garrison 0.9.0

Garrison - 面向 Rust 生态的一站式身份认证鉴权框架
Documentation
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// Copyright (c) 2026 Kirky.X🌠
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

//! /oauth2/authorize 端点 — 两段式票据授权码流程 + PKCE 强制 + consent 记忆(RFC 6749 §4.1 + RFC 7636 S256)。
//!
//! ## 流程(两段式票据)
//!
//! 1. 校验 response_type=code / PKCE(code_challenge + S256)/ client_id / redirect_uri
//! 2. 未登录 → 签发 32 字符随机票据,DAO `set_if_absent` 暂存完整请求(TTL 600s)并重定向登录页;
//!    return_to 仅携带 resume 地址 + 票据,不回传请求参数,参数注入面被票据化结构性消除
//! 3. 登录后凭票据 resume:原子消费票据(GETDEL,二次消费拒),恢复完整请求,并对客户端存在性 /
//!    白名单 / scope 做 fail-closed 重校验(往返期间注册可能变化)
//! 4. consent 记忆判定(scope 超集合并 + 属性快照哈希,见 `consent_decision`):记忆覆盖 → 直接签发
//!    授权码;记忆不足 → 升级征询页(未配置则 interaction_required)
//! 5. 签发授权码(10 分钟 TTL,一次性使用)并重定向 redirect_uri?code=xxx&state=xxx

use crate::constants::DaoKeyPrefix;
use crate::dao::GarrisonDao;
use crate::error::{GarrisonError, GarrisonResult};
use crate::oauth2_server::client::OAuth2ClientStore;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
use base64::Engine;
use percent_encoding::{utf8_percent_encode, AsciiSet};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256, Sha512};
use std::sync::Arc;

/// 授权码有效期(10 分钟,RFC 6749 §4.1.2 建议 ≤ 10 分钟)。
const AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS: u64 = 600;

/// authorize 暂存票据 TTL(10 分钟;登录往返的合理上限,对齐 tinyauth 的 10 分钟缓存窗口)。
const AUTHORIZE_TICKET_TTL_SECONDS: u64 = 600;

/// authorize 暂存票据长度(32 字符字母数字,对齐 tinyauth utils.GenerateString(32))。
const AUTHORIZE_TICKET_LEN: usize = 32;

/// authorize 暂存票据 DAO key 前缀:`oauth2:authorize-ticket:{ticket}`。
const OAUTH2_AUTHORIZE_TICKET_KEY_PREFIX: &str = "oauth2:authorize-ticket:";

/// consent 记忆 DAO key 前缀:`oauth2:consent:{tenant_id}:{user_id}:{client_id}`。
const OAUTH2_CONSENT_KEY_PREFIX: &str = "oauth2:consent:";

/// OAuth2 refresh_token 的 DAO fallback key:`oauth2:rtoken:{token}`。
///
/// 未注入 `RefreshTokenRotation`(需 `db-sqlite`)的部署经 DAO 键值存储消费 refresh token
/// (无 reuse detection,安全风险见 `token` 模块文档)。
fn oauth2_refresh_token_key(token: &str) -> String {
    debug_assert!(
        !token.contains(':'),
        "oauth2 refresh_token key: token must not contain ':' (ambiguous key)"
    );
    format!("oauth2:rtoken:{}", token)
}

/// authorize 暂存票据的 DAO key:`oauth2:authorize-ticket:{ticket}`。
fn authorize_ticket_key(ticket: &str) -> String {
    debug_assert!(
        !ticket.contains(':'),
        "authorize ticket key: ticket must not contain ':' (ambiguous key)"
    );
    format!("{}{}", OAUTH2_AUTHORIZE_TICKET_KEY_PREFIX, ticket)
}

/// consent 记忆的 DAO key:`oauth2:consent:{tenant_id}:{user_id}:{client_id}`。
///
/// tenant_id / user_id 为数值(不含 ':'),client_id 作末段(reconcile 用 `splitn(3, ':')` 保留其完整性)。
fn consent_key(tenant_id: i64, user_id: i64, client_id: &str) -> String {
    debug_assert!(
        !client_id.contains(':'),
        "consent key: client_id must not contain ':' (ambiguous key)"
    );
    format!(
        "{}{}:{}:{}",
        OAUTH2_CONSENT_KEY_PREFIX, tenant_id, user_id, client_id
    )
}

/// 票据无效 / 过期 / 已消费的统一错误(不区分三者,避免向票据持有者泄露状态)。
fn ticket_invalid_error() -> GarrisonError {
    GarrisonError::OAuth2("oauth2-server-authorize-ticket-invalid-or-expired".into())
}

/// 「需要用户交互但 prompt=none 禁止交互」错误(OIDC Core §3.1.2.6);prompt/consent 判定的租户解析
/// 缺上下文时回退默认租户 0 并告警(静默降级违背 strict 语义,写入与判定同键、归属失真须可见)。
fn current_tenant_id_with_warn() -> i64 {
    match crate::context::tenant::current_tenant_id_strict() {
        Some(t) => t,
        None => {
            tracing::warn!(
                "{}",
                crate::i18n::translate_detail("logs-oauth2-authorize-tenant-context-missing", &[])
            );
            0
        },
    }
}

fn interaction_required_error() -> GarrisonError {
    GarrisonError::OAuth2("oauth2-server-authorize-interaction-required".into())
}

/// 授权码已签发 token 的吊销追踪记录 TTL(30 天,覆盖 refresh token 生命周期);
/// 用于重放/双花检测时定位并吊销此前签发的 access/refresh token。
const CODE_USED_RECORD_TTL_SECONDS: u64 = 2_592_000;

/// 授权码已签发 token 的吊销追踪记录:授权码被原子消费(删除)后,其签发的 token 仍需可定位吊销,
/// 故 `access_token` / `refresh_token` 单独持久化于此。
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct CodeUsedRecord {
    access_token: String,
    refresh_token: Option<String>,
}

/// code_verifier 最小长度(RFC 7636 §4.1)。
const CODE_VERIFIER_MIN_LEN: usize = 43;
/// code_verifier 最大长度(RFC 7636 §4.1)。
const CODE_VERIFIER_MAX_LEN: usize = 128;

/// S256 code_challenge 固定长度(BASE64URL_NO_PAD(SHA256(32B)) = 43 字符,RFC 7636 §4.2)。
///
/// 在 `verify_pkce` 入口校验长度,防超长字符串放大常量时间循环成 CPU DoS(CWE-400)。
const S256_CHALLENGE_LEN: usize = 43;

/// URL 查询参数值编码集:编码控制字符 + 保留字符 + 不安全字符(`&` / `=` / `#` / `+` / `%` 等),
/// 防参数注入与 URL 解析歧义。
const QUERY_VALUE_ENCODE_SET: &AsciiSet = &percent_encoding::CONTROLS
    .add(b' ')
    .add(b'!')
    .add(b'"')
    .add(b'#')
    .add(b'$')
    .add(b'&')
    .add(b'\'')
    .add(b'(')
    .add(b')')
    .add(b'*')
    .add(b'+')
    .add(b',')
    .add(b'/')
    .add(b':')
    .add(b';')
    .add(b'<')
    .add(b'=')
    .add(b'>')
    .add(b'?')
    .add(b'@')
    .add(b'[')
    .add(b'\\')
    .add(b']')
    .add(b'^')
    .add(b'`')
    .add(b'{')
    .add(b'|')
    .add(b'}')
    .add(b'%');

/// /oauth2/authorize 请求参数(query string)。
///
/// 两段式票据流程中,校验通过后的完整请求会序列化暂存(TTL 600s),登录后经 `resume` 原样恢复。
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AuthorizeRequest {
    /// 授权类型(必须为 "code")。
    pub response_type: String,
    /// 客户端 ID。
    pub client_id: String,
    /// 重定向 URI(必须在客户端白名单中)。
    pub redirect_uri: String,
    /// 请求的 scope(空格分隔,可选)。
    pub scope: Option<String>,
    /// 客户端状态(原样回传,防 CSRF)。
    pub state: Option<String>,
    /// PKCE code_challenge(S256 方法:BASE64URL(SHA256(code_verifier)))。
    pub code_challenge: String,
    /// PKCE code_challenge_method(必须为 "S256")。
    pub code_challenge_method: String,
    /// OIDC Core §3.1.2.1 prompt 值(`none` / `login`;空格分隔多值取首个
    /// 已知值)。缺省(None)= 默认流程。
    #[serde(default)]
    pub prompt: Option<String>,
}

impl AuthorizeRequest {
    /// 解析 prompt 参数为枚举(`none` → NoInteraction、`login` → ForceLogin;
    /// 未知值/缺省 → 默认流程)。多值取首个已知值。
    pub fn prompt_hint(&self) -> AuthorizePrompt {
        match self.prompt.as_deref().map(str::trim) {
            Some("none") => AuthorizePrompt::NoInteraction,
            Some("login") => AuthorizePrompt::ForceLogin,
            _ => AuthorizePrompt::None,
        }
    }
}

/// /oauth2/authorize 响应。
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum AuthorizeResponse {
    /// 成功:重定向到 redirect_uri?code=xxx&state=xxx。
    Redirect {
        /// 重定向目标 URL(含 code 和 state 参数)。
        location: String,
    },
    /// 需要用户交互:重定向到交互页面(`login_url` 指向登录页或 consent 征询页)。
    ///
    /// 两种来源:未登录(return_to 仅携带 resume 地址 + 一次性票据);consent 记忆不足(携带重入票据,
    /// 需 `with_consent_url` 配置,未配置时以 interaction_required 显性失败)。
    LoginRequired {
        /// 交互页面 URL(登录页或 consent 征询页,含 return_to/ticket 参数)。
        login_url: String,
    },
}

/// 授权码记录(存储在 DAO 中,10 分钟 TTL,一次性使用)。
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AuthorizationCode {
    /// 授权码字符串(BASE64URL 编码的 32 字节随机数)。
    pub code: String,
    /// 关联的客户端 ID。
    pub client_id: String,
    /// 关联的 redirect_uri。
    pub redirect_uri: String,
    /// 授权的 scope 列表。
    pub scopes: Vec<String>,
    /// 授权用户 ID。
    pub user_id: i64,
    /// PKCE code_challenge(token 交换时验证 code_verifier)。
    pub code_challenge: String,
}

