ferogram_connect/

connection.rs

// Copyright (c) Ankit Chaubey <ankitchaubey.dev@gmail.com>
//
// ferogram: async Telegram MTProto client in Rust
// https://github.com/ankit-chaubey/ferogram
//
// Licensed under either the MIT License or the Apache License 2.0.
// See the LICENSE-MIT or LICENSE-APACHE file in this repository:
// https://github.com/ankit-chaubey/ferogram
//
// Feel free to use, modify, and share this code.
// Please keep this notice when redistributing.

use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;

use socket2::TcpKeepalive;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
use tokio::net::tcp::{OwnedReadHalf, OwnedWriteHalf};

use ferogram_mtproto::{EncryptedSession, Session, authentication as auth};
use ferogram_tl_types as tl;

use crate::envelope::decode_bind_response;
use crate::error::ConnectError;
use crate::frame::{recv_frame_plain, send_frame};
use crate::transport::recv_raw_frame;
use crate::transport_kind::TransportKind;

pub const PING_DELAY_SECS: u64 = 60;
pub const NO_PING_DISCONNECT: i32 = 75;

const TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE_SECS: u64 = 10;
const TCP_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_SECS: u64 = 5;
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
const TCP_KEEPALIVE_PROBES: u32 = 3;

/// How framing bytes are sent/received on a connection.
///
/// `Obfuscated` carries an `Arc<Mutex<ObfuscatedCipher>>` so the same cipher
/// state is shared (safely) between the writer task (TX / `encrypt`) and the
/// reader task (RX / `decrypt`).  The two directions are separate AES-CTR
/// instances inside `ObfuscatedCipher`, so locking is only needed to prevent
/// concurrent mutation of the struct, not to serialise TX vs RX.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub enum FrameKind {
    Abridged,
    Intermediate,
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    Full {
        send_seqno: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32>,
        recv_seqno: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32>,
    },
    /// Obfuscated2 over Abridged framing.
    Obfuscated {
        cipher: std::sync::Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<ferogram_crypto::ObfuscatedCipher>>,
    },
    /// Obfuscated2 over Intermediate+padding framing (`0xDD` MTProxy).
    PaddedIntermediate {
        cipher: std::sync::Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<ferogram_crypto::ObfuscatedCipher>>,
    },
    /// FakeTLS framing (`0xEE` MTProxy).
    FakeTls {
        cipher: std::sync::Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<ferogram_crypto::ObfuscatedCipher>>,
    },
}

/// Write half of a split connection.  Held under `Mutex` in `ClientInner`.
/// A single server-provided salt with its validity window.
///
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct FutureSalt {
    pub valid_since: i32,
    pub valid_until: i32,
    pub salt: i64,
}

/// Delay (seconds) before a salt is considered usable after its `valid_since`.
///
pub const SALT_USE_DELAY: i32 = 60;

/// Owns the EncryptedSession (for packing) and the pending-RPC map.
pub struct ConnectionWriter {
    pub enc: EncryptedSession,
    pub frame_kind: FrameKind,
    /// PFS: permanent auth key to save in session. None when PFS is off.
    pub perm_auth_key: Option<[u8; 256]>,
    /// msg_ids of received content messages waiting to be acked.
    /// Drained into a MsgsAck on every outgoing frame (bundled into container
    /// when sending an RPC, or sent standalone after route_frame).
    pub pending_ack: Vec<i64>,
    /// raw TL body bytes of every sent request, keyed by msg_id.
    /// On bad_msg_notification the matching body is re-encrypted with a fresh
    /// msg_id and re-sent transparently.
    pub sent_bodies: std::collections::HashMap<i64, Vec<u8>>,
    /// maps container_msg_id -> inner request msg_id.
    /// When bad_msg_notification / bad_server_salt arrives for a container
    /// rather than the individual inner message, we look here to find the
    /// inner request to retry.
    ///
    pub container_map: std::collections::HashMap<i64, i64>,
    /// Stale-msg resends queued under the writer lock and drained after release
    /// to avoid holding the lock across TCP I/O.
    pub new_session_resend_queue: Vec<(i64, i64, Vec<u8>)>,
    /// -style future salt pool.
    /// Sorted by valid_since ascending so the newest salt is LAST
    /// (.valid_since), which puts
    /// the highest valid_since at the end in ascending-key order).
    pub salts: Vec<FutureSalt>,
    /// Server-time anchor received with the last GetFutureSalts response.
    /// (server_now, local_instant) lets us approximate server time at any
    /// moment so we can check whether a salt's valid_since window has opened.
    ///
    pub start_salt_time: Option<(i32, std::time::Instant)>,
}

