enprot 0.5.26

// Copyright (c) 2018-2026 [Ribose Inc](https://www.ribose.com).
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
// are met:
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
//    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
//    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
//    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
// ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
// OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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//! CLI dispatch layer — gated behind the `cli` feature. Contains
//! all clap-dependent types (CommonArgs, Command, *Subcmd structs)
//! and the `app_main` entry point. Library-only consumers build
//! with `--no-default-features` and get the crypto / parsing /
//! capability / ledger modules without pulling in clap.

use std::ffi::OsString;
use std::fs;
use std::io::Write;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use clap::builder::PossibleValuesParser;
use clap::{Args, CommandFactory, Parser, Subcommand};

use crate::etree::ParseOps;
use crate::{Error, Result, capability, config, consts, crypto, etree, output, pki};

mod cap;
mod cas_cmd;
/// Per-subcommand modules. Each one exposes a `pub fn run(args)` entry
/// point that `app_main`'s match dispatches to.
mod chain_head_cmd;
mod color;
mod init;
mod inspect;
mod list;
mod merge_cmd;
mod pipeline;
mod pki_cmd;
mod provenance_cmd;
mod smudge;
mod verify;
mod verify_chain;

pub(super) fn make_policy(name: &str) -> Box<dyn crypto::CryptoPolicy> {
    // Invariant: callers route `name` through clap's `VALID_POLICIES`
    // value_parser, so only "default" or "nist" reach here. Returning
    // an `Err` would be incorrect — this function is infallible by
    // contract; an unknown name indicates a programming error in the
    // caller, not user input.
    match name {
        "default" => Box::new(crypto::CryptoPolicyDefault {}),
        "nist" => Box::new(crypto::CryptoPolicyNIST {}),
        other => panic!(
            "make_policy: unknown policy '{}' (callers must validate via VALID_POLICIES)",
            other
        ),
    }
}

/// Top-level CLI. Every invocation picks one subcommand.
#[derive(Parser)]
#[command(
    name = "enprot",
    version,
    about = "Engyon Protected Text (EPT) confidentiality processor"
)]
pub struct Cli {
    /// Common arguments accepted in any position (before or after the
    /// subcommand name). Each field has `global = true` so clap recognises
    /// it at top-level or inside any subcommand.
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub common: CommonArgs,

    #[command(subcommand)]
    pub command: Command,
}

#[derive(Subcommand)]
pub enum Command {
    /// Encrypt WORD segments in the input file(s).
    Encrypt(EncryptSubcmd),
    /// Decrypt WORD segments in the input file(s).
    Decrypt(OperationSubcmd),
    /// Store (unencrypted) WORD segments to CAS.
    Store(OperationSubcmd),
    /// Fetch (unencrypted) WORD segments from CAS.
    Fetch(OperationSubcmd),
    /// Encrypt and store WORD segments (shorthand for `encrypt` plus store mode).
    EncryptStore(EncryptSubcmd),
    /// Parse and re-write each input without applying any transform.
    /// Useful for validating markup or measuring parse performance.
    Passthrough(OperationSubcmd),
    /// Verify file integrity: check markup structure, CAS pointers,
    /// and extfield format without decrypting.
    Verify(OperationSubcmd),
    /// List all WORD segments in the input file(s).
    List(OperationSubcmd),
    /// Print shell completion script to stdout.
    ///
    /// Install with: enprot completions bash > /etc/bash_completion.d/enprot
    Completions {
        /// Target shell.
        #[arg(value_enum)]
        shell: clap_complete::Shell,
    },
    /// Generate a keypair (e.g. Ed25519) and write the PEM-encoded
    /// halves to `--out-priv` / `--out-pub`.
    Keygen(KeygenSubcmd),
    /// Sign FILE (or stdin) with `--key` and write a detached signature
    /// to `--out` (default: `<FILE>.sig`).
    Sign(SignSubcmd),
    /// Verify a detached signature (`SIG`, default `<FILE>.sig`)
    /// against FILE using `--key`. Named `verify-sig` to avoid clashing
    /// with the existing `verify` subcommand, which checks EPT markup.
    VerifySig(VerifySigSubcmd),
    /// Compute and print the SHA3-256 fingerprint of a PEM-encoded
    /// pubkey. Useful for building `trust_roots` lists in policy
    /// files (TODO.finalize/26) and for visually comparing two keys
    /// for equality.
    Fingerprint(FingerprintSubcmd),
    /// Walk the chain anchor DAG in FILE(s): check that every CHAIN
    /// block's signature validates against the named signer's pubkey,
    /// that parent references resolve to earlier anchors, and that
    /// There are no cycles. Exit non-zero on any failure (CI-friendly).
    VerifyChain(VerifyChainSubcmd),
    /// Append-only signed audit log. Each line on stdin becomes a
    /// signed chain anchor in FILE — `tail -f` for cryptographic
    /// logs. Verify later with `enprot verify-chain --trust-root`.
    AuditLog(AuditLogSubcmd),
    /// Print the current chain head hash of FILE. The head is the
    /// AnchorHash of the last CHAIN block (or a full-file SHA3-256
    /// if the file has no anchors). Publish the hash out-of-band;
    /// later verify with `enprot pin`.
    Snapshot(SnapshotSubcmd),
    /// Verify that FILE's chain head hash matches EXPECTED-HASH.
    /// Exit non-zero on mismatch. Use after `enprot snapshot` to
    /// detect retroactive modification against a published pin.
    Pin(PinSubcmd),
    /// Print the capability set implied by the current flags (passwords,
    /// CAS dir, key files) and exit. No file transformation occurs.
    /// Useful for verifying "what would I be able to do?" before running
    /// a real command. Output is one capability per line.
    Capabilities,
    /// Write a commented TOML template to `.enprot.toml` (or, with
    /// `--global`, to `~/.config/enprot/config.toml`). Refuses to
    /// overwrite an existing file. See TODO.roadmap/40.
    Init(InitSubcmd),
    /// Git merge-driver contract: `enprot merge-driver %O %A %B %P`
    /// (TODO.roadmap/43). Performs a three-way WORD-aware merge and
    /// writes the result back into `%A` (the "ours" path). Emits
    /// CONFLICT markers when both sides modified the same WORD region
    /// differently.
    MergeDriver(MergeDriverSubcmd),
    /// Walk CONFLICT blocks in FILE and replace each one with the
    /// chosen resolution (TODO.roadmap/44). The default mode is
    /// `--interactive`; pass `--ours`/`--theirs`/`--both`/`--skip`
    /// for non-interactive runs (e.g., CI).
    Resolve(ResolveSubcmd),
    /// Walk CONFLICT blocks in FILE and print one summary line per
    /// conflict (TODO.roadmap/49). Exit non-zero if any conflicts
    /// remain — CI-friendly as a gate after a merge-driver step.
    Conflicts(ConflictsSubcmd),
    /// Combined diagnostic: show structure + integrity + capabilities
    /// in one pass (TODO.finalize/42). Useful for debugging
    /// "what is this file and what can I do with it?".
    Inspect(InspectSubcmd),
    /// Capability policy queries: list declared WORDs, check access,
    /// explain decisions (TODO.complete/25).
    Cap(cap::CapArgs),
    /// Git `clean` filter (TODO.roadmap/45): read plaintext from
    /// stdin, write ciphertext to stdout. Used by `.gitattributes`
    /// `filter=enprot`. Defaults to `aes-256-gcm-siv-det` so the
    /// ciphertext is deterministic and diffs are stable.
    Clean(SmudgeCleanSubcmd),
    /// Git `smudge` filter: read ciphertext from stdin, write
    /// plaintext to stdout. Inverse of `clean`. Requires the WORD
    /// password (from `-k` or `ENPROPT_KEY`).
    Smudge(SmudgeCleanSubcmd),
    /// Git `textconv` for readable diffs (alias for `smudge`).
    Textconv(SmudgeCleanSubcmd),
    /// Build a provenance manifest for a directory (TODO.roadmap/51):
    /// walk the tree, store each file in CAS, emit INCLUDE per file.
    /// Output is an EPT file ready for `enprot attest`.
    Manifest(ManifestSubcmd),
    /// Append a signed chain anchor to a provenance manifest
    /// (TODO.roadmap/51). The anchor commits to the manifest's full
    /// state — any later tampering invalidates the signature.
    Attest(AttestSubcmd),
    /// Supply-chain manifest operations (TODO.roadmap/52). Wraps
    /// provenance with dependency parsing, structural diff, and a
    /// customer-side verify entry point. Subcommand form:
    /// `enprot scm {init,add,deps,attest,verify,diff}`.
    Scm(ScmSubcmd),
    /// CAS integrity operations (TODO.complete/67). Subcommand form:
    /// `enprot cas {verify}`. `cas verify` walks the input file(s),
    /// collects every STORED/INCLUDE/MUTED/KEY/CERT hash reference,
    /// and confirms each resolves to a CAS blob whose SHA3-256
    /// matches the declared hash.
    Cas(cas_cmd::CasArgs),
}

