#![recursion_limit = "256"]
use std::future::Future;
use std::sync::{
Arc,
atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering},
};
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use asupersync::Cx;
use fastmcp_core::{AuthContext, McpContext, McpError, McpResult};
use fastmcp_protocol::{
Content, FINAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, JsonRpcRequest, Tool, protocol_policy::ProtocolPolicy,
};
use fastmcp_server::http_admission::security::scope_policy::request::ScopeRequestPolicy;
use fastmcp_server::http_admission::security::scope_policy::{
RequiredScopes, ScopeImplicationPolicy,
};
use fastmcp_server::{
AuthProvider, AuthRequest, Middleware, MiddlewareDecision, Server, ServerHttpEndpoint,
ServerHttpEndpointResponse, StaticTokenVerifier, TokenAuthProvider, ToolHandler,
};
use fastmcp_transport::http::{HttpMethod, HttpRequest, HttpResponse};
use serde_json::{Value, json};
const TOOL: &str = "scope_admission_probe";
#[derive(Default)]
struct Counts {
auth: AtomicUsize,
middleware: AtomicUsize,
error_hooks: AtomicUsize,
handler: AtomicUsize,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct Probe {
token: String,
verifier: StaticTokenVerifier,
provider: TokenAuthProvider,
counts: Arc<Counts>,
}
impl Probe {
fn new(grants: &[&str]) -> Self {
let nonce = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap()
.as_nanos();
let token = format!("scope-admission-{}-{nonce}", std::process::id());
let mut facts = AuthContext::with_subject(format!("scope-owner-{nonce}"));
facts.scopes = grants.iter().map(|grant| (*grant).to_owned()).collect();
facts.claims = Some(json!({"scope":grants.join(" ")}));
let verifier = StaticTokenVerifier::new([(token.clone(), facts)]).unwrap();
Self {
token,
provider: TokenAuthProvider::new(verifier.clone()),
verifier,
counts: Arc::new(Counts::default()),
}
}
fn snapshot(&self) -> (usize, usize, usize, usize) {
(
self.counts.auth.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
self.counts.middleware.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
self.counts.error_hooks.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
self.counts.handler.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
)
}
}
impl AuthProvider for Probe {
fn authenticate(&self, ctx: &McpContext, request: AuthRequest<'_>) -> McpResult<AuthContext> {
self.counts.auth.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
self.provider.authenticate(ctx, request)
}
}
impl ToolHandler for Probe {
fn definition(&self) -> Tool {
Tool {
name: TOOL.to_owned(),
description: None,
input_schema: json!({"type":"object"}),
output_schema: None,
icon: None,
version: None,
tags: Vec::new(),
annotations: None,
}
}
fn call(&self, ctx: &McpContext, _: Value) -> McpResult<Vec<Content>> {
self.counts.handler.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
let facts = ctx.auth().unwrap_or_else(AuthContext::anonymous);
Ok(vec![Content::text(
json!({"scopes":facts.scopes,"claims":facts.claims}).to_string(),
)])
}
}
struct ApplicationMiddleware {
probe: Probe,
cached: bool,
}
impl Middleware for ApplicationMiddleware {
fn on_request(&self, ctx: &McpContext, _: &JsonRpcRequest) -> McpResult<MiddlewareDecision> {
self.probe.counts.middleware.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
if self.cached {
assert!(
ctx.mark_response_cache_hit(1),
"the request scope must admit a cache hit"
);
Ok(MiddlewareDecision::Respond(json!({
"resultType":"complete", "content":[{"type":"text","text":"cache-hit"}]
})))
} else {
Ok(MiddlewareDecision::Continue)
}
}
fn on_error(&self, _: &McpContext, _: &JsonRpcRequest, error: McpError) -> McpError {
self.probe.counts.error_hooks.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
error
}
}
fn required(scopes: &[&str]) -> RequiredScopes {
RequiredScopes::new(scopes.iter().map(|scope| (*scope).to_owned()).collect()).unwrap()
}
fn policy(edges: &[(&str, &str)], scopes: &[&str]) -> ScopeRequestPolicy {