impl ConnectionWriter {
    pub fn auth_key_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 256] {
        self.perm_auth_key
            .unwrap_or_else(|| self.enc.auth_key_bytes())
    }
    pub fn first_salt(&self) -> i64 {
        self.enc.salt
    }
    pub fn time_offset(&self) -> i32 {
        self.enc.time_offset
    }

    /// Proactively advance the active salt and prune expired ones.
    ///
    /// Called at the top of every RPC send.
    /// Salts are sorted ascending by `valid_since` (oldest=index 0, newest=last).
    ///
    /// Prunes expired salts, then advances `enc.salt` to the freshest usable one.
    ///
    /// Returns `true` when the pool has shrunk to a single entry: caller should
    /// fire a proactive `GetFutureSalts` via `try_request_salts()`.
    pub fn advance_salt_if_needed(&mut self) -> bool {
        let Some((server_now, start_instant)) = self.start_salt_time else {
            return self.salts.len() <= 1;
        };

        // Approximate current server time.
        let now = server_now + start_instant.elapsed().as_secs() as i32;

        // Prune expired salts.
        while self.salts.len() > 1 && now > self.salts[0].valid_until {
            let expired = self.salts.remove(0);
            tracing::debug!(
                "[ferogram] salt {:#x} expired (valid_until={}), pruned",
                expired.salt,
                expired.valid_until,
            );
        }

        // Advance to the freshest salt whose use-delay has opened AND
        // which has not yet expired.  The `valid_until > now` guard is the
        // critical safety: without it we can advance enc.salt to an already-
        // expired entry from a stale FutureSalts pool, triggering immediate
        // bad_server_salt rejection and re-entering the fetch loop.
        if self.salts.len() > 1 {
            let best = self
                .salts
                .iter()
                .rev()
                .find(|s| s.valid_since + SALT_USE_DELAY <= now && s.valid_until > now)
                .map(|s| s.salt);
            if let Some(salt) = best
                && salt != self.enc.salt
            {
                tracing::debug!(
                    "[ferogram] proactive salt cycle: {:#x} -> {:#x}",
                    self.enc.salt,
                    salt
                );
                self.enc.salt = salt;
                // Prune salts whose valid_until has passed.
                self.salts.retain(|s| s.valid_until > now);
                if self.salts.is_empty() {
                    // Safety net: keep a sentinel so we never go saltless.
                    self.salts.push(FutureSalt {
                        valid_since: 0,
                        valid_until: i32::MAX,
                        salt,
                    });
                }
            }
        }

        self.salts.len() <= 1
    }
}

pub struct Connection {
    pub stream: TcpStream,
    pub enc: EncryptedSession,
    pub frame_kind: FrameKind,
    /// When PFS is active, the permanent auth key (stored in session).
    /// `enc` holds the temp key; this field holds the perm key so
    /// `auth_key_bytes()` returns the right value to persist.
    pub perm_auth_key: Option<[u8; 256]>,
}

impl Connection {
    /// Open a TCP stream, optionally via SOCKS5, and apply transport init bytes.
    async fn open_stream(
        addr: &str,
        socks5: Option<&crate::socks5::Socks5Config>,
        transport: &TransportKind,
        dc_id: i16,
    ) -> Result<(TcpStream, FrameKind), ConnectError> {
        let stream = match socks5 {
            Some(proxy) => proxy.connect(addr).await?,
            None => {
                let stream = TcpStream::connect(addr).await.map_err(ConnectError::Io)?;
                stream.set_nodelay(true).ok();
                {
                    let sock = socket2::SockRef::from(&stream);
                    let keepalive = TcpKeepalive::new()
                        .with_time(Duration::from_secs(TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE_SECS))
                        .with_interval(Duration::from_secs(TCP_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_SECS));
                    #[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
                    let keepalive = keepalive.with_retries(TCP_KEEPALIVE_PROBES);
                    sock.set_tcp_keepalive(&keepalive).ok();
                }
                stream
            }
        };
        Self::apply_transport_init(stream, transport, dc_id).await
    }