/// consent 征询判定结果。
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ConsentDecision {
    /// 记忆的 consent 完整覆盖本次请求(scope 子集 + 属性快照未变化)→ 免征询。
    Remembered,
    /// 需要重新征询。
    Required(ConsentRequiredReason),
}

/// 需要重新征询的具体原因(显性化,供征询页与审计区分处置)。
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ConsentRequiredReason {
    /// 该 (tenant, user, client) 无 consent 记录(首次授权)。
    FirstGrant,
    /// 请求含未授 scope(超集合并语义:仅新增部分触发征询)。
    ScopeExpansion {
        /// 本次请求中尚未被授权的 scope。
        new_scopes: Vec<String>,
    },
    /// 属性快照哈希与当前属性不一致(属性名或属性值变化,粒度相关)。
    AttributesChanged,
    /// consent 记录不可解析 / 快照缺失——fail-safe 视为需要重新征询。
    SnapshotUnreadable,
}

/// 属性快照比较粒度(consent 重征询判定,对齐 cas ConsentReminderOptions 双粒度语义)。
///
/// 名哈希恒参与比较,差异仅在值哈希是否参与:ATTRIBUTE_NAME 忽略属性值变化(默认),
/// ATTRIBUTE_VALUE 名 + 值任一变化即重征询。
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
pub enum AttributeSnapshotGranularity {
    /// 只比较属性名集合哈希(默认)。
    #[default]
    AttributeName,
    /// 属性名 + 属性值哈希都比较。
    AttributeValue,
}

/// 授权时服务可释放的单个属性视图(属性名 + 该名的候选值集合)。
pub type ConsentAttributes = (String, Vec<String>);

/// OIDC Core §3.1.2.1 prompt 参数语义子集(授权码流程相关项)。
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
pub enum AuthorizePrompt {
    /// 未指定 prompt:默认流程(未登录引导登录、consent 记忆判定)。
    #[default]
    None,
    /// prompt=none:不允许任何交互——未登录或 consent 不足一律 `interaction_required` 显性失败。
    NoInteraction,
    /// prompt=login:即使已有会话也强制重走登录往返。
    ForceLogin,
    /// prompt=login 的别名形态(OIDC core §3.1.2.1 值集原文),语义同 [`AuthorizePrompt::ForceLogin`]。
    Login,
}

/// consent 记忆记录(DAO 持久化,键 `oauth2:consent:{tenant}:{user}:{client}`,永久驻留)。
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct ConsentRecord {
    /// 已授 scope 集合(超集合并语义:只增不减,字典序存储)。
    granted_scopes: Vec<String>,
    /// 授权时属性名集合的 SHA-512 十六进制摘要(双粒度都比较)。
    attribute_names_hash: String,
    /// 授权时属性值的 SHA-512 十六进制摘要(仅 ATTRIBUTE_VALUE 粒度参与比较;恒双写,粒度切换不需强制重征询)。
    attribute_values_hash: String,
}

/// Authorize handler,处理授权码流程。
pub struct AuthorizeHandler {
    store: Arc<dyn OAuth2ClientStore>,
    dao: Arc<dyn GarrisonDao>,
    login_url: String,
    /// consent 征询页 URL:记忆不足时升级重定向的目标;None 时升级路径以 interaction_required
    /// 显性失败(fail-closed,不静默放行)。
    consent_url: Option<String>,
    /// 属性快照比较粒度(默认 ATTRIBUTE_NAME)。
    attribute_granularity: AttributeSnapshotGranularity,
}

impl AuthorizeHandler {
    /// 创建 handler(`dao` 用于存储授权码 / 暂存票据 / consent 记忆;`login_url` 为未登录时的重定向目标)。
    pub fn new(
        store: Arc<dyn OAuth2ClientStore>,
        dao: Arc<dyn GarrisonDao>,
        login_url: String,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            store,
            dao,
            login_url,
            consent_url: None,
            attribute_granularity: AttributeSnapshotGranularity::default(),
        }
    }

    /// 配置 consent 征询页 URL(consent 记忆不足时的升级重定向目标);未配置时征询需求以
    /// `interaction_required` 显性失败。
    ///
    /// **prompt=none 属性视图约束**:prompt=none 静默续期判定以空属性视图比对快照,故经征询页批准
    /// (非空属性视图写入快照)的用户其 prompt=none 请求会因属性视图变化重新触发 interaction_required
    /// (fail-safe 方向);需对此类用户生效的部署须以 `attributes` 传入与征询时一致的属性视图。
    pub fn with_consent_url(mut self, consent_url: String) -> Self {
        self.consent_url = Some(consent_url);
        self
    }

    /// 配置属性快照比较粒度(默认 ATTRIBUTE_NAME)。
    pub fn with_attribute_granularity(mut self, granularity: AttributeSnapshotGranularity) -> Self {
        self.attribute_granularity = granularity;
        self
    }

    /// 处理 authorize 请求(默认流程,等价 `authorize_with_prompt(req, user_id, None)`)。
    pub async fn authorize(
        &self,
        req: &AuthorizeRequest,
        user_id: Option<i64>,
    ) -> GarrisonResult<AuthorizeResponse> {
        self.authorize_with_prompt(req, user_id, AuthorizePrompt::None)
            .await
    }

    /// 处理带 prompt 语义(OIDC Core §3.1.2.1:none / login)的 authorize 请求。
    pub async fn authorize_with_prompt(
        &self,
        req: &AuthorizeRequest,
        user_id: Option<i64>,
        prompt: AuthorizePrompt,
    ) -> GarrisonResult<AuthorizeResponse> {
        validate_request_shape(req)?;

        let client = self.load_client(&req.client_id).await?;

        if !client.is_redirect_uri_allowed(&req.redirect_uri) {
            return Err(GarrisonError::OAuth2(format!(
                "oauth2-server-authorize-redirect-uri-not-allowed::{}",
                req.redirect_uri
            )));
        }

        // prompt=login(含别名变体):已登录也强制重走登录往返(重新认证语义)
        if matches!(prompt, AuthorizePrompt::ForceLogin | AuthorizePrompt::Login) {
            return self.restage_and_login_redirect(req).await;
        }

        let Some(user_id) = user_id else {
            // prompt=none:不弹登录——interaction_required 显性失败
            if prompt == AuthorizePrompt::NoInteraction {
                return Err(interaction_required_error());
            }
            // 两段式:校验通过后签发票据暂存完整请求,登录后凭票据续流
            return self.restage_and_login_redirect(req).await;
        };

        let scopes = parse_request_scopes(req);
        client.validate_scopes(&scopes)?;

        if prompt == AuthorizePrompt::NoInteraction {
            let tenant_id = current_tenant_id_with_warn();
            if self
                .consent_decision(tenant_id, user_id, &req.client_id, &scopes, &[])
                .await?
                != ConsentDecision::Remembered
            {
                return Err(interaction_required_error());
            }
            return self.issue_authorization_code(req, &scopes, user_id).await;
        }

        // 授权续流(consent 记忆判定 + 授权码签发):直连 authorize 不携带属性视图(空视图快照),
        // 属性级重征询经 resume / resume_with_consent 路径生效
        self.continue_authorization(req, &scopes, user_id, &[])
            .await
    }

    /// 登录后凭票据续流:原子消费票据并恢复完整请求。`user_id` 为 None 表示仍未登录——以新票据
    /// 重新暂存(旧票据已消费,一次性语义保持)并再次引导登录。
    ///
    /// 票据一次性(GETDEL 原子消费):过期 / 未知 / 二次消费统一以
    /// `oauth2-server-authorize-ticket-invalid-or-expired` 拒绝,不区分三者(避免泄露票据状态)。
    pub async fn resume(
        &self,
        ticket: &str,
        user_id: Option<i64>,
        attributes: &[ConsentAttributes],
    ) -> GarrisonResult<AuthorizeResponse> {
        let key = authorize_ticket_key(ticket);
        // 原子消费:读取 + 删除单次完成,并发二次消费只有一个能取到
        let json = self
            .dao
            .get_and_delete(&key)
            .await?
            .ok_or_else(ticket_invalid_error)?;
        let req: AuthorizeRequest = serde_json::from_str(&json).map_err(|e| {
            GarrisonError::Internal(format!("oauth2-server-authorize-ticket-deserialize::{}", e))
        })?;

        let Some(user_id) = user_id else {
            return self.restage_and_login_redirect(&req).await;
        };

        // 恢复的请求必须 fail-closed 重校验(往返期间注册可能变化)
        let scopes = self.revalidate_staged(&req).await?;
        self.continue_authorization(&req, &scopes, user_id, attributes)
            .await
    }

    /// 以新票据重新暂存请求并构造登录页跳转地址:return_to 仅携带 resume 地址 + 票据,
    /// 原始请求参数不进入 return_to(参数注入面被票据化结构性消除)。
    async fn restage_and_login_redirect(
        &self,
        req: &AuthorizeRequest,
    ) -> GarrisonResult<AuthorizeResponse> {
        let ticket = self.stage_request(req).await?;
        let return_to = format!("/oauth2/authorize/resume?ticket={}", ticket);
        let login_url = format!(
            "{}?return_to={}",
            self.login_url,
            utf8_percent_encode(&return_to, QUERY_VALUE_ENCODE_SET)
        );
        Ok(AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url })
    }

    /// 将完整请求暂存为一次性票据(`set_if_absent`,TTL 600s),返回票据。
    async fn stage_request(&self, req: &AuthorizeRequest) -> GarrisonResult<String> {
        let ticket = generate_authorize_ticket();
        let key = authorize_ticket_key(&ticket);
        let json = serde_json::to_string(req).map_err(|e| {
            GarrisonError::Internal(format!("oauth2-server-authorize-serialize::{}", e))
        })?;
        // SETNX:票据空间 62^32,冲突只可能是蓄意键复用——显性失败,绝不覆盖既有暂存
        if !self
            .dao
            .set_if_absent(&key, &json, AUTHORIZE_TICKET_TTL_SECONDS)
            .await?
        {
            return Err(GarrisonError::Internal(
                "oauth2-server-authorize-ticket-collision".into(),
            ));
        }
        Ok(ticket)
    }