ScopeRequestPolicy::new(
8,
ScopeImplicationPolicy::new(
7,
edges
.iter()
.map(|(a, b)| ((*a).to_owned(), (*b).to_owned()))
.collect(),
)
.unwrap(),
vec![
("tools/list".to_owned(), required(&[])),
("tools/call".to_owned(), required(scopes)),
],
)
.unwrap()
}
fn server(probe: &Probe, cached: bool, authenticate: bool) -> Server {
let builder = Server::new("scope-admission", "1.0.0")
.protocol_policy(ProtocolPolicy::ModernOnly)
.unwrap()
.middleware(ApplicationMiddleware {
probe: probe.clone(),
cached,
})
.tool(probe.clone());
if authenticate {
builder.auth_provider(probe.clone()).build()
} else {
builder.build()
}
}
fn endpoint(server: Server) -> ServerHttpEndpoint {
#[cfg(not(feature = "legacy-2024-11-05"))]
let endpoint = server.into_http_endpoint();
#[cfg(feature = "legacy-2024-11-05")]
let endpoint = server.into_http_endpoint("http://scope.example");
endpoint.unwrap()
}
fn request(probe: &Probe, id: i64, method: &str, mut params: Value) -> HttpRequest {
params["_meta"] = json!({
"io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion":FINAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
"io.modelcontextprotocol/clientCapabilities":{},
});
let mut request = HttpRequest::new(HttpMethod::Post, "/mcp")
.with_header("host", "scope.example")
.with_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {}", probe.token))
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_header("accept", "application/json")
.with_header("mcp-protocol-version", FINAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
.with_header("mcp-method", method)
.with_body(
serde_json::to_vec(&json!({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":id,"method":method,"params":params}))
.unwrap(),
);
if method == "tools/call" {
request = request.with_header("mcp-name", TOOL);
}
request
}
fn call(probe: &Probe, id: i64) -> HttpRequest {
request(probe, id, "tools/call", json!({"name":TOOL,"arguments":{}}))
}
async fn dispatch(cx: &Cx, endpoint: &ServerHttpEndpoint, request: HttpRequest) -> HttpResponse {
let mut session = endpoint.open_session(cx).unwrap();
let response = session.handle_async(cx, request).await.unwrap();
session.close(cx).await;
match response {
ServerHttpEndpointResponse::Immediate(response) => response,
_ => panic!("JSON request should yield a complete response"),
}
}
fn body(response: &HttpResponse) -> Value {
serde_json::from_slice(&response.body).unwrap()
}
fn success(response: &HttpResponse) -> Value {
let document = body(response);
assert!(
document.get("error").is_none(),
"unexpected protocol failure: {document}"
);
assert_eq!(response.status.0, 200);
document["result"].clone()
}
fn denied(response: &HttpResponse, id: i64, probe: &Probe) -> Value {
let document = body(response);
assert_eq!(document["id"], id);
assert!(document.get("result").is_none());
assert!(document["error"]["code"].is_number());
assert_eq!(document["error"]["message"], "Operation is not permitted");
assert!(document["error"].get("data").is_none());
assert!(!String::from_utf8_lossy(&response.body).contains(&probe.token));
document["error"].clone()
}
fn run<F, Fut>(scenario: F)
where
F: FnOnce(Cx) -> Fut + Send + 'static,
Fut: Future<Output = ()> + Send + 'static,
{
asupersync::runtime::RuntimeBuilder::current_thread()
.with_reactor(asupersync::runtime::reactor::create_reactor().unwrap())
.blocking_threads(1, 4)
.build()
.unwrap()
.block_on(async move {
let parent = Cx::current().unwrap();
let mut task = parent.spawn(scenario).unwrap();
task.join(&parent).await.unwrap();
});
}
#[test]
fn http_scope_admission_one_edge_denial_stops_handler_and_reaccepts_baseline() {
run(|cx| async move {
let probe = Probe::new(&["admin"]);
let allowed = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, true)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(
&[("admin", "write"), ("write", "read")],
&["read", "write"],
))
.unwrap(),
);
let blocked = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, true)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[("admin", "write")], &["read", "write"]))
