exochain-proofs 0.2.0-beta

// Copyright 2026 Exochain Foundation
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at:
//
//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

//! Zero-knowledge ML verification.
//!
//! Verifies that a given output was produced by a committed model on a
//! committed input, without revealing the model weights or input data.
//!
//! # Provenance extensions (LEG-007)
//!
//! `InferenceProof` carries optional provenance fields required for FRE 702
//! / Daubert admissibility:
//!
//! - `prompt_hash` — distinct from `input_hash`; captures the system/user
//!   prompt separately from the contextual input data.
//! - `human_attestation` — a signed record of whether the reviewing human
//!   adopted, modified, or rejected the AI output.
//! - `ai_delta` — records the divergence between AI recommendation and final
//!   human decision.
//! - `daubert_checklist` — structured metadata for FRE 702 admissibility.
//!
//! All new fields are `Option<T>` with `#[serde(default)]` so that existing
//! serialized `InferenceProof` values continue to deserialize correctly
//! (Architecture panel backward-compat requirement).

use exo_core::{
    hash::hash_structured,
    types::{Hash256, PublicKey, Signature},
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

use crate::error::{ProofError, Result};

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// ModelCommitment
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// A commitment to a machine learning model.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ModelCommitment {
    /// Hash of the model architecture description.
    pub architecture_hash: Hash256,
    /// Hash of the model weights.
    pub weights_hash: Hash256,
    /// Model version identifier.
    pub version: u64,
}

impl ModelCommitment {
    /// Create a new model commitment.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(architecture: &[u8], weights: &[u8], version: u64) -> Self {
        Self {
            architecture_hash: Hash256::digest(architecture),
            weights_hash: Hash256::digest(weights),
            version,
        }
    }

    /// Compute the canonical commitment hash.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn commitment_hash(&self) -> Hash256 {
        let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
        hasher.update(b"zkml:model:");
        hasher.update(self.architecture_hash.as_bytes());
        hasher.update(self.weights_hash.as_bytes());
        hasher.update(&self.version.to_le_bytes());
        Hash256::from_bytes(*hasher.finalize().as_bytes())
    }
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Provenance types (LEG-007)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Whether the reviewing human adopted, modified, or rejected the AI output.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum AttestationDecision {
    /// Human accepted the AI output verbatim.
    Adopted,
    /// Human modified the AI output before finalising.
    Modified,
    /// Human rejected the AI output and decided independently.
    Rejected,
}

/// Signed human attestation over an AI inference.
///
/// Required for FRE 702 / Daubert admissibility: the attestation proves that
/// a qualified human reviewed the AI output and made an independent decision.
///
/// The `signature` field is an Ed25519 signature over the canonical message:
/// `b"zkml:attestation:" || reviewer_did_len_le_u64 || reviewer_did_bytes || ai_recommendation_hash || final_decision_hash || decision_variant_byte`
///
/// Daubert admissibility requires the stronger inference-bound message from
/// [`HumanAttestation::signing_message_for_inference`], which binds the
/// reviewer decision to the prompt hash, input hash, output hash, model
/// commitment, proof, and verification tag.
///
/// Callers must verify the signature against the reviewer's `public_key` before
/// relying on the attestation for evidentiary purposes.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct HumanAttestation {
    /// DID of the reviewing human.
    pub reviewer_did: String,
    /// Public key of the reviewer (for signature verification).
    pub reviewer_public_key: PublicKey,
    /// What the AI system recommended.
    pub ai_recommendation_hash: Hash256,
    /// What the human ultimately decided.
    pub final_decision_hash: Hash256,
    /// Whether the human adopted, modified, or rejected the AI output.
    pub decision: AttestationDecision,
    /// Ed25519 signature over the attestation payload.
    pub signature: Signature,
}

impl HumanAttestation {
    /// Compute the canonical message that must be signed by the reviewer.
    ///
    /// The reviewer DID length is part of the signed frame. If it cannot be
    /// represented exactly, the message is rejected instead of being encoded
    /// with a saturated sentinel length.
    pub fn signing_message(
        reviewer_did: &str,
        ai_recommendation_hash: &Hash256,
        final_decision_hash: &Hash256,
        decision: &AttestationDecision,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        let decision_byte: u8 = match decision {
            AttestationDecision::Adopted => 0x01,
            AttestationDecision::Modified => 0x02,
            AttestationDecision::Rejected => 0x03,
        };
        let reviewer_did_bytes = reviewer_did.as_bytes();
        let reviewer_did_len = u64::try_from(reviewer_did_bytes.len()).map_err(|_| {
            ProofError::InvalidProofFormat(format!(
                "reviewer DID length {} cannot be represented in canonical attestation frame",
                reviewer_did_bytes.len()
            ))
        })?;
        let mut msg = b"zkml:attestation:".to_vec();
        msg.extend_from_slice(&reviewer_did_len.to_le_bytes());
        msg.extend_from_slice(reviewer_did_bytes);
        msg.extend_from_slice(ai_recommendation_hash.as_bytes());
        msg.extend_from_slice(final_decision_hash.as_bytes());
        msg.push(decision_byte);
        Ok(msg)
    }

