feather-reader 0.4.7

//! Persistence for in-flight logins, authenticated sessions, and DPoP nonces.
//!
//! Two properties here are security-relevant and neither is obvious from the
//! SQL:
//!
//! * **`state` is consumed atomically.** A `SELECT` followed by a `DELETE` lets
//!   two concurrent callbacks both pass and both exchange the same `code` —
//!   and the authorization server is entitled to revoke *"any outstanding
//!   sessions and tokens associated with the earlier use of the `code`"*, so the
//!   loser destroys the winner's session. One statement, `RETURNING`, zero rows
//!   means rejected.
//!
//! * **Secrets are AAD-bound to their row, column, AND destinations.** Binding
//!   only the secrets is not enough: the declared adversary is anything able to
//!   write the database, and against that adversary a plain unauthenticated
//!   `aud` or `issuer` column defeats the scheme without touching a ciphertext
//!   at all — repoint the PDS and a live DPoP-bound token is sent to the
//!   attacker's host, with everything still decrypting perfectly. So the AAD
//!   covers the destinations too, and is length-prefixed rather than
//!   delimiter-joined so no rearrangement of fields can collide. See
//!   [`super::crypto`]; the unbound `enc.v1` form is rejected outright here.

use anyhow::{Context as _, Result};
use sqlx::SqlitePool;

use super::crypto::Codec;

/// Tables for the OAuth flow. `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`, matching the
/// convention in [`crate::store`].
const SCHEMA: &str = r#"
-- One row per in-flight login. Short-lived and single-use; see `take_pending`.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS oauth_state (
    state                TEXT PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
    -- SHA-256 of the cookie value set before the redirect. The callback must
    -- present the cookie; without it a callback URL fired by any other browser
    -- would complete the login and hand out the session.
    browser_binding_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
    pkce_verifier        TEXT NOT NULL,   -- AAD-bound
    dpop_key_jwk         TEXT NOT NULL,   -- AAD-bound
    issuer               TEXT NOT NULL,
    pds_url              TEXT NOT NULL,
    did                  TEXT NOT NULL,
    -- The negotiated client-auth method is stored so the callback re-creates the
    -- same client rather than re-negotiating against possibly-changed metadata.
    auth_method          TEXT NOT NULL,
    auth_kid             TEXT,
    -- The EXACT redirect_uri sent in PAR; it must match byte-for-byte at the
    -- token endpoint.
    redirect_uri         TEXT NOT NULL,
    requested_scope      TEXT NOT NULL,
    request_uri          TEXT NOT NULL,
    app_return_to        TEXT,
    expires_at           INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS oauth_state_expires_at ON oauth_state(expires_at);

-- One row per authenticated account.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS oauth_session (
    sub            TEXT PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
    issuer         TEXT NOT NULL,
    -- The PDS. Every XRPC request is built against this rather than re-derived,
    -- so it belongs to the token set.
    aud            TEXT NOT NULL,
    dpop_key_jwk   TEXT NOT NULL,   -- AAD-bound
    access_token   TEXT NOT NULL,   -- AAD-bound
    refresh_token  TEXT NOT NULL,   -- AAD-bound
    token_type     TEXT NOT NULL,
    granted_scope  TEXT NOT NULL,
    -- NULL is legitimate: `expires_in` is optional in a token response.
    expires_at     INTEGER
);

-- Server-issued DPoP nonces, per origin. Persisted rather than used once,
-- because a nonce is expected on every subsequent request to that origin.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS oauth_nonce (
    origin     TEXT PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
    nonce      TEXT NOT NULL,
    updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
"#;

/// Create the OAuth tables.
pub async fn init_schema(pool: &SqlitePool) -> Result<()> {
    sqlx::query(SCHEMA)
        .execute(pool)
        .await
        .context("creating the OAuth tables")?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Build an AAD from a table name and a list of fields, **length-prefixed**.
///
/// Not delimiter-joined. A `table:field:field` encoding is only unambiguous
/// while no field can contain the delimiter, and the fields here include
/// `did:web:…` subjects and URL issuers — precisely the inputs that erode that
/// assumption. Length prefixes make the encoding injective unconditionally,
/// rather than by an invariant nobody is enforcing.
fn structured_aad(table: &str, fields: &[&str]) -> Vec<u8> {
    let mut out = Vec::new();
    for field in std::iter::once(&table).chain(fields.iter()) {
        out.extend_from_slice(&(field.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
        out.extend_from_slice(field.as_bytes());
    }
    out
}

/// The AAD a state-row secret is sealed against.
///
/// It covers the **destinations**, not just the row and column. Binding only the
/// secrets leaves `issuer`/`pds_url`/`did`/`redirect_uri` as plain
/// unauthenticated columns — and against the declared adversary (anything able
/// to write the database) the scheme is then defeated without touching a
/// ciphertext at all: repoint the issuer and we mint a client assertion for the
/// attacker's server and neutralise the `iss` check, while every secret still
/// decrypts perfectly.
///
/// `browser_binding_hash` is in here for the same reason — it is the only thing
/// standing between a server-global state table and a login-CSRF, so it must not
/// be swappable either.
/// Every non-secret column of a state row, so the AAD covers the whole row.
///
/// A struct rather than a long argument list: the failure mode here is a field
/// that nobody remembered to bind, and a struct makes adding a column without
/// binding it a visible omission rather than an invisible one.
struct StateBinding<'a> {
    state: &'a str,
    issuer: &'a str,
    pds_url: &'a str,
    did: &'a str,
    redirect_uri: &'a str,
    browser_binding_hash: &'a str,
    auth_method: &'a str,
    auth_kid: Option<&'a str>,
    requested_scope: &'a str,
    request_uri: &'a str,
    app_return_to: Option<&'a str>,
    expires_at: i64,
}

/// A fixed marker distinguishing an absent optional field from an empty one.
///
/// Emitted as its OWN element beside the value. Encoding presence into the value
/// (a prefix, a sentinel string) would only move the collision: a real value can
/// always be chosen to look like the sentinel.
fn present_or_absent(value: Option<&str>) -> &'static str {
    match value {
        Some(_) => "present",
        None => "absent",
    }
}