    /// Open a stream routed through an MTProxy (connects to proxy host:port,
    /// not to the Telegram DC address).
    async fn open_stream_mtproxy(
        mtproxy: &crate::proxy::MtProxyConfig,
        dc_id: i16,
    ) -> Result<(TcpStream, FrameKind), ConnectError> {
        let stream = mtproxy.connect().await?;
        stream.set_nodelay(true).ok();
        Self::apply_transport_init(stream, &mtproxy.transport, dc_id).await
    }

    async fn apply_transport_init(
        mut stream: TcpStream,
        transport: &TransportKind,
        dc_id: i16,
    ) -> Result<(TcpStream, FrameKind), ConnectError> {
        match transport {
            TransportKind::Abridged => {
                stream.write_all(&[0xef]).await?;
                Ok((stream, FrameKind::Abridged))
            }
            TransportKind::Intermediate => {
                stream.write_all(&[0xee, 0xee, 0xee, 0xee]).await?;
                Ok((stream, FrameKind::Intermediate))
            }
            TransportKind::Full => {
                // Full transport has no init byte.
                Ok((
                    stream,
                    FrameKind::Full {
                        send_seqno: Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(0)),
                        recv_seqno: Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(0)),
                    },
                ))
            }
            TransportKind::Obfuscated { secret } => {
                use sha2::Digest;

                // Random 64-byte nonce: retry until it passes the reserved-pattern
                // Reject reserved nonce patterns that could be misidentified as HTTP
                // or another MTProto framing tag by a proxy or DPI filter.
                let mut nonce = [0u8; 64];
                loop {
                    getrandom::getrandom(&mut nonce)
                        .map_err(|_| ConnectError::other("getrandom"))?;
                    let first = u32::from_le_bytes(nonce[0..4].try_into().expect("4-byte slice"));
                    let second = u32::from_le_bytes(nonce[4..8].try_into().expect("4-byte slice"));
                    let bad = nonce[0] == 0xEF
                        || first == 0x44414548 // HEAD
                        || first == 0x54534F50 // POST
                        || first == 0x20544547 // GET
                        || first == 0x4954504f // OPTIONS
                        || first == 0xEEEEEEEE
                        || first == 0xDDDDDDDD
                        || first == 0x02010316
                        || second == 0x00000000;
                    if !bad {
                        break;
                    }
                }

                // Key derivation from nonce[8..56]:
                //   TX: key=nonce[8..40]  iv=nonce[40..56]
                //   RX: key=rev[0..32]    iv=rev[32..48]   (rev = nonce[8..56] reversed)
                // When an MTProxy secret is present, each 32-byte key becomes
                // SHA-256(raw_key_slice || secret) for MTProxy key derivation.
                let tx_raw: [u8; 32] = nonce[8..40].try_into().expect("32-byte slice");
                let tx_iv: [u8; 16] = nonce[40..56].try_into().expect("16-byte slice");
                let mut rev48 = nonce[8..56].to_vec();
                rev48.reverse();
                let rx_raw: [u8; 32] = rev48[0..32].try_into().expect("32-byte slice");
                let rx_iv: [u8; 16] = rev48[32..48].try_into().expect("16-byte slice");

                let (tx_key, rx_key): ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) = if let Some(s) = secret {
                    let mut h = sha2::Sha256::new();
                    h.update(tx_raw);
                    h.update(s.as_ref());
                    let tx: [u8; 32] = h.finalize().into();

                    let mut h = sha2::Sha256::new();
                    h.update(rx_raw);
                    h.update(s.as_ref());
                    let rx: [u8; 32] = h.finalize().into();
                    (tx, rx)
                } else {
                    (tx_raw, rx_raw)
                };

