fheanor 0.11.5

A library that provides fast implementations of rings commonly used in homomorphic encryption, built on feanor-math.
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
use std::cell::LazyCell;

use tracing::{Level, event};

use feanor_math::algorithms::int_factor::is_prime_power;
use feanor_math::group::AbelianGroupStore;
use feanor_math::ring::*;
use feanor_math::assert_el_eq;
use feanor_math::serialization::SerializableElementRing;

use crate::bgv::*;
use crate::bgv::modswitch::*;
use crate::poly_eval::digit_extract::DigitExtract;
use crate::circuit::*;
use crate::filename_keys;

use crate::lin_transform::composite;
use crate::number_ring::galois::*;
use crate::lin_transform::pow2;

///
/// Precomputed public data that is required to bootstrap BGV ciphertexts
/// over a fixed plaintext and ciphertext ring.
/// 
pub struct ThinBootstrapper<Inst, Strategy>
    where Inst: BGVInstantiation, 
        Strategy: BGVModswitchStrategy<Inst>,
        <CiphertextRing<Inst> as RingStore>::Type: AsBGVPlaintext<Inst>
{
    modswitch_strategy: Strategy,
    digit_extract: DigitExtract<Inst::PlaintextRing>,
    slots_to_coeffs_thin: PlaintextCircuit<<CiphertextRing<Inst> as RingStore>::Type>,
    coeffs_to_slots_thin: PlaintextCircuit<<CiphertextRing<Inst> as RingStore>::Type>,
    plaintext_ring_hierarchy: Vec<PlaintextRing<Inst>>,
    original_plaintext_ring: PlaintextRing<Inst>,
    intermediate_plaintext_ring: PlaintextRing<Inst>,
    tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext: PlaintextRing<Inst>,
    slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors: usize,
    master_ciphertext_ring: CiphertextRing<Inst>
}

impl<Inst, Strategy> ThinBootstrapper<Inst, Strategy>
    where Inst: BGVInstantiation, 
        Strategy: BGVModswitchStrategy<Inst>,
        <CiphertextRing<Inst> as RingStore>::Type: AsBGVPlaintext<Inst>
{
    ///
    /// Creates a new [`ThinBootstrapper`]. In many cases, it is easier to create
    /// a [`ThinBootstrapper`] using [`ThinBootstrapper::build_pow2()`] or
    /// [`ThinBootstrapper::build_odd()`].
    /// 
    /// Bootstrapping for BFV consists of the following steps.
    ///  - **Slots-to-Coeffs**: Move the values stored in the slots of the input
    ///    ciphertext into its coefficients
    ///  - **Mod-switch**: Modulus-switches the ciphertext to an intermediate
    ///    plaintext modulus `p^e`. This means the ciphertext now can be used
    ///    as a plaintext.
    ///  - **Noisy expansion**: Converts the modulus-switched ciphertext into
    ///    a low-noise ciphertext, which encrypts the same coefficients as the
    ///    the modulus-switched ciphertext, plus some noise. This requires an
    ///    encryption of the secret key.
    ///  - **Coeffs-to-Slots**: Moves the coefficients (with noise) into the
    ///    slots of the ciphertext.
    ///  - **Digit Extraction**: Removes the noise from the encoded values and
    ///    scales them down.
    /// 
    /// The parameters are as follows:
    ///  - `instantiation` describes the scheme whose ciphertexts are to be bootstrapped
    ///  - `C` is the ciphertext ring over which a to-be-bootstrapped input ciphertext 
    ///    should be defined
    ///  - `slots_to_coeffs_thin` is the circuit which is used to compute the 
    ///    Slots-to-Coeffs transform. The coefficients of this circuit should be
    ///    taken from the plaintext ring of the scheme with modulus `t`.
    ///  - `coeffs_to_slots_thin` is the circuit which is used to compute the
    ///    Coeffs-to-Slots transform. The coefficients of this circuit should be
    ///    taken from the plaintext ring of the scheme with modulus `p^e`.
    ///  - `digit_extract` is the function used for digit extraction.
    ///  - `slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors` is the number of RNS factors to use
    ///    when computing the Slots-to-Coeffs transform. More concretely,
    ///    since the result of the Slots-to-Coeffs transform does not have to have
    ///    any noise budget left, the input ciphertext can be mod-switched to a lower
    ///    modulus ciphertext ring before the Slots-to-Coeffs transform, which will
    ///    improve performance of the Slots-to-Coeffs transform. Since BGV uses hybrid
    ///    key-switching, this can be quite low, and just has to be large enough to
    ///    accomodate the noise growth caused by the Slots-to-Coeffs transform.
    /// 
    /// The parameters corresponding to the plaintext space (i.e. `t = p^r`) are
    /// implicitly given through the `digit_extract` parameter.
    /// 
    pub fn create(
        instantiation: &Inst, 
        original_plaintext_ring: PlaintextRing<Inst>,
        intermediate_plaintext_ring: PlaintextRing<Inst>,
        C_master: CiphertextRing<Inst>,
        slots_to_coeffs_thin: PlaintextCircuit<Inst::PlaintextRing>, 
        coeffs_to_slots_thin: PlaintextCircuit<Inst::PlaintextRing>,
        digit_extract: DigitExtract<Inst::PlaintextRing>, 
        modswitch_strategy: Strategy,
        slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors: usize
    ) -> Self {
        let p = digit_extract.p();
        let r = digit_extract.r();
        let e = digit_extract.e();
        let plaintext_ring_hierarchy = ((r + 1)..e).map(|k| instantiation.create_plaintext_ring(ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(&p), k))).collect();
        let coeffs_to_slots_thin = coeffs_to_slots_thin.change_ring_uniform(|x| x.change_ring(|x| Inst::encode_plain(&intermediate_plaintext_ring, &C_master, &x)));
        let slots_to_coeffs_thin = slots_to_coeffs_thin.change_ring_uniform(|x| x.change_ring(|x| Inst::encode_plain(&original_plaintext_ring, &C_master, &x)));
        let tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext = instantiation.create_plaintext_ring(ZZbig.add(ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(&p), e), ZZbig.one())); 
        Self {
            digit_extract,
            coeffs_to_slots_thin,
            slots_to_coeffs_thin,
            plaintext_ring_hierarchy,
            slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors,
            modswitch_strategy,
            original_plaintext_ring,
            intermediate_plaintext_ring,
            tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext,
            master_ciphertext_ring: C_master
        }
    }

