encypher-c2pa 1.0.4

Offline, verification-only C2PA SDK
Documentation
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//! C2PA manifest verification pipeline.
//!
//! Given asset bytes, a MIME type, optional trust configuration, and an optional
//! validation time, [`verify`] reproduces the reference verifier semantics and
//! the C2PA status-code model:
//!
//! 1. Extract the JUMBF manifest store for the asset's format (via
//!    [`c2pa_formats`]).
//! 2. Parse the store ([`crate::c2pa_core::jumbf::parse_manifest_store`]); the active
//!    manifest is the last in store order.
//! 3. Decode the claim CBOR.
//! 4. Verify the COSE claim signature against the leaf certificate.
//! 5. Recompute each created/gathered assertion's hashed-URI binding.
//! 6. Verify the `c2pa.hash.data` hard binding against the asset bytes
//!    (honoring the assertion's exclusion ranges).
//! 7. Validate the signing certificate chain against the supplied trust list,
//!    honoring an explicit `validation_time`.
//! 8. Record any attached RFC 3161 timestamp.
//! 9. Check the signing certificate's validity window at the validation time.
//!
//! The result is a [`ValidationResults`] partitioned into success /
//! informational / failure status codes, a [`ValidationState`], and a JSON
//! report matching the reader-report SSOT shape.
//!
//! The validation state is posture-dependent. In the strict / conformance
//! posture an untrusted signing credential does **not** invalidate a manifest
//! (it only prevents [`ValidationState::Trusted`]); every other failure
//! (signature mismatch, hash mismatch, missing claim) yields
//! [`ValidationState::Invalid`]. In the generous regular/core-spec posture the
//! full non-invalidating set ([`REGULAR_INTEGRITY_CAVEATS`]: cert-time, trust,
//! OCSP, timestamp, and conformance-policy codes) is treated as surfaced
//! caveats, so only a construction-integrity failure yields `Invalid`.

mod cache;
mod cawg;
pub(crate) use cawg::{
    CAWG_ICA_DID_UNAVAILABLE, CAWG_IDENTITY_ASSERTION_DUPLICATE, CAWG_IDENTITY_ASSERTION_MISMATCH,
    CAWG_IDENTITY_CBOR_INVALID, CAWG_IDENTITY_EXPECTED_CLAIM_GENERATOR_MISMATCH,
    CAWG_IDENTITY_EXPECTED_COUNTERSIGNER_MISMATCH, CAWG_IDENTITY_EXPECTED_COUNTERSIGNER_MISSING,
    CAWG_IDENTITY_EXPECTED_PARTIAL_CLAIM_MISMATCH, CAWG_IDENTITY_HARD_BINDING_INCORRECT,
    CAWG_IDENTITY_HARD_BINDING_MISSING, CAWG_IDENTITY_PAD_INVALID, CAWG_IDENTITY_SIG_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
    CAWG_IDENTITY_TRUSTED, CAWG_IDENTITY_UNEXPECTED_COUNTERSIGNER, CAWG_IDENTITY_WELL_FORMED,
    CAWG_LEGACY_PROFILE,
};
mod cawg_ica;
pub(crate) use cawg_ica::{
    CAWG_ICA_CREDENTIAL_VALID, CAWG_ICA_DID_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD, CAWG_ICA_INVALID_ALG,
    CAWG_ICA_INVALID_CONTENT_TYPE, CAWG_ICA_INVALID_COSE_SIGN1, CAWG_ICA_INVALID_DID_DOCUMENT,
    CAWG_ICA_INVALID_ISSUER, CAWG_ICA_INVALID_VERIFIABLE_CREDENTIAL, CAWG_ICA_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH,
    CAWG_ICA_SIGNER_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH, CAWG_ICA_TIME_STAMP_INVALID, CAWG_ICA_TIME_STAMP_VALIDATED,
    CAWG_ICA_VALID_FROM_INVALID, CAWG_ICA_VALID_FROM_MISSING, CAWG_ICA_VALID_UNTIL_INVALID,
};
mod cert;
mod crjson;
mod observe;
mod report;
pub(crate) mod versions;
pub(crate) use crjson::{crjson_from_asset, to_crjson};
pub(crate) use versions::{ClaimGeneration, VersionEvaluation, VersionVerdict};

pub(crate) use cache::{CachedResult, VerifyCache};
pub(crate) use observe::{global as global_metrics, Metrics, MetricsSnapshot};

use crate::c2pa_cbor::{decode, DecodeError, Value};
use crate::c2pa_core::jumbf::{
    manifest_superboxes_from_store, parse_manifest_store, superbox_content, JumbfError,
    ParsedManifest, ParsedStore,
};
pub(crate) use crate::c2pa_core::{ComplianceLevel, EngineProfile, OperatingMode, SpecVersion};
use crate::c2pa_crypto::{
    extract_claim_tsa_tokens, extract_x5chain, timestamp_input, timestamp_input_v1, verify_claim,
    visit_ocsp_staples, ClaimTimestampVersion,
};
use crate::c2pa_formats::{text_standard, AssetFormat};
use crate::c2pa_trust::{validate_chain, TrustList, MAX_OCSP_RESPONSE_BYTES};
use serde::Serialize;
use serde_json::{json, Map, Value as Json};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256, Sha384, Sha512};
use thiserror::Error;
use time::OffsetDateTime;

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Status code constants (C2PA 2.x validation status codes)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Claim signature cryptographically verified.
pub const CLAIM_SIGNATURE_VALIDATED: &str = "claimSignature.validated";
/// Claim signature failed to verify.
pub const CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH: &str = "claimSignature.mismatch";
/// The claim signature box is absent or unreadable (e.g. mislabeled box,
/// invalid signature URI).
pub const CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISSING: &str = "claimSignature.missing";
/// Signing certificate valid at the validation time.
pub const CLAIM_SIGNATURE_INSIDE_VALIDITY: &str = "claimSignature.insideValidity";
/// The signing certificate was outside its validity window at validation time.
pub const CLAIM_SIGNATURE_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY: &str = "claimSignature.outsideValidity";
/// Assertion hashed-URI binding matched.
pub const ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MATCH: &str = "assertion.hashedURI.match";
/// Assertion hashed-URI binding mismatched (or assertion absent).
pub const ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH: &str = "assertion.hashedURI.mismatch";
/// `c2pa.hash.data` hard binding matched the asset.
pub const ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH: &str = "assertion.dataHash.match";
/// `c2pa.hash.data` hard binding did not match the asset.
pub const ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH: &str = "assertion.dataHash.mismatch";
/// Informational: a C2PA 2.4 data-hash binding excludes bytes beyond its
/// manifest carrier.
pub const ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_ADDITIONAL_EXCLUSIONS_PRESENT: &str =
    "assertion.dataHash.additionalExclusionsPresent";
/// Success: a `c2pa.hash.bmff.v2` or `c2pa.hash.bmff.v3` box-based hard binding matched the asset.
pub const ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH: &str = "assertion.bmffHash.match";
/// Failure: a `c2pa.hash.bmff.v2` or `c2pa.hash.bmff.v3` box-based hard binding did not match.
pub const ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH: &str = "assertion.bmffHash.mismatch";
/// Failure: a BMFF hash merkle structure (or a fragment's auxiliary
/// C2PA `merkle` box) is structurally invalid per spec 15.12.2.2 / A.5.4.
pub const ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED: &str = "assertion.bmffHash.malformed";
/// Success: every general box hash range matched (`c2pa.hash.boxes`).
pub const ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MATCH: &str = "assertion.boxesHash.match";
/// Failure: a box-hash range did not match, or boxes appeared out of order.
pub const ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MISMATCH: &str = "assertion.boxesHash.mismatch";
/// Failure: the `c2pa.hash.boxes` assertion is structurally invalid.
pub const ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MALFORMED: &str = "assertion.boxesHash.malformed";
/// Failure: the asset contains boxes not covered by the assertion.
pub const ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_UNKNOWN_BOX: &str = "assertion.boxesHash.unknownBox";
/// Success: every collection URI hash (and the ZIP central directory) matched.
pub const ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_MATCH: &str = "assertion.collectionHash.match";
/// Failure: a collection entry's bytes (or the ZIP central directory) did not
/// match its recorded hash.
pub const ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_MISMATCH: &str = "assertion.collectionHash.mismatch";
/// Failure: the `c2pa.hash.collection.data` assertion is structurally invalid.
pub const ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_MALFORMED: &str = "assertion.collectionHash.malformed";
/// Failure: a collection URI contains `.` or `..` path segments.
pub const ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_INVALID_URI: &str = "assertion.collectionHash.invalidURI";
/// Failure: a file listed in the collection assertion is absent from the archive.
pub const ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_INCORRECT_FILE_COUNT: &str =
    "assertion.collectionHash.incorrectFileCount";
/// Success: every required multi-asset part matched its part hash.
pub const ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH: &str = "assertion.multiAssetHash.match";
/// Failure: a multi-asset part's bytes did not match its part hash.
pub const ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISMATCH: &str = "assertion.multiAssetHash.mismatch";
/// Failure: a required multi-asset part cannot be located.
pub const ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISSING_PART: &str = "assertion.multiAssetHash.missingPart";
/// Failure: the multi-asset hash assertion is structurally malformed.
pub const ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED: &str = "assertion.multiAssetHash.malformed";
/// Signing certificate chained to a trust anchor.
pub const SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_TRUSTED: &str = "signingCredential.trusted";
/// Signing certificate did not chain to a trust anchor (or was invalid at the
/// validation time). Never invalidates integrity: in the strict posture it is
/// the only non-invalidating failure, and in the generous posture it is one of
/// the [`REGULAR_INTEGRITY_CAVEATS`] (the trust axis carries it, not `caveats[]`).
pub const SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED: &str = "signingCredential.untrusted";
/// Signing certificate structurally invalid or absent.
pub const SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_INVALID: &str = "signingCredential.invalid";
/// Stapled OCSP response says the signing certificate is not revoked.
pub const SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_NOT_REVOKED: &str = "signingCredential.ocsp.notRevoked";
/// Stapled OCSP response says the signing certificate is revoked.
pub const SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_REVOKED: &str = "signingCredential.ocsp.revoked";
/// No usable OCSP staple; revocation check skipped (informational).
pub const SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_SKIPPED: &str = "signingCredential.ocsp.skipped";
/// RFC 3161 timestamp token present and message digest matched.
pub const TIME_STAMP_VALIDATED: &str = "timeStamp.validated";
/// RFC 3161 timestamp present but the TSA certificate is untrusted.
pub const TIME_STAMP_UNTRUSTED: &str = "timeStamp.untrusted";
/// RFC 3161 timestamp present and the TSA certificate chains to the TSA trust list.
pub const TIME_STAMP_TRUSTED: &str = "timeStamp.trusted";
/// RFC 3161 timestamp genTime fell outside the TSA certificate's validity window.
pub const TIME_STAMP_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY: &str = "timeStamp.outsideValidity";
/// A `sigTst2` header is present but does not contain exactly one usable token.
pub const TIME_STAMP_MALFORMED: &str = "timeStamp.malformed";
/// No trusted RFC 3161 timestamp present. Informational under the core spec
/// (timestamping is a SHOULD); a hard failure under the conformance program,
/// which upgrades it to a SHALL.
pub const TIME_STAMP_MISSING: &str = "timeStamp.missing";
/// No claim (or no manifest) found.
pub const CLAIM_MISSING: &str = "claim.missing";
/// Claim CBOR could not be decoded.
pub const CLAIM_CBOR_INVALID: &str = "claim.cbor.invalid";
/// More than one claim box present in a single manifest.
pub const CLAIM_MULTIPLE: &str = "claim.multiple";
/// Claim is missing a required v2 field (e.g. `instanceID`, `created_assertions`).
pub const CLAIM_MALFORMED: &str = "claim.malformed";
/// Claim references no hard-binding (`c2pa.hash.*`) assertion.
pub const CLAIM_HARD_BINDINGS_MISSING: &str = "claim.hardBindings.missing";
/// More than one supported hard binding is declared by the claim.
pub const ASSERTION_MULTIPLE_HARD_BINDINGS: &str = "assertion.multipleHardBindings";
/// A referenced assertion uses an unsupported hash algorithm.
pub const ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED: &str = "algorithm.unsupported";
/// An assertion's CBOR could not be decoded.
pub const ASSERTION_CBOR_INVALID: &str = "assertion.cbor.invalid";
/// An assertion-store box is not declared by any claim assertion reference.
pub const ASSERTION_UNDECLARED: &str = "assertion.undeclared";
/// An actions assertion is absent or violates the required action ordering.
pub const ASSERTION_ACTION_MALFORMED: &str = "assertion.action.malformed";
/// A claim referenced an assertion that is not present in the manifest store.
pub const HASHED_URI_MISSING: &str = "hashedURI.missing";
/// An ingredient references a manifest not present in the manifest store.
pub const INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_MISSING: &str = "ingredient.manifest.missing";
/// An ingredient's active-manifest hash matched the referenced manifest box.
pub const INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_VALIDATED: &str = "ingredient.manifest.validated";
/// An ingredient's active-manifest hash did not match the referenced manifest box.
pub const INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_MISMATCH: &str = "ingredient.manifest.mismatch";
/// An ingredient's claim-signature hash matched the referenced signature box.
pub const INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_VALIDATED: &str = "ingredient.claimSignature.validated";
/// An ingredient references a claim-signature box that is not present.
pub const INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISSING: &str = "ingredient.claimSignature.missing";
/// An ingredient's claim-signature hash did not match the referenced signature box.
pub const INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH: &str = "ingredient.claimSignature.mismatch";
/// Informational (conformance mode only): the asset's format is outside the
/// certified conformance scope for the active spec version. Verification still
/// proceeds and reports normally; this records the scope observation for
/// conformance evidence. Never emitted in regular/generous verification.
pub const CONFORMANCE_OUT_OF_SCOPE: &str = "conformanceScope.outOfScope";
/// Conformance-mode-only: the manifest's structure does not conform to the
/// profile's *target* spec revision (per the version ladder). Informational
/// under [`ComplianceLevel::CoreSpec`] (records the observation), a hard
/// failure under [`ComplianceLevel::ConformanceProgram`] (the strict internal
/// conformance-analysis bar). Never emitted in regular/generous verification —
/// the public verify posture reports the ladder via `version_verdict` without
/// judging against a target. A policy code: it does not clear
/// `version_verdict.validated_under` (the manifest may conform perfectly to a
/// *different* revision — that is exactly the diagnostic).
pub const CONFORMANCE_SPEC_VERSION_NONCONFORMANT: &str =
    "conformanceScope.specVersion.nonConformant";
/// EXPERIMENTAL (PR #2058 compound): the host-less `c2pa.compound.content`
/// binding verified — every component's `ingredientRef` hashed-URI resolved to a
/// present `c2pa.ingredient.v3` assertion whose JUMBF content hash matched.
/// This is the compound parent's hard-binding success (it has no host asset).
pub const ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MATCH: &str = "assertion.compoundContent.match";
/// EXPERIMENTAL (PR #2058 compound): a component's `ingredientRef` hashed-URI
/// did not resolve to a present assertion, or its content hash mismatched. The
/// compound binding is broken. Failure.
pub const ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MISMATCH: &str = "assertion.compoundContent.mismatch";
/// EXPERIMENTAL (PR #2058 compound): the `c2pa.compound.content` assertion is
/// structurally invalid (undecodable, no `components`, or a component missing a
/// well-formed `ingredientRef` {url, hash, alg}). Failure.
pub const ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED: &str = "assertion.compoundContent.malformed";

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Errors
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Errors that prevent the verifier from producing a validation result.
///
/// A missing manifest is **not** an error — it yields a graceful result: the
/// generous posture reports [`ValidationState::None`] (no provenance), while the
/// strict posture reports [`ValidationState::Invalid`] + [`CLAIM_MISSING`].
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum ValidateError {
    /// The MIME type does not map to a supported asset format.
    #[error("unsupported MIME type: {0}")]
    UnsupportedMime(String),
    /// The asset's container could not be parsed to locate a manifest store.
    #[error("format extraction failed: {0}")]
    Format(#[from] crate::c2pa_formats::FormatError),
    /// The manifest store JUMBF structure could not be parsed.
    #[error("manifest store parse failed: {0}")]
    Jumbf(#[from] crate::c2pa_core::jumbf::JumbfError),
    /// The active manifest's hard-binding assertion is malformed or unsupported.
    #[error("hard binding invalid: {0}")]
    HardBinding(String),
    /// Verification panicked internally; contained at the API boundary so it
    /// never crosses an FFI/gRPC edge as an abort.
    #[error("internal verification panic (contained)")]
    Panic,
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Public types
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Overall validation state of the active manifest.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
pub enum ValidationState {
    /// Manifest integrity intact but the signer is not trusted.
    Valid,
    /// A failure broke manifest integrity (signature/hash/claim).
    Invalid,
    /// Integrity intact and the signing credential chained to a trust anchor.
    Trusted,
    /// No provenance to judge: the asset carries no C2PA manifest at all. Only
    /// emitted in the generous (regular/core-spec) posture; the strict posture
    /// keeps an absent manifest as `Invalid` + `claim.missing`.
    None,
}

impl ValidationState {
    /// The state's canonical string form (`"Valid"`, `"Invalid"`, `"Trusted"`, `"None"`).
    pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            ValidationState::Valid => "Valid",
            ValidationState::Invalid => "Invalid",
            ValidationState::Trusted => "Trusted",
            ValidationState::None => "None",
        }
    }
}

/// A single validation status code with its JUMBF URL and human explanation.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
pub struct StatusCode {
    /// The C2PA status code, e.g. `"claimSignature.validated"`.
    pub code: String,
    /// The JUMBF URI the status applies to.
    pub url: String,
    /// Human-readable explanation.
    pub explanation: String,
    /// Machine-readable evidence for extension status codes.
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub details: Option<Json>,
}

/// Validation status codes partitioned by severity.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
pub struct ValidationResults {
    /// Codes for checks that passed.
    pub success: Vec<StatusCode>,
    /// Advisory codes that do not affect validity (e.g. `timeStamp.untrusted`,
    /// `signingCredential.ocsp.skipped`). Reserved: emitting these requires RFC
    /// 3161 timestamp-token and OCSP verification, which the workspace crates do
    /// not yet provide, so this bucket is currently always empty.
    pub informational: Vec<StatusCode>,
    /// Codes for checks that failed.
    pub failure: Vec<StatusCode>,
}

impl ValidationResults {
    /// True when `code` appears in the success bucket.
    pub fn has_success(&self, code: &str) -> bool {
        self.success.iter().any(|s| s.code == code)
    }
    /// True when `code` appears in the failure bucket.
    pub fn has_failure(&self, code: &str) -> bool {
        self.failure.iter().any(|s| s.code == code)
    }
    /// True when `code` appears in the informational bucket.
    pub fn has_informational(&self, code: &str) -> bool {
        self.informational.iter().any(|s| s.code == code)
    }

    fn push_success(&mut self, code: &str, url: String, explanation: String) {
        self.success.push(StatusCode {
            code: code.into(),
            url,
            explanation,
            details: None,
        });
    }
    fn push_success_with_details(
        &mut self,
        code: &str,
        url: String,
        explanation: String,
        details: Json,
    ) {
        self.success.push(StatusCode {
            code: code.into(),
            url,
            explanation,
            details: Some(details),
        });
    }
    fn push_failure(&mut self, code: &str, url: String, explanation: String) {
        self.failure.push(StatusCode {
            code: code.into(),
            url,
            explanation,
            details: None,
        });
    }
    fn push_informational(&mut self, code: &str, url: String, explanation: String) {
        self.informational.push(StatusCode {
            code: code.into(),
            url,
            explanation,
            details: None,
        });
    }
}

/// Inputs to [`verify`].
pub struct VerifyInput<'a> {
    /// Raw asset bytes (the full file).
    pub data: &'a [u8],
    /// Asset MIME type, used to select the container format.
    pub mime: &'a str,
    /// Trust list for the claim-signing certificate. `None` disables the trust
    /// check (no `signingCredential.*` status is emitted).
    pub claim_signer_trust: Option<&'a TrustList>,
    /// Trust anchors for RFC 3161 timestamp authority certificates.
    pub tsa_trust: Option<&'a TrustList>,
    /// End-entity certificates trusted directly (the C2PA "allowed list"):
    /// a leaf that byte-matches an entry is trusted without chaining to an
    /// anchor, provided it is an acceptable claim signer and valid at the
    /// effective time. `None` disables the allowed-list check.
    pub allowed_certs: Option<&'a TrustList>,
    /// Instant to validate certificate windows against. `None` uses the current
    /// UTC time.
    pub validation_time: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
    /// Engine profile: spec version + conformance/regular mode, gating which
    /// formats are in scope. Defaults to the certified
    /// [`EngineProfile::CONFORMANCE_V2_2`]; a MIME type outside the profile's
    /// scope is rejected with [`ValidateError::UnsupportedMime`].
    pub profile: crate::c2pa_core::EngineProfile,
}

#[derive(Clone, Copy, Default)]
struct CawgTrustInputs<'a> {
    trust: Option<&'a TrustList>,
    allowed_certs: Option<&'a TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
    /// Pinned offline `did:web` DID-document store for ICA issuers, keyed by
    /// primary DID (no fragment). `None` fails did:web resolution closed.
    did_documents: Option<&'a std::collections::HashMap<String, Json>>,
    /// Refuse CAWG 1.1-era legacy shapes (field-order `signer_payload`
    /// encoding, 1.1 ICA context, byte-array `c2paAsset` hashes): only the
    /// CAWG 1.2 canonical shapes are attempted.
    strict_encoding: bool,
}
/// The store-wide facts one manifest's verification needs: its sibling
/// manifests and the per-manifest hashed-URI digests. Both are derived from the
/// same parsed store, so they travel together rather than as separate parameters.
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
struct StoreContext<'a> {
    manifests: &'a [ParsedManifest<'a>],
    manifest_hashes: &'a std::collections::HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>,
}
fn manifest_hashes(
    store_bytes: &[u8],
    manifests: &[ParsedManifest<'_>],
) -> Result<std::collections::HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>, JumbfError> {
    let boxes = manifest_superboxes_from_store(store_bytes)?;
    let mut hashes = std::collections::HashMap::with_capacity(boxes.len().min(manifests.len()));
    for (manifest_box, manifest) in boxes.into_iter().zip(manifests) {
        if let Some(hash) = hash_bytes("sha256", superbox_content(manifest_box)?) {
            hashes.insert(manifest.label.clone(), hash);
        }
    }
    Ok(hashes)
}

/// Output of [`verify`].
pub struct VerifyOutput {
    /// Overall validation state of the active manifest.
    pub validation_state: ValidationState,
    /// Status codes partitioned by severity.
    pub results: ValidationResults,
    /// Reader-report JSON matching the SSOT shape.
    pub report_json: Json,
    /// Content Credentials JSON (crJSON): the decoded manifest-store contents.
    /// Populated by default under [`ComplianceLevel::ConformanceProgram`] (the
    /// conformance posture wants the full manifest rendering for evidence) and
    /// `None` otherwise. Distinct from `report_json`, which is the validation
    /// outcome, not the manifest contents.
    pub crjson: Option<Json>,
    /// Spec-version classification: which C2PA revision the manifest's
    /// structure conforms to and which it validated under. `None` when no
    /// claim could be decoded.
    pub version_verdict: Option<VersionVerdict>,
}

/// Verify the C2PA manifest embedded in an asset.
///
/// **Verification is generous by default**: any asset whose MIME type maps to a
/// container the engine can read is verified, regardless of the active spec
/// profile's format scope. Only a MIME type that maps to *no* known container
/// produces [`ValidateError::UnsupportedMime`] (genuinely unreadable) — a format
/// being outside the certified set is NOT a read failure.
///
/// In [`OperatingMode::Conformance`], if the format is outside the certified
/// scope for the active [`SpecVersion`], an informational
/// [`CONFORMANCE_OUT_OF_SCOPE`] code is recorded — verification still proceeds
/// and reports the full status-code set. In [`OperatingMode::Regular`] no such
/// code is emitted. An asset with no manifest yields a graceful result rather
/// than an error: [`ValidationState::None`] in the generous posture,
/// [`ValidationState::Invalid`] + [`CLAIM_MISSING`] in the strict posture.
pub fn verify(input: &VerifyInput) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_with_fragments(input, &[], CawgTrustInputs::default())
}

/// Verify with trust material dedicated to CAWG named-actor credentials.
pub fn verify_with_cawg_trust(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_with_cawg_trust_policy(input, cawg_trust, cawg_allowed_certs, false)
}

/// Verify with CAWG trust material and document-signing anchor policy.
pub fn verify_with_cawg_trust_policy(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_with_fragments(
        input,
        &[],
        CawgTrustInputs {
            trust: cawg_trust,
            allowed_certs: cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
            did_documents: None,
            strict_encoding: false,
        },
    )
}

/// Verify with CAWG trust material, document-signing anchor policy, and a
/// pinned offline DID-document store for `did:web` ICA issuers.
///
/// `cawg_did_documents` maps a primary DID (fragment stripped, e.g.
/// `did:web:example.com`) to its DID document JSON. Resolution never touches
/// the network: an issuer absent from the store fails closed with
/// `cawg.ica.did_unavailable`.
pub fn verify_with_cawg_trust_policy_and_did_documents(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
    cawg_did_documents: Option<&std::collections::HashMap<String, Json>>,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_with_fragments(
        input,
        &[],
        CawgTrustInputs {
            trust: cawg_trust,
            allowed_certs: cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
            did_documents: cawg_did_documents,
            strict_encoding: false,
        },
    )
}

/// Fragmented verification with CAWG trust, document-signing anchor policy,
/// and a pinned offline DID-document store for `did:web` ICA issuers (see
/// [`verify_with_cawg_trust_policy_and_did_documents`]).
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust_policy_and_did_documents(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
    cawg_did_documents: Option<&std::collections::HashMap<String, Json>>,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_with_fragments(
        input,
        fragments,
        CawgTrustInputs {
            trust: cawg_trust,
            allowed_certs: cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
            did_documents: cawg_did_documents,
            strict_encoding: false,
        },
    )
}

/// [`verify_with_cawg_trust_policy_and_did_documents`] plus the CAWG strict
/// encoding switch.
///
/// With `cawg_strict_encoding` set, CAWG 1.1-era legacy shapes are refused:
/// only the canonical RFC 8949 §4.2 `signer_payload` encoding is attempted for
/// X.509 identity signatures, and only CAWG 1.2 ICA credential shapes (the 1.2
/// JSON-LD context, base64-string `c2paAsset` hashes) are accepted. A
/// 1.1-only asset then fails with the existing mismatch/invalid codes. When
/// unset, legacy shapes verify as before and are surfaced via the
/// informational `com.encypher.cawg.legacyProfile` status.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn verify_with_cawg_trust_policy_did_documents_and_strict_encoding(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
    cawg_did_documents: Option<&std::collections::HashMap<String, Json>>,
    cawg_strict_encoding: bool,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_with_fragments(
        input,
        &[],
        CawgTrustInputs {
            trust: cawg_trust,
            allowed_certs: cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
            did_documents: cawg_did_documents,
            strict_encoding: cawg_strict_encoding,
        },
    )
}

/// Fragmented variant of
/// [`verify_with_cawg_trust_policy_did_documents_and_strict_encoding`].
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust_policy_did_documents_and_strict_encoding(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
    cawg_did_documents: Option<&std::collections::HashMap<String, Json>>,
    cawg_strict_encoding: bool,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_with_fragments(
        input,
        fragments,
        CawgTrustInputs {
            trust: cawg_trust,
            allowed_certs: cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
            did_documents: cawg_did_documents,
            strict_encoding: cawg_strict_encoding,
        },
    )
}
/// [`verify`] for FRAGMENTED BMFF assets (DASH/HLS): `input.data` is the
/// initialization segment carrying the manifest; `fragments` are the fragment
/// files (`.m4s`) in playback order. Each fragment's leaf hash is recomputed
/// per spec A.5.4.1.2 and climbed to the stored Merkle row using its auxiliary
/// C2PA `merkle` box. Duplicate fragment identities or non-increasing
/// per-track playback locations are rejected. Absent fragments are NOT a
/// failure (streaming semantics — validate what is available).
pub fn verify_fragmented(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_with_fragments(input, fragments, CawgTrustInputs::default())
}

/// Fragmented verification with CAWG-specific trust material.
pub fn verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust_policy(
        input,
        fragments,
        cawg_trust,
        cawg_allowed_certs,
        false,
    )
}

/// Fragmented verification with CAWG trust and document-signing anchor policy.
pub fn verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust_policy(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    verify_with_fragments(
        input,
        fragments,
        CawgTrustInputs {
            trust: cawg_trust,
            allowed_certs: cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
            did_documents: None,
            strict_encoding: false,
        },
    )
}
fn verify_with_fragments(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    cawg_inputs: CawgTrustInputs<'_>,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    // scope. Unreadable MIME (maps to no format) is the only hard error.
    let format = AssetFormat::from_mime(input.mime)
        .ok_or_else(|| ValidateError::UnsupportedMime(input.mime.to_string()))?;

    // Conformance-mode scope observation: recorded as informational, never a
    // hard failure, so strict internal validation captures it for evidence
    // while still verifying the asset fully.
    let out_of_scope =
        input.profile.mode == OperatingMode::Conformance && !input.profile.permits_mime(input.mime);

    let store_bytes = match crate::c2pa_formats::extract_manifest(format, input.data)? {
        Some(bytes) => bytes,
        None => {
            let mut out = no_manifest_output("no C2PA manifest found", input.profile, false);
            if out_of_scope {
                note_out_of_scope(&mut out, input.mime);
            }
            return Ok(out);
        }
    };

    let store = parse_manifest_store(&store_bytes)?;
    let Some(manifest) = store.manifests.last() else {
        let mut out =
            no_manifest_output("manifest store contained no manifests", input.profile, true);
        stamp_manifest_store_hash(&mut out, &store_bytes);
        if out_of_scope {
            note_out_of_scope(&mut out, input.mime);
        }
        return Ok(out);
    };
    // In regular mode every data-hash exclusion must describe bytes inside the
    // resolved manifest carrier. This prevents a signed assertion from making
    // host bytes mutable while retaining spec-compatible additional-exclusion
    // behavior in conformance mode.
    if input.profile.mode == OperatingMode::Regular
        && crate::c2pa_formats::supports_hash_mode(input.mime)
    {
        if let Some(exclusions) = regular_data_hash_exclusions(manifest)? {
            let spans = crate::c2pa_formats::compute_data_hash_exclusions(format, input.data)?;
            let [carrier] = spans.as_slice() else {
                return Err(ValidateError::HardBinding(format!(
                    "expected one resolved manifest carrier, found {}",
                    spans.len()
                )));
            };
            validate_regular_exclusion_geometry(&exclusions, carrier.start, carrier.length)?;
        }
    }
    let additional_exclusions_present = input.profile.mode == OperatingMode::Conformance
        && input.profile.version_str() == "2.4"
        && crate::c2pa_formats::supports_hash_mode(input.mime)
        && has_conformance_additional_exclusions(manifest, format, input.data);

    let mut report_decode_nodes = MAX_REPORT_DECODED_VALUE_NODES;
    // SHA-256 over each manifest JUMBF superbox, used to authenticate
    // ingredient links and compound child bindings.
    let manifest_hashes = manifest_hashes(&store_bytes, &store.manifests)?;
    let mut out = verify_manifest(
        manifest,
        StoreContext {
            manifests: &store.manifests,
            manifest_hashes: &manifest_hashes,
        },
        input,
        format,
        fragments,
        None,
        cawg_inputs,
        &mut report_decode_nodes,
    );
    // Reader-shape parity: list every manifest in the store (ingredient
    // parents included), with `active_manifest` as the pointer.
    append_store_manifests(
        &mut out.report_json,
        &store,
        &manifest.label,
        &mut report_decode_nodes,
    );
    stamp_manifest_store_hash(&mut out, &store_bytes);
    if additional_exclusions_present {
        note_additional_exclusions(&mut out, &manifest.label);
    }
    if out_of_scope {
        note_out_of_scope(&mut out, input.mime);
    }
    // crJSON is emitted only in strict-debug mode. Attach the active
    // manifest's validation results so the document can be evaluated directly
    // by the C2PA conformance-program rubrics.
    if input.profile.debug {
        out.crjson = Some(crjson::to_crjson_with_report(&store, &out.report_json));
    }
    stamp_profile(&mut out, input.profile);
    Ok(out)
}

/// Record the active engine profile (spec version, mode, compliance level) in
/// the report JSON, so a consumer can tell which spec version and which
/// compliance bar (core spec vs conformance program) produced this result.
fn stamp_profile(out: &mut VerifyOutput, profile: EngineProfile) {
    if let Some(obj) = out.report_json.as_object_mut() {
        obj.insert(
            "engine_profile".to_string(),
            json!({
                "spec_version": profile.version_str(),
                "operating_mode": match profile.mode {
                    OperatingMode::Conformance => "conformance",
                    OperatingMode::Regular => "regular",
                },
                "compliance_level": match profile.compliance {
                    ComplianceLevel::CoreSpec => "core-spec",
                    ComplianceLevel::ConformanceProgram => "conformance-program",
                },
            }),
        );
    }
}

/// Bind the report to the exact extracted or caller-supplied manifest-store
/// bytes, rather than to a decoded or reserialized representation.
fn stamp_manifest_store_hash(out: &mut VerifyOutput, manifest_store: &[u8]) {
    use std::fmt::Write as _;

    let digest = Sha256::digest(manifest_store);
    let mut encoded = String::with_capacity(digest.len() * 2);
    for byte in digest {
        write!(&mut encoded, "{byte:02x}").expect("writing to String cannot fail");
    }
    if let Some(obj) = out.report_json.as_object_mut() {
        obj.insert("manifest_store_sha256".to_string(), Json::String(encoded));
    }
}

/// Record the conformance out-of-scope observation as an informational code on
/// both the structured results and the report JSON.
fn note_out_of_scope(out: &mut VerifyOutput, mime: &str) {
    out.results.push_informational(
        CONFORMANCE_OUT_OF_SCOPE,
        String::new(),
        format!("format {mime} is outside the certified conformance scope"),
    );
    // Rebuild the validation_results block from the updated results so the
    // informational code appears in the report JSON too. `validation_results`
    // is a pure function of `results`, so this stays consistent with finish().
    if let Some(obj) = out.report_json.as_object_mut() {
        obj.insert(
            "validation_results".to_string(),
            validation_results_json(&out.results),
        );
        // The out-of-scope code is also a surfaced caveat, so recompute the
        // structured verdict too, preserving the existing `present` value.
        let present = obj
            .get("provenance_verdict")
            .and_then(|v| v.get("present"))
            .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
            .unwrap_or(true);
        obj.insert(
            "provenance_verdict".to_string(),
            provenance_verdict_json(&out.results, present),
        );
    }
}

fn note_additional_exclusions(out: &mut VerifyOutput, manifest_label: &str) {
    out.results.push_informational(
        ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_ADDITIONAL_EXCLUSIONS_PRESENT,
        format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{manifest_label}/c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.data"),
        "extra data hash exclusions found".into(),
    );
    if let Some(obj) = out.report_json.as_object_mut() {
        obj.insert(
            "validation_results".to_string(),
            validation_results_json(&out.results),
        );
    }
}

