fheanor 0.11.2

use std::alloc::Allocator;
use std::alloc::Global;
use std::ops::Range;

use feanor_math::algorithms::convolution::STANDARD_CONVOLUTION;
use feanor_math::algorithms::discrete_log::Subgroup;
use feanor_math::algorithms::int_factor::is_prime_power;
use feanor_math::matrix::OwnedMatrix;
use feanor_math::ring::*;
use feanor_math::rings::finite::FiniteRing;
use feanor_math::rings::poly::dense_poly::DensePolyRing;
use feanor_math::rings::poly::PolyRingStore;
use feanor_math::rings::zn::*;
use feanor_math::rings::zn::zn_64::*;
use feanor_math::integer::*;
use feanor_math::ordered::*;
use feanor_math::homomorphism::Homomorphism;
use feanor_math::rings::extension::FreeAlgebraStore;
use feanor_math::seq::*;
use feanor_math::rings::finite::FiniteRingStore;
use tracing::instrument;

use crate::bfv::default_impl_lift_to_Cmul;
use crate::bfv::force_double_rns_repr;
use crate::ciphertext_ring::indices::RNSFactorIndexList;
use crate::ciphertext_ring::NumberRingRNSQuotient;
use crate::gadget_product::digits::RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices;
use crate::gadget_product::*;
use crate::number_ring::galois::*;
use crate::number_ring::hypercube::isomorphism::BaseRing;
use crate::number_ring::hypercube::isomorphism::DecoratedBaseRingBase;
use crate::number_ring::hypercube::isomorphism::HypercubeIsomorphism;
use crate::number_ring::hypercube::structure::HypercubeStructure;
use crate::number_ring::*;
use crate::number_ring::pow2_cyclotomic::Pow2CyclotomicNumberRing;
use crate::ciphertext_ring::double_rns_managed::*;
use crate::ntt::FheanorNegacyclicNTT;
use crate::number_ring::tensor_ring::*;
use crate::rns_conv::RNSOperation;
use crate::rns_conv::bfv_rescale::RNSRescalingConversion;
use crate::bfv::{Pow2BFV, CompositeBFV};
use crate::{DefaultCiphertextAllocator, DefaultNegacyclicNTT};
use crate::clpx::encoding::*;
use crate::*;

use rand::{Rng, CryptoRng};
use rand_distr::StandardNormal;

///
/// Implementation of the isomorphism `Z[X]/(Phi_m(X), t(X^m2), p) ~ Fp[X]/(Phi_m2(X))`
/// that CLPX/GBFV is based on.
/// 
pub mod encoding;

pub mod eval;

pub type NumberRing<Inst: CLPXInstantiation> = <Inst::CiphertextRing as NumberRingQuotient>::NumberRing;
pub type SecretKey<Inst: CLPXInstantiation> = El<CiphertextRing<Inst>>;
pub type KeySwitchKey<Inst: CLPXInstantiation> = (GadgetProductOperand<Inst>, GadgetProductOperand<Inst>);
pub type RelinKey<Inst: CLPXInstantiation> = KeySwitchKey<Inst>;
pub type CiphertextRing<Inst: CLPXInstantiation> = RingValue<Inst::CiphertextRing>;
pub type PlaintextRing<Inst: CLPXInstantiation> = CLPXPlaintextRing<NumberRing<Inst>, zn_big::Zn<BigIntRing>>;
pub type Ciphertext<Inst: CLPXInstantiation> = (El<CiphertextRing<Inst>>, El<CiphertextRing<Inst>>);
pub type GadgetProductOperand<Inst: CLPXInstantiation> = RNSGadgetProductRhsOperand<Inst::CiphertextRing>;

pub type SecretKeyDistribution = bgv::SecretKeyDistribution;

///
/// When choosing primes for an RNS base, where the only constraint is that
/// the total modulus is at least `b` bits, we choose the bitlength to be
/// within `SAMPLE_PRIMES_MINOFFSET..SAMPLE_PRIMES_MAXOFFSET`
/// 
/// This must be `> 0`, since we need a little bit slack to accommodate
/// for the error and exact-lifting constraints of the RNS base conversion 
/// algorithms.
/// 
const SAMPLE_PRIMES_MINOFFSET: usize = 3;

///
/// When choosing primes for an RNS base, where the only constraint is that
/// the total modulus is at least `b` bits, we choose the bitlength to be
/// within `SAMPLE_PRIMES_MINOFFSET..SAMPLE_PRIMES_MAXOFFSET`
/// 
const SAMPLE_PRIMES_MAXOFFSET: usize = SAMPLE_PRIMES_SIZE + SAMPLE_PRIMES_MINOFFSET;

///
/// When choosing primes for an RNS base, we restrict to primes of this bitlength.
/// The reason is that the corresponding quotient rings can be represented by [`zn_64::Zn`].
/// 
const SAMPLE_PRIMES_SIZE: usize = 57;

///
/// Trait for types that represent an instantiation of CLPX/GBFV.
/// 
/// The design is very similar to [`crate::bfv::BFVInstantiation`], for details
/// have a look at that.
/// 
/// For a few more details on how this works, see [`crate::examples::clpx_basics`].
/// 
pub trait CLPXInstantiation {

    ///
    /// Type of the ciphertext ring `R/qR`.
    /// 
    type CiphertextRing: NumberRingRNSQuotient + FiniteRing;
    
    ///
    /// The number ring `R` we work in, i.e. the ciphertext ring is `R/qR` and
    /// the plaintext ring is `R/tR`.
    /// 
    fn number_ring(&self) -> &NumberRing<Self>;
     
    ///
    /// Creates the ciphertext ring `R/qR` and the extended-modulus ciphertext ring
    /// `R/qq'R` that is necessary for homomorphic multiplication.
    /// 
    /// The modulus for `q` is chosen such that its bitlength is within `log2_q`.
    /// The modulus `q'` is chosen so that `R/qq'R` can represent the result of
    /// the intermediate product of the shortest lifts of two elements of `R/qR`.
    /// 
    fn create_ciphertext_rings(&self, log2_q: Range<usize>, log2_t_coeff_inf_norm: usize) -> (CiphertextRing<Self>, CiphertextRing<Self>);

    ///
    /// Creates the CLPX plaintext ring with the given parameters.
    /// 
    /// Here `t(X)` is a polynomial, representing an element of the number ring.
    /// The given `acting_galois_group` should be the subgroup of the Galois group
    /// of the number ring that fixes `t`
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn create_plaintext_ring(&self, poly_ring: DensePolyRing<BigIntRing>, t: El<DensePolyRing<BigIntRing>>, characteristic: El<BigIntRing>, acting_galois_group: Subgroup<CyclotomicGaloisGroup>) -> PlaintextRing<Self> {
        let base_ring = zn_big::Zn::new(ZZbig, characteristic);
        CLPXPlaintextRingBase::create(self.number_ring().clone(), base_ring, poly_ring, t, acting_galois_group, Global, STANDARD_CONVOLUTION)
    }
    
