foreguard 0.8.0

Preview what your AI agent is about to do — before it does it. A dry-run trust layer for autonomous agents, powered by kedge.
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//! MCP protocol details, including the stateless `2026-07-28` revision.
//!
//! That revision is the largest change to MCP since launch, and it moves a
//! trust boundary Foreguard sits directly on top of:
//!
//! - The `initialize` / `initialized` handshake is gone (SEP-2575), and so is
//!   the `Mcp-Session-Id` header and its protocol-level session (SEP-2567).
//! - What the handshake used to establish **once** now travels in `_meta` on
//!   **every** request: notably `io.modelcontextprotocol/clientInfo`.
//! - Servers advertise capabilities through a new `server/discover` method
//!   instead of an `initialize` reply.
//!
//! The security consequence is the point. Under the old spec, client identity
//! was asserted a single time, at a moment the host controlled. Under the new
//! one it is re-asserted on every message, so anything that can influence a
//! request body can also claim to be a different client. That is exactly the
//! mix-up problem the new `Mcp-Method` / `Mcp-Name` HTTP headers were added to
//! mitigate for gateways.
//!
//! Scope note, stated plainly: Foreguard proxies **stdio**, not Streamable
//! HTTP. It therefore never sees `Mcp-Method` or `Mcp-Name` and makes no claim
//! to validate them. What it can see, and does check, is the JSON-RPC body:
//! `_meta` is treated as untrusted input rather than as trusted identity.

use serde_json::Value;

/// The stateless revision Foreguard advertises when acting as a client.
pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: &str = "2026-07-28";

/// The last revision that still used the `initialize` handshake. Kept so the
/// client can fall back when talking to a server that predates statelessness.
pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEGACY: &str = "2025-06-18";

/// Reverse-DNS key carrying client identity in `_meta` under the new spec.
pub const CLIENT_INFO_KEY: &str = "io.modelcontextprotocol/clientInfo";

/// Borrow the `_meta` object of a request's `params`, if present.
pub fn meta(msg: &Value) -> Option<&Value> {
    msg.get("params")?.get("_meta")
}

/// The `name` a request's `_meta` claims for its client, if any.
pub fn claimed_client(msg: &Value) -> Option<&str> {
    meta(msg)?.get(CLIENT_INFO_KEY)?.get("name")?.as_str()
}

/// Watches the client identity asserted across a stateless session.
///
/// With no handshake to pin it, identity is only ever a per-message claim. This
/// records the first one and reports when a later message claims a different
/// client, which is the observable signature of a spoof or a mix-up between
/// servers. It is a *signal*, not proof: a legitimate host multiplexing two
/// clients over one pipe would look the same, so callers should surface it
/// rather than hard-fail on it.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct SessionIdentity {
    first: Option<String>,
}

impl SessionIdentity {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self::default()
    }

    /// Record this message's claimed client. Returns `Some((first, now))` when
    /// it contradicts the identity established earlier in the session.
    pub fn observe(&mut self, msg: &Value) -> Option<(String, String)> {
        let claimed = claimed_client(msg)?.to_string();
        match &self.first {
            None => {
                self.first = Some(claimed);
                None
            }
            Some(first) if *first != claimed => Some((first.clone(), claimed)),
            Some(_) => None,
        }
    }

    /// The client identity established for this session, if one has been claimed —
    /// used as the Cedar `principal` (`Agent::"…"`) when authorizing tool calls.
    pub fn current(&self) -> Option<&str> {
        self.first.as_deref()
    }
}

/// Every string inside `_meta`, so untrusted content hiding there is scanned
/// for taint like any other argument. `_meta` rides on each request now, which
/// makes it a carrier for injected data, not just for telemetry.
pub fn meta_strings(msg: &Value) -> Vec<String> {
    let mut out = Vec::new();
    if let Some(m) = meta(msg) {
        collect(m, &mut out);
    }
    out
}

fn collect(v: &Value, out: &mut Vec<String>) {
    match v {
        Value::String(s) => out.push(s.clone()),
        Value::Array(a) => a.iter().for_each(|x| collect(x, out)),
        Value::Object(o) => o.values().for_each(|x| collect(x, out)),
        _ => {}
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use serde_json::json;

    fn req(meta: Value) -> Value {
        json!({
            "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call",
            "params": { "name": "write_file", "arguments": {}, "_meta": meta }
        })
    }