/// Panic-containment wrapper around [`verify`] for FFI/gRPC boundaries.
///
/// A verifier must never abort the host process on malformed input. The parsers
/// are written to return errors rather than panic (and are fuzzed); this wraps
/// [`verify`] in [`std::panic::catch_unwind`] as defence in depth so an
/// unexpected panic surfaces as [`ValidateError::Panic`] instead of crossing an
/// FFI edge as an abort.
pub fn verify_safe(input: &VerifyInput) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    match std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| verify(input))) {
        Ok(result) => result,
        Err(_) => Err(ValidateError::Panic),
    }
}

/// Panic-containment wrapper for [`verify_with_cawg_trust`].
pub fn verify_with_cawg_trust_safe(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    match std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
        verify_with_cawg_trust(input, cawg_trust, cawg_allowed_certs)
    })) {
        Ok(result) => result,
        Err(_) => Err(ValidateError::Panic),
    }
}
/// Panic-containment wrapper with explicit CAWG document-signing policy.
pub fn verify_with_cawg_trust_policy_safe(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    match std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
        verify_with_cawg_trust_policy(
            input,
            cawg_trust,
            cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
        )
    })) {
        Ok(result) => result,
        Err(_) => Err(ValidateError::Panic),
    }
}

/// Panic-containment wrapper for
/// [`verify_with_cawg_trust_policy_did_documents_and_strict_encoding`].
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn verify_with_cawg_trust_policy_did_documents_and_strict_encoding_safe(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
    cawg_did_documents: Option<&std::collections::HashMap<String, Json>>,
    cawg_strict_encoding: bool,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    match std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
        verify_with_cawg_trust_policy_did_documents_and_strict_encoding(
            input,
            cawg_trust,
            cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
            cawg_did_documents,
            cawg_strict_encoding,
        )
    })) {
        Ok(result) => result,
        Err(_) => Err(ValidateError::Panic),
    }
}

/// Panic-containment wrapper around [`verify_fragmented`] (see [`verify_safe`]).
pub fn verify_fragmented_safe(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    match std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
        verify_fragmented(input, fragments)
    })) {
        Ok(result) => result,
        Err(_) => Err(ValidateError::Panic),
    }
}

/// Panic-containment wrapper for [`verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust`].
pub fn verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust_safe(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    match std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
        verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust(input, fragments, cawg_trust, cawg_allowed_certs)
    })) {
        Ok(result) => result,
        Err(_) => Err(ValidateError::Panic),
    }
}
/// Panic-containment wrapper for fragmented CAWG verification with policy.
pub fn verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust_policy_safe(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    match std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
        verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust_policy(
            input,
            fragments,
            cawg_trust,
            cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
        )
    })) {
        Ok(result) => result,
        Err(_) => Err(ValidateError::Panic),
    }
}
/// Panic-containment wrapper for fragmented verification with the full CAWG
/// trust, policy, pinned DID-document, and encoding option set.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust_policy_did_documents_and_strict_encoding_safe(
    input: &VerifyInput,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    cawg_trust: Option<&TrustList>,
    cawg_allowed_certs: Option<&TrustList>,
    document_signing_require_anchor: bool,
    cawg_did_documents: Option<&std::collections::HashMap<String, Json>>,
    cawg_strict_encoding: bool,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    match std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
        verify_fragmented_with_cawg_trust_policy_did_documents_and_strict_encoding(
            input,
            fragments,
            cawg_trust,
            cawg_allowed_certs,
            document_signing_require_anchor,
            cawg_did_documents,
            cawg_strict_encoding,
        )
    })) {
        Ok(result) => result,
        Err(_) => Err(ValidateError::Panic),
    }
}

/// Verify a DETACHED / sidecar C2PA manifest store against its external content.
///
/// C2PA 2.4 sidecar discovery (cross-cutting predicate: a `.c2pa` file alongside
/// an asset) carries the manifest store out-of-band; the manifest still binds to
/// the asset through its ordinary hard binding (a data hash over the content).
/// `manifest_store` is the sidecar store bytes, `content` is the asset the
/// manifest describes, and `content_mime` selects the asset's container format.
/// The hard binding is evaluated against `content` exactly as for an embedded
/// manifest, with the assertion's own exclusions applied (none, for a true
/// sidecar, so the whole asset is hashed).
///
/// `input.data` / `input.mime` are ignored (the store and content are passed
/// explicitly); trust lists, `validation_time` and `profile` are honored. The
/// content side must be a real asset: `application/c2pa` (the host-less compound
/// store) is rejected, and this path never touches the compound `C2paStore`
/// verification flow.
pub fn verify_detached<'a>(
    manifest_store: &'a [u8],
    content: &'a [u8],
    content_mime: &'a str,
    input: &VerifyInput<'a>,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    let format = AssetFormat::from_mime(content_mime)
        .ok_or_else(|| ValidateError::UnsupportedMime(content_mime.to_string()))?;
    if format == AssetFormat::C2paStore {
        // The content side cannot itself be a host-less manifest store.
        return Err(ValidateError::UnsupportedMime(content_mime.to_string()));
    }

    let out_of_scope = input.profile.mode == OperatingMode::Conformance
        && !input.profile.permits_mime(content_mime);

    let store = parse_manifest_store(manifest_store)?;
    let Some(manifest) = store.manifests.last() else {
        let mut out =
            no_manifest_output("manifest store contained no manifests", input.profile, true);
        stamp_manifest_store_hash(&mut out, manifest_store);
        if out_of_scope {
            note_out_of_scope(&mut out, content_mime);
        }
        return Ok(out);
    };

    let mut report_decode_nodes = MAX_REPORT_DECODED_VALUE_NODES;
    let manifest_hashes = manifest_hashes(manifest_store, &store.manifests)?;

    // Present the external content as the asset under verification, then run the
    // standard per-manifest pipeline (origin's exact-label hard-binding checks).
    let content_input = VerifyInput {
        data: content,
        mime: content_mime,
        ..*input
    };
    let mut out = verify_manifest(
        manifest,
        StoreContext {
            manifests: &store.manifests,
            manifest_hashes: &manifest_hashes,
        },
        &content_input,
        format,
        &[],
        None,
        CawgTrustInputs::default(),
        &mut report_decode_nodes,
    );
    append_store_manifests(
        &mut out.report_json,
        &store,
        &manifest.label,
        &mut report_decode_nodes,
    );
    stamp_manifest_store_hash(&mut out, manifest_store);
    if out_of_scope {
        note_out_of_scope(&mut out, content_mime);
    }
    if input.profile.debug {
        out.crjson = Some(crjson::to_crjson_with_report(&store, &out.report_json));
    }
    stamp_profile(&mut out, input.profile);
    Ok(out)
}

/// Verify a detached manifest against a caller-computed hard-binding digest.
///
/// This validates the same claim structure, assertion hashed-URI bindings,
/// COSE signature, certificate chain, timestamp, and CAWG identity as
/// [`verify`]. Only the asset hashing step is replaced: the supplied digest is
/// compared to the active manifest's sole `c2pa.hash.data`,
/// `c2pa.hash.bmff.v2`, or `c2pa.hash.bmff.v3` assertion. The caller remains
/// responsible for computing the format-specific digest from locally parsed and authorized container geometry.
pub fn verify_prehashed_manifest<'a>(
    manifest_store: &'a [u8],
    content_mime: &'a str,
    hard_binding_digest: &'a [u8],
    input: &VerifyInput<'a>,
) -> Result<VerifyOutput, ValidateError> {
    let format = AssetFormat::from_mime(content_mime)
        .ok_or_else(|| ValidateError::UnsupportedMime(content_mime.to_string()))?;
    if format == AssetFormat::C2paStore {
        return Err(ValidateError::UnsupportedMime(content_mime.to_string()));
    }

    let store = parse_manifest_store(manifest_store)?;
    let Some(manifest) = store.manifests.last() else {
        let mut out =
            no_manifest_output("manifest store contained no manifests", input.profile, true);
        stamp_manifest_store_hash(&mut out, manifest_store);
        return Ok(out);
    };
    let mut report_decode_nodes = MAX_REPORT_DECODED_VALUE_NODES;
    let manifest_hashes = manifest_hashes(manifest_store, &store.manifests)?;
    let digest_input = VerifyInput {
        data: &[],
        mime: content_mime,
        ..*input
    };
    let mut out = verify_manifest(
        manifest,
        StoreContext {
            manifests: &store.manifests,
            manifest_hashes: &manifest_hashes,
        },
        &digest_input,
        format,
        &[],
        Some(hard_binding_digest),
        CawgTrustInputs::default(),
        &mut report_decode_nodes,
    );
    append_store_manifests(
        &mut out.report_json,
        &store,
        &manifest.label,
        &mut report_decode_nodes,
    );
    stamp_manifest_store_hash(&mut out, manifest_store);
    if input.profile.debug {
        out.crjson = Some(crjson::to_crjson_with_report(&store, &out.report_json));
    }
    stamp_profile(&mut out, input.profile);
    Ok(out)
}

fn claim_declares_sole_data_hash(manifest: &ParsedManifest<'_>) -> bool {
    let Some(claim_cbor) = manifest.claim_cbor else {
        return false;
    };
    let Ok(claim) = decode(claim_cbor) else {
        return false;
    };
    let generation = versions::claim_generation(manifest, &claim);
    let mut total = 0usize;
    let mut supported = 0usize;
    let mut data_hash = false;
    for field in ref_fields(generation) {
        let Some(Value::Array(references)) = claim.get(field) else {
            continue;
        };
        let Some(next) = total.checked_add(references.len()) else {
            return false;
        };
        if next > MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES {
            return false;
        }
        total = next;
        for reference in references {
            let Some(label) = reference
                .get("url")
                .and_then(Value::as_text)
                .and_then(|url| assertion_label_for_manifest(url, &manifest.label))
            else {
                continue;
            };
            if is_supported_hard_binding_label(label, false) {
                supported += 1;
                data_hash = label == "c2pa.hash.data";
            }
        }
    }
    supported == 1 && data_hash
}

// Parse the active data-hash assertion without constraining its exclusion list
// to a single range.
fn regular_data_hash_exclusions(
    manifest: &ParsedManifest<'_>,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<(usize, usize)>>, ValidateError> {
    if !claim_declares_sole_data_hash(manifest) {
        return Ok(None);
    }
    let mut bindings = manifest
        .assertions
        .iter()
        .filter(|(label, _)| label == "c2pa.hash.data");
    let cbor = match (bindings.next(), bindings.next()) {
        (None, _) => return Ok(None),
        (Some(binding), None) => binding.1,
        (Some(_), Some(_)) => {
            return Err(ValidateError::HardBinding(
                "regular verification requires exactly one c2pa.hash.data binding".into(),
            ));
        }
    };
    let assertion = decode(cbor)
        .map_err(|_| ValidateError::HardBinding("hard-binding assertion CBOR is invalid".into()))?;
    let exclusions = match assertion.get("exclusions") {
        Some(Value::Array(exclusions)) if !exclusions.is_empty() => exclusions,
        _ => {
            return Err(ValidateError::HardBinding(
                "signed data-hash exclusion list must contain at least one range".into(),
            ));
        }
    };
    if exclusions.len() > MAX_DATA_HASH_EXCLUSIONS {
        return Err(ValidateError::HardBinding(format!(
            "exclusion list exceeds the verifier cap ({} > {MAX_DATA_HASH_EXCLUSIONS})",
            exclusions.len()
        )));
    }

    exclusions
        .iter()
        .map(|exclusion| {
            let start = exclusion
                .get("start")
                .and_then(|value| match value {
                    Value::Integer(value) => usize::try_from(*value).ok(),
                    _ => None,
                })
                .ok_or_else(|| {
                    ValidateError::HardBinding("signed data-hash exclusion start is invalid".into())
                })?;
            let length = exclusion
                .get("length")
                .and_then(|value| match value {
                    Value::Integer(value) => usize::try_from(*value).ok(),
                    _ => None,
                })
                .filter(|length| *length > 0)
                .ok_or_else(|| {
                    ValidateError::HardBinding(
                        "signed data-hash exclusion length is invalid".into(),
                    )
                })?;
            Ok((start, length))
        })
        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
        .map(Some)
}

fn has_conformance_additional_exclusions(
    manifest: &ParsedManifest<'_>,
    format: AssetFormat,
    data: &[u8],
) -> bool {
    let Some(exclusions) = regular_data_hash_exclusions(manifest).ok().flatten() else {
        return false;
    };
    let Ok(spans) = crate::c2pa_formats::compute_data_hash_exclusions(format, data) else {
        return false;
    };
    let [carrier] = spans.as_slice() else {
        return false;
    };
    let Some(carrier_end) = carrier.start.checked_add(carrier.length) else {
        return false;
    };
    exclusions.iter().any(|(start, length)| {
        start
            .checked_add(*length)
            .is_none_or(|end| *start < carrier.start || end > carrier_end)
    })
}

fn validate_regular_exclusion_geometry(
    exclusions: &[(usize, usize)],
    carrier_start: usize,
    carrier_length: usize,
) -> Result<(), ValidateError> {
    let carrier_end = carrier_start.checked_add(carrier_length).ok_or_else(|| {
        ValidateError::HardBinding("resolved carrier output span overflows".into())
    })?;
    let mut sorted = exclusions.to_vec();
    sorted.sort_unstable_by_key(|(start, _)| *start);
    let mut previous_end = None;
    for (start, length) in sorted {
        let end = start.checked_add(length).ok_or_else(|| {
            ValidateError::HardBinding(
                "signed exclusion does not fit within resolved carrier output span".into(),
            )
        })?;
        if previous_end.is_some_and(|prior| start < prior)
            || start < carrier_start
            || end > carrier_end
        {
            return Err(ValidateError::HardBinding(
                "signed exclusion does not fit within resolved carrier output span".into(),
            ));
        }
        previous_end = Some(end);
    }
    Ok(())
}

const MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_RESPONSES: usize = 32;
const MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_TOTAL_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
const MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_COLLECTION_DEPTH: usize = 4;
const MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_COLLECTION_NODES: usize = 4096;
const MAX_OCSP_STATUS_ASSERTION_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
const MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_CHAIN_CERTIFICATES: usize = 20;
const MAX_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_ASSERTIONS: usize = 32;
const MAX_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_TOTAL_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;

struct CertificateStatusPayloads<'a> {
    payloads: Vec<&'a [u8]>,
    rejected: bool,
}

fn is_certificate_status_label(label: &str) -> bool {
    label == "c2pa.certificate-status"
        || label
            .strip_prefix("c2pa.certificate-status__")
            .and_then(|instance| instance.parse::<usize>().ok())
            .is_some_and(|instance| instance > 0)
}

/// Visit each individually well-formed certificate-status reference declared
/// by one bounded claim. A malformed unrelated reference cannot hide valid
/// sibling evidence, while duplicate, cross-manifest, and undeclared status
/// assertions remain excluded.
fn visit_declared_certificate_status_payloads<'a>(
    manifest: &'a ParsedManifest<'a>,
    mut visit: impl FnMut(&'a [u8]),
) -> bool {
    let Some(claim_cbor) = manifest.claim_cbor else {
        return false;
    };
    let Ok(claim) = decode(claim_cbor) else {
        return false;
    };
    let generation = versions::claim_generation(manifest, &claim);
    let mut total = 0usize;
    for field in ref_fields(generation) {
        let Some(Value::Array(references)) = claim.get(field) else {
            continue;
        };
        let Some(next) = total.checked_add(references.len()) else {
            return false;
        };
        if next > MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES {
            return false;
        }
        total = next;
    }

    // Count every locally resolvable declaration by URL before checking its
    // other HashedUri fields. A malformed duplicate of a status label must not
    // make that declaration look unique.
    let mut declaration_counts = std::collections::HashMap::<&str, usize>::new();
    for field in ref_fields(generation) {
        let Some(Value::Array(references)) = claim.get(field) else {
            continue;
        };
        for reference in references {
            let Some(label) = reference
                .get("url")
                .and_then(Value::as_text)
                .and_then(|url| assertion_label_for_manifest(url, &manifest.label))
            else {
                continue;
            };
            *declaration_counts.entry(label).or_default() += 1;
        }
    }

    for field in ref_fields(generation) {
        let Some(Value::Array(references)) = claim.get(field) else {
            continue;
        };
        for reference in references {
            let (Some(url), Some(_hash), Some(algorithm)) = (
                reference.get("url").and_then(Value::as_text),
                reference.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes),
                resolved_hash_algorithm(reference, &claim),
            ) else {
                continue;
            };
            if bmff_algorithm_index(algorithm).is_none() {
                continue;
            }
            let Some(label) = assertion_label_for_manifest(url, &manifest.label) else {
                continue;
            };
            if declaration_counts.get(label) != Some(&1) || !is_certificate_status_label(label) {
                continue;
            }
            let mut payloads = manifest
                .assertions
                .iter()
                .filter(|(assertion_label, _)| assertion_label == label)
                .map(|(_, payload)| *payload);
            if let (Some(payload), None) = (payloads.next(), payloads.next()) {
                visit(payload);
            }
        }
    }
    true
}

/// Build the bounded store-wide evidence view required by C2PA 2.4. The first
/// pass caps assertion count and raw bytes before the output vector is
/// allocated or any certificate-status payload is decoded. The second pass
/// decodes only candidate status assertions, never unrelated sibling payloads.
fn certificate_status_payloads<'a>(
    manifests: &'a [ParsedManifest<'a>],
) -> CertificateStatusPayloads<'a> {
    let mut count = 0usize;
    let mut bytes = 0usize;
    let mut rejected = false;
    for manifest in manifests {
        visit_declared_certificate_status_payloads(manifest, |payload| {
            let Some(next_count) = count.checked_add(1) else {
                rejected = true;
                return;
            };
            let Some(next_bytes) = bytes.checked_add(payload.len()) else {
                rejected = true;
                return;
            };
            if next_count > MAX_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_ASSERTIONS
                || next_bytes > MAX_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_TOTAL_BYTES
                || payload.len() > MAX_OCSP_STATUS_ASSERTION_BYTES
            {
                rejected = true;
                return;
            }
            count = next_count;
            bytes = next_bytes;
        });
        if rejected {
            return CertificateStatusPayloads {
                payloads: Vec::new(),
                rejected: true,
            };
        }
    }

    let mut payloads = Vec::with_capacity(count);
    for manifest in manifests {
        visit_declared_certificate_status_payloads(manifest, |payload| {
            if decode(payload).is_ok() {
                payloads.push(payload);
            }
        });
    }
    CertificateStatusPayloads {
        payloads,
        rejected: false,
    }
}

#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(super) enum EmbeddedOcspStatus {
    NotChecked,
    NotRevoked,
    LeafRevoked,
    CaRevoked,
    LeafAndCaRevoked,
    Skipped,
}

impl EmbeddedOcspStatus {
    pub(super) fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::NotChecked => "not_checked",
            Self::NotRevoked => "not_revoked",
            Self::LeafRevoked => "leaf_revoked",
            Self::CaRevoked => "ca_revoked",
            Self::LeafAndCaRevoked => "leaf_and_ca_revoked",
            Self::Skipped => "skipped",
        }
    }

    fn blocks_trust(self) -> bool {
        matches!(
            self,
            Self::LeafRevoked | Self::CaRevoked | Self::LeafAndCaRevoked
        )
    }
}

#[derive(Default)]
struct OcspEvidenceBudget {
    responses: usize,
    total_bytes: usize,
    collection_nodes: usize,
    rejected: bool,
}

impl OcspEvidenceBudget {
    fn remaining_responses(&self) -> usize {
        MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_RESPONSES.saturating_sub(self.responses)
    }

    fn visit_collection_node(&mut self) -> bool {
        if self.collection_nodes >= MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_COLLECTION_NODES {
            self.rejected = true;
            return false;
        }
        self.collection_nodes += 1;
        true
    }

    fn accept_response(&mut self, response: &[u8]) -> bool {
        if self.responses >= MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_RESPONSES || response.len() > MAX_OCSP_RESPONSE_BYTES
        {
            self.rejected = true;
            return false;
        }
        let Some(total_bytes) = self.total_bytes.checked_add(response.len()) else {
            self.rejected = true;
            return false;
        };
        if total_bytes > MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_TOTAL_BYTES {
            self.rejected = true;
            return false;
        }
        self.responses += 1;
        self.total_bytes = total_bytes;
        true
    }
}

fn visit_ocsp_values(
    value: &Value,
    depth: usize,
    budget: &mut OcspEvidenceBudget,
    visit: &mut impl FnMut(&[u8]),
) {
    if budget.rejected {
        return;
    }
    if depth > MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_COLLECTION_DEPTH {
        budget.rejected = true;
        return;
    }
    if !budget.visit_collection_node() {
        return;
    }

    match value {
        Value::Map(entries) => {
            for (key, nested) in entries {
                if budget.rejected {
                    return;
                }
                if key.as_text() == Some("ocspVals") {
                    if !budget.visit_collection_node() {
                        return;
                    }
                    let Value::Array(values) = nested else {
                        continue;
                    };
                    if values.len() > budget.remaining_responses() {
                        budget.rejected = true;
                        return;
                    }
                    for value in values {
                        if !budget.visit_collection_node() {
                            return;
                        }
                        if let Some(response) = value.as_bytes() {
                            if budget.accept_response(response) {
                                visit(response);
                            }
                            if budget.rejected {
                                return;
                            }
                        }
                    }
                } else {
                    visit_ocsp_values(nested, depth + 1, budget, visit);
                }
            }
        }
        Value::Array(values) => {
            for nested in values {
                visit_ocsp_values(nested, depth + 1, budget, visit);
                if budget.rejected {
                    return;
                }
            }
        }
        _ => {}
    }
}

fn scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(
    signature: &[u8],
    certificate_status_assertions: &[&[u8]],
    mut visit: impl FnMut(&[u8]),
) -> OcspEvidenceBudget {
    let mut budget = OcspEvidenceBudget::default();
    let signature_within_limit =
        visit_ocsp_staples(signature, budget.remaining_responses(), |response| {
            if budget.accept_response(response) {
                visit(response);
            }
        });
    if !signature_within_limit || budget.rejected {
        budget.rejected = true;
        return budget;
    }

    for bytes in certificate_status_assertions {
        if bytes.len() > MAX_OCSP_STATUS_ASSERTION_BYTES {
            budget.rejected = true;
            return budget;
        }
        if let Ok(assertion) = decode(bytes) {
            visit_ocsp_values(&assertion, 0, &mut budget, &mut visit);
        }
        if budget.rejected {
            return budget;
        }
    }
    budget
}

fn ocsp_chain_pairs<'a>(
    chain: &'a [Vec<u8>],
    trust: Option<&'a TrustList>,
) -> Option<Vec<(&'a [u8], &'a [u8])>> {
    if chain.len() > MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_CHAIN_CERTIFICATES {
        return None;
    }
    let Some(mut subject) = chain.first().map(Vec::as_slice) else {
        return Some(Vec::new());
    };
    let mut pairs = Vec::with_capacity(chain.len());
    for _ in 0..MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_CHAIN_CERTIFICATES {
        let candidates = chain.iter().skip(1).map(Vec::as_slice).chain(
            trust
                .into_iter()
                .flat_map(|trust| trust.anchors.iter().map(Vec::as_slice)),
        );
        let Some(issuer) = crate::c2pa_trust::resolve_issuer(subject, candidates) else {
            break;
        };
        if issuer == subject
            || pairs
                .iter()
                .any(|(prior_subject, _)| *prior_subject == issuer)
        {
            break;
        }
        pairs.push((subject, issuer));
        if trust.is_some_and(|trust| {
            trust
                .anchors
                .iter()
                .any(|anchor| anchor.as_slice() == issuer)
        }) {
            break;
        }
        subject = issuer;
    }
    Some(pairs)
}

pub(super) fn evaluate_embedded_ocsp(
    signature: &[u8],
    certificate_status_assertions: &[&[u8]],
    chain: &[Vec<u8>],
    signed_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
    verification_time: OffsetDateTime,
    trust: Option<&TrustList>,
) -> EmbeddedOcspStatus {
    let preflight = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(signature, certificate_status_assertions, |_| {});
    if preflight.rejected {
        return EmbeddedOcspStatus::Skipped;
    }
    if preflight.responses == 0 {
        return EmbeddedOcspStatus::NotChecked;
    }
    let Some(pairs) = ocsp_chain_pairs(chain, trust) else {
        return EmbeddedOcspStatus::Skipped;
    };
    let mut statuses = vec![None; pairs.len()];
    let evidence =
        scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(signature, certificate_status_assertions, |staple| {
            for (accumulated, (subject, issuer)) in statuses.iter_mut().zip(&pairs) {
                let candidate = crate::c2pa_trust::evaluate_ocsp_verified(
                    staple,
                    issuer,
                    subject,
                    signed_at,
                    verification_time,
                );
                *accumulated = crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::merge(*accumulated, candidate);
            }
        });
    if evidence.rejected {
        return EmbeddedOcspStatus::Skipped;
    }

    embedded_ocsp_status_from_certificate_statuses(&statuses)
}

fn embedded_ocsp_status_from_certificate_statuses(
    statuses: &[Option<crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus>],
) -> EmbeddedOcspStatus {
    let leaf_revoked = statuses.first().is_some_and(|status| {
        matches!(status, Some(crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Revoked { .. }))
    });
    let ca_revoked = statuses
        .iter()
        .skip(1)
        .any(|status| matches!(status, Some(crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Revoked { .. })));
    match (leaf_revoked, ca_revoked) {
        (true, true) => EmbeddedOcspStatus::LeafAndCaRevoked,
        (true, false) => EmbeddedOcspStatus::LeafRevoked,
        (false, true) => EmbeddedOcspStatus::CaRevoked,
        (false, false)
            if statuses
                .first()
                .is_some_and(|status| *status == Some(crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Good)) =>
        {
            EmbeddedOcspStatus::NotRevoked
        }
        (false, false) => EmbeddedOcspStatus::Skipped,
    }
}

fn record_embedded_ocsp_status(
    status: EmbeddedOcspStatus,
    sig_url: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    match status {
        EmbeddedOcspStatus::NotRevoked => results.push_success(
            SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_NOT_REVOKED,
            sig_url.into(),
            "embedded OCSP response: signing certificate not revoked at signing".into(),
        ),
        EmbeddedOcspStatus::LeafRevoked => results.push_failure(
            SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_REVOKED,
            sig_url.into(),
            "embedded OCSP response: signing certificate revoked at signing".into(),
        ),
        EmbeddedOcspStatus::CaRevoked => results.push_failure(
            SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED,
            sig_url.into(),
            "embedded OCSP response: CA certificate revoked at signing".into(),
        ),
        EmbeddedOcspStatus::LeafAndCaRevoked => {
            results.push_failure(
                SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_REVOKED,
                sig_url.into(),
                "embedded OCSP response: signing certificate revoked at signing".into(),
            );
            results.push_failure(
                SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED,
                sig_url.into(),
                "embedded OCSP response: CA certificate revoked at signing".into(),
            );
        }
        EmbeddedOcspStatus::NotChecked | EmbeddedOcspStatus::Skipped => {
            results.push_informational(
                SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_SKIPPED,
                sig_url.into(),
                "no usable embedded OCSP response for the leaf; revocation check skipped".into(),
            );
        }
    }
}

/// Run the per-manifest verification steps and assemble the output.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] // one internal pass threads shared store/report budgets
fn verify_manifest<'a>(
    manifest: &'a ParsedManifest<'a>,
    store: StoreContext<'a>,
    input: &VerifyInput,
    format: AssetFormat,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    prehashed_digest: Option<&[u8]>,
    cawg_inputs: CawgTrustInputs<'_>,
    report_decode_nodes: &mut usize,
) -> VerifyOutput {
    let label = manifest.label.clone();
    let sig_url = format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.signature");
    let mut results = ValidationResults::default();

    // --- Claim + signature presence ---
    let Some(claim_cbor) = manifest.claim_cbor else {
        results.push_failure(CLAIM_MISSING, sig_url, "no claim found in manifest".into());
        return finish(
            label,
            manifest,
            None,
            None,
            &[],
            None,
            results,
            None,
            input.profile,
            report_decode_nodes,
        );
    };
    let claim = match decode(claim_cbor) {
        Ok(c) => c,
        Err(_) => {
            results.push_failure(
                CLAIM_CBOR_INVALID,
                sig_url,
                "claim CBOR could not be decoded".into(),
            );
            return finish(
                label,
                manifest,
                None,
                None,
                &[],
                None,
                results,
                None,
                input.profile,
                report_decode_nodes,
            );
        }
    };

    // Spec-version classification: claim generation (v1 vs v2) drives the
    // generation-aware structural checks below; the ladder verdict rides on
    // the output and is finalized in `finish` (cleared when Invalid).
    let generation = versions::claim_generation(manifest, &claim);
    let mut claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(manifest, &claim, generation);
    let verdict = versions::evaluate(manifest, &claim, format);

    // Strict target-version control (internal conformance analysis): in
    // Conformance mode the manifest is additionally held to the profile's
    // target spec revision. Informational under the core-spec bar; a hard
    // failure under the conformance program. Regular mode stays silent — the
    // ladder verdict carries the classification without judgment.
    if input.profile.mode == OperatingMode::Conformance && claim_refs.undeclared_labels.is_empty() {
        if let Some(eval) = verdict
            .evaluations
            .iter()
            .find(|e| e.version == input.profile.version)
        {
            if !eval.structure_conformant {
                let explanation = format!(
                    "manifest does not conform to target spec {}: {}",
                    input.profile.version.version_str(),
                    eval.reasons.join("; "),
                );
                match input.profile.compliance {
                    ComplianceLevel::ConformanceProgram => results.push_failure(
                        CONFORMANCE_SPEC_VERSION_NONCONFORMANT,
                        sig_url.clone(),
                        explanation,
                    ),
                    ComplianceLevel::CoreSpec => results.push_informational(
                        CONFORMANCE_SPEC_VERSION_NONCONFORMANT,
                        sig_url.clone(),
                        explanation,
                    ),
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // --- Structural claim/assertion validation (detection of malformed input) ---
    let certificate_statuses = certificate_status_payloads(store.manifests);
    let mut structure_ok = !verify_claim_structure(
        manifest,
        store,
        &claim,
        generation,
        &claim_refs,
        format,
        &sig_url,
        &mut results,
    );
    if certificate_statuses.rejected {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.clone(),
            "store-wide certificate-status evidence exceeds verifier bounds".into(),
        );
        structure_ok = false;
    }

    let Some(cose) = manifest.signature_cose else {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISSING,
            sig_url,
            "no claim signature present".into(),
        );
        return finish(
            label,
            manifest,
            Some(&claim),
            Some(&claim_refs.declared_labels),
            &[],
            None,
            results,
            Some(verdict),
            input.profile,
            report_decode_nodes,
        );
    };

    // The accepted relative URI resolves inside the current manifest. The
    // absolute form must name this manifest exactly; cross-manifest and deeper
    // paths never resolve to the current signature box.
    let sig_ref_ok = claim
        .get("signature")
        .and_then(Value::as_text)
        .is_some_and(|uri| claim_signature_uri_is_local(uri, &label));
    if !sig_ref_ok {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISSING,
            sig_url.clone(),
            "claim signature reference does not resolve to c2pa.signature".into(),
        );
        return finish(
            label,
            manifest,
            Some(&claim),
            Some(&claim_refs.declared_labels),
            &[],
            None,
            results,
            Some(verdict),
            input.profile,
            report_decode_nodes,
        );
    }

    // --- Signing certificate chain ---
    let (chain, chain_error) = match extract_x5chain(cose) {
        Ok(chain) => (chain, None),
        Err(error) => (Vec::new(), Some(error.to_string())),
    };
    let leaf = chain.first().map(|c| c.as_slice());

    // Step 8 (computed early): a fully verified RFC 3161 token establishes the
    // validation instant for the claim-signing chain. Unverified token bytes
    // never influence certificate validity.
    let claim_timestamp = extract_claim_tsa_tokens(cose);
    let (timestamp_version, timestamp_token) = match claim_timestamp {
        Some((version, tokens)) if matches!(tokens.as_slice(), [Some(_)]) => {
            let token = tokens.into_iter().next().flatten();
            (Some(version), token)
        }
        None => (None, None),
        Some(_) => {
            results.push_informational(
                TIME_STAMP_MALFORMED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "timestamp header does not contain exactly one usable RFC 3161 token".into(),
            );
            (None, None)
        }
    };
    let trusted_timestamp = timestamp_token.as_ref().and_then(|token| {
        let timestamp_payload = match timestamp_version {
            Some(ClaimTimestampVersion::V1) => timestamp_input_v1(cose, claim_cbor),
            Some(ClaimTimestampVersion::V2) => timestamp_input(cose),
            None => return None,
        };
        let Ok(timestamp_payload) = timestamp_payload else {
            results.push_informational(
                TIME_STAMP_MALFORMED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "timestamp token has a malformed C2PA CounterSignature input".into(),
            );
            return None;
        };
        let normalized_token = match timestamp_version {
            Some(ClaimTimestampVersion::V1) => {
                crate::c2pa_trust::token_from_timestamp_response(token)
            }
            Some(ClaimTimestampVersion::V2) => Ok(token.clone()),
            None => return None,
        };
        let Ok(normalized_token) = normalized_token else {
            results.push_informational(
                TIME_STAMP_MALFORMED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "legacy timestamp response does not contain a usable CMS token".into(),
            );
            return None;
        };
        if let Err(error) =
            crate::c2pa_trust::inspect_timestamp_token(&normalized_token, &timestamp_payload)
        {
            results.push_informational(
                TIME_STAMP_MALFORMED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                format!("timestamp token failed structural or cryptographic validation: {error}"),
            );
            return None;
        }
        let Some(trust) = input.tsa_trust else {
            results.push_informational(
                TIME_STAMP_UNTRUSTED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "timestamp token valid but no TSA trust anchors were supplied".into(),
            );
            return None;
        };
        let verification =
            crate::c2pa_trust::verify_timestamp_token(&normalized_token, &timestamp_payload, trust);
        if matches!(timestamp_version, Some(ClaimTimestampVersion::V1)) && verification.verified {
            results.push_informational(
                TIME_STAMP_UNTRUSTED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "legacy claim-v1 timestamp input does not bind the COSE signature and cannot anchor signing-certificate validity"
                    .into(),
            );
            return None;
        }
        if verification.verified {
            results.push_success(
                TIME_STAMP_VALIDATED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "RFC 3161 timestamp signature and message imprint validated".into(),
            );
            results.push_success(
                TIME_STAMP_TRUSTED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "timestamp authority chains to a supplied TSA trust anchor".into(),
            );
            verification.time
        } else {
            let error = verification
                .error
                .unwrap_or("timestamp_verification_failed");
            if error == "timestamp_tsa_outside_validity" {
                results.push_informational(
                    TIME_STAMP_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY,
                    sig_url.clone(),
                    "timestamp authority certificate was outside its validity window at genTime"
                        .into(),
                );
            }
            results.push_informational(
                TIME_STAMP_UNTRUSTED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                format!("RFC 3161 timestamp verification failed: {error}"),
            );
            None
        }
    });

