forensic-hashdb 0.2.2

File hash databases for digital forensics — NSRL/CIRCL known-good, malware known-bad, known-vulnerable Windows drivers (loldrivers), and analyst-supplied MD5/SHA1/SHA256 feeds.
Documentation
name: CI

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:
    branches: [main]

permissions:
  contents: read

jobs:
  ci:
    uses: SecurityRonin/fleet-ci/.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml@619094ad54edc586f5c2733358e00326b30790bd
    with:
      # The old MSRV job ran `cargo test` at 1.75, not a bare build. The
      # default (`build`) would verify less than CI already did.
      msrv-check: test
      # The old coverage gate is the fleet per-line gate (strict, which is the
      # default here) but it skipped test and fuzz scaffolding — written inside
      # the inline Python as `if "/tests/" in cur or "/fuzz/" in cur: continue`,
      # not as an --ignore-filename-regex flag. Same exclusion, expressed the
      # way this workflow takes it. Verified load-bearing on origin/main:
      #   tests/coverage.rs, fuzz/fuzz_targets/{fuzz_feed,fuzz_known_good}.rs
      # all match, and re-running the shared gate's own rules over
      # `cargo llvm-cov --workspace --all-features` with this regex gives
      # 0 uncovered / 2 annotated exemptions — i.e. green, unchanged.
      coverage-ignore-regex: "/tests/|/fuzz/"

  # -- carried across verbatim from the previous ci.yml ---------------------
  geiger:
    name: Unsafe Audit (cargo-geiger)
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    continue-on-error: true
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@29eef336d9b2848a0b548edc03f92a220660cdb8 # stable
      - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@9d47c6ad4b02e050fd481d890b2ea34778fd09d6 # v2.7.8
      - run: cargo install cargo-geiger --locked
      - run: cargo geiger 2>&1 || true