/// `init` subcommand: scaffold a commented TOML config the user can
/// edit in place. With `--git`, also writes a `.gitattributes` file
/// that wires `enprot` into git's `clean` / `smudge` / `textconv`
/// filter chain.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct InitSubcmd {
    /// Write to `~/.config/enprot/config.toml` instead of `./.enprot.toml`.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub global: bool,

    /// Overwrite an existing file. Off by default to prevent stomping
    /// hand-edited config.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub force: bool,

    /// Also write `.gitattributes` and print the `.git/config` snippet
    /// for the enprot filter (TODO.roadmap/45). The config snippet
    /// goes to stdout so the user can review before pasting — enprot
    /// doesn't write to `.git/config` directly to avoid stomping
    /// unrelated entries.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub git: bool,
}

/// `merge-driver` subcommand: invoked by git with four positional
/// arguments — the ancestor version, our version, their version,
/// and the path of the file in the working tree. Output goes back
/// into the "ours" path (the second argument). Exits non-zero on
/// parse errors; exits zero even when conflicts are emitted (the
/// presence of CONFLICT markers in the output is the merge's signal).
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct MergeDriverSubcmd {
    /// Common ancestor version (`%O` in git's contract).
    pub base: PathBuf,
    /// Our version (`%A`); the merge result is written here.
    pub ours: PathBuf,
    /// Their version (`%B`).
    pub theirs: PathBuf,
    /// Working-tree path (`%P`); informational.
    #[arg(value_name = "PATH")]
    pub path: Option<PathBuf>,
}

/// `resolve` subcommand: clear CONFLICT markers by replacing each one
/// with the chosen side. Modes: `--ours`, `--theirs`, `--both`,
/// `--skip`, or `--interactive` (default). Per-WORD overrides via
/// `--word WORD:MODE` (TODO.roadmap/56).
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct ResolveSubcmd {
    /// Resolution mode. One of: ours, theirs, both, skip, interactive.
    /// Default: interactive. Used for any CONFLICT not covered by an
    /// explicit `--word` override.
    #[arg(long, short = 'm', value_name = "MODE", default_value = "interactive")]
    pub mode: String,

    /// Per-WORD resolution override. Repeatable. Format: `WORD:MODE`
    /// where MODE is one of ours/theirs/both/skip. Takes precedence
    /// over `--mode` for the named WORD. Unknown WORDs are silently
    /// skipped (the file may have changed between listing conflicts
    /// and resolving them).
    #[arg(long = "word", value_name = "WORD:MODE", value_delimiter = ',')]
    pub word: Vec<String>,

    /// Input file. Resolved output is written back here in-place.
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub file: PathBuf,
}

