forge-sandbox 0.6.0

//! deno_core op definitions for the Forge sandbox.
//!
//! The `#[op2]` macro generates additional public items (v8 function pointers,
//! metadata structs) that cannot carry doc comments. We suppress `missing_docs`
//! at the module level — all actual functions and types are documented below.
#![allow(missing_docs)]

use std::cell::RefCell;
use std::rc::Rc;
use std::sync::Arc;

use deno_core::op2;
use deno_core::OpState;
use deno_error::JsErrorBox;

use std::collections::HashSet;

use crate::stash::validate_key;
use crate::{ResourceDispatcher, StashDispatcher, ToolDispatcher};

/// Rate limiting state for tool calls within a single execution.
pub(crate) struct ToolCallLimits {
    /// Maximum number of tool calls allowed.
    pub(crate) max_calls: usize,
    /// Maximum size of serialized arguments per call.
    pub(crate) max_args_size: usize,
    /// Number of tool calls made so far.
    pub(crate) calls_made: usize,
}

/// Rate limiting state for stash operations within a single execution.
pub(crate) struct StashCallLimits {
    /// Maximum number of stash operations allowed (None = unlimited).
    pub(crate) max_calls: Option<usize>,
    /// Number of stash operations made so far.
    pub(crate) calls_made: usize,
}

impl StashCallLimits {
    /// Check if the limit has been reached. Returns an error message if so.
    pub(crate) fn check_limit(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
        if let Some(max) = self.max_calls {
            if self.calls_made >= max {
                return Err(format!(
                    "stash operation limit reached ({max} calls per execution)"
                ));
            }
        }
        self.calls_made += 1;
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// Log a message from sandbox code.
#[op2(fast)]
pub fn op_forge_log(#[string] msg: &str) {
    tracing::info!(target: "forge::sandbox::js", "{}", msg);
}

/// Store the execution result in OpState.
#[op2(fast)]
pub fn op_forge_set_result(state: &mut OpState, #[string] json: &str) {
    state.put(ExecutionResult(json.to_string()));
}

/// Call a tool on a downstream server via the ToolDispatcher.
///
/// Enforces per-execution rate limiting and argument size limits via
/// [`ToolCallLimits`] stored in OpState.
#[op2]
#[string]
pub async fn op_forge_call_tool(
    op_state: Rc<RefCell<OpState>>,
    #[string] server: String,
    #[string] tool: String,
    #[string] args_json: String,
) -> Result<String, JsErrorBox> {
    tracing::debug!(
        server = %server,
        tool = %tool,
        args_len = args_json.len(),
        "tool call dispatched"
    );

    // Check and increment tool call limits
    {
        let mut st = op_state.borrow_mut();
        let limits = st.borrow_mut::<ToolCallLimits>();
        if limits.calls_made >= limits.max_calls {
            return Err(JsErrorBox::generic(format!(
                "tool call limit exceeded (max {} calls per execution)",
                limits.max_calls
            )));
        }
        if args_json.len() > limits.max_args_size {
            return Err(JsErrorBox::generic(format!(
                "tool call args too large ({} bytes, max {} bytes)",
                args_json.len(),
                limits.max_args_size
            )));
        }
        limits.calls_made += 1;
    }

    let dispatcher = {
        let st = op_state.borrow();
        st.borrow::<Arc<dyn ToolDispatcher>>().clone()
    };

    let args: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&args_json)
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("invalid JSON args: {e}")))?;

    let result = match dispatcher.call_tool(&server, &tool, args).await {
        Ok(val) => val,
        Err(e) => {
            let known = {
                let st = op_state.borrow();
                st.try_borrow::<KnownTools>()
                    .map(|kt| kt.0.clone())
                    .unwrap_or_default()
            };
            let pairs: Vec<(&str, &str)> = known
                .iter()
                .map(|(s, t)| (s.as_str(), t.as_str()))
                .collect();
            let mut structured = e.to_structured_error(Some(&pairs));
            crate::redact::redact_structured_error(&server, &tool, &mut structured);
            return serde_json::to_string(&structured)
                .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("error serialization failed: {e}")));
        }
    };

    serde_json::to_string(&result)
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("result serialization failed: {e}")))
}