    /// Verify the Ed25519 signature on this attestation.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn verify_signature(&self) -> bool {
        let Ok(msg) = Self::signing_message(
            &self.reviewer_did,
            &self.ai_recommendation_hash,
            &self.final_decision_hash,
            &self.decision,
        ) else {
            return false;
        };
        exo_core::crypto::verify(&msg, &self.signature, &self.reviewer_public_key)
    }

    /// Compute the canonical inference-bound message that must be signed when
    /// the attestation is used for Daubert admissibility.
    pub fn signing_message_for_inference(
        reviewer_did: &str,
        ai_recommendation_hash: &Hash256,
        final_decision_hash: &Hash256,
        decision: &AttestationDecision,
        inference: &InferenceProof,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        let Some(prompt_hash) = inference.prompt_hash else {
            return Err(ProofError::InvalidProofFormat(
                "prompt_hash is required for inference-bound human attestation".into(),
            ));
        };
        let payload = HumanAttestationInferenceSigningPayload {
            domain: "exo.zkml.human_attestation.v2",
            reviewer_did,
            ai_recommendation_hash: *ai_recommendation_hash,
            final_decision_hash: *final_decision_hash,
            decision,
            model_hash: inference.model_commitment.commitment_hash(),
            input_hash: inference.input_hash,
            output_hash: inference.output_hash,
            proof: inference.proof,
            verification_tag: inference.verification_tag,
            prompt_hash,
        };
        canonical_cbor_message(&payload, "human attestation inference signing payload")
    }

    /// Verify this attestation against a concrete inference proof and its
    /// provenance fields.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn verify_for_inference(&self, inference: &InferenceProof) -> bool {
        let Ok(msg) = Self::signing_message_for_inference(
            &self.reviewer_did,
            &self.ai_recommendation_hash,
            &self.final_decision_hash,
            &self.decision,
            inference,
        ) else {
            return false;
        };
        exo_core::crypto::verify(&msg, &self.signature, &self.reviewer_public_key)
    }
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
struct HumanAttestationInferenceSigningPayload<'a> {
    domain: &'static str,
    reviewer_did: &'a str,
    ai_recommendation_hash: Hash256,
    final_decision_hash: Hash256,
    decision: &'a AttestationDecision,
    model_hash: Hash256,
    input_hash: Hash256,
    output_hash: Hash256,
    proof: Hash256,
    verification_tag: Hash256,
    prompt_hash: Hash256,
}

/// Captures divergence between AI recommendation and final human decision.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AiDelta {
    /// Hash of what the AI recommended.
    pub ai_output_hash: Hash256,
    /// Hash of the final human decision.
    pub human_output_hash: Hash256,
    /// True when the AI and human outputs differ.
    pub divergence_detected: bool,
}

impl AiDelta {
    /// Compute an AiDelta, setting `divergence_detected` automatically.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(ai_output: &[u8], human_output: &[u8]) -> Self {
        let ai_output_hash = Hash256::digest(ai_output);
        let human_output_hash = Hash256::digest(human_output);
        let divergence_detected = ai_output_hash != human_output_hash;
        Self {
            ai_output_hash,
            human_output_hash,
            divergence_detected,
        }
    }
}

/// Structured metadata for FRE 702 / Daubert admissibility.
///
/// An AI inference without a completed Daubert checklist should be treated as
/// `AdmissibilityStatus::Inadmissible` pending review.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DaubertChecklist {
    /// The AI methodology is documented and reproducible.
    pub methodology_documented: bool,
    /// The methodology has been subjected to peer review or publication.
    pub peer_reviewable: bool,
    /// The known or potential error rate of the technique (None = unknown).
    pub known_error_rate: Option<String>,
    /// The technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
    pub generally_accepted: bool,
}

impl DaubertChecklist {
    /// Returns true if all required Daubert elements are satisfied.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn is_complete(&self) -> bool {
        self.methodology_documented
            && self.peer_reviewable
            && self
                .known_error_rate
                .as_ref()
                .is_some_and(|error_rate| !error_rate.trim().is_empty())
            && self.generally_accepted
    }
}

