eth 0.9.3

no_std-first Ethereum execution-layer protocol toolkit facade.
Documentation

eth

eth is the public facade crate for a no_std-first Ethereum execution-layer protocol workspace.

The crate is intentionally conservative at 0.9.3: it provides explicit Ethereum primitive domains, bounded decode-budget policy, stable error categories, primitive RLP bridge helpers, a caller-provided Keccak-256 boundary, small first-party crate boundaries, optional sanitization support, and release evidence before RPC, signer, EVM, Reth, or P2P integrations become real dependencies.

Current Status

The current release candidate is 0.9.3.

Implemented now:

  • no_std facade with small first-party support crates.
  • Ethereum domain newtypes for chain, block, gas, nonce, timestamp, address, hash, wei, and transaction type values.
  • Constant-time equality composition for fixed-width hash and wei values.
  • Bounded decode limits plus stateful cumulative allocation, item, and proof-node accounting.
  • Canonical RLP scalar, list, and integer decoding plus no-allocation canonical encoding helpers.
  • No-allocation primitive RLP encode and exact-decode helpers for chain, block, gas, nonce, timestamp, address, hash, and wei values.
  • Caller-provided Keccak-256 trait boundary without a default hash implementation dependency.
  • Stable error codes, messages, categories, and formatting for codec, protocol, fork, feature, resource, and verification failures.
  • Optional sanitization bridge and derive macros outside the default feature set.
  • Release gates for formatting, clippy, tests, packaging, MSRV compatibility, dependency policy, audit, SBOM, and pentest evidence.

Not implemented yet:

  • No RPC transport.
  • No signer or local key storage.
  • No EVM execution adapter.
  • No Reth or P2P integration.
  • No transaction or block parser yet.

Trust Dashboard

Area Status
License MIT OR Apache-2.0
MSRV Rust 1.90.0
Latest verified stable Rust 1.96.0
Default target no_std
Default features protocol-core only
Default networking/signing none
Unsafe policy first-party crates use #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
Release evidence local gates, cargo-deny, cargo-audit, SBOM, pentest report
Crate versions tracked in the version matrix

Install

[dependencies]
eth = "0.9"

Disable defaults explicitly for embedded or freestanding builds:

[dependencies]
eth = { version = "0.9", default-features = false }

Optional sanitization support:

[dependencies]
eth = { version = "0.9", features = ["sanitization"] }

Features

Feature Default Purpose
std no Enables std support in admitted core crates.
evm no Future explicit EVM adapter boundary.
rpc no Future explicit RPC trust-policy boundary.
sanitization no Re-exports optional secret sanitization bridge APIs.
signer no Future signer isolation boundary.
reth no Future Reth integration boundary.
testkit no Test fixtures, conformance helpers, and adversarial inputs.

Default builds do not enable networking, signing, local key storage, Reth, P2P, or EVM execution.

Primitive Domains

Use explicit Ethereum domains instead of unqualified integers and byte arrays:

use eth::primitives::{
    Address, B256, BlockNumber, ChainId, Gas, Nonce, TransactionType, Wei,
};

let chain = ChainId::new(1);
let block = BlockNumber::new(19_000_000);
let gas = Gas::new(21_000);
let nonce = Nonce::new(7);
let address = Address::from([0x11_u8; 20]);
let hash = B256::from([0x22_u8; 32]);
let value = Wei::from_u128(1_000_000_000_000_000_000);
let tx_type = TransactionType::try_new_typed(2);

assert_eq!(u64::from(chain), 1);
assert_eq!(u64::from(block), 19_000_000);
assert_eq!(u64::from(gas), 21_000);
assert_eq!(u64::from(nonce), 7);
assert_eq!(<[u8; 20]>::from(address), [0x11_u8; 20]);
assert_eq!(<[u8; 32]>::from(hash), [0x22_u8; 32]);
assert_eq!(value.to_be_bytes()[31], 0);
assert_eq!(tx_type.map(u8::from), Ok(2));

Legacy transactions are not typed EIP-2718 envelopes. Use TransactionType::LEGACY for APIs that need a legacy domain value, and try_new_typed for type bytes that will be encoded as typed envelopes.