/// Wrapper for execution results stored in OpState.
pub(crate) struct ExecutionResult(pub(crate) String);

/// Wrapper for the maximum resource content size, stored in OpState.
pub(crate) struct MaxResourceSize(pub(crate) usize);

/// Wrapper for the current server group, stored in OpState.
///
/// Used by stash ops to enforce group isolation. `None` means ungrouped.
pub(crate) struct CurrentGroup(pub(crate) Option<String>);

/// Set of known server names for SR-R6 validation.
///
/// Stored in OpState so `op_forge_read_resource` can reject unknown servers
/// before any dispatch machinery runs.
pub(crate) struct KnownServers(pub(crate) HashSet<String>);

/// Known (server, tool) pairs for structured error fuzzy matching.
///
/// Stored in OpState so tool/resource dispatch errors can produce
/// `{error:true, code:"TOOL_NOT_FOUND", suggested_fix:"Did you mean 'find_symbols'?"}`.
pub(crate) struct KnownTools(pub(crate) Vec<(String, String)>);

/// Validate a resource URI for security.
///
/// Rejects:
/// - URIs with path traversal (`..` as a path segment, including URL-encoded variants)
/// - URIs longer than 2048 bytes
/// - URIs containing null bytes
/// - URIs containing control characters (U+0000..U+001F, U+007F)
pub(crate) fn validate_resource_uri(uri: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
    if uri.len() > 2048 {
        return Err(format!(
            "resource URI too long ({} bytes, max 2048 bytes)",
            uri.len()
        ));
    }
    if uri.bytes().any(|b| b == 0) {
        return Err("resource URI must not contain null bytes".into());
    }
    if uri.chars().any(|c| c.is_control()) {
        return Err("resource URI must not contain control characters".into());
    }
    if has_path_traversal(uri) {
        return Err("resource URI must not contain path traversal".into());
    }
    if let Some(scheme) = extract_uri_scheme(uri) {
        if is_blocked_scheme(&scheme) {
            return Err(format!("URI scheme '{}' is not allowed", scheme));
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Blocked URI schemes that should never be passed to resource dispatchers.
const BLOCKED_SCHEMES: &[&str] = &[
    "data",
    "javascript",
    "ftp",
    "gopher",
    "telnet",
    "ldap",
    "dict",
];

/// Extract the scheme from a URI (text before `://` or `:`).
/// Returns `None` for schemeless URIs like `some-resource-id`.
fn extract_uri_scheme(uri: &str) -> Option<String> {
    // Check for `://` first (most common)
    if let Some(pos) = uri.find("://") {
        let candidate = &uri[..pos];
        // A valid scheme contains only alphanumeric, +, -, . and starts with a letter
        if !candidate.is_empty()
            && candidate.as_bytes()[0].is_ascii_alphabetic()
            && candidate
                .bytes()
                .all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'+' || b == b'-' || b == b'.')
        {
            return Some(candidate.to_ascii_lowercase());
        }
    }
    // Check for `:` without `//` (e.g., `data:text/plain,...`, `javascript:...`)
    if let Some(pos) = uri.find(':') {
        let candidate = &uri[..pos];
        if !candidate.is_empty()
            && candidate.as_bytes()[0].is_ascii_alphabetic()
            && candidate
                .bytes()
                .all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'+' || b == b'-' || b == b'.')
        {
            return Some(candidate.to_ascii_lowercase());
        }
    }
    None
}

/// Check if a scheme is in the blocklist (case-insensitive, scheme already lowercased).
fn is_blocked_scheme(scheme: &str) -> bool {
    BLOCKED_SCHEMES.contains(&scheme)
}

/// Check if a URI contains path traversal (`..`) as a path segment.
///
/// Checks the raw URI, then percent-decodes and checks again (to catch `%2e%2e`),
/// then double-decodes and checks again (to catch `%252e%252e`).
fn has_path_traversal(uri: &str) -> bool {
    if has_dotdot_segment(uri) {
        return true;
    }
    // Decode once and check
    let decoded = percent_encoding::percent_decode_str(uri).decode_utf8_lossy();
    if has_dotdot_segment(&decoded) {
        return true;
    }
    // Double-decode and check (catches %252e%252e → %2e%2e → ..)
    let double_decoded = percent_encoding::percent_decode_str(&decoded).decode_utf8_lossy();
    if double_decoded != decoded && has_dotdot_segment(&double_decoded) {
        return true;
    }
    false
}