.unwrap(),
);
let first = success(&dispatch(&cx, &allowed, call(&probe, 1)).await);
let facts: Value =
serde_json::from_str(first["content"][0]["text"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
facts,
json!({"scopes":["admin"],"claims":{"scope":"admin"}})
);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (1, 1, 0, 1));
denied(&dispatch(&cx, &blocked, call(&probe, 2)).await, 2, &probe);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (2, 1, 0, 1));
assert_eq!(
success(&dispatch(&cx, &allowed, call(&probe, 3)).await),
first
);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (3, 2, 0, 2));
});
}
#[test]
fn http_scope_admission_requires_all_permissions_not_just_one_matching_grant() {
run(|cx| async move {
let probe = Probe::new(&["read"]);
let blocked = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, true)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[], &["read", "write"]))
.unwrap(),
);
let allowed = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, true)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[], &["read"]))
.unwrap(),
);
denied(&dispatch(&cx, &blocked, call(&probe, 1)).await, 1, &probe);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (1, 0, 0, 0));
success(&dispatch(&cx, &allowed, call(&probe, 2)).await);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (2, 1, 0, 1));
});
}
#[test]
fn http_scope_admission_explicit_public_rule_does_not_make_unlisted_methods_public() {
run(|cx| async move {
let probe = Probe::new(&["read"]);
let endpoint = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, true)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[], &["write"]))
.unwrap(),
);
let list =
success(&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, request(&probe, 1, "tools/list", json!({}))).await);
assert_eq!(list["tools"][0]["name"], TOOL);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (1, 1, 0, 0));
denied(
&dispatch(
&cx,
&endpoint,
request(&probe, 2, "resources/list", json!({})),
)
.await,
2,
&probe,
);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (2, 1, 0, 0));
denied(&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, call(&probe, 3)).await, 3, &probe);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (3, 1, 0, 0));
});
}
#[test]
fn http_scope_admission_caller_metadata_and_arguments_cannot_install_permissions() {
run(|cx| async move {
let probe = Probe::new(&["read"]);
let endpoint = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, true)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[], &["write"]))
.unwrap(),
);
let baseline = denied(&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, call(&probe, 1)).await, 1, &probe);
let mut injected = call(&probe, 2);
let mut document: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&injected.body).unwrap();
document["params"]["_meta"]["com.example/scopePolicy"] =
json!({"scopes":["write"],"implications":[["read","write"]]});
document["params"]["arguments"] =
json!({"scopes":["write"],"requiredScopes":[],"policyRevision":999});
injected.body = serde_json::to_vec(&document).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
denied(&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, injected).await, 2, &probe),
baseline
);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (2, 0, 0, 0));
});
}
#[test]
fn http_scope_admission_precedes_an_application_cache_that_short_circuits_dispatch() {
run(|cx| async move {
let probe = Probe::new(&["read"]);
let blocked = endpoint(
server(&probe, true, true)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[], &["write"]))
.unwrap(),
);
let allowed = endpoint(
server(&probe, true, true)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[], &["read"]))
.unwrap(),
);
denied(&dispatch(&cx, &blocked, call(&probe, 1)).await, 1, &probe);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (1, 0, 0, 0));