/// Fail-closed Daubert admissibility decision for an inference proof.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum DaubertAdmissibility {
    /// All provenance required for Daubert/FRE 702 review is present.
    Admissible,
    /// Required provenance is missing or invalid.
    Inadmissible { reason: String },
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// InferenceProof
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Proof that an inference was correctly executed.
///
/// The core fields (`model_commitment`, `input_hash`, `output_hash`, `proof`,
/// `verification_tag`) are always present and backward-compatible with
/// existing serialized proofs.
///
/// The provenance fields (`prompt_hash`, `human_attestation`, `ai_delta`,
/// `daubert_checklist`) are `Option<T>` with `serde(default)` so that
/// pre-existing serialized proofs continue to deserialize.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct InferenceProof {
    /// The model commitment.
    pub model_commitment: ModelCommitment,
    /// Hash of the contextual input data (context window / user message).
    pub input_hash: Hash256,
    /// Hash of the output data.
    pub output_hash: Hash256,
    /// The cryptographic proof binding input -> model -> output.
    pub proof: Hash256,
    /// Auxiliary verification data.
    pub verification_tag: Hash256,

    // ---- LEG-007 provenance extensions (backward-compatible) ----
    /// Hash of the system/user prompt (distinct from `input_hash`).
    ///
    /// Separating prompt from context allows courts to assess whether the
    /// AI was directed toward a particular outcome.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub prompt_hash: Option<Hash256>,

    /// Signed human attestation: did the reviewer adopt, modify, or reject?
    #[serde(default)]
    pub human_attestation: Option<HumanAttestation>,

    /// Divergence record comparing AI recommendation to final human decision.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub ai_delta: Option<AiDelta>,

    /// Daubert admissibility checklist for FRE 702 compliance.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub daubert_checklist: Option<DaubertChecklist>,
}

impl InferenceProof {
    /// Return the fail-closed Daubert admissibility status for this proof.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn daubert_admissibility_status(&self) -> DaubertAdmissibility {
        if let Err(err) = crate::guard_unaudited("zkml::daubert_admissibility_status") {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: err.to_string(),
            };
        }

        if self.prompt_hash.is_none() {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: "prompt_hash is required for Daubert admissibility".into(),
            };
        }

        if !self.proof_integrity_valid() {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: "proof integrity check failed".into(),
            };
        }

        let Some(attestation) = &self.human_attestation else {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: "human_attestation is required for Daubert admissibility".into(),
            };
        };

        if !attestation.verify_for_inference(self) {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: "human_attestation signature failed verification".into(),
            };
        }

        if attestation.ai_recommendation_hash != self.output_hash {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: "human_attestation AI recommendation does not match proof output_hash"
                    .into(),
            };
        }

        let Some(ai_delta) = &self.ai_delta else {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: "ai_delta is required for Daubert admissibility".into(),
            };
        };

        if ai_delta.ai_output_hash != attestation.ai_recommendation_hash
            || ai_delta.human_output_hash != attestation.final_decision_hash
        {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: "ai_delta does not match human_attestation hashes".into(),
            };
        }

        let Some(checklist) = &self.daubert_checklist else {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: "daubert_checklist is required for Daubert admissibility".into(),
            };
        };

        if !checklist.is_complete() {
            return DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible {
                reason: "daubert_checklist is incomplete".into(),
            };
        }

        DaubertAdmissibility::Admissible
    }

    fn proof_integrity_valid(&self) -> bool {
        let model_hash = self.model_commitment.commitment_hash();
        let expected_proof =
            compute_inference_proof(&model_hash, &self.input_hash, &self.output_hash);
        let Ok(expected_tag) = compute_verification_tag(
            &model_hash,
            &self.input_hash,
            &self.output_hash,
            &self.proof,
            self.prompt_hash.as_ref(),
        ) else {
            return false;
        };

        constant_time_hash256_eq(&expected_proof, &self.proof)
            & constant_time_hash256_eq(&expected_tag, &self.verification_tag)
    }
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Prove
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Generate a basic proof (backward-compatible, no provenance fields).
///
/// Equivalent to the previous API.  New callers should prefer
/// `prove_inference_with_provenance()`.
///
/// **Unaudited** — gated behind the `unaudited-pedagogical-proofs` feature.
pub fn prove_inference(
    model: &ModelCommitment,
    input: &[u8],
    output: &[u8],
) -> Result<InferenceProof> {
    crate::guard_unaudited("zkml::prove_inference")?;
    let input_hash = Hash256::digest(input);
    let output_hash = Hash256::digest(output);
    let model_hash = model.commitment_hash();

    // Compute the proof: a deterministic binding of model + input + output.
    // NOTE: In a production ZKML system this would execute the model inside a
    // ZK circuit (R1CS or STARK).  This hash-based binding is the MVP
    // implementation and is documented as such for Daubert disclosure purposes.
    let proof = compute_inference_proof(&model_hash, &input_hash, &output_hash);

    let verification_tag =
        compute_verification_tag(&model_hash, &input_hash, &output_hash, &proof, None)?;