/// `conflicts` subcommand (TODO.roadmap/49): walk CONFLICT blocks
/// in FILE and print one summary per conflict. Exits non-zero if
/// any conflicts remain.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct ConflictsSubcmd {
    /// Output format: text (default) or json (enveloped versioned
    /// schema, same shape as `capabilities --format json`).
    #[arg(long, value_enum, default_value_t = output::OutputFormat::Text)]
    pub format: output::OutputFormat,

    /// Input file.
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub file: PathBuf,
}

/// `inspect` subcommand (TODO.finalize/42): combined diagnostic.
/// Shows file structure, chain anchor integrity, and the
/// capabilities the current call context has over the file.
/// Exits non-zero if the file fails integrity checks.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct InspectSubcmd {
    /// Output format: text (default) or json.
    #[arg(long, value_enum, default_value_t = output::OutputFormat::Text)]
    pub format: output::OutputFormat,

    /// Input file (use stdin if omitted).
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub file: Option<PathBuf>,
}

/// Shared args for the git `clean` / `smudge` / `textconv` filters
/// (TODO.roadmap/45). All three operate as stdin → stdout pipes; the
/// WORD password comes from the global `-k WORD=password` flag or
/// `ENPROPT_KEY=WORD=password` env var.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct SmudgeCleanSubcmd {
    /// WORD whose password unlocks the file. Required.
    #[arg(short = 'w', long = "word", value_name = "WORD")]
    pub word: String,

    /// Override the cipher algorithm (clean only). Default:
    /// `aes-256-gcm-siv-det` for diff-stable ciphertext.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "ALG")]
    pub cipher: Option<String>,

    /// Override the PBKDF algorithm (clean only). For diff-stable
    /// output across runs, pair `aes-256-gcm-siv-det` with `legacy`
    /// (no random salt). Default: argon2 with auto-tuned params.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "ALG")]
    pub pbkdf: Option<String>,
}

/// `manifest` subcommand (TODO.roadmap/51): build a provenance
/// manifest for a project tree. Walks the directory, stores each
/// file in CAS, emits an EPT file with one INCLUDE per source file.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct ManifestSubcmd {
    /// Project root to walk.
    #[arg(value_name = "DIR")]
    pub dir: PathBuf,

    /// CAS directory (default: `./cas` if it exists, else `.`).
    #[arg(short = 'c', long, value_name = "DIR")]
    pub casdir: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Output manifest path (default: stdout).
    #[arg(short = 'o', long, value_name = "FILE")]
    pub output: Option<PathBuf>,
}

/// `attest` subcommand (TODO.roadmap/51): append a signed chain
/// anchor to a manifest, signing the file's current state.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct AttestSubcmd {
    /// Builder's private key (PEM).
    #[arg(long, value_name = "PRIV.pem")]
    pub signer: PathBuf,

    /// Manifest file. Modified in-place.
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub file: PathBuf,
}

/// `scm` subcommand (TODO.roadmap/52). The subcommand selects the
/// operation; common args (CAS dir, signer, etc.) are flat fields.
/// Re-uses `provenance::attest` and the existing `verify-chain` so
/// the wire format is identical to TODO.roadmap/51.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct ScmSubcmd {
    #[command(subcommand)]
    pub command: ScmCommand,

    /// CAS directory. Default: `./cas` if it exists, else `.`.
    #[arg(short = 'c', long, global = true)]
    pub casdir: Option<PathBuf>,
}

#[derive(Subcommand)]
pub enum ScmCommand {
    /// Create an empty manifest at MANIFEST.
    Init {
        #[arg(value_name = "MANIFEST")]
        manifest: PathBuf,
    },
    /// Append PATH (file or directory) to MANIFEST.
    Add {
        #[arg(value_name = "MANIFEST")]
        manifest: PathBuf,
        #[arg(value_name = "PATH")]
        path: PathBuf,
    },
    /// Parse Cargo.toml at MANIFEST_FILE and append each `[dependencies]`
    /// entry as an INCLUDE.
    Deps {
        #[arg(value_name = "MANIFEST")]
        manifest: PathBuf,
        #[arg(value_name = "Cargo.toml")]
        cargo_toml: PathBuf,
    },
    /// Sign MANIFEST with --signer (delegates to provenance::attest).
    Attest {
        #[arg(long, value_name = "PRIV.pem")]
        signer: PathBuf,
        #[arg(value_name = "MANIFEST")]
        manifest: PathBuf,
    },
    /// Verify MANIFEST with --trust-root (delegates to verify-chain).
    Verify {
        #[arg(long, value_name = "PUB.pem")]
        trust_root: PathBuf,
        #[arg(value_name = "MANIFEST")]
        manifest: PathBuf,
    },
    /// Structural diff between OLD and NEW manifests.
    Diff {
        #[arg(value_name = "OLD")]
        old: PathBuf,
        #[arg(value_name = "NEW")]
        new: PathBuf,
    },
}

/// Encrypt subcommand: encrypt-specific options plus the shared output
/// wiring.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct EncryptSubcmd {
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub encrypt: EncryptOpts,

    #[command(flatten)]
    pub output: OutputArgs,

    /// Recipient pubkey (PEM). Repeatable. When supplied, the
    /// transform uses ML-KEM encapsulation instead of PBKDF
    /// (TODO.roadmap/60). Any one matching privkey can decrypt.
    #[arg(long = "recipient", value_name = "PUB.pem")]
    pub recipients: Vec<PathBuf>,
}

/// Decrypt/Store/Fetch/Passthrough subcommand: just the shared output
/// wiring (no crypto knobs).
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct OperationSubcmd {
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub output: OutputArgs,

    /// Private key (PEM) for KEM-mode decryption (TODO.roadmap/60).
    /// When the Encrypted block has a `recipients:` extfield, this
    /// privkey is used for ML-KEM decapsulation. Ignored for
    /// password-mode blocks.
    #[arg(long = "key-file", value_name = "PRIV.pem")]
    pub key_files: Vec<PathBuf>,
}

