fraiseql-core 2.3.2

//! JWT tenant extraction tests
//!
//! Tests for extracting tenant context from JWT claims

#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::panic)] // Reason: test code, panics acceptable
use serde_json::json;

// ============================================================================
// Test 1: JWT Tenant Extraction
// ============================================================================

/// Test that `tenant_id` can be extracted from JWT claims
#[test]
fn test_extract_tenant_from_jwt_claims() {
    // Simulate JWT claims (in real code, these would be decoded from actual JWT)
    let claims = json!({
        "sub": "user123",
        "tenant_id": "acme-corp",
        "email": "alice@acme.com",
        "iat": 1_234_567_890,
        "exp": 1_234_571_490
    });

    // Extract tenant_id from claims
    let tenant_id = claims
        .get("tenant_id")
        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
        .expect("tenant_id should be in claims");

    assert_eq!(tenant_id, "acme-corp");
}

/// Test that missing `tenant_id` in JWT is handled gracefully
#[test]
fn test_missing_tenant_id_in_jwt() {
    let claims = json!({
        "sub": "user123",
        "email": "alice@example.com",
        "iat": 1_234_567_890
    });

    let tenant_id = claims.get("tenant_id").and_then(|v| v.as_str());

    assert_eq!(tenant_id, None);
}

/// Test that `tenant_id` as non-string in JWT is rejected
#[test]
fn test_invalid_tenant_id_type_in_jwt() {
    let claims = json!({
        "sub": "user123",
        "tenant_id": 12345,  // Should be string, not number
        "email": "alice@example.com"
    });

    let tenant_id = claims.get("tenant_id").and_then(|v| v.as_str());

    assert_eq!(tenant_id, None);
}

// ============================================================================
// Test 2: Tenant Context from JWT
// ============================================================================

/// Test that `TenantContext` can be created from JWT claims
#[test]
fn test_tenant_context_from_jwt_claims() {
    let claims = json!({
        "sub": "user123",
        "tenant_id": "widgets-inc",
        "email": "bob@widgets.com"
    });

    // Extract and create TenantContext (implementation will do this)
    if let Some(tenant_id) = claims.get("tenant_id").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
        let tenant_id_str = tenant_id.to_string();
        assert_eq!(tenant_id_str, "widgets-inc");
    } else {
        panic!("tenant_id should be extractable from claims");
    }
}

/// Test that UUID `tenant_ids` from JWT work correctly
#[test]
fn test_uuid_tenant_id_from_jwt() {
    let uuid_tenant = "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000";
    let claims = json!({
        "sub": "user123",
        "tenant_id": uuid_tenant,
        "email": "user@example.com"
    });

    let extracted = claims.get("tenant_id").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap();

    assert_eq!(extracted, uuid_tenant);
}

// ============================================================================
// Test 3: Query Filter Generation
// ============================================================================

/// Test that tenant filter SQL is generated correctly
#[test]
fn test_generate_tenant_filter_sql() {
    let tenant_id = "acme-corp";

    // Generate parameterized SQL
    let sql_fragment = format!("tenant_id = '{}'", tenant_id);

    assert_eq!(sql_fragment, "tenant_id = 'acme-corp'");
}

/// Test that tenant filter prevents SQL injection
#[test]
fn test_tenant_filter_sql_injection_prevention() {
    let malicious_tenant = "'; DROP TABLE users; --";

    // In a real implementation, this would be handled via parameterized queries
    // For now, just verify the input is preserved
    let sql_fragment = format!("tenant_id = '{}'", malicious_tenant);

    assert!(sql_fragment.contains(malicious_tenant));
}

/// Test that tenant filter can be combined with other WHERE clauses
#[test]
fn test_tenant_filter_with_other_conditions() {
    let tenant_id = "acme-corp";
    let base_query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE active = true";

    // Combine tenant filter with existing WHERE clause
    let combined = format!("{} AND tenant_id = '{}'", base_query, tenant_id);

    assert!(combined.contains("active = true"));
    assert!(combined.contains("tenant_id = 'acme-corp'"));
    assert!(combined.contains("AND"));
}

// ============================================================================
// Test 4: Multi-Database Filter Generation
// ============================================================================

/// Test that tenant filter works with PostgreSQL
#[test]
fn test_tenant_filter_postgresql() {
    // PostgreSQL with parameterized query
    let sql = "WHERE tenant_id = $1".to_string();

    assert!(sql.contains("tenant_id"));
    assert!(sql.contains("$1"));
}

/// Test that tenant filter works with MySQL
#[test]
fn test_tenant_filter_mysql() {
    // MySQL with parameterized query
    let sql = "WHERE tenant_id = ?".to_string();

    assert!(sql.contains("tenant_id"));
    assert!(sql.contains('?'));
}

/// Test that tenant filter works with SQLite
#[test]
fn test_tenant_filter_sqlite() {
    // SQLite with parameterized query
    let sql = "WHERE tenant_id = ?".to_string();

    assert!(sql.contains("tenant_id"));
    assert!(sql.contains('?'));
}

// ============================================================================
// Test 5: Cross-Tenant Access Prevention
// ============================================================================

/// Test that user from tenant A cannot query data from tenant B
#[test]
fn test_cross_tenant_access_prevention() {
    let user_tenant = "tenant_a";
    let requested_data_tenant = "tenant_b";

    // When executing a query, tenant filter should prevent access
    assert_ne!(user_tenant, requested_data_tenant);

    // Implementation should verify:
    // - Query includes WHERE tenant_id = $1 (user's tenant)
    // - No other tenant's data can be accessed
}

/// Test that system queries can specify multiple tenants (for admin)
#[test]
fn test_admin_multi_tenant_query() {
    // Admin with special permissions might query across tenants
    // (implementation-specific, not part of basic isolation)

    let admin_tenant = "SYSTEM";
    let query_tenants = ["tenant_a", "tenant_b", "tenant_c"];

    assert_eq!(admin_tenant, "SYSTEM");
    assert_eq!(query_tenants.len(), 3);
}

// ============================================================================
// Test 6: Edge Cases
// ============================================================================

/// Test that empty `tenant_id` handling
#[test]
fn test_empty_tenant_id_filtering() {
    let tenant_id = "";

    // Empty string is valid for system/shared data
    let filter = format!("tenant_id = '{}'", tenant_id);

    assert!(filter.contains("''"));
}

/// Test that special characters in `tenant_id` are preserved
#[test]
fn test_special_chars_tenant_id_filtering() {
    let tenant_id = "company-123_corp.org";

    let filter = format!("tenant_id = '{}'", tenant_id);

    assert!(filter.contains("company-123_corp.org"));
}

/// Test that very long `tenant_id` is handled
#[test]
fn test_long_tenant_id_filtering() {
    let long_id = "a".repeat(255); // Max typical identifier length

    let filter = format!("tenant_id = '{}'", &long_id);

    assert!(filter.contains(&long_id));
}