::ExpiredToken(ref m) if m.contains("jwt-expired")),
        "过期 token 应报 ExpiredToken(jwt-expired),实际: {err:?}"
    );
}

// 覆盖收口:Debug(Hs) / 曲线分派 / sign_with_amr / 参数与密钥校验

/// 测试专用 P-384 EC 私钥(PKCS#8,RFC 5915 无内嵌公钥)——覆盖曲线 OID
/// 分派后的 P-384 标量乘法路径。
// nosemgrep: generic.secrets.security.detected-private-key.detected-private-key —— CI 已验证的测试夹具 PEM(假钥,非真实凭证)
const TEST_EC_P384_NO_PUB_PEM: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MFcCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIEQDA+AgEBBDCrSR9PoTneWpSyQK4o7cZ9
KOjYI78wO42PYSfhcB9CSltc9XIsGYxelq9j5ZyfZxOgBwYFK4EEACI=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
";

/// Hs 变体的 Debug 输出为固定字面量(对称密钥不输出任何密钥材料)。
#[test]
fn key_material_debug_hs_variant() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("hs-secret-0123456789abcdef-0123456789");
    let s = format!("{:?}", handler.key_material);
    assert_eq!(s, "KeyMaterial::Hs", "Hs Debug 应为固定字面量: {s}");
}

/// P-384 无内嵌公钥:经曲线 OID 分派做 P-384 标量乘法,坐标各 48 字节。
#[test]
fn export_public_jwk_ec_p384_scalar_mult_when_pubkey_absent() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_P384_NO_PUB_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    match handler.export_public_jwk_parts().unwrap() {
        Some(JwkPublicKey::Ec { crv, x, y }) => {
            assert_eq!(crv, "P-384", "P-384 OID 应分派到 P-384 标量乘法");
            assert_eq!(
                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(&x)
                    .unwrap()
                    .len(),
                48
            );
            assert_eq!(
                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
                    .decode(&y)
                    .unwrap()
                    .len(),
                48
            );
        },
        other => panic!("无内嵌公钥的 P-384 应经标量乘法导出 Ec JWK,实际: {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// sign_with_amr:非对称密钥(RSA/EC/Ed)下携带 amr 账本签发并验回。
#[test]
fn sign_with_amr_works_for_asymmetric_materials() {
    let rsa = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_rsa_private_pem(TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::RS256)
        .unwrap();
    let token = rsa
        .sign_with_amr(
            "user-amr",
            3600,
            &["pwd".to_string(), "otp".to_string()],
            Some(1_700_000_000),
        )
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(verify_ok(&rsa, &token).login_id, "user-amr");

    let ec = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::ES256)
        .unwrap();
    let token = ec
        .sign_with_amr("user-amr-ec", 3600, &["webauthn".to_string()], None)
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(verify_ok(&ec, &token).login_id, "user-amr-ec");

    let ed = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ed_pem(TEST_ED_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap()
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::EdDSA)
        .unwrap();
    let token = ed
        .sign_with_amr("user-amr-ed", 3600, &["pwd".to_string()], None)
        .unwrap();
    assert_eq!(verify_ok(&ed, &token).login_id, "user-amr-ed");
}

/// sign 负 timeout → fail-fast(jwt-timeout-negative),不产立即过期 token。
#[test]
fn sign_negative_timeout_rejected() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("negative-timeout-secret-0123456789")
        .try_with_algorithm(Algorithm::HS256)
        .unwrap();
    let err = match handler.sign("user-neg", -1) {
        Err(e) => e,
        Ok(t) => panic!("负 timeout 应被拒绝,实际签发: {t:?}"),
    };
    assert!(
        matches!(err, GarrisonError::Config(ref m) if m.contains("jwt-timeout-negative")),
        "应报 jwt-timeout-negative,实际: {err:?}"
    );
}

/// private_pem 访问器:非对称返回 PEM 原文(敏感,禁日志),Hs 返回 None。
#[test]
fn private_pem_accessors_per_material() {
    let hs = JwtHandler::new("hs-secret-0123456789abcdef-0123456789");
    assert!(hs.private_pem().is_none(), "Hs 无私钥 PEM");

    let rsa = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_rsa_private_pem(TEST_RSA_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    assert!(rsa.private_pem().unwrap().contains("BEGIN"));

    let ec = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ec_pem(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    assert!(ec.private_pem().unwrap().contains("BEGIN"));

    let ed = JwtHandler::new("placeholder")
        .with_ed_pem(TEST_ED_PRIVATE_PEM)
        .unwrap();
    assert!(ed.private_pem().unwrap().contains("BEGIN"));
}

/// 对称路径空密钥 sign → jwt-secret-empty(fail-fast)。
#[test]
fn sign_empty_secret_rejected() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("");
    let err = match handler.sign("user-empty", 3600) {
        Err(e) => e,
        Ok(t) => panic!("空密钥应被拒绝,实际签发: {t:?}"),
    };
    assert!(
        matches!(err, GarrisonError::Config(ref m) if m.contains("jwt-secret-empty")),
        "应报 jwt-secret-empty,实际: {err:?}"
    );
}

/// 对称路径过短密钥 sign → jwt-secret-too-short(含长度与下限)。
#[test]
fn sign_short_secret_rejected() {
    let handler = JwtHandler::new("short-secret");
    let err = match handler.sign("user-short", 3600) {
        Err(e) => e,
        Ok(t) => panic!("过短密钥应被拒绝,实际签发: {t:?}"),
    };
    assert!(
        matches!(err, GarrisonError::Config(ref m) if m.contains("jwt-secret-too-short")),
        "应报 jwt-secret-too-short,实际: {err:?}"
    );
}