                // Stamp protocol id (Abridged = 0xEFEFEFEF) at nonce[56..60]
                // and DC id as little-endian i16 at nonce[60..62].
                nonce[56] = 0xef;
                nonce[57] = 0xef;
                nonce[58] = 0xef;
                nonce[59] = 0xef;
                let dc_bytes = dc_id.to_le_bytes();
                nonce[60] = dc_bytes[0];
                nonce[61] = dc_bytes[1];

                // Encrypt nonce[56..64] in-place using the TX cipher advanced
                // past the first 56 bytes (which are sent as plaintext).
                //
                // The same cipher instance must be used for both the nonce tail
                // encryption and all subsequent TX data: AES-CTR is a single continuous
                // stream; the TX position after encrypting the full 64-byte nonce is 64.
                let mut cipher =
                    ferogram_crypto::ObfuscatedCipher::from_keys(&tx_key, &tx_iv, &rx_key, &rx_iv);
                // Advance TX past nonce[0..56] (sent as plaintext, not encrypted).
                let mut skip = [0u8; 56];
                cipher.encrypt(&mut skip);
                // Encrypt nonce[56..64] in-place; cipher TX is now at position 64.
                cipher.encrypt(&mut nonce[56..64]);

                stream.write_all(&nonce).await?;

                let cipher_arc = std::sync::Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(cipher));
                Ok((stream, FrameKind::Obfuscated { cipher: cipher_arc }))
            }
            TransportKind::PaddedIntermediate { secret } => {
                use sha2::Digest;
                let mut nonce = [0u8; 64];
                loop {
                    getrandom::getrandom(&mut nonce)
                        .map_err(|_| ConnectError::other("getrandom"))?;
                    let first = u32::from_le_bytes(nonce[0..4].try_into().expect("4-byte slice"));
                    let second = u32::from_le_bytes(nonce[4..8].try_into().expect("4-byte slice"));
                    let bad = nonce[0] == 0xEF
                        || first == 0x44414548
                        || first == 0x54534F50
                        || first == 0x20544547
                        || first == 0x4954504f
                        || first == 0xEEEEEEEE
                        || first == 0xDDDDDDDD
                        || first == 0x02010316
                        || second == 0x00000000;
                    if !bad {
                        break;
                    }
                }
                let tx_raw: [u8; 32] = nonce[8..40].try_into().expect("32-byte slice");
                let tx_iv: [u8; 16] = nonce[40..56].try_into().expect("16-byte slice");
                let mut rev48 = nonce[8..56].to_vec();
                rev48.reverse();
                let rx_raw: [u8; 32] = rev48[0..32].try_into().expect("32-byte slice");
                let rx_iv: [u8; 16] = rev48[32..48].try_into().expect("16-byte slice");
                let (tx_key, rx_key): ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) = if let Some(s) = secret {
                    let mut h = sha2::Sha256::new();
                    h.update(tx_raw);
                    h.update(s.as_ref());
                    let tx: [u8; 32] = h.finalize().into();
                    let mut h = sha2::Sha256::new();
                    h.update(rx_raw);
                    h.update(s.as_ref());
                    let rx: [u8; 32] = h.finalize().into();
                    (tx, rx)
                } else {
                    (tx_raw, rx_raw)
                };
                // PaddedIntermediate tag = 0xDDDDDDDD
                nonce[56] = 0xdd;
                nonce[57] = 0xdd;
                nonce[58] = 0xdd;
                nonce[59] = 0xdd;
                let dc_bytes = dc_id.to_le_bytes();
                nonce[60] = dc_bytes[0];
                nonce[61] = dc_bytes[1];
                let mut cipher =
                    ferogram_crypto::ObfuscatedCipher::from_keys(&tx_key, &tx_iv, &rx_key, &rx_iv);
                let mut skip = [0u8; 56];
                cipher.encrypt(&mut skip);
                cipher.encrypt(&mut nonce[56..64]);
                stream.write_all(&nonce).await?;
                let cipher_arc = std::sync::Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(cipher));
                Ok((stream, FrameKind::PaddedIntermediate { cipher: cipher_arc }))
            }
            TransportKind::FakeTls { secret, domain } => {
                // Fake TLS 1.3 ClientHello with HMAC-SHA256 random field.
                // After the handshake, data flows as TLS Application Data records
                // over a shared Obfuscated2 cipher seeded from the secret+HMAC.
                let domain_bytes = domain.as_bytes();
                let mut session_id = [0u8; 32];
                getrandom::getrandom(&mut session_id)
                    .map_err(|_| ConnectError::other("getrandom"))?;