/// Check if a string contains `..` as a path segment (not as part of a filename).
///
/// Matches: `..`, `../`, `/../`, `/..` at end, bare `..`
fn has_dotdot_segment(s: &str) -> bool {
    // Exact match
    if s == ".." {
        return true;
    }
    // Starts with ../
    if s.starts_with("../") {
        return true;
    }
    // Ends with /..
    if s.ends_with("/..") {
        return true;
    }
    // Contains /../ anywhere
    if s.contains("/../") {
        return true;
    }
    false
}

/// Read a resource by URI from a downstream server via the ResourceDispatcher.
///
/// Enforces URI validation (SR-R1), per-execution rate limiting (SR-R3),
/// max resource size truncation (SR-R2), and error redaction (SR-R5).
#[op2]
#[string]
pub async fn op_forge_read_resource(
    op_state: Rc<RefCell<OpState>>,
    #[string] server: String,
    #[string] uri: String,
) -> Result<String, JsErrorBox> {
    tracing::debug!(
        server = %server,
        uri = %uri,
        "resource read dispatched"
    );

    // SR-R1: Validate URI
    validate_resource_uri(&uri).map_err(JsErrorBox::generic)?;

    // SR-R6: Reject unknown server names before dispatch
    {
        let st = op_state.borrow();
        if let Some(known) = st.try_borrow::<KnownServers>() {
            if !known.0.contains(&server) {
                return Err(JsErrorBox::generic(format!("unknown server: '{server}'")));
            }
        }
    }

    // SR-R3: Check and increment tool call limits (shared with tool calls)
    {
        let mut st = op_state.borrow_mut();
        let limits = st.borrow_mut::<ToolCallLimits>();
        if limits.calls_made >= limits.max_calls {
            return Err(JsErrorBox::generic(format!(
                "tool call limit exceeded (max {} calls per execution)",
                limits.max_calls
            )));
        }
        limits.calls_made += 1;
    }

    // Get dispatcher and max_resource_size from OpState
    let (dispatcher, max_resource_size) = {
        let st = op_state.borrow();
        let d = st.borrow::<Arc<dyn ResourceDispatcher>>().clone();
        let max_size = st
            .try_borrow::<MaxResourceSize>()
            .map(|m| m.0)
            .unwrap_or(crate::ipc::DEFAULT_MAX_RESOURCE_SIZE);
        (d, max_size)
    };

    let result = match dispatcher.read_resource(&server, &uri).await {
        Ok(val) => val,
        Err(e) => {
            let known = {
                let st = op_state.borrow();
                st.try_borrow::<KnownTools>()
                    .map(|kt| kt.0.clone())
                    .unwrap_or_default()
            };
            let pairs: Vec<(&str, &str)> = known
                .iter()
                .map(|(s, t)| (s.as_str(), t.as_str()))
                .collect();
            let mut structured = e.to_structured_error(Some(&pairs));
            crate::redact::redact_structured_error(&server, "readResource", &mut structured);
            return serde_json::to_string(&structured)
                .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("error serialization failed: {e}")));
        }
    };

    // SR-R2: Serialize and truncate if > max_resource_size
    let mut json = serde_json::to_string(&result)
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("result serialization failed: {e}")))?;

    if json.len() > max_resource_size {
        let original_size = json.len();
        let end = floor_char_boundary(&json, max_resource_size);
        json = serde_json::json!({
            "_truncated": true,
            "_data_is_fragment": true,
            "_original_bytes": original_size,
            "_shown_bytes": end,
            "data": &json[..end],
        })
        .to_string();
    }

    Ok(json)
}

fn floor_char_boundary(s: &str, max: usize) -> usize {
    let mut end = max.min(s.len());
    while end > 0 && !s.is_char_boundary(end) {
        end -= 1;
    }
    end
}