    ///
    /// Creates a new [`ThinBootstrapper`] for BFV instantiated over a power-of-two cyclotomic
    /// number ring. This function makes good default choices for the algorithms used in the
    /// various steps of bootstrapping.
    /// 
    /// Parameters:
    ///  - `instantiation` describes the scheme whose ciphertexts are to be bootstrapped.
    ///  - `P` is the plaintext ring which the input ciphertext encrypts an element from.
    ///    Its modulus `t` should be a power of a prime, i.e. `t = p^r`.
    ///  - `C` is the ciphertext ring over which a to-be-bootstrapped input ciphertext 
    ///    should be defined.
    ///  - `v` is the number of digits to remove. In other words, during bootstrapping the
    ///    noise is removed from an intermediate "noisy decryption" using a rounded division
    ///    by `p^v`. Hence, `p^v/2` should be larger than the expected magnitude of the noise,
    ///    after modulus-switching to `p^e` with `e = v + r`.
    ///  - `digit_extract_error_bound` allows to give a tighter bound on the noise. If `p` is
    ///    large, even with `v = 1` the bound on the noise `p^v/2` is often far from tight.
    ///    Setting this to a tighter bound will enable the use of more efficient digit extraction
    ///    polynomials. Note that if this is set, it is required that `v = 1`.
    ///  - `lin_transform_max_levels` maximal number of sequential plaintext-ciphertext multiplications
    ///    performed by the linear transform. Higher values can lead to better performance, while
    ///    lower values improve noise growth.
    ///  - `gk_digits` specifies the gadget vector used for Galois keys. This is required to
    ///    estimate the number of RNS factors used for the Slots-to-Coeffs transform.
    ///  - `strategy` is the modulus-switching strategy to use when evaluating the digit
    ///    extraction circuits during bootstrapping.
    ///  - `cache_dir` specifies a directory to load and store precomputed data. If it is `None`,
    ///    no data will be read or written, but always computed from scratch.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    pub fn build_pow2(
        instantiation: &Inst,
        P: &PlaintextRing<Inst>,
        C_master: &CiphertextRing<Inst>, 
        v: usize,
        digit_extract_error_bound: Option<i64>,
        lin_transform_max_levels: usize, 
        _gk_digits: &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices, 
        strategy: Strategy,
        cache_dir: Option<&str>
    ) -> Self
        where Inst::PlaintextRing: SerializableElementRing,
            Inst::CiphertextRing: Clone
    {
        let log2_m = ZZi64.abs_log2_ceil(&(instantiation.number_ring().galois_group().m() as i64)).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(instantiation.number_ring().galois_group().m(), 1 << log2_m);

        let t = int_cast(P.base_ring().integer_ring().clone_el(P.base_ring().modulus()), ZZbig, P.base_ring().integer_ring());
        let (p, r) = is_prime_power(&ZZbig, &t).unwrap();
        let e = r + v;
        event!(Level::INFO, p = %&ZZbig.format(&p), e = e, r = r, v = v);

        let intermediate_plaintext_ring = instantiation.create_plaintext_ring(ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(&p), e));
        let base_plaintext_ring = instantiation.create_plaintext_ring(ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(&p), r));
        let plaintext_ring_hierarchy = ((r + 1)..e).map(|k| instantiation.create_plaintext_ring(ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(&p), k))).collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let all_plaintext_rings = [&base_plaintext_ring].into_iter().chain(plaintext_ring_hierarchy.iter()).chain([&intermediate_plaintext_ring]).collect::<Vec<_>>();

        let hypercube = HypercubeStructure::default_pow2_hypercube(intermediate_plaintext_ring.acting_galois_group(), ZZbig.clone_el(&p));
        let H = LazyCell::new(|| HypercubeIsomorphism::new(&intermediate_plaintext_ring, &hypercube, cache_dir));
        let base_H = LazyCell::new(|| H.change_modulus(&base_plaintext_ring));

        let m = intermediate_plaintext_ring.number_ring().galois_group().m();
        let slots_to_coeffs = create_circuit_cached(&base_plaintext_ring, &filename_keys![slots2coeffs, m: m, p: &p, r: r, levels: lin_transform_max_levels], cache_dir, || pow2::slots_to_coeffs_thin(&base_H, lin_transform_max_levels));
        let coeffs_to_slots = create_circuit_cached(&intermediate_plaintext_ring, &filename_keys![coeffs2slots, m: m, p: &p, e: e, levels: lin_transform_max_levels], cache_dir, || pow2::coeffs_to_slots_thin(&H, lin_transform_max_levels));
        let digit_extract = DigitExtract::new_default(&all_plaintext_rings, &H, digit_extract_error_bound, cache_dir);

        // we estimate the noise growth of the slots-to-coeffs transform as `log2_m` multiplications by
        // ring elements of size at most `t`
        let min_rns_factor_log2 = C_master.base_ring().as_iter().map(|rns_factor| *rns_factor.modulus() as i64).map(|rns_factor| (rns_factor as f64).log2()).min_by(f64::total_cmp).unwrap();
        let slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors = ((ZZbig.abs_log2_ceil(&t).unwrap() as f64 + P.number_ring().coeff_basis_product_expansion_factor().log2()) * (P.acting_galois_group().group_order() as f64).log2() / min_rns_factor_log2).ceil() as usize; 

        return Self::create(instantiation, base_plaintext_ring, intermediate_plaintext_ring, C_master.clone(), slots_to_coeffs, coeffs_to_slots, digit_extract, strategy, slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors);
    }