    /// 登录上下文中的授权续流:consent 记忆判定 + 授权码签发。
    ///
    /// 调用方(直连 authorize / resume)负责客户端与 scope 的 fail-closed 重校验,本方法只做 consent 决策与放行/升级。
    async fn continue_authorization(
        &self,
        req: &AuthorizeRequest,
        scopes: &[String],
        user_id: i64,
        attributes: &[ConsentAttributes],
    ) -> GarrisonResult<AuthorizeResponse> {
        let tenant_id = current_tenant_id_with_warn();
        match self
            .consent_decision(tenant_id, user_id, &req.client_id, scopes, attributes)
            .await?
        {
            ConsentDecision::Remembered => {
                self.issue_authorization_code(req, scopes, user_id).await
            },
            ConsentDecision::Required(reason) => {
                // 首次授权沿用既有直连放行语义:静默批准并记录,后续授权进入
                // scope 超集记忆判定(不新增征询往返)
                if matches!(reason, ConsentRequiredReason::FirstGrant) {
                    self.grant_consent(tenant_id, user_id, &req.client_id, scopes, attributes)
                        .await?;
                    return self.issue_authorization_code(req, scopes, user_id).await;
                }
                // 记忆不足(扩 scope / 属性变化 / 记录损坏):升级征询
                self.escalate_consent(req).await
            },
        }
    }

    /// consent 记忆不足时的征询升级:以新票据重新暂存并重定向征询页。
    async fn escalate_consent(&self, req: &AuthorizeRequest) -> GarrisonResult<AuthorizeResponse> {
        let Some(consent_url) = &self.consent_url else {
            // 未配置征询页:无法完成征询往返——显性失败,不静默放行
            return Err(interaction_required_error());
        };
        let ticket = self.stage_request(req).await?;
        // 征询页允许自带 query string:按是否已有 query 选定界符(同授权码重定向)
        let sep = if consent_url.contains('?') { '&' } else { '?' };
        let login_url = format!("{}{}ticket={}", consent_url, sep, ticket);
        Ok(AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url })
    }

    /// 判定本次请求是否可由记忆的 consent 覆盖(免征询)。
    ///
    /// 判定序:记录存在性 → 记录可解析性(fail-safe)→ scope 超集 → 属性快照;`attributes` 决定释放哪些属性。
    pub async fn consent_decision(
        &self,
        tenant_id: i64,
        user_id: i64,
        client_id: &str,
        requested_scopes: &[String],
        attributes: &[ConsentAttributes],
    ) -> GarrisonResult<ConsentDecision> {
        let key = consent_key(tenant_id, user_id, client_id);
        let Some(json) = self.dao.get(&key).await? else {
            return Ok(ConsentDecision::Required(ConsentRequiredReason::FirstGrant));
        };
        // 记录不可解析(存储损坏 / 写入被截断 / 快照哈希缺失):fail-safe
        // 重新征询,绝不静默放行
        let Ok(record) = serde_json::from_str::<ConsentRecord>(&json) else {
            return Ok(ConsentDecision::Required(
                ConsentRequiredReason::SnapshotUnreadable,
            ));
        };

        // scope 超集判定:请求 ⊆ 已授才可能免征询
        let new_scopes: Vec<String> = requested_scopes
            .iter()
            .filter(|s| !record.granted_scopes.contains(*s))
            .cloned()
            .collect();
        if !new_scopes.is_empty() {
            return Ok(ConsentDecision::Required(
                ConsentRequiredReason::ScopeExpansion { new_scopes },
            ));
        }

        // 属性快照判定:名哈希双粒度都比较;值哈希仅 ATTRIBUTE_VALUE 粒度参与。
        // 快照哈希缺失 / 非法(如读到了 scope-only 的旧格式记录)→ fail-safe 重征询
        let names_changed = record.attribute_names_hash != attribute_names_hash(attributes);
        let values_changed = record.attribute_values_hash != attribute_values_hash(attributes);
        let attributes_changed = match self.attribute_granularity {
            AttributeSnapshotGranularity::AttributeName => names_changed,
            AttributeSnapshotGranularity::AttributeValue => names_changed || values_changed,
        };
        if attributes_changed {
            return Ok(ConsentDecision::Required(
                ConsentRequiredReason::AttributesChanged,
            ));
        }

        Ok(ConsentDecision::Remembered)
    }

    /// 记录用户批准的 consent(超集合并 + 属性快照写入),返回合并后的已授集合。
    ///
    /// 合并语义:已授集合只增不减;记录不可解析时以本次批准重建(重建后仍需重新批准既有增量 scope,
    /// fail-safe 方向是多征询而非少征询);记录永久驻留(consent 跨会话有效)。
    pub async fn grant_consent(
        &self,
        tenant_id: i64,
        user_id: i64,
        client_id: &str,
        approved_scopes: &[String],
        attributes: &[ConsentAttributes],
    ) -> GarrisonResult<Vec<String>> {
        let key = consent_key(tenant_id, user_id, client_id);
        let mut merged: Vec<String> = self
            .dao
            .get(&key)
            .await?
            .and_then(|json| serde_json::from_str::<ConsentRecord>(&json).ok())
            .map(|r| r.granted_scopes)
            .unwrap_or_default();
        for scope in approved_scopes {
            if !merged.contains(scope) {
                merged.push(scope.clone());
            }
        }
        merged.sort();
        // 属性快照以本次批准时的视图覆盖写入(cas update 语义:最新决策为准)
        let record = ConsentRecord {
            granted_scopes: merged.clone(),
            attribute_names_hash: attribute_names_hash(attributes),
            attribute_values_hash: attribute_values_hash(attributes),
        };
        let json = serde_json::to_string(&record).map_err(|e| {
            GarrisonError::Internal(format!("oauth2-server-authorize-serialize::{}", e))
        })?;
        // TTL 0 = 永久驻留
        self.dao.set(&key, &json, 0).await?;
        Ok(merged)
    }

    /// consent 征询后的重入续流:消费升级时签发的新票据并落实用户决定:`approved=false` 返回
    /// access_denied,`approved=true` 将 `attributes` 快照写入 consent 记录后放行。
    pub async fn resume_with_consent(
        &self,
        ticket: &str,
        user_id: i64,
        approved: bool,
        attributes: &[ConsentAttributes],
    ) -> GarrisonResult<AuthorizeResponse> {
        let key = authorize_ticket_key(ticket);
        // 原子消费(同 resume:过期 / 二次消费统一拒绝)
        let json = self
            .dao
            .get_and_delete(&key)
            .await?
            .ok_or_else(ticket_invalid_error)?;
        let req: AuthorizeRequest = serde_json::from_str(&json).map_err(|e| {
            GarrisonError::Internal(format!("oauth2-server-authorize-ticket-deserialize::{}", e))
        })?;

        if !approved {
            // RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1:用户拒绝授权
            return Err(GarrisonError::OAuth2(
                "oauth2-server-authorize-access-denied".into(),
            ));
        }

        let scopes = self.revalidate_staged(&req).await?;
        let tenant_id = current_tenant_id_with_warn();
        self.grant_consent(tenant_id, user_id, &req.client_id, &scopes, attributes)
            .await?;
        self.issue_authorization_code(&req, &scopes, user_id).await
    }

    /// 往返后 fail-closed 重校验(客户端存在 / redirect_uri / scope 白名单),
    /// 返回解析后的 scope 集合。
    async fn revalidate_staged(&self, req: &AuthorizeRequest) -> GarrisonResult<Vec<String>> {
        let client = self.load_client(&req.client_id).await?;
        if !client.is_redirect_uri_allowed(&req.redirect_uri) {
            return Err(GarrisonError::OAuth2(format!(
                "oauth2-server-authorize-redirect-uri-not-allowed::{}",
                req.redirect_uri
            )));
        }
        let scopes = parse_request_scopes(req);
        client.validate_scopes(&scopes)?;
        Ok(scopes)
    }

    /// 生成授权码并构造重定向地址(10 分钟 TTL,一次性使用)。
    async fn issue_authorization_code(
        &self,
        req: &AuthorizeRequest,
        scopes: &[String],
        user_id: i64,
    ) -> GarrisonResult<AuthorizeResponse> {
        let code = generate_authorization_code();
        let auth_code = AuthorizationCode {
            code: code.clone(),
            client_id: req.client_id.clone(),
            redirect_uri: req.redirect_uri.clone(),
            scopes: scopes.to_vec(),
            user_id,
            code_challenge: req.code_challenge.clone(),
        };

        let key = DaoKeyPrefix::OAuth2AuthCode.build_key(&code);
        let json = serde_json::to_string(&auth_code).map_err(|e| {
            GarrisonError::Internal(format!("oauth2-server-authorize-serialize::{}", e))
        })?;
        self.dao.set(&key, &json, AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS).await?;

        // redirect_uri 白名单为精确匹配,允许自带 query string;RFC 6749 §4.1.2 / RFC 3986:
        // 追加参数须按是否已有 query 选定界符(? 或 &),恒拼 `?` 会产生双 `?` 畸形 URL
        let sep = if req.redirect_uri.contains('?') {
            '&'
        } else {
            '?'
        };
        let mut location = format!("{}{}code={}", req.redirect_uri, sep, code);
        if let Some(state) = &req.state {
            location.push_str("&state=");
            location.push_str(&utf8_percent_encode(state, QUERY_VALUE_ENCODE_SET).to_string());
        }
        Ok(AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location })
    }

    /// 加载客户端(不存在 → 显性 OAuth2 错误)。
    async fn load_client(
        &self,
        client_id: &str,
    ) -> GarrisonResult<crate::oauth2_server::client::OAuth2Client> {
        self.store.get(client_id).await?.ok_or_else(|| {
            GarrisonError::OAuth2(format!("oauth2-server-client-id-invalid::{}", client_id))
        })
    }

    /// 消费授权码(一次性使用;供 /oauth2/token 端点调用)。
    ///
    /// `get_and_delete` 将「读取 + 删除」合并为原子操作,消除 `get` / `delete` 之间的 TOCTOU 竞态
    /// (并发双花 / 重放):多个并发请求同一 code 只有一个能取到 `Some`,其余返回 `None`。
    ///
    /// `Ok(None)` 表示授权码不存在、已过期或已被消费。
    pub async fn consume_code(&self, code: &str) -> GarrisonResult<Option<AuthorizationCode>> {
        let key = DaoKeyPrefix::OAuth2AuthCode.build_key(code);
        let json = self.dao.get_and_delete(&key).await?;
        match json {
            Some(json) => {
                let auth_code: AuthorizationCode = serde_json::from_str(&json).map_err(|e| {
                    GarrisonError::Internal(format!("oauth2-server-authorize-deserialize::{}", e))
                })?;
                Ok(Some(auth_code))
            },
            None => Ok(None),
        }
    }