    ///
    /// Generates a secret key, using the randomness of the given rng.
    /// 
    /// If `hwt` is set, the secret will be a random ring element with
    /// exactly `hwt` entries (w.r.t. coefficient basis) in `{-1, 1}`, 
    /// and the others as `0`. If `hwt` is not set, the secret will be
    /// a ring element whose coefficient basis coefficients are drawn
    /// uniformly at random from `{-1, 0, 1}`.
    /// 
    /// If you need another kind of secret, consider creating the ring
    /// element yourself using `C.from_canonical_basis()`.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn gen_sk<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, mut rng: R, distr: SecretKeyDistribution) -> SecretKey<Self> {
        match distr {
            SecretKeyDistribution::SparseWithHwt(hwt) => {
                assert!(hwt > 0, "if you want to use zero as secret key, use SecretKeyDistribution::Zero instead");
                assert!(hwt * 3 <= C.rank() * 2, "it does not make sense to take more than 2/3 of secret key entries in {{-1, 1}}");
                let mut result_data = (0..C.rank()).map(|_| 0).collect::<Vec<_>>();
                for _ in 0..hwt {
                    let mut i = rng.next_u32() as usize % C.rank();
                    while result_data[i] != 0 {
                        i = rng.next_u32() as usize % C.rank();
                    }
                    result_data[i] = (rng.next_u32() % 2) as i32 * 2 - 1;
                }
                return C.from_canonical_basis(result_data.into_iter().map(|c| C.base_ring().int_hom().map(c)));
            },
            SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary => C.from_canonical_basis((0..C.rank()).map(|_| C.base_ring().int_hom().map((rng.next_u32() % 3) as i32 - 1))),
            SecretKeyDistribution::Zero => C.zero(),
            SecretKeyDistribution::Custom(_) => panic!("if you use SecretKeyDistribution::Custom(_), you must generate the secret key yourself")
        }
    }
    
    ///
    /// Generates a new encryption of zero using the secret key and the randomness of the given rng.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn enc_sym_zero<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, mut rng: R, sk: &SecretKey<Self>, noise_sigma: f64) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        let a = C.random_element(|| rng.next_u64());
        let mut b = C.negate(C.mul_ref(&a, &sk));
        let e = C.from_canonical_basis((0..C.rank()).map(|_| C.base_ring().int_hom().map((rng.sample::<f64, _>(StandardNormal) * noise_sigma).round() as i32)));
        C.add_assign(&mut b, e);
        return (b, a);
    }
    
    ///
    /// Creates a transparent encryption of zero, i.e. a noiseless encryption that does not hide
    /// the encrypted value - everyone can read it, even without access to the secret key.
    /// 
    /// Often used to initialize an accumulator (or similar) during algorithms. 
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn transparent_zero(C: &CiphertextRing<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        (C.zero(), C.zero())
    }

    ///
    /// Encrypts the given value, using the randomness of the given rng.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn enc_sym<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, rng: R, m: &El<PlaintextRing<Self>>, sk: &SecretKey<Self>, noise_sigma: f64) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        Self::hom_add_plain(P, C, m, Self::enc_sym_zero(C, rng, sk, noise_sigma))
    }

    ///
    /// Decrypts a given ciphertext.
    /// 
    /// This function does perform any semantic checks. In particular, it is up to the
    /// caller to ensure that the ciphertext is defined over the given ring, and is a valid
    /// BFV encryption w.r.t. the given plaintext modulus.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn dec(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, ct: Ciphertext<Self>, sk: &SecretKey<Self>) -> El<PlaintextRing<Self>> {
        let (c0, c1) = ct;
        let noisy_m = C.add(c0, C.mul_ref_snd(c1, sk));
        return P.get_ring().decode(C, &noisy_m);
    }

    ///
    /// Decrypts a given ciphertext and prints its value to stdout.
    /// Designed for debugging purposes.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn dec_println(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, ct: &Ciphertext<Self>, sk: &SecretKey<Self>) {
        let m = Self::dec(P, C, Self::clone_ct(C, ct), sk);
        println!("ciphertext (noise budget: {}):", Self::noise_budget(P, C, ct, sk));
        P.println(&m);
        println!();
    }

    ///
    /// Decrypts a given ciphertext and prints the values in its slots to stdout.
    /// Designed for debugging purposes.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn dec_println_slots(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, ct: &Ciphertext<Self>, sk: &SecretKey<Self>, dir: Option<&str>)
        where DecoratedBaseRingBase<PlaintextRing<Self>>: CanIsoFromTo<BaseRing<PlaintextRing<Self>>>
    {
        let ZZ = P.base_ring().integer_ring();
        let (p, _e) = is_prime_power(ZZ, P.base_ring().modulus()).unwrap();
        let hypercube = if P.number_ring().galois_group().m() % 2 == 0 {
            HypercubeStructure::default_pow2_hypercube(P.acting_galois_group(), int_cast(p, ZZbig, ZZ))
        } else {
            HypercubeStructure::halevi_shoup_hypercube(P.acting_galois_group(), int_cast(p, ZZbig, ZZ))
        };
        let H = HypercubeIsomorphism::new(&P, &hypercube, dir);
        let m = Self::dec(P, C, Self::clone_ct(C, ct), sk);
        println!("ciphertext (noise budget: {}):", Self::noise_budget(P, C, ct, sk));
        for a in H.get_slot_values(&m) {
            H.slot_ring().println(&a);
        }
        println!();
    }
    
    ///
    /// Computes an encryption of the sum of two encrypted messages.
    /// 
    /// This function does perform any semantic checks. In particular, it is up to the
    /// caller to ensure that the ciphertexts are defined over the given ring, and are
    /// BFV encryptions w.r.t. compatible plaintext moduli.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn hom_add(C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, lhs: Ciphertext<Self>, rhs: &Ciphertext<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        let (lhs0, lhs1) = lhs;
        let (rhs0, rhs1) = rhs;
        return (C.add_ref(&lhs0, &rhs0), C.add_ref(&lhs1, &rhs1));
    }
    
    ///
    /// Computes an encryption of the difference of two encrypted messages.
    /// 
    /// This function does perform any semantic checks. In particular, it is up to the
    /// caller to ensure that the ciphertexts are defined over the given ring, and are
    /// BFV encryptions w.r.t. compatible plaintext moduli.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn hom_sub(C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, lhs: Ciphertext<Self>, rhs: &Ciphertext<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        let (lhs0, lhs1) = lhs;
        let (rhs0, rhs1) = rhs;
        return (C.sub_ref(&lhs0, rhs0), C.sub_ref(&lhs1, rhs1));
    }
    