    // Step 4: a trusted timestamp takes precedence for certificate validity,
    // while OCSP freshness still uses the caller's current verification time.
    let ocsp_verification_time = input
        .validation_time
        .unwrap_or_else(OffsetDateTime::now_utc);
    let at = trusted_timestamp.unwrap_or(ocsp_verification_time);

    // Evaluate the signing-certificate chain up front when a trust list is
    // supplied. The leaf's claim-signing profile (EKU, key usage, and CA
    // constraints) is intrinsic to the credential and is enforced even when
    // no trust policy was supplied.
    let chain_result = match (input.claim_signer_trust, leaf) {
        (Some(trust), Some(leaf_der)) => {
            Some(validate_chain(leaf_der, &chain[1..], trust, Some(at)))
        }
        _ => None,
    };
    // Whole-chain validity at `at`. With a trust list this reflects every cert
    // in the chain; without one it is the leaf's own validity window.
    let in_validity = match &chain_result {
        Some(cr) => cr.chain_validity_ok && leaf.map(|d| cert::valid_at(d, at)).unwrap_or(false),
        None => leaf.map(|d| cert::valid_at(d, at)).unwrap_or(false),
    };
    let leaf_acceptable = chain_result
        .as_ref()
        .map(|cr| cr.leaf_acceptable)
        .unwrap_or_else(|| {
            leaf.map(crate::c2pa_trust::leaf_acceptable_der)
                .unwrap_or(false)
        });

    // Cryptographic verification of the claim signature against the leaf.
    let sig_verification = leaf.map(|d| verify_claim(cose, claim_cbor, d));
    let sig_ok = matches!(sig_verification, Some(Ok(())));

    let generous = is_generous(input.profile);
    // Construction-only signature soundness: the signature verifies and the
    // claim structure is well-formed. Leaf claim-signer acceptability
    // (EKU/keyUsage/CA) is NOT folded in: a credential-profile failure emits
    // `signingCredential.invalid` and CONTINUES — the reference implementation
    // still runs and reports signature verification, hashed-URI checks, and
    // hard-binding checks. Cert-time validity is likewise excluded — it is a
    // trust/time signal, not a construction signal. The strict posture still
    // folds `in_validity` into the gates below; the generous posture treats
    // cert-time as a non-invalidating caveat.
    let sig_constructed = sig_ok && structure_ok;

    match leaf {
        Some(_leaf_der) => {
            // An unacceptable claim signer (CA cert, keyCertSign, wrong/any
            // EKU) is reported as `signingCredential.invalid` — an
            // invalidating failure in both postures — but it never suppresses
            // the downstream checks: signature verification, hashed-URI, and
            // hard-binding results are still evaluated and reported.
            if !leaf_acceptable {
                results.push_failure(
                    SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_INVALID,
                    sig_url.clone(),
                    "signing certificate is not a valid claim-signing credential".into(),
                );
            }
            // Generous posture validates on construction soundness alone;
            // strict keeps the cert-validity-window requirement.
            let validated = if generous {
                sig_constructed
            } else {
                sig_constructed && in_validity
            };
            if validated {
                results.push_success(
                    CLAIM_SIGNATURE_VALIDATED,
                    sig_url.clone(),
                    "claim signature valid".into(),
                );
            } else if !sig_ok {
                results.push_failure(
                    CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH,
                    sig_url.clone(),
                    match &sig_verification {
                        Some(Err(error)) => format!("claim signature invalid: {error}"),
                        _ => "claim signature invalid".into(),
                    },
                );
            }
            // When sig_ok but outside validity, claimSignature.validated is
            // intentionally suppressed; the outsideValidity failure below
            // carries the verdict.
        }
        None => {
            let explanation = chain_error.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| {
                "no integrity-protected signing certificate in signature".into()
            });
            results.push_failure(SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_INVALID, sig_url.clone(), explanation);
            results.push_failure(
                CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "claim signature could not be verified without an integrity-protected signing certificate".into(),
            );
        }
    }

    if leaf.is_some() {
        if in_validity {
            results.push_success(
                CLAIM_SIGNATURE_INSIDE_VALIDITY,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "claim signature valid".into(),
            );
        } else {
            results.push_failure(
                CLAIM_SIGNATURE_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "signing certificate outside its validity window".into(),
            );
        }
    }

    // Steps 5-6: assertion hashed-URI bindings and the asset hard binding.
    // The hashedURI + dataHash bindings run when the signature is usable.
    // Strict keeps the cert-validity-window requirement (sig_ok &&
    // in_validity); generous gates on construction soundness alone so an
    // expired-but-intact manifest still reports its bindings. Leaf
    // claim-signer acceptability never gates these checks: a
    // credential-profile failure reports its own code and the binding checks
    // still run (matching the reference implementation).
    let sig_usable = if generous {
        sig_constructed
    } else {
        sig_constructed && in_validity
    };
    if sig_usable {
        // Step 5: assertion hashed-URI bindings.
        verify_assertion_bindings(&claim, &mut claim_refs, generation, &label, &mut results);
        // Ingredient manifest and signature hashes are semantic work. Defer
        // them until the active claim signature is usable, then cache each
        // child-manifest/algorithm digest for this verification.
        let mut ingredient_digests = IngredientManifestDigestCache::new(store);
        verify_ingredient_references(
            &claim_refs,
            &claim,
            &mut ingredient_digests,
            &sig_url,
            &mut results,
        );
        // Step 6: verify the asset's content. Multi-asset may validate as a
        // fallback, but it never replaces the manifest's primary hard binding.
        let _content_binding = if let Some(digest) = prehashed_digest {
            verify_prehashed_hard_binding(&claim, &claim_refs, digest, &label, &mut results)
        } else {
            verify_data_hash(
                &claim,
                &claim_refs,
                input.data,
                format,
                fragments,
                &label,
                &mut results,
            )
        };
        // Step 6a (EXPERIMENTAL, PR #2058): host-less compound binding. ONLY for
        // application/c2pa (C2paStore). Ordinary host-bearing formats require a
        // real c2pa.hash.* binding (verify_data_hash) and never treat
        // c2pa.compound.content as a hard binding.
        if format == AssetFormat::C2paStore {
            verify_compound_content(&claim_refs, &label, store.manifest_hashes, &mut results);
        }
        // Named-actor trust is evaluated only when this exact asset and claim
        // are valid and every referenced assertion still matches its stored
        // bytes. A valid identity COSE inside any invalid manifest must never
        // produce `cawg.identity.trusted`.
        if results.failure.is_empty() {
            cawg::verify_identity_assertions(
                &mut cawg::IdentityContext {
                    manifest,
                    claim: &claim,
                    validation_time: at,
                    claim_timestamp: trusted_timestamp,
                    cawg_trust: cawg_inputs.trust,
                    cawg_allowed_certs: cawg_inputs.allowed_certs,
                    ocsp_verification_time,
                    document_signing_require_anchor: cawg_inputs.document_signing_require_anchor,
                    tsa_trust: input.tsa_trust,
                    did_documents: cawg_inputs.did_documents,
                    strict_encoding: cawg_inputs.strict_encoding,
                    results: &mut results,
                },
                &claim_refs,
                claim_refs
                    .binding_plan(format == AssetFormat::C2paStore)
                    .primary(),
                &certificate_statuses.payloads,
            );
        }
    }

    // Step 7a: evaluate bounded embedded OCSP evidence before trust so a
    // revoked leaf or CA certificate cannot be reported trusted. The shared
    // evaluator also serves CAWG identity validation.
    let ocsp_status = evaluate_embedded_ocsp(
        cose,
        &certificate_statuses.payloads,
        &chain,
        trusted_timestamp,
        ocsp_verification_time,
        input.claim_signer_trust,
    );
    let ocsp_blocks_trust = ocsp_status.blocks_trust();
    record_embedded_ocsp_status(ocsp_status, &sig_url, &mut results);

    // Step 7b: trust evaluation (when a trust list and/or allowed list is
    // supplied). Reuses the chain result computed at `at` in step 4. A revoked
    // OCSP status or a fatal structural defect prevents a trusted verdict. An
    // allowed-list match trusts the end-entity certificate directly — no
    // chain-to-anchor required — but the leaf must still be an acceptable
    // claim signer and valid at `at`.
    let leaf_allowed = match (input.allowed_certs, leaf) {
        (Some(allowed), Some(leaf_der)) => {
            allowed.anchors.iter().any(|a| a.as_slice() == leaf_der)
                && crate::c2pa_trust::leaf_acceptable_der(leaf_der)
                && cert::valid_at(leaf_der, at)
        }
        _ => false,
    };
    if chain_result.is_some() || (input.allowed_certs.is_some() && leaf.is_some()) {
        let chain_trusted = chain_result
            .as_ref()
            .map(|cr| cr.trusted && cr.leaf_acceptable)
            .unwrap_or(false);
        if (chain_trusted || leaf_allowed) && structure_ok && !ocsp_blocks_trust {
            results.push_success(
                SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_TRUSTED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "signing certificate trusted".into(),
            );
        } else if !results.has_failure(SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED) {
            results.push_failure(
                SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED,
                sig_url.clone(),
                "signing certificate untrusted".into(),
            );
        }
    }

    // Conformance-program SHOULD->SHALL upgrades, applied on the full-evaluation
    // path (structural-failure early exits above are already failures).
    apply_compliance_upgrades(&mut results, input.profile.compliance, &sig_url);
    finish(
        label,
        manifest,
        Some(&claim),
        Some(&claim_refs.declared_labels),
        &chain,
        Some(cose),
        results,
        Some(verdict),
        input.profile,
        report_decode_nodes,
    )
}

/// Structural validation of the claim and assertions: detect malformed or
/// non-conforming input (the verifier's adversarial-input responsibility).
///
/// Emits, as failures: `claim.multiple` (>1 claim box), `claim.malformed`
/// (missing fields required by the detected claim generation),
/// `claim.hardBindings.missing` (no `c2pa.hash.*`
const MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES: usize = 4_096;
const MAX_ASSERTION_HASH_WORK_BYTES: usize = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
const MAX_ASSERTION_DECODED_VALUE_NODES: usize = 1 << 20;
// One verifier-call budget spans the active manifest and every ingredient
// parent. No report assertion or parent receives a fresh decoder allowance.
const MAX_REPORT_DECODED_VALUE_NODES: usize = 1 << 20;

fn checked_hash_work_total(lengths: impl IntoIterator<Item = usize>) -> Option<usize> {
    lengths.into_iter().try_fold(0usize, |total, length| {
        total
            .checked_add(length)
            .filter(|next| *next <= MAX_ASSERTION_HASH_WORK_BYTES)
    })
}

fn is_supported_bmff_hash_label(label: &str) -> bool {
    matches!(label, "c2pa.hash.bmff.v2" | "c2pa.hash.bmff.v3")
}

fn is_supported_whole_asset_hash_label(label: &str) -> bool {
    label == "c2pa.hash.data" || is_supported_bmff_hash_label(label)
}

/// Compatibility name used by the CAWG consumer. This predicate describes
/// primary bindings only; `c2pa.hash.multi-asset` is a supplemental fallback.
fn is_supported_hard_binding_label(label: &str, compound_ok: bool) -> bool {
    is_supported_whole_asset_hash_label(label)
        || label == "c2pa.hash.boxes"
        || label == "c2pa.hash.collection.data"
        || (compound_ok && label == "c2pa.compound.content")
}

fn is_multi_asset_binding_label(label: &str) -> bool {
    label == "c2pa.hash.multi-asset"
}

struct IndexedAssertion<'a> {
    jumbf: Option<&'a [u8]>,
    payload: Option<&'a [u8]>,
    decoded: Option<Value>,
    jumbf_digests: [Option<Vec<u8>>; 3],
}

struct ClaimAssertionReference<'a> {
    field: &'static str,
    value: &'a Value,
    label: Option<&'a str>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
enum OperativeBinding<'index, 'claim> {
    Primary(&'index ClaimAssertionReference<'claim>),
    MultiAsset(&'index ClaimAssertionReference<'claim>),
}

impl<'index, 'claim> OperativeBinding<'index, 'claim> {
    fn reference(self) -> &'index ClaimAssertionReference<'claim> {
        match self {
            Self::Primary(reference) | Self::MultiAsset(reference) => reference,
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
struct BindingPlan<'index, 'claim> {
    primary_candidate: Option<&'index ClaimAssertionReference<'claim>>,
    primary_count: usize,
    multi_asset_candidate: Option<&'index ClaimAssertionReference<'claim>>,
    multi_asset_count: usize,
}

impl<'index, 'claim> BindingPlan<'index, 'claim> {
    fn primary(self) -> Option<&'index ClaimAssertionReference<'claim>> {
        (self.primary_count == 1)
            .then_some(self.primary_candidate)
            .flatten()
    }

    fn multi_asset(self) -> Option<&'index ClaimAssertionReference<'claim>> {
        (self.multi_asset_count == 1)
            .then_some(self.multi_asset_candidate)
            .flatten()
    }
}

const GENERATOR_ICON_REFERENCE_FIELD: &str = "claim_generator_info.icon";

fn visit_generator_icon_references<'a>(
    claim: &'a Value,
    generation: ClaimGeneration,
    mut visit: impl FnMut(&'a Value),
) {
    let Some(info) = claim.get("claim_generator_info") else {
        return;
    };
    match generation {
        ClaimGeneration::V1 => {
            if let Value::Array(entries) = info {
                for entry in entries {
                    if let Some(icon) = entry.get("icon") {
                        visit(icon);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        ClaimGeneration::V2 => {
            if let Some(icon) = info.get("icon") {
                visit(icon);
            }
        }
    }
}

/// One bounded, exact-resolution view of a claim's assertion declarations.
///
/// Every downstream validation phase uses this view. References are kept once
/// in claim order, assertion payloads are indexed once, and only declared
/// assertion-store boxes are decoded or exposed to semantic validation.
struct ClaimAssertionRefs<'a> {
    complete: bool,
    duplicate_label: Option<&'a str>,
    references: Vec<ClaimAssertionReference<'a>>,
    binding_labels: Vec<&'a str>,
    declared_labels: std::collections::HashSet<&'a str>,
    assertions: std::collections::HashMap<&'a str, IndexedAssertion<'a>>,
    undeclared_labels: Vec<&'a str>,
    invalid_cbor_labels: Vec<&'a str>,
    hash_work_bytes: Option<usize>,
    decode_budget_exhausted: bool,
    decoded_value_nodes: usize,
}

impl<'a> ClaimAssertionRefs<'a> {
    fn build(
        manifest: &'a ParsedManifest<'_>,
        claim: &'a Value,
        generation: ClaimGeneration,
    ) -> Self {
        let mut total = 0usize;
        for field in ref_fields(generation) {
            let Some(Value::Array(items)) = claim.get(field) else {
                continue;
            };
            let Some(next) = total.checked_add(items.len()) else {
                return Self::incomplete();
            };
            if next > MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES {
                return Self::incomplete();
            }
            total = next;
        }
        let mut icon_overflow = false;
        visit_generator_icon_references(claim, generation, |_| {
            total = match total.checked_add(1) {
                Some(next) if next <= MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES => next,
                _ => {
                    icon_overflow = true;
                    total
                }
            };
        });
        if icon_overflow {
            return Self::incomplete();
        }

        let mut references = Vec::with_capacity(total);
        let mut declared_labels = std::collections::HashSet::with_capacity(total);
        let mut duplicate_label = None;
        let mut binding_labels = Vec::new();
        for field in ref_fields(generation) {
            let Some(Value::Array(items)) = claim.get(field) else {
                continue;
            };
            for value in items {
                let label = value
                    .get("url")
                    .and_then(Value::as_text)
                    .and_then(|url| assertion_label_for_manifest(url, &manifest.label));
                if let Some(label) = label {
                    if is_supported_hard_binding_label(label, true)
                        || is_multi_asset_binding_label(label)
                    {
                        binding_labels.push(label);
                    }
                }
                if let Some(label) = label {
                    if !declared_labels.insert(label) {
                        duplicate_label.get_or_insert(label);
                        continue;
                    }
                }
                references.push(ClaimAssertionReference {
                    field,
                    value,
                    label,
                });
            }
        }
        visit_generator_icon_references(claim, generation, |value| {
            let label = value
                .get("url")
                .and_then(Value::as_text)
                .and_then(|url| assertion_label_for_manifest(url, &manifest.label));
            if let Some(label) = label {
                if !declared_labels.insert(label) {
                    duplicate_label.get_or_insert(label);
                    return;
                }
            }
            references.push(ClaimAssertionReference {
                field: GENERATOR_ICON_REFERENCE_FIELD,
                value,
                label,
            });
        });

        let payloads: std::collections::HashMap<&str, &[u8]> = manifest
            .assertions
            .iter()
            .map(|(label, payload)| (label.as_str(), *payload))
            .collect();
        let jumbf: std::collections::HashMap<&str, &[u8]> = manifest
            .assertion_jumbf
            .iter()
            .map(|(label, bytes)| (label.as_str(), *bytes))
            .collect();
        // Preflight every byte domain that may be decoded or hashed before any
        // assertion payload becomes a `Value`. JUMBF content is counted twice
        // for the claim and optional compound digest slots; raw payload bytes
        // are counted independently for semantic decoding.
        let hash_work_bytes = checked_hash_work_total(declared_labels.iter().flat_map(|label| {
            let jumbf_len = jumbf.get(label).map_or(0, |bytes| bytes.len());
            let payload_len = payloads.get(label).map_or(0, |bytes| bytes.len());
            [jumbf_len, jumbf_len, payload_len]
        }));
        let decode_payloads = hash_work_bytes.is_some();
        let mut remaining_nodes = MAX_ASSERTION_DECODED_VALUE_NODES;
        let mut decode_budget_exhausted = false;
        let mut assertions = std::collections::HashMap::with_capacity(declared_labels.len());
        let mut invalid_cbor_labels = Vec::new();
        for reference in references.iter().filter_map(|reference| reference.label) {
            let payload = payloads.get(reference).copied();
            let decoded = if decode_payloads && !decode_budget_exhausted {
                match payload {
                    Some(bytes) => match decode((bytes, &mut remaining_nodes)) {
                        Ok(value) => Some(value),
                        Err(DecodeError::NodeLimitExceeded(_)) => {
                            decode_budget_exhausted = true;
                            None
                        }
                        Err(_) => {
                            invalid_cbor_labels.push(reference);
                            None
                        }
                    },
                    None => None,
                }
            } else {
                None
            };
            assertions.insert(
                reference,
                IndexedAssertion {
                    jumbf: jumbf.get(reference).copied(),
                    payload,
                    decoded,
                    jumbf_digests: [None, None, None],
                },
            );
        }
        let undeclared_labels = manifest
            .assertion_jumbf
            .iter()
            .filter_map(|(label, _)| {
                (!declared_labels.contains(label.as_str())).then_some(label.as_str())
            })
            .collect();

        Self {
            complete: true,
            duplicate_label,
            references,
            binding_labels,
            declared_labels,
            assertions,
            undeclared_labels,
            invalid_cbor_labels,
            hash_work_bytes,
            decode_budget_exhausted,
            decoded_value_nodes: MAX_ASSERTION_DECODED_VALUE_NODES - remaining_nodes,
        }
    }

    fn incomplete() -> Self {
        Self {
            complete: false,
            duplicate_label: None,
            references: Vec::new(),
            binding_labels: Vec::new(),
            declared_labels: std::collections::HashSet::new(),
            assertions: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
            undeclared_labels: Vec::new(),
            invalid_cbor_labels: Vec::new(),
            hash_work_bytes: None,
            decode_budget_exhausted: false,
            decoded_value_nodes: 0,
        }
    }

    fn indexed(&self, label: &str) -> Option<&IndexedAssertion<'a>> {
        self.assertions.get(label)
    }

    fn jumbf_digest(&self, label: &str, algorithm: &str) -> Option<&[u8]> {
        let index = bmff_algorithm_index(algorithm)?;
        self.indexed(label)?.jumbf_digests[index].as_deref()
    }

    fn binding_plan(&self, compound_ok: bool) -> BindingPlan<'_, 'a> {
        let primary_count = self
            .binding_labels
            .iter()
            .filter(|label| is_supported_hard_binding_label(label, compound_ok))
            .count();
        let multi_asset_count = self
            .binding_labels
            .iter()
            .filter(|label| is_multi_asset_binding_label(label))
            .count();
        BindingPlan {
            primary_candidate: self.references.iter().find(|reference| {
                reference
                    .label
                    .is_some_and(|label| is_supported_hard_binding_label(label, compound_ok))
            }),
            primary_count,
            multi_asset_candidate: self
                .references
                .iter()
                .find(|reference| reference.label.is_some_and(is_multi_asset_binding_label)),
            multi_asset_count,
        }
    }

    fn hash_work_bytes(&self, _generation: ClaimGeneration) -> Option<usize> {
        self.hash_work_bytes
    }
}

#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] // internal structural gate; grouping obscures inputs
fn verify_claim_structure(
    manifest: &ParsedManifest,
    store: StoreContext<'_>,
    claim: &Value,
    generation: ClaimGeneration,
    claim_refs: &ClaimAssertionRefs<'_>,
    format: AssetFormat,
    sig_url: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) -> bool {
    // Returns false when a fatal structural defect (multiple claims / malformed
    // claim) means the signature must not be reported as validated/trusted.
    let mut fatal = false;
    // claim.multiple: more than one claim box in the manifest.
    if manifest.claim_count > 1 {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MULTIPLE,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            format!(
                "{} claim boxes in manifest (expected 1)",
                manifest.claim_count
            ),
        );
        fatal = true;
    }

    // Defense in depth for in-crate direct callers; the production JUMBF parser rejects both duplicate forms before this function.
    let mut manifest_labels = std::collections::BTreeSet::new();
    if store
        .manifests
        .iter()
        .any(|item| !manifest_labels.insert(item.label.as_str()))
    {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            "manifest store contains duplicate labels; internal JUMBF references are ambiguous"
                .into(),
        );
        fatal = true;
    }
    let mut assertion_labels = std::collections::BTreeSet::new();
    if manifest
        .assertion_jumbf
        .iter()
        .any(|(label, _)| !assertion_labels.insert(label.as_str()))
    {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            "manifest contains duplicate assertion labels; internal JUMBF references are ambiguous"
                .into(),
        );
        fatal = true;
    }

    // claim.malformed: fields required by the detected claim generation must
    // be present and have their required shape (claim v1:
    // instanceID/claim_generator/claim_generator_info/dc:format/assertions;
    // claim v2: instanceID/claim_generator_info/created_assertions). This
    // includes GeneratorInfoMap optional-member types and hashed-URI icons.
    let missing = match generation {
        ClaimGeneration::V1 => versions::v1_missing_fields(claim),
        ClaimGeneration::V2 => versions::v2_missing_fields(claim),
    };
    if !missing.is_empty() {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            format!("claim missing required field(s): {}", missing.join(", ")),
        );
        fatal = true;
    }

    // claim.malformed: v2 manifest labels must follow the C2PA 2.x grammar
    // `urn:c2pa:<guid>[:vendor[:version[_reason]]]` (or a legacy v1-shaped
    // label, which the reference implementation also tolerates). Matches
    // upstream `verify_claim`, which logs `claim box label invalid` as a
    // claim.malformed failure while continuing validation (non-fatal).
    if generation == ClaimGeneration::V2 && !manifest_label_conformant(&manifest.label) {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            format!("claim box label invalid: {}", manifest.label),
        );
    }

    if !claim_refs.complete {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            format!(
                "claim assertion-reference count exceeds verifier bound ({MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES})"
            ),
        );
        return true;
    }
    for reference in &claim_refs.references {
        let malformed = !matches!(reference.value, Value::Map(_))
            || reference
                .value
                .get("url")
                .and_then(Value::as_text)
                .is_none()
            || reference
                .value
                .get("hash")
                .and_then(Value::as_bytes)
                .is_none();
        if malformed {
            results.push_failure(
                CLAIM_MALFORMED,
                sig_url.to_string(),
                "claim assertion reference is not a complete HashedUriMap".into(),
            );
            fatal = true;
        }
        if reference.field == GENERATOR_ICON_REFERENCE_FIELD
            && !reference.label.is_some_and(is_generator_icon_label)
        {
            results.push_failure(
                CLAIM_MALFORMED,
                sig_url.to_string(),
                "claim generator icon must reference a c2pa.icon assertion".into(),
            );
            fatal = true;
        }
    }
    if let Some(label) = claim_refs.duplicate_label {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            format!("claim declares assertion '{label}' more than once"),
        );
        fatal = true;
    }

    // Every assertion-store box must be declared by exactly one local claim
    // reference. Undeclared payloads are never decoded or exposed to semantic
    // consumers through the index.
    for label in &claim_refs.undeclared_labels {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_UNDECLARED,
            format!(
                "self#jumbf=/c2pa/{}/c2pa.assertions/{label}",
                manifest.label
            ),
            format!(
                "assertion '{label}' is present in the assertion store but absent from the claim"
            ),
        );
        fatal = true;
    }

    if claim_refs.hash_work_bytes(generation).is_none() {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            format!(
                "aggregate assertion digest work exceeds verifier bound ({MAX_ASSERTION_HASH_WORK_BYTES} bytes)"
            ),
        );
        fatal = true;
    }
    if claim_refs.decode_budget_exhausted {
        results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            format!(
                "aggregate decoded assertion values exceed verifier bound ({MAX_ASSERTION_DECODED_VALUE_NODES} nodes; {} nodes consumed)",
                claim_refs.decoded_value_nodes
            ),
        );
        fatal = true;
    }

    // The bounded plan separates the one primary binding from the optional
    // multi-asset fallback. Compound participates as a primary only for a
    // host-less C2PA store.
    let binding_plan = claim_refs.binding_plan(format == AssetFormat::C2paStore);
    match binding_plan.primary_count {
        0 => results.push_failure(
            CLAIM_HARD_BINDINGS_MISSING,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            "claim references no supported primary hard binding".into(),
        ),
        1 => {}
        _ => {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTIPLE_HARD_BINDINGS,
                format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{}/c2pa.assertions", manifest.label),
                "claim declares more than one supported primary hard binding".into(),
            );
            fatal = true;
        }
    }
    if binding_plan.multi_asset_count > 1 {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
            format!(
                "self#jumbf=/c2pa/{}/c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.multi-asset",
                manifest.label
            ),
            "claim declares more than one c2pa.hash.multi-asset fallback".into(),
        );
        fatal = true;
    }

    // algorithm.unsupported: every effective referenced-assertion hash
    // algorithm must be SHA-2.
    const SUPPORTED_ALGS: [&str; 3] = ["sha256", "sha384", "sha512"];
    for reference in &claim_refs.references {
        if let Some(alg) = resolved_hash_algorithm(reference.value, claim) {
            if !SUPPORTED_ALGS.contains(&alg) {
                results.push_failure(
                    ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
                    sig_url.to_string(),
                    format!("unsupported hash algorithm in hashed-URI reference: {alg}"),
                );
            }
        }
    }

    // Decode only declared assertions, once, when building the index.
    for label in &claim_refs.invalid_cbor_labels {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_CBOR_INVALID,
            format!(
                "self#jumbf=/c2pa/{}/c2pa.assertions/{label}",
                manifest.label
            ),
            format!("assertion '{label}' CBOR could not be decoded"),
        );
    }

    verify_action_assertions(claim_refs, generation, sig_url, results);

    fatal
}

fn referenced_action_assertions<'index, 'claim>(
    claim_refs: &'index ClaimAssertionRefs<'claim>,
    field: &str,
) -> Vec<(&'claim str, &'index Value)> {
    claim_refs
        .references
        .iter()
        .filter(|reference| reference.field == field)
        .filter_map(|reference| {
            let label = reference.label?;
            if !label.starts_with("c2pa.actions") {
                return None;
            }
            let assertion = claim_refs.indexed(label)?.decoded.as_ref()?;
            Some((label, assertion))
        })
        .collect()
}

fn verify_action_assertions(
    claim_refs: &ClaimAssertionRefs<'_>,
    generation: ClaimGeneration,
    sig_url: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    if generation == ClaimGeneration::V1 {
        return;
    }
    let created = referenced_action_assertions(claim_refs, "created_assertions");
    let gathered = referenced_action_assertions(claim_refs, "gathered_assertions");
    let fail = |results: &mut ValidationResults, explanation: &str| {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_ACTION_MALFORMED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            explanation.to_string(),
        );
    };
    let Some((_, first_assertion)) = created.first() else {
        fail(
            results,
            "standard manifest has no created actions assertion",
        );
        return;
    };
    let Some(Value::Array(first_actions)) = first_assertion.get("actions") else {
        fail(results, "first actions assertion has no actions array");
        return;
    };
    let Some(first_action) = first_actions.first() else {
        fail(
            results,
            "first actions assertion has an empty actions array",
        );
        return;
    };
    let first_kind = first_action.get("action").and_then(Value::as_text);
    if !matches!(first_kind, Some("c2pa.created" | "c2pa.opened")) {
        fail(results, "first action must be c2pa.created or c2pa.opened");
        return;
    }
    if first_kind == Some("c2pa.created")
        && first_action
            .get("digitalSourceType")
            .and_then(Value::as_text)
            .is_none()
    {
        fail(results, "c2pa.created action has no digitalSourceType");
        return;
    }

    let mut inception_actions = 0usize;
    for (assertion_index, (label, assertion)) in created.iter().chain(gathered.iter()).enumerate() {
        let Some(Value::Array(actions)) = assertion.get("actions") else {
            fail(results, &format!("{label} has no actions array"));
            return;
        };
        if actions.is_empty() {
            fail(results, &format!("{label} has an empty actions array"));
            return;
        }
        for (action_index, action) in actions.iter().enumerate() {
            let Some(kind) = action.get("action").and_then(Value::as_text) else {
                fail(
                    results,
                    &format!("{label} action {action_index} has no action"),
                );
                return;
            };
            if matches!(kind, "c2pa.created" | "c2pa.opened") {
                inception_actions += 1;
                if assertion_index != 0 || action_index != 0 {
                    fail(
                        results,
                        "c2pa.created or c2pa.opened may occur only as the first action",
                    );
                    return;
                }
            }
        }
    }
    if inception_actions != 1 {
        fail(
            results,
            "manifest must contain exactly one c2pa.created or c2pa.opened action",
        );
    }
}

/// C2PA manifest-label grammar check, mirroring the reference
/// implementation's `manifest_label_to_parts`:
/// - `urn:uuid:<guid>` (legacy v1 shape) is accepted;
/// - `urn:c2pa:<guid>[:vendor[:version[_reason]]]` with at most 5 parts,
///   vendor <= 32 printable ASCII characters without whitespace, and numeric
///   version/reason;
/// - `<vendor>:urn:uuid:<guid>` (v1 vendor-prefixed, exactly 4 parts).
fn manifest_label_conformant(label: &str) -> bool {
    let parts: Vec<&str> = label.split(':').collect();
    if parts.len() < 3 {
        return false;
    }
    if parts[0] == "urn" {
        if parts[1] == "uuid" {
            return true;
        }
        if parts[1] != "c2pa" {
            return false;
        }
        if parts.len() > 5 {
            return false;
        }
        if parts.len() > 3 && !parts[3].is_empty() {
            let vendor = parts[3];
            if vendor.len() > 32 || !vendor.is_ascii() || vendor.chars().any(char::is_whitespace) {
                return false;
            }
        }
        if parts.len() > 4 && !parts[4].is_empty() {
            let mut version_parts = parts[4].split('_');
            let Some(version) = version_parts.next() else {
                return false;
            };
            if version.parse::<usize>().is_err() {
                return false;
            }
            if let Some(reason) = version_parts.next() {
                if reason.parse::<usize>().is_err() {
                    return false;
                }
            }
        }
        return true;
    }
    // Legacy v1 vendor-prefixed shape: `<vendor>:urn:uuid:<guid>`.
    parts.len() == 4 && parts[1] == "urn" && parts[2] == "uuid"
}

fn resolved_hash_algorithm<'a>(value: &'a Value, enclosing: &'a Value) -> Option<&'a str> {
    value
        .get("alg")
        .and_then(Value::as_text)
        .or_else(|| enclosing.get("alg").and_then(Value::as_text))
}

struct IngredientManifestDigestCache<'a> {
    store: StoreContext<'a>,
    digests: std::collections::HashMap<(&'a str, usize), Vec<u8>>,
}

impl<'a> IngredientManifestDigestCache<'a> {
    fn new(store: StoreContext<'a>) -> Self {
        Self {
            store,
            digests: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
        }
    }

    fn matches(
        &mut self,
        manifest: &'a ParsedManifest<'a>,
        algorithm_index: usize,
        expected: &[u8],
    ) -> bool {
        if algorithm_index == 0 {
            return self
                .store
                .manifest_hashes
                .get(&manifest.label)
                .is_some_and(|digest| digest.as_slice() == expected);
        }
        let digest = self
            .digests
            .entry((manifest.label.as_str(), algorithm_index))
            .or_insert_with(|| match algorithm_index {
                1 => Sha384::digest(manifest.manifest_jumbf).to_vec(),
                2 => Sha512::digest(manifest.manifest_jumbf).to_vec(),
                _ => unreachable!("algorithm index prevalidated"),
            });
        digest.as_slice() == expected
    }
}

/// Authenticate embedded provenance references carried by ingredient assertions.
///
/// An exact `activeManifest` hash authenticates the complete child manifest and
/// short-circuits `claimSignature`, matching the C2PA validation procedure. If
/// the parent claim redacts assertions from that child, the full manifest must
/// differ and `claimSignature` becomes the required fallback binding.
fn verify_ingredient_references<'a>(
    claim_refs: &ClaimAssertionRefs<'_>,
    claim: &Value,
    digest_cache: &mut IngredientManifestDigestCache<'a>,
    sig_url: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    for reference in &claim_refs.references {
        let Some(assertion_label) = reference.label else {
            continue;
        };
        if !assertion_label.starts_with("c2pa.ingredient") {
            continue;
        }
        let Some(ingredient) = claim_refs
            .indexed(assertion_label)
            .and_then(|assertion| assertion.decoded.as_ref())
        else {
            continue;
        };
        let Some(active_manifest) = ingredient.get("activeManifest") else {
            continue;
        };
        if verify_ingredient_manifest_reference(
            active_manifest,
            claim,
            digest_cache,
            sig_url,
            results,
        ) {
            if let Some(claim_signature) = ingredient.get("claimSignature") {
                verify_ingredient_signature_reference(
                    claim_signature,
                    claim,
                    digest_cache.store,
                    sig_url,
                    results,
                );
            } else {
                results.push_failure(
                    INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISSING,
                    sig_url.to_string(),
                    "redacted ingredient is missing claimSignature".into(),
                );
            }
        }
    }
}