    /// 记录授权码签发的 token,供「重放/双花」时吊销:授权码被原子消费(删除)后其签发的 token 仍需可定位,
    /// 故写入独立的 `oauth2:codeused:` 记录(TTL 较长以覆盖 token 生命周期)。
    pub async fn record_code_tokens(
        &self,
        code: &str,
        access_token: &str,
        refresh_token: Option<&str>,
    ) -> GarrisonResult<()> {
        let key = DaoKeyPrefix::OAuth2CodeUsed.build_key(code);
        let record = CodeUsedRecord {
            access_token: access_token.to_string(),
            refresh_token: refresh_token.map(|s| s.to_string()),
        };
        let json = serde_json::to_string(&record).map_err(|e| {
            GarrisonError::Internal(format!("oauth2-server-authorize-serialize::{}", e))
        })?;
        self.dao
            .set(&key, &json, CODE_USED_RECORD_TTL_SECONDS)
            .await
    }

    /// 重放/双花检测:授权码已不存在时,读取 `oauth2:codeused:` 记录并删除其 access/refresh token 的
    /// DAO 记录(使 introspection / refresh 失效);best-effort,删除失败仅告警不阻断主流程。
    ///
    /// `Ok(false)` 表示无签发记录(code 从未成功签发过 token,纯随机重放)。
    pub async fn revoke_replayed_code_tokens(&self, code: &str) -> GarrisonResult<bool> {
        let key = DaoKeyPrefix::OAuth2CodeUsed.build_key(code);
        let json = self.dao.get_and_delete(&key).await?;
        let Some(json) = json else {
            return Ok(false);
        };
        let record: CodeUsedRecord = match serde_json::from_str(&json) {
            Ok(r) => r,
            Err(e) => {
                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "revoke_replayed_code_tokens: failed to deserialize codeused record, skipping revocation");
                return Ok(false);
            },
        };
        // 吊销 access token(introspection / 资源服务器按 DAO 记录校验时失效)
        let at_key = DaoKeyPrefix::OAuth2AccessToken.build_key(&record.access_token);
        if let Err(e) = self.dao.delete(&at_key).await {
            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "revoke_replayed_code_tokens: failed to delete access token record");
        }
        // 吊销 refresh token(阻止后续 refresh 轮换)
        if let Some(rt) = &record.refresh_token {
            let rt_key = oauth2_refresh_token_key(rt);
            if let Err(e) = self.dao.delete(&rt_key).await {
                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "revoke_replayed_code_tokens: failed to delete refresh token record");
            }
        }
        Ok(true)
    }
}

// 请求校验与解析辅助

/// 校验请求形状:response_type / PKCE 方法 / challenge 非空(错误序与既有端点一致)。
fn validate_request_shape(req: &AuthorizeRequest) -> GarrisonResult<()> {
    if req.response_type != "code" {
        return Err(GarrisonError::OAuth2(format!(
            "oauth2-server-authorize-unsupported-response-type::{}",
            req.response_type
        )));
    }
    if req.code_challenge_method != "S256" {
        return Err(GarrisonError::OAuth2(format!(
            "oauth2-server-authorize-unsupported-code-challenge-method::{}",
            req.code_challenge_method
        )));
    }
    if req.code_challenge.is_empty() {
        return Err(GarrisonError::OAuth2(
            "oauth2-server-authorize-code-challenge-empty".into(),
        ));
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// 解析 scope 参数(空格分隔;缺省为空集)。
fn parse_request_scopes(req: &AuthorizeRequest) -> Vec<String> {
    req.scope
        .as_ref()
        .map(|s| s.split_whitespace().map(|x| x.to_string()).collect())
        .unwrap_or_default()
}

// PKCE 工具函数

/// 生成授权码(32 字节随机数 → BASE64URL 编码)。
fn generate_authorization_code() -> String {
    let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
    // getrandom::fill 每次直接读 OS CSPRNG,无用户态 DRBG 缓冲:性能略低于 thread_rng,
    // 但消除 reseed 状态机攻击面;授权码生成非高频路径,安全优先
    getrandom::fill(&mut bytes).expect("OS CSPRNG 不可用");
    URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes)
}

/// 生成 authorize 暂存票据(32 字符字母数字随机串)。
///
/// ThreadRng(ChaCha12 CSPRNG,OS 熵播种):票据是登录往返的请求暂存凭证,
/// 可预测性意味着攻击者可持他人票据恢复其 authorize 请求(会话固定面)。
impl AuthorizeHandler {
    /// 启动期 reconcile:清理引用了已删除 client 的 consent 行。
    ///
    /// 以 client store 的存活列表为准——consent 键 `{prefix}{tenant}:{user}:{client}`
    /// 逐条扫描(`keys("oauth2:consent:*")`),client 已不存在即删除;
    /// 返回 (removed, kept)。幂等:再跑一次 removed == 0。
    pub async fn reconcile_consents(&self) -> GarrisonResult<(usize, usize)> {
        let alive: std::collections::HashSet<String> = self
            .store
            .list()
            .await?
            .into_iter()
            .map(|c| c.client_id)
            .collect();
        let pattern = format!("{OAUTH2_CONSENT_KEY_PREFIX}*");
        let mut removed = 0;
        let mut kept = 0;
        for key in self.dao.keys(&pattern).await? {
            let Some(rest) = key.strip_prefix(OAUTH2_CONSENT_KEY_PREFIX) else {
                continue;
            };
            // rest = `{tenant}:{user}:{client_id}`;splitn(3) 保留末段完整
            // (与 consent_key 文档一致)
            let mut parts = rest.splitn(3, ':');
            let Some(client_id) = parts.nth(2) else {
                continue;
            };
            if alive.contains(client_id) {
                kept += 1;
            } else {
                self.dao.delete(&key).await?;
                removed += 1;
            }
        }
        Ok((removed, kept))
    }
}

fn generate_authorize_ticket() -> String {
    use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString};
    Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), AUTHORIZE_TICKET_LEN)
}

// 属性快照哈希(对齐 cas DefaultConsentDecisionBuilder 的双粒度判定)

/// SHA-512 摘要的小写十六进制编码(128 字符)。
fn sha512_hex(data: &[u8]) -> String {
    let mut hasher = Sha512::new();
    hasher.update(data);
    hasher
        .finalize()
        .iter()
        .map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b))
        .collect()
}

/// 属性名集合哈希:属性名排序后以 `|` 连接取 SHA-512(对齐
/// cas sha512ConsentAttributeNames 的 `String.join("|", keySet)`)。
///
/// 排序保证判定与属性出现顺序无关;双粒度(名/值)都参与该比较。
fn attribute_names_hash(attributes: &[ConsentAttributes]) -> String {
    let mut names: Vec<&str> = attributes.iter().map(|(name, _)| name.as_str()).collect();
    names.sort();
    sha512_hex(names.join("|").as_bytes())
}

/// 属性值哈希:按属性名排序后,各属性的值序列以 `|` 连接取 SHA-512
///(对齐 cas sha512ConsentAttributeValues 的值聚合)。仅 ATTRIBUTE_VALUE
/// 粒度参与比较。
fn attribute_values_hash(attributes: &[ConsentAttributes]) -> String {
    let mut sorted: Vec<&ConsentAttributes> = attributes.iter().collect();
    sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0));
    let per_attr: Vec<String> = sorted.iter().map(|(_, values)| values.join("")).collect();
    sha512_hex(per_attr.join("|").as_bytes())
}

/// 从 code_verifier 生成 code_challenge(S256 方法)。
///
/// `code_challenge = BASE64URL(SHA256(code_verifier))`
pub fn generate_code_challenge(code_verifier: &str) -> String {
    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
    hasher.update(code_verifier.as_bytes());
    let digest = hasher.finalize();
    URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(digest)
}

/// 校验 code_verifier 长度(RFC 7636 §4.1:43-128 字符)。
pub fn is_valid_code_verifier_len(code_verifier: &str) -> bool {
    (CODE_VERIFIER_MIN_LEN..=CODE_VERIFIER_MAX_LEN).contains(&code_verifier.len())
}

/// 校验 code_verifier 与 code_challenge 是否匹配(S256 方法)。
///
/// 1. 校验 code_verifier 长度(43-128 字符)
/// 2. 校验 code_challenge 长度(S256 固定 43 字符,防止 DoS)
/// 3. 计算 SHA256(code_verifier) → BASE64URL
/// 4. 与 code_challenge 常量时间比对(CWE-208 防御)
pub fn verify_pkce(code_verifier: &str, code_challenge: &str) -> GarrisonResult<bool> {
    if !is_valid_code_verifier_len(code_verifier) {
        return Err(GarrisonError::OAuth2(format!(
            "oauth2-server-authorize-code-verifier-invalid-length::{}",
            code_verifier.len()
        )));
    }
    // 长度校验:S256 challenge = BASE64URL_NO_PAD(SHA256) 固定 43 字符。
    // 异常长度直接判失败(Ok(false)),避免进入常量时间循环被超长输入放大成 CPU DoS。
    if code_challenge.len() != S256_CHALLENGE_LEN {
        return Ok(false);
    }
    let computed = generate_code_challenge(code_verifier);
    // 纵深防御:常量时间比较,与代码库其余签名比较保持一致(CWE-208)。
    Ok(crate::secure::ct_eq::constant_time_eq(
        computed.as_bytes(),
        code_challenge.as_bytes(),
    ))
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::dao::InMemoryDao;
    use crate::oauth2_server::client::{GrantType, OAuth2Client};

    /// 创建测试用 OAuth2Client。
    fn make_test_client(id: &str) -> OAuth2Client {
        OAuth2Client::new(
            id,
            "secret-123",
            vec!["https://app.example.com/cb".into()],
            vec![GrantType::AuthorizationCode],
            vec!["read".into()],
        )
        .unwrap()
    }

    /// 创建测试用 AuthorizeHandler。
    fn make_handler() -> (AuthorizeHandler, Arc<InMemoryDao>) {
        let dao = Arc::new(InMemoryDao::new());
        let store = Arc::new(crate::oauth2_server::client::DaoOAuth2ClientStore::new(
            dao.clone(),
        ));
        let handler =
            AuthorizeHandler::new(store, dao.clone(), "https://auth.example.com/login".into());
        (handler, dao)
    }