    Ok(InferenceProof {
        model_commitment: model.clone(),
        input_hash,
        output_hash,
        proof,
        verification_tag,
        prompt_hash: None,
        human_attestation: None,
        ai_delta: None,
        daubert_checklist: None,
    })
}

/// Generate a proof with full LEG-007 provenance.
///
/// `prompt` is the system/user prompt (separate from `input` context data).
/// The resulting proof carries a distinct `prompt_hash` for Daubert disclosure.
///
/// **Unaudited** — gated behind the `unaudited-pedagogical-proofs` feature.
pub fn prove_inference_with_provenance(
    model: &ModelCommitment,
    prompt: &[u8],
    input: &[u8],
    output: &[u8],
) -> Result<InferenceProof> {
    // guard applied via the inner call
    let mut proof = prove_inference(model, input, output)?;
    let prompt_hash = Hash256::digest(prompt);
    proof.prompt_hash = Some(prompt_hash);
    let model_hash = model.commitment_hash();
    proof.verification_tag = compute_verification_tag(
        &model_hash,
        &proof.input_hash,
        &proof.output_hash,
        &proof.proof,
        Some(&prompt_hash),
    )?;
    Ok(proof)
}

/// Verify that an inference proof is valid.
///
/// This checks that the proof correctly binds the model commitment, input hash,
/// and output hash without needing the actual model or input.
///
/// **Unaudited** — gated behind the `unaudited-pedagogical-proofs` feature.
/// Returns `Err(UnauditedImplementation)` when the feature is disabled.
pub fn verify_inference(proof: &InferenceProof) -> Result<bool> {
    crate::guard_unaudited("zkml::verify_inference")?;
    let model_hash = proof.model_commitment.commitment_hash();

    // Recompute the expected proof
    let expected_proof =
        compute_inference_proof(&model_hash, &proof.input_hash, &proof.output_hash);

    let proof_ok = constant_time_hash256_eq(&expected_proof, &proof.proof);

    // Recompute and check the verification tag
    let expected_tag = compute_verification_tag(
        &model_hash,
        &proof.input_hash,
        &proof.output_hash,
        &proof.proof,
        proof.prompt_hash.as_ref(),
    )?;

    let tag_ok = constant_time_hash256_eq(&expected_tag, &proof.verification_tag);

    Ok(proof_ok & tag_ok)
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Internals
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

fn compute_inference_proof(
    model_hash: &Hash256,
    input_hash: &Hash256,
    output_hash: &Hash256,
) -> Hash256 {
    let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
    hasher.update(b"zkml:proof:");
    hasher.update(model_hash.as_bytes());
    hasher.update(input_hash.as_bytes());
    hasher.update(output_hash.as_bytes());
    Hash256::from_bytes(*hasher.finalize().as_bytes())
}

fn compute_verification_tag(
    model_hash: &Hash256,
    input_hash: &Hash256,
    output_hash: &Hash256,
    proof: &Hash256,
    prompt_hash: Option<&Hash256>,
) -> Result<Hash256> {
    if let Some(prompt_hash) = prompt_hash {
        let payload = InferenceVerificationTagPayload {
            domain: "exo.zkml.verification_tag.v2",
            model_hash: *model_hash,
            input_hash: *input_hash,
            output_hash: *output_hash,
            proof: *proof,
            prompt_hash: *prompt_hash,
        };
        return hash_structured(&payload).map_err(|err| {
            ProofError::InvalidProofFormat(format!(
                "zkML verification tag canonical encoding failed: {err}"
            ))
        });
    }

    let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
    hasher.update(b"zkml:verify:");
    hasher.update(model_hash.as_bytes());
    hasher.update(input_hash.as_bytes());
    hasher.update(output_hash.as_bytes());
    hasher.update(proof.as_bytes());
    Ok(Hash256::from_bytes(*hasher.finalize().as_bytes()))
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
struct InferenceVerificationTagPayload {
    domain: &'static str,
    model_hash: Hash256,
    input_hash: Hash256,
    output_hash: Hash256,
    proof: Hash256,
    prompt_hash: Hash256,
}

fn canonical_cbor_message<T: Serialize>(value: &T, label: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut encoded = Vec::new();
    ciborium::into_writer(value, &mut encoded).map_err(|err| {
        ProofError::InvalidProofFormat(format!("{label} canonical CBOR encoding failed: {err}"))
    })?;
    Ok(encoded)
}

fn constant_time_hash256_eq(left: &Hash256, right: &Hash256) -> bool {
    let mut diff = 0u8;
    for idx in 0..32 {
        diff |= left.as_bytes()[idx] ^ right.as_bytes()[idx];
    }
    diff == 0
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

#[cfg(all(test, feature = "unaudited-pedagogical-proofs"))]
mod tests {
    use exo_core::crypto;

    use super::*;

    fn make_model() -> ModelCommitment {
        ModelCommitment::new(b"transformer-v1", b"weights-blob-1234", 1)
    }