    #[test]
    fn reads_client_info_from_the_new_meta_key() {
        let m = req(json!({ CLIENT_INFO_KEY: { "name": "claude-code", "version": "1.0" } }));
        assert_eq!(claimed_client(&m), Some("claude-code"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_request_without_meta_is_not_an_error() {
        let m = json!({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"});
        assert!(meta(&m).is_none());
        assert!(claimed_client(&m).is_none());
        assert!(meta_strings(&m).is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn identity_change_mid_session_is_reported() {
        let mut id = SessionIdentity::new();
        let a = req(json!({ CLIENT_INFO_KEY: { "name": "claude-code" } }));
        let b = req(json!({ CLIENT_INFO_KEY: { "name": "evil-client" } }));
        assert_eq!(id.observe(&a), None, "the first claim establishes identity");
        assert_eq!(id.observe(&a), None, "repeating the same claim is fine");
        assert_eq!(
            id.observe(&b),
            Some(("claude-code".into(), "evil-client".into())),
            "a contradicting claim must be surfaced"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn meta_strings_are_collected_for_taint_scanning() {
        let m = req(json!({
            CLIENT_INFO_KEY: { "name": "claude-code" },
            "baggage": "note=visit https://evil.example/x",
        }));
        let s = meta_strings(&m);
        assert!(s.iter().any(|x| x.contains("evil.example")));
        assert!(s.iter().any(|x| x == "claude-code"));
    }
}

/// Harvest declared capability hints from a `tools/list` reply.
///
/// Returns `(name, hints)` for each advertised tool. The proxy caches these so a
/// later `tools/call` can be judged with what the server said about that tool,
/// subject to the asymmetry in [`crate::classify::classify_call_annotated`]:
/// upgrades are trusted, a downgrade only ever applies to a name our own lexical
/// read already considers benign.
pub fn tool_annotations(msg: &Value) -> Vec<(String, crate::classify::Ann)> {
    let Some(tools) = msg.pointer("/result/tools").and_then(Value::as_array) else {
        return Vec::new();
    };
    tools
        .iter()
        .filter_map(|t| {
            let name = t.get("name")?.as_str()?.to_string();
            let a = t.get("annotations");
            Some((
                name,
                crate::classify::Ann {
                    read_only: a
                        .and_then(|x| x.get("readOnlyHint"))
                        .and_then(Value::as_bool),
                    destructive: a
                        .and_then(|x| x.get("destructiveHint"))
                        .and_then(Value::as_bool),
                },
            ))
        })
        .collect()
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod annotation_parsing {
    use super::*;
    use serde_json::json;

    #[test]
    fn reads_hints_from_a_real_tools_list_shape() {
        // Shape copied from @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem.
        let msg = json!({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"tools":[
            {"name":"directory_tree","annotations":{"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}},
            {"name":"write_file","annotations":{"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":true}},
            {"name":"mystery"}
        ]}});
        let got = tool_annotations(&msg);
        assert_eq!(got.len(), 3);
        assert_eq!(got[0].0, "directory_tree");
        assert_eq!(got[0].1.read_only, Some(true));
        assert_eq!(got[1].1.destructive, Some(true));
        assert_eq!(
            got[2].1.read_only, None,
            "a tool with no annotations is unknown, not safe"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_non_tools_list_message_yields_nothing() {
        assert!(tool_annotations(&json!({"result":{"content":[]}})).is_empty());
        assert!(tool_annotations(&json!({"method":"tools/call"})).is_empty());
    }
}

/// How many tools must share a head token before it counts as a namespace.
/// One-off prefixes prove nothing and must never earn a tool special treatment.
const MIN_SIBLINGS: usize = 3;

/// Infer namespace prefixes from a server's advertised tool names.
///
/// MCP servers routinely namespace (`puppeteer_navigate`, `puppeteer_click`, …),
/// which pushes the real verb out of head position and makes the whole family
/// fail safe. kedge-core deliberately will not guess at this: a single name in
/// isolation carries no evidence that its first token is a namespace rather than
/// a verb, and guessing is what produced the read-verb window bypass reverted in
/// kedge-core 0.3.1.
///
/// A catalogue does carry that evidence. If a head token is shared by several
/// tools it is empirically a namespace, and stripping it lets the tool be judged
/// exactly as the same tool would be without a prefix.
///
/// The safety property is worth stating precisely: stripping can only make a
/// namespaced name behave like its unnamespaced equivalent. `puppeteer_screenshot`
/// becomes `screenshot`, which was always read-only. It never grants a namespaced
/// tool more latitude than an unprefixed tool of the same name already had, and a
/// lone `ns_` prefix, having no siblings, earns nothing at all.
pub fn namespaces(names: &[String]) -> std::collections::HashSet<String> {
    let mut counts: std::collections::HashMap<String, usize> = std::collections::HashMap::new();
    for n in names {
        if let Some(head) = head_token(n) {
            if is_known_verb(&head) {
                continue;
            }
            *counts.entry(head).or_default() += 1;
        }
    }
    counts
        .into_iter()
        .filter(|(_, c)| *c >= MIN_SIBLINGS)
        .map(|(k, _)| k)
        .collect()
}