    /// 创建测试用 AuthorizeRequest。
    fn make_request(client_id: &str, code_challenge: &str) -> AuthorizeRequest {
        AuthorizeRequest {
            response_type: "code".into(),
            client_id: client_id.into(),
            redirect_uri: "https://app.example.com/cb".into(),
            scope: Some("read".into()),
            state: Some("xyz".into()),
            code_challenge: code_challenge.into(),
            code_challenge_method: "S256".into(),
            prompt: None,
        }
    }

    // PKCE 工具函数测试

    #[test]
    fn generate_code_challenge_matches_rfc7636_example() {
        // RFC 7636 Appendix B 测试向量
        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let expected = "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM";
        assert_eq!(generate_code_challenge(verifier), expected);
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_pkce_matches() {
        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        assert!(verify_pkce(verifier, &challenge).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_pkce_mismatch() {
        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let wrong_challenge = "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM";
        let other = generate_code_challenge("other-verifier-other-verifier-other-verifier");
        assert!(!verify_pkce(verifier, &other).unwrap());
        let _ = wrong_challenge;
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_pkce_rejects_short_verifier() {
        let err = verify_pkce("short", "challenge").unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, GarrisonError::OAuth2(_)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_pkce_rejects_long_verifier() {
        let verifier = "a".repeat(129);
        let err = verify_pkce(&verifier, "challenge").unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, GarrisonError::OAuth2(_)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_code_verifier_len_boundary() {
        assert!(!is_valid_code_verifier_len(&"a".repeat(42)));
        assert!(is_valid_code_verifier_len(&"a".repeat(43)));
        assert!(is_valid_code_verifier_len(&"a".repeat(128)));
        assert!(!is_valid_code_verifier_len(&"a".repeat(129)));
    }

    // authorize handler 测试

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_success() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        let client = make_test_client("auth-001");
        handler.store.create(client).await.unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = make_request("auth-001", &challenge);

        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1001)).await.expect("授权");
        match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location } => {
                assert!(location.starts_with("https://app.example.com/cb?code="));
                assert!(location.contains("state=xyz"));
            },
            _ => panic!("期望 Redirect"),
        }
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_unlogged_redirects_to_login() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        let client = make_test_client("auth-002");
        handler.store.create(client).await.unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = make_request("auth-002", &challenge);

        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, None).await.expect("授权");
        match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => {
                assert!(login_url.starts_with("https://auth.example.com/login?return_to="));
            },
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        }
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_invalid_client_id() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        let req = make_request("no-such-client", "challenge");
        let err = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1)).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, GarrisonError::OAuth2(_)));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_invalid_redirect_uri() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("auth-003"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let mut req = make_request("auth-003", &challenge);
        req.redirect_uri = "https://evil.example.com/cb".into();

        let err = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1)).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, GarrisonError::OAuth2(_)));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_unsupported_response_type() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("auth-004"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let mut req = make_request("auth-004", &challenge);
        req.response_type = "token".into();

        let err = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1)).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, GarrisonError::OAuth2(_)));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_unsupported_code_challenge_method() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("auth-005"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let req = make_request("auth-005", "challenge");
        let mut req = req;
        req.code_challenge_method = "plain".into();

        let err = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1)).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, GarrisonError::OAuth2(_)));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_empty_code_challenge() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("auth-006"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let req = make_request("auth-006", "");
        let err = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1)).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, GarrisonError::OAuth2(_)));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_without_state() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("auth-007"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let mut req = make_request("auth-007", &challenge);
        req.state = None;

        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1)).await.unwrap();
        match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location } => {
                assert!(!location.contains("state="));
            },
            _ => panic!("期望 Redirect"),
        }
    }

    /// 两段式票据化后,未登录 return_to 只携带 resume 地址与一次性票据,原始请求参数(含 redirect_uri 的
    /// `&`/`=`、state 的特殊字符)不再进入 return_to——参数注入面被票据化结构性消除。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_return_to_carries_only_resume_ticket() {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler();
        // 注册一个允许特殊 redirect_uri 的客户端
        let client = OAuth2Client::new(
            "auth-encode-001",
            "secret-123",
            vec!["https://app.example.com/cb?existing=param".into()],
            vec![GrantType::AuthorizationCode],
            vec!["read".into()],
        )
        .unwrap();
        handler.store.create(client).await.unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = AuthorizeRequest {
            response_type: "code".into(),
            client_id: "auth-encode-001".into(),
            redirect_uri: "https://app.example.com/cb?existing=param".into(),
            scope: Some("read".into()),
            state: Some("state&with&amps".into()),
            code_challenge: challenge,
            code_challenge_method: "S256".into(),
            prompt: None,
        };

        let resp = handler
            .authorize(&req, None)
            .await
            .expect("应返回 LoginRequired");
        match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => {
                let return_to_part = login_url
                    .split("return_to=")
                    .nth(1)
                    .expect("应包含 return_to 参数");
                // return_to 必须指向 resume 地址,且只携带票据——
                // redirect_uri / state 等原始参数不得以任何编码形式出现
                assert!(
                    return_to_part.contains("authorize%2Fresume")
                        || return_to_part.contains("authorize/resume"),
                    "return_to 应指向 resume 续流地址: {}",
                    login_url
                );
                assert!(
                    !return_to_part.contains("redirect_uri"),
                    "return_to 不得携带 redirect_uri(票据化后由暂存恢复): {}",
                    login_url
                );
                assert!(
                    !return_to_part.contains("state"),
                    "return_to 不得携带 state: {}",
                    login_url
                );
                // 票据本身应为 32 字符字母数字
                let ticket = return_to_part
                    .rsplit("ticket%3D")
                    .next()
                    .or_else(|| return_to_part.rsplit("ticket=").next())
                    .expect("return_to 应携带票据参数");
                assert_eq!(
                    ticket.len(),
                    32,
                    "票据应为 32 字符,实际 {} 字符: {}",
                    ticket.len(),
                    login_url
                );
                assert!(
                    ticket.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric()),
                    "票据应为纯字母数字: {}",
                    login_url
                );
                // 暂存票据应可从 DAO 中定位(TTL 由 stage 路径写入)
                let staged = dao
                    .keys("oauth2:authorize-ticket:*")
                    .await
                    .expect("keys 扫描");
                assert_eq!(staged.len(), 1, "应恰好暂存一张票据");
            },
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        }
    }

    /// 未登录 authorize:校验通过后签发 32 字符票据,经 DAO `set_if_absent` 暂存完整请求(TTL 600s)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_not_logged_in_stages_full_request_with_600s_ttl() {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("ticket-001"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = make_request("ticket-001", &challenge);

        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, None).await.expect("授权");
        let login_url = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        };

        let staged = dao
            .keys("oauth2:authorize-ticket:*")
            .await
            .expect("keys 扫描");
        assert_eq!(staged.len(), 1, "应恰好暂存一张票据");
        let key = &staged[0];

        // 暂存内容必须完整覆盖原始请求参数(resume 恢复完整请求的前提)
        let json = dao.get(key).await.unwrap().expect("暂存应存在");
        let staged_req: AuthorizeRequest = serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("应可反序列化");
        assert_eq!(staged_req.client_id, req.client_id);
        assert_eq!(staged_req.redirect_uri, req.redirect_uri);
        assert_eq!(staged_req.scope, req.scope);
        assert_eq!(staged_req.state, req.state);
        assert_eq!(staged_req.code_challenge, req.code_challenge);
        assert_eq!(staged_req.response_type, req.response_type);
        assert_eq!(staged_req.code_challenge_method, req.code_challenge_method);

        // TTL 必须为 600s 量级(10 分钟,对齐 tinyauth 暂存窗口)
        let ttl = dao.get_timeout(key).await.unwrap().expect("应设置 TTL");
        assert!(
            ttl.as_secs() <= 600 && ttl.as_secs() > 590,
            "TTL 应为 600s 量级,实际 {:?}",
            ttl
        );

        // return_to 指向 resume 地址且票据与暂存键一致
        let ticket = extract_ticket_from_login_url(&login_url);
        assert_eq!(
            key,
            &format!("oauth2:authorize-ticket:{}", ticket),
            "return_to 中的票据应与暂存键一致: {}",
            login_url
        );
    }

    /// 登录后凭票据 resume:原子消费票据,恢复完整请求并续流签发授权码——
    /// code 的 client/redirect_uri/scope/challenge 均来自暂存的原始请求。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resume_restores_full_request_and_issues_code() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("ticket-002"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = make_request("ticket-002", &challenge);

        let login_url = match handler.authorize(&req, None).await.unwrap() {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        };
        let ticket = extract_ticket_from_login_url(&login_url);

        // 登录完成后凭票据续流(登录后 user_id 就位)
        let resp = handler
            .resume(&ticket, Some(4001), &[])
            .await
            .expect("resume");
        let location = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location } => location,
            _ => panic!("期望 Redirect"),
        };
        assert!(location.contains("state=xyz"), "state 应原样回传");

        // code 必须携带暂存请求的全部上下文
        let code = location
            .split("code=")
            .nth(1)
            .unwrap()
            .split('&')
            .next()
            .unwrap();
        let auth_code = handler.consume_code(code).await.unwrap().expect("应存在");
        assert_eq!(auth_code.client_id, "ticket-002");
        assert_eq!(auth_code.user_id, 4001);
        assert_eq!(auth_code.redirect_uri, "https://app.example.com/cb");
        assert_eq!(auth_code.scopes, vec!["read".to_string()]);
        assert_eq!(auth_code.code_challenge, challenge);
    }

    /// 未知 / 过期票据 resume 拒绝(显性 OAuth2 错误,不静默当作新请求)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resume_rejects_unknown_or_expired_ticket() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        let err = handler
            .resume("totally-unknown-ticket-0123456789ab", Some(1), &[])
            .await
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string()
                .contains("oauth2-server-authorize-ticket-invalid-or-expired"),
            "期望票据无效/过期错误,实际: {}",
            err
        );
    }

    /// 票据一次性:resume 成功后同一票据再次 resume 必须拒绝(二次消费拒)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resume_rejects_second_consumption_of_same_ticket() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("ticket-003"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let req = make_request(
            "ticket-003",
            &generate_code_challenge("dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"),
        );

        let login_url = match handler.authorize(&req, None).await.unwrap() {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        };
        let ticket = extract_ticket_from_login_url(&login_url);

        assert!(handler.resume(&ticket, Some(4002), &[]).await.is_ok());
        let err = handler.resume(&ticket, Some(4002), &[]).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string()
                .contains("oauth2-server-authorize-ticket-invalid-or-expired"),
            "二次消费应拒绝,实际: {}",
            err
        );
    }

