fastmcp-client 0.7.1

//! HTTPS-only bearer-credential binding for the modern HTTP client.
//!
//! HTTP-03 requires that a bearer credential is attached only when the
//! complete configured target is the same admitted HTTPS resource the
//! credential was bound to, and never to a cleartext `http:` endpoint —
//! including localhost and loopback literals. A local server behind a TLS
//! terminator is addressed by its public HTTPS URL from the client side.
//!
//! The rules are enforced structurally rather than at call sites:
//!
//! - A [`BoundBearerCredential`] can only be constructed against an `https`
//!   [`CanonicalHttpUrl`], so a cleartext binding never exists.
//! - [`BoundBearerCredential::authorization_for_target`] returns a header
//!   value only for a target canonically equal to the bound resource; every
//!   other target — different path, authority, scheme, or query — yields
//!   `None` rather than a downgraded or redirected credential.
//! - The token is redacted from `Debug` output so credentials cannot leak
//!   through diagnostics, and header-hostile bytes are refused at binding.

use core::fmt;

pub use fastmcp_core::CanonicalHttpUrl;

/// Typed refusals raised when constructing a credential binding.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum BearerBindingError {
    /// The binding resource is not an `https` URL. Cleartext HTTP —
    /// including localhost and loopback literals — can never hold a bearer
    /// credential.
    CleartextResource,
    /// The token is empty.
    EmptyToken,
    /// The token contains bytes that cannot safely become an HTTP header
    /// value.
    InvalidTokenBytes,
}

impl fmt::Display for BearerBindingError {
    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
        match self {
            Self::CleartextResource => {
                formatter.write_str("bearer credentials bind only to https resources")
            }
            Self::EmptyToken => formatter.write_str("bearer token is empty"),
            Self::InvalidTokenBytes => {
                formatter.write_str("bearer token contains header-hostile bytes")
            }
        }
    }
}

impl std::error::Error for BearerBindingError {}

/// A bearer token bound to exactly one admitted HTTPS resource.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct BoundBearerCredential {
    resource: CanonicalHttpUrl,
    token: String,
}

impl fmt::Debug for BoundBearerCredential {
    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
        formatter
            .debug_struct("BoundBearerCredential")
            .field("resource", &self.resource.as_str())
            .field("token", &"<redacted>")
            .finish()
    }
}

impl BoundBearerCredential {
    /// Binds a token to one admitted HTTPS resource.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Returns a typed [`BearerBindingError`] when the resource is not
    /// `https` or the token is empty or header-hostile. There is no
    /// cleartext escape hatch: an `http:` resource — remote, localhost, or
    /// loopback — can never hold a credential.
    pub fn bind(
        resource: CanonicalHttpUrl,
        token: impl Into<String>,
    ) -> Result<Self, BearerBindingError> {
        if !resource.as_str().starts_with("https://") {
            return Err(BearerBindingError::CleartextResource);
        }
        let token = token.into();
        if token.is_empty() {
            return Err(BearerBindingError::EmptyToken);
        }
        if token
            .bytes()
            .any(|byte| byte.is_ascii_control() || byte == b' ')
        {
            return Err(BearerBindingError::InvalidTokenBytes);
        }
        Ok(Self { resource, token })
    }

    /// Returns the bound HTTPS resource.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn resource(&self) -> &CanonicalHttpUrl {
        &self.resource
    }

    /// Returns the `Authorization` header value for `target`, or `None`
    /// when the target is not canonically identical to the bound resource.
    ///
    /// A `None` is not an error: the request simply proceeds without a
    /// credential, so a mismatched, downgraded, or redirected target can
    /// never observe the token.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn authorization_for_target(&self, target: &CanonicalHttpUrl) -> Option<String> {
        if target.as_str() == self.resource.as_str() {
            Some(format!("Bearer {}", self.token))
        } else {
            None
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::{BearerBindingError, BoundBearerCredential, CanonicalHttpUrl};

    fn url(value: &str) -> CanonicalHttpUrl {
        CanonicalHttpUrl::parse(value).expect("test URL is canonical")
    }

    #[test]
    fn binds_only_to_https_resources() {
        assert!(BoundBearerCredential::bind(url("https://mcp.example/api"), "token-1").is_ok());

        for cleartext in [
            "http://mcp.example/api",
            "http://localhost:8080/api",
            "http://127.0.0.1:8080/api",
            "http://[::1]:8080/api",
        ] {
            assert_eq!(
                BoundBearerCredential::bind(url(cleartext), "token-1").err(),
                Some(BearerBindingError::CleartextResource),
                "cleartext resource {cleartext:?} must never hold a credential"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn refuses_empty_and_header_hostile_tokens() {
        let resource = url("https://mcp.example/api");
        assert_eq!(
            BoundBearerCredential::bind(resource.clone(), "").err(),
            Some(BearerBindingError::EmptyToken)
        );
        assert_eq!(
            BoundBearerCredential::bind(resource.clone(), "to\r\nken").err(),
            Some(BearerBindingError::InvalidTokenBytes)
        );
        assert_eq!(
            BoundBearerCredential::bind(resource, "to ken").err(),
            Some(BearerBindingError::InvalidTokenBytes)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn attaches_only_to_the_exact_bound_resource() {
        let credential =
            BoundBearerCredential::bind(url("https://mcp.example/api"), "token-1").expect("binds");

        assert_eq!(
            credential.authorization_for_target(&url("https://mcp.example/api")),
            Some("Bearer token-1".to_owned())
        );

        // One changed dimension per case: path, authority, scheme-equivalent
        // http twin, and added query all withhold the credential.
        for target in [
            "https://mcp.example/other",
            "https://other.example/api",
            "http://mcp.example/api",
            "https://mcp.example/api?extra=1",
        ] {
            assert_eq!(
                credential.authorization_for_target(&url(target)),
                None,
                "target {target:?} must not observe the token"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn debug_output_redacts_the_token() {
        let credential =
            BoundBearerCredential::bind(url("https://mcp.example/api"), "super-secret-token-value")
                .expect("binds");
        let debug = format!("{credential:?}");
        assert!(debug.contains("<redacted>"));
        assert!(
            !debug.contains("super-secret-token-value"),
            "the token must never appear in diagnostics: {debug}"
        );
    }
}