let cached = success(&dispatch(&cx, &allowed, call(&probe, 2)).await);
assert_eq!(cached["content"][0]["text"], "cache-hit");
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (2, 1, 0, 0));
denied(&dispatch(&cx, &blocked, call(&probe, 3)).await, 3, &probe);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (3, 1, 0, 0));
});
}
#[test]
fn http_scope_admission_stacked_policies_intersect_instead_of_replacing_restrictions() {
run(|cx| async move {
let probe = Probe::new(&["read"]);
for strict_first in [true, false] {
let strict = policy(&[], &["write"]);
let public = policy(&[], &[]);
let (first, second) = if strict_first {
(strict, public)
} else {
(public, strict)
};
let endpoint = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, true)
.with_scope_authorization(first)
.unwrap()
.with_scope_authorization(second)
.unwrap(),
);
denied(&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, call(&probe, 1)).await, 1, &probe);
}
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (2, 0, 0, 0));
});
}
#[test]
fn http_scope_admission_anonymous_access_requires_an_explicit_empty_rule() {
run(|cx| async move {
let probe = Probe::new(&[]);
let allowed = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, false)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[], &[]))
.unwrap(),
);
let blocked = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, false)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[], &["read"]))
.unwrap(),
);
let mut anonymous = call(&probe, 1);
anonymous.headers.remove("authorization");
success(&dispatch(&cx, &allowed, anonymous.clone()).await);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (0, 1, 0, 1));
denied(&dispatch(&cx, &blocked, anonymous).await, 1, &probe);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (0, 1, 0, 1));
});
}
#[test]
fn http_scope_admission_does_not_cache_a_prior_credential_grant_after_revocation() {
run(|cx| async move {
let probe = Probe::new(&["admin"]);
let endpoint = endpoint(
server(&probe, false, true)
.with_scope_authorization(policy(&[("admin", "read")], &["read"]))
.unwrap(),
);
success(&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, call(&probe, 1)).await);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (1, 1, 0, 1));
assert!(probe.verifier.revoke_token(&probe.token).unwrap());
let response = dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, call(&probe, 2)).await;
assert_eq!(response.status.0, 401);
assert!(response.headers.contains_key("www-authenticate"));
assert_eq!(probe.counts.auth.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 2);
assert_eq!(probe.counts.middleware.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
assert_eq!(probe.counts.handler.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
});
}
mod named_operation_tests {
use super::*;
use fastmcp_server::http_admission::security::HttpSecurityPolicy;
use fastmcp_server::http_admission::security::endpoint::{
SecuredHttpEndpointError,
revalidation::{SseAuthorizationError, SseRevalidationPolicy},
};
use fastmcp_server::http_admission::security::scope_policy::request::operation::{
OperationScopePolicy, ScopedOperation,
};
use fastmcp_server::http_admission::{HttpAdmissionLimits, HttpEndpointConfig};
use std::time::Duration;
const PRIVATE_TOOL: &str = "private_write_probe";
struct OtherTool(Probe);
impl ToolHandler for OtherTool {
fn definition(&self) -> Tool {
let mut definition = self.0.definition();
definition.name = PRIVATE_TOOL.to_owned();
definition
}
fn call(&self, ctx: &McpContext, arguments: Value) -> McpResult<Vec<Content>> {
self.0.call(ctx, arguments)
}
}
fn named_server(probe: &Probe, cached: bool) -> Server {
Server::new("named-operation-test", "1")
.protocol_policy(ProtocolPolicy::ModernOnly)
.unwrap()
.auth_provider(probe.clone())
.middleware(ApplicationMiddleware {
probe: probe.clone(),
cached,
})
.tool(probe.clone())
.tool(OtherTool(probe.clone()))
.build()
}
fn named_rules() -> OperationScopePolicy {