    /// 票据 TTL 到期后 resume 拒绝(真实过期路径,非仅未知票据)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resume_rejects_ticket_after_ttl_expiry() {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler();
        // 手工暂存 1s TTL 的请求快照,模拟已发出的票据进入过期
        let req = make_request("ticket-004", "challenge");
        let json = serde_json::to_string(&req).unwrap();
        let key = "oauth2:authorize-ticket:expiring-ticket-0123456789012345";
        assert!(dao.set_if_absent(key, &json, 1).await.unwrap());
        tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(1200)).await;

        let ticket = key.rsplit(':').next().unwrap();
        let err = handler.resume(ticket, Some(4003), &[]).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string()
                .contains("oauth2-server-authorize-ticket-invalid-or-expired"),
            "过期票据应拒绝,实际: {}",
            err
        );
    }

    /// resume 时仍未登录:以新票据重新暂存(旧票据已消费,一次性语义保持),再次引导登录。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resume_without_login_reissues_fresh_ticket() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("ticket-005"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let req = make_request(
            "ticket-005",
            &generate_code_challenge("dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"),
        );

        let login_url = match handler.authorize(&req, None).await.unwrap() {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        };
        let first_ticket = extract_ticket_from_login_url(&login_url);

        let resp = handler.resume(&first_ticket, None, &[]).await.unwrap();
        let second_url = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        };
        let second_ticket = extract_ticket_from_login_url(&second_url);
        assert_ne!(
            first_ticket, second_ticket,
            "重新暂存必须签发新票据(旧票据已消费)"
        );

        // 旧票据已消费;新票据可正常续流
        assert!(handler
            .resume(&first_ticket, Some(4004), &[])
            .await
            .is_err());
        assert!(handler
            .resume(&second_ticket, Some(4004), &[])
            .await
            .is_ok());
    }

    /// 从 LoginRequired 的 login_url 中提取票据(测试辅助:return_to=...ticket=...)。
    fn extract_ticket_from_login_url(login_url: &str) -> String {
        let return_to = login_url.split("return_to=").nth(1).expect("含 return_to");
        let decoded = percent_encoding::percent_decode_str(return_to)
            .decode_utf8()
            .expect("return_to 应为合法 UTF-8");
        decoded
            .rsplit("ticket=")
            .next()
            .expect("return_to 应含 ticket")
            .to_string()
    }

    /// 创建测试用 OAuth2Client(指定 allowed_scopes)。
    fn make_test_client_with_scopes(id: &str, scopes: &[&str]) -> OAuth2Client {
        OAuth2Client::new(
            id,
            "secret-123",
            vec!["https://app.example.com/cb".into()],
            vec![GrantType::AuthorizationCode],
            scopes.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(),
        )
        .unwrap()
    }

    /// 创建带 consent 征询页配置的测试用 AuthorizeHandler。
    fn make_handler_with_consent_url() -> (AuthorizeHandler, Arc<InMemoryDao>) {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler();
        let handler = handler.with_consent_url("https://auth.example.com/consent".into());
        (handler, dao)
    }

    // consent 记忆测试

    /// grant_consent 超集合并:已授集合只增不减,字典序持久化。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn grant_consent_merges_superset_and_only_grows() {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler();

        let merged = handler
            .grant_consent(0, 5001, "consent-001", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(merged, vec!["read".to_string()]);

        let merged = handler
            .grant_consent(
                0,
                5001,
                "consent-001",
                &["write".into(), "read".into()],
                &[],
            )
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(merged, vec!["read".to_string(), "write".to_string()]);

        // 再次只授 read:既有 write 不得丢失(只增不减)
        let merged = handler
            .grant_consent(0, 5001, "consent-001", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(merged, vec!["read".to_string(), "write".to_string()]);

        // 持久化:键 (tenant, user, client) 的记录存在
        let key = "oauth2:consent:0:5001:consent-001";
        assert!(
            dao.get(key).await.unwrap().is_some(),
            "consent 记录应持久化于 (tenant,user,client) 键"
        );
    }

    /// scope 子集 ⊆ 已授 → 免征询(Remembered)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn consent_decision_subset_of_granted_is_remembered() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .grant_consent(
                0,
                5002,
                "consent-002",
                &["read".into(), "write".into()],
                &[],
            )
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(0, 5002, "consent-002", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(d, ConsentDecision::Remembered, "子集请求应免征询");
    }

    /// 含新增 scope → 重新征询,且原因中列出未授的增量 scope。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn consent_decision_new_scope_requires_consent_listing_new_scopes() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 5003, "consent-003", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(
                0,
                5003,
                "consent-003",
                &["read".into(), "admin".into()],
                &[],
            )
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Required(ConsentRequiredReason::ScopeExpansion {
                new_scopes: vec!["admin".to_string()],
            }),
            "新增 scope 应触发重征询并列出增量"
        );
    }

    /// 无记录 → 首次授权需征询(FirstGrant)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn consent_decision_without_record_requires_first_grant() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(0, 5004, "consent-004", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Required(ConsentRequiredReason::FirstGrant),
            "无记录应为首次授权"
        );
    }

    /// consent 记录按租户隔离:同 (user, client) 在不同 tenant 下互不可见。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn consent_records_are_tenant_scoped() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .grant_consent(7, 5005, "consent-005", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(7, 5005, "consent-005", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(d, ConsentDecision::Remembered);

        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(8, 5005, "consent-005", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Required(ConsentRequiredReason::FirstGrant),
            "其他租户不得命中本租户 consent"
        );
    }

    /// 授权续流:consent 记忆不足(扩 scope)→ 升级征询页(新票据重入);
    /// 批准后超集合并并放行。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resume_with_insufficient_consent_escalates_then_merge_on_approval() {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler_with_consent_url();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client_with_scopes(
                "consent-006",
                &["read", "admin"],
            ))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 5006, "consent-006", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        // 请求含新增 scope:stage → resume → 升级征询页
        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let mut req = make_request("consent-006", &generate_code_challenge(verifier));
        req.scope = Some("read admin".into());
        let login_url = match handler.authorize(&req, None).await.unwrap() {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        };
        let resp = handler
            .resume(&extract_ticket_from_login_url(&login_url), Some(5006), &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let consent_page_url = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            other => panic!("期望升级征询页,实际: {:?}", other),
        };
        assert!(
            consent_page_url.starts_with("https://auth.example.com/consent?ticket="),
            "应重定向到征询页并携带重入票据: {}",
            consent_page_url
        );

        // 升级以新票据重入(一次性行为保持)
        let staged = dao
            .keys("oauth2:authorize-ticket:*")
            .await
            .expect("keys 扫描");
        assert_eq!(staged.len(), 1, "升级应签发恰好一张重入票据");

        // 批准:合并 consent 并放行
        let new_ticket = consent_page_url.rsplit("ticket=").next().unwrap();
        let resp = handler
            .resume_with_consent(new_ticket, 5006, true, &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert!(
            matches!(resp, AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { .. }),
            "批准后应放行"
        );

        // 合并后集合为超集:再次等价请求免征询
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(
                0,
                5006,
                "consent-006",
                &["read".into(), "admin".into()],
                &[],
            )
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(d, ConsentDecision::Remembered, "批准后应合并为超集");
    }

    /// 用户拒绝:access_denied 显性失败,consent 记录不发生变化。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resume_with_consent_denied_is_access_denied_and_records_nothing() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler_with_consent_url();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client_with_scopes(
                "consent-007",
                &["read", "admin"],
            ))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 5007, "consent-007", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let mut req = make_request("consent-007", &generate_code_challenge(verifier));
        req.scope = Some("read admin".into());
        let login_url = match handler.authorize(&req, None).await.unwrap() {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        };
        let resp = handler
            .resume(&extract_ticket_from_login_url(&login_url), Some(5007), &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let consent_page_url = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            other => panic!("期望升级征询页,实际: {:?}", other),
        };
        let new_ticket = consent_page_url.rsplit("ticket=").next().unwrap();

        let err = handler
            .resume_with_consent(new_ticket, 5007, false, &[])
            .await
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string()
                .contains("oauth2-server-authorize-access-denied"),
            "拒绝应为 access_denied,实际: {}",
            err
        );

        // 记录未变:原 scope 仍 Remembered,增量 scope 仍需征询
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(0, 5007, "consent-007", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(d, ConsentDecision::Remembered);
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(
                0,
                5007,
                "consent-007",
                &["read".into(), "admin".into()],
                &[],
            )
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Required(ConsentRequiredReason::ScopeExpansion { .. })
        ));
    }

    /// 未配置征询页且 consent 不足:interaction_required 显性失败(不静默放行)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn continue_without_consent_url_errors_explicitly_when_escalation_needed() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client_with_scopes(
                "consent-008",
                &["read", "admin"],
            ))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 5008, "consent-008", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let mut req = make_request("consent-008", &generate_code_challenge(verifier));
        req.scope = Some("read admin".into());
        let login_url = match handler.authorize(&req, None).await.unwrap() {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        };
        let err = handler
            .resume(&extract_ticket_from_login_url(&login_url), Some(5008), &[])
            .await
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string()
                .contains("oauth2-server-authorize-interaction-required"),
            "未配置征询页应显性失败,实际: {}",
            err
        );
    }

    /// 直连首次授权沿用既有放行语义:签发授权码并记录 consent;
    /// 后续同 scope 授权走记忆 fast path(免征询)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_direct_first_grant_records_consent_then_remembered() {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("consent-009"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let req = make_request("consent-009", &generate_code_challenge(verifier));

        // 首次:放行 + 记录
        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(6001)).await.unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(resp, AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { .. }));
        let key = "oauth2:consent:0:6001:consent-009";
        assert!(
            dao.get(key).await.unwrap().is_some(),
            "首次授权应记录 consent"
        );

        // 二次:记忆覆盖,免征询直接放行
        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(6001)).await.unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(resp, AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { .. }));
    }

    // 属性快照双粒度测试

    /// 属性名集合变化 → 重新征询(ATTRIBUTE_NAME 粒度即比名哈希)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn attribute_name_change_requires_reconsent() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        let attrs = vec![("email".to_string(), vec!["a@x".to_string()])];
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 7001, "attr-001", &["read".into()], &attrs)
            .await
            .unwrap();

        // 同属性视图 → 免征询
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(0, 7001, "attr-001", &["read".into()], &attrs)
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(d, ConsentDecision::Remembered);