/// Store a value in the session stash via the StashDispatcher.
///
/// - `key`: The stash key (alphanumeric + `_-.:`).
/// - `value_json`: JSON-serialized value to store.
/// - `ttl_secs`: TTL in seconds; 0 means use server default.
#[op2]
#[string]
pub async fn op_forge_stash_put(
    op_state: Rc<RefCell<OpState>>,
    #[string] key: String,
    #[string] value_json: String,
    #[smi] ttl_secs: u32,
) -> Result<String, JsErrorBox> {
    // Defense-in-depth: validate key at op boundary before IPC traversal
    validate_key(&key).map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(e.to_string()))?;

    // Check stash operation limit
    if let Some(limits) = op_state.borrow_mut().try_borrow_mut::<StashCallLimits>() {
        limits.check_limit().map_err(JsErrorBox::generic)?;
    }

    let (dispatcher, current_group) = {
        let st = op_state.borrow();
        let d = st.borrow::<Arc<dyn StashDispatcher>>().clone();
        let g = st.borrow::<CurrentGroup>().0.clone();
        (d, g)
    };

    let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&value_json)
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("invalid JSON value: {e}")))?;

    let ttl = if ttl_secs == 0 { None } else { Some(ttl_secs) };

    let result = dispatcher
        .put(&key, value, ttl, current_group)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(e.to_string()))?;

    serde_json::to_string(&result)
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("result serialization failed: {e}")))
}

/// Retrieve a value from the session stash via the StashDispatcher.
#[op2]
#[string]
pub async fn op_forge_stash_get(
    op_state: Rc<RefCell<OpState>>,
    #[string] key: String,
) -> Result<String, JsErrorBox> {
    validate_key(&key).map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(e.to_string()))?;

    if let Some(limits) = op_state.borrow_mut().try_borrow_mut::<StashCallLimits>() {
        limits.check_limit().map_err(JsErrorBox::generic)?;
    }

    let (dispatcher, current_group) = {
        let st = op_state.borrow();
        let d = st.borrow::<Arc<dyn StashDispatcher>>().clone();
        let g = st.borrow::<CurrentGroup>().0.clone();
        (d, g)
    };

    let result = dispatcher
        .get(&key, current_group)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(e.to_string()))?;

    serde_json::to_string(&result)
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("result serialization failed: {e}")))
}

/// Delete an entry from the session stash via the StashDispatcher.
#[op2]
#[string]
pub async fn op_forge_stash_delete(
    op_state: Rc<RefCell<OpState>>,
    #[string] key: String,
) -> Result<String, JsErrorBox> {
    validate_key(&key).map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(e.to_string()))?;

    if let Some(limits) = op_state.borrow_mut().try_borrow_mut::<StashCallLimits>() {
        limits.check_limit().map_err(JsErrorBox::generic)?;
    }

    let (dispatcher, current_group) = {
        let st = op_state.borrow();
        let d = st.borrow::<Arc<dyn StashDispatcher>>().clone();
        let g = st.borrow::<CurrentGroup>().0.clone();
        (d, g)
    };

    let result = dispatcher
        .delete(&key, current_group)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(e.to_string()))?;

    serde_json::to_string(&result)
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("result serialization failed: {e}")))
}

/// List all keys visible to the current group from the session stash.
#[op2]
#[string]
pub async fn op_forge_stash_keys(op_state: Rc<RefCell<OpState>>) -> Result<String, JsErrorBox> {
    if let Some(limits) = op_state.borrow_mut().try_borrow_mut::<StashCallLimits>() {
        limits.check_limit().map_err(JsErrorBox::generic)?;
    }

    let (dispatcher, current_group) = {
        let st = op_state.borrow();
        let d = st.borrow::<Arc<dyn StashDispatcher>>().clone();
        let g = st.borrow::<CurrentGroup>().0.clone();
        (d, g)
    };

    let result = dispatcher
        .keys(current_group)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(e.to_string()))?;

    serde_json::to_string(&result)
        .map_err(|e| JsErrorBox::generic(format!("result serialization failed: {e}")))
}

deno_core::extension!(
    forge_ext,
    ops = [
        op_forge_log,
        op_forge_set_result,
        op_forge_call_tool,
        op_forge_read_resource,
        op_forge_stash_put,
        op_forge_stash_get,
        op_forge_stash_delete,
        op_forge_stash_keys
    ],
);