OperationScopePolicy::new(
10,
policy(&[], &["invoke"]),
vec![
(ScopedOperation::ToolCall(TOOL.into()), required(&["read"])),
(
ScopedOperation::ToolCall(PRIVATE_TOOL.into()),
required(&["write"]),
),
],
)
.unwrap()
}
fn named_call(probe: &Probe, id: i64, name: &str, sse: bool) -> HttpRequest {
request(probe, id, "tools/call", json!({"name":name,"arguments":{}}))
.with_header("mcp-name", name)
.with_header(
"accept",
if sse {
"text/event-stream"
} else {
"application/json"
},
)
}
fn native_policy(revalidate: bool) -> HttpSecurityPolicy {
let policy = HttpSecurityPolicy::new(
HttpEndpointConfig::new("/mcp", HttpAdmissionLimits::new(32, 8192, 65536).unwrap())
.unwrap(),
"https://scope.example",
vec![],
)
.unwrap()
.with_scope_authorization(ScopeRequestPolicy::for_operations(named_rules()).unwrap())
.unwrap();
if revalidate {
policy
.with_sse_revalidation(
SseRevalidationPolicy::new(
Duration::from_millis(25),
Duration::from_millis(25),
64,
)
.unwrap(),
)
.unwrap()
} else {
policy
}
}
async fn native_immediate(
cx: &Cx,
endpoint: &ServerHttpEndpoint,
policy: &HttpSecurityPolicy,
request: HttpRequest,
) -> HttpResponse {
let response = Box::pin(endpoint.handle_secured_async(cx, policy, request))
.await
.unwrap();
let (response, mut stream) = response.into_parts();
let streaming = stream.is_some();
if let Some(stream) = &mut stream {
stream.close(cx).await;
}
assert!(
!streaming,
"JSON or refused operation must not allocate an SSE response"
);
response
}
#[test]
fn named_permissions_precede_real_handlers_and_short_circuit_caches() {
run(|cx| async move {
for cached in [false, true] {
for adapted in [false, true] {
let probe = Probe::new(&["invoke", "read"]);
let server = named_server(&probe, cached);
let server = if adapted {
server
.with_scope_authorization(
ScopeRequestPolicy::for_operations(named_rules()).unwrap(),
)
.unwrap()
} else {
server
.with_operation_scope_authorization(named_rules())
.unwrap()
};
let endpoint = endpoint(server);
let first = success(
&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, named_call(&probe, 1, TOOL, false)).await,
);
if cached {
assert_eq!(first["content"][0]["text"], "cache-hit");
} else {
let facts: Value =
serde_json::from_str(first["content"][0]["text"].as_str().unwrap())
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
facts,
json!({"scopes":["invoke","read"],"claims":{"scope":"invoke read"}})
);
}
let effects = usize::from(!cached);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (1, 1, 0, effects));
let forbidden = denied(
&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, named_call(&probe, 2, PRIVATE_TOOL, false)).await,
2,
&probe,
);
let unknown = denied(
&dispatch(
&cx,
&endpoint,
named_call(&probe, 3, "unregistered_tool", false),
)
.await,
3,
&probe,
);
assert_eq!(
unknown, forbidden,
"existing and absent forbidden targets have the same error"
);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (3, 1, 0, effects));
let mut spoofed = named_call(&probe, 4, PRIVATE_TOOL, false);
let mut document: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&spoofed.body).unwrap();
document["params"]["arguments"] = json!({"name":TOOL,"scopes":["write"]});
document["params"]["_meta"]["com.example/operation"] =
json!({"name":TOOL,"requiredScopes":[]});
spoofed.body = serde_json::to_vec(&document).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
denied(&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, spoofed).await, 4, &probe),
forbidden
);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (4, 1, 0, effects));
assert_eq!(
success(
&dispatch(&cx, &endpoint, named_call(&probe, 5, TOOL, false)).await
),
first
);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (5, 2, 0, 2 * effects));
}
}
});
}
#[test]
fn native_named_json_and_sse_denials_precede_dispatch_and_preserve_valid_reuse() {
run(|cx| async move {
let probe = Probe::new(&["invoke", "read"]);
let endpoint = endpoint(named_server(&probe, false));