Primitive domains bridge directly to the bounded codec without allocation:

use eth::codec::DecodeLimits;
use eth::primitives::{Address, ChainId, Wei};

let limits = DecodeLimits {
    max_input_bytes: 64,
    max_list_items: 4,
    max_nesting_depth: 4,
    max_total_allocation: 64,
    max_proof_nodes: 4,
    max_total_items: 4,
};

let chain = ChainId::new(1);
let mut encoded_chain = [0_u8; 8];
let written = chain.encode_rlp(&mut encoded_chain)?;
assert_eq!(encoded_chain.get(..written), Some([0x01].as_slice()));
assert_eq!(ChainId::try_from_rlp(&[0x01], limits)?, chain);

let value = Wei::from_u128(1024);
let mut encoded_value = [0_u8; 8];
let written = value.encode_rlp(&mut encoded_value)?;
assert_eq!(encoded_value.get(..written), Some([0x82, 0x04, 0x00].as_slice()));
assert_eq!(Wei::try_from_rlp(&[0x82, 0x04, 0x00], limits)?, value);

let address = Address::from([0x11_u8; 20]);
let mut encoded_address = [0_u8; 21];
let written = address.encode_rlp(&mut encoded_address)?;
assert_eq!(written, 21);
assert_eq!(Address::try_from_rlp(&encoded_address, limits)?, address);
# Ok::<(), eth::primitives::PrimitiveRlpError>(())

Constant-Time Composition

B256::ct_eq and Wei::ct_eq return subtle::Choice so compound checks can use & and | without short-circuiting:

use eth::primitives::B256;

let block_hash = B256::from([1_u8; 32]);
let expected_block_hash = B256::from([1_u8; 32]);
let receipts_root = B256::from([2_u8; 32]);
let expected_receipts_root = B256::from([2_u8; 32]);

let valid = block_hash.ct_eq(&expected_block_hash)
    & receipts_root.ct_eq(&expected_receipts_root);

assert!(bool::from(valid));

Convert Choice to bool only at the final trust boundary.

Keccak Boundary

eth defines a no_std Keccak-256 trait boundary and intentionally does not ship a default hashing backend yet:

use eth::hash::{Keccak256, hash_one};
use eth::primitives::B256;

struct PlatformKeccak {
    output: B256,
}

impl Keccak256 for PlatformKeccak {
    fn update(&mut self, input: &[u8]) {
        let _ = input;
    }

    fn finalize(self) -> B256 {
        self.output
    }
}

let digest = hash_one(
    PlatformKeccak {
        output: B256::from([0x44_u8; 32]),
    },
    b"ethereum",
);

assert_eq!(<[u8; 32]>::from(digest), [0x44_u8; 32]);

Implementations must compute Ethereum Keccak-256, not FIPS SHA3-256. See the Keccak boundary document for the dependency decision and future backend admission checklist.

Stable Errors

Error values expose stable codes, messages, and categories. They do not carry input bytes, keys, signatures, or other secret-bearing payloads:

use eth::error::{DecodeError, DecodeErrorCategory, ResourceError};

let error = DecodeError::AllocationExceeded;

assert_eq!(error.code(), "ETH_CODEC_ALLOCATION_EXCEEDED");
assert_eq!(error.category(), DecodeErrorCategory::ResourceExhaustion);
assert_eq!(error.resource(), Some(ResourceError::AllocationBytes));
assert_eq!(error.to_string(), "decoder exceeded the active allocation limit");

Decode Budgets

Every future untrusted decoder is required to use explicit limits. Use DecodeAccumulator when more than one allocation can occur:

use eth::codec::{DecodeError, DecodeLimits};

let limits = DecodeLimits {
    max_input_bytes: 1024,
    max_list_items: 16,
    max_nesting_depth: 4,
    max_total_allocation: 64,
    max_proof_nodes: 8,
    max_total_items: 32,
};

assert_eq!(limits.check_input_len(512), Ok(()));

let mut budget = limits.accumulator();
assert_eq!(budget.check_allocation(32), Ok(()));
assert_eq!(budget.check_allocation(32), Ok(()));
assert_eq!(budget.check_allocation(1), Err(DecodeError::AllocationExceeded));
assert_eq!(budget.account_items(33), Err(DecodeError::ItemCountExceeded));

