<h1 align="center">fast-mcp-ssh</h1>
<p align="center">SSH, SFTP and persistent shells for AI agents. One Rust binary, no runtime.</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="./LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue" alt="License" /></a>
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/rust-1.89%2B-b7410e?logo=rust" alt="Rust 1.89+" />
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-Linux%20%7C%20macOS%20%7C%20Windows-0078D6" alt="Platform" />
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/MCP-stdio-8A2BE2" alt="MCP stdio" />
</p>
An MCP server that gives a model real SSH access: one connection per host kept
alive across calls, a PTY shell that remembers `cd` and `export`, SFTP instead
of `cat > file`, regex guards before anything leaves your machine, and an
append-only audit log. Answers come back as TOON, roughly 40 percent fewer
tokens than JSON on tabular data.
## Install
```bash
cargo install --path . # or: cargo build --release
```
Copy [`hosts.example.toml`](./hosts.example.toml) to `~/.fast-mcp-ssh/hosts.toml`
and fill in your hosts. Keys go in `~/.fast-mcp-ssh/keys/<name>`; `auth` is
`key`, `agent` or `password`.
## Wire it up
`.mcp.json`, or `claude_desktop_config.json` for Claude Desktop:
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"ssh": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "fast-mcp-ssh"
}
}
}
```
## Tools
`host` is optional on every tool once `[defaults] default_host` is set.
| Run | `exec` `exec_batch` `sh` `interrupt` | One-shot, parallel fan-out, persistent PTY, Ctrl-C |
| Files | `ls` `stat` `dn` `up` `wr` `mkdir` `rm` `tail` | SFTP, plus `tail -n` / `tail -F` in a bounded window |
| Ops | `facts` `sys` `svc` | Cached host profile, parsed `ps`/`df`/`mem`/`net`, systemd units |
| Session | `hosts` `ping` `disconnect` `disconnect_all` `reload` | Discovery and lifecycle; `reload` swaps config without a restart |
| Network | `forward` `unforward` `forwards` | Local TCP forwards over the same connection |
Every tool carries MCP annotations (`readOnlyHint`, `destructiveHint`,
`idempotentHint`, `openWorldHint`) so a client can gate destructive calls.
## Security
- **Guards run before any SSH packet.** `deny_patterns` refuse outright,
`confirm_patterns` trigger an MCP elicitation, and a client that cannot
elicit is denied. `read_only = true` blocks anything that looks like a write.
- **Paths are checked on both sides.** Remote reads of keys, shadow files and
cloud credentials are refused, and so are local writes that would land in
your `~/.bashrc` or an autostart folder. Paths are re-checked after the
server resolves them, so a symlink cannot launder a blocked target.
- **Host keys are pinned** (TOFU by default, `strict` and per-host fingerprints
available). Every call is appended to `~/.fast-mcp-ssh/audit.log` as NDJSON,
with credentials scrubbed.
Guards are a speed bump against accidents, not a boundary against an adversary
who controls the model. Scope the remote account accordingly: full threat model
in [SECURITY.md](./SECURITY.md).
## Benchmark
50 iterations per scenario against the same Linux host over the same LAN, same
SSH key, bench client on Windows 11. Medians, lower is better. Reproduce with
[`benchmark/`](./benchmark); raw runs in
[`benchmark/results/`](./benchmark/results).
| Cold start | **41 ms** | 289 ms | 279 ms |
| `exec echo ok` | **1.5 ms** | 89.9 ms | 45.1 ms |
| `exec uname -a; whoami; pwd` | **2.4 ms** | 89.0 ms | 46.1 ms |
| `exec seq 1 5000` (~29 KB) | **18.7 ms** | 90.5 ms | 46.3 ms |
| Write a 1 KB file | **1.4 ms** | 90.9 ms | 45.7 ms |
| Read a 1 KB file | **2.1 ms** | 90.8 ms | 45.8 ms |
| Tool surface, sent every session | 23 tools, 17.6 KB | 37 tools, 39.9 KB | **4 tools, 1.7 KB** |
Both alternatives are Node processes, so ~250 ms of their cold start is the
runtime booting. The steady-state gap is the connection: `fast-mcp-ssh` keeps
one SSH session per host and spawns a channel per call, while the other two
reconnect. Writes go over SFTP here and through a `cat > file` heredoc there.
returning the same output. `ssh-mcp-server` returns raw stdout with no exit
code, which is why its replies are the shortest and why a failed command looks
like a successful one.
[mgr]: https://www.npmjs.com/package/mcp-ssh-manager
[fj]: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@fangjunjie/ssh-mcp-server
## Development
```bash
cargo test # unit tests
cargo clippy --all-targets # no warnings allowed in CI
./scripts/test-sh.ps1 # end-to-end against a real host (Windows)
```
Never write to stdout outside the MCP transport: a stray `println!` corrupts
the JSON-RPC stream and the client disconnects without an error. `tracing`
macros go to stderr and are safe.
## License
MIT.