/// The AAD a state-row secret is sealed against: every non-secret column.
///
/// `column` is included so a ciphertext cannot be moved between columns of the
/// same row, and `browser_binding_hash` because it is the only thing standing
/// between a server-global state table and a login CSRF.
fn state_aad(binding: &StateBinding<'_>, column: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
    let expires_at = binding.expires_at.to_string();
    structured_aad(
        "oauth_state",
        &[
            binding.state,
            column,
            binding.issuer,
            binding.pds_url,
            binding.did,
            binding.redirect_uri,
            binding.browser_binding_hash,
            binding.auth_method,
            // **An absent field and an empty one must not encode alike.**
            // `unwrap_or("")` made `NULL` and `''` byte-identical, so either
            // could be flipped to the other with every ciphertext still
            // verifying — the very collision the session AAD below avoids with
            // its `"none"` marker. A separate presence element keeps them
            // distinct without depending on the value's own bytes.
            present_or_absent(binding.auth_kid),
            binding.auth_kid.unwrap_or(""),
            binding.requested_scope,
            binding.request_uri,
            // Declared as a post-login redirect target. Nothing writes it yet,
            // which is exactly why binding it now costs nothing — unbound, it
            // becomes an open redirect the day it is wired up. `None` versus
            // `Some("")` is precisely the distinction a redirect helper would
            // branch on, so the presence element matters here most.
            present_or_absent(binding.app_return_to),
            binding.app_return_to.unwrap_or(""),
            // **The row's own lifetime is a destination too.** Both the expiry
            // check and the sweeper read this column RAW, so an adversary with
            // database write can still keep the row itself around by pushing it
            // out — binding it does not stop that. What it does stop is the row
            // remaining USABLE: the sealed DPoP key and PKCE verifier no longer
            // decrypt, so an extended `state` cannot be replayed into a
            // completed login. The residual is row growth, not a live credential.
            &expires_at,
        ],
    )
}

/// The AAD a session-row secret is sealed against.
///
/// `aud` is the PDS every subsequent request is built against, so it is bound:
/// repointing it would otherwise ship a live DPoP-bound access token to a host
/// of the attacker's choosing, with the tokens decrypting perfectly.
fn session_aad(
    sub: &str,
    column: &str,
    issuer: &str,
    aud: &str,
    token_type: &str,
    granted_scope: &str,
    expires_at: Option<i64>,
) -> Vec<u8> {
    // `None` and `0` must not collide, so an absent expiry gets its own marker
    // rather than a numeric stand-in.
    let expires_at = expires_at.map_or_else(|| "none".to_string(), |secs| secs.to_string());
    structured_aad(
        "oauth_session",
        &[
            sub,
            column,
            issuer,
            aud,
            // Enforced strictly on the wire (`Bearer` is refused outright) and
            // previously neither authenticated nor re-checked on read.
            token_type,
            granted_scope,
            // Clearing this to NULL made `is_stale` permanently false, so the
            // session was never proactively refreshed.
            &expires_at,
        ],
    )
}

/// An in-flight login.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PendingAuth {
    pub state: String,
    pub browser_binding_hash: String,
    pub pkce_verifier: String,
    pub dpop_key_jwk: String,
    pub issuer: String,
    pub pds_url: String,
    pub did: String,
    pub auth_method: String,
    pub auth_kid: Option<String>,
    pub redirect_uri: String,
    pub requested_scope: String,
    pub request_uri: String,
    pub app_return_to: Option<String>,
    pub expires_at: i64,
}

/// Row shape for `oauth_state`, secrets still sealed.
#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct PendingRow {
    state: String,
    browser_binding_hash: String,
    pkce_verifier: String,
    dpop_key_jwk: String,
    issuer: String,
    pds_url: String,
    did: String,
    auth_method: String,
    auth_kid: Option<String>,
    redirect_uri: String,
    requested_scope: String,
    request_uri: String,
    app_return_to: Option<String>,
    expires_at: i64,
}

/// Record an in-flight login.
pub async fn put_pending(pool: &SqlitePool, codec: &Codec, auth: &PendingAuth) -> Result<()> {
    let binding = StateBinding {
        state: &auth.state,
        issuer: &auth.issuer,
        pds_url: &auth.pds_url,
        did: &auth.did,
        redirect_uri: &auth.redirect_uri,
        browser_binding_hash: &auth.browser_binding_hash,
        auth_method: &auth.auth_method,
        auth_kid: auth.auth_kid.as_deref(),
        requested_scope: &auth.requested_scope,
        request_uri: &auth.request_uri,
        app_return_to: auth.app_return_to.as_deref(),
        expires_at: auth.expires_at,
    };

    sqlx::query(
        r#"
        INSERT INTO oauth_state (
            state, browser_binding_hash, pkce_verifier, dpop_key_jwk, issuer,
            pds_url, did, auth_method, auth_kid, redirect_uri, requested_scope,
            request_uri, app_return_to, expires_at
        ) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?7, ?8, ?9, ?10, ?11, ?12, ?13, ?14)
        "#,
    )
    .bind(&auth.state)
    .bind(&auth.browser_binding_hash)
    .bind(codec.encrypt_bound(&auth.pkce_verifier, &state_aad(&binding, "pkce_verifier")))
    .bind(codec.encrypt_bound(&auth.dpop_key_jwk, &state_aad(&binding, "dpop_key_jwk")))
    .bind(&auth.issuer)
    .bind(&auth.pds_url)
    .bind(&auth.did)
    .bind(&auth.auth_method)
    .bind(&auth.auth_kid)
    .bind(&auth.redirect_uri)
    .bind(&auth.requested_scope)
    .bind(&auth.request_uri)
    .bind(&auth.app_return_to)
    .bind(auth.expires_at)
    .execute(pool)
    .await
    .context("recording the pending login")?;
    Ok(())
}