    // ---- original tests (backward compat) ----

    #[test]
    fn model_commitment_deterministic() {
        let m1 = ModelCommitment::new(b"arch", b"weights", 1);
        let m2 = ModelCommitment::new(b"arch", b"weights", 1);
        assert_eq!(m1, m2);
        assert_eq!(m1.commitment_hash(), m2.commitment_hash());
    }

    #[test]
    fn different_models_different_hashes() {
        let m1 = ModelCommitment::new(b"arch1", b"weights1", 1);
        let m2 = ModelCommitment::new(b"arch2", b"weights2", 1);
        assert_ne!(m1.commitment_hash(), m2.commitment_hash());
    }

    #[test]
    fn different_versions_different_hashes() {
        let m1 = ModelCommitment::new(b"arch", b"weights", 1);
        let m2 = ModelCommitment::new(b"arch", b"weights", 2);
        assert_ne!(m1.commitment_hash(), m2.commitment_hash());
    }

    #[test]
    fn prove_and_verify() {
        let model = make_model();
        let proof =
            prove_inference(&model, b"classify this image", b"cat: 0.95, dog: 0.05").unwrap();
        assert!(verify_inference(&proof).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_fails_tampered_model() {
        let model = make_model();
        let mut tampered = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        tampered.model_commitment = ModelCommitment::new(b"evil-arch", b"evil-weights", 99);
        assert!(!verify_inference(&tampered).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_fails_tampered_input() {
        let model = make_model();
        let mut tampered = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        tampered.input_hash = Hash256::digest(b"different-input");
        assert!(!verify_inference(&tampered).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_fails_tampered_output() {
        let model = make_model();
        let mut tampered = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        tampered.output_hash = Hash256::digest(b"different-output");
        assert!(!verify_inference(&tampered).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_fails_tampered_proof_field() {
        let model = make_model();
        let mut tampered = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        tampered.proof = Hash256::ZERO;
        assert!(!verify_inference(&tampered).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_fails_tampered_tag() {
        let model = make_model();
        let mut tampered = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        tampered.verification_tag = Hash256::ZERO;
        assert!(!verify_inference(&tampered).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_inference_uses_constant_time_hash_comparisons() {
        let source = include_str!("zkml.rs");
        let Some(verify_start) = source.find("pub fn verify_inference") else {
            panic!("verify_inference must exist");
        };
        let Some(internals_start) = source.find("// Internals") else {
            panic!("internals marker must exist");
        };
        let verify_source = &source[verify_start..internals_start];

        assert!(
            verify_source.contains("constant_time_hash256_eq"),
            "verify_inference must use the constant-time Hash256 comparator"
        );
        assert!(
            !verify_source.contains("expected_proof != proof.proof"),
            "proof comparison must not use variable-time PartialEq"
        );
        assert!(
            !verify_source.contains("expected_tag == proof.verification_tag"),
            "verification tag comparison must not use variable-time PartialEq"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn different_inputs_different_proofs() {
        let model = make_model();
        let p1 = prove_inference(&model, b"input1", b"output1").unwrap();
        let p2 = prove_inference(&model, b"input2", b"output2").unwrap();
        assert_ne!(p1.proof, p2.proof);
    }

    #[test]
    fn same_inputs_same_proof() {
        let model = make_model();
        let p1 = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        let p2 = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p1, p2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn proof_hides_model_input() {
        let model = make_model();
        let proof = prove_inference(&model, b"secret input", b"secret output").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(proof.input_hash, Hash256::digest(b"secret input"));
        assert_eq!(proof.output_hash, Hash256::digest(b"secret output"));
        assert_eq!(
            proof.model_commitment.architecture_hash,
            Hash256::digest(b"transformer-v1")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_input_output() {
        let model = make_model();
        assert!(verify_inference(&prove_inference(&model, b"", b"").unwrap()).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn large_input_output() {
        let model = make_model();
        let proof = prove_inference(&model, &vec![0xABu8; 10_000], &vec![0xCDu8; 5_000]).unwrap();
        assert!(verify_inference(&proof).unwrap());
    }

    // ---- backward compat: old proofs (no Option fields) still deserialize ----

    #[test]
    fn backward_compat_deserialize_without_provenance_fields() {
        // A serialized proof without the new Option fields must deserialize with
        // all provenance fields set to None.
        let model = make_model();
        let proof = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        let json = serde_json::to_string(&proof).unwrap();
        let restored: InferenceProof = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
        assert!(restored.prompt_hash.is_none());
        assert!(restored.human_attestation.is_none());
        assert!(restored.ai_delta.is_none());
        assert!(restored.daubert_checklist.is_none());
    }