/// `keygen` subcommand: emit a fresh keypair.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct KeygenSubcmd {
    /// Signature algorithm.
    #[arg(value_parser = clap::builder::PossibleValuesParser::new(
        pki::SigAlgKind::ALL.iter().map(|k| k.name()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
    ))]
    pub alg: String,

    /// Write private key to PATH (PEM). Default: stdout.
    #[arg(long = "out-priv", value_name = "PATH")]
    pub out_priv: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Write public key to PATH (PEM). Default: stdout.
    #[arg(long = "out-pub", value_name = "PATH")]
    pub out_pub: Option<PathBuf>,
}

/// `sign` subcommand: produce a detached signature. When
/// `--key-file` is supplied multiple times (TODO.roadmap/59),
/// produces a multi-signature bundle file; single `--key-file`
/// produces raw signature bytes (backwards compat).
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct SignSubcmd {
    /// Signature algorithm (must match the key type).
    #[arg(long, value_parser = clap::builder::PossibleValuesParser::new(
        pki::SigAlgKind::ALL.iter().map(|k| k.name()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
    ))]
    pub alg: String,

    /// Private key (PEM) to sign with. Repeatable for multi-sig
    /// bundles. Named `--key-file` because the global `-k/--key`
    /// already means a symmetric WORD=PASSWORD pair.
    #[arg(long = "key-file", value_name = "PRIV.pem")]
    pub key: Vec<PathBuf>,

    /// Input file (omit to read stdin).
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub input: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Write signature to PATH. Default: `<FILE>.sig`, or stdout when
    /// reading from stdin.
    #[arg(short = 'o', long = "out", value_name = "PATH")]
    pub out: Option<PathBuf>,
}

/// `verify-sig` subcommand: verify a detached signature. When
/// `--key-file` is supplied multiple times (TODO.roadmap/59), the
/// signature file is treated as a multi-sig bundle and every entry
/// must verify against its corresponding pubkey.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct VerifySigSubcmd {
    /// Signature algorithm (must match the key type).
    #[arg(long, value_parser = clap::builder::PossibleValuesParser::new(
        pki::SigAlgKind::ALL.iter().map(|k| k.name()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
    ))]
    pub alg: String,

    /// Public key (PEM) to verify against. Repeatable for multi-sig
    /// bundles.
    #[arg(long = "key-file", value_name = "PUB.pem")]
    pub key: Vec<PathBuf>,

    /// Signature file. Default: `<FILE>.sig`. Required when reading
    /// the message from stdin.
    #[arg(long = "sig-file", value_name = "SIG")]
    pub sig: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Input file (omit to read stdin).
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub input: Option<PathBuf>,
}

/// `fingerprint` subcommand: print the SHA3-256 fingerprint of a
/// PEM-encoded pubkey. Used to populate `trust_roots` lists in
/// policy files (TODO.finalize/26) and to compare two keys for
/// equality without parsing the full PEM.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct FingerprintSubcmd {
    /// Public key (PEM) to fingerprint.
    #[arg(value_name = "PUB.pem")]
    pub key: PathBuf,
}

/// `verify-chain` subcommand: walk a file's CHAIN anchors and verify
/// signatures + DAG structure. Repeatable `--trust-root` flags form
/// a whitelist; if non-empty, anchors signed by anything else fail.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct VerifyChainSubcmd {
    /// Public key (PEM) whose fingerprint must match a CHAIN's
    /// `signer:` field. Repeatable; if non-empty, forms a trust
    /// whitelist. If empty, every anchor is checked against the
    /// pubkey whose fingerprint matches — and fails if no key
    /// matches.
    #[arg(long = "trust-root", value_name = "PUB.pem")]
    pub trust_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,

    /// Input file(s). Each is verified independently.
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub files: Vec<String>,
}

/// `audit-log` subcommand: stream lines from stdin into FILE as
/// signed chain anchors. Each line becomes one Plain node + one
/// CHAIN node appended to the file. Produces a linear, tamper-evident
/// log with O(1) verification per anchor.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct AuditLogSubcmd {
    /// Private key (PEM) to sign each anchor. The pubkey is derived
    /// automatically; pass it to `verify-chain --trust-root` later.
    #[arg(long = "signer", value_name = "PRIV.pem")]
    pub signer: PathBuf,

    /// Log file. Appended to if it exists; created if not. Each
    /// invocation reads the existing content into memory, appends
    /// new anchors, and writes the result back atomically.
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub file: String,
}

/// `snapshot` subcommand: print the chain head hash.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct SnapshotSubcmd {
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub file: String,
}

/// `pin` subcommand: verify the chain head hash matches EXPECTED.
#[derive(Args)]
pub struct PinSubcmd {
    /// Expected chain head hash (64 hex chars).
    #[arg(value_name = "EXPECTED-HASH")]
    pub expected: String,

    #[arg(value_name = "FILE")]
    pub file: String,
}

/// Crypto-policy, separators, RNG source, password store. Defined at
/// top-level with `global = true` on every field, so clap accepts these
/// flags before or after the subcommand name.
#[derive(Args, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct CommonArgs {
    /// Produce more verbose output.
    #[arg(short = 'v', long, global = true)]
    pub verbose: bool,

    /// Suppress unnecessary output.
    #[arg(short = 'q', long, global = true)]
    pub quiet: bool,

    /// Maximum recursion depth (0 = infinite).
    #[arg(long, global = true, default_value_t = consts::DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH)]
    pub max_depth: usize,

    /// Specify left separator in parsing.
    #[arg(short = 'l', long, global = true, default_value = consts::DEFAULT_LEFT_SEP)]
    pub left_separator: String,

    /// Specify right separator in parsing.
    #[arg(short = 'r', long, global = true, default_value = consts::DEFAULT_RIGHT_SEP)]
    pub right_separator: String,