/// **Consume** an in-flight login: return it and delete it, atomically.
///
/// One statement, so two concurrent callbacks cannot both succeed. A
/// `SELECT` then `DELETE` would let both pass and both exchange the same
/// `code` — and the authorization server is entitled to revoke every session
/// associated with the earlier use, so the loser destroys the winner's session.
///
/// An EXPIRED row is deleted as well and reported absent, so it cannot be
/// probed for existence after the fact.
pub async fn take_pending(
    pool: &SqlitePool,
    codec: &Codec,
    state: &str,
    now: i64,
) -> Result<Option<PendingAuth>> {
    let row: Option<PendingRow> = sqlx::query_as(
        r#"
        DELETE FROM oauth_state WHERE state = ?1
        RETURNING state, browser_binding_hash, pkce_verifier, dpop_key_jwk,
                  issuer, pds_url, did, auth_method, auth_kid, redirect_uri,
                  requested_scope, request_uri, app_return_to, expires_at
        "#,
    )
    .bind(state)
    .fetch_optional(pool)
    .await
    .context("consuming the pending login")?;

    let Some(row) = row else { return Ok(None) };
    // Expired AT `expires_at`, not one second later.
    if row.expires_at <= now {
        // Deleted above regardless; an expired flow is simply gone.
        return Ok(None);
    }

    // The AAD is rebuilt from the STORED destinations, so any edit to them
    // makes the secrets undecryptable rather than merely unnoticed.
    let binding = StateBinding {
        state: &row.state,
        issuer: &row.issuer,
        pds_url: &row.pds_url,
        did: &row.did,
        redirect_uri: &row.redirect_uri,
        browser_binding_hash: &row.browser_binding_hash,
        auth_method: &row.auth_method,
        auth_kid: row.auth_kid.as_deref(),
        requested_scope: &row.requested_scope,
        request_uri: &row.request_uri,
        app_return_to: row.app_return_to.as_deref(),
        expires_at: row.expires_at,
    };
    let aad = |column: &str| state_aad(&binding, column);
    Ok(Some(PendingAuth {
        pkce_verifier: codec
            .decrypt_bound(&row.pkce_verifier, &aad("pkce_verifier"))
            .context("decrypting the stored PKCE verifier (or its bound context was altered)")?,
        dpop_key_jwk: codec
            .decrypt_bound(&row.dpop_key_jwk, &aad("dpop_key_jwk"))
            .context("decrypting the stored DPoP key (or its bound context was altered)")?,
        state: row.state,
        browser_binding_hash: row.browser_binding_hash,
        issuer: row.issuer,
        pds_url: row.pds_url,
        did: row.did,
        auth_method: row.auth_method,
        auth_kid: row.auth_kid,
        redirect_uri: row.redirect_uri,
        requested_scope: row.requested_scope,
        request_uri: row.request_uri,
        app_return_to: row.app_return_to,
        expires_at: row.expires_at,
    }))
}

/// An authenticated account's tokens.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct OAuthSession {
    pub sub: String,
    pub issuer: String,
    pub aud: String,
    pub dpop_key_jwk: String,
    pub access_token: String,
    pub refresh_token: String,
    pub token_type: String,
    pub granted_scope: String,
    pub expires_at: Option<i64>,
}

#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct SessionRow {
    sub: String,
    issuer: String,
    aud: String,
    dpop_key_jwk: String,
    access_token: String,
    refresh_token: String,
    token_type: String,
    granted_scope: String,
    expires_at: Option<i64>,
}

/// Store or REPLACE a session.
///
/// An upsert, not an insert: logging in again is normal (a second browser, or
/// re-auth after expiry), and a plain insert would fail on the primary key and
/// 500 every subsequent login.
pub async fn put_session(pool: &SqlitePool, codec: &Codec, session: &OAuthSession) -> Result<()> {
    let [dpop_key_jwk, access_token, refresh_token] = encrypt_secrets(codec, session);
    sqlx::query(
        r#"
        INSERT INTO oauth_session (
            sub, issuer, aud, dpop_key_jwk, access_token, refresh_token,
            token_type, granted_scope, expires_at
        ) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?7, ?8, ?9)
        ON CONFLICT(sub) DO UPDATE SET
            issuer        = excluded.issuer,
            aud           = excluded.aud,
            dpop_key_jwk  = excluded.dpop_key_jwk,
            access_token  = excluded.access_token,
            refresh_token = excluded.refresh_token,
            token_type    = excluded.token_type,
            granted_scope = excluded.granted_scope,
            expires_at    = excluded.expires_at
        "#,
    )
    .bind(&session.sub)
    .bind(&session.issuer)
    .bind(&session.aud)
    .bind(dpop_key_jwk)
    .bind(access_token)
    .bind(refresh_token)
    .bind(&session.token_type)
    .bind(&session.granted_scope)
    .bind(session.expires_at)
    .execute(pool)
    .await
    .context("storing the OAuth session")?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Read a session by subject DID.
pub async fn get_session(
    pool: &SqlitePool,
    codec: &Codec,
    sub: &str,
) -> Result<Option<OAuthSession>> {
    Ok(get_session_versioned(pool, codec, sub)
        .await?
        .map(|(session, _)| session))
}

/// The stored form of a session's secrets, exactly as read — what
/// [`delete_session_if_unchanged`] compares against.
///
/// Every write re-encrypts under a fresh nonce, so ANY `put_session` since the
/// read (a refresh rotating the tokens, a re-login) changes these, even one that
/// happened to store the same plaintext.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SessionVersion {
    dpop_key_jwk: String,
    access_token: String,
    refresh_token: String,
}

/// [`get_session`], also returning the [`SessionVersion`] of the row it read —
/// both from ONE row read, so the version is guaranteed to be the one the
/// returned tokens came from.
pub async fn get_session_versioned(
    pool: &SqlitePool,
    codec: &Codec,
    sub: &str,
) -> Result<Option<(OAuthSession, SessionVersion)>> {
    let row: Option<SessionRow> = sqlx::query_as(
        r#"
        SELECT sub, issuer, aud, dpop_key_jwk, access_token, refresh_token,
               token_type, granted_scope, expires_at
        FROM oauth_session WHERE sub = ?1
        "#,
    )
    .bind(sub)
    .fetch_optional(pool)
    .await
    .context("reading the OAuth session")?;

    let Some(row) = row else { return Ok(None) };
    let aad = |column: &str| {
        session_aad(
            &row.sub,
            column,
            &row.issuer,
            &row.aud,
            &row.token_type,
            &row.granted_scope,
            row.expires_at,
        )
    };
    let session = OAuthSession {
        dpop_key_jwk: codec
            .decrypt_bound(&row.dpop_key_jwk, &aad("dpop_key_jwk"))
            .context("decrypting the session DPoP key (or its bound context was altered)")?,
        access_token: codec
            .decrypt_bound(&row.access_token, &aad("access_token"))
            .context("decrypting the stored access token (or its bound context was altered)")?,
        refresh_token: codec
            .decrypt_bound(&row.refresh_token, &aad("refresh_token"))
            .context("decrypting the stored refresh token (or its bound context was altered)")?,
        sub: row.sub,
        issuer: row.issuer,
        aud: row.aud,
        token_type: row.token_type,
        granted_scope: row.granted_scope,
        expires_at: row.expires_at,
    };
    let version = SessionVersion {
        dpop_key_jwk: row.dpop_key_jwk,
        access_token: row.access_token,
        refresh_token: row.refresh_token,
    };
    Ok(Some((session, version)))
}