    ///
    /// Creates a new [`ThinBootstrapper`] for BFV instantiated over an odd cyclotomic
    /// number ring. This function makes good default choices for the algorithms used in the
    /// various steps of bootstrapping.
    /// 
    /// Parameters:
    ///  - `instantiation` describes the scheme whose ciphertexts are to be bootstrapped.
    ///  - `P` is the plaintext ring which the input ciphertext encrypts an element from.
    ///    Its modulus `t` should be a power of a prime, i.e. `t = p^r`.
    ///  - `C` is the ciphertext ring over which a to-be-bootstrapped input ciphertext 
    ///    should be defined.
    ///  - `v` is the number of digits to remove. In other words, during bootstrapping the
    ///    noise is removed from an intermediate "noisy decryption" using a rounded division
    ///    by `p^v`. Hence, `p^v/2` should be larger than the expected magnitude of the noise,
    ///    after modulus-switching to `p^e` with `e = v + r`.
    ///  - `digit_extract_error_bound` allows to give a tighter bound on the noise. If `p` is
    ///    large, even with `v = 1` the bound on the noise `p^v/2` is often far from tight.
    ///    Setting this to a tighter bound will enable the use of more efficient digit extraction
    ///    polynomials. Note that if this is set, it is required that `v = 1`.
    ///  - `gk_digits` specifies the gadget vector used for Galois keys. This is required to
    ///    estimate the number of RNS factors used for the Slots-to-Coeffs transform.
    ///  - `lin_transform_max_levels` maximal number of sequential plaintext-ciphertext multiplications
    ///    performed by the linear transform. Higher values can lead to better performance, while
    ///    lower values improve noise growth.
    ///  - `strategy` is the modulus-switching strategy to use when evaluating the digit
    ///    extraction circuits during bootstrapping.
    ///  - `cache_dir` specifies a directory to load and store precomputed data. If it is `None`,
    ///    no data will be read or written, but always computed from scratch.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    pub fn build_odd(
        instantiation: &Inst,
        P: &PlaintextRing<Inst>,
        C_master: &CiphertextRing<Inst>, 
        v: usize,
        digit_extract_error_bound: Option<i64>,
        lin_transform_max_levels: usize,
        _gk_digits: &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices,
        strategy: Strategy, 
        cache_dir: Option<&str>
    ) -> Self
        where Inst::PlaintextRing: SerializableElementRing,
            Inst::CiphertextRing: Clone
    {
        assert!(instantiation.number_ring().galois_group().m() % 2 != 0);

        let t = int_cast(P.base_ring().integer_ring().clone_el(P.base_ring().modulus()), ZZbig, P.base_ring().integer_ring());
        let (p, r) = is_prime_power(&ZZbig, &t).unwrap();
        let e = r + v;
        event!(Level::INFO, p = %&ZZbig.format(&p), e = e, r = r, v = v);

        let intermediate_plaintext_ring = instantiation.create_plaintext_ring(ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(&p), e));
        let base_plaintext_ring = instantiation.create_plaintext_ring(ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(&p), r));
        let plaintext_ring_hierarchy = ((r + 1)..e).map(|k| instantiation.create_plaintext_ring(ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(&p), k))).collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let all_plaintext_rings = [&base_plaintext_ring].into_iter().chain(plaintext_ring_hierarchy.iter()).chain([&intermediate_plaintext_ring]).collect::<Vec<_>>();

        let hypercube = HypercubeStructure::halevi_shoup_hypercube(intermediate_plaintext_ring.acting_galois_group(), ZZbig.clone_el(&p));
        let H = LazyCell::new(|| HypercubeIsomorphism::new(&intermediate_plaintext_ring, &hypercube, cache_dir));
        let base_H = LazyCell::new(|| H.change_modulus(&base_plaintext_ring));

        let m = intermediate_plaintext_ring.number_ring().galois_group().m();
        let slots_to_coeffs =  create_circuit_cached(&base_plaintext_ring, &filename_keys![slots2coeffs, m: m, p: &p, r: r, levels: lin_transform_max_levels], cache_dir, || composite::slots_to_powcoeffs_thin(&base_H, lin_transform_max_levels));
        let coeffs_to_slots = create_circuit_cached(&intermediate_plaintext_ring, &filename_keys![coeffs2slots, m: m, p: &p, e: e, levels: lin_transform_max_levels], cache_dir, || composite::powcoeffs_to_slots_thin(&H, lin_transform_max_levels));
        let digit_extract = DigitExtract::new_default(&all_plaintext_rings, &H, digit_extract_error_bound, cache_dir);

        // we estimate the noise growth of the slots-to-coeffs transform as `log2_m` multiplications by
        // ring elements of size at most `t`
        let min_rns_factor_log2 = C_master.base_ring().as_iter().map(|rns_factor| *rns_factor.modulus() as i64).map(|rns_factor| (rns_factor as f64).log2()).min_by(f64::total_cmp).unwrap();
        let slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors = ((ZZbig.abs_log2_ceil(&t).unwrap() as f64 + P.number_ring().coeff_basis_product_expansion_factor().log2()) * (hypercube.dim_count() as f64 + 1.0) / min_rns_factor_log2).ceil() as usize;
        
        return Self::create(instantiation, base_plaintext_ring, intermediate_plaintext_ring, C_master.clone(), slots_to_coeffs, coeffs_to_slots, digit_extract, strategy, slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors);
    }

    ///
    /// Replaces the digit extraction object used by this bootstrapper.
    /// 
    pub fn with_digit_extraction(self, new_digit_extraction: DigitExtract<Inst::PlaintextRing>) -> Self {
        assert_el_eq!(ZZbig, self.digit_extract.p(), new_digit_extraction.p());
        assert_eq!(self.digit_extract.r(), new_digit_extraction.r());
        assert_eq!(self.digit_extract.e(), new_digit_extraction.e());
        Self {
            coeffs_to_slots_thin: self.coeffs_to_slots_thin,
            digit_extract: new_digit_extraction,
            intermediate_plaintext_ring: self.intermediate_plaintext_ring,
            plaintext_ring_hierarchy: self.plaintext_ring_hierarchy,
            master_ciphertext_ring: self.master_ciphertext_ring,
            modswitch_strategy: self.modswitch_strategy,
            original_plaintext_ring: self.original_plaintext_ring,
            slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors: self.slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors,
            tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext: self.tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext,
            slots_to_coeffs_thin: self.slots_to_coeffs_thin
        }
    }

    pub fn r(&self) -> usize {
        self.digit_extract.e() - self.digit_extract.v()
    }

    pub fn e(&self) -> usize {
        self.digit_extract.e()
    }

    pub fn v(&self) -> usize {
        self.digit_extract.v()
    }

    pub fn p(&self) -> &El<BigIntRing> {
        self.digit_extract.p()
    }

    ///
    /// The plaintext ring w.r.t. which the output of noisy expansion is defined.
    /// This is also used for the coefficients-to-slots transform and at the beginning
    /// of digit extraction.
    /// 
    pub fn intermediate_plaintext_ring(&self) -> &PlaintextRing<Inst> {
        &self.intermediate_plaintext_ring
    }