    // ---- LEG-007: prompt_hash distinct from input_hash ----

    #[test]
    fn zkml_proof_binds_model_and_prompt() {
        let model = make_model();
        let prompt = b"You are a board advisor. Recommend yes or no.";
        let context = b"Q4 revenue declined 15%.";
        let output = b"Recommend: reject the acquisition.";

        let proof = prove_inference_with_provenance(&model, prompt, context, output).unwrap();

        assert!(verify_inference(&proof).unwrap());
        assert!(proof.prompt_hash.is_some(), "prompt_hash must be present");
        // prompt_hash and input_hash must differ when prompt != context
        assert_ne!(
            proof.prompt_hash.unwrap(),
            proof.input_hash,
            "prompt_hash must be distinct from input_hash"
        );
        assert_eq!(proof.prompt_hash, Some(Hash256::digest(prompt)));
        assert_eq!(proof.input_hash, Hash256::digest(context));
    }

    #[test]
    fn prove_inference_with_provenance_verifies() {
        let model = make_model();
        let proof =
            prove_inference_with_provenance(&model, b"prompt", b"context", b"output").unwrap();
        assert!(verify_inference(&proof).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_inference_rejects_swapped_prompt_provenance() {
        let model = make_model();
        let mut proof =
            prove_inference_with_provenance(&model, b"prompt", b"context", b"output").unwrap();

        proof.prompt_hash = Some(Hash256::digest(b"different prompt"));

        assert!(
            !verify_inference(&proof).unwrap(),
            "prompt provenance must be bound to the inference verification tag"
        );
    }

    // ---- LEG-007: HumanAttestation with Ed25519 signature ----

    fn make_attestation(
        decision: AttestationDecision,
    ) -> (HumanAttestation, exo_core::types::SecretKey) {
        let (public_key, secret_key) = crypto::generate_keypair();
        let reviewer_did = "did:exo:reviewer-alice".to_string();
        let ai_rec = Hash256::digest(b"ai says: approve");
        let final_dec = Hash256::digest(b"human says: reject");

        let msg = HumanAttestation::signing_message(&reviewer_did, &ai_rec, &final_dec, &decision)
            .unwrap();
        let signature = crypto::sign(&msg, &secret_key);

        let att = HumanAttestation {
            reviewer_did,
            reviewer_public_key: public_key,
            ai_recommendation_hash: ai_rec,
            final_decision_hash: final_dec,
            decision,
            signature,
        };
        (att, secret_key)
    }

    fn make_inference_attestation(
        proof: &InferenceProof,
        final_decision_hash: Hash256,
        decision: AttestationDecision,
    ) -> (HumanAttestation, exo_core::types::SecretKey) {
        let (public_key, secret_key) = crypto::generate_keypair();
        let reviewer_did = "did:exo:reviewer-alice".to_string();
        let msg = HumanAttestation::signing_message_for_inference(
            &reviewer_did,
            &proof.output_hash,
            &final_decision_hash,
            &decision,
            proof,
        )
        .unwrap();
        let signature = crypto::sign(&msg, &secret_key);

        let att = HumanAttestation {
            reviewer_did,
            reviewer_public_key: public_key,
            ai_recommendation_hash: proof.output_hash,
            final_decision_hash,
            decision,
            signature,
        };
        (att, secret_key)
    }

    #[test]
    fn human_attestation_signature_verifies() {
        let (att, _) = make_attestation(AttestationDecision::Rejected);
        assert!(
            att.verify_signature(),
            "Valid Ed25519 attestation must verify"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn human_attestation_signing_message_frames_reviewer_did() {
        let reviewer_did = "did:exo:reviewer-alice";
        let ai_rec = Hash256::digest(b"ai recommendation");
        let final_dec = Hash256::digest(b"final decision");

        let msg = HumanAttestation::signing_message(
            reviewer_did,
            &ai_rec,
            &final_dec,
            &AttestationDecision::Modified,
        )
        .unwrap();

        let domain = b"zkml:attestation:";
        assert!(msg.starts_with(domain));
        let did_len_start = domain.len();
        let did_len_end = did_len_start + 8;
        let did_len_bytes: [u8; 8] = match msg[did_len_start..did_len_end].try_into() {
            Ok(bytes) => bytes,
            Err(_) => panic!("DID length prefix must be eight bytes"),
        };
        let expected_len = match u64::try_from(reviewer_did.len()) {
            Ok(len) => len,
            Err(_) => panic!("reviewer DID length must fit in u64"),
        };
        assert_eq!(u64::from_le_bytes(did_len_bytes), expected_len);
        assert_eq!(
            &msg[did_len_end..did_len_end + reviewer_did.len()],
            reviewer_did.as_bytes()
        );

        let mut legacy = domain.to_vec();
        legacy.extend_from_slice(reviewer_did.as_bytes());
        legacy.extend_from_slice(ai_rec.as_bytes());
        legacy.extend_from_slice(final_dec.as_bytes());
        legacy.push(0x02);
        assert_ne!(msg, legacy, "new attestations must not use legacy framing");
    }