/// Replace a session's tokens ONLY if the row still holds the secrets of
/// `version` — the one the refresh started from. `true` if it was written;
/// `false` if the row is gone or was rewritten since (nothing is written).
///
/// The refresh's write. [`put_session`] is an upsert, which is right for a
/// login and wrong here: a sign-out (a `/logout`, the operator's revoke-all)
/// that deleted the row while the refresh was in flight would have it
/// RESURRECTED with the brand-new tokens, after reporting it signed out. And a
/// row another writer rotated meanwhile would be silently overwritten.
pub async fn update_session_if_unchanged(
    pool: &SqlitePool,
    codec: &Codec,
    session: &OAuthSession,
    version: &SessionVersion,
) -> Result<bool> {
    let [dpop_key_jwk, access_token, refresh_token] = encrypt_secrets(codec, session);
    // One statement, so the comparison and the write are atomic.
    let result = sqlx::query(
        r#"
        UPDATE oauth_session SET
            issuer        = ?2,
            aud           = ?3,
            dpop_key_jwk  = ?4,
            access_token  = ?5,
            refresh_token = ?6,
            token_type    = ?7,
            granted_scope = ?8,
            expires_at    = ?9
        WHERE sub = ?1
          AND dpop_key_jwk = ?10 AND access_token = ?11 AND refresh_token = ?12
        "#,
    )
    .bind(&session.sub)
    .bind(&session.issuer)
    .bind(&session.aud)
    .bind(dpop_key_jwk)
    .bind(access_token)
    .bind(refresh_token)
    .bind(&session.token_type)
    .bind(&session.granted_scope)
    .bind(session.expires_at)
    .bind(&version.dpop_key_jwk)
    .bind(&version.access_token)
    .bind(&version.refresh_token)
    .execute(pool)
    .await
    .context("updating the OAuth session (if unchanged)")?;
    Ok(result.rows_affected() > 0)
}

/// A session's three secret columns, encrypted and bound to the row's context
/// exactly as [`put_session`] stores them.
fn encrypt_secrets(codec: &Codec, session: &OAuthSession) -> [String; 3] {
    let bound = |column: &str, plaintext: &str| {
        codec.encrypt_bound(
            plaintext,
            &session_aad(
                &session.sub,
                column,
                &session.issuer,
                &session.aud,
                &session.token_type,
                &session.granted_scope,
                session.expires_at,
            ),
        )
    };
    [
        bound("dpop_key_jwk", &session.dpop_key_jwk),
        bound("access_token", &session.access_token),
        bound("refresh_token", &session.refresh_token),
    ]
}

/// Delete a session ONLY if it still holds the secrets of `version`. `true` if
/// it was deleted; `false` if the row is gone or has been rewritten since.
///
/// The sign-out's delete. A sign-out revokes the token it READ and then
/// deletes; if a refresh rotated the row in between (the live app refreshes
/// under an in-process lock a separate process cannot share), an
/// unconditional delete removes the NEW token — never revoked, and no longer
/// on record for anyone to revoke.
pub async fn delete_session_if_unchanged(
    pool: &SqlitePool,
    sub: &str,
    version: &SessionVersion,
) -> Result<bool> {
    // One statement: the comparison and the delete are atomic, so a write
    // landing between "check" and "delete" is impossible.
    let result = sqlx::query(
        "DELETE FROM oauth_session WHERE sub = ?1 AND dpop_key_jwk = ?2 \
         AND access_token = ?3 AND refresh_token = ?4",
    )
    .bind(sub)
    .bind(&version.dpop_key_jwk)
    .bind(&version.access_token)
    .bind(&version.refresh_token)
    .execute(pool)
    .await
    .context("deleting the OAuth session (if unchanged)")?;
    Ok(result.rows_affected() > 0)
}

/// Every stored session's subject DID, in a stable order.
///
/// Reads the `sub` column only, so a row whose secrets no longer decrypt (a
/// rotated encryption key, a pre-AAD row) is listed like any other. That is the
/// point: the operator revoke-all walks this list, and an unreadable row still
/// needs its sign-out (which deletes it) before the database is wiped.
pub async fn list_session_subs(pool: &SqlitePool) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
    sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT sub FROM oauth_session ORDER BY sub")
        .fetch_all(pool)
        .await
        .context("listing the OAuth sessions")
}

/// Delete a session. `true` if one existed.
pub async fn delete_session(pool: &SqlitePool, sub: &str) -> Result<bool> {
    let result = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_session WHERE sub = ?1")
        .bind(sub)
        .execute(pool)
        .await
        .context("deleting the OAuth session")?;
    Ok(result.rows_affected() > 0)
}

/// Delete every pending login that has expired. Returns how many went.
///
/// An abandoned login -- the user is redirected and closes the tab -- leaves a
/// row holding a sealed DPoP key and is never consumed by `take_pending`, which
/// only runs when a callback arrives. Without this they accumulate forever, and
/// on a publicly reachable login form that is an unbounded write primitive
/// against the volume.
pub async fn sweep_expired_pending(pool: &SqlitePool, now: i64) -> Result<u64> {
    let result = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_state WHERE expires_at <= ?1")
        .bind(now)
        .execute(pool)
        .await
        .context("sweeping expired pending logins")?;
    Ok(result.rows_affected())
}