    ///
    /// The plaintext ring w.r.t. which the input ciphertext is defined.
    /// 
    pub fn base_plaintext_ring(&self) -> &PlaintextRing<Inst> {
        &self.original_plaintext_ring
    }

    ///
    /// The master ciphertext ring. All ciphertexts, including the output of bootstrapping,
    /// will be defined over downscaled version of this ciphertext ring, i.e. following the
    /// usual convention of [`ModulusAwareCiphertext`].
    /// 
    pub fn master_ciphertext_ring(&self) -> &CiphertextRing<Inst> {
        &self.master_ciphertext_ring
    }
    ///
    /// Returns the sequence of plaintext rings `R/p^rR`, ..., `R/p^eR`, which are
    /// all plaintext rings used at some point during bootstrapping.
    /// 
    pub fn complete_plaintext_ring_sequence<'a>(&'a self) -> Vec<&'a PlaintextRing<Inst>> {
        [self.base_plaintext_ring()].into_iter().chain(self.plaintext_ring_hierarchy.iter()).chain([self.intermediate_plaintext_ring()]).collect::<Vec<_>>()
    }

    pub fn required_galois_keys(&self, P: &PlaintextRing<Inst>) -> Vec<GaloisGroupEl> {
        let mut result = Vec::new();
        result.extend(self.slots_to_coeffs_thin.required_galois_keys(&P.acting_galois_group()).into_iter());
        result.extend(self.coeffs_to_slots_thin.required_galois_keys(&P.acting_galois_group()).into_iter());
        result.extend(self.digit_extract.required_galois_keys(&P.acting_galois_group()).into_iter());
        result.sort_by_key(|g| P.acting_galois_group().representative(g));
        result.dedup_by(|g, s| P.acting_galois_group().eq_el(g, s));
        return result;
    }

    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn prepare_input_for_slots_to_coefficients(
        &self,
        ct_dropped_moduli: &RNSFactorIndexList,
        ct: Ciphertext<Inst>,
        gk_digits: &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices,
        debug_sk: Option<&SecretKey<Inst>>
    ) -> (CiphertextRing<Inst>, Ciphertext<Inst>) {
        let P_base = self.base_plaintext_ring();
        let C_master = self.master_ciphertext_ring();
        // First, we mod-switch the input ciphertext so that it only has `self.slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors` many RNS factors
        let input_dropped_rns_factors = {
            assert!(C_master.base_ring().len() - ct_dropped_moduli.len() >= self.slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors);
            let (drop_additional, _) = compute_optimal_special_modulus(
                C_master.get_ring(),
                ct_dropped_moduli,
                C_master.base_ring().len() - ct_dropped_moduli.len() - self.slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors,
                gk_digits
            );
            drop_additional.union(&ct_dropped_moduli)
        };
        let C_input = Inst::mod_switch_down_C(C_master, &input_dropped_rns_factors);
        let ct_input = Inst::mod_switch_ct(P_base, &C_input, &Inst::mod_switch_down_C(C_master, ct_dropped_moduli), ct);
        assert_eq!(C_input.base_ring().len(), self.slots_to_coeffs_rns_factors);

        let sk_input = debug_sk.map(|sk| Inst::mod_switch_sk(&C_input, &C_master, sk));
        if let Some(sk) = &sk_input {
            Inst::dec_println_slots(P_base, &C_input, &ct_input, sk, Some("."));
        }
        return (C_input, ct_input);
    }
    
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn perform_slots_to_coefficients(
        &self,
        C_input: &CiphertextRing<Inst>,
        ct: Ciphertext<Inst>,
        gks: &[(GaloisGroupEl, KeySwitchKey<Inst>)],
        debug_sk: Option<&SecretKey<Inst>>
    ) -> Ciphertext<Inst> {
        let P_base = self.base_plaintext_ring();
        let C_master = self.master_ciphertext_ring();
        let dropped_rns_factors = RNSFactorIndexList::missing_from(C_input.base_ring(), C_master.base_ring());
        let result = DefaultModswitchStrategy::never_modswitch().evaluate_circuit(
            &self.slots_to_coeffs_thin, 
            C_master,
            P_base, 
            C_master, 
            &[ModulusAwareCiphertext {
                data: ct, 
                info: (), 
                dropped_rns_factor_indices: dropped_rns_factors.clone(),
                sk: SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary
            }], 
            None, 
            gks,
            debug_sk
        );
        assert_eq!(1, result.len());
        let result = result.into_iter().next().unwrap();
        debug_assert_eq!(result.dropped_rns_factor_indices, dropped_rns_factors);

        let sk_input = debug_sk.map(|sk| Inst::mod_switch_sk(&C_input, &C_master, sk));
        if let Some(sk) = &sk_input {
            Inst::dec_println(P_base, &C_input, &result.data, sk);
        }
        return result.data;
    }