    /// Specify a secret PASSWORD for WORD (format: WORD=PASSWORD).
    ///
    /// One pair per occurrence; passwords containing commas are accepted
    /// verbatim. Use multiple `-k` flags for multiple pairs.
    #[arg(short = 'k', long = "key", global = true, value_name = "WORD=PASSWORD", value_parser = parse_word_password)]
    pub password: Vec<(String, String)>,

    /// Directory for CAS files (default "cas" if it exists, else ".").
    #[arg(short = 'c', long, global = true, value_name = "DIRECTORY", value_parser = parse_casdir)]
    pub casdir: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Set the policy to restrict cryptographic algorithms.
    #[arg(long, global = true, value_parser = PossibleValuesParser::new(consts::VALID_POLICIES.to_vec()))]
    pub policy: Option<String>,

    /// Load settings from POLICY, but do not enforce the policy.
    #[arg(long, global = true, value_parser = PossibleValuesParser::new(consts::VALID_POLICIES.to_vec()))]
    pub defaults: Option<String>,

    /// Select and enforce the use of FIPS-compliant algorithms (implies --policy=nist).
    #[arg(long, global = true)]
    pub fips: bool,

    /// Preset left/right separators for the host language.
    /// Overrides the default (`// <(` … `)>`). Explicit `-l`/`-r` flags
    /// take precedence over `--lang`.
    #[arg(long, global = true, value_parser = PossibleValuesParser::new(consts::LANG_SEPARATORS.iter().map(|(n, _, _)| *n).collect::<Vec<_>>()))]
    pub lang: Option<String>,

    /// Disable the PBKDF cache mechanism. Affects both encrypt (key
    /// derivation) and decrypt (same derivation, repeated per file).
    #[arg(long = "pbkdf-disable-cache", global = true)]
    pub pbkdf_disable_cache: bool,

    /// After running the transform, append a CHAIN block to the
    /// output that signs the new file state. Requires `--signer`.
    /// The resulting anchor can be verified later with
    /// `enprot verify-chain --trust-root <pubkey>`.
    ///
    /// Mutually exclusive with `passthrough` (which by definition
    /// performs no transformation and thus has nothing to anchor).
    #[arg(long, global = true)]
    pub anchor: bool,

    /// Private key (PEM) used to sign chain anchors when `--anchor`
    /// is set. The corresponding pubkey is derived automatically;
    /// pass it to `verify-chain --trust-root` later.
    #[arg(long, global = true, value_name = "PRIV.pem")]
    pub signer: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Output format for inspection subcommands (`capabilities`,
    /// `list`, `verify-chain`). `text` is the default; `json` emits a
    /// versioned envelope (`$schema: enprot/v1`) suitable for
    /// machine consumption.
    #[arg(long, global = true, value_enum, default_value_t = output::OutputFormat::Text)]
    pub format: output::OutputFormat,

    /// Emit inline `DATA` blocks on encrypt instead of the default
    /// CAS-referenced `STORED ct <hash>` (TODO.roadmap/42). Restores
    /// the pre-42 behavior; useful when CAS isn't available or for
    /// self-contained single-file output.
    #[arg(long, global = true)]
    pub inline: bool,

    /// Path to a capability policy TOML file (TODO.roadmap/46). When
    /// set, `verify-chain` checks trust roots and timestamp
    /// monotonicity, and `encrypt` refuses to write blocks for a WORD
    /// whose required capability the caller doesn't hold.
    #[arg(long, global = true, value_name = "PATH")]
    pub policy_file: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Number of parallel threads for multi-file processing (default 1).
    /// When > 1, each file is processed in its own thread with an
    /// independent ParseOps instance — no shared mutable state.
    #[arg(long, global = true, default_value_t = 1)]
    pub jobs: usize,

    /// Parse and transform without writing output files (TODO.complete/69).
    /// Prints what would change to stderr. No CAS writes. Useful for
    /// previewing the effect of an operation before committing.
    #[arg(long, global = true)]
    pub dry_run: bool,
}

impl CommonArgs {
    /// Construct a CommonArgs with only the filter-context fields
    /// populated. Used by subcommands that don't take the full CLI
    /// surface (e.g., `scm verify`, which delegates to
    /// `verify_chain_files`). Producing this in one place keeps the
    /// filter-dispatch paths DRY: any new CommonArgs field added
    /// downstream doesn't need to be wired through every call site.
    pub fn for_filter(casdir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Self {
        CommonArgs {
            verbose: false,
            quiet: false,
            max_depth: consts::DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH,
            left_separator: consts::DEFAULT_LEFT_SEP.to_string(),
            right_separator: consts::DEFAULT_RIGHT_SEP.to_string(),
            password: Vec::new(),
            casdir,
            policy: None,
            defaults: None,
            fips: false,
            lang: None,
            pbkdf_disable_cache: false,
            anchor: false,
            signer: None,
            format: output::OutputFormat::Text,
            inline: false,
            policy_file: None,
            jobs: 1,
            dry_run: false,
        }
    }
}

/// Encrypt-specific cryptographic knobs.
#[derive(Args, Default, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct EncryptOpts {
    /// Set the PBKDF algorithm to use when encrypting.
    #[arg(long, value_parser = PossibleValuesParser::new(consts::VALID_PBKDF_ALGS.to_vec()))]
    pub pbkdf: Option<String>,

    /// Set the millisecond count for the PBKDF algorithm.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "MSEC", value_parser = parse_positive_u32)]
    pub pbkdf_msec: Option<u32>,

    /// Set the salt length for the PBKDF.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "BYTES", value_parser = parse_positive_usize)]
    pub pbkdf_salt_len: Option<usize>,

    /// Advanced option for testing, do not use.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "PARAMS", hide = true)]
    pub pbkdf_params: Option<String>,

    /// Advanced option for testing, do not use.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "HEX", hide = true)]
    pub pbkdf_salt: Option<String>,

    /// Set the cipher algorithm to use when encrypting.
    #[arg(long, value_parser = PossibleValuesParser::new(consts::VALID_CIPHER_ALGS.to_vec()))]
    pub cipher: Option<String>,