/// Delete DPoP nonces untouched since `cutoff`. Returns how many went.
///
/// The origins come from whatever handle a visitor typed into the login form,
/// and `put_nonce` runs during PAR — before any authentication. So this is a
/// pre-auth write primitive against the volume, the same argument that
/// justifies sweeping abandoned logins, applied to the one table that had no
/// sweeper. A nonce is also worthless once stale: the server issues a new one
/// with the next challenge.
pub async fn sweep_stale_nonces(pool: &SqlitePool, cutoff: i64) -> Result<u64> {
    let result = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_nonce WHERE updated_at <= ?1")
        .bind(cutoff)
        .execute(pool)
        .await
        .context("sweeping stale DPoP nonces")?;
    Ok(result.rows_affected())
}

/// The stored DPoP nonce for an origin, if any.
pub async fn get_nonce(pool: &SqlitePool, origin: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
    sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT nonce FROM oauth_nonce WHERE origin = ?1")
        .bind(origin)
        .fetch_optional(pool)
        .await
        .context("reading the stored DPoP nonce")
}

/// Record the latest DPoP nonce for an origin. Servers rotate nonces, so a
/// later value replaces the earlier one.
/// `now` is passed in rather than read here, matching the rest of this module —
/// and so the sweeper's age rule can be tested without waiting for a clock.
pub async fn put_nonce(pool: &SqlitePool, origin: &str, nonce: &str, now: i64) -> Result<()> {
    sqlx::query(
        r#"
        INSERT INTO oauth_nonce (origin, nonce, updated_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3)
        ON CONFLICT(origin) DO UPDATE SET
            nonce = excluded.nonce, updated_at = excluded.updated_at
        "#,
    )
    .bind(origin)
    .bind(nonce)
    .bind(now)
    .execute(pool)
    .await
    .context("storing the DPoP nonce")?;
    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::store::init_url;

    const KEY: &str = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa";
    const DID: &str = "did:plc:ewvi7nxzyoun6zhxrhs64oiz";
    const NOW: i64 = 1_700_000_000;

    async fn db() -> (sqlx::SqlitePool, Codec) {
        let pool = init_url("sqlite::memory:").await.unwrap();
        init_schema(&pool).await.unwrap();
        (pool, Codec::new(Some(KEY)).unwrap())
    }

    /// `sqlx::query` demands a `&'static str`, so a test that varies a COLUMN
    /// name has to leak. Test-only, bounded by the fixed column lists below.
    fn leak(sql: String) -> &'static str {
        Box::leak(sql.into_boxed_str())
    }

    fn pending(state: &str) -> PendingAuth {
        PendingAuth {
            state: state.to_string(),
            browser_binding_hash: "hash-of-cookie".into(),
            pkce_verifier: "verifier-secret".into(),
            dpop_key_jwk: r#"{"kty":"EC","d":"secret"}"#.into(),
            issuer: "https://auth.example.com".into(),
            pds_url: "https://pds.example.com".into(),
            did: DID.into(),
            auth_method: "private_key_jwt".into(),
            auth_kid: Some("featherreader-oauth-1".into()),
            redirect_uri: "https://feather-reader.com/oauth/callback".into(),
            requested_scope: "atproto transition:generic".into(),
            request_uri: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:abc".into(),
            app_return_to: Some("/reader".into()),
            expires_at: NOW + 600,
        }
    }

    // ── the atomic consume ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_pending_login_round_trips() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        let want = pending("state-1");
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &want).await?;

        let got = take_pending(&pool, &codec, "state-1", NOW).await?.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(got, want);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// **Single use.** The second arrival must find nothing, so it is rejected
    /// before any token call — a replayed `code` exchange can make the
    /// authorization server revoke the session the first one just created.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_pending_login_can_only_be_taken_once() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("state-1")).await?;

        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "state-1", NOW).await?.is_some());
        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "state-1", NOW).await?.is_none());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// The consume is one statement, so concurrent callbacks cannot both win.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn concurrent_takes_yield_exactly_one_winner() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("race")).await?;

        // Concurrent futures interleave at every `.await`, which is exactly
        // where a SELECT-then-DELETE would let two callers both see the row.
        let (a, b, c, d) = tokio::join!(
            take_pending(&pool, &codec, "race", NOW),
            take_pending(&pool, &codec, "race", NOW),
            take_pending(&pool, &codec, "race", NOW),
            take_pending(&pool, &codec, "race", NOW),
        );
        let winners = [a?, b?, c?, d?].iter().filter(|r| r.is_some()).count();
        assert_eq!(winners, 1, "more than one caller consumed the same state");
        Ok(())
    }

    /// An expired row is not returned — and is consumed anyway, so it cannot be
    /// probed for existence afterwards.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn an_expired_pending_login_is_rejected_and_removed() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("stale")).await?;

        let after_expiry = NOW + 601;
        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "stale", after_expiry)
            .await?
            .is_none());
        // Gone even at a time when it would have been valid.
        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "stale", NOW).await?.is_none());
        Ok(())
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn an_unknown_state_is_simply_absent() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "never-existed", NOW)
            .await?
            .is_none());
        Ok(())
    }

    // ── AAD binding, end to end ──────────────────────────────────────────────

    /// The secrets must not be readable from the database itself.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn secret_columns_are_stored_encrypted() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("state-1")).await?;

        let (verifier, jwk): (String, String) =
            sqlx::query_as("SELECT pkce_verifier, dpop_key_jwk FROM oauth_state WHERE state = ?")
                .bind("state-1")
                .fetch_one(&pool)
                .await?;
        for stored in [&verifier, &jwk] {
            assert!(stored.starts_with("enc.v2.gcm."), "not bound: {stored}");
        }
        assert!(!verifier.contains("verifier-secret"));
        assert!(!jwk.contains("secret"));
        Ok(())
    }

    /// **The reason AAD was pulled forward.** Anything able to write the
    /// database must not be able to graft one login flow's DPoP key onto
    /// another flow's state row.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_secret_moved_between_rows_does_not_decrypt() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("victim")).await?;
        let mut attacker = pending("attacker");
        attacker.dpop_key_jwk = r#"{"kty":"EC","d":"attacker-key"}"#.into();
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &attacker).await?;

        // Lift the attacker's sealed DPoP key into the victim's row.
        let stolen: String =
            sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT dpop_key_jwk FROM oauth_state WHERE state = ?")
                .bind("attacker")
                .fetch_one(&pool)
                .await?;
        sqlx::query("UPDATE oauth_state SET dpop_key_jwk = ? WHERE state = ?")
            .bind(&stolen)
            .bind("victim")
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;

        assert!(
            take_pending(&pool, &codec, "victim", NOW).await.is_err(),
            "a grafted ciphertext decrypted in the wrong row"
        );
        Ok(())
    }