    ///
    /// Copies a ciphertext.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn clone_ct(C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, ct: &Ciphertext<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        (C.clone_el(&ct.0), C.clone_el(&ct.1))
    }

    ///
    /// Computes an encryption of the sum of an encrypted message and a plaintext.
    /// 
    /// This function does perform any semantic checks. In particular, it is up to the
    /// caller to ensure that the ciphertext is defined over the given ring, and is
    /// BFV encryption w.r.t. the given plaintext modulus.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn hom_add_plain(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, m: &El<PlaintextRing<Self>>, ct: Ciphertext<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        let m = P.get_ring().encode(C, m);
        return (C.add(ct.0, m), ct.1);
    }
    
    ///
    /// Computes an encryption of the product of an encrypted message and a plaintext.
    /// 
    /// This function does perform any semantic checks. In particular, it is up to the
    /// caller to ensure that the ciphertext is defined over the given ring, and is
    /// BFV encryption w.r.t. the given plaintext modulus.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn hom_mul_plain(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, m: &El<PlaintextRing<Self>>, ct: Ciphertext<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        let m = P.get_ring().small_lift(m);
        assert!(P.get_ring().ZZX().degree(&m).unwrap_or(0) < C.rank());
        let mod_Q =  C.base_ring().can_hom(&ZZbig).unwrap();
        let m_in_C = C.from_canonical_basis(
            (0..C.rank()).map(|i| ZZbig.clone_el(P.get_ring().ZZX().coefficient_at(&m, i)))
                .map(|c| mod_Q.map(c))
        );
        return (C.mul_ref_snd(ct.0, &m_in_C), C.mul(ct.1, m_in_C));
    }

    ///
    /// Computes the "noise budget" of a given ciphertext.
    /// 
    /// Concretely, the noise budget is `log(q/(t|e|))`, where `t` is the plaintext modulus
    /// and `|e|` is the `l_inf`-norm of the noise term. This will decrease during homomorphic
    /// operations, and if it reaches zero, decryption may yield incorrect results.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn noise_budget(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, ct: &Ciphertext<Self>, sk: &SecretKey<Self>) -> usize {
        let (c0, c1) = Self::clone_ct(C, ct);
        let noisy_m = C.add(c0, C.mul_ref_snd(c1, sk));
        let best_repr = P.get_ring().encode(C, &P.get_ring().decode(C, &noisy_m));
        let noise = C.sub(noisy_m, best_repr);
        let noise_coeffs = C.wrt_canonical_basis(&noise);
        let log2_size_of_noise: usize = (0..C.rank()).map(|i| C.base_ring().integer_ring().abs_log2_ceil(&C.base_ring().smallest_lift(noise_coeffs.at(i))).unwrap_or(0)).max().unwrap();
        let log2_can_norm_t_estimate = P.get_ring().ZZX().terms(P.get_ring().t()).map(|(c, _)| ZZbig.abs_log2_ceil(c).unwrap()).max().unwrap() + C.number_ring().small_basis_product_expansion_factor().log2().ceil() as usize;
        return ZZbig.abs_log2_ceil(C.base_ring().modulus()).unwrap().saturating_sub(log2_size_of_noise + log2_can_norm_t_estimate);
    }

    ///
    /// Generates a relinearization key, necessary to compute homomorphic multiplications.
    /// 
    /// The parameter `digits` refers to the number of "digits" to use for the gadget product
    /// during relinearization. More concretely, when performing relinearization, the ciphertext
    /// will be decomposed into multiple small parts, which are then multiplied with the components
    /// of the relinearization key. Thus, a larger value for `digits` will result in lower (additive)
    /// noise growth during relinearization, at the cost of higher performance.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn gen_rk<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, rng: R, sk: &SecretKey<Self>, digits: &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices, noise_sigma: f64) -> RelinKey<Self> {
        Self::gen_switch_key(C, rng, &C.pow(C.clone_el(sk), 2), sk, digits, noise_sigma)
    }

    ///
    /// Generates a key-switch key. 
    /// 
    /// In particular, this is used to generate relinearization keys (via [`CLPXInstantiation::gen_rk()`]).
    /// 
    /// The parameter `digits` refers to the number of "digits" to use for the gadget product
    /// during key-switching. More concretely, when performing key-switching, the ciphertext
    /// will be decomposed into multiple small parts, which are then multiplied with the components
    /// of the key-switching key. Thus, a larger value for `digits` will result in lower (additive)
    /// noise growth during key-switching, at the cost of higher performance.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn gen_switch_key<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, mut rng: R, old_sk: &SecretKey<Self>, new_sk: &SecretKey<Self>, digits: &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices, noise_sigma: f64) -> KeySwitchKey<Self> {
        let mut res0 = RNSGadgetProductRhsOperand::new_with_digits(C.get_ring(), digits.to_owned());
        let mut res1 = RNSGadgetProductRhsOperand::new_with_digits(C.get_ring(), digits.to_owned());
        for (i, digit) in digits.iter().enumerate() {
            let (c0, c1) = Self::enc_sym_zero(C, &mut rng, new_sk, noise_sigma);
            let factor = C.base_ring().get_ring().from_congruence((0..C.base_ring().len()).map(|i2| {
                let Fp = C.base_ring().at(i2);
                if digit.contains(&i2) { Fp.one() } else { Fp.zero() } 
            }));
            let mut payload = C.clone_el(&old_sk);
            C.inclusion().mul_assign_ref_map(&mut payload, &factor);
            C.add_assign_ref(&mut payload, &c0);
            res0.set_component(C.get_ring(), i, payload);
            res1.set_component(C.get_ring(), i, c1);
        }
        return (res0, res1);
    }
    