    /// Advanced option for testing, do not use.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "ALG", hide = true)]
    pub cipher_iv: Option<String>,

    /// Compress plaintext with zlib deflate before encryption.
    /// Reduces ciphertext size for text-heavy inputs. The `compress:zlib`
    /// extfield is recorded so decrypt knows to decompress.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub compress: bool,
}

/// Input/output wiring: which WORDs to operate on, which files to read,
/// where to write results.
#[derive(Args, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct OutputArgs {
    /// WORD segment to operate on. Repeatable; also accepts a
    /// comma-separated list (`-w Agent_007,GEHEIM`).
    #[arg(short = 'w', long = "word", value_name = "WORD", value_delimiter = ',')]
    pub word: Vec<String>,

    /// Specify output file for previous input.
    #[arg(short = 'o', long = "output", value_name = "FILE")]
    pub output: Vec<String>,

    /// Use PREFIX for output filenames. If PREFIX ends with `/` or is an
    /// existing directory, each output is placed inside it with its
    /// original basename (issue #18). Otherwise PREFIX is prepended to
    /// each input path verbatim (the legacy behavior).
    #[arg(
        short = 'p',
        long = "prefix",
        default_value = "",
        allow_hyphen_values = true
    )]
    pub prefix: String,

    /// Directory to write outputs into. Shorthand for `--prefix DIR/`.
    /// Conflicts with `--prefix`.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "DIR", value_parser = parse_output_dir, conflicts_with = "prefix")]
    pub output_dir: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Input file(s). "-" means stdin; default "-" if omitted.
    #[arg(value_name = "FILE", default_value = "-")]
    pub files: Vec<String>,
}

/// Load multiple PEM files into a Vec<String>. Used for --recipient
/// (pubkey) and --key-file (privkey) flags. (TODO.roadmap/60.)
fn load_pems(paths: &[PathBuf]) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
    paths
        .iter()
        .map(|p| fs::read_to_string(p).map_err(Error::from))
        .collect()
}

fn load_privkey_pems(paths: &[PathBuf]) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
    load_pems(paths)
}

fn parse_word_password(s: &str) -> std::result::Result<(String, String), String> {
    let (word, pass) = s
        .split_once('=')
        .ok_or_else(|| format!("Must be of the form WORD=PASSWORD, got '{}'", s))?;
    if word.is_empty() || pass.is_empty() {
        return Err(format!("Must be of the form WORD=PASSWORD, got '{}'", s));
    }
    Ok((word.to_string(), pass.to_string()))
}

fn parse_casdir(s: &str) -> std::result::Result<PathBuf, String> {
    let p = PathBuf::from(s);
    if p.is_dir() {
        Ok(p)
    } else {
        Err(format!("'{}' is not a directory", s))
    }
}

/// Value parser for `--output-dir`. The directory must already exist —
/// enprot doesn't create output trees for the user (yet). Use `-p` for
/// the prepend-string behavior if you want a non-existent prefix.
fn parse_output_dir(s: &str) -> std::result::Result<PathBuf, String> {
    let p = PathBuf::from(s);
    if p.is_dir() {
        Ok(p)
    } else {
        Err(format!("--output-dir '{}' is not a directory", s))
    }
}

fn parse_positive_u32(s: &str) -> std::result::Result<u32, String> {
    let n: u32 = s
        .parse()
        .map_err(|_| format!("expected a number > 0, got '{}'", s))?;
    if n == 0 {
        return Err(format!("expected a number > 0, got '{}'", s));
    }
    Ok(n)
}

fn parse_positive_usize(s: &str) -> std::result::Result<usize, String> {
    let n: usize = s
        .parse()
        .map_err(|_| format!("expected a number > 0, got '{}'", s))?;
    if n == 0 {
        return Err(format!("expected a number > 0, got '{}'", s));
    }
    Ok(n)
}

pub fn app_main<I, T>(args: I) -> Result<()>
where
    I: IntoIterator<Item = T>,
    T: Into<OsString> + Clone,
{
    // Initialize tracing subscriber. Honors RUST_LOG if set;
    // otherwise picks a level from --verbose/--quiet after parsing.
    let default_filter = tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
        .unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("warn"));
    tracing_subscriber::fmt()
        .with_env_filter(default_filter)
        .with_target(false)
        .try_init()
        .ok(); // ok() — don't fail if another subscriber is already set (tests)

    // <( ENCRYPTED AUTHOR )>
    // <( DATA X417HVMRRAs6Z1xGo5yY4TxUQ2tpAHEKQ1sg9+kfku5uUikK3y2tODtsUiGqfRGW )>
    // <( DATA xUCGYFu02BCdqPM7uuX5UNvbfrLvKkj6gLYwg/cr42PJmr4o5xnw1qo= )>
    // <( END AUTHOR )>

    let cli = Cli::parse_from(args);

    // Map -v / -q to tracing log level after parsing.
    if cli.common.verbose {
        // Re-init at debug for -v.
        // (subscriber is already set; this just adjusts the filter
        // via the env var for any child processes.)
    }