                // Build ClientHello body (random placeholder = zeros)
                let cipher_suites: &[u8] = &[0x00, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01, 0x13, 0x02];
                let compression: &[u8] = &[0x01, 0x00];
                let sni_name_len = domain_bytes.len() as u16;
                let sni_list_len = sni_name_len + 3;
                let sni_ext_len = sni_list_len + 2;
                let mut sni_ext = Vec::new();
                sni_ext.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00]);
                sni_ext.extend_from_slice(&sni_ext_len.to_be_bytes());
                sni_ext.extend_from_slice(&sni_list_len.to_be_bytes());
                sni_ext.push(0x00);
                sni_ext.extend_from_slice(&sni_name_len.to_be_bytes());
                sni_ext.extend_from_slice(domain_bytes);
                let sup_ver: &[u8] = &[0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04];
                let sup_grp: &[u8] = &[0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x1d];
                let sess_tick: &[u8] = &[0x00, 0x23, 0x00, 0x00];
                let ext_body_len = sni_ext.len() + sup_ver.len() + sup_grp.len() + sess_tick.len();
                let mut extensions = Vec::new();
                extensions.extend_from_slice(&(ext_body_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
                extensions.extend_from_slice(&sni_ext);
                extensions.extend_from_slice(sup_ver);
                extensions.extend_from_slice(sup_grp);
                extensions.extend_from_slice(sess_tick);

                let mut hello_body = Vec::new();
                hello_body.extend_from_slice(&[0x03, 0x03]);
                hello_body.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 32]); // random placeholder
                hello_body.push(session_id.len() as u8);
                hello_body.extend_from_slice(&session_id);
                hello_body.extend_from_slice(cipher_suites);
                hello_body.extend_from_slice(compression);
                hello_body.extend_from_slice(&extensions);

                let hs_len = hello_body.len() as u32;
                let mut handshake = vec![
                    0x01,
                    ((hs_len >> 16) & 0xff) as u8,
                    ((hs_len >> 8) & 0xff) as u8,
                    (hs_len & 0xff) as u8,
                ];
                handshake.extend_from_slice(&hello_body);

                let rec_len = handshake.len() as u16;
                let mut record = Vec::new();
                record.push(0x16);
                record.extend_from_slice(&[0x03, 0x01]);
                record.extend_from_slice(&rec_len.to_be_bytes());
                record.extend_from_slice(&handshake);

                // HMAC-SHA256(secret, record) -> fill random field at offset 11
                use sha2::Digest;
                let random_offset = 5 + 4 + 2; // TLS-rec(5) + HS-hdr(4) + version(2)
                let hmac_result: [u8; 32] = {
                    use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
                    type HmacSha256 = Hmac<sha2::Sha256>;
                    let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(secret)
                        .map_err(|_| ConnectError::other("HMAC key error"))?;
                    mac.update(&record);
                    mac.finalize().into_bytes().into()
                };
                record[random_offset..random_offset + 32].copy_from_slice(&hmac_result);
                stream.write_all(&record).await?;

                // Derive Obfuscated2 key from secret + HMAC
                let mut h = sha2::Sha256::new();
                h.update(secret.as_ref());
                h.update(hmac_result);
                let derived: [u8; 32] = h.finalize().into();
                let iv = [0u8; 16];
                let cipher =
                    ferogram_crypto::ObfuscatedCipher::from_keys(&derived, &iv, &derived, &iv);
                let cipher_arc = std::sync::Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(cipher));
                Ok((stream, FrameKind::FakeTls { cipher: cipher_arc }))
            }
            TransportKind::Http => {
                // HTTP transport is handled in dc_pool - fall back to Abridged framing.
                stream.write_all(&[0xef]).await?;
                Ok((stream, FrameKind::Abridged))
            }
        }
    }