    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn perform_noisy_expansion(
        &self,
        C_input: &CiphertextRing<Inst>,
        ct: Ciphertext<Inst>,
        used_sk: SecretKeyDistribution,
        sparse_sk_encaps: Option<&SparseKeyEncapsulationKey<Inst>>,
        debug_sk: Option<&SecretKey<Inst>>
    ) -> ModulusAwareCiphertext<Inst, Strategy> {
        let P_base = self.base_plaintext_ring();
        let P_main = self.intermediate_plaintext_ring();
        let C_master = self.master_ciphertext_ring();
        // this is slightly more complicated than in BFV, since we cannot mod-switch to a ciphertext modulus that is not coprime to `t = p^r`.
        // Instead, we first multiply by `p^v`, then mod-switch to `p^e + 1`, and then reduce the shortest lift of the result modulo `p^e`.
        // This will introduce the overflow modulo `p^e + 1` as error in the lower bits, which we will later remove during digit extraction
        let perform_noisy_expansion = |C: &CiphertextRing<Inst>, ct: Ciphertext<Inst>, enc_sk: Ciphertext<Inst>| {
            let ZZbig_to_C = C.inclusion().compose(C.base_ring().can_hom(&ZZbig).unwrap());
            let values_scaled = Ciphertext {
                c0: ZZbig_to_C.mul_map(ct.c0, ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(self.p()), self.v())),
                c1: ZZbig_to_C.mul_map(ct.c1, ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(self.p()), self.v())),
                implicit_scale: ct.implicit_scale
            };
            // change to `p^e + 1`
            let (c0, c1) = Inst::mod_switch_to_plaintext(P_main, &self.tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext, &C, values_scaled);
            // reduce modulo `p^e`, which will introduce additional error in the lower digits
            let mod_pe = P_main.base_ring().can_hom(self.tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext.base_ring().integer_ring()).unwrap();
            let (c0, c1) = (
                P_main.from_canonical_basis(self.tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext.wrt_canonical_basis(&c0).iter().map(|x| mod_pe.map(self.tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext.base_ring().smallest_lift(x)))),
                P_main.from_canonical_basis(self.tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext.wrt_canonical_basis(&c1).iter().map(|x| mod_pe.map(self.tmp_coprime_modulus_plaintext.base_ring().smallest_lift(x))))
            );
            return ModulusAwareCiphertext {
                data: Inst::hom_add_plain(P_main, C_master, &c0, Inst::hom_mul_plain(P_main, C_master, &c1, enc_sk)),
                info: self.modswitch_strategy.info_for_fresh_encryption(P_main, C_master, used_sk),
                dropped_rns_factor_indices: RNSFactorIndexList::empty(),
                sk: used_sk
            };
        };
        let result = if let Some(sparse_sk_encaps) = sparse_sk_encaps {
            let ct_keyswitched = {
                let ct_modswitched = Inst::mod_switch_ct(P_base, &sparse_sk_encaps.C_sparse_sk, &C_input, ct);
                Inst::key_switch(P_base, &sparse_sk_encaps.C_sparse_sk, &sparse_sk_encaps.C_sparse_sk, ct_modswitched, &sparse_sk_encaps.switch_to_sparse_key)
            };
            perform_noisy_expansion(&sparse_sk_encaps.C_sparse_sk, ct_keyswitched, Inst::clone_ct(P_main, C_master, &sparse_sk_encaps.encapsulated_key))
        } else {
            perform_noisy_expansion(&C_input, ct, Inst::enc_sk(P_main, C_master))
        };
        if let Some(sk) = debug_sk {
            Inst::dec_println(P_main, &C_master, &result.data, sk);
        }
        return result;
    }

    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn perform_coefficients_to_slots(
        &self,
        ct: ModulusAwareCiphertext<Inst, Strategy>,
        gks: &[(GaloisGroupEl, KeySwitchKey<Inst>)],
        debug_sk: Option<&SecretKey<Inst>>
    ) -> ModulusAwareCiphertext<Inst, Strategy> {
        let C_master = self.master_ciphertext_ring();
        let P_main = self.intermediate_plaintext_ring();
        let result = self.modswitch_strategy.evaluate_circuit(
            &self.coeffs_to_slots_thin, 
            C_master,
            P_main, 
            C_master, 
            &[ct], 
            None, 
            gks,
            debug_sk
        );
        assert_eq!(1, result.len());
        let result = result.into_iter().next().unwrap();
        if let Some(sk) = debug_sk {
            let C_current = Inst::mod_switch_down_C(C_master, &result.dropped_rns_factor_indices);
            Inst::dec_println_slots(P_main, &C_current, &result.data, &Inst::mod_switch_sk(&C_current, C_master, sk), Some("."));
        }
        return result;
    }

    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn perform_digit_extraction(
        &self,
        ct: ModulusAwareCiphertext<Inst, Strategy>,
        rk: &RelinKey<Inst>,
        gks: &[(GaloisGroupEl, KeySwitchKey<Inst>)],
        debug_sk: Option<&SecretKey<Inst>>
    ) -> ModulusAwareCiphertext<Inst, Strategy>
        where Inst::PlaintextRing: AsBGVPlaintext<Inst>
    {
        let C_master = self.master_ciphertext_ring();
        let plaintext_rings = self.complete_plaintext_ring_sequence();
        let result = self.digit_extract.evaluate_bgv::<_, Inst, Strategy>(
            &plaintext_rings,
            &self.modswitch_strategy,
            &plaintext_rings,
            C_master,
            ct,
            rk,
            gks,
            debug_sk
        ).0;
        return result;
    }

    ///
    /// Performs bootstrapping on thinly packed ciphertexts.
    /// 
    /// Parameters are as follows:
    ///  - `ct_dropped_moduli` contains all RNS factor indices of `C_master` that aren't used by `ct`
    ///    (anymore); More concrete, `ct` lives over the ciphertext ring one obtains by dropping the
    ///    RNS factors with these indices from the RNS base of `C_master`
    ///  - `ct` is the ciphertext to bootstrap; It must be thinly packed (i.e. each slot may only
    ///    contain an element of `Z/(t)`), otherwise this function will cause immediate noise overflow.
    ///  - `rk` is a relinearization key, to be used for computing products
    ///  - `gks` is a list of Galois keys, to be used for applying Galois automorphisms. This list
    ///    must contain a Galois key for each Galois automorphism listed in [`ThinBootstrapper::required_galois_keys()`],
    ///    but may contain additional Galois keys
    ///  - `debug_sk` can be a reference to a secret key, which is used to print out decryptions
    ///    of intermediate results for debugging purposes. May only be set if `LOG == true`.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    pub fn bootstrap_thin<'a>(
        &self,
        ct_dropped_moduli: &RNSFactorIndexList,
        ct: Ciphertext<Inst>,
        rk: &RelinKey<Inst>,
        gks: &[(GaloisGroupEl, KeySwitchKey<Inst>)],
        used_sk: SecretKeyDistribution,
        sk_encaps_data: Option<&SparseKeyEncapsulationKey<Inst>>,
        debug_sk: Option<&SecretKey<Inst>>
    ) -> ModulusAwareCiphertext<Inst, Strategy>
        where Inst: 'a,
            Inst::PlaintextRing: AsBGVPlaintext<Inst>
    {
        let (C_slots_to_coeffs, ct) = self.prepare_input_for_slots_to_coefficients(ct_dropped_moduli, ct, gks[0].1.gadget_vector_digits(), debug_sk);

        let values_in_coefficients = self.perform_slots_to_coefficients(&C_slots_to_coeffs, ct, gks, debug_sk);

        let noisy_decryption = self.perform_noisy_expansion(&C_slots_to_coeffs, values_in_coefficients, used_sk, sk_encaps_data, debug_sk);

        let noisy_decryption_in_slots = self.perform_coefficients_to_slots(noisy_decryption, gks, debug_sk);
        
        return self.perform_digit_extraction(noisy_decryption_in_slots, rk, gks, debug_sk);
    }
}