    tracing::info!(version = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), "enprot starting");
    // Single dispatch site. Bypass arms (subcommands that don't need
    // config layering) call their handler directly. Config-needing
    // arms wrap their handler in `with_config`, which loads the
    // layered TOML config and merges it into `common` before invoking
    // the closure. Adding a new variant is a single new match arm —
    // the compiler enforces exhaustiveness, no `unreachable!` arms.
    match cli.command {
        // Bypass config layering.
        Command::Init(a) => init::run(a),
        Command::MergeDriver(a) => merge_cmd::run_merge_driver(a),
        Command::Resolve(a) => merge_cmd::run_resolve(a),
        Command::Conflicts(a) => merge_cmd::run_conflicts(a),
        Command::Inspect(a) => inspect::run(a, cli.common),
        Command::Cap(args) => cap::run(args, &cli.common),
        Command::Cas(args) => cas_cmd::run(args, &cli.common),
        Command::Clean(a) => smudge::run(smudge::Mode::Clean, a, cli.common),
        Command::Smudge(a) => smudge::run(smudge::Mode::Smudge, a, cli.common),
        Command::Textconv(a) => smudge::run(smudge::Mode::Smudge, a, cli.common),
        Command::Manifest(a) => provenance_cmd::run_manifest(a),
        Command::Attest(a) => provenance_cmd::run_attest(a),
        Command::Scm(a) => provenance_cmd::run_scm(a),
        // Config-needing: load config then dispatch.
        Command::Encrypt(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| {
            pipeline::run(pipeline::RunConfig {
                common,
                output: a.output,
                op: Some((a.encrypt, Operation::Encrypt)),
                recipient_pubs: load_pems(&a.recipients)?,
                recipient_privs: Vec::new(),
            })
        }),
        Command::Decrypt(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| {
            pipeline::run(pipeline::RunConfig {
                common,
                output: a.output,
                op: Some((EncryptOpts::default(), Operation::Decrypt)),
                recipient_pubs: Vec::new(),
                recipient_privs: load_privkey_pems(&a.key_files)?,
            })
        }),
        Command::Store(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| {
            pipeline::run(pipeline::RunConfig {
                common,
                output: a.output,
                op: Some((EncryptOpts::default(), Operation::Store)),
                recipient_pubs: Vec::new(),
                recipient_privs: Vec::new(),
            })
        }),
        Command::Fetch(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| {
            pipeline::run(pipeline::RunConfig {
                common,
                output: a.output,
                op: Some((EncryptOpts::default(), Operation::Fetch)),
                recipient_pubs: Vec::new(),
                recipient_privs: Vec::new(),
            })
        }),
        Command::EncryptStore(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| {
            pipeline::run(pipeline::RunConfig {
                common,
                output: a.output,
                op: Some((a.encrypt, Operation::EncryptStore)),
                recipient_pubs: load_pems(&a.recipients)?,
                recipient_privs: Vec::new(),
            })
        }),
        Command::Passthrough(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| {
            pipeline::run(pipeline::RunConfig {
                common,
                output: a.output,
                op: None,
                recipient_pubs: Vec::new(),
                recipient_privs: Vec::new(),
            })
        }),
        Command::Verify(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| verify::run(common, a.output)),
        Command::List(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| list::run(common, a.output)),
        Command::Completions { shell } => {
            clap_complete::generate(shell, &mut Cli::command(), "enprot", &mut std::io::stdout());
            Ok(())
        }
        Command::Keygen(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| pki_cmd::keygen(common, a)),
        Command::Sign(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| pki_cmd::sign(common, a)),
        Command::VerifySig(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| pki_cmd::verify_sig(common, a)),
        Command::Fingerprint(a) => pki_cmd::fingerprint(a),
        Command::VerifyChain(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| verify_chain::run(common, a)),
        Command::AuditLog(a) => with_config(cli.common, |common| {
            chain_head_cmd::audit_log_stream(common, a)
        }),
        Command::Snapshot(a) => chain_head_cmd::snapshot(a),
        Command::Pin(a) => chain_head_cmd::pin(a),
        Command::Capabilities => with_config(cli.common, |common| {
            let policy = resolve_policy(&common)?;
            let mut paops = ParseOps::new(policy)?;
            apply_common(&common, &mut paops);
            let caps = capability::CapabilitySet::from_paops(&paops);
            let stdout = std::io::stdout();
            let mut out = stdout.lock();
            match common.format {
                output::OutputFormat::Text => {
                    for c in caps.iter_sorted() {
                        writeln!(out, "{}", c)?;
                    }
                }
                output::OutputFormat::Json => {
                    let dtos = caps
                        .iter_sorted()
                        .into_iter()
                        .map(capability_to_dto)
                        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
                    let payload = output::CapabilitiesOutput { capabilities: dtos };
                    writeln!(out, "{}", output::to_json(&payload)?)?;
                }
            }
            Ok(())
        }),
    }
}

/// Load layered TOML config and fill in `Option<T>` fields on `common`
/// where the user did not pass an explicit CLI flag. Built-in defaults
/// Load the layered TOML config and merge it into `common`, then
/// invoke the closure with the resolved `CommonArgs`. Used by the
/// `app_main` dispatch for subcommands that need config (the bypass
/// subcommands call their handlers directly, without this wrapper).
fn with_config<F>(common: CommonArgs, f: F) -> Result<()>
where
    F: FnOnce(CommonArgs) -> Result<()>,
{
    let common = apply_config(common)?;
    validate_common(&common);
    f(common)
}

/// Semantic validation of the fully-resolved common args. Runs after
/// config merge so TOML-supplied values (e.g. `auto_anchor = true`)
/// are considered. Prints warnings to stderr (not errors — the user
/// might intentionally set --signer globally in config and only use
/// --anchor on specific runs). Hard errors are returned.
fn validate_common(common: &CommonArgs) {
    if common.signer.is_some() && !common.anchor {
        eprintln!(
            "Warning: --signer is set but --anchor is not. \
             The signer key will not be used for this operation."
        );
    }
}

/// (clap `default_value_t`) are treated as "not explicitly set" — they
/// defer to config when present.
fn apply_config(mut common: CommonArgs) -> Result<CommonArgs> {
    let cfg = config::Config::load(&PathBuf::from("."))?;
    if common.casdir.is_none() {
        common.casdir = cfg.casdir.clone();
    }
    if common.policy.is_none() {
        common.policy = cfg.policy.clone();
    }
    if common.defaults.is_none() {
        common.defaults = cfg.defaults.clone();
    }
    if common.lang.is_none() {
        common.lang = cfg.lang.clone();
    }
    if common.signer.is_none() {
        common.signer = cfg.chain.signer.as_ref().map(PathBuf::from);
    }
    if cfg.chain.auto_anchor == Some(true) {
        common.anchor = true;
    }
    if cfg.fips == Some(true) {
        common.fips = true;
    }
    Ok(common)
}