    /// And between COLUMNS of the same row — the binding names the column too.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_secret_moved_between_columns_does_not_decrypt() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("state-1")).await?;

        let verifier: String =
            sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT pkce_verifier FROM oauth_state WHERE state = ?")
                .bind("state-1")
                .fetch_one(&pool)
                .await?;
        sqlx::query("UPDATE oauth_state SET dpop_key_jwk = ? WHERE state = ?")
            .bind(&verifier)
            .bind("state-1")
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;

        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "state-1", NOW).await.is_err());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// **A session secret moved between columns of the same row does not
    /// decrypt** — the `oauth_state` twin above, which never got written for
    /// `oauth_session`. `an_unbound_session_ciphertext_is_refused` says in its
    /// own doc that the column is part of the binding; nothing checked it, so
    /// dropping `column` from `session_aad` left the suite green. Against the
    /// declared adversary — anything that can write the database — that is
    /// `access_token` ↔ `refresh_token` swapped inside one row with both
    /// still authenticating, and `get_session` handing the refresh token to
    /// the PDS as an access token.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_session_secret_moved_between_columns_does_not_decrypt() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;
        let access: String =
            sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT access_token FROM oauth_session WHERE sub = ?")
                .bind(DID)
                .fetch_one(&pool)
                .await?;
        sqlx::query("UPDATE oauth_session SET refresh_token = ? WHERE sub = ?")
            .bind(&access)
            .bind(DID)
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;
        assert!(
            get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await.is_err(),
            "the access token's ciphertext was accepted in the refresh_token column"
        );
        Ok(())
    }

    /// **An absent expiry and a zero expiry are different sessions.** The AAD
    /// comment says `None` and `0` must not collide; the only tamper test
    /// stored `Some(NOW + 3600)` and flipped it to NULL, which differs under
    /// either encoding — so `unwrap_or(0)` in place of the `"none"` marker
    /// left the suite green. Flipping between NULL and 0 with every token
    /// still decrypting pins `is_stale` permanently one way or the other.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn an_absent_expiry_and_a_zero_expiry_are_different_sessions() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        for (stored, flipped_to) in [(None, "0"), (Some(0), "NULL")] {
            let (pool, codec) = db().await;
            put_session(
                &pool,
                &codec,
                &OAuthSession {
                    expires_at: stored,
                    ..session()
                },
            )
            .await?;
            // Two literals, chosen by the loop — not a bound parameter, because
            // binding `None` would write NULL through the same path the code
            // under test uses, and the point is a raw flip.
            sqlx::query(sqlx::AssertSqlSafe(format!(
                "UPDATE oauth_session SET expires_at = {flipped_to} WHERE sub = ?"
            )))
            .bind(DID)
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;
            assert!(
                get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await.is_err(),
                "expires_at {stored:?} → {flipped_to} still decrypted"
            );
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// **Binding the secrets is not enough: the DESTINATIONS must be bound too.**
    ///
    /// The declared adversary is anything able to write the database. Against
    /// that adversary, leaving `issuer`/`pds_url`/`did`/`redirect_uri` as plain
    /// unauthenticated columns defeats the whole scheme without touching a
    /// ciphertext — repoint the issuer and we mint a client assertion for the
    /// attacker's server and neutralise the RFC 9207 `iss` check, while every
    /// secret still decrypts perfectly.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn tampering_with_a_pending_logins_destinations_breaks_it() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        for column in [
            "issuer",
            "pds_url",
            "did",
            "redirect_uri",
            "browser_binding_hash",
            "auth_method",
            // Added after a cold review found each of these tamperable while
            // every ciphertext still verified:
            //
            // `auth_kid` selects the signing key and is never re-verified;
            // `requested_scope` and `request_uri` describe the grant being
            // completed; `app_return_to` is a declared post-login redirect
            // target, so unbound it becomes an open redirect the day it is
            // wired up — binding it now costs nothing.
            "auth_kid",
            "requested_scope",
            "request_uri",
            "app_return_to",
        ] {
            let (pool, codec) = db().await;
            put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("state-1")).await?;
            sqlx::query(leak(format!(
                "UPDATE oauth_state SET {column} = ? WHERE state = ?"
            )))
            .bind("https://evil.example")
            .bind("state-1")
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;
            assert!(
                take_pending(&pool, &codec, "state-1", NOW).await.is_err(),
                "tampering with `{column}` went undetected"
            );
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// The session's `aud` IS the PDS every later request is sent to, so
    /// repointing it would ship a live DPoP-bound access token to the attacker's
    /// host. It must break the tokens, not travel alongside them.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn tampering_with_a_sessions_destinations_breaks_it() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        for column in [
            "aud",
            "issuer",
            // `token_type` is refused outright on the wire if it is not `DPoP`,
            // but the stored copy was neither authenticated nor re-checked.
            "token_type",
            "granted_scope",
        ] {
            let (pool, codec) = db().await;
            put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;
            sqlx::query(leak(format!(
                "UPDATE oauth_session SET {column} = ? WHERE sub = ?"
            )))
            .bind("https://evil.example")
            .bind(DID)
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;
            assert!(
                get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await.is_err(),
                "tampering with `{column}` went undetected"
            );
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Stale nonces are swept; fresh ones are not.
    ///
    /// Its sibling `sweep_expired_pending` has a test and this had none —
    /// replacing the whole body with `Ok(0)` passed. The origins come from
    /// whatever handle a visitor types into the login form and are written
    /// during PAR, before any authentication, so the table is a pre-auth write
    /// primitive against the volume.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn stale_nonces_are_swept_and_fresh_ones_kept() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, _codec) = db().await;
        put_nonce(&pool, "https://old.example", "n1", NOW - 10_000).await?;
        put_nonce(&pool, "https://new.example", "n2", NOW).await?;

        assert_eq!(sweep_stale_nonces(&pool, NOW - 5_000).await?, 1);
        assert_eq!(get_nonce(&pool, "https://old.example").await?, None);
        assert_eq!(
            get_nonce(&pool, "https://new.example").await?.as_deref(),
            Some("n2"),
            "a nonce still in use was swept"
        );
        Ok(())
    }