///
/// Data required for performing thin bootstrapping with sparse key encapsulation.
/// 
/// Sparse key encapsulation refers to key-switching a ciphertext to a sparse secret key
/// just before homomorphic decryption (which happens at a very low ciphertext modulus,
/// which can offset the security loss due to key sparsity), and thus introduce much less
/// noise that has to be homomorphically removed.
/// 
pub struct SparseKeyEncapsulationKey<Inst: BGVInstantiation> {
    ///
    /// Ciphertext ring with small modulus, over which encryptions with the
    /// sparse key remain secure.
    /// 
    pub C_sparse_sk: CiphertextRing<Inst>,
    ///
    /// Key-switch key to switch a ciphertext encrypted by the standard key
    /// to a ciphertext encrypted by the sparse key.
    /// 
    /// This is defined w.r.t. the switch-to-sparse ciphertext ring, which has
    /// a significantly smaller modulus than the standard ciphertext ring. This
    /// is necessary for security.
    /// 
    pub switch_to_sparse_key: KeySwitchKey<Inst>,
    ///
    /// An encryption of the sparse secret key (mapped into the plaintext ring
    /// by taking a shortest lift to `R`) w.r.t. the standard secret key.
    /// 
    pub encapsulated_key: Ciphertext<Inst>
}

impl<Params> SparseKeyEncapsulationKey<Params>
    where Params: BGVInstantiation, 
        Params::PlaintextRing: AsBGVPlaintext<Params>
{
    pub fn create<R: CryptoRng + Rng>(P: &PlaintextRing<Params>, C: &CiphertextRing<Params>, C_sparse_sk: CiphertextRing<Params>, sparse_sk: SecretKey<Params>, standard_sk: &SecretKey<Params>, mut rng: R, noise_sigma: f64) -> Self {
        let switch_to_sparse_key = Params::gen_switch_key(
            P,
            &C_sparse_sk, 
            &mut rng,
            &Params::mod_switch_sk(&C_sparse_sk, C, standard_sk),
            &sparse_sk,
            &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(C_sparse_sk.base_ring().len(), C_sparse_sk.base_ring().len()),
            noise_sigma
        );
        let ZZ_to_Pbase = P.base_ring().can_hom(P.base_ring().integer_ring()).unwrap().compose(P.base_ring().integer_ring().can_hom(&ZZbig).unwrap());
        let sparse_sk_as_plain = P.from_canonical_basis(C_sparse_sk.wrt_canonical_basis(&sparse_sk).iter().map(|x| ZZ_to_Pbase.map(C_sparse_sk.base_ring().smallest_lift(x))));
        let encapsulated_key = Params::enc_sym(P, C, &mut rng, &sparse_sk_as_plain, standard_sk, noise_sigma);
        SparseKeyEncapsulationKey { 
            switch_to_sparse_key: switch_to_sparse_key, 
            encapsulated_key: encapsulated_key,
            C_sparse_sk: C_sparse_sk
        }
    }

    pub fn new<R: CryptoRng + Rng>(P: &PlaintextRing<Params>, C: &CiphertextRing<Params>, standard_sk: &SecretKey<Params>, C_sparse_rns_factor_count: usize, hwt: usize, mut rng: R, noise_sigma: f64) -> Self {
        let C_sparse_sk = RingValue::from(C.get_ring().drop_rns_factor(&RNSFactorIndexList::from(C_sparse_rns_factor_count..C.base_ring().len(), C.base_ring().len())));
        let sparse_sk = Params::gen_sk(&C_sparse_sk, &mut rng, SecretKeyDistribution::SparseWithHwt(hwt));
        return Self::create(P, C, C_sparse_sk, sparse_sk, standard_sk, rng, noise_sigma);
    }
}

impl<R: ?Sized + RingBase> DigitExtract<R> {

    pub fn evaluate_bgv<S, Inst, Strategy>(
        &self,
        rings: &[S],
        modswitch_strategy: &Strategy, 
        P: &[&PlaintextRing<Inst>],
        C_master: &CiphertextRing<Inst>, 
        input: ModulusAwareCiphertext<Inst, Strategy>, 
        rk: &RelinKey<Inst>,
        gks: &[(GaloisGroupEl, KeySwitchKey<Inst>)],
        debug_sk: Option<&SecretKey<Inst>>
    ) -> (ModulusAwareCiphertext<Inst, Strategy>, ModulusAwareCiphertext<Inst, Strategy>)
        where S: RingStore<Type = R>,
            Inst: BGVInstantiation, 
            R: AsBGVPlaintext<Inst>,
            Strategy: BGVModswitchStrategy<Inst>
    {
        let ZZ = P[0].base_ring().integer_ring();
        let (p, actual_r) = is_prime_power(ZZ, P[0].base_ring().modulus()).unwrap();
        assert!(actual_r >= self.r());
        assert_eq!(self.v() + 1, P.len());
        assert_eq!(self.v() + 1, rings.len());
        assert_el_eq!(ZZbig, self.p(), int_cast(ZZ.clone_el(&p), ZZbig, ZZ));
        for i in 0..=self.v() {
            assert_el_eq!(ZZbig, ZZbig.pow(ZZbig.clone_el(self.p()), actual_r + i), int_cast(ZZ.clone_el(P[i].base_ring().modulus()), ZZbig, ZZ));
        }