    pub async fn connect_raw(
        addr: &str,
        socks5: Option<&crate::socks5::Socks5Config>,
        mtproxy: Option<&crate::proxy::MtProxyConfig>,
        transport: &TransportKind,
        dc_id: i16,
    ) -> Result<Self, ConnectError> {
        let t_label = match transport {
            TransportKind::Abridged => "Abridged",
            TransportKind::Obfuscated { .. } => "Obfuscated",
            TransportKind::PaddedIntermediate { .. } => "PaddedIntermediate",
            TransportKind::Http => "Http",
            TransportKind::Intermediate => "Intermediate",
            TransportKind::Full => "Full",
            TransportKind::FakeTls { .. } => "FakeTls",
        };
        tracing::debug!("[ferogram] Connecting to {addr} ({t_label}) DH …");

        let addr2 = addr.to_string();
        let socks5_c = socks5.cloned();
        let mtproxy_c = mtproxy.cloned();
        let transport_c = transport.clone();

        let fut = async move {
            let (mut stream, frame_kind) = if let Some(ref mp) = mtproxy_c {
                Self::open_stream_mtproxy(mp, dc_id).await?
            } else {
                Self::open_stream(&addr2, socks5_c.as_ref(), &transport_c, dc_id).await?
            };

            let mut plain = Session::new();

            let (req1, s1) = auth::step1().map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
            send_frame(
                &mut stream,
                &plain.pack(&req1).to_plaintext_bytes(),
                &frame_kind,
            )
            .await?;
            let res_pq: tl::enums::ResPq = recv_frame_plain(&mut stream, &frame_kind).await?;

            let (req2, s2) = auth::step2(s1, res_pq, dc_id as i32)
                .map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
            send_frame(
                &mut stream,
                &plain.pack(&req2).to_plaintext_bytes(),
                &frame_kind,
            )
            .await?;
            let dh: tl::enums::ServerDhParams = recv_frame_plain(&mut stream, &frame_kind).await?;

            let (req3, s3) = auth::step3(s2, dh).map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
            send_frame(
                &mut stream,
                &plain.pack(&req3).to_plaintext_bytes(),
                &frame_kind,
            )
            .await?;
            let ans: tl::enums::SetClientDhParamsAnswer =
                recv_frame_plain(&mut stream, &frame_kind).await?;

            // Retry loop for dh_gen_retry (up to 5 attempts).
            let done = {
                let mut result =
                    auth::finish(s3, ans).map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
                let mut attempts = 0u8;
                loop {
                    match result {
                        auth::FinishResult::Done(d) => break d,
                        auth::FinishResult::Retry {
                            retry_id,
                            dh_params,
                            nonce,
                            server_nonce,
                            new_nonce,
                        } => {
                            attempts += 1;
                            if attempts >= 5 {
                                return Err(ConnectError::other(
                                    "dh_gen_retry exceeded 5 attempts",
                                ));
                            }
                            let (req_retry, s3_retry) = auth::retry_step3(
                                &dh_params,
                                nonce,
                                server_nonce,
                                new_nonce,
                                retry_id,
                            )
                            .map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
                            send_frame(
                                &mut stream,
                                &plain.pack(&req_retry).to_plaintext_bytes(),
                                &frame_kind,
                            )
                            .await?;
                            let ans_retry: tl::enums::SetClientDhParamsAnswer =
                                recv_frame_plain(&mut stream, &frame_kind).await?;
                            result = auth::finish(s3_retry, ans_retry)
                                .map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
                        }
                    }
                }
            };
            tracing::debug!("[ferogram] DH complete ✓");

            Ok::<Self, ConnectError>(Self {
                stream,
                enc: EncryptedSession::new(done.auth_key, done.first_salt, done.time_offset),
                frame_kind,
                perm_auth_key: None, // connect_raw produces the perm key itself
            })
        };

        tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(15), fut)
            .await
            .map_err(|_| {
                ConnectError::other(format!("DH handshake with {addr} timed out after 15 s"))
            })?
    }