/// Validate `activeManifest`; return true only when redaction requires the
/// caller to authenticate the child through `claimSignature` instead.
fn verify_ingredient_manifest_reference<'a>(
    reference: &Value,
    claim: &Value,
    digest_cache: &mut IngredientManifestDigestCache<'a>,
    fallback_url: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) -> bool {
    let url = reference
        .get("url")
        .and_then(Value::as_text)
        .unwrap_or(fallback_url);
    let Some(label) = ingredient_manifest_label(url, None) else {
        results.push_failure(
            INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_MISSING,
            url.to_string(),
            "ingredient activeManifest does not resolve to a manifest".into(),
        );
        return false;
    };
    let store = digest_cache.store;
    let actual_manifest = store
        .manifests
        .iter()
        .find(|manifest| manifest.label == label);
    let Some(actual_manifest) = actual_manifest else {
        results.push_failure(
            INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_MISSING,
            url.to_string(),
            format!("ingredient references manifest '{label}' not in store"),
        );
        return false;
    };
    let Some(algorithm) = resolved_hash_algorithm(reference, claim) else {
        results.push_failure(
            ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
            url.to_string(),
            "ingredient manifest reference has no hash algorithm".into(),
        );
        return false;
    };
    let Some(algorithm_index) = bmff_algorithm_index(algorithm) else {
        results.push_failure(
            ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
            url.to_string(),
            format!("ingredient manifest uses unsupported hash algorithm '{algorithm}'"),
        );
        return false;
    };
    let expected = reference.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes);
    if expected
        .is_some_and(|expected| digest_cache.matches(actual_manifest, algorithm_index, expected))
    {
        results.push_success(
            INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_VALIDATED,
            url.to_string(),
            "ingredient manifest hash matched".into(),
        );
        return false;
    }
    if claim_redacts_manifest(claim, label) {
        return true;
    }
    results.push_failure(
        INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_MISMATCH,
        url.to_string(),
        "ingredient manifest hash mismatch".into(),
    );
    false
}

fn claim_redacts_manifest(claim: &Value, manifest_label: &str) -> bool {
    let Some(Value::Array(references)) = claim.get("redacted_assertions") else {
        return false;
    };
    references.iter().any(|reference| {
        reference
            .as_text()
            .and_then(extract_manifest_label)
            .is_some_and(|label| label == manifest_label)
    })
}

fn verify_ingredient_signature_reference(
    reference: &Value,
    claim: &Value,
    store: StoreContext<'_>,
    fallback_url: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    let url = reference
        .get("url")
        .and_then(Value::as_text)
        .unwrap_or(fallback_url);
    let Some(label) = ingredient_manifest_label(url, Some("/c2pa.signature")) else {
        results.push_failure(
            INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISSING,
            url.to_string(),
            "ingredient claimSignature does not resolve to a claim-signature box".into(),
        );
        return;
    };
    let signature = store
        .manifests
        .iter()
        .find(|manifest| manifest.label == label)
        .and_then(|manifest| manifest.signature_cose);
    let Some(actual) = signature else {
        results.push_failure(
            INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISSING,
            url.to_string(),
            format!("ingredient references missing claim signature in manifest '{label}'"),
        );
        return;
    };
    let Some(algorithm) = resolved_hash_algorithm(reference, claim) else {
        results.push_failure(
            ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
            url.to_string(),
            "ingredient claim signature reference has no hash algorithm".into(),
        );
        return;
    };
    let Some(digest) = hash_claim_signature_box(algorithm, actual) else {
        results.push_failure(
            ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
            url.to_string(),
            format!("ingredient claim signature uses unsupported hash algorithm '{algorithm}'"),
        );
        return;
    };
    if reference.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes) == Some(digest.as_slice()) {
        results.push_success(
            INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_VALIDATED,
            url.to_string(),
            "ingredient claim signature hash matched".into(),
        );
    } else {
        results.push_failure(
            INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH,
            url.to_string(),
            "ingredient claim signature hash mismatch".into(),
        );
    }
}

fn claim_signature_uri_is_local(uri: &str, manifest_label: &str) -> bool {
    uri == "self#jumbf=c2pa.signature"
        || uri
            .strip_prefix("self#jumbf=/c2pa/")
            .and_then(|target| target.strip_suffix("/c2pa.signature"))
            .is_some_and(|target| target == manifest_label && !target.contains('/'))
}

/// Return the exact manifest label from an absolute ingredient hashed URI.
/// Legacy vendor-prefixed UUID labels remain valid input, so the store lookup,
/// not a `urn:c2pa:` prefix test, decides whether the label is known.
fn ingredient_manifest_label<'a>(url: &'a str, suffix: Option<&str>) -> Option<&'a str> {
    let rest = url.strip_prefix("self#jumbf=/c2pa/")?;
    let label = match suffix {
        Some(suffix) => rest.strip_suffix(suffix)?,
        None => rest,
    };
    (!label.is_empty() && !label.contains('/')).then_some(label)
}

/// Extract a manifest label from an absolute JUMBF URI that may name one of
/// the manifest's child boxes.
fn extract_manifest_label(url: &str) -> Option<&str> {
    let rest = url.strip_prefix("self#jumbf=/c2pa/")?;
    let label = rest.split('/').next()?;
    (!label.is_empty()).then_some(label)
}

/// The claim fields that carry hashed-URI assertion references for a claim
/// generation.
fn ref_fields(generation: ClaimGeneration) -> &'static [&'static str] {
    match generation {
        ClaimGeneration::V1 => &["assertions"],
        ClaimGeneration::V2 => &["created_assertions", "gathered_assertions"],
    }
}
fn is_generator_icon_label(label: &str) -> bool {
    label == "c2pa.icon"
        || label
            .strip_prefix("c2pa.icon__")
            .and_then(|suffix| suffix.parse::<usize>().ok())
            .is_some_and(|instance| instance > 0)
}

fn assertion_label_for_manifest<'a>(url: &'a str, manifest_label: &str) -> Option<&'a str> {
    if let Some(label) = url.strip_prefix("self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/") {
        return (!label.is_empty() && !label.contains('/')).then_some(label);
    }
    let rest = url.strip_prefix("self#jumbf=/c2pa/")?;
    let rest = rest.strip_prefix(manifest_label)?;
    let label = rest.strip_prefix("/c2pa.assertions/")?;
    (!label.is_empty() && !label.contains('/')).then_some(label)
}

/// Recompute and compare each hashed-URI assertion binding in the claim.
///
/// The reference bytes are the assertion's JUMBF content (description +
/// content boxes, without the superbox header). For legacy claim v1, a
/// tolerant fallback also accepts a hash over the assertion CBOR payload.
/// Absolute references must name this manifest exactly; suffix-only
/// cross-manifest resolution would let a signed URI target different bytes.
fn verify_assertion_bindings(
    claim: &Value,
    claim_refs: &mut ClaimAssertionRefs<'_>,
    generation: ClaimGeneration,
    label: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    let references = &claim_refs.references;
    let assertions = &mut claim_refs.assertions;
    for indexed_reference in references {
        let reference = indexed_reference.value;
        let resolved_label = indexed_reference.label;
        let Some(url) = reference.get("url").and_then(Value::as_text) else {
            results.push_failure(
                CLAIM_MALFORMED,
                format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.claim"),
                "claim assertion reference has no textual url".into(),
            );
            continue;
        };
        let Some(assertion_label) = resolved_label else {
            results.push_failure(
                HASHED_URI_MISSING,
                url.to_string(),
                "assertion reference does not resolve inside the current manifest".into(),
            );
            continue;
        };
        let assertion_url = format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.assertions/{assertion_label}");
        let expected = reference.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes);
        let Some(algorithm) = resolved_hash_algorithm(reference, claim) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
                assertion_url,
                "hashed-URI reference has no hash algorithm".into(),
            );
            continue;
        };
        let content_matches = match (
            bmff_algorithm_index(algorithm),
            assertions.get_mut(assertion_label),
            expected,
        ) {
            (Some(index), Some(assertion), Some(expected_hash)) => {
                if assertion.jumbf_digests[index].is_none() {
                    assertion.jumbf_digests[index] = assertion
                        .jumbf
                        .and_then(|bytes| hash_bytes(algorithm, bytes));
                }
                assertion.jumbf_digests[index].as_deref() == Some(expected_hash)
            }
            _ => false,
        };
        let (content, legacy_payload) = assertions
            .get(assertion_label)
            .map(|assertion| (assertion.jumbf, assertion.payload))
            .unwrap_or((None, None));
        let legacy_payload_matches = !content_matches
            && generation == ClaimGeneration::V1
            && matches!(
                (
                    legacy_payload.and_then(|payload| hash_bytes(algorithm, payload)),
                    expected,
                ),
                (Some(actual), Some(expected_hash)) if actual.as_slice() == expected_hash
            );
        if content_matches || legacy_payload_matches {
            results.push_success(
                ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MATCH,
                assertion_url,
                format!("hashed uri matched: self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/{assertion_label}"),
            );
        } else if content.is_none() {
            results.push_failure(
                HASHED_URI_MISSING,
                assertion_url,
                format!("referenced assertion '{assertion_label}' not found in manifest"),
            );
        } else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH,
                assertion_url,
                format!("hashed uri mismatch: self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/{assertion_label}"),
            );
        }
    }
}

/// EXPERIMENTAL: host-less compound-content binding label.
const COMPOUND_CONTENT_LABEL: &str = "c2pa.compound.content";

/// EXPERIMENTAL (PR #2058 compound): verify the host-less
/// `c2pa.compound.content` hard binding.
///
/// A compound parent manifest has no host asset; it binds to its `componentOf`
/// children through a `c2pa.compound.content` assertion. Each
/// `components[].ingredientRef` is a hashed-URI {url, hash, alg} to that child's
/// `c2pa.ingredient.v3` assertion *in this manifest*. This recomputes each
/// ingredient assertion's JUMBF-content hash (same domain as
/// [`verify_assertion_bindings`]) and matches it. Because the claim binds
/// compound.content (step 5), compound.content binds each ingredient assertion
/// here, and each ingredient assertion binds its child manifest by
/// `activeManifest` hash ([`verify_ingredient_references`]), the parent is
/// cryptographically bound to its children with no host asset.
///
/// No-op for ordinary manifests (those without a `c2pa.compound.content`
/// assertion), so it is safe to call on every manifest.
fn verify_compound_content(
    claim_refs: &ClaimAssertionRefs<'_>,
    label: &str,
    manifest_hashes: &std::collections::HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    let url = format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.assertions/{COMPOUND_CONTENT_LABEL}");
    if claim_refs
        .binding_plan(true)
        .primary()
        .and_then(|reference| reference.label)
        != Some(COMPOUND_CONTENT_LABEL)
    {
        return;
    }
    let Some(data) = claim_refs
        .indexed(COMPOUND_CONTENT_LABEL)
        .and_then(|assertion| assertion.decoded.as_ref())
    else {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
            url,
            "c2pa.compound.content CBOR could not be decoded".into(),
        );
        return;
    };
    let Some(Value::Array(components)) = data.get("components") else {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
            url,
            "c2pa.compound.content has no components array".into(),
        );
        return;
    };
    if components.is_empty() {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
            url,
            "c2pa.compound.content components array is empty".into(),
        );
        return;
    }
    let mut local_digests = std::collections::HashMap::<&str, Vec<u8>>::new();
    for (idx, component) in components.iter().enumerate() {
        let Some(ingredient_ref) = component.get("ingredientRef") else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
                url.clone(),
                format!("compound component {idx} has no ingredientRef"),
            );
            return;
        };
        // Strict: url, hash, AND alg must all be present; alg pinned to sha256.
        let (Some(ref_url), Some(expected), Some(alg)) = (
            ingredient_ref.get("url").and_then(Value::as_text),
            ingredient_ref.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes),
            ingredient_ref.get("alg").and_then(Value::as_text),
        ) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
                url.clone(),
                format!("compound component {idx} ingredientRef missing url/hash/alg"),
            );
            return;
        };
        if alg != "sha256" {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
                url.clone(),
                format!("compound component {idx} ingredientRef unsupported alg {alg:?}"),
            );
            return;
        }
        let Some(alabel) = assertion_label_for_manifest(ref_url, label) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
                url.clone(),
                format!("compound component {idx} ingredientRef url is not a local assertion ref"),
            );
            return;
        };
        // The component MUST reference the base c2pa.ingredient.v3 assertion or
        // a standard `__N` instance, not a different assertion or version label.
        let is_instance = alabel
            .strip_prefix("c2pa.ingredient.v3__")
            .and_then(|suffix| suffix.parse::<usize>().ok())
            .is_some_and(|instance| instance > 0);
        if alabel != "c2pa.ingredient.v3" && !is_instance {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
                url.clone(),
                format!("compound component {idx} does not reference a c2pa.ingredient.v3 assertion ({alabel})"),
            );
            return;
        }
        // 1) The component binds the ingredient assertion's exact JUMBF
        // content. Reuse the claim-binding digest when the algorithm matches;
        // otherwise hash this label+algorithm once for all components.
        let digest = if let Some(digest) = claim_refs.jumbf_digest(alabel, alg) {
            Some(digest)
        } else if let Some(digest) = local_digests.get(alabel) {
            Some(digest.as_slice())
        } else {
            let Some(content) = claim_refs
                .indexed(alabel)
                .and_then(|assertion| assertion.jumbf)
            else {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MISMATCH,
                    url.clone(),
                    format!("compound component {idx} ingredient assertion '{alabel}' not present"),
                );
                return;
            };
            let Some(computed) = hash_bytes(alg, content) else {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
                    url.clone(),
                    format!("compound component {idx} ingredientRef uses unsupported alg {alg:?}"),
                );
                return;
            };
            Some(local_digests.entry(alabel).or_insert(computed).as_slice())
        };
        if digest != Some(expected) {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MISMATCH,
                url.clone(),
                format!("compound component {idx} ingredientRef hash did not match '{alabel}'"),
            );
            return;
        }
        // 2) The ingredient assertion must be a componentOf with an activeManifest.
        let Some(ing) = claim_refs
            .indexed(alabel)
            .and_then(|assertion| assertion.decoded.as_ref())
        else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
                url.clone(),
                format!("compound component {idx} ingredient '{alabel}' CBOR invalid"),
            );
            return;
        };
        if ing.get("relationship").and_then(Value::as_text) != Some("componentOf") {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MISMATCH,
                url.clone(),
                format!("compound component {idx} ingredient '{alabel}' is not componentOf"),
            );
            return;
        }
        // 3) The ingredient's activeManifest hash MUST match the actual child
        // manifest present in the store (closes the child-swap gap: the child
        // manifest bytes live OUTSIDE the parent's signed claim).
        let (Some(child_url), Some(child_hash), Some(child_alg)) = ing
            .get("activeManifest")
            .map(|a| {
                (
                    a.get("url").and_then(Value::as_text),
                    a.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes),
                    a.get("alg").and_then(Value::as_text),
                )
            })
            .unwrap_or((None, None, None))
        else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MISMATCH,
                url.clone(),
                format!(
                    "compound component {idx} ingredient '{alabel}' has no valid activeManifest"
                ),
            );
            return;
        };
        if child_alg != "sha256" {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MALFORMED,
                url.clone(),
                format!("compound component {idx} activeManifest unsupported alg {child_alg:?}"),
            );
            return;
        }
        let child_ok = extract_manifest_label(child_url)
            .and_then(|cl| manifest_hashes.get(cl))
            .is_some_and(|computed| computed.as_slice() == child_hash);
        if !child_ok {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MISMATCH,
                url.clone(),
                format!(
                    "compound component {idx} child manifest absent or hash mismatch (tampered/substituted child)"
                ),
            );
            return;
        }
    }
    results.push_success(
        ASSERTION_COMPOUND_CONTENT_MATCH,
        url,
        format!(
            "compound binding verified: {} component(s)",
            components.len()
        ),
    );
}

/// Confirm that a caller-computed digest is the active claim's sole supported
/// hard binding. Generalized box, collection, multi-asset, and merkle bindings
/// require source bytes that this detached verification entry point does not
/// accept, so it rejects those forms.
fn verify_prehashed_hard_binding<'index, 'claim>(
    claim: &Value,
    claim_refs: &'index ClaimAssertionRefs<'claim>,
    digest: &[u8],
    label: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) -> Option<OperativeBinding<'index, 'claim>> {
    let Some(binding) = claim_refs.binding_plan(false).primary() else {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH,
            format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.assertions"),
            "detached verification requires exactly one supported hard binding".into(),
        );
        return None;
    };
    let assertion_label = binding.label?;
    if !is_supported_whole_asset_hash_label(assertion_label) {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH,
            format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.assertions/{assertion_label}"),
            "detached verification requires a data or BMFF hard binding".into(),
        );
        return None;
    }
    let is_bmff = is_supported_bmff_hash_label(assertion_label);
    let match_code = if is_bmff {
        ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH
    } else {
        ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH
    };
    let mismatch_code = if is_bmff {
        ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH
    } else {
        ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH
    };
    let url = format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.assertions/{assertion_label}");
    let Some(assertion) = claim_refs
        .indexed(assertion_label)
        .and_then(|assertion| assertion.decoded.as_ref())
    else {
        results.push_failure(
            mismatch_code,
            url,
            "hard-binding assertion CBOR invalid".into(),
        );
        return None;
    };
    let Some(algorithm) = resolved_hash_algorithm(assertion, claim) else {
        results.push_failure(
            ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
            url,
            "hard-binding assertion has no hash algorithm".into(),
        );
        return None;
    };
    if bmff_algorithm_index(algorithm).is_none() {
        results.push_failure(
            ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
            url,
            format!("hard-binding assertion uses unsupported hash algorithm '{algorithm}'"),
        );
        return None;
    }
    if algorithm != "sha256" || assertion.get("merkle").is_some() || digest.len() != 32 {
        results.push_failure(
            mismatch_code,
            url,
            "detached verification supports one non-merkle SHA-256 hard binding; multi-asset parts are unavailable on this entry point".into(),
        );
        return None;
    }
    let expected = assertion.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes);
    if expected == Some(digest)
        && !results.has_failure(ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH)
        && !results.has_failure(HASHED_URI_MISSING)
    {
        results.push_success(
            match_code,
            url,
            "caller-computed hard-binding digest valid".into(),
        );
        Some(OperativeBinding::Primary(binding))
    } else {
        if expected != Some(digest) {
            results.push_failure(mismatch_code, url, "hard-binding digest mismatch".into());
        }
        None
    }
}

/// Verify the `c2pa.hash.data` hard binding against the asset bytes.
///
/// Verify the asset hard binding (`c2pa.hash.data`, `c2pa.hash.bmff.v2`, or
/// `c2pa.hash.bmff.v3`).
///
/// `c2pa.hash.data` excludes byte ranges given as `{start, length}`. BMFF hash
/// assertions exclude whole boxes by `xpath` and, in the merkle variant, carry
/// a `merkle` array of per-chunk hashes. The simple (non-merkle) BMFF case is
/// verified by resolving the box paths to byte ranges; the merkle variant
/// verifies the `initHash` over this asset and, when `fragments` are supplied,
/// every fragment's Merkle leaf.
fn is_standard_primary_mismatch(label: &str, status: &StatusCode) -> bool {
    match label {
        "c2pa.hash.data" => {
            status.code == ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH
                && status.explanation == "asset hash mismatch"
        }
        "c2pa.hash.boxes" => {
            status.code == ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MISMATCH
                && status.explanation != "box entry missing hash"
        }
        "c2pa.hash.collection.data" => status.code == ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_MISMATCH,
        _ if is_supported_bmff_hash_label(label) => status.code == ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH,
        _ => false,
    }
}
fn is_primary_binding_match(label: &str, status: &StatusCode) -> bool {
    match label {
        "c2pa.hash.data" => status.code == ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH,
        "c2pa.hash.boxes" => status.code == ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MATCH,
        "c2pa.hash.collection.data" => status.code == ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_MATCH,
        _ if is_supported_bmff_hash_label(label) => status.code == ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH,
        _ => false,
    }
}

/// Execute the one primary binding first. A single multi-asset assertion is a
/// fallback, never a peer hard binding: it is evaluated only after an ordinary
/// byte mismatch. Structural, malformed, missing, and unsupported failures
/// remain attached to the primary and do not activate the fallback.
fn verify_data_hash<'index, 'claim>(
    claim: &Value,
    claim_refs: &'index ClaimAssertionRefs<'claim>,
    data: &[u8],
    format: AssetFormat,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    label: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) -> Option<OperativeBinding<'index, 'claim>> {
    let plan = claim_refs.binding_plan(format == AssetFormat::C2paStore);
    let primary = plan.primary()?;
    let primary_label = primary.label?;
    if primary_label == COMPOUND_CONTENT_LABEL {
        return None;
    }

    let binding_compromised = results.has_failure(ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH)
        || results.has_failure(HASHED_URI_MISSING);
    let failure_start = results.failure.len();
    let success_start = results.success.len();
    verify_primary_hard_binding(claim, claim_refs, data, format, fragments, label, results);
    let added_failures = &results.failure[failure_start..];
    if !binding_compromised
        && added_failures.is_empty()
        && results.success[success_start..]
            .iter()
            .any(|status| is_primary_binding_match(primary_label, status))
    {
        return Some(OperativeBinding::Primary(primary));
    }

    let fallback = plan.multi_asset()?;
    if added_failures.is_empty()
        || !added_failures
            .iter()
            .all(|status| is_standard_primary_mismatch(primary_label, status))
    {
        return None;
    }

    let fallback_label = fallback.label?;
    let cbor = claim_refs
        .indexed(fallback_label)
        .and_then(|assertion| assertion.payload)?;
    // C2PA 2.4 suppresses only the failed primary byte-match status when the
    // usable multi-asset fallback applies. All earlier failures stay.
    results.failure.truncate(failure_start);
    let success_start = results.success.len();
    verify_multi_asset(claim, claim_refs, cbor, data, format, label, results);
    let fallback_matched = results.failure.len() == failure_start
        && results.success[success_start..]
            .iter()
            .any(|status| status.code == ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH);
    if binding_compromised {
        results.success.truncate(success_start);
        return None;
    }
    fallback_matched.then_some(OperativeBinding::MultiAsset(fallback))
}

fn verify_primary_hard_binding(
    claim: &Value,
    claim_refs: &ClaimAssertionRefs<'_>,
    data: &[u8],
    format: AssetFormat,
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    label: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    // A tampered assertion breaks the claim's hashed-URI binding to it. The
    // asset bytes can still hash correctly because assertions live inside the
    // excluded manifest carrier, so never report a positive hard binding after
    // that failure.
    let binding_compromised = results.has_failure(ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH)
        || results.has_failure(HASHED_URI_MISSING);
    let Some(binding) = claim_refs
        .binding_plan(format == AssetFormat::C2paStore)
        .primary()
    else {
        return;
    };
    let Some(alabel) = binding.label else {
        return;
    };
    if alabel == COMPOUND_CONTENT_LABEL {
        return;
    }
    let Some(indexed) = claim_refs.indexed(alabel) else {
        return;
    };
    match alabel {
        "c2pa.hash.boxes" => {
            if let Some(cbor) = indexed.payload {
                verify_boxes_hash(
                    cbor,
                    claim,
                    format,
                    data,
                    binding_compromised,
                    label,
                    results,
                );
            }
            return;
        }
        "c2pa.hash.collection.data" => {
            if let Some(cbor) = indexed.payload {
                verify_collection_hash(cbor, data, binding_compromised, label, results);
            }
            return;
        }
        "c2pa.hash.multi-asset" => return,
        _ if !is_supported_whole_asset_hash_label(alabel) => return,
        _ => {}
    }
    let url = format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.assertions/{alabel}");
    let is_bmff = is_supported_bmff_hash_label(alabel);
    let mismatch_code = if is_bmff {
        ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH
    } else {
        ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH
    };
    let match_code = if is_bmff {
        ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH
    } else {
        ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH
    };
    let Some(hash_data) = indexed.decoded.as_ref() else {
        results.push_failure(mismatch_code, url, "hash assertion CBOR invalid".into());
        return;
    };
    let expected = hash_data.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes);
    let Some(alg) = resolved_hash_algorithm(hash_data, claim) else {
        results.push_failure(
            ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
            url,
            "hard-binding assertion has no hash algorithm".into(),
        );
        return;
    };
    if bmff_algorithm_index(alg).is_none() {
        results.push_failure(
            ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
            url,
            format!("hard-binding assertion uses unsupported hash algorithm '{alg}'"),
        );
        return;
    }
    let bmff_exclusions = if is_bmff {
        match bmff_exclusion_maps(hash_data) {
            Ok(exclusions) => exclusions,
            Err(error) => {
                results.push_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED, url, error.to_string());
                return;
            }
        }
    } else {
        Vec::new()
    };
    // Merkle BMFF binding (fragmented DASH/HLS or chunked mdat). When the
    // assertion also carries a top-level `hash`, that signed value must match
    // before any merkle success can be emitted.
    let merkle_present = is_bmff && hash_data.get("merkle").is_some();
    if !merkle_present && expected.is_none() {
        let code = if is_bmff {
            ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED
        } else {
            ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH
        };
        results.push_failure(code, url, "hard-binding assertion missing hash".into());
        return;
    }
    if merkle_present {
        if let Some(expected_hash) = expected {
            let actual =
                match crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_hash_with_exclusions(data, alg, &bmff_exclusions) {
                    Ok(hash) => hash,
                    Err(_) => {
                        results.push_failure(
                            ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                            url.clone(),
                            "BMFF top-level hash or exclusions are malformed".into(),
                        );
                        return;
                    }
                };
            if actual.as_slice() != expected_hash {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH,
                    url.clone(),
                    "BMFF top-level hash mismatch".into(),
                );
                return;
            }
        }
        verify_bmff_merkle_init(
            BmffMerkleInput {
                hash_data,
                assertion_alg: alg,
                exclusions: &bmff_exclusions,
                data,
                fragments,
                url: &url,
                binding_compromised,
            },
            results,
        );
        return;
    }
    // BMFF hard bindings are computed structurally (box-offset markers), not as
    // a plain file-minus-exclusions digest; delegate to the format crate so
    // sign and verify share byte-exact semantics. `c2pa.hash.data` excludes
    // explicit byte ranges.
    let actual: Option<Vec<u8>> = if is_bmff {
        crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_hash_with_exclusions(data, alg, &bmff_exclusions).ok()
    } else {
        // Reject pathological exclusion lists before parsing or hashing any
        // ranges. This is a resource-exhaustion guard, not a policy limit.
        if let Some(Value::Array(items)) = hash_data.get("exclusions") {
            if items.len() > MAX_DATA_HASH_EXCLUSIONS {
                results.push_failure(
                    mismatch_code,
                    url,
                    format!(
                        "exclusion list exceeds the verifier cap ({} > {MAX_DATA_HASH_EXCLUSIONS}); manifest rejected",
                        items.len()
                    ),
                );
                return;
            }
        }
        let mut exclusions = parse_exclusions(hash_data.get("exclusions"));
        if !exclusions.is_empty() {
            if let Ok(spans) = crate::c2pa_formats::compute_data_hash_exclusions(format, data) {
                if let [carrier] = spans.as_slice() {
                    let carrier_end = carrier.start.checked_add(carrier.length);
                    let all_inside_carrier = carrier_end.is_some_and(|carrier_end| {
                        exclusions.iter().all(|(start, length)| {
                            start
                                .checked_add(*length)
                                .is_some_and(|end| *start >= carrier.start && end <= carrier_end)
                        })
                    });
                    if all_inside_carrier {
                        exclusions.clear();
                        exclusions.push((carrier.start, carrier.length));
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        hash_with_exclusions(alg, data, &exclusions)
    };
    let matched = matches!((&actual, expected), (Some(a), Some(e)) if a.as_slice() == e);
    if matched {
        // Exactly one hard binding is operative, so a match completes content
        // validation for this claim.
        if !binding_compromised {
            results.push_success(match_code, url, "asset hash valid".into());
        }
        return;
    }
    // The sole operative hard binding did not match.
    results.push_failure(mismatch_code, url, "asset hash mismatch".into());
}

const MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_ENTRIES: usize = 4_096;
const MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_LEAVES: usize = 262_144;
const MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_TOTAL_HASH_BYTES: usize = 1 << 30;
const MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_TOTAL_CHUNKS: usize = MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_LEAVES;
const MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_DATA_QUALIFIERS: usize = 4_096;
const MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_DATA_BYTES: usize = 1 << 20;
const MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_SUBSETS: usize = 4_096;
const MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_XPATH_BYTES: usize = 1024;

type BmffMerkleProofKey = (i128, i128, usize);
type BmffMerkleProofIndex =
    std::collections::HashMap<BmffMerkleProofKey, crate::c2pa_formats::BmffMerkleBox>;

fn checked_bmff_merkle_work(
    total_bytes: &mut usize,
    total_chunks: &mut usize,
    payload_bytes: usize,
    chunks: usize,
) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
    let new_bytes = total_bytes
        .checked_add(payload_bytes)
        .filter(|total| *total <= MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_TOTAL_HASH_BYTES)
        .ok_or("aggregate monolithic merkle payload bytes exceed the verifier bound")?;
    let new_chunks = total_chunks
        .checked_add(chunks)
        .filter(|total| *total <= MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_TOTAL_CHUNKS)
        .ok_or("aggregate monolithic merkle chunks exceed the verifier bound")?;
    *total_bytes = new_bytes;
    *total_chunks = new_chunks;
    Ok(())
}

fn bmff_digest_len(alg: &str) -> Option<usize> {
    match alg {
        "sha256" => Some(32),
        "sha384" => Some(48),
        "sha512" => Some(64),
        _ => None,
    }
}

fn bmff_algorithm_index(alg: &str) -> Option<usize> {
    match alg {
        "sha256" => Some(0),
        "sha384" => Some(1),
        "sha512" => Some(2),
        _ => None,
    }
}

fn bmff_merkle_row<'a>(
    entry: &'a Value,
    alg: &str,
) -> Result<(usize, &'a [Value], usize), &'static str> {
    let digest_len = bmff_digest_len(alg).ok_or("unsupported merkle hash algorithm")?;
    if !matches!(entry.get("uniqueId"), Some(Value::Integer(_)))
        || !matches!(entry.get("localId"), Some(Value::Integer(_)))
    {
        return Err("merkle entry is missing integer uniqueId or localId");
    }
    let Some(Value::Array(row)) = entry.get("hashes") else {
        return Err("merkle entry is missing a hashes row");
    };
    if row.is_empty() || row.len() > MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_LEAVES {
        return Err("merkle hashes row is empty or exceeds the verifier bound");
    }
    if row
        .iter()
        .any(|value| value.as_bytes().is_none_or(|hash| hash.len() != digest_len))
    {
        return Err("merkle hashes row contains a non-byte value or wrong digest width");
    }
    let count = match entry.get("count") {
        Some(Value::Integer(count)) => usize::try_from(*count).ok().filter(|count| *count > 0),
        _ => None,
    }
    .ok_or("merkle count is missing or not positive")?;
    if count < row.len() {
        return Err("merkle count is smaller than the stored row");
    }
    Ok((count, row, digest_len))
}

fn bmff_fragment_merkle_row<'a>(
    entry: &'a Value,
    alg: &str,
) -> Result<(usize, &'a [Value], usize), &'static str> {
    if entry.get("fixedBlockSize").is_some() || entry.get("variableBlockSizes").is_some() {
        return Err("fragment merkle entry contains a block-size descriptor");
    }
    bmff_merkle_row(entry, alg)
}

/// Select the bytes covered by a Merkle `initHash`.
///
/// A standalone initialization segment has no top-level `moof`, so its whole
/// file is covered. A flat fragmented MP4 covers only bytes before the first
/// top-level `moof` (C2PA 2.4, `merkle-map.initHash`).
fn bmff_initialization_scope(data: &[u8]) -> Result<&[u8], &'static str> {
    let mut offset = 0usize;
    while offset < data.len() {
        let header = data
            .get(offset..offset.checked_add(8).ok_or("BMFF box offset overflows")?)
            .ok_or("BMFF top-level box header is truncated")?;
        let size32 = u32::from_be_bytes(
            header[..4]
                .try_into()
                .map_err(|_| "BMFF top-level box size is truncated")?,
        );
        let (header_len, size) = match size32 {
            0 => (8usize, data.len() - offset),
            1 => {
                let extended = data
                    .get(offset..offset.checked_add(16).ok_or("BMFF box offset overflows")?)
                    .ok_or("BMFF extended box header is truncated")?;
                let size = usize::try_from(u64::from_be_bytes(
                    extended[8..16]
                        .try_into()
                        .map_err(|_| "BMFF extended box size is truncated")?,
                ))
                .map_err(|_| "BMFF box size exceeds platform limits")?;
                (16, size)
            }
            size => (8, size as usize),
        };
        if size < header_len {
            return Err("BMFF top-level box size is smaller than its header");
        }
        let end = offset
            .checked_add(size)
            .filter(|end| *end <= data.len())
            .ok_or("BMFF top-level box lies outside the asset")?;
        if &header[4..8] == b"moof" {
            return Ok(&data[..offset]);
        }
        offset = end;
    }
    Ok(data)
}

fn bmff_merkle_proof_index(data: &[u8]) -> Result<BmffMerkleProofIndex, &'static str> {
    let boxes =
        crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_merkle_boxes(data).map_err(|_| "asset not parseable as BMFF")?;
    let mut index = BmffMerkleProofIndex::with_capacity(boxes.len());
    for parsed in boxes {
        let merkle_box = parsed?;
        let key = (
            merkle_box.unique_id,
            merkle_box.local_id,
            merkle_box.location,
        );
        if index.insert(key, merkle_box).is_some() {
            return Err("duplicate auxiliary C2PA merkle proof key");
        }
    }
    Ok(index)
}

enum BmffMonolithicPlanLayout<'a> {
    Fixed(usize),
    Variable(&'a [Value]),
    Whole,
}

struct BmffMonolithicPlan<'entry, 'data> {
    alg: &'entry str,
    count: usize,
    row_values: &'entry [Value],
    local_id: usize,
    unique_id: i128,
    payload: &'data [u8],
    layout: BmffMonolithicPlanLayout<'entry>,
}