/// Is this token a verb kedge already understands, rather than a namespace?
///
/// This guard is load-bearing. Without it, a server exposing `write_file`,
/// `write_query` and `write_x` would make "write" look like a namespace, and
/// stripping it turns `write_query` into `query`, which reads as safe. A verb
/// must never be mistaken for a namespace.
fn is_known_verb(token: &str) -> bool {
    // A read verb classifies read-only on its own.
    if !kedge_core::classify(token).is_mutating() {
        return true;
    }
    // A dangerous verb trips deny-wins even behind a read prefix. An unknown
    // token does not, which is exactly what distinguishes the two.
    kedge_core::classify(&format!("read_{token}")).is_mutating()
}

/// The first alphanumeric token of a tool name, lowercased.
fn head_token(name: &str) -> Option<String> {
    name.split(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
        .find(|s| !s.is_empty())
        .map(|s| s.to_ascii_lowercase())
}

/// Strip a known namespace prefix, returning the name to classify.
///
/// Returns the original name unchanged when its head is not an established
/// namespace, or when stripping would leave nothing behind.
pub fn strip_namespace(name: &str, spaces: &std::collections::HashSet<String>) -> String {
    let Some(head) = head_token(name) else {
        return name.to_string();
    };
    if !spaces.contains(&head) {
        return name.to_string();
    }
    let rest: String = name
        .chars()
        .skip(head.chars().count())
        .skip_while(|c| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
        .collect();
    if rest.trim().is_empty() {
        name.to_string()
    } else {
        rest
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod namespace_detection {
    use super::*;

    fn names(v: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
        v.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_shared_prefix_is_recognised_as_a_namespace() {
        // The real puppeteer catalogue.
        let ns = namespaces(&names(&[
            "puppeteer_navigate",
            "puppeteer_screenshot",
            "puppeteer_click",
            "puppeteer_fill",
            "puppeteer_select",
            "puppeteer_hover",
            "puppeteer_evaluate",
        ]));
        assert!(ns.contains("puppeteer"));
        assert_eq!(strip_namespace("puppeteer_screenshot", &ns), "screenshot");
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_lone_prefix_earns_nothing() {
        // This is the bypass shape. One tool named ns_* proves nothing, so the
        // name is judged whole and keeps failing safe.
        let ns = namespaces(&names(&["ns_get_frobnicate", "read_file", "write_file"]));
        assert!(!ns.contains("ns"), "a single occurrence is not a namespace");
        assert_eq!(
            strip_namespace("ns_get_frobnicate", &ns),
            "ns_get_frobnicate",
            "unchanged, so kedge still fails safe on the unknown head"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn two_siblings_are_still_not_enough() {
        let ns = namespaces(&names(&["ns_get_a", "ns_get_b", "read_file"]));
        assert!(!ns.contains("ns"), "below the corroboration threshold");
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_real_filesystem_catalogue_declares_no_namespace() {
        // Its tools do not share a head, so nothing should be stripped.
        let ns = namespaces(&names(&[
            "read_file",
            "read_text_file",
            "read_media_file",
            "write_file",
            "edit_file",
            "list_directory",
            "directory_tree",
            "search_files",
            "get_file_info",
            "move_file",
        ]));
        assert!(!ns.contains("directory"), "one occurrence, not a namespace");
        assert_eq!(strip_namespace("directory_tree", &ns), "directory_tree");
    }

    /// A verb is not a namespace, however many tools share it. Without this,
    /// three `write_*` tools would make "write" a namespace and `write_query`
    /// would strip to `query`, which reads as safe.
    #[test]
    fn a_shared_verb_is_never_treated_as_a_namespace() {
        let ns = namespaces(&names(&[
            "write_file",
            "write_query",
            "write_config",
            "write_log",
        ]));
        assert!(
            !ns.contains("write"),
            "BYPASS: a verb was treated as a namespace"
        );
        assert_eq!(strip_namespace("write_query", &ns), "write_query");

        for verb in ["get", "delete", "read", "list", "rm", "create"] {
            let catalogue = names(&[
                &format!("{verb}_a"),
                &format!("{verb}_b"),
                &format!("{verb}_c"),
                &format!("{verb}_d"),
            ]);
            let ns = namespaces(&catalogue);
            assert!(
                !ns.contains(verb),
                "BYPASS: verb {verb:?} treated as a namespace"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn stripping_never_empties_a_name() {
        let ns: std::collections::HashSet<String> = ["puppeteer".to_string()].into_iter().collect();
        assert_eq!(strip_namespace("puppeteer", &ns), "puppeteer");
        assert_eq!(strip_namespace("puppeteer_", &ns), "puppeteer_");
    }
}