        return self.evaluate_generic(
            input,
            |exp, inputs, circuit| {
                let digit_extracted = modswitch_strategy.evaluate_circuit(circuit, &rings[exp - self.r()], P[exp - self.r()], C_master, inputs, Some(rk), gks, debug_sk);
                if let Some(sk) = debug_sk {
                    println!("Digit extraction modulo p^{} done", exp);
                    for ct in &digit_extracted {
                        modswitch_strategy.print_info(P[exp - self.r()], C_master, ct);
                        let Clocal = Inst::mod_switch_down_C(C_master, &ct.dropped_rns_factor_indices);
                        let sk_local = Inst::mod_switch_sk(&Clocal, C_master, sk);
                        Inst::dec_println_slots(P[exp - self.r()], &Clocal, &ct.data, &sk_local, Some("."));
                        println!();
                    }
                }
                return digit_extracted;
            },
            |exp_old, exp_new, input| {
                let C_current = Inst::mod_switch_down_C(C_master, &input.dropped_rns_factor_indices);
                let result = ModulusAwareCiphertext {
                    data: Inst::change_plaintext_modulus(P[exp_new - self.r()], P[exp_old - self.r()], &C_current, input.data),
                    dropped_rns_factor_indices: input.dropped_rns_factor_indices.clone(),
                    info: input.info,
                    sk: input.sk
                };
                return result;
            }
        );
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
use crate::bgv::noise_estimator::NaiveBGVNoiseEstimator;

#[test]
fn test_digit_extract_homomorphic() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();
    let mut rng = rand::rng();

    let params = Pow2BGV::new(1 << 7);
    let P1 = params.create_plaintext_ring(int_cast(17 * 17, ZZbig, ZZi64));
    let P2 = params.create_plaintext_ring(int_cast(17 * 17 * 17, ZZbig, ZZi64));
    let C_master = params.create_ciphertext_ring(790..800);

    let sk = Pow2BGV::gen_sk(&C_master, &mut rng, SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary);
    let rk = Pow2BGV::gen_rk(&P2, &C_master, &mut rng, &sk, &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(7, C_master.base_ring().len()), 3.2);
    let m = P2.int_hom().map(17 * 17 + 2 * 17 - 3);
    let ct = Pow2BGV::enc_sym(&P2, &C_master, &mut rng, &m, &sk, 3.2);

    let digitextract = DigitExtract::new_digit_retain_based(&[P1.base_ring(), P2.base_ring()]);
    let strategy = DefaultModswitchStrategy::<_, _, true>::new(NaiveBGVNoiseEstimator);
    let (ct_high, ct_low) = digitextract.evaluate_bgv::<_, Pow2BGV, _>(&[P1.base_ring(), P2.base_ring()], &strategy, &[&P1, &P2], &C_master, ModulusAwareCiphertext {
        data: ct,
        dropped_rns_factor_indices: RNSFactorIndexList::empty(),
        info: strategy.info_for_fresh_encryption(&P2, &C_master, SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary),
        sk: SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary
    }, &rk, &[], Some(&sk));
    let C_result = Pow2BGV::mod_switch_down_C(&C_master, &ct_high.dropped_rns_factor_indices);
    let sk_result = Pow2BGV::mod_switch_sk(&C_result, &C_master, &sk);
    let m_high = Pow2BGV::dec(&P1, &C_result, Pow2BGV::clone_ct(&P1, &C_result, &ct_high.data), &sk_result);
    assert!(P1.wrt_canonical_basis(&m_high).iter().skip(1).all(|x| P1.base_ring().is_zero(&x)));
    let m_high = P1.base_ring().smallest_lift(P1.wrt_canonical_basis(&m_high).at(0));
    assert_eq!(17 + 2, m_high);
    
    let m_low = Pow2BGV::dec(&P2, &C_result, Pow2BGV::clone_ct(&P2, &C_result, &ct_low.data), &sk_result);
    assert!(P2.wrt_canonical_basis(&m_low).iter().skip(1).all(|x| P2.base_ring().is_zero(&x)));
    let m_low = P2.base_ring().smallest_lift(P2.wrt_canonical_basis(&m_low).at(0));
    assert_eq!(-3, m_low);
}

#[test]
fn test_pow2_bgv_thin_bootstrapping_17() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();
    let mut rng = StdRng::from_seed([0; 32]);
    
    // 8 slots of rank 16
    let params = Pow2BGV::new(1 << 7);
    let t = int_cast(17, ZZbig, ZZi64);
    let P = params.create_plaintext_ring(t);
    let C_master = params.create_ciphertext_ring(790..800);
    let key_switch_params = RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(5, C_master.base_ring().len());
    let bootstrapper = ThinBootstrapper::build_pow2(&params, &P, &C_master, 2, None, 4, &key_switch_params, DefaultModswitchStrategy::<_, _, true>::new(NaiveBGVNoiseEstimator), Some("."));
    
    let sk = Pow2BGV::gen_sk(&C_master, &mut rng, SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary);
    let gk = Pow2BGV::gen_gks(bootstrapper.intermediate_plaintext_ring(), &C_master, &mut rng, &sk, bootstrapper.required_galois_keys(&P), &key_switch_params, 3.2);
    let rk = Pow2BGV::gen_rk(bootstrapper.intermediate_plaintext_ring(), &C_master, &mut rng, &sk, &key_switch_params, 3.2);
    
    let m = P.int_hom().map(2);
    let ct = Pow2BGV::enc_sym(&P, &C_master, &mut rng, &m, &sk, 3.2);
    let ct_result = bootstrapper.bootstrap_thin(
        &RNSFactorIndexList::empty(),
        ct, 
        &rk, 
        &gk,
        SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary,
        None,
        Some(&sk)
    );
    let C_result = Pow2BGV::mod_switch_down_C(&C_master, &ct_result.dropped_rns_factor_indices);
    let sk_result = Pow2BGV::mod_switch_sk(&C_result, &C_master, &sk);

    assert_el_eq!(P, P.int_hom().map(2), Pow2BGV::dec(&P, &C_result, ct_result.data, &sk_result));
}

#[test]
fn test_composite_bgv_thin_bootstrapping_2_sparse_key_encapsulation() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();
    let mut rng = StdRng::from_seed([0; 32]);
    