    ///
    /// Computes an encryption of the product of two encrypted messages.
    /// 
    /// This function does perform any semantic checks. In particular, it is up to the
    /// caller to ensure that the ciphertexts are defined over the given ring, and are
    /// BFV encryptions w.r.t. the given plaintext modulus.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn hom_mul(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, C_mul: &CiphertextRing<Self>, lhs: Ciphertext<Self>, rhs: Ciphertext<Self>, rk: &RelinKey<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        let (c00, c01) = lhs;
        let (c10, c11) = rhs;

        let mut lift = Self::lift_to_Cmul(C, C_mul);
        let c00_lifted = lift(&c00);
        let c01_lifted = lift(&c01);
        let c10_lifted = lift(&c10);
        let c11_lifted = lift(&c11);

        let [mut lifted0, mut lifted1, mut lifted2] = C_mul.get_ring().two_by_two_convolution([&c00_lifted, &c01_lifted], [&c10_lifted, &c11_lifted]);
        
        let (t_in_C_mul, t_coeff_inf_norm)  = Self::create_t_in_C_mul(P, C_mul);
        C_mul.mul_assign_ref(&mut lifted0, &t_in_C_mul);
        C_mul.mul_assign_ref(&mut lifted1, &t_in_C_mul);
        C_mul.mul_assign_ref(&mut lifted2, &t_in_C_mul);

        let mut scale_down = Self::rescale_to_C(C, C_mul, t_coeff_inf_norm);
        let res0 = scale_down(&lifted0);
        let res1 = scale_down(&lifted1);
        let res2 = scale_down(&lifted2);

        let op = RNSGadgetProductLhsOperand::from_element_with(C.get_ring(), &res2, rk.0.gadget_vector_digits());
        let (s0, s1) = rk;
        return (C.add_ref(&res0, &op.gadget_product(s0, C.get_ring())), C.add_ref(&res1, &op.gadget_product(s1, C.get_ring())));

    }
    
    ///
    /// Computes an encryption of the square of an encrypted messages.
    /// 
    /// This function does perform any semantic checks. In particular, it is up to the
    /// caller to ensure that the ciphertexts are defined over the given ring, and are
    /// BFV encryptions w.r.t. the given plaintext modulus.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn hom_square(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, C_mul: &CiphertextRing<Self>, val: Ciphertext<Self>, rk: &RelinKey<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        let (c0, c1) = val;

        let mut lift = Self::lift_to_Cmul(C, C_mul);
        let c0_lifted = lift(&c0);
        let c1_lifted = lift(&c1);

        let [mut lifted0, mut lifted1, mut lifted2] = C_mul.get_ring().two_by_two_convolution([&c0_lifted, &c1_lifted], [&c0_lifted, &c1_lifted]);

        let (t_in_C_mul, t_coeff_inf_norm) = Self::create_t_in_C_mul(P, C_mul);
        C_mul.mul_assign_ref(&mut lifted0, &t_in_C_mul);
        C_mul.mul_assign_ref(&mut lifted1, &t_in_C_mul);
        C_mul.mul_assign_ref(&mut lifted2, &t_in_C_mul);

        let mut scale_down = Self::rescale_to_C(C, C_mul, t_coeff_inf_norm);
        let res0 = scale_down(&lifted0);
        let res1 = scale_down(&lifted1);
        let res2 = scale_down(&lifted2);

        let op = RNSGadgetProductLhsOperand::from_element_with(C.get_ring(), &res2, rk.0.gadget_vector_digits());
        let (s0, s1) = rk;
        return (C.add_ref(&res0, &op.gadget_product(s0, C.get_ring())), C.add_ref(&res1, &op.gadget_product(s1, C.get_ring())));
    }

    ///
    /// Using a key-switch key, computes an encryption encrypting the same message as the given ciphertext
    /// under a different secret key.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn key_switch(C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, ct: Ciphertext<Self>, switch_key: &KeySwitchKey<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        let (c0, c1) = ct;
        let (s0, s1) = switch_key;
        let op = RNSGadgetProductLhsOperand::from_element_with(C.get_ring(), &c1, switch_key.0.gadget_vector_digits());
        return (
            C.add_ref_snd(c0, &op.gadget_product(s0, C.get_ring())),
            op.gadget_product(s1, C.get_ring())
        );
    }

    ///
    /// Computes `t(X)` as an element in `R/qR`.
    /// 
    fn create_t_in_C_mul(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C_mul: &CiphertextRing<Self>) -> (El<CiphertextRing<Self>>, usize) {
        let ZZ_to_Zq = C_mul.base_ring().can_hom(&ZZi64).unwrap();
        let mut log2_t_coeff_inf_norm = 0;
        let result = C_mul.from_canonical_basis((0..C_mul.rank()).map(|i| if ZZbig.is_zero(P.get_ring().ZZX().coefficient_at(P.get_ring().t(), i)) {
            0
        } else {
            let result = int_cast(ZZbig.clone_el(P.get_ring().ZZX().coefficient_at(P.get_ring().t(), i)), ZZi64, ZZbig);
            log2_t_coeff_inf_norm = log2_t_coeff_inf_norm.max(ZZi64.abs_log2_ceil(&result).unwrap());
            result
        }).map(|c| ZZ_to_Zq.map(c)));
        return (result, log2_t_coeff_inf_norm);
    }

    ///
    /// Generates a Galois key, usable for homomorphically applying the Galois automorphisms
    /// defined by the given element of the Galois group.
    /// 
    /// The Galois automorphism must be part of the subgroup acting on the plaintext ring.
    /// 
    /// The parameter `digits` defined the RNS-based gadget vector to use for the gadget product
    /// during key-switching. More concretely, when performing key-switching, the ciphertext
    /// will be decomposed into multiple small parts, which are then multiplied with the components
    /// of the key-switching key. Thus, a large number of small digits will result in lower (additive)
    /// noise growth during key-switching, at the cost of higher performance.
    /// 
    /// The noise is chosen according to the rounded Gaussian distribution with standard deviation `noise_sigma`.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn gen_gk<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, rng: R, sk: &SecretKey<Self>, g: &GaloisGroupEl, digits: &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices, noise_sigma: f64) -> KeySwitchKey<Self> {
        assert!(P.acting_galois_group().contains(g));
        Self::gen_switch_key(C, rng, &C.get_ring().apply_galois_action(sk, g), sk, digits, noise_sigma)
    }
    
    ///
    /// Computes an encryption of `sigma(x)`, where `x` is the message encrypted by the given ciphertext
    /// and `sigma` is the given Galois automorphism.
    /// 
    /// This function does not perform any semantic checks. In particular, it is up to the
    /// caller to ensure that the ciphertext is defined over the given ring, and is a valid
    /// BFV encryptions w.r.t. the given plaintext modulus.
    /// 
    /// As opposed to BGV, hybrid key switching is currently not implemented for BFV.
    /// You can achieve the same effect by manually modulus-switching ciphertext to a higher
    /// modulus before calling `hom_galois()`.
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn hom_galois(_P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, ct: Ciphertext<Self>, g: &GaloisGroupEl, gk: &KeySwitchKey<Self>) -> Ciphertext<Self> {
        Self::key_switch(C, (
            C.get_ring().apply_galois_action(&ct.0, g),
            C.get_ring().apply_galois_action(&ct.1, g)
        ), gk)
    }