/// Parse and bound every monolithic Merkle entry before hashing any `mdat`.
///
/// `mdat` spans are parsed once. A payload may be targeted by only one
/// monolithic entry, so aggregate hashing remains linear in unique selected
/// payload bytes rather than entries times asset size.
fn preflight_bmff_monolithic_entries<'entry, 'data>(
    entries: &'entry [Value],
    assertion_alg: &'entry str,
    data: &'data [u8],
) -> Result<Vec<BmffMonolithicPlan<'entry, 'data>>, String> {
    let monolithic_count = entries
        .iter()
        .filter(|entry| entry.get("initHash").is_none())
        .count();
    if monolithic_count == 0 {
        return Ok(Vec::new());
    }
    let mdats = crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_mdat_payloads(data)
        .map_err(|_| "asset not parseable as BMFF".to_string())?;
    let mut plans = Vec::with_capacity(monolithic_count);
    let mut seen_tree_targets = std::collections::HashSet::with_capacity(monolithic_count);
    let mut seen_local_ids = std::collections::HashSet::with_capacity(monolithic_count);
    let mut total_bytes = 0usize;
    let mut total_chunks = 0usize;

    for entry in entries
        .iter()
        .filter(|entry| entry.get("initHash").is_none())
    {
        let alg = match entry.get("alg") {
            None => assertion_alg,
            Some(Value::Text(alg)) => alg.as_str(),
            Some(_) => return Err("monolithic merkle alg is not a string".into()),
        };
        let (count, row_values, _) = bmff_merkle_row(entry, alg).map_err(str::to_string)?;
        if count > MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_LEAVES {
            return Err("monolithic merkle leaf count exceeds the verifier bound".into());
        }
        let local_id = match entry.get("localId") {
            Some(Value::Integer(id)) => {
                usize::try_from(*id).map_err(|_| "monolithic merkle localId is not non-negative")?
            }
            _ => return Err("monolithic merkle entry missing localId".into()),
        };
        let unique_id = match entry.get("uniqueId") {
            Some(Value::Integer(id)) => *id,
            _ => return Err("monolithic merkle entry missing uniqueId".into()),
        };
        if !seen_tree_targets.insert((unique_id, local_id)) || !seen_local_ids.insert(local_id) {
            return Err(format!(
                "duplicate monolithic merkle tree/localId/layout target for mdat {local_id}"
            ));
        }

        let Some(&(payload_start, payload_len)) = mdats.get(local_id) else {
            return Err(format!("no mdat with index {local_id}"));
        };
        let payload = payload_start
            .checked_add(payload_len)
            .and_then(|end| data.get(payload_start..end))
            .ok_or_else(|| "mdat payload lies outside the asset".to_string())?;

        let fixed = match entry.get("fixedBlockSize") {
            None => None,
            Some(Value::Integer(size)) => match usize::try_from(*size) {
                Ok(size) if size > 0 => Some(size),
                _ => return Err("fixedBlockSize is not positive".into()),
            },
            Some(_) => return Err("fixedBlockSize is not an integer".into()),
        };
        let variable = match entry.get("variableBlockSizes") {
            None => None,
            Some(Value::Array(sizes)) if sizes.is_empty() => {
                return Err("variableBlockSizes is empty".into())
            }
            Some(Value::Array(sizes)) => Some(sizes.as_slice()),
            Some(_) => return Err("variableBlockSizes is not an array".into()),
        };
        if fixed.is_some() && variable.is_some() {
            return Err("fixedBlockSize and variableBlockSizes are mutually exclusive".into());
        }

        let (chunk_count, layout) = if let Some(size) = fixed {
            (
                payload_len.div_ceil(size),
                BmffMonolithicPlanLayout::Fixed(size),
            )
        } else if let Some(sizes) = variable {
            if sizes.len() != count {
                return Err("variableBlockSizes count does not match the merkle count".into());
            }
            let mut offset = 0usize;
            for value in sizes {
                let size = match value {
                    Value::Integer(size) => usize::try_from(*size)
                        .map_err(|_| "variableBlockSizes entry is not a non-negative integer")?,
                    _ => return Err("variableBlockSizes entry is not an integer".into()),
                };
                offset = offset
                    .checked_add(size)
                    .filter(|end| *end <= payload_len)
                    .ok_or_else(|| "variableBlockSizes do not tile the mdat payload".to_string())?;
            }
            if offset != payload_len {
                return Err("variableBlockSizes do not tile the mdat payload".into());
            }
            (sizes.len(), BmffMonolithicPlanLayout::Variable(sizes))
        } else {
            (1, BmffMonolithicPlanLayout::Whole)
        };
        if chunk_count != count {
            return Err(format!(
                "count {count} does not match {chunk_count} mdat chunk(s)"
            ));
        }
        checked_bmff_merkle_work(
            &mut total_bytes,
            &mut total_chunks,
            payload_len,
            chunk_count,
        )
        .map_err(str::to_string)?;

        plans.push(BmffMonolithicPlan {
            alg,
            count,
            row_values,
            local_id,
            unique_id,
            payload,
            layout,
        });
    }
    Ok(plans)
}

struct BmffMerkleInput<'a, 'b> {
    hash_data: &'a Value,
    assertion_alg: &'a str,
    exclusions: &'a [crate::c2pa_formats::BmffExclusionMap],
    data: &'a [u8],
    fragments: &'a [&'b [u8]],
    url: &'a str,
    binding_compromised: bool,
}

/// Verify a `c2pa.hash.bmff.v2` or `c2pa.hash.bmff.v3` merkle binding.
///
/// A merkle BMFF binding covers a fragmented asset (DASH/HLS init segment +
/// fragment files) or a chunked monolithic `mdat`. From the primary asset the
/// merkle `initHash` — the BMFF-structural hash of the init segment with the
/// assertion's exclusions applied — is checked with the same
/// box-offset-marker hashing the non-merkle path uses
/// ([`crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_hash`]).
///
/// When `fragments` are supplied (spec 15.12.2.2 / A.5.4), each fragment's
/// Merkle leaf hash is recomputed (plain digest minus exclusions, no offset
/// markers) and climbed to the row stored in the assertion using the proof in
/// the fragment's auxiliary C2PA `merkle` box; mismatches fail with
/// `assertion.bmffHash.mismatch`, structural defects with
/// `assertion.bmffHash.malformed`. Without supplied fragments, fragmented trees
/// are reported informational. Monolithic trees are streamed over their
/// corresponding top-level `mdat` payload and validated immediately.
fn verify_bmff_merkle_init(input: BmffMerkleInput<'_, '_>, results: &mut ValidationResults) {
    let BmffMerkleInput {
        hash_data,
        assertion_alg,
        exclusions,
        data,
        fragments,
        url,
        binding_compromised,
    } = input;
    let Some(Value::Array(entries)) = hash_data.get("merkle") else {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url.to_string(),
            "merkle field is not an array".into(),
        );
        return;
    };
    if entries.is_empty() || entries.len() > MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_ENTRIES {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url.to_string(),
            "merkle entry count is empty or exceeds the verifier bound".into(),
        );
        return;
    }

    let monolithic_plans = match preflight_bmff_monolithic_entries(entries, assertion_alg, data) {
        Ok(plans) => plans,
        Err(why) => {
            results.push_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED, url.to_string(), why);
            return;
        }
    };

    let needs_auxiliary_proofs = entries.iter().any(|entry| {
        entry.get("initHash").is_none()
            && match (entry.get("count"), entry.get("hashes")) {
                (Some(Value::Integer(count)), Some(Value::Array(row))) => {
                    usize::try_from(*count).is_ok_and(|count| count > row.len())
                }
                _ => false,
            }
    });
    let proof_index = if needs_auxiliary_proofs {
        match bmff_merkle_proof_index(data) {
            Ok(index) => Some(index),
            Err(why) => {
                results.push_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED, url.to_string(), why.into());
                return;
            }
        }
    } else {
        None
    };
    let init_scope = if entries.iter().any(|entry| entry.get("initHash").is_some()) {
        match bmff_initialization_scope(data) {
            Ok(scope) => scope,
            Err(why) => {
                results.push_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED, url.to_string(), why.into());
                return;
            }
        }
    } else {
        data
    };

    // Three fixed cache slots prevent alternating per-entry algorithms from
    // rehashing the attacker-sized initialization scope.
    let mut cached: [Option<Vec<u8>>; 3] = [None, None, None];
    let mut init_tracks = 0usize;
    let mut fragment_trees = 0usize;
    let mut mono_entries = 0usize;
    let mut mono_ok = 0usize;
    let mut monolithic_plans = monolithic_plans.iter();
    for entry in entries {
        let expected_init = match entry.get("initHash") {
            None => {
                mono_entries += 1;
                let Some(plan) = monolithic_plans.next() else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url.to_string(),
                        "monolithic merkle preflight plan is incomplete".into(),
                    );
                    return;
                };
                if verify_bmff_monolithic_entry(plan, proof_index.as_ref(), url, results) {
                    mono_ok += 1;
                }
                continue;
            }
            Some(Value::Bytes(hash)) => {
                fragment_trees += 1;
                hash.as_slice()
            }
            Some(_) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    "merkle initHash is not a byte string".into(),
                );
                return;
            }
        };
        let alg = match entry.get("alg") {
            None => assertion_alg,
            Some(Value::Text(alg)) => alg.as_str(),
            Some(_) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    "merkle alg is not a string".into(),
                );
                return;
            }
        };
        let (Some(cache_index), Ok((_, _, digest_len))) = (
            bmff_algorithm_index(alg),
            bmff_fragment_merkle_row(entry, alg),
        ) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url.to_string(),
                "merkle row or hash algorithm is malformed".into(),
            );
            return;
        };
        if expected_init.len() != digest_len {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url.to_string(),
                "merkle initHash has the wrong digest width".into(),
            );
            return;
        }
        if cached[cache_index].is_none() {
            let actual =
                match crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_hash_with_exclusions(init_scope, alg, exclusions) {
                    Ok(hash) => hash,
                    Err(_) => {
                        results.push_failure(
                            ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                            url.to_string(),
                            "merkle initialization scope or exclusions are malformed".into(),
                        );
                        return;
                    }
                };
            cached[cache_index] = Some(actual);
        }
        let actual = cached[cache_index].as_deref();
        if actual != Some(expected_init) {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH,
                url.to_string(),
                "merkle initHash mismatch: init segment bytes altered".into(),
            );
            return;
        }
        init_tracks += 1;
    }

    if init_tracks > 0 {
        if fragments.is_empty() {
            if !binding_compromised {
                results.push_success(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!("merkle initHash valid over init segment ({init_tracks} track(s))"),
                );
            }
            if fragment_trees > 0 {
                results.push_informational(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!(
                        "{fragment_trees} fragment merkle tree(s) not evaluated: fragment files not provided (use fragmented verification)"
                    ),
                );
            }
        } else if verify_bmff_fragments(entries, assertion_alg, exclusions, fragments, url, results)
            && !binding_compromised
        {
            results.push_success(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH,
                url.to_string(),
                format!(
                    "merkle initHash and {} fragment merkle leaf hash(es) valid",
                    fragments.len()
                ),
            );
        }
    } else if mono_entries > 0 {
        if mono_ok == mono_entries && !binding_compromised {
            results.push_success(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH,
                url.to_string(),
                format!("monolithic merkle mdat tree(s) valid ({mono_ok} of {mono_entries})"),
            );
        }
    } else {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url.to_string(),
            "merkle array has no usable entries".into(),
        );
    }
}

/// Allocation-free cursor over the chunks described by a Merkle map.
///
/// Variable block sizes remain borrowed from decoded CBOR. The iterator keeps
/// only the current byte offset, so verifier memory does not scale with the
/// attacker-controlled leaf count.
enum BmffChunkLayout<'a> {
    Fixed { size: usize, offset: usize },
    Variable { sizes: &'a [Value], offset: usize },
    Whole(Option<&'a [u8]>),
}

struct BmffChunkIter<'a> {
    payload: &'a [u8],
    layout: BmffChunkLayout<'a>,
}

impl<'a> Iterator for BmffChunkIter<'a> {
    type Item = Result<&'a [u8], &'static str>;

    fn next(&mut self) -> Option<Self::Item> {
        match &mut self.layout {
            BmffChunkLayout::Fixed { size, offset } => {
                if *offset >= self.payload.len() {
                    return None;
                }
                let start = *offset;
                let end = start.saturating_add(*size).min(self.payload.len());
                *offset = end;
                Some(Ok(&self.payload[start..end]))
            }
            BmffChunkLayout::Variable { sizes, offset } => {
                let (next, rest) = sizes.split_first()?;
                *sizes = rest;
                let size = match next {
                    Value::Integer(size) => match usize::try_from(*size) {
                        Ok(size) => size,
                        Err(_) => {
                            return Some(Err(
                                "variableBlockSizes entry is not a non-negative integer",
                            ))
                        }
                    },
                    _ => return Some(Err("variableBlockSizes entry is not an integer")),
                };
                let start = *offset;
                let Some(end) = start.checked_add(size) else {
                    return Some(Err("variableBlockSizes total overflows"));
                };
                let Some(chunk) = self.payload.get(start..end) else {
                    return Some(Err("variableBlockSizes do not tile the mdat payload"));
                };
                *offset = end;
                Some(Ok(chunk))
            }
            BmffChunkLayout::Whole(chunk) => chunk.take().map(Ok),
        }
    }
}

/// Validate one monolithic (chunked-mdat) merkle entry per spec 15.12.2.1.
///
/// `localId` is the zero-based index of the `mdat` box this tree covers. The
/// payload is chunked by `fixedBlockSize` XOR `variableBlockSizes` (both
/// present = malformed; neither = the whole payload is a single leaf). When
/// the assertion stores the leaf row (`count == hashes.len()`), leaves are
/// compared directly; when it stores a higher row (`count > hashes.len()`),
/// each leaf's indexed auxiliary C2PA `merkle` proof is climbed to that row.
fn verify_bmff_monolithic_entry(
    plan: &BmffMonolithicPlan<'_, '_>,
    proof_index: Option<&BmffMerkleProofIndex>,
    url: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) -> bool {
    let malformed = |results: &mut ValidationResults, why: String| {
        results.push_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED, url.to_string(), why);
        false
    };
    let Some(digest_len) = bmff_digest_len(plan.alg) else {
        return malformed(
            results,
            format!("unsupported hash algorithm '{}'", plan.alg),
        );
    };
    let chunks = BmffChunkIter {
        payload: plan.payload,
        layout: match &plan.layout {
            BmffMonolithicPlanLayout::Fixed(size) => BmffChunkLayout::Fixed {
                size: *size,
                offset: 0,
            },
            BmffMonolithicPlanLayout::Variable(sizes) => {
                BmffChunkLayout::Variable { sizes, offset: 0 }
            }
            BmffMonolithicPlanLayout::Whole => BmffChunkLayout::Whole(Some(plan.payload)),
        },
    };
    let mut visited = 0usize;
    for (index, chunk) in chunks.enumerate() {
        let chunk = match chunk {
            Ok(chunk) => chunk,
            Err(why) => return malformed(results, why.into()),
        };
        visited += 1;
        let Some(leaf) = hash_bytes(plan.alg, chunk) else {
            return malformed(
                results,
                format!("unsupported hash algorithm '{}'", plan.alg),
            );
        };
        if plan.count == plan.row_values.len() {
            if plan.row_values.get(index).and_then(Value::as_bytes) != Some(leaf.as_slice()) {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!(
                        "mdat {} chunk {index}: merkle leaf hash mismatch",
                        plan.local_id
                    ),
                );
                return false;
            }
            continue;
        }

        let Some(proof_index) = proof_index else {
            return malformed(results, "auxiliary C2PA merkle proof index missing".into());
        };
        let key = (plan.unique_id, plan.local_id as i128, index);
        let Some(merkle_box) = proof_index.get(&key) else {
            return malformed(
                results,
                format!(
                    "mdat {} chunk {index}: auxiliary C2PA merkle box missing",
                    plan.local_id
                ),
            );
        };
        if merkle_box.proof.iter().any(|hash| hash.len() != digest_len) {
            return malformed(
                results,
                format!(
                    "mdat {} chunk {index}: merkle proof has the wrong digest width",
                    plan.local_id
                ),
            );
        }
        match merkle_climb(
            leaf,
            index,
            plan.count,
            &merkle_box.proof,
            plan.row_values.len(),
            plan.alg,
        ) {
            Some((row_index, derived))
                if plan.row_values.get(row_index).and_then(Value::as_bytes)
                    == Some(derived.as_slice()) => {}
            Some(_) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!(
                        "mdat {} chunk {index}: merkle leaf does not derive the stored row hash",
                        plan.local_id
                    ),
                );
                return false;
            }
            None => {
                return malformed(
                    results,
                    format!(
                        "mdat {} chunk {index}: merkle proof inconsistent",
                        plan.local_id
                    ),
                )
            }
        }
    }
    if visited != plan.count {
        return malformed(
            results,
            format!(
                "count {} does not match {visited} streamed mdat chunk(s)",
                plan.count
            ),
        );
    }
    true
}

/// Validate supplied fragment files against the assertion's Merkle trees
/// (spec A.5.4.1.2 + 18.6.6.1).
fn verify_bmff_fragments(
    entries: &[Value],
    assertion_alg: &str,
    exclusions: &[crate::c2pa_formats::BmffExclusionMap],
    fragments: &[&[u8]],
    url: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) -> bool {
    let mut tree_index =
        std::collections::HashMap::<(i128, i128), &Value>::with_capacity(entries.len());
    for entry in entries
        .iter()
        .filter(|entry| entry.get("initHash").is_some())
    {
        let key = match (entry.get("uniqueId"), entry.get("localId")) {
            (Some(Value::Integer(unique_id)), Some(Value::Integer(local_id))) => {
                (*unique_id, *local_id)
            }
            _ => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    "fragment merkle entry is missing integer uniqueId or localId".into(),
                );
                return false;
            }
        };
        if tree_index.insert(key, entry).is_some() {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url.to_string(),
                "duplicate fragment merkle entry key".into(),
            );
            return false;
        }
    }

    let mut matched = 0usize;
    let mut seen_identities =
        std::collections::HashSet::<(i128, i128, usize)>::with_capacity(fragments.len());
    let mut last_locations =
        std::collections::HashMap::<(i128, i128), usize>::with_capacity(fragments.len());
    for (index, fragment) in fragments.iter().enumerate() {
        let boxes = match crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_merkle_boxes(fragment) {
            Ok(boxes) => boxes,
            Err(_) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!("fragment {index}: not parseable as BMFF"),
                );
                continue;
            }
        };
        if boxes.len() != 1 {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url.to_string(),
                format!(
                    "fragment {index}: expected one auxiliary C2PA merkle box, found {}",
                    boxes.len()
                ),
            );
            continue;
        }
        let merkle_box = match boxes.into_iter().next() {
            Some(Ok(merkle_box)) => merkle_box,
            Some(Err(why)) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!("fragment {index}: {why}"),
                );
                continue;
            }
            None => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!("fragment {index}: auxiliary C2PA merkle box missing"),
                );
                continue;
            }
        };
        let identity = (
            merkle_box.unique_id,
            merkle_box.local_id,
            merkle_box.location,
        );
        if !seen_identities.insert(identity) {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH,
                url.to_string(),
                format!(
                    "fragment {index}: duplicate fragment identity uniqueId={} localId={} location={}",
                    merkle_box.unique_id, merkle_box.local_id, merkle_box.location
                ),
            );
            return false;
        }
        let order_key = (merkle_box.unique_id, merkle_box.local_id);
        if let Some(previous) = last_locations.insert(order_key, merkle_box.location) {
            if merkle_box.location <= previous {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!(
                        "fragment {index}: non-increasing playback location {} after {previous} for uniqueId={} localId={}",
                        merkle_box.location, merkle_box.unique_id, merkle_box.local_id
                    ),
                );
                return false;
            }
        }
        let Some(entry) = tree_index.get(&(merkle_box.unique_id, merkle_box.local_id)) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url.to_string(),
                format!(
                    "fragment {index}: no merkle entry for uniqueId={} localId={}",
                    merkle_box.unique_id, merkle_box.local_id
                ),
            );
            continue;
        };
        let alg = match entry.get("alg") {
            None => assertion_alg,
            Some(Value::Text(alg)) => alg.as_str(),
            Some(_) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!("fragment {index}: merkle alg is not a string"),
                );
                continue;
            }
        };
        let (count, row_values, digest_len) = match bmff_fragment_merkle_row(entry, alg) {
            Ok(row) => row,
            Err(why) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!("fragment {index}: {why}"),
                );
                continue;
            }
        };
        if merkle_box.proof.iter().any(|hash| hash.len() != digest_len) {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url.to_string(),
                format!("fragment {index}: merkle proof has the wrong digest width"),
            );
            continue;
        }

        let leaf = match crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_fragment_leaf_hash(fragment, alg, exclusions) {
            Ok(leaf) => leaf,
            Err(_) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!("fragment {index}: BMFF exclusions or hash algorithm are invalid"),
                );
                continue;
            }
        };
        match merkle_climb(
            leaf,
            merkle_box.location,
            count,
            &merkle_box.proof,
            row_values.len(),
            alg,
        ) {
            Some((row_index, derived))
                if row_values.get(row_index).and_then(Value::as_bytes)
                    == Some(derived.as_slice()) =>
            {
                matched += 1;
            }
            Some(_) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!("fragment {index}: merkle leaf does not derive the stored row hash"),
                );
            }
            None => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url.to_string(),
                    format!(
                        "fragment {index}: merkle proof inconsistent with location {} / count {count} / row {}",
                        merkle_box.location,
                        row_values.len()
                    ),
                );
            }
        }
    }
    matched > 0 && matched == fragments.len()
}

/// Climb a Merkle proof from a leaf to the row stored in the manifest.
///
/// Standard binary tree with C2PA's null-node rule (spec A.5.4): row sizes
/// shrink as `n -> ceil(n/2)`; a node whose sibling would be a null node (the
/// lone last node of an odd-sized row) is PROMOTED unchanged and consumes no
/// proof hash ("null hashes are not included"). At each level with a real
/// sibling, the next proof hash is combined left||right by index parity.
/// Returns the derived hash and its index in the stored row, or `None` when
/// the proof length does not fit the distance between the leaf row (`count`
/// nodes) and the stored row (`row_len` nodes).
fn merkle_climb(
    leaf: Vec<u8>,
    location: usize,
    count: usize,
    proof: &[Vec<u8>],
    row_len: usize,
    alg: &str,
) -> Option<(usize, Vec<u8>)> {
    if row_len == 0 || count == 0 || location >= count {
        return None;
    }
    let mut h = leaf;
    let mut idx = location;
    let mut n = count;
    let mut proof_iter = proof.iter();
    while n > row_len {
        let sibling = idx ^ 1;
        if sibling < n {
            let s = proof_iter.next()?;
            let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(h.len() + s.len());
            if idx.is_multiple_of(2) {
                buf.extend_from_slice(&h);
                buf.extend_from_slice(s);
            } else {
                buf.extend_from_slice(s);
                buf.extend_from_slice(&h);
            }
            h = hash_bytes(alg, &buf)?;
        }
        idx /= 2;
        n = n.div_ceil(2);
    }
    // The whole proof must be consumed and the final row must match in size.
    if n != row_len || proof_iter.next().is_some() {
        return None;
    }
    Some((idx, h))
}

/// Verify a general box hash (`c2pa.hash.boxes`, spec 15.12.3).
///
/// The asset is segmented into named spans ([`crate::c2pa_formats::box_spans`]) and
/// the assertion's `boxes` entries are consumed in order: each entry's
/// `names` must match the next spans exactly (out-of-order or missing →
/// `assertion.boxesHash.mismatch`), its hash is computed from the start of
/// the first named span through the end of the last (inter-box bytes
/// included), and compared unless the entry is `excluded` or is the `C2PA`
/// manifest run (structurally checked; its hash is the placeholder the
/// two-pass creation cannot make self-consistent). Asset spans left over
/// after all entries yields `assertion.boxesHash.unknownBox`.
fn verify_boxes_hash(
    cbor: &[u8],
    claim: &Value,
    format: AssetFormat,
    data: &[u8],
    binding_compromised: bool,
    label: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    let url = format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.boxes");
    let Ok(box_map) = decode(cbor) else {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url,
            "boxes hash assertion CBOR invalid".into(),
        );
        return;
    };
    let Some(Value::Array(entries)) = box_map.get("boxes") else {
        results.push_failure(ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MALFORMED, url, "no boxes field".into());
        return;
    };
    let default_alg = resolved_hash_algorithm(&box_map, claim);

    let spans = match crate::c2pa_formats::box_spans(format, data) {
        Ok(Some(s)) => s,
        Ok(None) => {
            results.push_informational(
                ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MATCH,
                url,
                "general box hash not evaluated: segmentation for this container is not implemented".into(),
            );
            return;
        }
        Err(e) => {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                format!("asset segmentation failed: {e}"),
            );
            return;
        }
    };

    let mut idx = 0usize;
    let mut mismatched = false;
    let mut c2pa_seen = false;
    for entry in entries {
        let Some(Value::Array(names)) = entry.get("names") else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                "box entry missing names".into(),
            );
            return;
        };
        let names: Vec<&str> = names.iter().filter_map(Value::as_text).collect();
        if names.is_empty() {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                "empty names array".into(),
            );
            return;
        }
        let Some(alg) = entry.get("alg").and_then(Value::as_text).or(default_alg) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
                url,
                "no hash algorithm in box entry or box map".into(),
            );
            return;
        };
        let first = idx;
        for name in &names {
            match spans.get(idx) {
                Some(s) if s.name == *name => idx += 1,
                Some(s) => {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MISMATCH,
                        url,
                        format!(
                            "expected box '{name}' but found '{}' (out of order or missing)",
                            s.name
                        ),
                    );
                    return;
                }
                None => {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MISMATCH,
                        url,
                        format!("asset ended before box '{name}'"),
                    );
                    return;
                }
            }
        }
        let excluded = matches!(entry.get("excluded"), Some(Value::Bool(true)));
        let is_c2pa_run = names == ["C2PA"];
        if is_c2pa_run {
            c2pa_seen = true;
            continue; // structurally consumed; hash is the creation placeholder
        }
        if excluded {
            continue;
        }
        let Some(expected) = entry.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MISMATCH,
                url,
                "box entry missing hash".into(),
            );
            return;
        };
        let range = &data[spans[first].start..spans[idx - 1].end];
        let Some(actual) = hash_bytes(alg, range) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
                url,
                format!("unsupported hash algorithm '{alg}'"),
            );
            return;
        };
        if actual.as_slice() != expected {
            mismatched = true;
        }
    }
    if idx != spans.len() {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_UNKNOWN_BOX,
            url,
            format!(
                "asset contains {} box(es) not covered by the assertion (first: '{}')",
                spans.len() - idx,
                spans[idx].name
            ),
        );
        return;
    }
    if mismatched {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MISMATCH,
            url,
            "box hash mismatch: asset bytes altered".into(),
        );
        return;
    }
    if !c2pa_seen {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url,
            "assertion does not cover the C2PA manifest box".into(),
        );
        return;
    }
    if !binding_compromised {
        results.push_success(
            ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MATCH,
            url,
            format!(
                "all box hashes valid ({} entries over {} boxes)",
                entries.len(),
                spans.len()
            ),
        );
    }
}

/// Verify a collection data hash (`c2pa.hash.collection.data`, spec 15.12.5).
///
/// Per-URI hashing primarily covers the exact A.6.2.1 span: the local file
/// header followed by compressed/encrypted content. The c2pa-org public ZIP
/// vector's broader local span is accepted as a compatibility convention.
/// URIs with `.`/`..` path segments are rejected (`invalidURI`);
/// listed-but-absent files are `incorrectFileCount`.
///
/// `zip_central_directory_hash` covers all central headers and the EOCD while
/// skipping the manifest entry's four-byte CRC-32 field, exactly as A.6.2.2
/// requires. A mismatch is always a hard binding failure.
fn verify_collection_hash(
    cbor: &[u8],
    data: &[u8],
    binding_compromised: bool,
    label: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    let url = format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.collection.data");
    let malformed = |results: &mut ValidationResults, why: String| {
        results.push_failure(ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_MALFORMED, url.clone(), why);
    };
    let Ok(map) = decode(cbor) else {
        malformed(results, "collection hash assertion CBOR invalid".into());
        return;
    };
    let Some(Value::Array(uris)) = map.get("uris") else {
        malformed(results, "no uris field".into());
        return;
    };
    let Some(alg) = map.get("alg").and_then(Value::as_text) else {
        malformed(results, "no alg field".into());
        return;
    };

    // Parse the central directory up front, both as a structural check and to
    // obtain the exact A.6.2.2 byte slices.
    let Ok(cd_parts) = crate::c2pa_formats::zip_central_directory_hash_parts(data) else {
        malformed(results, "asset is not a readable ZIP archive".into());
        return;
    };
    let Some(expected_cd) = map
        .get("zip_central_directory_hash")
        .and_then(Value::as_bytes)
    else {
        malformed(results, "zip_central_directory_hash missing".into());
        return;
    };

    for u in uris {
        let (Some(uri), Some(expected)) = (
            u.get("uri").and_then(Value::as_text),
            u.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes),
        ) else {
            malformed(results, "uri entry missing uri or hash".into());
            return;
        };
        if uri.split('/').any(|seg| seg == "." || seg == "..") {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_INVALID_URI,
                url,
                format!("uri '{uri}' contains a relative path segment"),
            );
            return;
        }
        // Primary: exact A.6.2.1 header-plus-content span. Compatibility:
        // c2pa-org's published ZIP vector includes the trailing descriptor.
        let span = match crate::c2pa_formats::zip_entry_hash_span(data, uri) {
            Ok(s) => s,
            Err(e) => {
                malformed(results, format!("entry '{uri}' unreadable: {e}"));
                return;
            }
        };
        let Some((es, ee)) = span else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_INCORRECT_FILE_COUNT,
                url,
                format!("listed file '{uri}' not found in archive"),
            );
            return;
        };
        let exact_match = hash_bytes(alg, &data[es..ee]).is_some_and(|h| h.as_slice() == expected);
        let public_vector_match = !exact_match
            && matches!(
                crate::c2pa_formats::zip_entry_local_span(data, uri),
                Ok(Some((start, end)))
                    if hash_bytes(alg, &data[start..end])
                        .is_some_and(|h| h.as_slice() == expected)
            );
        if !(exact_match || public_vector_match) {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_MISMATCH,
                url.clone(),
                format!("collection entry '{uri}' hash mismatch"),
            );
            return;
        }
    }

    let cd_ok = hash_parts(alg, &cd_parts).is_some_and(|h| h.as_slice() == expected_cd);
    if !cd_ok {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_MISMATCH,
            url,
            "ZIP central directory hash mismatch".into(),
        );
        return;
    }
    if !binding_compromised {
        results.push_success(
            ASSERTION_COLLECTION_HASH_MATCH,
            url,
            format!(
                "collection hashes valid ({} entries; central directory checked)",
                uris.len()
            ),
        );
    }
}

/// Maximum number of `c2pa.hash.data` exclusion ranges the verifier accepts.
///
/// Inputs beyond this bound are rejected before the exclusion list is parsed
/// or any asset bytes are hashed.
const MAX_DATA_HASH_EXCLUSIONS: usize = 32_768;

/// A.8 text-wrapper header size: 8 (magic) + 1 (version) + 4 (manifest length).
const TEXT_WRAPPER_HEADER: usize = 13;

/// The deterministic UTF-8 byte length of a PADDED A.8 wrapper for a manifest
/// of `manifest_len` bytes (mirrors `c2pa_text::worst_case_wrapper_byte_length`,
/// the padding target the engine's text embed always uses):
/// `3 (U+FEFF) + (13 + manifest_len) * 4 + 6`.
fn padded_wrapper_byte_length(manifest_len: usize) -> usize {
    3 + (TEXT_WRAPPER_HEADER + manifest_len) * 4 + 6
}

/// Length-bounded C2PA A.8 text-wrapper measurement.
///
/// Returns the byte span `(start, length)` of the first valid wrapper in
/// `text`, measured from the wrapper's own four-byte length field — never by
/// consume-all-VS scanning — so a foreign selector run adjacent to the wrapper
/// is never absorbed into the measured span:
///
/// 1. after `U+FEFF`, decode exactly `13 + manifest_len` payload selectors
///    (header validated: magic, version, length);
/// 2. then consume PADDING selectors only — byte values `0x00`/`0xFF`, the
///    deterministic padded-wrapper alphabet — and only while the total span
///    stays within [`padded_wrapper_byte_length`] for that manifest length.
///
/// An unpadded wrapper measures as header + manifest exactly; the engine's
/// padded wrapper measures as its exact padded length, leaving any adjacent
/// foreign run outside the span.
fn locate_text_wrapper(text: &str) -> Option<(usize, usize)> {
    const MAGIC: &[u8; 8] = b"C2PATXT\0";
    const VERSION: u8 = 1;
    let mut search_from = 0usize;
    while let Some(rel) = text[search_from..].find('\u{feff}') {
        let start = search_from + rel;
        let mut pos = start + 3; // U+FEFF is 3 UTF-8 bytes
        let mut payload: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(TEXT_WRAPPER_HEADER);
        let mut manifest_len: Option<usize> = None;
        let mut chars = text[pos..].chars();
        // Phase 1+2: header, then exactly `manifest_len` manifest selectors.
        loop {
            match manifest_len {
                Some(len) if payload.len() == TEXT_WRAPPER_HEADER + len => break,
                _ => {}
            }
            let Some(b) = chars.next().and_then(text_standard::vs_to_byte) else {
                // Selector run ends before the declared payload: not a valid
                // wrapper at this U+FEFF; keep searching.
                manifest_len = None;
                break;
            };
            pos += text_standard::byte_to_vs(b).len_utf8();
            payload.push(b);
            if payload.len() == TEXT_WRAPPER_HEADER {
                if &payload[0..8] != MAGIC || payload[8] != VERSION {
                    manifest_len = None;
                    break;
                }
                manifest_len =
                    Some(
                        u32::from_be_bytes([payload[9], payload[10], payload[11], payload[12]])
                            as usize,
                    );
            }
        }
        if let Some(len) = manifest_len {
            // Phase 3: padding selectors (0x00/0xFF), bounded by the
            // deterministic padded-wrapper length. A foreign selector run
            // beyond that bound is NOT part of the wrapper.
            let bound = start + padded_wrapper_byte_length(len);
            for c in text[pos..].chars() {
                match text_standard::vs_to_byte(c) {
                    Some(b) if (b == 0x00 || b == 0xFF) && pos + c.len_utf8() <= bound => {
                        pos += c.len_utf8();
                    }
                    _ => break,
                }
            }
            return Some((start, pos - start));
        }
        search_from = start + 3;
    }
    None
}

/// Public character-offset view of the C2PA A.8 text-wrapper locator.
///
/// Returns the half-open `[start, end)` scalar span of the first valid wrapper,
/// or `None` when the text carries none.
pub fn text_wrapper_char_span(text: &str) -> Option<(usize, usize)> {
    let (start_b, len_b) = locate_text_wrapper(text)?;
    let start_c = text[..start_b].chars().count();
    let span_c = text[start_b..start_b + len_b].chars().count();
    Some((start_c, start_c + span_c))
}

/// Maximum number of parts in one multi-asset assertion.
const MAX_MULTI_ASSET_PARTS: usize = 4_096;

/// Verify a `c2pa.hash.multi-asset` fallback binding using the locator and
/// hard-binding methodology declared for each part.
///
/// A byte-offset locator hashes its declared range. A `bmffBox` locator uses
/// the bounded BMFF path resolver for coverage, then hashes only the selected
/// box payload, excluding its box header as required by C2PA 2.4 section
/// 18.9.2. Part assertions remain typed as data, BMFF, or general-box hashes;
/// unsupported labels and malformed methodology fail closed.
fn multi_asset_part_label_is(label: &str, base: &str) -> bool {
    label == base
        || label
            .strip_prefix(base)
            .and_then(|suffix| suffix.strip_prefix("__"))
            .is_some_and(|instance| !instance.is_empty())
}

#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum MultiAssetPartMethod {
    Data,
    Bmff,
    Boxes,
}

fn multi_asset_part_method(label: &str) -> Option<MultiAssetPartMethod> {
    if multi_asset_part_label_is(label, "c2pa.hash.data.part") {
        Some(MultiAssetPartMethod::Data)
    } else if multi_asset_part_label_is(label, "c2pa.hash.bmff.v2.part")
        || multi_asset_part_label_is(label, "c2pa.hash.bmff.v3.part")
    {
        Some(MultiAssetPartMethod::Bmff)
    } else if multi_asset_part_label_is(label, "c2pa.hash.boxes.part") {
        Some(MultiAssetPartMethod::Boxes)
    } else {
        None
    }
}