    /// **An absent optional column and an empty one must not encode alike.**
    ///
    /// The tamper test above only ever writes a NON-EMPTY value, so it passed
    /// while `NULL` and `''` produced byte-identical AAD and either could be
    /// flipped to the other undetected. This covers both directions for both
    /// optional columns, which is the case that test could not see.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn swapping_an_absent_optional_column_for_an_empty_one_breaks_it() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        for (column, set_to_empty) in [
            ("auth_kid", true),
            ("auth_kid", false),
            ("app_return_to", true),
            ("app_return_to", false),
        ] {
            let (pool, codec) = db().await;
            let mut auth = pending("state-1");
            // Start from whichever state we are NOT flipping to.
            if set_to_empty {
                // Stored absent; an adversary makes it empty.
                if column == "auth_kid" {
                    auth.auth_kid = None;
                } else {
                    auth.app_return_to = None;
                }
            } else {
                // Stored empty; an adversary makes it absent.
                if column == "auth_kid" {
                    auth.auth_kid = Some(String::new());
                } else {
                    auth.app_return_to = Some(String::new());
                }
            }
            put_pending(&pool, &codec, &auth).await?;

            let sql = leak(format!(
                "UPDATE oauth_state SET {column} = ? WHERE state = ?"
            ));
            let query = if set_to_empty {
                sqlx::query(sql).bind(Some(String::new()))
            } else {
                sqlx::query(sql).bind(Option::<String>::None)
            };
            query.bind("state-1").execute(&pool).await?;

            assert!(
                take_pending(&pool, &codec, "state-1", NOW).await.is_err(),
                "`{column}`: {} went undetected",
                if set_to_empty {
                    "NULL -> ''"
                } else {
                    "'' -> NULL"
                }
            );
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// **A row's own lifetime is a destination.**
    ///
    /// Both the expiry check in `take_pending` and `sweep_expired_pending`
    /// filter on `expires_at`. While it was outside the AAD, anyone who could
    /// write the database could push it a year out and keep a pending login —
    /// with its sealed DPoP key and PKCE verifier — alive indefinitely, which is
    /// exactly what the ten-minute cap exists to prevent. Every ciphertext still
    /// verified.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn extending_a_pending_logins_expiry_breaks_it() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("state-1")).await?;
        sqlx::query("UPDATE oauth_state SET expires_at = ? WHERE state = ?")
            .bind(NOW + 31_536_000)
            .bind("state-1")
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;
        assert!(
            take_pending(&pool, &codec, "state-1", NOW).await.is_err(),
            "the expiry was extended without breaking the row"
        );
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Clearing a session's expiry made `is_stale` permanently false, so the
    /// session was never proactively refreshed — behaviour steered by an
    /// unauthenticated column while every token decrypted cleanly.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn clearing_a_sessions_expiry_breaks_it() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;
        sqlx::query("UPDATE oauth_session SET expires_at = NULL WHERE sub = ?")
            .bind(DID)
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;
        assert!(
            get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await.is_err(),
            "the expiry was cleared without breaking the row"
        );
        Ok(())
    }

    /// The AAD is length-prefixed, so no rearrangement of field boundaries can
    /// produce the same bytes. A delimiter-joined encoding is only safe while no
    /// field can contain the delimiter — and `did:web:…` subjects and URL
    /// issuers are exactly the inputs that erode that assumption.
    #[test]
    fn the_aad_encoding_is_unambiguous_across_field_boundaries() {
        assert_ne!(
            structured_aad("t", &["ab", "c"]),
            structured_aad("t", &["a", "bc"])
        );
        assert_ne!(
            structured_aad("t", &["a:b"]),
            structured_aad("t", &["a", "b"])
        );
        assert_ne!(
            structured_aad("t", &["a", ""]),
            structured_aad("t", &["", "a"])
        );
        assert_ne!(structured_aad("t1", &["a"]), structured_aad("t2", &["a"]));
    }

    /// Both nullable columns must survive the round trip as `None`.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_pending_login_round_trips_with_its_optional_fields_absent() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        let mut want = pending("state-1");
        want.auth_kid = None;
        want.app_return_to = None;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &want).await?;
        assert_eq!(
            take_pending(&pool, &codec, "state-1", NOW).await?.unwrap(),
            want
        );
        Ok(())
    }

    /// A row is expired AT `expires_at`, not one second later. The earlier test
    /// probed `expires_at + 1`, which cannot tell `<` from `<=`.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_pending_login_is_expired_at_exactly_its_expiry() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("edge")).await?;
        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "edge", NOW + 600)
            .await?
            .is_none());

        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("edge")).await?;
        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "edge", NOW + 599)
            .await?
            .is_some());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// An abandoned login — the user closes the tab after being redirected —
    /// leaves a row holding a sealed DPoP key. Without a sweep those accumulate
    /// forever, and on a publicly reachable login form that is an unbounded
    /// write primitive against the volume.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn expired_pending_logins_are_swept() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("old")).await?;
        let mut fresh = pending("fresh");
        fresh.expires_at = NOW + 3600;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &fresh).await?;

        assert_eq!(sweep_expired_pending(&pool, NOW + 700).await?, 1);
        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "old", NOW).await?.is_none());
        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "fresh", NOW).await?.is_some());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// An UNBOUND `enc.v1` value must be refused where a bound one is expected,
    /// or the binding is opt-out for anyone who can write the row.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn an_unbound_ciphertext_is_refused() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_pending(&pool, &codec, &pending("state-1")).await?;

        sqlx::query("UPDATE oauth_state SET pkce_verifier = ? WHERE state = ?")
            .bind(codec.encrypt("verifier-secret"))
            .bind("state-1")
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;