    ///
    /// Homomorphically applies multiple Galois automorphisms at once.
    /// Functionally, this is equivalent to calling [`BFVInstantiation::hom_galois()`]
    /// multiple times, but can be faster.
    /// 
    /// All used Galois keys must use the same digits, i.e. the same RNS-based
    /// gadget vector.
    /// 
    /// This function does not perform any semantic checks. In particular, it is up to the
    /// caller to ensure that the ciphertext is defined over the given ring, and is a valid
    /// BFV encryptions w.r.t. the given plaintext modulus.
    /// 
    /// As opposed to BGV, hybrid key switching is currently not implemented for BFV.
    /// You can achieve the same effect by manually modulus-switching ciphertext to a higher
    /// modulus before calling `hom_galois()`.
    /// 
    /// [`BFVInstantiation::hom_galois()`]: crate::bfv::BFVInstantiation::hom_galois()
    /// 
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn hom_galois_many<'b, V>(_P: &PlaintextRing<Self>, C: &CiphertextRing<Self>, ct: Ciphertext<Self>, gs: &[GaloisGroupEl], gks: V) -> Vec<Ciphertext<Self>>
        where V: VectorFn<&'b KeySwitchKey<Self>>,
            Self: 'b
    {
        let digits = gks.at(0).0.gadget_vector_digits();
        let has_same_digits = |gk: &RNSGadgetProductRhsOperand<_>| gk.gadget_vector_digits().len() == digits.len() && gk.gadget_vector_digits().iter().zip(digits.iter()).all(|(l, r)| l == r);
        assert!(gks.iter().all(|gk| has_same_digits(&gk.0) && has_same_digits(&gk.1)));
        let (c0, c1) = ct;
        let c1_op = RNSGadgetProductLhsOperand::from_element_with(C.get_ring(), &c1, digits);
        let c1_op_gs = c1_op.apply_galois_action_many(C.get_ring(), gs);
        let c0_gs = C.get_ring().apply_galois_action_many(&c0, gs).into_iter();
        assert_eq!(gks.len(), c1_op_gs.len());
        assert_eq!(gks.len(), c0_gs.len());
        return c0_gs.zip(c1_op_gs.iter()).enumerate().map(|(i, (c0_g, c1_g))| {
            let (s0, s1) = gks.at(i);
            let r0 = c1_g.gadget_product(s0, C.get_ring());
            let r1 = c1_g.gadget_product(s1, C.get_ring());
            return (C.add_ref(&r0, &c0_g), r1);
        }).collect();
    }
    
    ///
    /// Returns an implementation of the function `R/qR -> R/qq'R` that maps every `x` in `R/qR`
    /// to a short element of `R/qq'R` congruent to `x` modulo `q`.
    /// 
    /// The function is behind a trait object, so that concrete instantiations can use a different
    /// implementation which is more performant on their concrete choice of rings.
    /// 
    fn lift_to_Cmul<'a>(C: &'a CiphertextRing<Self>, C_mul: &'a CiphertextRing<Self>) -> Box<dyn 'a + for<'b> FnMut(&'b El<CiphertextRing<Self>>) -> El<CiphertextRing<Self>>> {
        default_impl_lift_to_Cmul(C, C_mul, |_, delta| delta)
    }

    ///
    /// Returns an implementation of the function `R/qq'R -> R/qR` that maps every `x` in `R/qq'R`
    /// to an element of `R/qR` close to `smallest_lift(tx/q)`.
    /// 
    /// The function is behind a trait object, so that concrete instantiations can use a different
    /// implementation which is more performant on their concrete choice of rings.
    /// 
    fn rescale_to_C<'a>(C: &'a CiphertextRing<Self>, C_mul: &'a CiphertextRing<Self>, log2_t_coeff_inf_norm: usize) -> Box<dyn 'a + for<'b> FnMut(&'b El<CiphertextRing<Self>>) -> El<CiphertextRing<Self>>> {
        default_impl_rescale_to_C::<Self>(C, C_mul, log2_t_coeff_inf_norm)
    }
}

pub type Pow2CLPX<A = DefaultCiphertextAllocator, C = DefaultNegacyclicNTT> = Pow2BFV<A, C>;

impl<A: Allocator + Clone , C: FheanorNegacyclicNTT<Zn>> CLPXInstantiation for Pow2CLPX<A, C> {

    type CiphertextRing = ManagedDoubleRNSRingBase<Pow2CyclotomicNumberRing<C>, A>;

    fn number_ring(&self) -> &NumberRing<Self> {
        crate::bfv::BFVInstantiation::number_ring(self)
    }

    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn create_ciphertext_rings(&self, log2_q: Range<usize>, log2_t_coeff_inf_norm: usize) -> (CiphertextRing<Self>, CiphertextRing<Self>)  {
        let number_ring = self.number_ring();
        let required_root_of_unity = number_ring.mod_p_required_root_of_unity() as i64;
        let next_prime = |bound| largest_prime_leq_congruent_to_one(int_cast(bound, ZZi64, ZZbig), required_root_of_unity).map(|p| int_cast(p, ZZbig, ZZi64));
        let C_rns_base_primes = sample_primes(log2_q.start, log2_q.end, SAMPLE_PRIMES_SIZE, &next_prime).unwrap();
        let C_rns_base = zn_rns::Zn::new(C_rns_base_primes.iter().map(|p| Zn::new(int_cast(ZZbig.clone_el(p), ZZi64, ZZbig) as u64)).collect::<Vec<_>>(), ZZbig);

        let Cmul_modulus_size = 2 * ZZbig.abs_log2_ceil(C_rns_base.modulus()).unwrap() + 2 * number_ring.small_basis_product_expansion_factor().log2().ceil() as usize + log2_t_coeff_inf_norm + 3;
        let Cmul_rns_base_primes = extend_sampled_primes(&C_rns_base_primes, Cmul_modulus_size + SAMPLE_PRIMES_MINOFFSET, Cmul_modulus_size + SAMPLE_PRIMES_MAXOFFSET, SAMPLE_PRIMES_SIZE, &next_prime).unwrap();
        let Cmul_rns_base = zn_rns::Zn::new(Cmul_rns_base_primes.iter().map(|p| Zn::new(int_cast(ZZbig.clone_el(p), ZZi64, ZZbig) as u64)).collect(), ZZbig);

        let C_mul = ManagedDoubleRNSRingBase::new_with_alloc(
            number_ring.clone(),
            Cmul_rns_base,
            self.ciphertext_allocator().clone()
        );