        // 属性名集合变化(新增 uid)→ 重征询
        let mut changed = attrs.clone();
        changed.push(("uid".to_string(), vec!["u1".to_string()]));
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(0, 7001, "attr-001", &["read".into()], &changed)
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Required(ConsentRequiredReason::AttributesChanged),
            "属性名集合变化应触发重征询"
        );
    }

    /// 属性值变化:ATTRIBUTE_VALUE 粒度重征询;ATTRIBUTE_NAME 粒度不触发(只比名)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn attribute_value_change_depends_on_granularity() {
        let attrs_old = vec![("email".to_string(), vec!["a@x".to_string()])];
        let attrs_new = vec![("email".to_string(), vec!["b@x".to_string()])];

        // 默认粒度(ATTRIBUTE_NAME):值变不触发
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 7002, "attr-002", &["read".into()], &attrs_old)
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(0, 7002, "attr-002", &["read".into()], &attrs_new)
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Remembered,
            "名哈希粒度下属性值变化不应重征询"
        );

        // ATTRIBUTE_VALUE 粒度:值变触发(粒度可配的直接体现)
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        let handler =
            handler.with_attribute_granularity(AttributeSnapshotGranularity::AttributeValue);
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 7003, "attr-003", &["read".into()], &attrs_old)
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(0, 7003, "attr-003", &["read".into()], &attrs_new)
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Required(ConsentRequiredReason::AttributesChanged),
            "值哈希粒度下属性值变化应触发重征询"
        );
    }

    /// 属性不变:双粒度均免征询。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn attribute_unchanged_remembered_under_both_granularities() {
        let attrs = vec![
            ("email".to_string(), vec!["a@x".to_string()]),
            ("uid".to_string(), vec!["u1".to_string(), "u2".to_string()]),
        ];
        for granularity in [
            AttributeSnapshotGranularity::AttributeName,
            AttributeSnapshotGranularity::AttributeValue,
        ] {
            let (handler, _) = make_handler();
            let handler = handler.with_attribute_granularity(granularity);
            handler
                .grant_consent(0, 7004, "attr-004", &["read".into()], &attrs)
                .await
                .unwrap();
            let d = handler
                .consent_decision(0, 7004, "attr-004", &["read".into()], &attrs)
                .await
                .unwrap();
            assert_eq!(
                d,
                ConsentDecision::Remembered,
                "{:?} 粒度下属性不变应免征询",
                granularity
            );
        }
    }

    /// consent 记录损坏(不可解析)→ fail-safe 重新征询(绝不静默放行)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn corrupt_consent_record_failsafe_requires_reconsent() {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler();
        dao.set("oauth2:consent:0:7005:attr-005", "{broken-json", 0)
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(0, 7005, "attr-005", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Required(ConsentRequiredReason::SnapshotUnreadable),
            "记录不可解析应 fail-safe 重征询"
        );
    }

    /// 快照哈希属性:SHA-512 十六进制(128 字符)、确定性、顺序不敏感;
    /// 名哈希只反映名集合(值变化不影响),值哈希对值差异敏感。
    #[test]
    fn attribute_snapshot_hash_properties() {
        let a = vec![
            ("email".to_string(), vec!["a@x".to_string()]),
            ("uid".to_string(), vec!["u1".to_string()]),
        ];
        let a_reordered = vec![
            ("uid".to_string(), vec!["u1".to_string()]),
            ("email".to_string(), vec!["a@x".to_string()]),
        ];
        // 与 a 仅值不同(名集合一致)
        let value_changed = vec![
            ("email".to_string(), vec!["b@x".to_string()]),
            ("uid".to_string(), vec!["u1".to_string()]),
        ];
        // 与 a 名集合不同
        let name_changed = vec![("email".to_string(), vec!["a@x".to_string()])];

        for hash_fn in [attribute_names_hash, attribute_values_hash] {
            let h1 = hash_fn(&a);
            assert_eq!(h1.len(), 128, "SHA-512 十六进制应为 128 字符");
            assert!(h1.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
            assert_eq!(h1, hash_fn(&a), "同输入哈希必须确定");
            assert_eq!(h1, hash_fn(&a_reordered), "输入顺序不得影响哈希");
        }
        // 名哈希:值变化不影响、名集合变化敏感
        assert_eq!(
            attribute_names_hash(&a),
            attribute_names_hash(&value_changed),
            "名哈希不得受属性值影响"
        );
        assert_ne!(
            attribute_names_hash(&a),
            attribute_names_hash(&name_changed),
            "名哈希必须反映名集合差异"
        );
        // 值哈希:值差异敏感
        assert_ne!(
            attribute_values_hash(&a),
            attribute_values_hash(&value_changed),
            "值哈希必须反映属性值差异"
        );
    }

    /// 征询批准路径携带属性视图:快照随批准写入,后续同视图请求免征询;
    /// 视图漂移触发重征询(fail-safe 方向是多征询)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn consent_approval_persists_attribute_snapshot() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler_with_consent_url();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client_with_scopes("attr-006", &["read", "admin"]))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 7006, "attr-006", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let attrs = vec![("email".to_string(), vec!["a@x".to_string()])];
        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let mut req = make_request("attr-006", &generate_code_challenge(verifier));
        req.scope = Some("read admin".into());
        let login_url = match handler.authorize(&req, None).await.unwrap() {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            _ => panic!("期望 LoginRequired"),
        };
        let resp = handler
            .resume(
                &extract_ticket_from_login_url(&login_url),
                Some(7006),
                &attrs,
            )
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let consent_page_url = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            other => panic!("期望升级征询页,实际: {:?}", other),
        };
        let new_ticket = consent_page_url.rsplit("ticket=").next().unwrap();
        handler
            .resume_with_consent(new_ticket, 7006, true, &attrs)
            .await
            .unwrap();

        // 同属性视图 → 免征询
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(
                0,
                7006,
                "attr-006",
                &["read".into(), "admin".into()],
                &attrs,
            )
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Remembered,
            "批准时的属性快照应覆盖后续同视图请求"
        );

        // 属性视图漂移 → 重征询
        let d = handler
            .consent_decision(0, 7006, "attr-006", &["read".into(), "admin".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            d,
            ConsentDecision::Required(ConsentRequiredReason::AttributesChanged),
            "属性视图漂移应触发重征询"
        );
    }

    // reconcile + prompt=none 测试

    /// 启动 reconcile:清理引用了已删除 client 的 consent 行,
    /// 存活 client 的记录原样保留。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn reconcile_removes_orphan_consent_and_keeps_live() {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler();
        // 两个 client,其一将被删除
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("reconcile-live"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("reconcile-dead"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        // 两个 consent 记录(不同 user 避免键覆盖)
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 8001, "reconcile-live", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 8002, "reconcile-dead", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        // 删除 dead client 后 reconcile
        handler.store.delete("reconcile-dead").await.unwrap();
        let (removed, kept) = handler.reconcile_consents().await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            removed, 1,
            "应恰好清理 1 条孤儿记录,实际清理 {} 条",
            removed
        );
        assert_eq!(kept, 1, "存活 client 的记录应保留,实际保留 {} 条", kept);

        assert!(
            dao.get("oauth2:consent:0:8002:reconcile-dead")
                .await
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "已删 client 的 consent 行应被清理"
        );
        assert!(
            dao.get("oauth2:consent:0:8001:reconcile-live")
                .await
                .unwrap()
                .is_some(),
            "存活 client 的 consent 行应保留"
        );

        // 幂等:再次 reconcile 无事可做
        let (removed, _) = handler.reconcile_consents().await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(removed, 0, "reconcile 必须幂等");
    }

    /// prompt=none:有有效 consent → 直接放行(不弹征询、不弹登录)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn prompt_none_with_valid_consent_passes_through() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("prompt-none-001"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 8101, "prompt-none-001", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let req = make_request(
            "prompt-none-001",
            &generate_code_challenge("dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"),
        );
        let resp = handler
            .authorize_with_prompt(&req, Some(8101), AuthorizePrompt::None)
            .await
            .expect("prompt=none + 有效 consent 应放行");
        assert!(
            matches!(resp, AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { .. }),
            "应直接签发授权码"
        );
    }

    /// prompt=none:consent 不足 → interaction_required 错误(不弹交互页,显性错误返回,OIDC Core §3.1.2.1)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn prompt_none_without_consent_is_interaction_required() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client_with_scopes(
                "prompt-none-002",
                &["read", "admin"],
            ))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        // 有部分记录但请求扩 scope:同样按 consent 不足处理
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 8102, "prompt-none-002", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let mut req = make_request(
            "prompt-none-002",
            &generate_code_challenge("dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"),
        );
        req.scope = Some("read admin".into());
        let err = handler
            .authorize_with_prompt(&req, Some(8102), AuthorizePrompt::None)
            .await
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string()
                .contains("oauth2-server-authorize-interaction-required"),
            "consent 不足应 interaction_required,实际: {}",
            err
        );
    }

    /// prompt=none 且未登录:同样 interaction_required(不引导登录)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn prompt_none_without_login_is_interaction_required() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("prompt-none-003"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let req = make_request(
            "prompt-none-003",
            &generate_code_challenge("dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"),
        );
        // prompt=none 对应 NoInteraction 变体(AuthorizePrompt::None 为
        // 「未指定 prompt」默认流程:未登录引导登录两段式)
        let err = handler
            .authorize_with_prompt(&req, None, AuthorizePrompt::NoInteraction)
            .await
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string()
                .contains("oauth2-server-authorize-interaction-required"),
            "未登录应 interaction_required,实际: {}",
            err
        );
    }

    /// prompt=login:已登录会话仍强制重走登录(force_login 语义),
    /// 恢复票据一次性语义与默认路径一致。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn prompt_login_forces_reauthentication_roundtrip() {
        let (handler, dao) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("prompt-login-001"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        // 已有有效 consent:默认路径直接放行;prompt=login 必须仍走登录往返
        handler
            .grant_consent(0, 8103, "prompt-login-001", &["read".into()], &[])
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let req = make_request(
            "prompt-login-001",
            &generate_code_challenge("dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"),
        );
        let resp = handler
            .authorize_with_prompt(&req, Some(8103), AuthorizePrompt::Login)
            .await
            .expect("prompt=login 应引导重新登录");
        let login_url = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::LoginRequired { login_url } => login_url,
            other => panic!("期望 LoginRequired,实际: {:?}", other),
        };
        let ticket = extract_ticket_from_login_url(&login_url);
        // 旧票据已消费(重新暂存):恰好一张在库
        let staged = dao.keys("oauth2:authorize-ticket:*").await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(staged.len(), 1);
        // 登录后续流放行
        let resp = handler.resume(&ticket, Some(8103), &[]).await.unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(resp, AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { .. }));
    }