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    // --- SK-V01: stash key validation rejects control characters ---
    #[test]
    fn sk_v01_stash_key_rejects_control_chars() {
        let err = validate_key("key\x01value").unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, crate::stash::StashError::InvalidKey),
            "expected InvalidKey, got: {err}"
        );
    }

    // --- SK-V02: stash key validation rejects path separators ---
    #[test]
    fn sk_v02_stash_key_rejects_path_separators() {
        assert!(validate_key("key/value").is_err());
        assert!(validate_key("key\\value").is_err());
        assert!(validate_key("../etc/passwd").is_err());
    }

    // --- SK-V03: stash key validation rejects empty and oversized keys ---
    #[test]
    fn sk_v03_stash_key_rejects_empty_and_oversized() {
        assert!(validate_key("").is_err());
        let long_key = "a".repeat(257);
        let err = validate_key(&long_key).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, crate::stash::StashError::KeyTooLong { len: 257 }),
            "expected KeyTooLong, got: {err}"
        );
    }

    // --- SK-V04: stash key validation accepts valid patterns ---
    #[test]
    fn sk_v04_stash_key_accepts_valid_patterns() {
        assert!(validate_key("simple-key").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_key("key_with.dots:colons").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_key("CamelCase123").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_key("a").is_ok());
        let max_key = "x".repeat(256);
        assert!(validate_key(&max_key).is_ok());
    }

    // --- SK-V05: stash key validation rejects unicode ---
    #[test]
    fn sk_v05_stash_key_rejects_unicode() {
        assert!(validate_key("key\u{0000}null").is_err());
        assert!(validate_key("key with space").is_err());
        assert!(validate_key("emoji\u{1F600}").is_err());
    }

    // --- RS-U04: reject URIs with path traversal (..) ---
    #[test]
    fn rs_u04_rejects_uri_with_path_traversal() {
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs/../../../etc/passwd").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///..").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("..").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("a/../../b").is_err());
        // Valid URI without traversal should pass
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs/app.log").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("postgres://db/table").is_ok());
    }

    // --- URI-V01: legitimate double dots in filenames are allowed ---
    #[test]
    fn uri_v01_allows_legitimate_double_dots() {
        // Double dots as part of a filename (not a path segment) should be allowed
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///v2..backup").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///data..2024.csv").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///config..old").is_ok());
    }

    // --- URI-V02: URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e) is blocked ---
    #[test]
    fn uri_v02_blocks_url_encoded_traversal() {
        // %2e = '.', so %2e%2e/%2e%2e = ../../..
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///%2e%2e/secret").is_err());
    }

    // --- URI-V03: double-encoded traversal (%252e%252e) is blocked ---
    #[test]
    fn uri_v03_blocks_double_encoded_traversal() {
        // %252e decodes to %2e, which decodes to '.'
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd").is_err());
    }

    // --- URI-V04: mixed-case encoded traversal is blocked ---
    #[test]
    fn uri_v04_blocks_mixed_case_encoded_traversal() {
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs/%2E%2E/secret").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs/%2e%2E/secret").is_err());
    }

    // --- RS-U05: reject URIs longer than 2048 bytes ---
    #[test]
    fn rs_u05_rejects_uri_longer_than_2048_bytes() {
        let long_uri = "x".repeat(2049);
        let err = validate_resource_uri(&long_uri).unwrap_err();
        assert!(err.contains("too long"), "should mention too long: {err}");

        // Exactly 2048 should be OK
        let ok_uri = "x".repeat(2048);
        assert!(validate_resource_uri(&ok_uri).is_ok());
    }

    // --- RS-U06: reject URIs with null bytes ---
    #[test]
    fn rs_u06_rejects_uri_with_null_bytes() {
        let uri = "file:///logs\0/app.log";
        let err = validate_resource_uri(uri).unwrap_err();
        assert!(err.contains("null"), "should mention null: {err}");
    }

    // --- RS-U07: reject URIs with control characters ---
    #[test]
    fn rs_u07_rejects_uri_with_control_characters() {
        // SOH (0x01)
        let err = validate_resource_uri("file:///logs\x01/app.log").unwrap_err();
        assert!(err.contains("control"), "should mention control: {err}");

        // Tab (0x09)
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs\t/app.log").is_err());

        // Newline (0x0A)
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs\n/app.log").is_err());