    // 8 slots of rank 16
    let params = CompositeBGV::new(31, 11);
    let t = int_cast(8, ZZbig, ZZi64);
    let P = params.create_plaintext_ring(t);
    let C_master = params.create_ciphertext_ring(790..800);
    let key_switch_params = RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(5, C_master.base_ring().len());
    let bootstrapper = ThinBootstrapper::build_odd(&params, &P, &C_master, 4, None, 4, &key_switch_params, DefaultModswitchStrategy::<_, _, true>::new(NaiveBGVNoiseEstimator), Some("."));
    
    let sk = CompositeBGV::gen_sk(&C_master, &mut rng, SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary);
    let gk = CompositeBGV::gen_gks(bootstrapper.intermediate_plaintext_ring(), &C_master, &mut rng, &sk, bootstrapper.required_galois_keys(&P), &key_switch_params, 3.2);
    let rk = CompositeBGV::gen_rk(bootstrapper.intermediate_plaintext_ring(), &C_master, &mut rng, &sk, &key_switch_params, 3.2);
    let encaps = SparseKeyEncapsulationKey::new(bootstrapper.intermediate_plaintext_ring(), &C_master, &sk, 2, 16, &mut rng, 3.2);

    let m = P.int_hom().map(2);
    let ct = CompositeBGV::enc_sym(&P, &C_master, &mut rng, &m, &sk, 3.2);
    let ct_result = bootstrapper.bootstrap_thin(
        &RNSFactorIndexList::empty(),
        ct, 
        &rk, 
        &gk,
        SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary,
        Some(&encaps),
        Some(&sk)
    );
    let C_result = CompositeBGV::mod_switch_down_C(&C_master, &ct_result.dropped_rns_factor_indices);
    let sk_result = CompositeBGV::mod_switch_sk(&C_result, &C_master, &sk);

    assert_el_eq!(P, P.int_hom().map(2), CompositeBGV::dec(&P, &C_result, ct_result.data, &sk_result));
}

#[ignore]
#[test]
fn measure_time_double_rns_composite_bgv_thin_bootstrapping() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();

    let mut rng = StdRng::from_seed([0; 32]);

    let t = int_cast(4, ZZbig, ZZi64);
    let sk_distr = SecretKeyDistribution::SparseWithHwt(256);
    let params = CompositeBGV::new(37, 949);
    let P = params.create_plaintext_ring(t);
    let C_master = params.create_ciphertext_ring(805..820);
    assert_eq!(15, C_master.base_ring().len());
    let key_switch_params = RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(7, C_master.base_ring().len());
    let bootstrapper = ThinBootstrapper::build_odd(&params, &P, &C_master, 7, None, 4, &key_switch_params, DefaultModswitchStrategy::<_, _, false>::new(NaiveBGVNoiseEstimator), Some("."));
    
    let sk = CompositeBGV::gen_sk(&C_master, &mut rng, sk_distr);
    let gk = CompositeBGV::gen_gks(bootstrapper.intermediate_plaintext_ring(), &C_master, &mut rng, &sk, bootstrapper.required_galois_keys(&P), &key_switch_params, 3.2);
    let rk = CompositeBGV::gen_rk(bootstrapper.intermediate_plaintext_ring(), &C_master, &mut rng, &sk, &key_switch_params, 3.2);
    
    let m = P.int_hom().map(2);
    let ct = CompositeBGV::enc_sym(&P, &C_master, &mut rng, &m, &sk, 3.2);
    let ct_result = bootstrapper.bootstrap_thin(
        &RNSFactorIndexList::empty(),
        ct, 
        &rk, 
        &gk,
        sk_distr,
        None,
        None
    );
    let C_result = CompositeBGV::mod_switch_down_C(&C_master, &ct_result.dropped_rns_factor_indices);
    let sk_result = CompositeBGV::mod_switch_sk(&C_result, &C_master, &sk);
    println!("final noise budget: {}", CompositeBGV::noise_budget(&P, &C_result, &ct_result.data, &sk_result));
    let result = CompositeBGV::dec(&P, &C_result, ct_result.data, &sk_result);
    assert_el_eq!(P, P.int_hom().map(2), result);
}

#[ignore]
#[test]
fn measure_time_double_rns_pow2_bgv_thin_bootstrapping() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();
    
    let mut rng = StdRng::from_seed([0; 32]);

    let t = int_cast(17, ZZbig, ZZi64);
    let sk_distr = SecretKeyDistribution::SparseWithHwt(256);
    let params = Pow2BGV::new(1 << 16);
    let P = params.create_plaintext_ring(t);
    let C_master = params.create_ciphertext_ring(805..820);
    assert_eq!(15, C_master.base_ring().len());
    let gk_params = RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(7, C_master.base_ring().len());
    let rk_params = RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(3, C_master.base_ring().len());
    let bootstrapper = ThinBootstrapper::build_pow2(&params, &P, &C_master, 2, None, 4, &gk_params, DefaultModswitchStrategy::<_, _, false>::new(NaiveBGVNoiseEstimator), Some("."));
    
    let sk = Pow2BGV::gen_sk(&C_master, &mut rng, sk_distr);
    let gk = Pow2BGV::gen_gks(bootstrapper.intermediate_plaintext_ring(), &C_master, &mut rng, &sk, bootstrapper.required_galois_keys(&P), &gk_params, 3.2);
    let rk = Pow2BGV::gen_rk(bootstrapper.intermediate_plaintext_ring(), &C_master, &mut rng, &sk, &rk_params, 3.2);
    
    let m = P.int_hom().map(2);
    let ct = Pow2BGV::enc_sym(&P, &C_master, &mut rng, &m, &sk, 3.2);
    let ct_result = bootstrapper.bootstrap_thin(
        &RNSFactorIndexList::empty(),
        ct, 
        &rk, 
        &gk,
        sk_distr,
        None,
        None
    );
    let C_result = Pow2BGV::mod_switch_down_C(&C_master, &ct_result.dropped_rns_factor_indices);
    let sk_result = Pow2BGV::mod_switch_sk(&C_result, &C_master, &sk);
    println!("final noise budget: {}", Pow2BGV::noise_budget(&P, &C_result, &ct_result.data, &sk_result));
    let result = Pow2BGV::dec(&P, &C_result, ct_result.data, &sk_result);
    assert_el_eq!(P, P.int_hom().map(2), result);
}