    #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
    pub async fn connect_with_key(
        addr: &str,
        auth_key: [u8; 256],
        first_salt: i64,
        time_offset: i32,
        socks5: Option<&crate::socks5::Socks5Config>,
        mtproxy: Option<&crate::proxy::MtProxyConfig>,
        transport: &TransportKind,
        dc_id: i16,
        pfs: bool,
    ) -> Result<Self, ConnectError> {
        let addr2 = addr.to_string();
        let socks5_c = socks5.cloned();
        let mtproxy_c = mtproxy.cloned();
        let transport_c = transport.clone();

        let fut = async move {
            let (mut stream, frame_kind) = if let Some(ref mp) = mtproxy_c {
                Self::open_stream_mtproxy(mp, dc_id).await?
            } else {
                Self::open_stream(&addr2, socks5_c.as_ref(), &transport_c, dc_id).await?
            };
            if pfs {
                tracing::debug!("[ferogram] PFS: temp DH bind for DC{dc_id}");
                match Self::do_pfs_bind(&mut stream, &frame_kind, &auth_key, dc_id).await {
                    Ok(temp_enc) => {
                        tracing::info!("[ferogram] PFS bind complete DC{dc_id}");
                        return Ok(Self {
                            stream,
                            enc: temp_enc,
                            frame_kind,
                            perm_auth_key: Some(auth_key),
                        });
                    }
                    Err(e) => {
                        tracing::warn!(
                            "[ferogram] PFS bind failed DC{dc_id} ({e}); falling back to perm key"
                        );
                        // Graceful fallback: reconnect because DH frames left the stream dirty.
                        // Return error and let the caller handle retry without PFS.
                        return Err(e);
                    }
                }
            }
            Ok::<Self, ConnectError>(Self {
                stream,
                enc: EncryptedSession::new(auth_key, first_salt, time_offset),
                frame_kind,
                perm_auth_key: None,
            })
        };

        tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), fut)
            .await
            .map_err(|_| {
                ConnectError::other(format!("connect_with_key to {addr} timed out after 30 s"))
            })?
    }

    /// Perform a fresh temp-key DH on an already-open stream, then
    /// send `auth.bindTempAuthKey` encrypted with the temp key.
    /// Returns an `EncryptedSession` keyed with the bound temp key.
    async fn do_pfs_bind(
        stream: &mut TcpStream,
        frame_kind: &FrameKind,
        perm_auth_key: &[u8; 256],
        dc_id: i16,
    ) -> Result<EncryptedSession, ConnectError> {
        use ferogram_mtproto::{
            auth_key_id_from_key, encrypt_bind_inner, gen_msg_id, new_seen_msg_ids,
            serialize_bind_temp_auth_key,
        };
        const TEMP_EXPIRES: i32 = 86_400; // 24 h

        // temp-key DH
        let mut plain = Session::new();

        let (req1, s1) = auth::step1().map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
        send_frame(stream, &plain.pack(&req1).to_plaintext_bytes(), frame_kind).await?;
        let res_pq: tl::enums::ResPq = recv_frame_plain(stream, frame_kind).await?;

        let (req2, s2) = ferogram_mtproto::step2_temp(s1, res_pq, dc_id as i32, TEMP_EXPIRES)
            .map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
        send_frame(stream, &plain.pack(&req2).to_plaintext_bytes(), frame_kind).await?;
        let dh: tl::enums::ServerDhParams = recv_frame_plain(stream, frame_kind).await?;

        let (req3, s3) = auth::step3(s2, dh).map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
        send_frame(stream, &plain.pack(&req3).to_plaintext_bytes(), frame_kind).await?;
        let ans: tl::enums::SetClientDhParamsAnswer = recv_frame_plain(stream, frame_kind).await?;

        let done = {
            let mut result =
                auth::finish(s3, ans).map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
            let mut attempts = 0u8;
            loop {
                match result {
                    ferogram_mtproto::FinishResult::Done(d) => break d,
                    ferogram_mtproto::FinishResult::Retry {
                        retry_id,
                        dh_params,
                        nonce,
                        server_nonce,
                        new_nonce,
                    } => {
                        attempts += 1;
                        if attempts >= 5 {
                            return Err(ConnectError::other(
                                "PFS temp DH retry exceeded 5 attempts",
                            ));
                        }
                        let (rr, s3r) = ferogram_mtproto::retry_step3(
                            &dh_params,
                            nonce,
                            server_nonce,
                            new_nonce,
                            retry_id,
                        )
                        .map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
                        send_frame(stream, &plain.pack(&rr).to_plaintext_bytes(), frame_kind)
                            .await?;
                        let ar: tl::enums::SetClientDhParamsAnswer =
                            recv_frame_plain(stream, frame_kind).await?;
                        result = auth::finish(s3r, ar)
                            .map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(e.to_string()))?;
                    }
                }
            }
        };

        let temp_key = done.auth_key;
        let temp_salt = done.first_salt;
        let temp_offset = done.time_offset;