        let dropped_indices = RNSFactorIndexList::from((0..C_mul.base_ring().len()).filter(|i| C_rns_base.as_iter().all(|Zp| Zp.get_ring() != C_mul.base_ring().at(*i).get_ring())), C_mul.base_ring().len());
        let C = RingValue::from(C_mul.get_ring().drop_rns_factor(&dropped_indices));
        assert!(C.base_ring().get_ring() == C_rns_base.get_ring());
        return (C, C_mul);
    }

    fn lift_to_Cmul<'a>(C: &'a CiphertextRing<Self>, C_mul: &'a CiphertextRing<Self>) -> Box<dyn 'a + for<'b> FnMut(&'b El<CiphertextRing<Self>>) -> El<CiphertextRing<Self>>> {
        default_impl_lift_to_Cmul(C, C_mul, |C_delta, delta| force_double_rns_repr(C_delta, delta))
    }
}

pub type CompositeCLPX<A = DefaultCiphertextAllocator> = CompositeBFV<A>;

impl<A: Allocator + Clone > CLPXInstantiation for CompositeCLPX<A> {

    type CiphertextRing = ManagedDoubleRNSRingBase<TensorProductNumberRing, A>;
    
    fn number_ring(&self) -> &TensorProductNumberRing {
        crate::bfv::BFVInstantiation::number_ring(self)
    }

    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn create_ciphertext_rings(&self, log2_q: Range<usize>, log2_t_coeff_inf_norm: usize) -> (CiphertextRing<Self>, CiphertextRing<Self>)  {
        let number_ring = self.number_ring();
        let required_root_of_unity = number_ring.mod_p_required_root_of_unity() as i64;
        let next_prime = |bound| largest_prime_leq_congruent_to_one(int_cast(bound, ZZi64, ZZbig), required_root_of_unity).map(|p| int_cast(p, ZZbig, ZZi64));
        let C_rns_base_primes = sample_primes(log2_q.start, log2_q.end, SAMPLE_PRIMES_SIZE, &next_prime).unwrap();
        let C_rns_base = zn_rns::Zn::new(C_rns_base_primes.iter().map(|p| Zn::new(int_cast(ZZbig.clone_el(p), ZZi64, ZZbig) as u64)).collect::<Vec<_>>(), ZZbig);

        let Cmul_modulus_size = 2 * ZZbig.abs_log2_ceil(C_rns_base.modulus()).unwrap() + 2 * number_ring.small_basis_product_expansion_factor().log2().ceil() as usize + log2_t_coeff_inf_norm + 3;
        let Cmul_rns_base_primes = extend_sampled_primes(&C_rns_base_primes, Cmul_modulus_size + SAMPLE_PRIMES_MINOFFSET, Cmul_modulus_size + SAMPLE_PRIMES_MAXOFFSET, SAMPLE_PRIMES_SIZE, &next_prime).unwrap();
        let Cmul_rns_base = zn_rns::Zn::new(Cmul_rns_base_primes.iter().map(|p| Zn::new(int_cast(ZZbig.clone_el(p), ZZi64, ZZbig) as u64)).collect(), ZZbig);

        let C_mul = ManagedDoubleRNSRingBase::new_with_alloc(
            number_ring.clone(),
            Cmul_rns_base,
            self.ciphertext_allocator().clone()
        );

        let dropped_indices = RNSFactorIndexList::from((0..C_mul.base_ring().len()).filter(|i| C_rns_base.as_iter().all(|Zp| Zp.get_ring() != C_mul.base_ring().at(*i).get_ring())), C_mul.base_ring().len());
        let C = RingValue::from(C_mul.get_ring().drop_rns_factor(&dropped_indices));
        assert!(C.base_ring().get_ring() == C_rns_base.get_ring());
        return (C, C_mul);
    }

    fn lift_to_Cmul<'a>(C: &'a CiphertextRing<Self>, C_mul: &'a CiphertextRing<Self>) -> Box<dyn 'a + for<'b> FnMut(&'b El<CiphertextRing<Self>>) -> El<CiphertextRing<Self>>> {
        default_impl_lift_to_Cmul(C, C_mul, |C_delta, delta| force_double_rns_repr(C_delta, delta))
    }
}

///
/// Default construction of the function `R/qq'R -> R/qR` that maps every `x` in `R/qq'R`
/// to an element of `R/qR` close to `smallest_lift(tx/q)`, as required during CLPX homomorphic
/// multiplication.
/// 
/// This is the default implementation of [`CLPXInstantiation::rescale_to_C()`], but we
/// also make it available as standalone function to allow reuse in more scenarios.
/// 
pub fn default_impl_rescale_to_C<'a, Inst: ?Sized + CLPXInstantiation>(
    C: &'a CiphertextRing<Inst>, 
    C_mul: &'a CiphertextRing<Inst>,
    log2_t_coeff_inf_norm: usize
) -> Box<dyn 'a + for<'b> FnMut(&'b El<CiphertextRing<Inst>>) -> El<CiphertextRing<Inst>>> {
    assert!(C.number_ring() == C_mul.number_ring());
    assert_eq!(C.get_ring().small_generating_set_len(), C_mul.get_ring().small_generating_set_len());
    
    // strictly speaking, this is not quite true since we actually multiply c (with small basis inf norm) by t
    // (with coeff basis inf norm) and care about the small basis inf norm of the result; however, since the 
    // function currently isn't there, let's just pretend that `log2_t_coeff_inf_norm` is also an upper bound
    // to `log2 | t |_sbinf`
    assert!(
        ZZbig.is_gt(
            C_mul.base_ring().modulus(), 
            &ZZbig.mul(ZZbig.mul_ref(C.base_ring().modulus(), C.base_ring().modulus()), ZZbig.power_of_two(3 + log2_t_coeff_inf_norm + C_mul.number_ring().small_basis_product_expansion_factor().log2().ceil() as usize))),
        "extended modulus not big enough to avoid wrap-around during homomorphic multiplication"
    );

    let rescale = RNSRescalingConversion::new_with_alloc(
        C_mul.base_ring().as_iter().cloned().collect(), 
        C.base_ring().as_iter().cloned().collect(),
        Vec::new(), 
        (0..C.base_ring().len()).collect(),
        Global
    );
    let mut tmp_in = OwnedMatrix::from_fn(C_mul.base_ring().len(), C_mul.get_ring().small_generating_set_len(), |i, _| C_mul.base_ring().at(i).zero());
    let mut tmp_out = OwnedMatrix::from_fn(C.base_ring().len(), C.get_ring().small_generating_set_len(), |i, _| C.base_ring().at(i).zero());
    