    /// redirect_uri 自带 query string 时 code 参数必须用 `&` 追加(RFC 6749 §4.1.2 / RFC 3986),
    /// 恒拼 `?` 会产生双 `?` 畸形跳转 URL。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_redirect_url_appends_code_with_ampersand_when_query_exists() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        let client = OAuth2Client::new(
            "auth-encode-003",
            "secret-123",
            vec!["https://app.example.com/cb?existing=param".into()],
            vec![GrantType::AuthorizationCode],
            vec!["read".into()],
        )
        .unwrap();
        handler.store.create(client).await.unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = AuthorizeRequest {
            response_type: "code".into(),
            client_id: "auth-encode-003".into(),
            redirect_uri: "https://app.example.com/cb?existing=param".into(),
            scope: Some("read".into()),
            state: Some("xyz".into()),
            code_challenge: challenge,
            code_challenge_method: "S256".into(),
            prompt: None,
        };

        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1001)).await.expect("授权");
        match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location } => {
                assert!(location.starts_with("https://app.example.com/cb?existing=param&code="));
                assert!(
                    !location.contains("?code="),
                    "不得出现双 ? 畸形 URL: {}",
                    location
                );
                assert!(location.ends_with("&state=xyz"));
            },
            _ => panic!("期望 Redirect"),
        }
    }

    /// redirect URL 中的 state 参数必须百分号编码。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_redirect_url_encodes_state() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("auth-encode-002"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = AuthorizeRequest {
            response_type: "code".into(),
            client_id: "auth-encode-002".into(),
            redirect_uri: "https://app.example.com/cb".into(),
            scope: Some("read".into()),
            state: Some("state&with=special#chars".into()),
            code_challenge: challenge,
            code_challenge_method: "S256".into(),
            prompt: None,
        };

        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1001)).await.expect("授权");
        match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location } => {
                // state 中的特殊字符必须被编码,不能直接出现
                assert!(
                    !location.contains("state&with=special#chars"),
                    "state 中的特殊字符未被编码: {}",
                    location
                );
                assert!(location.contains("state="), "应有 state 参数: {}", location);
            },
            _ => panic!("期望 Redirect"),
        }
    }

    /// authorize 端点请求超出 allowed_scopes 的 scope 返回 invalid_scope。
    /// make_test_client 的 allowed_scopes = ["read"],请求 "admin" 应被拒绝。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_scope_not_allowed() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("auth-scope-001"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let mut req = make_request("auth-scope-001", &challenge);
        req.scope = Some("admin".into());

        let err = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1)).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string().contains(&crate::i18n::translate_detail(
                "oauth2-server-client-invalid-scope",
                &[("arg0", "admin")],
            )),
            "期望 invalid_scope 错误,实际: {}",
            err
        );
    }

    /// authorize 端点请求合法 scope 正常通过。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn authorize_scope_allowed() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("auth-scope-002"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let mut req = make_request("auth-scope-002", &challenge);
        req.scope = Some("read".into());

        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(1)).await.unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(resp, AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { .. }));
    }

    // consume_code 测试

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn consume_code_returns_auth_data() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("consume-001"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = make_request("consume-001", &challenge);
        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(2001)).await.unwrap();
        let location = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location } => location,
            _ => panic!("期望 Redirect"),
        };
        let code = location
            .split("code=")
            .nth(1)
            .unwrap()
            .split('&')
            .next()
            .unwrap();

        let auth_code = handler.consume_code(code).await.unwrap().expect("应存在");
        assert_eq!(auth_code.client_id, "consume-001");
        assert_eq!(auth_code.user_id, 2001);
        assert_eq!(auth_code.code_challenge, challenge);
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn consume_code_one_time_use() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("consume-002"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = make_request("consume-002", &challenge);
        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(2002)).await.unwrap();
        let location = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location } => location,
            _ => panic!("期望 Redirect"),
        };
        let code = location
            .split("code=")
            .nth(1)
            .unwrap()
            .split('&')
            .next()
            .unwrap();

        assert!(handler.consume_code(code).await.unwrap().is_some());
        assert!(handler.consume_code(code).await.unwrap().is_none());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn consume_code_nonexistent_returns_none() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        let result = handler.consume_code("nonexistent-code").await.unwrap();
        assert!(result.is_none());
    }

    /// 并发原子消费:16 个 tokio 任务同时用同一 code 调用 consume_code,仅一个取到 `Some`,其余返回 `None`。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn consume_code_atomic_concurrent_only_one_wins() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("consume-conc-001"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = make_request("consume-conc-001", &challenge);
        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(3001)).await.unwrap();
        let location = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location } => location,
            _ => panic!("期望 Redirect"),
        };
        let code = location
            .split("code=")
            .nth(1)
            .unwrap()
            .split('&')
            .next()
            .unwrap()
            .to_string();

        let handler = std::sync::Arc::new(handler);
        let mut handles = Vec::new();
        for _ in 0..16 {
            let h = handler.clone();
            let c = code.clone();
            handles.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
                h.consume_code(&c).await.unwrap().is_some()
            }));
        }
        let mut wins = 0usize;
        for h in handles {
            if h.await.unwrap() {
                wins += 1;
            }
        }
        assert_eq!(
            wins, 1,
            "并发双花:仅一个 consume_code 应成功,实际 {}",
            wins
        );
    }

    /// 重放检测 + 吊销 — 授权码被消费后记录签发的 token,
    /// 再次消费(重放)时 `revoke_replayed_code_tokens` 应定位并删除签发记录。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn revoke_replayed_code_tokens_deletes_records() {
        let (handler, _) = make_handler();
        handler
            .store
            .create(make_test_client("revoke-001"))
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk";
        let challenge = generate_code_challenge(verifier);
        let req = make_request("revoke-001", &challenge);
        let resp = handler.authorize(&req, Some(3002)).await.unwrap();
        let location = match resp {
            AuthorizeResponse::Redirect { location } => location,
            _ => panic!("期望 Redirect"),
        };
        let code = location
            .split("code=")
            .nth(1)
            .unwrap()
            .split('&')
            .next()
            .unwrap()
            .to_string();

        assert!(handler.consume_code(&code).await.unwrap().is_some());
        // 记录该 code 签发的 token(模拟 issue_tokens 之后)
        handler
            .record_code_tokens(&code, "at-fake-001", Some("rt-fake-001"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        // 重放:第二次消费返回 None
        assert!(handler.consume_code(&code).await.unwrap().is_none());

        let revoked = handler.revoke_replayed_code_tokens(&code).await.unwrap();
        assert!(revoked, "应检测到 codeused 记录并吊销 token");
        // access/refresh token DAO 记录应被删除
        let at_key = crate::constants::DaoKeyPrefix::OAuth2AccessToken.build_key("at-fake-001");
        assert!(
            handler.dao.get(&at_key).await.unwrap().is_none(),
            "access token 记录应已被吊销删除"
        );
        // DAO fallback 存储键(本模块 oauth2_refresh_token_key),断言 refresh token 已被吊销删除
        let rt_key = oauth2_refresh_token_key("rt-fake-001");
        assert!(
            handler.dao.get(&rt_key).await.unwrap().is_none(),
            "refresh token 记录应已被吊销删除"
        );

        // codeused 记录本身应已删除(get_and_delete 语义)
        let revoked_again = handler.revoke_replayed_code_tokens(&code).await.unwrap();
        assert!(!revoked_again, "codeused 记录应已消费删除");
    }

    #[test]
    fn generate_authorization_code_produces_unique() {
        let code1 = generate_authorization_code();
        let code2 = generate_authorization_code();
        assert_ne!(code1, code2);
        assert!(code1.len() >= 43); // 32 bytes → 43 base64url chars
    }
}

// prompt 解析 / 错误构造 / 租户回退 单测
#[cfg(test)]
mod prompt_and_error_tests {
    use super::*;

    fn make_req(prompt: Option<&str>) -> AuthorizeRequest {
        AuthorizeRequest {
            response_type: "code".into(),
            client_id: "c1".into(),
            redirect_uri: "https://app.example.com/cb".into(),
            scope: Some("read".into()),
            state: Some("xyz".into()),
            code_challenge: "challenge-001".into(),
            code_challenge_method: "S256".into(),
            prompt: prompt.map(str::to_string),
        }
    }

    /// prompt 缺省/未知值 → 默认流程;none/login 及别名、空白容忍各归其位。
    #[test]
    fn prompt_hint_parses_none_login_and_alias() {
        assert_eq!(
            make_req(None).prompt_hint(),
            AuthorizePrompt::None,
            "缺省 → 默认流程"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            make_req(Some("none")).prompt_hint(),
            AuthorizePrompt::NoInteraction
        );
        assert_eq!(
            make_req(Some("login")).prompt_hint(),
            AuthorizePrompt::ForceLogin
        );
        assert_eq!(
            make_req(Some("consent")).prompt_hint(),
            AuthorizePrompt::None,
            "未知值 → 默认流程"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            make_req(Some("  login  ")).prompt_hint(),
            AuthorizePrompt::ForceLogin,
            "值应先 trim 再匹配"
        );
    }

    /// ticket 失效 / prompt=none 交互禁止的错误构造使用稳定 OAuth2 错误码。
    #[test]
    fn ticket_and_interaction_errors_use_stable_oauth2_codes() {
        let err = ticket_invalid_error();
        assert!(
            matches!(&err, GarrisonError::OAuth2(m) if m.contains("ticket-invalid-or-expired")),
            "ticket 失效应报稳定的 OAuth2 错误码,实际: {err:?}"
        );
        let err = interaction_required_error();
        assert!(
            matches!(&err, GarrisonError::OAuth2(m) if m.contains("interaction-required")),
            "prompt=none 交互禁止应报 interaction-required,实际: {err:?}"
        );
    }

    /// 无租户上下文时 current_tenant_id_with_warn 回退默认租户 0(fail-visible 语义)。
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn current_tenant_falls_back_to_zero_without_context() {
        // 本测试运行于独立 tokio worker,无 task_local 上下文注入 → 走 None 分支
        assert_eq!(current_tenant_id_with_warn(), 0);
    }
}