/// Convert a full BMFF box span into its content span. ISO base box fields and
/// the UUID user type are box-header bytes, not part content.
fn bmff_box_payload_bounds(
    data: &[u8],
    box_start: usize,
    box_length: usize,
) -> Option<(usize, usize)> {
    let box_end = box_start.checked_add(box_length)?;
    let header = data.get(box_start..box_start.checked_add(8)?)?;
    if box_end > data.len() {
        return None;
    }
    let size32 = u32::from_be_bytes(header[..4].try_into().ok()?);
    let mut header_length: usize = match size32 {
        0 => 8,
        1 => {
            let extended = data.get(box_start..box_start.checked_add(16)?)?;
            let declared =
                usize::try_from(u64::from_be_bytes(extended[8..16].try_into().ok()?)).ok()?;
            if declared != box_length {
                return None;
            }
            16
        }
        declared => {
            if declared as usize != box_length {
                return None;
            }
            8
        }
    };
    if &header[4..8] == b"uuid" {
        header_length = header_length.checked_add(16)?;
    }
    if header_length > box_length {
        return None;
    }
    Some((
        box_start.checked_add(header_length)?,
        box_length - header_length,
    ))
}

fn multi_asset_general_box_format(data: &[u8]) -> Option<AssetFormat> {
    [AssetFormat::Jpeg, AssetFormat::Png]
        .into_iter()
        .find(|format| matches!(crate::c2pa_formats::box_spans(*format, data), Ok(Some(_))))
}

fn verify_multi_asset(
    claim: &Value,
    claim_refs: &ClaimAssertionRefs<'_>,
    ma_cbor: &[u8],
    data: &[u8],
    format: AssetFormat,
    label: &str,
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
) {
    let url = format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{label}/c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.multi-asset");
    let Ok(ma) = decode(ma_cbor) else {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url,
            "multi-asset CBOR invalid".into(),
        );
        return;
    };
    let Some(Value::Array(parts)) = ma.get("parts") else {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url,
            "multi-asset has no parts array".into(),
        );
        return;
    };
    if parts.is_empty() {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url,
            "multi-asset parts array is empty".into(),
        );
        return;
    }
    if parts.len() > MAX_MULTI_ASSET_PARTS {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url,
            format!("multi-asset part count exceeds verifier bound ({MAX_MULTI_ASSET_PARTS})"),
        );
        return;
    }
    let bmff_paths: Vec<&str> = parts
        .iter()
        .filter_map(|part| {
            part.get("location")?
                .get("bmffBox")?
                .as_text()
                .filter(|path| !path.is_empty())
        })
        .collect();
    let bmff_locator_ranges = if format == AssetFormat::Bmff && !bmff_paths.is_empty() {
        match crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_box_ranges(data, &bmff_paths) {
            Ok(ranges) => ranges,
            Err(error) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url,
                    format!("BMFF locator plan is invalid: {error}"),
                );
                return;
            }
        }
    } else {
        Vec::new()
    };
    let mut bmff_locator_index = 0usize;

    enum Locator<'a> {
        ByteOffset {
            start: usize,
            length: usize,
        },
        BmffBox {
            path: &'a str,
            box_start: usize,
            box_length: usize,
            content_start: usize,
            content_length: usize,
        },
    }

    impl Locator<'_> {
        fn coverage_bounds(&self) -> (usize, usize) {
            match self {
                Self::ByteOffset { start, length } => (*start, *length),
                Self::BmffBox {
                    box_start,
                    box_length,
                    ..
                } => (*box_start, *box_length),
            }
        }

        fn content_bounds(&self) -> (usize, usize) {
            match self {
                Self::ByteOffset { start, length } => (*start, *length),
                Self::BmffBox {
                    content_start,
                    content_length,
                    ..
                } => (*content_start, *content_length),
            }
        }

        fn description(&self) -> String {
            match self {
                Self::ByteOffset { start, length } => {
                    format!("byte range [{start}, {})", start.saturating_add(*length))
                }
                Self::BmffBox { path, .. } => format!("BMFF box '{path}'"),
            }
        }
    }

    enum Method<'a> {
        Data {
            algorithm: &'a str,
            expected: &'a [u8],
            exclusions: Vec<(usize, usize)>,
        },
        Bmff {
            hash_data: &'a Value,
            algorithm: &'a str,
            expected: Option<&'a [u8]>,
            exclusions: Vec<crate::c2pa_formats::BmffExclusionMap>,
            merkle: bool,
        },
        Boxes {
            cbor: &'a [u8],
        },
    }

    struct Part<'a> {
        locator: Locator<'a>,
        optional: bool,
        label: &'a str,
        method: Method<'a>,
    }

    let mut collected = Vec::with_capacity(parts.len());
    for part in parts {
        let optional = match part.get("optional") {
            None => false,
            Some(Value::Bool(optional)) => *optional,
            Some(_) => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url,
                    "multi-asset part optional flag is not a boolean".into(),
                );
                return;
            }
        };
        let Some(location) = part.get("location") else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                "multi-asset part has no locator".into(),
            );
            return;
        };
        let has_byte_offset = location.get("byteOffset").is_some();
        let has_length = location.get("length").is_some();
        let has_bmff_box = location.get("bmffBox").is_some();
        let locator = match (has_byte_offset, has_length, has_bmff_box) {
            (true, true, false) => {
                let (Some(start), Some(length)) = (
                    location.get("byteOffset").and_then(int_usize),
                    location.get("length").and_then(int_usize),
                ) else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url,
                        "byte-offset locator has a negative or non-integer bound".into(),
                    );
                    return;
                };
                Locator::ByteOffset { start, length }
            }
            (false, false, true) => {
                let Some(path) = location
                    .get("bmffBox")
                    .and_then(Value::as_text)
                    .filter(|path| !path.is_empty())
                else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url,
                        "bmffBox locator is not a non-empty string".into(),
                    );
                    return;
                };
                if format != AssetFormat::Bmff {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url,
                        "bmffBox locator used for a non-BMFF asset".into(),
                    );
                    return;
                }
                let ranges = &bmff_locator_ranges[bmff_locator_index];
                bmff_locator_index += 1;
                let [(box_start, box_length)] = ranges.as_slice() else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url,
                        format!("bmffBox locator '{path}' must resolve to exactly one box"),
                    );
                    return;
                };
                let Some((content_start, content_length)) =
                    bmff_box_payload_bounds(data, *box_start, *box_length)
                else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url,
                        format!("bmffBox locator '{path}' resolved to malformed bounds"),
                    );
                    return;
                };
                Locator::BmffBox {
                    path,
                    box_start: *box_start,
                    box_length: *box_length,
                    content_start,
                    content_length,
                }
            }
            _ => {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                    url,
                    "locator must contain exactly byteOffset+length or bmffBox".into(),
                );
                return;
            }
        };

        let Some(hash_assertion) = part.get("hashAssertion") else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                "multi-asset part has no hashAssertion".into(),
            );
            return;
        };
        let Some(part_url) = hash_assertion.get("url").and_then(Value::as_text) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                "part hashAssertion is not a HashedUri".into(),
            );
            return;
        };
        let Some(part_label) = assertion_label_for_manifest(part_url, label) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                format!("part hash assertion URI '{part_url}' is not local to the claim"),
            );
            return;
        };
        let Some(method_kind) = multi_asset_part_method(part_label) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                format!("part hash assertion '{part_label}' is not a supported .part method"),
            );
            return;
        };

        let nested_hash = hash_assertion.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes);
        let nested_algorithm = resolved_hash_algorithm(hash_assertion, claim);
        let exact_declaration = claim_refs.references.iter().find(|reference| {
            reference.label == Some(part_label)
                && nested_hash.is_some()
                && reference.value.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes) == nested_hash
                && resolved_hash_algorithm(reference.value, claim) == nested_algorithm
        });
        let (Some(nested_hash), Some(nested_algorithm), Some(_)) =
            (nested_hash, nested_algorithm, exact_declaration)
        else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                format!("part hashAssertion '{part_label}' is not an exact declared HashedUri"),
            );
            return;
        };
        if bmff_digest_len(nested_algorithm) != Some(nested_hash.len()) {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                format!("part hashAssertion '{part_label}' has an invalid digest"),
            );
            return;
        }
        let Some(indexed) = claim_refs.indexed(part_label) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                format!("part hash assertion '{part_label}' is not indexed"),
            );
            return;
        };
        let Some(part_hash) = indexed.decoded.as_ref() else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                format!("part hash assertion '{part_label}' is missing or invalid CBOR"),
            );
            return;
        };
        let (_, part_content_length) = locator.content_bounds();
        let method = match method_kind {
            MultiAssetPartMethod::Data => {
                let Some(expected) = part_hash.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes) else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url,
                        format!("data hash part assertion '{part_label}' has no hash"),
                    );
                    return;
                };
                let Some(algorithm) = resolved_hash_algorithm(part_hash, &ma)
                    .or_else(|| claim.get("alg").and_then(Value::as_text))
                else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
                        url,
                        format!("data hash part '{part_label}' has no hash algorithm"),
                    );
                    return;
                };
                if bmff_digest_len(algorithm) != Some(expected.len()) {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
                        url,
                        format!("data hash part '{part_label}' has an unsupported algorithm or digest width"),
                    );
                    return;
                }
                let exclusions = match parse_local_part_exclusions(
                    part_hash.get("exclusions"),
                    part_content_length,
                ) {
                    Ok(exclusions) => exclusions,
                    Err(error) => {
                        results.push_failure(
                                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                                url,
                                format!(
                                    "data hash part assertion '{part_label}' has invalid exclusions: {error}"
                                ),
                            );
                        return;
                    }
                };
                Method::Data {
                    algorithm,
                    expected,
                    exclusions,
                }
            }
            MultiAssetPartMethod::Bmff => {
                let merkle = part_hash.get("merkle").is_some();
                let expected = part_hash.get("hash").and_then(Value::as_bytes);
                if !merkle && expected.is_none() {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url,
                        format!("BMFF part assertion '{part_label}' has no hash or merkle tree"),
                    );
                    return;
                }
                let Some(algorithm) = resolved_hash_algorithm(part_hash, &ma)
                    .or_else(|| claim.get("alg").and_then(Value::as_text))
                else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
                        url,
                        format!("BMFF part '{part_label}' has no hash algorithm"),
                    );
                    return;
                };
                if bmff_algorithm_index(algorithm).is_none()
                    || expected.is_some_and(|hash| bmff_digest_len(algorithm) != Some(hash.len()))
                {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED,
                        url,
                        format!(
                            "BMFF part '{part_label}' has an unsupported algorithm or digest width"
                        ),
                    );
                    return;
                }
                let exclusions = match bmff_exclusion_maps(part_hash) {
                    Ok(exclusions) => exclusions,
                    Err(error) => {
                        results.push_failure(
                            ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                            url,
                            format!(
                                "BMFF part assertion '{part_label}' has invalid exclusions: {error}"
                            ),
                        );
                        return;
                    }
                };
                Method::Bmff {
                    hash_data: part_hash,
                    algorithm,
                    expected,
                    exclusions,
                    merkle,
                }
            }
            MultiAssetPartMethod::Boxes => {
                let Some(cbor) = indexed.payload else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url,
                        format!("general-box part assertion '{part_label}' has no payload"),
                    );
                    return;
                };
                Method::Boxes { cbor }
            }
        };
        collected.push(Part {
            locator,
            optional,
            label: part_label,
            method,
        });
    }

    let mut expected_start = 0usize;
    for part in &collected {
        let (start, length) = part.locator.coverage_bounds();
        if start != expected_start {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                format!(
                    "multi-asset parts are not contiguous and ordered: '{}' starts at {start} (expected {expected_start})",
                    part.label
                ),
            );
            return;
        }
        let Some(end) = start.checked_add(length) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url,
                format!("multi-asset part '{}' bounds overflow", part.label),
            );
            return;
        };
        expected_start = end;
    }
    let declared_end = expected_start;

    let mut any_failure = false;
    for part in &collected {
        let (content_start, content_length) = part.locator.content_bounds();
        let Some(content_end) = content_start.checked_add(content_length) else {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                url.clone(),
                format!("multi-asset part '{}' content bounds overflow", part.label),
            );
            any_failure = true;
            continue;
        };
        if content_start > data.len() || (content_start == data.len() && content_length != 0) {
            if !part.optional {
                results.push_failure(
                    ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISSING_PART,
                    url.clone(),
                    format!("required part '{}' is absent", part.label),
                );
                any_failure = true;
            }
            continue;
        }
        if content_end > data.len() {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISMATCH,
                url.clone(),
                format!(
                    "part '{}' is truncated: {} exceeds asset length {}",
                    part.label,
                    part.locator.description(),
                    data.len()
                ),
            );
            any_failure = true;
            continue;
        }

        let content = &data[content_start..content_end];
        let outcome = match &part.method {
            Method::Data {
                algorithm,
                expected,
                exclusions,
            } => match hash_with_exclusions(algorithm, content, exclusions) {
                Some(actual) if actual.as_slice() == *expected => Ok(()),
                Some(_) => Err((false, "data hash mismatch".to_string())),
                None => Err((true, "data hash algorithm is unsupported".to_string())),
            },
            Method::Bmff {
                hash_data,
                algorithm,
                expected,
                exclusions,
                merkle,
            } => {
                let top_level = match expected {
                    Some(expected) => match crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_hash_with_exclusions(
                        content, algorithm, exclusions,
                    ) {
                        Ok(actual) if actual.as_slice() == *expected => Ok(()),
                        Ok(_) => Err((false, "BMFF structural hash mismatch".to_string())),
                        Err(error) => Err((true, format!("BMFF part hashing failed: {error}"))),
                    },
                    None => Ok(()),
                };
                if top_level.is_err() || !merkle {
                    top_level
                } else {
                    let mut part_results = ValidationResults::default();
                    verify_bmff_merkle_init(
                        BmffMerkleInput {
                            hash_data,
                            assertion_alg: algorithm,
                            exclusions,
                            data: content,
                            fragments: &[],
                            url: &url,
                            binding_compromised: false,
                        },
                        &mut part_results,
                    );
                    if part_results.failure.is_empty()
                        && part_results.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH)
                    {
                        Ok(())
                    } else {
                        let malformed = part_results
                            .failure
                            .iter()
                            .any(|status| status.code == ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED);
                        let explanation = part_results
                            .failure
                            .first()
                            .map(|status| status.explanation.clone())
                            .unwrap_or_else(|| "BMFF merkle methodology did not validate".into());
                        Err((malformed, explanation))
                    }
                }
            }
            Method::Boxes { cbor } => {
                let Some(part_format) = multi_asset_general_box_format(content) else {
                    results.push_failure(
                        ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
                        url.clone(),
                        format!(
                            "general-box part '{}' is not a supported JPEG or PNG part",
                            part.label
                        ),
                    );
                    any_failure = true;
                    continue;
                };
                let mut part_results = ValidationResults::default();
                verify_boxes_hash(
                    cbor,
                    claim,
                    part_format,
                    content,
                    false,
                    label,
                    &mut part_results,
                );
                if part_results.failure.is_empty()
                    && part_results.has_success(ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MATCH)
                {
                    Ok(())
                } else {
                    let malformed = part_results.failure.iter().any(|status| {
                        status.code == ASSERTION_BOXES_HASH_MALFORMED
                            || status.code == ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED
                    });
                    let explanation = part_results
                        .failure
                        .first()
                        .map(|status| status.explanation.clone())
                        .unwrap_or_else(|| "general-box methodology did not validate".into());
                    Err((malformed, explanation))
                }
            }
        };
        if let Err((malformed, explanation)) = outcome {
            results.push_failure(
                if malformed {
                    ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED
                } else {
                    ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISMATCH
                },
                url.clone(),
                format!("part '{}' failed: {explanation}", part.label),
            );
            any_failure = true;
        }
    }

    if declared_end < data.len() {
        results.push_failure(
            ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED,
            url.clone(),
            format!(
                "asset has {} uncovered trailing bytes beyond declared parts",
                data.len() - declared_end
            ),
        );
        any_failure = true;
    }
    if !any_failure {
        results.push_success(
            ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH,
            url,
            "all required multi-asset parts valid".into(),
        );
    }
}
/// Normalize every field of a BMFF v2/v3 exclusion map.
fn bmff_exclusion_maps(
    hash_data: &Value,
) -> Result<Vec<crate::c2pa_formats::BmffExclusionMap>, &'static str> {
    let Some(Value::Array(items)) = hash_data.get("exclusions") else {
        return Err("BMFF hash assertion has no exclusions array");
    };
    if items.is_empty() {
        return Err("BMFF exclusion list is empty");
    }
    if items.len() > MAX_DATA_HASH_EXCLUSIONS {
        return Err("BMFF exclusion list exceeds the verifier cap");
    }

    let mut total_data_qualifiers = 0usize;
    let mut total_data_bytes = 0usize;
    let mut total_subsets = 0usize;
    let mut exclusions = Vec::with_capacity(items.len());
    for item in items {
        let xpath = item
            .get("xpath")
            .and_then(Value::as_text)
            .filter(|xpath| !xpath.is_empty())
            .ok_or("BMFF exclusion is missing xpath")?;
        if xpath.len() > MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_XPATH_BYTES {
            return Err("BMFF exclusion xpath exceeds the verifier cap");
        }
        let xpath = xpath.to_string();
        let length = match item.get("length") {
            Some(Value::Null) | None => None,
            Some(value) => Some(int_usize(value).ok_or("BMFF exclusion length is invalid")?),
        };
        let version = match item.get("version") {
            Some(Value::Null) | None => None,
            Some(value) => Some(
                u8::try_from(int_usize(value).ok_or("BMFF exclusion version is invalid")?)
                    .map_err(|_| "BMFF exclusion version is invalid")?,
            ),
        };
        let flags = match item.get("flags") {
            Some(Value::Null) | None => None,
            Some(Value::Bytes(bytes)) if bytes.len() == 3 => {
                Some(u32::from_be_bytes([0, bytes[0], bytes[1], bytes[2]]))
            }
            Some(_) => return Err("BMFF exclusion flags must be a three-byte string"),
        };
        let exact = match item.get("exact") {
            Some(Value::Null) | None => true,
            Some(Value::Bool(value)) => *value,
            Some(_) => return Err("BMFF exclusion exact field is not a boolean"),
        };
        if !matches!(item.get("exact"), None | Some(Value::Null)) && flags.is_none() {
            return Err("BMFF exclusion exact field requires flags");
        }
        let data = match item.get("data") {
            Some(Value::Array(maps)) if maps.is_empty() => {
                return Err("BMFF exclusion data field is empty")
            }
            Some(Value::Array(maps)) => {
                total_data_qualifiers = total_data_qualifiers
                    .checked_add(maps.len())
                    .filter(|count| *count <= MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_DATA_QUALIFIERS)
                    .ok_or("BMFF exclusion data qualifiers exceed the verifier cap")?;
                let mut normalized = Vec::with_capacity(maps.len());
                for map in maps {
                    let value = map
                        .get("value")
                        .and_then(Value::as_bytes)
                        .ok_or("BMFF exclusion data value is invalid")?;
                    total_data_bytes = total_data_bytes
                        .checked_add(value.len())
                        .filter(|bytes| *bytes <= MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_DATA_BYTES)
                        .ok_or("BMFF exclusion data bytes exceed the verifier cap")?;
                    normalized.push(crate::c2pa_formats::BmffDataMap {
                        offset: map
                            .get("offset")
                            .and_then(int_usize)
                            .ok_or("BMFF exclusion data offset is invalid")?,
                        value: value.to_vec(),
                    });
                }
                normalized
            }
            Some(Value::Null) | None => Vec::new(),
            Some(_) => return Err("BMFF exclusion data field is not an array"),
        };
        let subset = match item.get("subset") {
            Some(Value::Array(maps)) if maps.is_empty() => {
                return Err("BMFF exclusion subset field is empty")
            }
            Some(Value::Array(maps)) => {
                total_subsets = total_subsets
                    .checked_add(maps.len())
                    .filter(|count| *count <= MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_SUBSETS)
                    .ok_or("BMFF exclusion subsets exceed the verifier cap")?;
                let mut normalized = Vec::with_capacity(maps.len());
                let mut previous_end = None;
                for (index, map) in maps.iter().enumerate() {
                    let offset = map
                        .get("offset")
                        .and_then(int_usize)
                        .ok_or("BMFF exclusion subset offset is invalid")?;
                    let length = map
                        .get("length")
                        .and_then(int_usize)
                        .ok_or("BMFF exclusion subset length is invalid")?;
                    if length == 0 && index + 1 != maps.len() {
                        return Err("only the final BMFF exclusion subset may have zero length");
                    }
                    if previous_end.is_some_and(|end| offset < end) {
                        return Err("BMFF exclusion subsets overlap or are not sorted");
                    }
                    previous_end = Some(offset.saturating_add(length));
                    normalized.push(crate::c2pa_formats::BmffSubsetMap { offset, length });
                }
                normalized
            }
            Some(Value::Null) | None => Vec::new(),
            Some(_) => return Err("BMFF exclusion subset field is not an array"),
        };
        exclusions.push(crate::c2pa_formats::BmffExclusionMap {
            xpath,
            length,
            data,
            subset,
            version,
            flags,
            exact,
        });
    }
    Ok(exclusions)
}
fn parse_local_part_exclusions(
    value: Option<&Value>,
    part_len: usize,
) -> Result<Vec<(usize, usize)>, &'static str> {
    let Some(value) = value else {
        return Ok(Vec::new());
    };
    let Value::Array(items) = value else {
        return Err("exclusions is not an array");
    };
    if items.len() > MAX_DATA_HASH_EXCLUSIONS {
        return Err("exclusion list exceeds the verifier cap");
    }
    let mut ranges = Vec::with_capacity(items.len());
    for item in items {
        let start = item
            .get("start")
            .and_then(int_usize)
            .ok_or("exclusion start is missing or invalid")?;
        let length = item
            .get("length")
            .and_then(int_usize)
            .ok_or("exclusion length is missing or invalid")?;
        let end = start
            .checked_add(length)
            .ok_or("exclusion range overflows")?;
        if end > part_len {
            return Err("exclusion range extends beyond the located part");
        }
        ranges.push((start, length));
    }
    ranges.sort_by_key(|(start, _)| *start);
    Ok(ranges)
}

/// Parse the `exclusions` array into sorted `(start, length)` ranges.
fn parse_exclusions(value: Option<&Value>) -> Vec<(usize, usize)> {
    let mut ranges = Vec::new();
    if let Some(Value::Array(items)) = value {
        for item in items {
            let start = item.get("start").and_then(int_usize);
            let length = item.get("length").and_then(int_usize);
            if let (Some(start), Some(length)) = (start, length) {
                ranges.push((start, length));
            }
        }
    }
    ranges.sort_by_key(|(s, _)| *s);
    ranges
}

/// Interpret a CBOR integer as a `usize`, rejecting negatives.
fn int_usize(value: &Value) -> Option<usize> {
    match value {
        Value::Integer(n) if *n >= 0 => usize::try_from(*n).ok(),
        _ => None,
    }
}

/// Hash `data` skipping the given byte ranges, per the C2PA data-hash binding.
fn hash_with_exclusions(alg: &str, data: &[u8], exclusions: &[(usize, usize)]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut hasher = Hasher::new(alg)?;
    let mut pos = 0usize;
    for &(start, length) in exclusions {
        let start = start.min(data.len());
        if pos < start {
            hasher.update(&data[pos..start]);
        }
        pos = start.saturating_add(length).min(data.len()).max(pos);
    }
    if pos < data.len() {
        hasher.update(&data[pos..]);
    }
    Some(hasher.finalize())
}

/// Compute the digest of `data` under the named algorithm.
fn hash_bytes(alg: &str, data: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut hasher = Hasher::new(alg)?;
    hasher.update(data);
    Some(hasher.finalize())
}

/// Hash the canonical Claim Signature superbox payload used by ingredient v3.
///
/// C2PA hashes the payload written by JUMBF `write_box_payload`: the `jumd`
/// description box followed by the `cbor` content box, without the outer
/// `jumb` header. Stream the encoding into the digest to avoid copying COSE.
fn hash_claim_signature_box(alg: &str, cose: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
    const LABEL: &[u8] = b"c2pa.signature";
    let mut hasher = Hasher::new(alg)?;
    update_box_header(&mut hasher, b"jumd", 16 + 1 + LABEL.len() + 1)?;
    hasher.update(&crate::c2pa_core::jumbf::UUID_CLAIM_SIGNATURE);
    hasher.update(&[0x03]); // label present + requestable
    hasher.update(LABEL);
    hasher.update(&[0]);
    update_box_header(&mut hasher, b"cbor", cose.len())?;
    hasher.update(cose);
    Some(hasher.finalize())
}

fn update_box_header(hasher: &mut Hasher, box_type: &[u8; 4], payload_len: usize) -> Option<()> {
    let short_size = payload_len.checked_add(8)?;
    if u32::try_from(short_size).is_ok() {
        hasher.update(&(short_size as u32).to_be_bytes());
        hasher.update(box_type);
    } else {
        let extended_size = u64::try_from(short_size.checked_add(8)?).ok()?;
        hasher.update(&1u32.to_be_bytes());
        hasher.update(box_type);
        hasher.update(&extended_size.to_be_bytes());
    }
    Some(())
}

/// Compute one digest over a sequence of discontiguous byte slices.
fn hash_parts(alg: &str, parts: &[&[u8]]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut hasher = Hasher::new(alg)?;
    for part in parts {
        hasher.update(part);
    }
    Some(hasher.finalize())
}

/// A dynamically-dispatched SHA-2 hasher selected by algorithm name.
enum Hasher {
    Sha256(Sha256),
    Sha384(Sha384),
    Sha512(Sha512),
}

impl Hasher {
    fn new(alg: &str) -> Option<Self> {
        match alg {
            "sha256" => Some(Hasher::Sha256(Sha256::new())),
            "sha384" => Some(Hasher::Sha384(Sha384::new())),
            "sha512" => Some(Hasher::Sha512(Sha512::new())),
            _ => None,
        }
    }
    fn update(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) {
        match self {
            Hasher::Sha256(h) => h.update(bytes),
            Hasher::Sha384(h) => h.update(bytes),
            Hasher::Sha512(h) => h.update(bytes),
        }
    }
    fn finalize(self) -> Vec<u8> {
        match self {
            Hasher::Sha256(h) => h.finalize().to_vec(),
            Hasher::Sha384(h) => h.finalize().to_vec(),
            Hasher::Sha512(h) => h.finalize().to_vec(),
        }
    }
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// State + report assembly
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Codes that are non-invalidating *caveats* in the generous (regular/core-spec)
/// posture: cert-time and trust/revocation signals that do not break manifest
/// *construction* integrity. Subtracted from the integrity-failure set in the
/// generous [`compute_state`]. `signingCredential.untrusted` is included here
/// (it never invalidated, in either posture) but is surfaced via the trust axis,
/// not the report's `caveats[]` (see [`is_surfaced_caveat`]).
const REGULAR_INTEGRITY_CAVEATS: &[&str] = &[
    SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED,
    CLAIM_SIGNATURE_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY,
    SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_SKIPPED,
    SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_REVOKED,
    TIME_STAMP_UNTRUSTED,
    TIME_STAMP_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY,
    TIME_STAMP_MISSING,
    // Conformance-mode policy observations: never emitted in the generous posture,
    // and non-invalidating for the construction/integrity axis (they are spec-version
    // policy signals, not integrity failures). Including them here keeps
    // provenance_verdict.integrity a true integrity axis in conformance mode too;
    // strict validation_state is unaffected (is_integrity_invalidating's strict
    // branch does not consult this set).
    CONFORMANCE_OUT_OF_SCOPE,
    CONFORMANCE_SPEC_VERSION_NONCONFORMANT,
];

/// True for the GENEROUS posture: regular operating mode AND the core-spec
/// compliance bar. Every other profile (conformance mode, or the conformance-
/// program bar) stays strict/unchanged — this is the single mode-gating boundary.
fn is_generous(profile: EngineProfile) -> bool {
    profile.mode == OperatingMode::Regular && profile.compliance == ComplianceLevel::CoreSpec
}

/// Identity-assertion-scoped failure test: `cawg.*` codes report the outcome of
/// validating a CAWG identity (or ICA credential) assertion, a consumer role the
/// CAWG Identity 1.2 specification layers ON TOP of the C2PA Manifest Consumer
/// (§3.1.7/§3.1.9; §9.4.6 gates identity interpretation on manifest validity,
/// never the reverse). They therefore NEVER break C2PA manifest integrity in
/// either posture: a tampered identity assertion still sinks the manifest via
/// the C2PA-level `assertion.hashedURI.mismatch`, while an unverifiable or
/// untrusted identity credential leaves the manifest verdict intact and is
/// reported on the assertion itself. Matches the reference implementation,
/// which tracks CAWG outcomes in a separate status section.
fn is_identity_assertion_scoped(code: &str) -> bool {
    code.starts_with("cawg.")
}

/// Construction-integrity failure test (posture-independent): a failure code
/// breaks construction integrity unless it is one of the surfaced, non-
/// invalidating caveats ([`REGULAR_INTEGRITY_CAVEATS`]) or an identity-
/// assertion-scoped `cawg.*` code. Single source of truth behind the generous
/// `validation_state`, the `provenance_verdict.integrity` axis, and the
/// `validated_under` clearing, so those cannot drift apart.
fn is_construction_integrity_invalidating(code: &str) -> bool {
    !REGULAR_INTEGRITY_CAVEATS.contains(&code) && !is_identity_assertion_scoped(code)
}

/// True when failure `code` invalidates manifest *integrity* under `profile`.
/// Unknown/new failure codes default to invalidating in both postures.
fn is_integrity_invalidating(code: &str, profile: EngineProfile) -> bool {
    if is_generous(profile) {
        is_construction_integrity_invalidating(code)
    } else {
        // Strict: every failure invalidates except the always-non-invalidating
        // untrusted-signer signal (byte-for-byte the prior rule) and the
        // identity-assertion-scoped CAWG codes.
        code != SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED && !is_identity_assertion_scoped(code)
    }
}

/// The surfaced caveat set for `provenance_verdict.caveats[]`: the generous
/// caveat codes EXCEPT `signingCredential.untrusted`, which the trust axis
/// carries instead of duplicating here.
fn is_surfaced_caveat(code: &str) -> bool {
    code != SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED && REGULAR_INTEGRITY_CAVEATS.contains(&code)
}

/// Compute the legacy [`ValidationState`] from the accumulated results under the
/// active `profile`.
///
/// Strict posture: `signingCredential.untrusted` is the only failure that does
/// not invalidate (it merely prevents `Trusted`). Generous posture: the full
/// caveat set ([`REGULAR_INTEGRITY_CAVEATS`]) is non-invalidating, so an
/// expired/untrusted-but-structurally-intact manifest is `Valid`, not `Invalid`.
fn compute_state(results: &ValidationResults, profile: EngineProfile) -> ValidationState {
    let integrity_failure = results
        .failure
        .iter()
        .any(|s| is_integrity_invalidating(&s.code, profile));
    if integrity_failure {
        ValidationState::Invalid
    } else if results.has_success(SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_TRUSTED) {
        ValidationState::Trusted
    } else {
        ValidationState::Valid
    }
}

/// Build the additive two-axis `provenance_verdict` object, reported in BOTH
/// postures (the legacy `validation_state` retains the posture-specific verdict).
/// `present` is a fact about the asset — does it carry a manifest at all —
/// independent of posture.
///
/// Precedence (per the verdict spec):
/// - integrity-Invalid beats everything; integrity is construction-only and is
///   never gated on cert-time or trust. Absent provenance is integrity `invalid`.
/// - `trust=trusted` only when integrity is valid AND a trusted credential was
///   established AND it was not revoked. `ocsp.revoked` forces `untrusted`.
/// - `trust=unknown` only when there is no provenance; otherwise a present
///   credential that is not positively trusted is `untrusted` (default-deny).
fn provenance_verdict_json(results: &ValidationResults, present: bool) -> Json {
    let integrity_invalid = !present
        || results
            .failure
            .iter()
            .any(|s| is_construction_integrity_invalidating(&s.code));
    let credential_trusted = results.has_success(SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_TRUSTED)
        && !results.has_failure(SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_REVOKED);
    let trust = if !present {
        "unknown"
    } else if !integrity_invalid && credential_trusted {
        "trusted"
    } else {
        "untrusted"
    };
    let mut caveats: Vec<&str> = Vec::new();
    for bucket in [&results.failure, &results.informational] {
        for s in bucket {
            if is_surfaced_caveat(&s.code) && !caveats.contains(&s.code.as_str()) {
                caveats.push(s.code.as_str());
            }
        }
    }
    json!({
        "present": present,
        "integrity": if integrity_invalid { "invalid" } else { "valid" },
        "trust": trust,
        "caveats": caveats,
    })
}

/// Apply the conformance-program SHOULD→SHALL upgrades.
///
/// The C2PA core technical specification makes certain checks recommendations
/// (SHOULDs); the conformance program turns them into requirements (SHALLs).
/// Under [`ComplianceLevel::ConformanceProgram`] this reclassifies those checks
/// from informational/absent to hard failures. Under
/// [`ComplianceLevel::CoreSpec`] it is a no-op, so core-spec validation is
/// strictly more permissive — the two levels are directly comparable on the same
/// manifest.
///
/// Currently upgraded (the program SHALLs our verifier observes):
/// - **Revocation information**: a skipped OCSP check
///   (`signingCredential.ocsp.skipped`, informational under core) becomes a
///   failure — the program requires usable revocation information.
/// - **Trusted timestamp**: absence of `timeStamp.trusted` adds a
///   `timeStamp.missing` failure — the program requires a trusted timestamp.
///
/// Only applied once the manifest is otherwise well-formed (the caller invokes
/// this on the full-evaluation path, not on early structural-failure exits).
fn apply_compliance_upgrades(
    results: &mut ValidationResults,
    compliance: ComplianceLevel,
    sig_url: &str,
) {
    if compliance != ComplianceLevel::ConformanceProgram {
        return;
    }
    // OCSP skipped (informational) -> failure under the program.
    if results.has_informational(SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_SKIPPED) {
        results.push_failure(
            SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_SKIPPED,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            "conformance program requires usable revocation information (SHALL)".into(),
        );
    }
    // No trusted timestamp -> failure under the program.
    if !results.has_success(TIME_STAMP_TRUSTED) {
        results.push_failure(
            TIME_STAMP_MISSING,
            sig_url.to_string(),
            "conformance program requires a trusted timestamp (SHALL)".into(),
        );
    }
}