RLP Codec

The RLP codec admits canonical byte-string scalars, lists, and Ethereum integers with exact consumption. Decoders require explicit limits; encoders are buffer-based and do not allocate:

use eth::codec::{
    DecodeLimits, RlpListForm, RlpScalarForm, decode_rlp_list, decode_rlp_scalar, decode_rlp_u64,
    encode_decoded_scalar, encode_rlp_list_payload, encode_rlp_scalar,
};

let limits = DecodeLimits {
    max_input_bytes: 32,
    max_list_items: 4,
    max_nesting_depth: 4,
    max_total_allocation: 32,
    max_proof_nodes: 4,
    max_total_items: 4,
};
let scalar = decode_rlp_scalar(&[0x83, b'd', b'o', b'g'], limits)?;

assert_eq!(scalar.payload(), b"dog");
assert_eq!(scalar.encoded_len(), 4);
assert_eq!(scalar.header_len(), 1);
assert_eq!(scalar.form(), RlpScalarForm::ShortString);

let mut encoded = [0_u8; 8];
let written = encode_decoded_scalar(scalar, &mut encoded)?;
assert_eq!(written, 4);
assert_eq!(encoded.get(..written), Some([0x83, b'd', b'o', b'g'].as_slice()));

assert_eq!(decode_rlp_u64(&[0x82, 0x04, 0x00], limits)?, 1024);
assert!(decode_rlp_u64(&[0x82, 0x00, 0x01], limits).is_err());

let list = decode_rlp_list(&[0xc8, 0x83, b'c', b'a', b't', 0x83, b'd', b'o', b'g'], limits)?;

assert_eq!(list.item_count(), 2);
assert_eq!(list.form(), RlpListForm::ShortList);
let mut items = list.items();
let first = items.next().transpose()?.and_then(|item| item.as_scalar());
let second = items.next().transpose()?.and_then(|item| item.as_scalar());
assert!(matches!(first, Some(item) if item.payload() == b"cat"));
assert!(matches!(second, Some(item) if item.payload() == b"dog"));

let mut scalar_output = [0_u8; 8];
assert_eq!(encode_rlp_scalar(b"cat", &mut scalar_output)?, 4);
assert_eq!(scalar_output.get(..4), Some([0x83, b'c', b'a', b't'].as_slice()));

let list_payload = [0x83, b'c', b'a', b't', 0x83, b'd', b'o', b'g'];
let mut list_output = [0_u8; 16];
assert_eq!(encode_rlp_list_payload(&list_payload, limits, &mut list_output)?, 9);
assert_eq!(list_output.get(..9), Some([0xc8, 0x83, b'c', b'a', b't', 0x83, b'd', b'o', b'g'].as_slice()));
# Ok::<(), eth::error::DecodeError>(())

Optional Sanitization

The main facade stays small by default. Applications that handle local secret material can opt into the sanitization bridge:

use eth::sanitization::{SecretBytes32, SecureSanitize};

let mut key = SecretBytes32::from_array([0x42_u8; 32]);
key.secure_sanitize();
assert!(key.constant_time_eq(&[0_u8; 32]));

For derive macros, depend on the support crate directly:

[dependencies]
eth-valkyoth-sanitization = { version = "0.7", features = ["derive"] }

Support Crates

Most users should depend on eth. The eth-valkyoth-* crates are published so the workspace can keep small, auditable boundaries:

Crate Default Purpose
eth-valkyoth-primitives yes Chain, block, gas, nonce, address, hash, wei, and transaction type domains.
eth-valkyoth-codec yes Bounded exact-consumption wire codec policy.
eth-valkyoth-hash yes Keccak-256 trait boundary for caller-provided hash implementations.
eth-valkyoth-protocol yes Fork-aware validation states and protocol context.
eth-valkyoth-verify yes Verification boundaries for signatures, proofs, and replay domains.
eth-valkyoth-sanitization no Optional bridge to the sanitization crate.
eth-valkyoth-derive no Optional sanitization derive macros.
eth-valkyoth-evm no Future EVM adapter boundary.
eth-valkyoth-rpc no Future RPC trust-policy boundary.
eth-valkyoth-signer no Future signer isolation boundary.
eth-valkyoth-reth no Future Reth integration boundary.
eth-valkyoth-testkit no Future fixtures and conformance helpers.

Rust Version Support

The minimum supported Rust version is Rust 1.90.0. New deployments should use the latest stable Rust verified by the release gates.

Compatibility evidence for 0.9.3:

Rust Local Evidence
1.90.0 cargo check --workspace --all-features
1.91.0 cargo check --workspace --all-features
1.92.0 cargo check --workspace --all-features
1.93.0 cargo check --workspace --all-features
1.94.0 cargo check --workspace --all-features
1.95.0 cargo check --workspace --all-features
1.96.0 full release gate

License

Licensed under either of Apache License, Version 2.0 or MIT license at your option.