    #[instrument(skip_all)]
    fn rescale_to_C_impl<Inst: ?Sized + CLPXInstantiation>(
        C: &CiphertextRing<Inst>, 
        C_mul: &CiphertextRing<Inst>, 
        tmp_in: &mut OwnedMatrix<El<Zn>>,
        tmp_out: &mut OwnedMatrix<El<zn_64::Zn>>,
        rescale: &RNSRescalingConversion,
        c: &El<CiphertextRing<Inst>>
    ) -> El<CiphertextRing<Inst>> {
        C_mul.get_ring().as_representation_wrt_small_generating_set(c, tmp_in.data_mut());
        rescale.apply(tmp_in.data(), tmp_out.data_mut());
        return C.get_ring().from_representation_wrt_small_generating_set(tmp_out.data());
    }
    Box::new(move |c| rescale_to_C_impl::<Inst>(C, C_mul, &mut tmp_in, &mut tmp_out, &rescale, c))
}

#[cfg(test)]
use feanor_math::assert_el_eq;
#[cfg(test)]
use feanor_math::group::AbelianGroupStore;
#[cfg(test)]
use feanor_math::algorithms::int_factor::factor;

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn test_setup_clpx<Params: CLPXInstantiation>(params: Params) -> (PlaintextRing<Params>, CiphertextRing<Params>, CiphertextRing<Params>, SecretKey<Params>, RelinKey<Params>, El<PlaintextRing<Params>>, Ciphertext<Params>) {
    let ZZX = DensePolyRing::new(ZZbig, "X");
    let gen_poly = params.number_ring().generating_poly(&ZZX);
    let norm = ZZX.evaluate(&gen_poly, &ZZbig.int_hom().map(2), ZZbig.identity());
    let [t] = ZZX.with_wrapped_indeterminate(|X| [X - 2]);
    let p = factor(ZZbig, norm).into_iter().filter(|(_, e)| *e == 1).map(|(p, _)| p).max_by(|l, r| ZZbig.cmp(l, r)).unwrap();

    let P = params.create_plaintext_ring(ZZX, t, p, params.number_ring().galois_group().get_group().clone().subgroup([]));
    assert!(P.number_ring().galois_group().m() >= 100);
    assert!(P.number_ring().galois_group().m() < 1000);
    let (C, C_mul) = params.create_ciphertext_rings(400..420, 10);
    let sk = Params::gen_sk(&C, rand::rng(), SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary);
    let rk = Params::gen_rk(&C, rand::rng(), &sk, &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(3, C.base_ring().len()), 3.2);
    let m = P.int_hom().map(2382901);
    let ct = Params::enc_sym(&P, &C, rand::rng(), &m, &sk, 3.2);
    return (P, C, C_mul, sk, rk, m, ct);
}

#[test]
fn test_composite_clpx_mul() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();
    let (P, C, C_mul, sk, rk, m, ct) = test_setup_clpx(CompositeCLPX::new(17, 11));
    assert_el_eq!(&P, &m, &CompositeCLPX::dec(&P, &C, CompositeCLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct), &sk));

    let sqr_ct = CompositeCLPX::hom_square(&P, &C, &C_mul, ct, &rk);
    assert_el_eq!(&P, P.pow(m, 2), &CompositeCLPX::dec(&P, &C, CompositeCLPX::clone_ct(&C, &sqr_ct), &sk));

    let params = CompositeCLPX::new(17, 5);
    let ZZX = DensePolyRing::new(ZZbig, "X");
    let [t] = ZZX.with_wrapped_indeterminate(|X| [X.pow_ref(10) + X.pow_ref(5) - 2]);
    let p = ZZbig.int_hom().map(43691);
    let acting_galois_group = params.number_ring().galois_group().get_group().clone().subgroup([params.number_ring().galois_group().from_representative(18)]);
    let P = params.create_plaintext_ring(ZZX.clone(), t, p, acting_galois_group);
    let (C, C_mul) = params.create_ciphertext_rings(400..420, 10);

    let sk = CompositeCLPX::gen_sk(&C, rand::rng(), SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary);
    let m = P.int_hom().map(210);
    let ct = CompositeCLPX::enc_sym(&P, &C, rand::rng(), &m, &sk, 3.2);
    assert_el_eq!(&P, &m, &CompositeCLPX::dec(&P, &C, CompositeCLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct), &sk));

    let rk = CompositeCLPX::gen_rk(&C, rand::rng(), &sk, &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(3, C.base_ring().len()), 3.2);
    let sqr_ct = CompositeCLPX::hom_square(&P, &C, &C_mul, ct, &rk);
    assert_el_eq!(&P, P.int_hom().map(409), &CompositeCLPX::dec(&P, &C, CompositeCLPX::clone_ct(&C, &sqr_ct), &sk));
}

#[test]
fn test_pow2_clpx_mul() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();
    let (P, C, C_mul, sk, rk, m, ct) = test_setup_clpx(Pow2BFV::new(1 << 8));
    assert_el_eq!(&P, &m, &Pow2BFV::dec(&P, &C, Pow2BFV::clone_ct(&C, &ct), &sk));

    let m1 = P.inclusion().map(P.base_ring().coerce(&ZZbig, ZZbig.power_of_two(35)));
    let ct1 = Pow2CLPX::enc_sym(&P, &C, rand::rng(), &m1, &sk, 3.2);
    let m2 = P.inclusion().map(P.base_ring().coerce(&ZZbig, ZZbig.power_of_two(36)));
    let ct2 = Pow2CLPX::enc_sym(&P, &C, rand::rng(), &m2, &sk, 3.2);

    let ct_res = Pow2CLPX::hom_mul(&P, &C, &C_mul, ct1, ct2, &rk);
    let res = Pow2CLPX::dec(&P, &C, Pow2CLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct_res), &sk);
    assert_el_eq!(ZZbig, ZZbig.power_of_two(71), &P.base_ring().smallest_positive_lift(P.wrt_canonical_basis(&res).at(0)));
}

#[test]
fn test_pow2_clpx_hom_galois() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();
    let params = Pow2CLPX::new(1 << 8);
    let ZZX = DensePolyRing::new(ZZbig, "X");
    let [t] = ZZX.with_wrapped_indeterminate(|X| [X.pow_ref(4) - 2]);
    let p = ZZbig.int_hom().map(6700417);
    let acting_galois_group = params.number_ring().galois_group().get_group().clone().subgroup([params.number_ring().galois_group().from_representative(65)]);
    let P = params.create_plaintext_ring(ZZX.clone(), t, p, acting_galois_group);
    let (C, _) = params.create_ciphertext_rings(400..420, 10);

    let sk = Pow2CLPX::gen_sk(&C, rand::rng(), bgv::SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary);
    let m = P.canonical_gen();
    let ct = Pow2CLPX::enc_sym(&P, &C, rand::rng(), &m, &sk, 3.2);
    let g = P.acting_galois_group().from_representative(65);
    let gk = Pow2CLPX::gen_gk(&P, &C, rand::rng(), &sk, &g, &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(3, C.base_ring().len()), 3.2);
    let res_ct = Pow2CLPX::hom_galois(&P, &C, ct, &g, &gk);
    assert_el_eq!(&P, P.pow(P.canonical_gen(), 65), Pow2CLPX::dec(&P, &C, res_ct, &sk));
}