/// Assemble the final [`VerifyOutput`] including the reader-report JSON.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] // internal report assembler; a params struct adds noise
fn finish(
    label: String,
    manifest: &ParsedManifest,
    claim: Option<&Value>,
    declared_assertions: Option<&std::collections::HashSet<&str>>,
    chain: &[Vec<u8>],
    cose: Option<&[u8]>,
    results: ValidationResults,
    verdict: Option<VersionVerdict>,
    profile: EngineProfile,
    report_decode_nodes: &mut usize,
) -> VerifyOutput {
    let state = compute_state(&results, profile);
    // Clear `validated_under` only when manifest *integrity* is broken (a
    // cryptographically broken manifest verified under no spec revision; the
    // structural ladder is kept for diagnostics). Policy-bar failures —
    // untrusted signer, conformance-program SHALL upgrades, target-version
    // nonconformance — do not change what revision the manifest validated
    // under, so they leave the verdict intact.
    let integrity_broken = if is_generous(profile) {
        // Generous: construction integrity uses the same predicate as the
        // two-axis verdict. Cert-time, trust, OCSP, timestamp, and
        // conformance-policy caveats are NOT construction-integrity failures,
        // so they must not clear `validated_under`.
        results
            .failure
            .iter()
            .any(|s| is_construction_integrity_invalidating(&s.code))
    } else {
        // Strict / conformance: byte-for-byte the prior POLICY_CODES rule.
        const POLICY_CODES: [&str; 4] = [
            SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED,
            SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_SKIPPED,
            TIME_STAMP_MISSING,
            CONFORMANCE_SPEC_VERSION_NONCONFORMANT,
        ];
        results
            .failure
            .iter()
            .any(|s| !POLICY_CODES.contains(&s.code.as_str()))
    };
    let mut verdict = verdict;
    if integrity_broken {
        if let Some(v) = verdict.as_mut() {
            v.validated_under = None;
        }
    }
    let mut report_json = build_report(
        &label,
        manifest,
        claim,
        declared_assertions,
        chain,
        cose,
        &results,
        state,
        report_decode_nodes,
    );
    if let Some(obj) = report_json.as_object_mut() {
        // A manifest reached `finish`, so provenance is present.
        obj.insert(
            "provenance_verdict".to_string(),
            provenance_verdict_json(&results, true),
        );
    }
    if let Some(v) = &verdict {
        if let Some(obj) = report_json.as_object_mut() {
            obj.insert("version_verdict".to_string(), v.to_json());
        }
    }
    VerifyOutput {
        validation_state: state,
        results,
        report_json,
        crjson: None,
        version_verdict: verdict,
    }
}

/// Build the graceful no-manifest output.
///
/// `present` is whether the asset carries *any* C2PA structure: `false` for an
/// asset with no manifest extracted at all, `true` for a manifest store that
/// parsed but contained no manifests. In the generous posture an asset with no
/// provenance (`present == false`) is [`ValidationState::None`] with an empty
/// status set; every other case (and every strict-posture case) stays
/// `Invalid` + `claim.missing`.
fn no_manifest_output(explanation: &str, profile: EngineProfile, present: bool) -> VerifyOutput {
    let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
    let state = if is_generous(profile) && !present {
        ValidationState::None
    } else {
        results.push_failure(CLAIM_MISSING, String::new(), explanation.into());
        ValidationState::Invalid
    };
    let report_json = json!({
        "active_manifest": Json::Null,
        "manifests": Json::Object(Map::new()),
        "validation_status": status_array(&results.failure),
        "validation_results": validation_results_json(&results),
        "validation_state": state.as_str(),
        "provenance_verdict": provenance_verdict_json(&results, present),
    });
    VerifyOutput {
        validation_state: state,
        results,
        report_json,
        crjson: None,
        version_verdict: None,
    }
}

/// Serialize a slice of status codes for the reader report.
fn status_array(codes: &[StatusCode]) -> Json {
    Json::Array(
        codes
            .iter()
            .map(|status| {
                let mut value = json!({
                    "code": status.code,
                    "explanation": status.explanation,
                    "url": status.url,
                });
                if let (Some(object), Some(details)) =
                    (value.as_object_mut(), status.details.as_ref())
                {
                    object.insert("details".into(), details.clone());
                }
                value
            })
            .collect(),
    )
}

/// Build the `validation_results.activeManifest` object.
fn validation_results_json(results: &ValidationResults) -> Json {
    json!({
        "activeManifest": {
            "success": status_array(&results.success),
            "informational": status_array(&results.informational),
            "failure": status_array(&results.failure),
        }
    })
}

/// Build one reader-report manifest entry (the per-label value in the
/// `manifests` map) from a parsed manifest and its decoded claim.
fn manifest_entry_json(
    manifest: &ParsedManifest,
    claim: Option<&Value>,
    claim_decode_budget_exhausted: bool,
    declared_assertions: Option<&std::collections::HashSet<&str>>,
    chain: &[Vec<u8>],
    cose: Option<&[u8]>,
    report_decode_nodes: &mut usize,
) -> Json {
    let mut assertions = Vec::with_capacity(manifest.assertions.len());
    for (alabel, cbor) in &manifest.assertions {
        if declared_assertions.is_some_and(|labels| !labels.contains(alabel.as_str())) {
            continue;
        }
        let data = match decode((*cbor, &mut *report_decode_nodes)) {
            Ok(value) => report::cbor_to_json(&value),
            Err(DecodeError::NodeLimitExceeded(_)) => {
                json!({ "_encypher_omitted": "decoded assertion report node budget exceeded" })
            }
            Err(_) => json!({}),
        };
        assertions.push(json!({ "label": alabel, "data": data }));
    }

    let claim_generator_info = if claim_decode_budget_exhausted {
        Json::Array(vec![
            json!({ "_encypher_omitted": "decoded claim report node budget exceeded" }),
        ])
    } else {
        claim
            .and_then(|c| c.get("claim_generator_info"))
            .map(report::cbor_to_json)
            .unwrap_or_else(|| Json::Array(Vec::new()))
    };
    let title = claim
        .and_then(|c| c.get("dc:title"))
        .and_then(Value::as_text)
        .unwrap_or("")
        .to_string();
    let instance_id = claim
        .and_then(|c| c.get("instanceID"))
        .and_then(Value::as_text)
        .unwrap_or("")
        .to_string();

    let mut sig_info = Map::new();
    if let (Some(leaf), Some(cose)) = (chain.first(), cose) {
        let info = cert::signature_info(leaf, cose);
        if let Some(alg) = info.alg {
            sig_info.insert("alg".into(), Json::String(alg));
        }
        if let Some(cn) = info.common_name {
            sig_info.insert("common_name".into(), Json::String(cn));
        }
        if let Some(issuer) = info.issuer {
            sig_info.insert("issuer".into(), Json::String(issuer));
        }
        if let Some(serial) = info.cert_serial_number {
            sig_info.insert("cert_serial_number".into(), Json::String(serial));
        }
    }

    json!({
        "claim_generator_info": claim_generator_info,
        "title": title,
        "instance_id": instance_id,
        "assertions": assertions,
        "signature_info": Json::Object(sig_info),
        "claim_version": 2,
    })
}

/// Append every non-active manifest in the store (ingredient parents) to the
/// report's `manifests` map, mirroring the c2pa-python Reader shape: the full
/// store is listed keyed by label with `active_manifest` as the pointer.
/// Parent manifests are decoded structurally only — `validation_results`,
/// `validation_status`, and `validation_state` remain scoped to the active
/// manifest, exactly like the Reader (parent validation is recorded by the
/// signer in the ingredient assertion's `validationResults`, not recomputed).
fn append_store_manifests(
    report: &mut Json,
    store: &ParsedStore<'_>,
    active_label: &str,
    report_decode_nodes: &mut usize,
) {
    let Some(manifests) = report
        .as_object_mut()
        .and_then(|o| o.get_mut("manifests"))
        .and_then(Json::as_object_mut)
    else {
        return;
    };
    for manifest in &store.manifests {
        if manifest.label == active_label || manifests.contains_key(&manifest.label) {
            continue;
        }
        let (claim, claim_decode_budget_exhausted) = match manifest.claim_cbor {
            Some(cbor) => match decode((cbor, &mut *report_decode_nodes)) {
                Ok(value) => (Some(value), false),
                Err(DecodeError::NodeLimitExceeded(_)) => (None, true),
                Err(_) => (None, false),
            },
            None => (None, false),
        };
        let chain = manifest
            .signature_cose
            .and_then(|cose| extract_x5chain(cose).ok())
            .unwrap_or_default();
        manifests.insert(
            manifest.label.clone(),
            manifest_entry_json(
                manifest,
                claim.as_ref(),
                claim_decode_budget_exhausted,
                None,
                &chain,
                manifest.signature_cose,
                report_decode_nodes,
            ),
        );
    }
}

/// Build the full reader-report JSON for an active manifest.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] // internal report assembler; a params struct adds noise
fn build_report(
    label: &str,
    manifest: &ParsedManifest,
    claim: Option<&Value>,
    declared_assertions: Option<&std::collections::HashSet<&str>>,
    chain: &[Vec<u8>],
    cose: Option<&[u8]>,
    results: &ValidationResults,
    state: ValidationState,
    report_decode_nodes: &mut usize,
) -> Json {
    let mut manifests = Map::new();
    manifests.insert(
        label.to_string(),
        manifest_entry_json(
            manifest,
            claim,
            false,
            declared_assertions,
            chain,
            cose,
            report_decode_nodes,
        ),
    );

    json!({
        "active_manifest": label,
        "manifests": Json::Object(manifests),
        "validation_status": status_array(&results.failure),
        "validation_results": validation_results_json(results),
        "validation_state": state.as_str(),
    })
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    //! Unit tests for ingredient provenance bindings, multipart
    //! (`c2pa.hash.multi-asset`) coverage, and tampered-assertion suppression
    //! of `dataHash.match`. Synthetic CBOR assertions isolate each rule from
    //! the on-disk interoperability corpus.
    use super::*;
    use crate::c2pa_cbor::{encode, Profile};
    use crate::c2pa_core::jumbf::{build_manifest, build_manifest_store};
    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

    fn vmap(pairs: Vec<(&str, Value)>) -> Value {
        Value::Map(
            pairs
                .into_iter()
                .map(|(k, v)| (Value::Text(k.into()), v))
                .collect(),
        )
    }

    fn enc(v: &Value) -> Vec<u8> {
        encode(v, Profile::LegacyPipelineBDefinite).expect("encode")
    }

    fn cose_with_unprotected_x5chain() -> Vec<u8> {
        let protected = enc(&Value::Map(Vec::new()));
        let unprotected = Value::Map(vec![(
            Value::Text("x5chain".into()),
            Value::Bytes(vec![0x30, 0x01, 0x00]),
        )]);
        encode(
            &Value::Tag(
                18,
                Box::new(Value::Array(vec![
                    Value::Bytes(protected),
                    unprotected,
                    Value::Null,
                    Value::Bytes(vec![0x01]),
                ])),
            ),
            Profile::LegacyPipelineBDefinite,
        )
        .expect("encode cose")
    }

    fn sha(data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        Sha256::digest(data).to_vec()
    }

    fn extended_jumbf_box(ordinary: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        assert_eq!(&ordinary[4..8], b"jumb");
        let declared = u32::from_be_bytes(ordinary[..4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
        assert_eq!(declared, ordinary.len());
        let extended_size = u64::try_from(ordinary.len().checked_add(8).unwrap()).unwrap();
        let mut extended = Vec::with_capacity(ordinary.len() + 8);
        extended.extend_from_slice(&1u32.to_be_bytes());
        extended.extend_from_slice(b"jumb");
        extended.extend_from_slice(&extended_size.to_be_bytes());
        extended.extend_from_slice(&ordinary[8..]);
        extended
    }

    #[test]
    fn manifest_hashes_hash_extended_superbox_payload() {
        let label = "urn:c2pa:extended-child";
        let ordinary = build_manifest(label, &[], &[0xa0], &[0xd2, 0x84]);
        let expected = Sha256::digest(&ordinary[8..]).to_vec();
        let store = build_manifest_store(&[extended_jumbf_box(&ordinary)]);
        let parsed = parse_manifest_store(&store).unwrap();

        let hashes = manifest_hashes(&store, &parsed.manifests).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(
            hashes.get(label).map(Vec::as_slice),
            Some(expected.as_slice())
        );
    }

    fn ingredient_reference(url: String, hash: Vec<u8>) -> Value {
        vmap(vec![
            ("url", Value::Text(url)),
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(hash)),
        ])
    }

    fn run_ingredient_bindings(
        actual_manifest: &[u8],
        expected_manifest: &[u8],
        actual_signature: &[u8],
        expected_signature: &[u8],
        redacted: bool,
    ) -> ValidationResults {
        let child_label = "urn:c2pa:child";
        let ingredient = vmap(vec![
            (
                "activeManifest",
                ingredient_reference(
                    format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{child_label}"),
                    sha(expected_manifest),
                ),
            ),
            (
                "claimSignature",
                ingredient_reference(
                    format!("self#jumbf=/c2pa/{child_label}/c2pa.signature"),
                    hash_claim_signature_box("sha256", expected_signature).expect("hash"),
                ),
            ),
        ]);
        let ingredient_cbor = enc(&ingredient);
        let parent = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:parent".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![("c2pa.ingredient.v3".into(), ingredient_cbor.as_slice())],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let child = ParsedManifest {
            label: child_label.into(),
            manifest_jumbf: actual_manifest,
            assertions: Vec::new(),
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: Some(actual_signature),
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let mut claim_fields = vec![(
            "created_assertions",
            Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![(
                "url",
                Value::Text("self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.ingredient.v3".into()),
            )])]),
        )];
        if redacted {
            claim_fields.push((
                "redacted_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![Value::Text(format!(
                    "self#jumbf=/c2pa/{child_label}/c2pa.assertions/c2pa.actions"
                ))]),
            ));
        }
        let claim = vmap(claim_fields);
        let manifests = [child];
        let mut manifest_hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        manifest_hashes.insert(child_label.to_string(), sha(actual_manifest));
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&parent, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let mut digest_cache = IngredientManifestDigestCache::new(StoreContext {
            manifests: &manifests,
            manifest_hashes: &manifest_hashes,
        });
        verify_ingredient_references(
            &claim_refs,
            &claim,
            &mut digest_cache,
            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/urn:c2pa:parent/c2pa.signature",
            &mut results,
        );
        results
    }

    #[test]
    fn main_claim_accepts_unprotected_x5chain_as_credential_source() {
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![(
                    "url",
                    Value::Text("self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.data".into()),
                )])]),
            ),
            ("signature", Value::Text("self#jumbf=c2pa.signature".into())),
        ]);
        let claim_cbor = enc(&claim);
        let cose = cose_with_unprotected_x5chain();
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:uuid:123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: Vec::new(),
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: Some(&claim_cbor),
            signature_cose: Some(&cose),
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let manifest_hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        let input = VerifyInput {
            data: &[],
            mime: "application/c2pa",
            claim_signer_trust: None,
            tsa_trust: None,
            allowed_certs: None,
            validation_time: None,
            profile: EngineProfile::GENEROUS,
        };

        let mut report_decode_nodes = MAX_REPORT_DECODED_VALUE_NODES;
        let out = verify_manifest(
            &manifest,
            StoreContext {
                manifests: std::slice::from_ref(&manifest),
                manifest_hashes: &manifest_hashes,
            },
            &input,
            AssetFormat::C2paStore,
            &[],
            None,
            CawgTrustInputs::default(),
            &mut report_decode_nodes,
        );

        // The synthetic DER is not a real certificate, so credential validation
        // still fails. It must fail after extraction, not because the compatible
        // unprotected bucket was rejected.
        assert!(out.results.has_failure(SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_INVALID));
        assert!(!out
            .results
            .failure
            .iter()
            .any(|status| status.explanation.contains("no x5chain")));
        assert!(!out.results.has_success(CLAIM_SIGNATURE_VALIDATED));
        assert_eq!(out.validation_state, ValidationState::Invalid);
    }

    #[test]
    fn matching_ingredient_manifest_short_circuits_signature_fallback() {
        let results = run_ingredient_bindings(
            b"child manifest",
            b"child manifest",
            b"swapped signature",
            b"expected signature",
            false,
        );
        assert!(results.has_success(INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_VALIDATED));
        assert!(!results.has_success(INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_VALIDATED));
        assert!(results.failure.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn swapped_ingredient_manifest_is_rejected_without_redaction() {
        let results = run_ingredient_bindings(
            b"swapped manifest",
            b"expected manifest",
            b"child signature",
            b"child signature",
            false,
        );
        assert!(results.has_failure(INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!results.has_success(INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_VALIDATED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn redacted_ingredient_uses_signature_fallback() {
        let results = run_ingredient_bindings(
            b"redacted manifest",
            b"original manifest",
            b"child signature",
            b"child signature",
            true,
        );
        assert!(results.has_success(INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_VALIDATED));
        assert!(!results.has_failure(INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_MISMATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn swapped_redacted_ingredient_signature_is_rejected() {
        let results = run_ingredient_bindings(
            b"redacted manifest",
            b"original manifest",
            b"swapped signature",
            b"expected signature",
            true,
        );
        assert!(results.has_failure(INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!results.has_success(INGREDIENT_CLAIM_SIGNATURE_VALIDATED));
    }

    /// CAWG identity/ICA failure codes are assertion-scoped per the CAWG 1.2
    /// consumer layering: they never break C2PA manifest integrity in either
    /// posture, while unknown and C2PA failure codes keep invalidating.
    #[test]
    fn cawg_failure_codes_are_assertion_scoped_not_integrity_invalidating() {
        for code in [
            "cawg.ica.did_unavailable",
            "cawg.ica.signature_mismatch",
            "cawg.identity.cbor.invalid",
        ] {
            assert!(!is_construction_integrity_invalidating(code), "{code}");
            assert!(
                !is_integrity_invalidating(code, EngineProfile::CONFORMANCE_V2_2),
                "{code} (strict)"
            );
        }
        assert!(is_construction_integrity_invalidating(
            ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH
        ));
        assert!(is_construction_integrity_invalidating("some.future.code"));

        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        results.push_failure(
            "cawg.ica.did_unavailable",
            String::new(),
            "unresolvable".into(),
        );
        assert_eq!(
            compute_state(&results, EngineProfile::CONFORMANCE_V2_2),
            ValidationState::Valid
        );
    }

    fn canonical_test_part_label(label: &str) -> String {
        match label {
            "p0" => "c2pa.hash.data.part".into(),
            "p1" => "c2pa.hash.data.part__1".into(),
            "p2" => "c2pa.hash.data.part__2".into(),
            "absent" => "c2pa.hash.data.part__99".into(),
            label => label.into(),
        }
    }

    /// Build a `c2pa.hash.multi-asset` value from `(byteOffset, length, part
    /// label, optional)` tuples.
    fn multi_asset(parts: &[(usize, usize, &str, bool)]) -> Value {
        let arr = parts
            .iter()
            .map(|&(off, len, plabel, optional)| {
                let plabel = canonical_test_part_label(plabel);
                vmap(vec![
                    (
                        "location",
                        vmap(vec![
                            ("byteOffset", Value::Integer(off as i128)),
                            ("length", Value::Integer(len as i128)),
                        ]),
                    ),
                    ("hashAssertion", hashed_uri_for_assertion(&plabel)),
                    ("optional", Value::Bool(optional)),
                ])
            })
            .collect();
        vmap(vec![("parts", Value::Array(arr))])
    }

    fn part_assertion(hash: &[u8]) -> Value {
        vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(hash.to_vec())),
        ])
    }

    /// Run [`verify_multi_asset`] over `data` with the given multi-asset value
    /// and named part-hash assertions, returning the accumulated results.
    fn run_multi(data: &[u8], ma: &Value, part_assertions: &[(&str, Value)]) -> ValidationResults {
        run_multi_for_format(data, ma, part_assertions, AssetFormat::Jpeg)
    }

    fn run_multi_for_format(
        data: &[u8],
        ma: &Value,
        part_assertions: &[(&str, Value)],
        format: AssetFormat,
    ) -> ValidationResults {
        let ma_cbor = enc(ma);
        let owned: Vec<(String, Vec<u8>)> = part_assertions
            .iter()
            .map(|(label, value)| (canonical_test_part_label(label), enc(value)))
            .collect();
        let assertions: Vec<(String, &[u8])> = owned
            .iter()
            .map(|(label, bytes)| (label.clone(), bytes.as_slice()))
            .collect();
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:test".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions,
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let claim = vmap(vec![(
            "created_assertions",
            Value::Array(
                owned
                    .iter()
                    .map(|(label, _)| hashed_uri_for_assertion(label))
                    .collect(),
            ),
        )]);
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifest, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        verify_multi_asset(
            &claim,
            &claim_refs,
            &ma_cbor,
            data,
            format,
            "urn:test",
            &mut results,
        );
        results
    }

    // A 30-byte asset partitioned into three contiguous 10-byte parts.
    fn fixture_data() -> Vec<u8> {
        (0u8..30).collect()
    }

    fn part_for(data: &[u8], off: usize, len: usize) -> Value {
        part_assertion(&sha(&data[off..off + len]))
    }

    #[test]
    fn intact_full_coverage_emits_match() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let ma = multi_asset(&[
            (0, 10, "p0", false),
            (10, 10, "p1", true),
            (20, 10, "p2", true),
        ]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p1", part_for(&data, 10, 10)),
            ("p2", part_for(&data, 20, 10)),
        ];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(r.failure.is_empty(), "unexpected failures: {:?}", r.failure);
    }
    #[test]
    fn part_exclusions_are_local_at_nonzero_asset_offset() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let ma = multi_asset(&[
            (0, 10, "p0", false),
            (10, 10, "p1", false),
            (20, 10, "p2", false),
        ]);
        let p1_digest = hash_with_exclusions("sha256", &data[10..20], &[(1, 1)]).unwrap();
        let p1 = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(p1_digest)),
            (
                "exclusions",
                Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                    ("start", Value::Integer(1)),
                    ("length", Value::Integer(1)),
                ])]),
            ),
        ]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p1", p1),
            ("p2", part_for(&data, 20, 10)),
        ];
        let results = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(results.failure.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn part_exclusion_outside_local_part_is_malformed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let ma = multi_asset(&[(0, 30, "p0", false)]);
        let p0 = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(sha(&data))),
            (
                "exclusions",
                Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                    ("start", Value::Integer(29)),
                    ("length", Value::Integer(2)),
                ])]),
            ),
        ]);
        let results = run_multi(&data, &ma, &[("p0", p0)]);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn gap_between_parts_is_malformed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        // part p1 starts at 11, leaving a 1-byte gap after p0 [0,10).
        let ma = multi_asset(&[(0, 10, "p0", false), (11, 10, "p1", false)]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p1", part_for(&data, 11, 10)),
        ];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn overlapping_parts_are_malformed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        // p1 starts at 8, overlapping p0 [0,10).
        let ma = multi_asset(&[(0, 10, "p0", false), (8, 10, "p1", false)]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p1", part_for(&data, 8, 10)),
        ];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn non_zero_start_is_malformed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let ma = multi_asset(&[(2, 10, "p0", false)]);
        let parts = [("p0", part_for(&data, 2, 10))];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn extra_trailing_data_is_malformed() {
        let mut data = fixture_data();
        data.extend_from_slice(&[0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC]); // 3 bytes beyond declared parts
        let ma = multi_asset(&[
            (0, 10, "p0", false),
            (10, 10, "p1", false),
            (20, 10, "p2", false),
        ]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p1", part_for(&data, 10, 10)),
            ("p2", part_for(&data, 20, 10)),
        ];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn required_part_absent_is_missing_part() {
        let data: Vec<u8> = (0u8..20).collect(); // covers only p0 and p1
        let ma = multi_asset(&[
            (0, 10, "p0", false),
            (10, 10, "p1", false),
            (20, 10, "p2", false),
        ]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p1", part_for(&data, 10, 10)),
            ("p2", part_assertion(&sha(&[0u8; 10]))),
        ];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISSING_PART));
        assert!(!r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn optional_part_cleanly_absent_emits_match() {
        let data: Vec<u8> = (0u8..20).collect(); // p2 [20,30) cleanly removed
        let ma = multi_asset(&[
            (0, 10, "p0", false),
            (10, 10, "p1", false),
            (20, 10, "p2", true),
        ]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p1", part_for(&data, 10, 10)),
            ("p2", part_assertion(&sha(&[0u8; 10]))),
        ];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(r.failure.is_empty(), "unexpected failures: {:?}", r.failure);
    }

    #[test]
    fn optional_part_truncated_is_mismatch_not_missing_part() {
        let data: Vec<u8> = (0u8..25).collect(); // p2 [20,30) only half present
        let ma = multi_asset(&[
            (0, 10, "p0", false),
            (10, 10, "p1", false),
            (20, 10, "p2", true),
        ]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p1", part_for(&data, 10, 10)),
            ("p2", part_assertion(&sha(&[0u8; 10]))),
        ];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISSING_PART));
        assert!(!r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn part_content_mismatch_is_mismatch() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let ma = multi_asset(&[
            (0, 10, "p0", false),
            (10, 10, "p1", false),
            (20, 10, "p2", false),
        ]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p1", part_assertion(&sha(b"wrong content"))), // bad hash
            ("p2", part_for(&data, 20, 10)),
        ];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn missing_referenced_part_assertion_is_malformed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let ma = multi_asset(&[
            (0, 10, "p0", false),
            (10, 10, "absent", false),
            (20, 10, "p2", false),
        ]);
        let parts = [
            ("p0", part_for(&data, 0, 10)),
            ("p2", part_for(&data, 20, 10)),
        ];
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &parts);
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISSING_PART));
        assert!(!r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_parts_array_is_malformed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let ma = multi_asset(&[]);
        let r = run_multi(&data, &ma, &[]);
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!r.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }
    #[test]
    fn excessive_multi_asset_part_count_is_rejected_before_resolution() {
        let part = vmap(vec![(
            "location",
            vmap(vec![
                ("byteOffset", Value::Integer(0)),
                ("length", Value::Integer(0)),
            ]),
        )]);
        let ma = vmap(vec![(
            "parts",
            Value::Array(vec![part; MAX_MULTI_ASSET_PARTS + 1]),
        )]);
        let results = run_multi(&[], &ma, &[]);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    fn single_part_multi_asset(location: Value, part_label: &str) -> Value {
        vmap(vec![(
            "parts",
            Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                ("location", location),
                ("hashAssertion", hashed_uri_for_assertion(part_label)),
                ("optional", Value::Bool(false)),
            ])]),
        )])
    }

    fn png_chunk(box_type: &[u8; 4], payload: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        let mut chunk = Vec::with_capacity(12 + payload.len());
        chunk.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
        chunk.extend_from_slice(box_type);
        chunk.extend_from_slice(payload);
        chunk.extend_from_slice(&[0; 4]);
        chunk
    }

    #[test]
    fn byte_offset_part_validates_with_data_hash_methodology() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let label = "c2pa.hash.data.part";
        let ma = single_part_multi_asset(
            vmap(vec![
                ("byteOffset", Value::Integer(0)),
                ("length", Value::Integer(data.len() as i128)),
            ]),
            label,
        );
        let results = run_multi(&data, &ma, &[(label, part_assertion(&sha(&data)))]);
        assert!(results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(results.failure.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn bmff_box_payload_validates_with_bmff_structural_methodology() {
        let inner_bmff = test_box(b"ftyp", b"isom");
        let outer_bmff = test_box(b"mpvd", &inner_bmff);
        let label = "c2pa.hash.bmff.v2.part";
        let digest =
            crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_hash_with_exclusions(&inner_bmff, "sha256", &[]).unwrap();
        let assertion = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(digest)),
            (
                "exclusions",
                Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![("xpath", Value::Text("/uuid".into()))])]),
            ),
        ]);
        let ma =
            single_part_multi_asset(vmap(vec![("bmffBox", Value::Text("/mpvd".into()))]), label);
        let results =
            run_multi_for_format(&outer_bmff, &ma, &[(label, assertion)], AssetFormat::Bmff);
        assert!(results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(results.failure.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn bmff_part_rejects_a_plain_digest_for_bmff_methodology() {
        let inner_bmff = test_box(b"ftyp", b"isom");
        let outer_bmff = test_box(b"mpvd", &inner_bmff);
        let label = "c2pa.hash.bmff.v3.part";
        let assertion = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(sha(&inner_bmff))),
            (
                "exclusions",
                Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![("xpath", Value::Text("/uuid".into()))])]),
            ),
        ]);
        let ma =
            single_part_multi_asset(vmap(vec![("bmffBox", Value::Text("/mpvd".into()))]), label);
        let results =
            run_multi_for_format(&outer_bmff, &ma, &[(label, assertion)], AssetFormat::Bmff);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn bmff_box_payload_validates_with_general_box_methodology() {
        let mut png = b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n".to_vec();
        png.extend_from_slice(&png_chunk(b"caBX", &[]));
        png.extend_from_slice(&png_chunk(b"IEND", &[]));
        let outer_bmff = test_box(b"mpvd", &png);
        let label = "c2pa.hash.boxes.part";
        let assertion = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            (
                "boxes",
                Value::Array(vec![
                    vmap(vec![
                        ("names", Value::Array(vec![Value::Text("PNGh".into())])),
                        ("hash", Value::Bytes(sha(&png[..8]))),
                    ]),
                    vmap(vec![(
                        "names",
                        Value::Array(vec![Value::Text("C2PA".into())]),
                    )]),
                    vmap(vec![
                        ("names", Value::Array(vec![Value::Text("IEND".into())])),
                        ("hash", Value::Bytes(sha(&png[20..]))),
                    ]),
                ]),
            ),
        ]);
        let ma =
            single_part_multi_asset(vmap(vec![("bmffBox", Value::Text("/mpvd".into()))]), label);
        let results =
            run_multi_for_format(&outer_bmff, &ma, &[(label, assertion)], AssetFormat::Bmff);
        assert!(results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(results.failure.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn mixed_locator_choice_is_malformed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let label = "c2pa.hash.data.part";
        let ma = single_part_multi_asset(
            vmap(vec![
                ("byteOffset", Value::Integer(0)),
                ("length", Value::Integer(data.len() as i128)),
                ("bmffBox", Value::Text("/mpvd".into())),
            ]),
            label,
        );
        let results = run_multi(&data, &ma, &[(label, part_assertion(&sha(&data)))]);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn non_part_hash_method_is_malformed_instead_of_plain_hashed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let label = "c2pa.thumbnail.claim";
        let ma = single_part_multi_asset(
            vmap(vec![
                ("byteOffset", Value::Integer(0)),
                ("length", Value::Integer(data.len() as i128)),
            ]),
            label,
        );
        let results = run_multi(&data, &ma, &[(label, part_assertion(&sha(&data)))]);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn negative_byte_offset_locator_bound_is_malformed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let label = "c2pa.hash.data.part";
        let ma = single_part_multi_asset(
            vmap(vec![
                ("byteOffset", Value::Integer(-1)),
                ("length", Value::Integer(data.len() as i128)),
            ]),
            label,
        );
        let results = run_multi(&data, &ma, &[(label, part_assertion(&sha(&data)))]);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn overflowing_byte_offset_locator_bounds_are_malformed() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let label = "c2pa.hash.data.part";
        let ma = single_part_multi_asset(
            vmap(vec![
                ("byteOffset", Value::Integer(usize::MAX as i128)),
                ("length", Value::Integer(1)),
            ]),
            label,
        );
        let results = run_multi(&data, &ma, &[(label, part_assertion(&sha(&data)))]);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn nested_part_hashed_uri_must_match_the_exact_claim_declaration() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let label = "c2pa.hash.data.part";
        let nested = vmap(vec![
            (
                "url",
                Value::Text(format!("self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/{label}")),
            ),
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(vec![1; 32])),
        ]);
        let ma = vmap(vec![(
            "parts",
            Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                (
                    "location",
                    vmap(vec![
                        ("byteOffset", Value::Integer(0)),
                        ("length", Value::Integer(data.len() as i128)),
                    ]),
                ),
                ("hashAssertion", nested),
            ])]),
        )]);
        let results = run_multi(&data, &ma, &[(label, part_assertion(&sha(&data)))]);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    /// Helper: run [`verify_data_hash`] over `data` against a whole-file
    /// `c2pa.hash.data` assertion whose hash equals `sha(data)`, with `results`
    /// optionally pre-seeded with a hashed-URI failure.
    fn run_data_hash(data: &[u8], preseed_tamper: bool) -> ValidationResults {
        let dh = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(sha(data))),
        ]);
        let owned = enc(&dh);
        let assertions: Vec<(String, &[u8])> = vec![("c2pa.hash.data".into(), owned.as_slice())];
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:test".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions,
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let claim = vmap(vec![(
            "created_assertions",
            Value::Array(vec![hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data")]),
        )]);
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifest, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        if preseed_tamper {
            results.push_failure(
                ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH,
                "self#jumbf=/c2pa/urn:test/c2pa.assertions/c2pa.actions.v2".into(),
                "tampered assertion".into(),
            );
        }
        let _operative_binding = verify_data_hash(
            &claim,
            &claim_refs,
            data,
            AssetFormat::Jpeg,
            &[],
            "urn:test",
            &mut results,
        );
        results
    }

    #[test]
    fn data_hash_matches_when_intact() {
        let data = b"the quick brown fox";
        let r = run_data_hash(data, false);
        assert!(r.has_success(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn data_hash_match_suppressed_when_assertion_tampered() {
        // The asset bytes still hash correctly, but a referenced assertion was
        // tampered (hashedURI.mismatch). dataHash.match MUST NOT be emitted.
        let data = b"the quick brown fox";
        let r = run_data_hash(data, true);
        assert!(!r.has_success(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(r.has_failure(ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH));
    }
    // ---- length-bounded C2PA A.8 wrapper measurement ----

    fn padded_text_with_wrapper(carrier: &str) -> String {
        let manifest: Vec<u8> = (0u8..64)
            .map(|i| i.wrapping_mul(7).wrapping_add(3))
            .collect();
        let embedded = crate::c2pa_formats::embed_manifest(
            AssetFormat::TextUnstructured,
            carrier.as_bytes(),
            &manifest,
        )
        .expect("embed");
        String::from_utf8(embedded).expect("utf8")
    }

    #[test]
    fn locate_text_wrapper_measures_padded_engine_wrapper_exactly() {
        let text = padded_text_with_wrapper("hello world");
        let (start, len) = locate_text_wrapper(&text).expect("wrapper found");
        assert_eq!(start, "hello world".len());
        assert_eq!(
            start + len,
            text.len(),
            "the padded wrapper spans to the end of the standalone text"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn locate_text_wrapper_never_absorbs_adjacent_foreign_run() {
        // Exercise foreign selector runs adjacent to the wrapper. Arbitrary
        // selectors and padding-look-alike selectors must remain outside the
        // length-derived wrapper bound.
        let text = padded_text_with_wrapper("hello world");
        let baseline = locate_text_wrapper(&text).expect("wrapper found");
        for run_bytes in [[0x01u8, 0x82, 0x33, 0xC4], [0x00u8, 0xFF, 0x00, 0xFF]] {
            let run: String = run_bytes
                .iter()
                .map(|&b| text_standard::byte_to_vs(b))
                .collect();
            let doc = format!("{text}{run} une suite.");
            assert_eq!(
                locate_text_wrapper(&doc).expect("wrapper still found"),
                baseline,
                "adjacent foreign run {run_bytes:02x?} must not shift the measured span"
            );
        }
        // Prefix adjacency: a foreign run immediately BEFORE the wrapper's
        // U+FEFF shifts the start but never leaks into the measured length.
        let run: String = [0x11u8, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44]
            .iter()
            .map(|&b| text_standard::byte_to_vs(b))
            .collect();
        let carrier_len = "hello world".len();
        let doc = format!("{}{}{}", &text[..carrier_len], run, &text[carrier_len..]);
        let (start, len) = locate_text_wrapper(&doc).expect("wrapper found");
        assert_eq!(start, carrier_len + run.len());
        assert_eq!(len, baseline.1, "prefix run must not change the length");
    }