    #[test]
    fn human_attestation_signing_message_does_not_saturate_reviewer_did_length() {
        let production = include_str!("zkml.rs");
        let signing_message_section = production
            .split("pub fn signing_message")
            .nth(1)
            .expect("signing_message function must exist")
            .split("pub fn verify_signature")
            .next()
            .expect("verify_signature function must follow signing_message");

        assert!(
            !signing_message_section.contains("unwrap_or(u64::MAX)"),
            "canonical attestation framing must fail closed instead of saturating reviewer DID length"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn human_attestation_rejects_legacy_unframed_signature() {
        let (public_key, secret_key) = crypto::generate_keypair();
        let reviewer_did = "did:exo:reviewer-alice".to_string();
        let ai_rec = Hash256::digest(b"ai says: approve");
        let final_dec = Hash256::digest(b"human says: reject");

        let mut legacy = b"zkml:attestation:".to_vec();
        legacy.extend_from_slice(reviewer_did.as_bytes());
        legacy.extend_from_slice(ai_rec.as_bytes());
        legacy.extend_from_slice(final_dec.as_bytes());
        legacy.push(0x03);

        let signature = crypto::sign(&legacy, &secret_key);
        let att = HumanAttestation {
            reviewer_did,
            reviewer_public_key: public_key,
            ai_recommendation_hash: ai_rec,
            final_decision_hash: final_dec,
            decision: AttestationDecision::Rejected,
            signature,
        };

        assert!(
            !att.verify_signature(),
            "legacy unframed attestations must not verify"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn human_attestation_tampered_decision_fails() {
        let (mut att, _) = make_attestation(AttestationDecision::Rejected);
        // Swap the decision after signing — signature must fail.
        att.decision = AttestationDecision::Adopted;
        assert!(
            !att.verify_signature(),
            "Tampered decision must fail verification"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn human_attestation_tampered_recommendation_fails() {
        let (mut att, _) = make_attestation(AttestationDecision::Adopted);
        att.ai_recommendation_hash = Hash256::digest(b"different");
        assert!(!att.verify_signature());
    }

    #[test]
    fn human_attestation_required_for_ai_output() {
        // A proof without human_attestation is flagged as lacking oversight.
        let model = make_model();
        let proof = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        assert!(
            proof.human_attestation.is_none(),
            "Basic prove_inference must not fabricate attestation"
        );
        // Caller must explicitly attach an attestation; absence = no oversight record.
    }

    // ---- LEG-007: AiDelta ----

    #[test]
    fn ai_delta_detects_divergence() {
        let delta = AiDelta::new(b"ai says approve", b"human says reject");
        assert!(delta.divergence_detected);
        assert_ne!(delta.ai_output_hash, delta.human_output_hash);
    }

    #[test]
    fn ai_delta_no_divergence_when_same() {
        let delta = AiDelta::new(b"approve", b"approve");
        assert!(!delta.divergence_detected);
        assert_eq!(delta.ai_output_hash, delta.human_output_hash);
    }

    // ---- LEG-007: DaubertChecklist ----

    #[test]
    fn daubert_checklist_complete_when_all_satisfied() {
        let checklist = DaubertChecklist {
            methodology_documented: true,
            peer_reviewable: true,
            known_error_rate: Some("< 2%".into()),
            generally_accepted: true,
        };
        assert!(checklist.is_complete());
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_checklist_incomplete_without_methodology() {
        let checklist = DaubertChecklist {
            methodology_documented: false,
            peer_reviewable: true,
            known_error_rate: None,
            generally_accepted: true,
        };
        assert!(!checklist.is_complete());
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_checklist_incomplete_without_known_error_rate() {
        let checklist = DaubertChecklist {
            methodology_documented: true,
            peer_reviewable: true,
            known_error_rate: None,
            generally_accepted: true,
        };

        assert!(
            !checklist.is_complete(),
            "Daubert admissibility requires a known or potential error rate"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_checklist_completeness_all_fields_required() {
        // Each false flag independently makes the checklist incomplete.
        for (doc, peer, accepted) in [
            (false, true, true),
            (true, false, true),
            (true, true, false),
        ] {
            let c = DaubertChecklist {
                methodology_documented: doc,
                peer_reviewable: peer,
                known_error_rate: None,
                generally_accepted: accepted,
            };
            assert!(!c.is_complete(), "Incomplete checklist must not pass");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn zkml_source_exposes_fail_closed_daubert_admissibility_status() {
        let source = include_str!("zkml.rs");
        let production = source
            .split("// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Tests")
            .next()
            .expect("production section exists");