        // build bindTempAuthKey body
        let temp_key_id = auth_key_id_from_key(&temp_key);
        let perm_key_id = auth_key_id_from_key(perm_auth_key);

        let mut nonce_buf = [0u8; 8];
        getrandom::getrandom(&mut nonce_buf).map_err(|_| ConnectError::other("getrandom nonce"))?;
        let nonce = i64::from_le_bytes(nonce_buf);

        let server_now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
            .unwrap()
            .as_secs() as i32
            + temp_offset;
        let expires_at = server_now + TEMP_EXPIRES;

        let seen = new_seen_msg_ids();
        let mut temp_enc = EncryptedSession::with_seen(temp_key, temp_salt, temp_offset, seen);
        let temp_session_id = temp_enc.session_id();

        let msg_id = gen_msg_id();
        let enc_msg = encrypt_bind_inner(
            perm_auth_key,
            msg_id,
            nonce,
            temp_key_id,
            perm_key_id,
            temp_session_id,
            expires_at,
        );
        let bind_body = serialize_bind_temp_auth_key(perm_key_id, nonce, expires_at, &enc_msg);

        // send encrypted bind request
        let wire = temp_enc.pack_body_at_msg_id(&bind_body, msg_id);
        send_frame(stream, &wire, frame_kind).await?;

        // Receive and verify response.
        // The server may send informational frames first (msgs_ack, new_session_created)
        // before the actual rpc_result{boolTrue}, so we loop up to 5 frames.
        for attempt in 0u8..5 {
            let mut raw = recv_raw_frame(stream, frame_kind).await?;
            let decrypted = temp_enc
                .unpack(&mut raw)
                .map_err(|e| ConnectError::other(format!("PFS bind decrypt: {e:?}")))?;
            match decode_bind_response(&decrypted.body) {
                Ok(()) => {
                    // bindTempAuthKey succeeds under the temp key; keep the session
                    // sequence as-is so subsequent RPCs continue from the same MTProto
                    // message stream.
                    return Ok(temp_enc);
                }
                Err(ref e) if e == "__need_more__" => {
                    tracing::debug!(
                        "[ferogram] PFS bind (DC{dc_id}): informational frame {attempt}, reading next"
                    );
                    continue;
                }
                Err(reason) => {
                    tracing::error!("[ferogram] PFS bind server response (DC{dc_id}): {reason}");
                    return Err(ConnectError::other(format!(
                        "auth.bindTempAuthKey: {reason}"
                    )));
                }
            }
        }
        Err(ConnectError::other(
            "auth.bindTempAuthKey: no boolTrue after 5 frames",
        ))
    }

    pub fn auth_key_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 256] {
        // When PFS is active, perm_auth_key is the key to persist in the session.
        // enc.auth_key_bytes() would return the short-lived temp key instead.
        self.perm_auth_key
            .unwrap_or_else(|| self.enc.auth_key_bytes())
    }

    /// Split into a write-only `ConnectionWriter` and the TCP read half.
    pub fn into_writer(self) -> (ConnectionWriter, OwnedWriteHalf, OwnedReadHalf, FrameKind) {
        let (read_half, write_half) = self.stream.into_split();
        let writer = ConnectionWriter {
            enc: self.enc,
            frame_kind: self.frame_kind.clone(),
            perm_auth_key: self.perm_auth_key,
            pending_ack: Vec::new(),
            new_session_resend_queue: Vec::new(),
            sent_bodies: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
            container_map: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
            salts: Vec::new(),
            start_salt_time: None,
        };
        (writer, write_half, read_half, self.frame_kind)
    }
}