        // DEL (0x7F)
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs\x7f/app.log").is_err());
    }

    // --- RS-S04: path traversal attack variants ---
    #[test]
    fn rs_s04_path_traversal_attack_variants() {
        // Classic traversal
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("../../../etc/passwd").is_err());
        // Encoded traversal
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd").is_err());
        // Double dots at start
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("..").is_err());
        // Double dots embedded
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///../").is_err());
        // Traversal after normal path
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///a/b/../../../etc/shadow").is_err());
    }

    // --- M2: URI Scheme Validation Tests ---

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_01_allows_http_scheme() {
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("http://example.com/resource").is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_02_allows_https_scheme() {
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("https://example.com/resource").is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_03_allows_file_scheme() {
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("file:///logs/app.log").is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_04_rejects_data_scheme() {
        let err = validate_resource_uri("data:text/plain;base64,SGVsbG8=").unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.contains("not allowed"),
            "expected 'not allowed' in error: {err}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_05_rejects_javascript_scheme() {
        let err = validate_resource_uri("javascript:alert(1)").unwrap_err();
        assert!(err.contains("not allowed"), "error: {err}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_06_rejects_ftp_scheme() {
        let err = validate_resource_uri("ftp://evil.com/malware").unwrap_err();
        assert!(err.contains("not allowed"), "error: {err}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_07_rejects_gopher_scheme() {
        let err = validate_resource_uri("gopher://evil.com/0").unwrap_err();
        assert!(err.contains("not allowed"), "error: {err}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_08_allows_custom_mcp_scheme() {
        // Custom MCP resource URIs should be allowed
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("postgres://db/table").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("redis://localhost:6379/0").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("mongodb://host/db").is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_09_allows_schemeless_uri() {
        // Bare resource identifiers without any scheme
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("some-resource-id").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("table_name").is_ok());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("logs/2024/app.log").is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn uri_m2_10_case_insensitive_scheme_check() {
        // Mixed case should be blocked
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("JAVASCRIPT:alert(1)").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("JavaScript:void(0)").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("DATA:text/plain,hello").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("FTP://evil.com/file").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("Gopher://host/0").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("TELNET://host:23").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("LDAP://host/dc=com").is_err());
        assert!(validate_resource_uri("DICT://host/define").is_err());
    }

    // --- Phase 7: Stash call limits tests ---

    #[test]
    fn stash_l4_01_stash_calls_count_against_limit() {
        let mut limits = StashCallLimits {
            max_calls: Some(3),
            calls_made: 0,
        };
        assert!(limits.check_limit().is_ok());
        assert!(limits.check_limit().is_ok());
        assert!(limits.check_limit().is_ok());
        // 4th call should fail
        assert!(limits.check_limit().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn stash_l4_02_stash_limit_rejection_message() {
        let mut limits = StashCallLimits {
            max_calls: Some(1),
            calls_made: 0,
        };
        assert!(limits.check_limit().is_ok());
        let err = limits.check_limit().unwrap_err();
        assert!(err.contains("limit reached"), "should mention limit: {err}");
        assert!(
            err.contains("1 calls"),
            "should mention the limit count: {err}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn stash_l4_03_stash_limit_independent_of_tool_limit() {
        // Stash limits track separately from tool call limits
        let mut stash_limits = StashCallLimits {
            max_calls: Some(5),
            calls_made: 0,
        };
        let tool_limits = ToolCallLimits {
            max_calls: 0, // tool calls exhausted
            max_args_size: 1024,
            calls_made: 0,
        };
        // Stash should still work even if tool limit is at 0
        assert!(stash_limits.check_limit().is_ok());
        let _ = tool_limits;
    }

    #[test]
    fn stash_l4_04_stash_limit_configurable() {
        // None means unlimited
        let mut unlimited = StashCallLimits {
            max_calls: None,
            calls_made: 0,
        };
        for _ in 0..1000 {
            assert!(unlimited.check_limit().is_ok());
        }

        // Some(N) means N calls max
        let mut limited = StashCallLimits {
            max_calls: Some(2),
            calls_made: 0,
        };
        assert!(limited.check_limit().is_ok());
        assert!(limited.check_limit().is_ok());
        assert!(limited.check_limit().is_err());
    }
}