#[test]
#[should_panic(expected = "extended modulus not big enough to avoid wrap-around during homomorphic multiplication")]
fn test_clpx_hom_mul_overflow_mul_by_t() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();
    let params = Pow2CLPX::new(1 << 8);
    let ZZX = DensePolyRing::new(ZZbig, "X");
    let [t] = ZZX.with_wrapped_indeterminate(|X| [X.pow_ref(8) - 61]);
    let p = int_cast(93392020920424417, ZZbig, ZZi64);
    let acting_galois_group = params.number_ring().galois_group().get_group().clone().subgroup([params.number_ring().galois_group().from_representative(225)]);
    let P = params.create_plaintext_ring(ZZX.clone(), t, p, acting_galois_group);
    let C = ManagedDoubleRNSRingBase::new(
        P.number_ring().clone(),
        zn_rns::Zn::new([495617, 496897, 497153, 498689, 499969, 503297, 505601, 506113, 507137, 509441].into_iter().map(zn_64::Zn::new).collect(), ZZbig)
    );
    let C_mul = ManagedDoubleRNSRingBase::new(
        P.number_ring().clone(),
        zn_rns::Zn::new([495617, 496897, 497153, 498689, 499969, 503297, 505601, 506113, 507137, 509441, 331777, 281857, 278017, 275201, 257281, 285697, 299521, 326657, 325889, 285953, 355841].into_iter().map(zn_64::Zn::new).collect(), ZZbig)
    );
    // the parameters are very carefully chosen; on the one hand, the extended modulus is large enough to
    // accomodate c0 * c1' + c1 * c0', where each ci, cj' are ring elements with coefficients at most 2 * q
    assert!(ZZbig.is_gt(C_mul.base_ring().modulus(), &ZZbig.int_hom().mul_map(ZZbig.mul_ref(C.base_ring().modulus(), C.base_ring().modulus()), 128 * 2 * 2 * 2)));
    // on the other hand, the extended modulus is not large enough to store the ci * cj' * t, for ci, cj' roughly q/2
    assert!(ZZbig.is_lt(C_mul.base_ring().modulus(), &ZZbig.int_hom().mul_map(ZZbig.mul_ref(C.base_ring().modulus(), C.base_ring().modulus()), 128 / 2 / 2 * 61)));

    let sk = Pow2CLPX::gen_sk(&C, rand::rng(), bgv::SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary);
    let rk = Pow2CLPX::gen_rk(&C, rand::rng(), &sk, &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(3, C.base_ring().len()), 3.2);

    let q_half = ZZbig.floor_div(ZZbig.clone_el(C.base_ring().modulus()), &ZZbig.power_of_two(1));
    let c1 = C.from_canonical_basis_extended([C.base_ring().coerce(&ZZbig, q_half)]);
    let c0 = C.negate(C.mul_ref(&c1, &sk));
    let ct = (c0, c1);
    assert_el_eq!(P.base_ring(), P.base_ring().zero(), P.wrt_canonical_basis(&Pow2CLPX::dec(&P, &C, Pow2CLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct), &sk)).at(0));

    let ct_res = Pow2CLPX::hom_square(&P, &C, &C_mul, ct, &rk);
    assert_el_eq!(P.base_ring(), P.base_ring().zero(), P.wrt_canonical_basis(&Pow2CLPX::dec(&P, &C, Pow2CLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct_res), &sk)).at(0));
}

#[test]
#[ignore]
fn measure_time_composite_clpx() {
    feanor_tracing::DelayedLogger::init_test();
    let mut rng = rand::rng();
    let ZZX = DensePolyRing::new(ZZbig, "X");
    let params = CompositeCLPX::new(127, 337);
    let [t] = ZZX.with_wrapped_indeterminate(|X| [X.pow_ref(2 * 127) + X.pow_ref(127) - 2]);
    let p = ZZbig.coerce(&StaticRing::<i128>::RING, 56713727820156410577229101238628035243);
    let acting_galois_group = params.number_ring().galois_group().get_group().clone().subgroup([params.number_ring().galois_group().from_representative(25276)]);
    
    let P = log_time("CreateEncoding", |[]|
        params.create_plaintext_ring(ZZX, t, p, acting_galois_group)
    );
    let int_to_P = P.inclusion().compose(P.base_ring().can_hom(&StaticRing::<i128>::RING).unwrap());
    let (C, C_mul) = log_time("CreateCtxtRing", |[]|
        params.create_ciphertext_rings(790..800, 10)
    );

    let sk = log_time("GenSK", |[]| 
        CompositeCLPX::gen_sk(&C, &mut rng, SecretKeyDistribution::UniformTernary)
    );

    let m = int_to_P.map(1 << 63);
    let ct = log_time("EncSym", |[]|
        CompositeCLPX::enc_sym(&P, &C, &mut rng, &m, &sk, 3.2)
    );

    let res = log_time("HomAddPlain", |[]| 
        CompositeCLPX::hom_add_plain(&P, &C, &m, CompositeCLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct))
    );
    assert_el_eq!(&P, &int_to_P.map(1 << 64), &CompositeCLPX::dec(&P, &C, res, &sk));

    let res = log_time("HomAdd", |[]| 
        CompositeCLPX::hom_add(&C, CompositeCLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct), &ct)
    );
    assert_el_eq!(&P, &int_to_P.map(1 << 64), &CompositeCLPX::dec(&P, &C, res, &sk));

    let res = log_time("HomMulPlain", |[]| 
        CompositeCLPX::hom_mul_plain(&P, &C, &m, CompositeCLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct))
    );
    assert_el_eq!(&P, &int_to_P.map(1 << 126), &CompositeCLPX::dec(&P, &C, res, &sk));

    let rk = log_time("GenRK", |[]| 
        CompositeCLPX::gen_rk(&C, &mut rng, &sk, &RNSGadgetVectorDigitIndices::select_digits(3, C.base_ring().len()), 3.2)
    );
    let res = log_time("HomMul", |[]| 
        CompositeCLPX::hom_mul(&P, &C, &C_mul, CompositeCLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct), CompositeCLPX::clone_ct(&C, &ct), &rk)
    );
    assert_el_eq!(&P, &int_to_P.map(1 << 126), &CompositeCLPX::dec(&P, &C, res, &sk));
}