        assert!(take_pending(&pool, &codec, "state-1", NOW).await.is_err());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// The same downgrade check for sessions, which hold the LONG-LIVED tokens.
    /// Covering only `oauth_state` would leave an implementation that used
    /// `decrypt` instead of `decrypt_bound` here passing the whole suite.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn an_unbound_session_ciphertext_is_refused() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        for column in ["access_token", "refresh_token", "dpop_key_jwk"] {
            let (pool, codec) = db().await;
            put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;
            sqlx::query(leak(format!(
                "UPDATE oauth_session SET {column} = ? WHERE sub = ?"
            )))
            .bind(codec.encrypt("some-value"))
            .bind(DID)
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;
            assert!(
                get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await.is_err(),
                "an unbound value was accepted in `{column}`"
            );
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    // ── sessions ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    fn session() -> OAuthSession {
        OAuthSession {
            sub: DID.into(),
            issuer: "https://auth.example.com".into(),
            aud: "https://pds.example.com".into(),
            dpop_key_jwk: r#"{"kty":"EC","d":"session-key"}"#.into(),
            access_token: "access-abc".into(),
            refresh_token: "refresh-xyz".into(),
            token_type: "DPoP".into(),
            granted_scope: "atproto transition:generic".into(),
            expires_at: Some(NOW + 3600),
        }
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_session_round_trips() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;
        assert_eq!(get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await?.unwrap(), session());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Logging in again must REPLACE the session, not fail on the primary key.
    /// A plain INSERT here is the bug that 500s every second login.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn re_login_replaces_the_existing_session() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;

        let mut second = session();
        second.access_token = "access-second".into();
        second.refresh_token = "refresh-second".into();
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &second).await?;

        let got = get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await?.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(got.access_token, "access-second");
        assert_eq!(got.refresh_token, "refresh-second");
        Ok(())
    }

    /// `expires_in` is optional in a token response, so the column is nullable
    /// and a session without one must survive the round trip.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_session_without_an_expiry_round_trips() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        let mut s = session();
        s.expires_at = None;
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &s).await?;
        assert_eq!(
            get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await?.unwrap().expires_at,
            None
        );
        Ok(())
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn session_tokens_are_bound_to_their_subject() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;

        let other = OAuthSession {
            sub: "did:plc:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa".into(),
            access_token: "access-other".into(),
            ..session()
        };
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &other).await?;

        let stolen: String =
            sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT access_token FROM oauth_session WHERE sub = ?")
                .bind(&other.sub)
                .fetch_one(&pool)
                .await?;
        sqlx::query("UPDATE oauth_session SET access_token = ? WHERE sub = ?")
            .bind(&stolen)
            .bind(DID)
            .execute(&pool)
            .await?;

        assert!(get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await.is_err());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// **The conditional delete removes only the version that was read.** A
    /// refresh that rotated the row since — even one storing identical
    /// plaintext, since every write re-encrypts — leaves it in place.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_rewritten_session_is_not_deleted_by_a_stale_version() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;
        let (_, stale) = get_session_versioned(&pool, &codec, DID).await?.unwrap();

        let rotated = OAuthSession {
            refresh_token: "refresh-rotated".into(),
            ..session()
        };
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &rotated).await?;
        assert!(
            !delete_session_if_unchanged(&pool, DID, &stale).await?,
            "reported deleting a row it should have left"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            get_session(&pool, &codec, DID)
                .await?
                .unwrap()
                .refresh_token,
            "refresh-rotated",
            "the ROTATED token was deleted on the strength of a stale read"
        );

        // Identical plaintext, rewritten: still a different version.
        let (_, before) = get_session_versioned(&pool, &codec, DID).await?.unwrap();
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &rotated).await?;
        assert!(!delete_session_if_unchanged(&pool, DID, &before).await?);

        // The current version deletes.
        let (_, current) = get_session_versioned(&pool, &codec, DID).await?.unwrap();
        assert!(delete_session_if_unchanged(&pool, DID, &current).await?);
        assert!(get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await?.is_none());
        assert!(!delete_session_if_unchanged(&pool, DID, &current).await?);
        Ok(())
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_deleted_session_is_gone() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;
        assert!(delete_session(&pool, DID).await?);
        assert!(get_session(&pool, &codec, DID).await?.is_none());
        assert!(!delete_session(&pool, DID).await?);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// **Every stored session is listed — including one that no longer
    /// decrypts.** The operator revoke-all walks this list; an unreadable row
    /// left off it would survive the revoke pass and be dropped by the wipe
    /// without the sign-out it is owed.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn every_session_subject_is_listed_including_an_unreadable_one() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, codec) = db().await;
        assert!(list_session_subs(&pool).await?.is_empty());

        put_session(&pool, &codec, &session()).await?;
        let other = OAuthSession {
            sub: "did:plc:bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb".into(),
            ..session()
        };
        put_session(&pool, &codec, &other).await?;
        // A row whose ciphertext cannot be decrypted at all.
        sqlx::query(
            "INSERT INTO oauth_session (sub, issuer, aud, dpop_key_jwk, access_token, \
             refresh_token, token_type, granted_scope, expires_at) \
             VALUES (?, 'https://auth.example.com', 'https://pds.example.com', \
             'garbage', 'garbage', 'garbage', 'DPoP', 'atproto', NULL)",
        )
        .bind("did:plc:cccccccccccccccccccccccc")
        .execute(&pool)
        .await?;
        assert!(
            get_session(&pool, &codec, "did:plc:cccccccccccccccccccccccc")
                .await
                .is_err(),
            "precondition: the raw row must be unreadable"
        );

        assert_eq!(
            list_session_subs(&pool).await?,
            vec![
                "did:plc:bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb".to_string(),
                "did:plc:cccccccccccccccccccccccc".to_string(),
                DID.to_string(),
            ]
        );
        Ok(())
    }

    // ── DPoP nonces ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    /// Nonces are per-ORIGIN and persist between requests: using one only for an
    /// immediate retry means every request pays a wasted round trip.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn nonces_are_stored_and_replaced_per_origin() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        let (pool, _) = db().await;
        assert_eq!(get_nonce(&pool, "https://a.example").await?, None);

        put_nonce(&pool, "https://a.example", "n1", NOW).await?;
        put_nonce(&pool, "https://b.example", "n2", NOW).await?;
        assert_eq!(
            get_nonce(&pool, "https://a.example").await?.as_deref(),
            Some("n1")
        );
        assert_eq!(
            get_nonce(&pool, "https://b.example").await?.as_deref(),
            Some("n2")
        );

        // Rotation: servers rotate nonces, so a later value replaces the earlier.
        put_nonce(&pool, "https://a.example", "n3", NOW).await?;
        assert_eq!(
            get_nonce(&pool, "https://a.example").await?.as_deref(),
            Some("n3")
        );
        Ok(())
    }
}