let policy = native_policy(false);
let baseline = success(
&native_immediate(&cx, &endpoint, &policy, named_call(&probe, 1, TOOL, false))
.await,
);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (1, 1, 0, 1));
let mut id = 2;
for sse in [false, true] {
let forbidden = native_immediate(
&cx,
&endpoint,
&policy,
named_call(&probe, id, PRIVATE_TOOL, sse),
)
.await;
id += 1;
let unknown = native_immediate(
&cx,
&endpoint,
&policy,
named_call(&probe, id, "unregistered_tool", sse),
)
.await;
id += 1;
assert_eq!(forbidden.status.0, 403);
assert_eq!(unknown.status.0, 403);
assert_eq!(unknown.headers, forbidden.headers);
assert_eq!(unknown.body, forbidden.body);
assert!(forbidden.body.is_empty());
assert_eq!(
forbidden.headers["www-authenticate"],
"Bearer error=\"insufficient_scope\""
);
assert_eq!(forbidden.headers["cache-control"], "no-store");
assert!(!forbidden.headers.contains_key("transfer-encoding"));
assert!(!format!("{:?}", forbidden.headers).contains(PRIVATE_TOOL));
}
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (5, 1, 0, 1));
assert_eq!(
success(
&native_immediate(&cx, &endpoint, &policy, named_call(&probe, 6, TOOL, false))
.await
),
baseline
);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (6, 2, 0, 2));
assert!(probe.verifier.revoke_token(&probe.token).unwrap());
let revoked =
native_immediate(&cx, &endpoint, &policy, named_call(&probe, 7, TOOL, false)).await;
assert_eq!(revoked.status.0, 401);
assert_eq!(probe.snapshot(), (7, 2, 0, 2));
});
}
#[test]
fn operation_scoped_sse_delivers_valid_results_but_withholds_revoked_credentials() {
run(|cx| async move {
for revoked in [false, true] {
let probe = Probe::new(&["invoke", "read"]);
let endpoint = endpoint(named_server(&probe, false));
let policy = native_policy(true);
let response = Box::pin(endpoint.handle_secured_async(
&cx,
&policy,
named_call(&probe, 1, TOOL, true),
))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(response.response().status.0, 200);
let (_, stream) = response.into_parts();
let mut stream =
stream.expect("authorized operation produces a guarded SSE response");
assert!(
stream.stream().is_none(),
"raw body access cannot bypass authorization"
);
asupersync::time::timeout(cx.now(), Duration::from_secs(3), async {
while probe.counts.handler.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0 {
asupersync::time::sleep(cx.now(), Duration::from_millis(1)).await;
}
})
.await
.expect("registered tool must execute within the fixture bound");
if revoked {
assert!(probe.verifier.revoke_token(&probe.token).unwrap());
}
asupersync::time::sleep(cx.now(), Duration::from_millis(40)).await;
let event = asupersync::time::timeout(
cx.now(),
Duration::from_secs(3),
stream.next_event(&cx),
)
.await
.expect("bounded SSE authorization wait");
if revoked {
assert!(matches!(
event,
Err(SecuredHttpEndpointError::Revalidation(
SseAuthorizationError::Rejected
))
));
} else {
let bytes = event.unwrap().unwrap().to_bytes().unwrap();
let wire = String::from_utf8(bytes).unwrap();
let data = wire
.lines()
.filter_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("data:"))
.map(str::trim_start)
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n");
let message: Value = serde_json::from_str(&data).unwrap();
assert_eq!(message["id"], 1);
assert!(message.get("error").is_none());
let facts: Value = serde_json::from_str(
message["result"]["content"][0]["text"].as_str().unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(facts["scopes"], json!(["invoke", "read"]));
assert!(
asupersync::time::timeout(
cx.now(),
Duration::from_secs(3),
stream.next_event(&cx)
)
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap()
.is_none()
);
}
assert!(
probe.counts.auth.load(Ordering::SeqCst) >= 2,
"fresh provider verdict is required after interval expiry"
);
assert_eq!(probe.counts.handler.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
stream.close(&cx).await;
assert!(cx.checkpoint().is_ok());
}
});
}
}