/// `enprot init` implementation: write the commented template either
/// to `.enprot.toml` in cwd or, with `--global`, to
/// `~/.config/enprot/config.toml`. Refuses to overwrite unless `--force`.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Operation {
    Encrypt,
    Decrypt,
    Store,
    Fetch,
    EncryptStore,
}

impl Operation {
    /// Human-readable label for chain-anchor `mut:` field.
    fn label(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Operation::Encrypt => "encrypt",
            Operation::Decrypt => "decrypt",
            Operation::Store => "store",
            Operation::Fetch => "fetch",
            Operation::EncryptStore => "encrypt-store",
        }
    }
}

pub(super) fn build_anchor_config(
    anchor_flag: bool,
    signer_path: Option<&Path>,
    op_kind: Option<Operation>,
    words: &[String],
) -> Result<etree::AnchorConfig> {
    if !anchor_flag {
        return Ok(etree::AnchorConfig::disabled());
    }
    let signer_path = signer_path.ok_or_else(|| Error::InvalidArg {
        arg: "anchor",
        reason: "--anchor requires --signer <PRIV.pem>".to_string(),
    })?;
    let priv_pem = fs::read_to_string(signer_path)?;
    let op = op_kind
        .map(|k| k.label())
        .unwrap_or("passthrough")
        .to_string();
    Ok(etree::AnchorConfig {
        enabled: true,
        operation: op,
        words: words.to_vec(),
        signer_priv_pem: Some(priv_pem),
    })
}

pub(super) fn walk_for_chains(
    tree: &etree::TextTree,
    out: &mut Vec<crate::ledger::AnchorHash>,
) -> Result<()> {
    for node in tree {
        match node {
            etree::TextNode::Chain { extfields } => {
                let signed = crate::ledger::SignedAnchor::from_extfields(extfields)?;
                if let Ok(h) = signed.id() {
                    out.push(h);
                }
            }
            etree::TextNode::BeginEnd { txt, .. } | etree::TextNode::Encrypted { txt, .. } => {
                walk_for_chains(txt, out)?;
            }
            _ => {}
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Translate a [`capability::Capability`] into a stable DTO for JSON output.
fn capability_to_dto(c: &capability::Capability) -> output::CapabilityDto {
    use capability::Capability::*;
    match c {
        Viewer => output::CapabilityDto {
            tier: "viewer",
            word: None,
            key_fp: None,
        },
        Reader => output::CapabilityDto {
            tier: "reader",
            word: None,
            key_fp: None,
        },
        Decryptor(w) => output::CapabilityDto {
            tier: "decryptor",
            word: Some(w.to_string()),
            key_fp: None,
        },
        Signer(fp) => output::CapabilityDto {
            tier: "signer",
            word: None,
            key_fp: Some(fp.to_hex()),
        },
        Verifier(fp) => output::CapabilityDto {
            tier: "verifier",
            word: None,
            key_fp: Some(fp.to_hex()),
        },
    }
}

/// Resolve the crypto policy from CommonArgs (shared by `run` and `verify_files`).
fn resolve_policy(common: &CommonArgs) -> Result<Box<dyn crypto::CryptoPolicy>> {
    let explicit_policy = common.policy.clone();
    let mut policy_name = explicit_policy
        .clone()
        .unwrap_or_else(|| consts::DEFAULT_POLICY.to_string());
    let fips = common.fips
        || (cfg!(unix)
            && match fs::read_to_string("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled") {
                Ok(s) => s.starts_with('1'),
                Err(_) => false,
            });
    if fips {
        if let Some(p) = explicit_policy.as_deref()
            && p != "nist"
        {
            return Err(Error::InvalidArg {
                arg: "--policy",
                reason: format!("Policy setting of '{p}' conflicts with --fips"),
            });
        }
        policy_name = "nist".to_string();
    }
    Ok(make_policy(&policy_name))
}

/// Resolve the final left/right separator strings from CLI args.
///
/// `--lang` provides a preset; explicit `-l`/`-r` flags override
/// the preset's value. The override is detected by comparing against
/// `consts::DEFAULT_*` — if the user didn't change the default, the
/// preset is used; if they did, the explicit value wins.
///
/// Single source of truth: `run()` and `apply_common()` both call
/// this. Before this helper existed, the logic was duplicated in
/// both, risking drift (TODO.finalize/32).
pub(super) fn resolve_separators(common: &CommonArgs) -> (String, String) {
    if let Some(ref lang) = common.lang
        && let Some((left, right)) = consts::lang_separators(lang)
    {
        let l = if common.left_separator == consts::DEFAULT_LEFT_SEP {
            left.to_string()
        } else {
            common.left_separator.clone()
        };
        let r = if common.right_separator == consts::DEFAULT_RIGHT_SEP {
            right.to_string()
        } else {
            common.right_separator.clone()
        };
        return (l, r);
    }
    (
        common.left_separator.clone(),
        common.right_separator.clone(),
    )
}

/// Apply common args to ParseOps (shared by `run` and `verify_files`).
fn apply_common(common: &CommonArgs, paops: &mut ParseOps) {
    if let Some(dir) = common.casdir.clone() {
        paops.io.set_local_casdir(dir);
    } else if Path::new("cas").is_dir() {
        paops.io.set_local_casdir(Path::new("cas").to_path_buf());
    } else {
        paops.io.set_local_casdir(Path::new(".").to_path_buf());
    }
    paops.io.verbose = common.verbose && !common.quiet;
    paops.io.inline_data = common.inline || common.casdir.is_none();
    paops.io.dry_run = common.dry_run;
    paops.max_depth = common.max_depth;
    let (left, right) = resolve_separators(common);
    paops.separators.left = left;
    paops.separators.right = right;
    paops.passwords.extend(common.password.clone());
}