        assert!(
            production.contains("pub enum DaubertAdmissibility"),
            "InferenceProof needs a typed Daubert admissibility decision"
        );
        assert!(
            production.contains("pub fn daubert_admissibility_status(&self)"),
            "InferenceProof callers need a fail-closed admissibility status API"
        );
    }

    fn complete_daubert_checklist() -> DaubertChecklist {
        DaubertChecklist {
            methodology_documented: true,
            peer_reviewable: true,
            known_error_rate: Some("< 2%".into()),
            generally_accepted: true,
        }
    }

    fn admissible_inference_proof() -> InferenceProof {
        let model = make_model();
        let ai_output = b"ai says: approve";
        let human_output = b"human says: reject";
        let mut proof = prove_inference_with_provenance(
            &model,
            b"constitutionally bounded prompt",
            b"case context",
            ai_output,
        )
        .unwrap();
        let human_output_hash = Hash256::digest(human_output);
        let (attestation, _) =
            make_inference_attestation(&proof, human_output_hash, AttestationDecision::Rejected);
        proof.human_attestation = Some(attestation);
        proof.ai_delta = Some(AiDelta::new(ai_output, human_output));
        proof.daubert_checklist = Some(complete_daubert_checklist());
        proof
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_admissibility_accepts_complete_verified_provenance() {
        let proof = admissible_inference_proof();

        assert!(verify_inference(&proof).unwrap());
        assert_eq!(
            proof.daubert_admissibility_status(),
            DaubertAdmissibility::Admissible
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_admissibility_rejects_replayed_attestation_with_swapped_prompt_hash() {
        let mut proof = admissible_inference_proof();
        assert_eq!(
            proof.daubert_admissibility_status(),
            DaubertAdmissibility::Admissible
        );

        proof.prompt_hash = Some(Hash256::digest(b"benign replacement prompt"));

        let status = proof.daubert_admissibility_status();
        assert!(
            matches!(status, DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible { ref reason } if reason.contains("integrity") || reason.contains("human_attestation")),
            "replayed provenance with a swapped prompt hash must be inadmissible, got {status:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_admissibility_rejects_legacy_output_only_attestation() {
        let mut proof = admissible_inference_proof();
        let (legacy_attestation, _) = make_attestation(AttestationDecision::Rejected);
        proof.human_attestation = Some(legacy_attestation);

        let status = proof.daubert_admissibility_status();

        assert!(
            matches!(status, DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible { ref reason } if reason.contains("human_attestation")),
            "Daubert admissibility must reject attestations that do not bind proof provenance, got {status:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_admissibility_rejects_missing_prompt_hash() {
        let mut proof = admissible_inference_proof();
        proof.prompt_hash = None;

        let status = proof.daubert_admissibility_status();

        assert!(
            matches!(status, DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible { ref reason } if reason.contains("prompt_hash")),
            "missing prompt hash must be inadmissible, got {status:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_admissibility_rejects_invalid_human_attestation() {
        let mut proof = admissible_inference_proof();
        let attestation = proof
            .human_attestation
            .as_mut()
            .expect("test proof has attestation");
        attestation.decision = AttestationDecision::Adopted;

        let status = proof.daubert_admissibility_status();

        assert!(
            matches!(status, DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible { ref reason } if reason.contains("human_attestation")),
            "invalid attestation must be inadmissible, got {status:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_admissibility_rejects_inconsistent_ai_delta() {
        let mut proof = admissible_inference_proof();
        let delta = proof.ai_delta.as_mut().expect("test proof has AI delta");
        delta.ai_output_hash = Hash256::digest(b"different AI output");

        let status = proof.daubert_admissibility_status();

        assert!(
            matches!(status, DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible { ref reason } if reason.contains("ai_delta")),
            "inconsistent AI delta must be inadmissible, got {status:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn daubert_admissibility_rejects_incomplete_checklist() {
        let mut proof = admissible_inference_proof();
        proof.daubert_checklist = Some(DaubertChecklist {
            methodology_documented: true,
            peer_reviewable: true,
            known_error_rate: None,
            generally_accepted: true,
        });

        let status = proof.daubert_admissibility_status();

        assert!(
            matches!(status, DaubertAdmissibility::Inadmissible { ref reason } if reason.contains("daubert_checklist")),
            "incomplete checklist must be inadmissible, got {status:?}"
        );
    }

    // ---- zkml_tampered_model_detected (alias of existing test) ----

    #[test]
    fn zkml_tampered_model_detected() {
        let model = make_model();
        let proof = prove_inference(&model, b"input", b"output").unwrap();
        let mut tampered = proof;
        tampered.model_commitment.weights_hash = Hash256::digest(b"evil-weights");
        assert!(!verify_inference(&tampered).unwrap());
    }
}