    #[test]
    fn locate_text_wrapper_absent_or_truncated_is_none() {
        assert!(locate_text_wrapper("plain text, no wrapper").is_none());
        assert!(locate_text_wrapper("bom \u{feff} but no selectors").is_none());
        // Truncation: the declared manifest length is not satisfiable, so the
        // candidate is rejected (no partial wrapper measurement).
        let text = padded_text_with_wrapper("txt");
        let (start, len) = locate_text_wrapper(&text).expect("wrapper found");
        let mut cut_at = start + len / 2;
        while !text.is_char_boundary(cut_at) {
            cut_at -= 1;
        }
        assert!(locate_text_wrapper(&text[..cut_at]).is_none());
    }

    fn structural_manifest() -> ParsedManifest<'static> {
        ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: Vec::new(),
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        }
    }

    fn hashed_uri_for_assertion(label: &str) -> Value {
        vmap(vec![
            (
                "url",
                Value::Text(format!("self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/{label}")),
            ),
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])),
        ])
    }

    fn valid_hashed_uri() -> Value {
        hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data")
    }

    fn run_structure(claim: &Value) -> (bool, ValidationResults) {
        let manifests = [structural_manifest()];
        let hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifests[0], claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        let fatal = verify_claim_structure(
            &manifests[0],
            StoreContext {
                manifests: &manifests,
                manifest_hashes: &hashes,
            },
            claim,
            ClaimGeneration::V2,
            &claim_refs,
            AssetFormat::Jpeg,
            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/test/c2pa.signature",
            &mut results,
        );
        (fatal, results)
    }

    #[test]
    fn malformed_v2_generator_info_is_fatal_claim_malformed() {
        let malformed = [
            ("absent", None),
            ("wrong outer type", Some(Value::Text("generator".into()))),
            ("empty value", Some(Value::Map(Vec::new()))),
            ("empty array", Some(Value::Array(Vec::new()))),
            (
                "legacy array-of-maps shape",
                Some(Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![(
                    "name",
                    Value::Text("generator".into()),
                )])])),
            ),
            (
                "non-map array entry",
                Some(Value::Array(vec![Value::Text("generator".into())])),
            ),
            (
                "missing name",
                Some(vmap(vec![("version", Value::Text("1.0".into()))])),
            ),
            (
                "non-text name",
                Some(vmap(vec![("name", Value::Integer(1.into()))])),
            ),
            (
                "empty name",
                Some(vmap(vec![("name", Value::Text(String::new()))])),
            ),
            (
                "icon wrong type",
                Some(vmap(vec![
                    ("name", Value::Text("generator".into())),
                    ("icon", Value::Text("icon".into())),
                ])),
            ),
            (
                "icon missing url",
                Some(vmap(vec![
                    ("name", Value::Text("generator".into())),
                    ("icon", vmap(vec![("hash", Value::Bytes(vec![7; 32]))])),
                ])),
            ),
            (
                "icon missing hash",
                Some(vmap(vec![
                    ("name", Value::Text("generator".into())),
                    (
                        "icon",
                        vmap(vec![(
                            "url",
                            Value::Text("self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/icon".into()),
                        )]),
                    ),
                ])),
            ),
        ];

        for (case, info) in malformed {
            let mut fields = vec![
                ("instanceID", Value::Text("urn:uuid:test".into())),
                ("created_assertions", Value::Array(vec![valid_hashed_uri()])),
            ];
            if let Some(info) = info {
                fields.push(("claim_generator_info", info));
            }
            let (fatal, results) = run_structure(&vmap(fields));
            assert!(fatal, "{case}");
            assert!(results.has_failure(CLAIM_MALFORMED), "{case}");
            assert!(
                !results.has_success(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH),
                "{case} reached a valid integrity verdict"
            );
        }
    }

    fn run_generator_icon_binding(
        generation: ClaimGeneration,
        icon_label: &str,
        expected_icon_hash: Vec<u8>,
        stored_icon_jumbf: Option<&[u8]>,
    ) -> (bool, ValidationResults) {
        let hard_label = "c2pa.hash.data";
        let hard_jumbf = b"hard-binding assertion jumbf";
        let assertion_payload = enc(&vmap(vec![("data", Value::Bytes(vec![1]))]));
        let icon_reference = vmap(vec![
            (
                "url",
                Value::Text(format!("self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/{icon_label}")),
            ),
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(expected_icon_hash)),
        ]);
        let generator = vmap(vec![
            ("name", Value::Text("generator".into())),
            ("icon", icon_reference),
        ]);
        let hard_reference = vmap(vec![
            (
                "url",
                Value::Text(format!("self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/{hard_label}")),
            ),
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(sha(hard_jumbf))),
        ]);
        let claim = match generation {
            ClaimGeneration::V1 => vmap(vec![
                ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
                ("claim_generator", Value::Text("generator/1.0".into())),
                ("claim_generator_info", Value::Array(vec![generator])),
                ("dc:format", Value::Text("image/jpeg".into())),
                ("assertions", Value::Array(vec![hard_reference])),
            ]),
            ClaimGeneration::V2 => vmap(vec![
                ("instanceID", Value::Text("urn:uuid:test".into())),
                ("claim_generator_info", generator),
                ("created_assertions", Value::Array(vec![hard_reference])),
            ]),
        };
        let mut assertions = vec![(hard_label.into(), assertion_payload.as_slice())];
        let mut assertion_jumbf = vec![(hard_label.into(), hard_jumbf.as_slice())];
        if let Some(icon_jumbf) = stored_icon_jumbf {
            assertions.push((icon_label.into(), assertion_payload.as_slice()));
            assertion_jumbf.push((icon_label.into(), icon_jumbf));
        }
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions,
            assertion_jumbf,
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some(
                match generation {
                    ClaimGeneration::V1 => "c2pa.claim",
                    ClaimGeneration::V2 => "c2pa.claim.v2",
                }
                .into(),
            ),
        };
        let manifests = [manifest];
        let hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        let mut claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifests[0], &claim, generation);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let fatal = verify_claim_structure(
            &manifests[0],
            StoreContext {
                manifests: &manifests,
                manifest_hashes: &hashes,
            },
            &claim,
            generation,
            &claim_refs,
            AssetFormat::Jpeg,
            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/test/c2pa.signature",
            &mut results,
        );
        if !fatal {
            verify_assertion_bindings(
                &claim,
                &mut claim_refs,
                generation,
                &manifests[0].label,
                &mut results,
            );
        }
        (fatal, results)
    }

    #[test]
    fn generator_icon_references_are_indexed_and_bound_for_both_claim_generations() {
        let icon_jumbf = b"embedded c2pa.icon assertion jumbf";
        for (generation, label) in [
            (ClaimGeneration::V1, "c2pa.icon__1"),
            (ClaimGeneration::V2, "c2pa.icon"),
        ] {
            let (fatal, results) =
                run_generator_icon_binding(generation, label, sha(icon_jumbf), Some(icon_jumbf));
            assert!(!fatal, "{generation:?}");
            assert!(
                results.has_success(ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MATCH),
                "{generation:?}"
            );
            assert!(!results.has_failure(HASHED_URI_MISSING), "{generation:?}");
            assert!(
                !results.has_failure(ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH),
                "{generation:?}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn generator_icon_missing_mismatch_and_wrong_label_fail_closed() {
        let icon_jumbf = b"embedded c2pa.icon assertion jumbf";
        let (fatal, missing) =
            run_generator_icon_binding(ClaimGeneration::V2, "c2pa.icon", sha(icon_jumbf), None);
        assert!(!fatal);
        assert!(missing.has_failure(HASHED_URI_MISSING));

        let (fatal, mismatch) = run_generator_icon_binding(
            ClaimGeneration::V2,
            "c2pa.icon",
            sha(b"different icon assertion"),
            Some(icon_jumbf),
        );
        assert!(!fatal);
        assert!(mismatch.has_failure(ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MISMATCH));

        for label in ["c2pa.thumbnail.claim.jpeg", "c2pa.icon__0", "c2pa.icon__x"] {
            let (fatal, wrong_label) = run_generator_icon_binding(
                ClaimGeneration::V2,
                label,
                sha(icon_jumbf),
                Some(icon_jumbf),
            );
            assert!(fatal, "{label}");
            assert!(wrong_label.has_failure(CLAIM_MALFORMED), "{label}");
            assert!(
                !wrong_label.has_success(ASSERTION_HASHED_URI_MATCH),
                "{label}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn v1_generator_icons_share_the_claim_reference_bound() {
        let generator_info = (1..=MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES)
            .map(|instance| {
                vmap(vec![
                    ("name", Value::Text(format!("generator {instance}"))),
                    (
                        "icon",
                        hashed_uri_for_assertion(&format!("c2pa.icon__{instance}")),
                    ),
                ])
            })
            .collect();
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            (
                "assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data")]),
            ),
            ("claim_generator_info", Value::Array(generator_info)),
        ]);
        let manifest = structural_manifest();
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifest, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V1);
        assert!(!claim_refs.complete);
    }

    #[test]
    fn malformed_hashed_uri_map_is_fatal() {
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![
                    valid_hashed_uri(),
                    vmap(vec![("hash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32]))]),
                ]),
            ),
        ]);
        let (fatal, results) = run_structure(&claim);
        assert!(fatal);
        assert!(results.has_failure(CLAIM_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn assertion_reference_count_is_bounded() {
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![valid_hashed_uri(); MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES + 1]),
            ),
        ]);
        let (fatal, results) = run_structure(&claim);
        assert!(fatal);
        assert!(results.has_failure(CLAIM_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn supported_bmff_hard_binding_labels_are_exact_v2_v3() {
        assert!(is_supported_bmff_hash_label("c2pa.hash.bmff.v2"));
        assert!(is_supported_bmff_hash_label("c2pa.hash.bmff.v3"));
        assert!(!is_supported_bmff_hash_label("c2pa.hash.bmff"));
        assert!(!is_supported_bmff_hash_label("c2pa.hash.bmff.experimental"));

        for label in ["c2pa.hash.bmff", "c2pa.hash.bmff.experimental"] {
            let claim = vmap(vec![
                ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
                (
                    "created_assertions",
                    Value::Array(vec![hashed_uri_for_assertion(label)]),
                ),
            ]);
            let (_, results) = run_structure(&claim);
            assert!(results.has_failure(CLAIM_HARD_BINDINGS_MISSING), "{label}");
        }

        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.bmff.v3")]),
            ),
        ]);
        let (_, results) = run_structure(&claim);
        assert!(!results.has_failure(CLAIM_HARD_BINDINGS_MISSING));
    }

    #[test]
    fn duplicate_declaration_reference_is_fatal() {
        let assertion_payload = enc(&vmap(vec![("actions", Value::Array(Vec::new()))]));
        let assertion_jumbf = b"bounded assertion jumbf content";
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![("c2pa.actions".into(), assertion_payload.as_slice())],
            assertion_jumbf: vec![("c2pa.actions".into(), assertion_jumbf.as_slice())],
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let manifests = [manifest];
        let duplicate = hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.actions");
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![duplicate.clone(), duplicate]),
            ),
        ]);
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifests[0], &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);

        let hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let fatal = verify_claim_structure(
            &manifests[0],
            StoreContext {
                manifests: &manifests,
                manifest_hashes: &hashes,
            },
            &claim,
            ClaimGeneration::V2,
            &claim_refs,
            AssetFormat::Jpeg,
            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/test/c2pa.signature",
            &mut results,
        );
        assert!(fatal);
        assert!(results.has_failure(CLAIM_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn assertion_digest_work_is_unique_by_resolved_label_and_algorithm() {
        let assertion_jumbf = b"bounded assertion jumbf content";
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: Vec::new(),
            assertion_jumbf: vec![("com.example.payload".into(), assertion_jumbf.as_slice())],
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let duplicate = hashed_uri_for_assertion("com.example.payload");
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![duplicate.clone(), duplicate]),
            ),
        ]);
        let mut claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifest, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        assert_eq!(
            claim_refs.hash_work_bytes(ClaimGeneration::V2),
            Some(assertion_jumbf.len() * 2)
        );

        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        for _ in 0..2 {
            verify_assertion_bindings(
                &claim,
                &mut claim_refs,
                ClaimGeneration::V2,
                "urn:test",
                &mut results,
            );
        }
        let expected_digest = sha(assertion_jumbf);
        assert_eq!(
            claim_refs.jumbf_digest("com.example.payload", "sha256"),
            Some(expected_digest.as_slice())
        );
        assert_eq!(
            claim_refs
                .indexed("com.example.payload")
                .expect("indexed assertion")
                .jumbf_digests
                .iter()
                .flatten()
                .count(),
            1
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn multiple_supported_hard_bindings_are_fatal() {
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![
                    hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data"),
                    hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.boxes"),
                ]),
            ),
        ]);
        let (fatal, results) = run_structure(&claim);
        assert!(fatal);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTIPLE_HARD_BINDINGS));
        assert!(!results.has_failure(CLAIM_HARD_BINDINGS_MISSING));
    }

    #[test]
    fn undeclared_assertions_are_fatal_and_excluded_from_semantics_and_report() {
        let certificate_status = enc(&vmap(vec![("ocspVals", Value::Array(Vec::new()))]));
        let actions = enc(&vmap(vec![("actions", Value::Array(Vec::new()))]));
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![
                (
                    "c2pa.certificate-status".into(),
                    certificate_status.as_slice(),
                ),
                ("c2pa.actions".into(), actions.as_slice()),
            ],
            assertion_jumbf: vec![
                (
                    "c2pa.certificate-status".into(),
                    certificate_status.as_slice(),
                ),
                ("c2pa.actions".into(), actions.as_slice()),
            ],
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let manifests = [manifest];
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            ("created_assertions", Value::Array(Vec::new())),
        ]);
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifests[0], &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);

        let hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let fatal = verify_claim_structure(
            &manifests[0],
            StoreContext {
                manifests: &manifests,
                manifest_hashes: &hashes,
            },
            &claim,
            ClaimGeneration::V2,
            &claim_refs,
            AssetFormat::Jpeg,
            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/test/c2pa.signature",
            &mut results,
        );
        assert!(fatal);
        assert_eq!(
            results
                .failure
                .iter()
                .filter(|status| status.code == ASSERTION_UNDECLARED)
                .count(),
            2
        );
        let mut report_decode_nodes = MAX_REPORT_DECODED_VALUE_NODES;
        let report = manifest_entry_json(
            &manifests[0],
            Some(&claim),
            false,
            Some(&claim_refs.declared_labels),
            &[],
            None,
            &mut report_decode_nodes,
        );
        assert!(report["assertions"].as_array().is_some_and(Vec::is_empty));
    }

    #[test]
    fn report_assertions_share_one_decode_budget() {
        let payload = enc(&Value::Array(vec![Value::Null, Value::Null]));
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:report-budget".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![
                ("com.example.first".into(), payload.as_slice()),
                ("com.example.second".into(), payload.as_slice()),
                ("com.example.third".into(), payload.as_slice()),
            ],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let mut report_decode_nodes = 4;

        let report = manifest_entry_json(
            &manifest,
            None,
            false,
            None,
            &[],
            None,
            &mut report_decode_nodes,
        );
        let assertions = report["assertions"].as_array().unwrap();

        assert_eq!(assertions[0]["data"], json!([null, null]));
        assert_eq!(
            assertions[1]["data"],
            json!({
                "_encypher_omitted": "decoded assertion report node budget exceeded"
            })
        );
        assert_eq!(assertions[2]["data"], assertions[1]["data"]);
        assert_eq!(report_decode_nodes, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn report_assertion_data_is_unchanged_within_budget() {
        let payload = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("name", Value::Text("example".into())),
            ("enabled", Value::Bool(true)),
        ]));
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:normal-report".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![("com.example.normal".into(), payload.as_slice())],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let mut report_decode_nodes = MAX_REPORT_DECODED_VALUE_NODES;

        let report = manifest_entry_json(
            &manifest,
            None,
            false,
            None,
            &[],
            None,
            &mut report_decode_nodes,
        );

        assert_eq!(
            report["assertions"],
            json!([{
                "label": "com.example.normal",
                "data": {
                    "name": "example",
                    "enabled": true,
                },
            }])
        );
    }

    fn mdat(payload: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + payload.len());
        out.extend_from_slice(&((8 + payload.len()) as u32).to_be_bytes());
        out.extend_from_slice(b"mdat");
        out.extend_from_slice(payload);
        out
    }

    fn test_box(box_type: &[u8; 4], payload: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + payload.len());
        out.extend_from_slice(&((8 + payload.len()) as u32).to_be_bytes());
        out.extend_from_slice(box_type);
        out.extend_from_slice(payload);
        out
    }

    fn run_bmff_data_hash(label: &str, hash_data: &Value, data: &[u8]) -> ValidationResults {
        let assertion_cbor = enc(hash_data);
        let assertions: Vec<(String, &[u8])> = vec![(label.into(), assertion_cbor.as_slice())];
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:test".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions,
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let claim = vmap(vec![(
            "created_assertions",
            Value::Array(vec![hashed_uri_for_assertion(label)]),
        )]);
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifest, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let _operative_binding = verify_data_hash(
            &claim,
            &claim_refs,
            data,
            AssetFormat::Bmff,
            &[],
            "urn:test",
            &mut results,
        );
        results
    }

    fn run_prehashed_label(label: &str, digest: &[u8]) -> ValidationResults {
        let assertion = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(digest.to_vec())),
        ]);
        let assertion_cbor = enc(&assertion);
        let assertions: Vec<(String, &[u8])> = vec![(label.into(), assertion_cbor.as_slice())];
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:test".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions,
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let claim = vmap(vec![(
            "created_assertions",
            Value::Array(vec![hashed_uri_for_assertion(label)]),
        )]);
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifest, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let _operative_binding =
            verify_prehashed_hard_binding(&claim, &claim_refs, digest, "urn:test", &mut results);
        results
    }

    fn bmff_noop_exclusions() -> Value {
        Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![("xpath", Value::Text("/uuid".into()))])])
    }

    #[test]
    fn data_hash_verifier_ignores_removed_or_experimental_bmff_labels() {
        let data = test_box(b"ftyp", b"isom");
        let digest = crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_hash_with_exclusions(&data, "sha256", &[]).unwrap();
        let hash_data = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(digest)),
            ("exclusions", bmff_noop_exclusions()),
        ]);

        let accepted = run_bmff_data_hash("c2pa.hash.bmff.v3", &hash_data, &data);
        assert!(accepted.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH));

        for label in ["c2pa.hash.bmff", "c2pa.hash.bmff.experimental"] {
            let ignored = run_bmff_data_hash(label, &hash_data, &data);
            assert!(!ignored.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH), "{label}");
            assert!(ignored.failure.is_empty(), "{label}: {:?}", ignored.failure);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn detached_hash_verifier_accepts_only_v2_v3_bmff_labels() {
        let digest = vec![7; 32];
        let accepted = run_prehashed_label("c2pa.hash.bmff.v2", &digest);
        assert!(accepted.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH));

        for label in ["c2pa.hash.bmff", "c2pa.hash.bmff.experimental"] {
            let ignored = run_prehashed_label(label, &digest);
            assert!(ignored.has_failure(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH), "{label}");
            assert!(!ignored.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH), "{label}");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn bmff_hash_and_merkle_must_both_match() {
        let data = test_box(b"ftyp", b"isom");
        let digest = crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_hash_with_exclusions(&data, "sha256", &[]).unwrap();
        let merkle_entry = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("count", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("hashes", Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])])),
            ("initHash", Value::Bytes(digest.clone())),
        ]);
        let bad_top_hash = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])),
            ("exclusions", bmff_noop_exclusions()),
            ("merkle", Value::Array(vec![merkle_entry.clone()])),
        ]);
        let bad = run_bmff_data_hash("c2pa.hash.bmff.v3", &bad_top_hash, &data);
        assert!(bad.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!bad.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH));

        let good_hash_and_merkle = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(digest)),
            ("exclusions", bmff_noop_exclusions()),
            ("merkle", Value::Array(vec![merkle_entry])),
        ]);
        let good = run_bmff_data_hash("c2pa.hash.bmff.v3", &good_hash_and_merkle, &data);
        assert!(good.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(!good.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH));
    }
    fn auxiliary_merkle_box(
        unique_id: i128,
        local_id: i128,
        location: usize,
        proof: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
    ) -> Vec<u8> {
        let map = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(unique_id)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(local_id)),
            ("location", Value::Integer(location as i128)),
            (
                "hashes",
                Value::Array(proof.into_iter().map(Value::Bytes).collect()),
            ),
        ]);
        let mut payload = Vec::new();
        payload.extend_from_slice(&crate::c2pa_formats::C2PA_BMFF_UUID);
        payload.extend_from_slice(&[0; 4]);
        payload.extend_from_slice(b"merkle\0");
        payload.extend_from_slice(&enc(&map));
        test_box(b"uuid", &payload)
    }

    fn verify_test_bmff_monolithic_entry(
        entry: &Value,
        assertion_alg: &str,
        data: &[u8],
        proof_index: Option<&BmffMerkleProofIndex>,
        url: &str,
        results: &mut ValidationResults,
    ) -> bool {
        let plans = match preflight_bmff_monolithic_entries(
            std::slice::from_ref(entry),
            assertion_alg,
            data,
        ) {
            Ok(plans) => plans,
            Err(why) => {
                results.push_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED, url.to_string(), why);
                return false;
            }
        };
        verify_bmff_monolithic_entry(&plans[0], proof_index, url, results)
    }

    #[test]
    fn fixed_merkle_chunks_validate_without_descriptor_collection() {
        let data = mdat(b"abcd");
        let hashes = b"abcd"
            .iter()
            .map(|byte| Value::Bytes(sha(&[*byte])))
            .collect();
        let entry = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(0)),
            ("count", Value::Integer(4)),
            ("fixedBlockSize", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("hashes", Value::Array(hashes)),
        ]);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        assert!(verify_test_bmff_monolithic_entry(
            &entry,
            "sha256",
            &data,
            None,
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
            &mut results,
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn variable_merkle_chunk_sizes_cannot_overflow() {
        let data = mdat(b"abcd");
        let entry = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(0)),
            ("count", Value::Integer(2)),
            (
                "variableBlockSizes",
                Value::Array(vec![Value::Integer(usize::MAX as i128), Value::Integer(1)]),
            ),
            (
                "hashes",
                Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32]), Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])]),
            ),
        ]);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        assert!(!verify_test_bmff_monolithic_entry(
            &entry,
            "sha256",
            &data,
            None,
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
            &mut results,
        ));
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn variable_merkle_chunks_validate_without_size_or_range_vectors() {
        let data = mdat(b"abcd");
        let entry = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(0)),
            ("count", Value::Integer(2)),
            (
                "variableBlockSizes",
                Value::Array(vec![Value::Integer(1), Value::Integer(3)]),
            ),
            (
                "hashes",
                Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(sha(b"a")), Value::Bytes(sha(b"bcd"))]),
            ),
        ]);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        assert!(verify_test_bmff_monolithic_entry(
            &entry,
            "sha256",
            &data,
            None,
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
            &mut results,
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn monolithic_merkle_leaf_count_is_bounded() {
        let data = mdat(&[]);
        let entry = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(0)),
            (
                "count",
                Value::Integer((MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_LEAVES as i128) + 1),
            ),
            (
                "variableBlockSizes",
                Value::Array(vec![Value::Integer(0); MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_LEAVES + 1]),
            ),
            ("hashes", Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])])),
        ]);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        assert!(!verify_test_bmff_monolithic_entry(
            &entry,
            "sha256",
            &data,
            None,
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
            &mut results,
        ));
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn monolithic_merkle_rejects_duplicate_mdat_targeting_across_trees() {
        let data = mdat(b"abcd");
        let entry = |unique_id| {
            vmap(vec![
                ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(unique_id)),
                ("localId", Value::Integer(0)),
                ("count", Value::Integer(1)),
                ("hashes", Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(sha(b"abcd"))])),
            ])
        };
        let entries = [entry(1), entry(2)];
        let error = match preflight_bmff_monolithic_entries(&entries, "sha256", &data) {
            Err(error) => error,
            Ok(_) => panic!("the same mdat cannot be targeted twice"),
        };
        assert!(error.contains("duplicate monolithic merkle"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn aggregate_monolithic_merkle_work_is_checked_and_bounded() {
        let mut bytes = MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_TOTAL_HASH_BYTES - 1;
        let mut chunks = MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_TOTAL_CHUNKS - 1;
        assert!(checked_bmff_merkle_work(&mut bytes, &mut chunks, 1, 1).is_ok());
        assert_eq!(bytes, MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_TOTAL_HASH_BYTES);
        assert_eq!(chunks, MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_TOTAL_CHUNKS);
        assert!(checked_bmff_merkle_work(&mut bytes, &mut chunks, 1, 0).is_err());

        let mut bytes = 0;
        let mut chunks = MAX_BMFF_MERKLE_TOTAL_CHUNKS;
        assert!(checked_bmff_merkle_work(&mut bytes, &mut chunks, 0, 1).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn flat_fragmented_init_hash_stops_before_the_first_top_level_moof() {
        let mut init = test_box(b"ftyp", b"isom");
        init.extend_from_slice(&test_box(b"moov", &test_box(b"moof", &[])));
        let mut flat = init.clone();
        flat.extend_from_slice(&test_box(b"moof", &[]));
        flat.extend_from_slice(&mdat(b"media"));
        let expected =
            crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_hash_with_exclusions(&init, "sha256", &[]).unwrap();
        let entry = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("count", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("hashes", Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])])),
            ("initHash", Value::Bytes(expected.clone())),
        ]);
        let hash_data = vmap(vec![("merkle", Value::Array(vec![entry.clone()]))]);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        verify_bmff_merkle_init(
            BmffMerkleInput {
                hash_data: &hash_data,
                assertion_alg: "sha256",
                exclusions: &[],
                data: &flat,
                fragments: &[],
                url: "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
                binding_compromised: false,
            },
            &mut results,
        );
        assert!(results.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(!results.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH));

        let standalone_hash_data = vmap(vec![("merkle", Value::Array(vec![entry]))]);
        let mut standalone_results = ValidationResults::default();
        verify_bmff_merkle_init(
            BmffMerkleInput {
                hash_data: &standalone_hash_data,
                assertion_alg: "sha256",
                exclusions: &[],
                data: &init,
                fragments: &[],
                url: "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
                binding_compromised: false,
            },
            &mut standalone_results,
        );
        assert!(standalone_results.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fragmented_merkle_rejects_wrong_init_hash_width() {
        let entry = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("count", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("hashes", Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])])),
            ("initHash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 31])),
        ]);
        let hash_data = vmap(vec![("merkle", Value::Array(vec![entry]))]);
        let data = test_box(b"ftyp", b"isom");
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        verify_bmff_merkle_init(
            BmffMerkleInput {
                hash_data: &hash_data,
                assertion_alg: "sha256",
                exclusions: &[],
                data: &data,
                fragments: &[],
                url: "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
                binding_compromised: false,
            },
            &mut results,
        );
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
    }

    fn run_fragment_merkle(entry: Value, proof: Vec<Vec<u8>>) -> ValidationResults {
        let fragment = auxiliary_merkle_box(7, 9, 0, proof);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        verify_bmff_fragments(
            &[entry],
            "sha256",
            &[],
            &[fragment.as_slice()],
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
            &mut results,
        );
        results
    }

    fn fragment_merkle_entry(count: i128, hashes: Vec<Value>) -> Value {
        vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(7)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(9)),
            ("count", Value::Integer(count)),
            ("hashes", Value::Array(hashes)),
            ("initHash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])),
        ])
    }

    #[test]
    fn fragment_merkle_rejects_non_byte_rows() {
        let non_byte = run_fragment_merkle(
            fragment_merkle_entry(1, vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32]), Value::Integer(7)]),
            Vec::new(),
        );
        assert!(non_byte.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fragment_merkle_rejects_block_size_descriptors() {
        let entry = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(7)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(9)),
            ("count", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("fixedBlockSize", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("hashes", Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])])),
            ("initHash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])),
        ]);
        let results = run_fragment_merkle(entry, Vec::new());
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fragment_merkle_rejects_missing_negative_zero_and_out_of_range_counts() {
        for count in [-1, 0, i128::MAX] {
            let invalid_count = run_fragment_merkle(
                fragment_merkle_entry(count, vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])]),
                Vec::new(),
            );
            assert!(invalid_count.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
        }
        let missing_count = run_fragment_merkle(
            vmap(vec![
                ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(7)),
                ("localId", Value::Integer(9)),
                ("hashes", Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])])),
                ("initHash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])),
            ]),
            Vec::new(),
        );
        assert!(missing_count.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fragment_merkle_rejects_wrong_row_digest_width() {
        let bad_row = run_fragment_merkle(
            fragment_merkle_entry(1, vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 31])]),
            Vec::new(),
        );
        assert!(bad_row.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fragment_merkle_rejects_wrong_proof_digest_width() {
        let bad_proof = run_fragment_merkle(
            fragment_merkle_entry(2, vec![Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])]),
            vec![vec![0; 31]],
        );
        assert!(bad_proof.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fragment_merkle_rejects_duplicate_fragment_identities() {
        let fragment = auxiliary_merkle_box(7, 9, 0, Vec::new());
        let leaf = crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_fragment_leaf_hash(&fragment, "sha256", &[]).unwrap();
        let entry = fragment_merkle_entry(1, vec![Value::Bytes(leaf)]);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        assert!(!verify_bmff_fragments(
            &[entry],
            "sha256",
            &[],
            &[fragment.as_slice(), fragment.as_slice()],
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
            &mut results,
        ));
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fragment_merkle_rejects_non_increasing_playback_locations() {
        let fragment0 = auxiliary_merkle_box(7, 9, 0, Vec::new());
        let fragment1 = auxiliary_merkle_box(7, 9, 1, Vec::new());
        let leaf0 =
            crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_fragment_leaf_hash(&fragment0, "sha256", &[]).unwrap();
        let leaf1 =
            crate::c2pa_formats::bmff_fragment_leaf_hash(&fragment1, "sha256", &[]).unwrap();
        let entry = fragment_merkle_entry(2, vec![Value::Bytes(leaf0), Value::Bytes(leaf1)]);

        let mut ordered = ValidationResults::default();
        assert!(verify_bmff_fragments(
            std::slice::from_ref(&entry),
            "sha256",
            &[],
            &[fragment0.as_slice(), fragment1.as_slice()],
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
            &mut ordered,
        ));
        assert!(ordered.failure.is_empty(), "{:?}", ordered.failure);

        let mut reordered = ValidationResults::default();
        assert!(!verify_bmff_fragments(
            &[entry],
            "sha256",
            &[],
            &[fragment1.as_slice(), fragment0.as_slice()],
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
            &mut reordered,
        ));
        assert!(reordered.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!reordered.has_success(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn monolithic_merkle_uses_indexed_auxiliary_proofs() {
        let left = sha(b"a");
        let right = sha(b"b");
        let mut pair = left.clone();
        pair.extend_from_slice(&right);
        let root = sha(&pair);
        let entry = vmap(vec![
            ("uniqueId", Value::Integer(3)),
            ("localId", Value::Integer(0)),
            ("count", Value::Integer(2)),
            ("fixedBlockSize", Value::Integer(1)),
            ("hashes", Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(root)])),
        ]);
        let mut proofs = auxiliary_merkle_box(3, 0, 0, vec![right]);
        proofs.extend_from_slice(&auxiliary_merkle_box(3, 0, 1, vec![left]));
        let index = bmff_merkle_proof_index(&proofs).unwrap();
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        assert!(verify_test_bmff_monolithic_entry(
            &entry,
            "sha256",
            &mdat(b"ab"),
            Some(&index),
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/c2pa.hash.bmff.v3",
            &mut results,
        ));
        assert!(!results.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!results.has_failure(ASSERTION_BMFF_HASH_MISMATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn auxiliary_merkle_proof_index_rejects_duplicate_keys() {
        let first = auxiliary_merkle_box(3, 0, 0, vec![vec![0; 32]]);
        let second = auxiliary_merkle_box(3, 0, 0, vec![vec![1; 32]]);
        let mut data = first;
        data.extend_from_slice(&second);
        assert_eq!(
            bmff_merkle_proof_index(&data),
            Err("duplicate auxiliary C2PA merkle proof key")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn bmff_exclusion_parser_treats_null_optionals_as_absent() {
        let hash_data = vmap(vec![(
            "exclusions",
            Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                ("xpath", Value::Text("/free".into())),
                ("length", Value::Null),
                ("version", Value::Null),
                ("flags", Value::Null),
                ("exact", Value::Null),
                ("data", Value::Null),
                ("subset", Value::Null),
            ])]),
        )]);
        let exclusions = bmff_exclusion_maps(&hash_data).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(exclusions.len(), 1);
        let exclusion = &exclusions[0];
        assert_eq!(exclusion.xpath, "/free");
        assert_eq!(exclusion.length, None);
        assert_eq!(exclusion.version, None);
        assert_eq!(exclusion.flags, None);
        assert!(exclusion.exact);
        assert!(exclusion.data.is_empty());
        assert!(exclusion.subset.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn bmff_exclusion_parser_rejects_wrong_non_null_optional_types() {
        for (field, value) in [
            ("length", Value::Bool(false)),
            ("version", Value::Text("zero".into())),
            ("flags", Value::Integer(0)),
            ("exact", Value::Integer(0)),
            ("data", Value::Text("none".into())),
            ("subset", Value::Text("none".into())),
        ] {
            let hash_data = vmap(vec![(
                "exclusions",
                Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                    ("xpath", Value::Text("/free".into())),
                    (field, value),
                ])]),
            )]);
            assert!(bmff_exclusion_maps(&hash_data).is_err(), "{field}");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn bmff_exclusion_parser_bounds_qualifier_entries_and_bytes() {
        let data_map = vmap(vec![
            ("offset", Value::Integer(0)),
            ("value", Value::Bytes(Vec::new())),
        ]);
        let too_many = vmap(vec![(
            "exclusions",
            Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                ("xpath", Value::Text("/free".into())),
                (
                    "data",
                    Value::Array(vec![data_map; MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_DATA_QUALIFIERS + 1]),
                ),
            ])]),
        )]);
        assert!(bmff_exclusion_maps(&too_many).is_err());

        let too_many_bytes = vmap(vec![(
            "exclusions",
            Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                ("xpath", Value::Text("/free".into())),
                (
                    "data",
                    Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                        ("offset", Value::Integer(0)),
                        (
                            "value",
                            Value::Bytes(vec![0; MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_DATA_BYTES + 1]),
                        ),
                    ])]),
                ),
            ])]),
        )]);
        assert!(bmff_exclusion_maps(&too_many_bytes).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn bmff_exclusion_parser_bounds_and_orders_subsets() {
        let subset_map = vmap(vec![
            ("offset", Value::Integer(0)),
            ("length", Value::Integer(1)),
        ]);
        let too_many = vmap(vec![(
            "exclusions",
            Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                ("xpath", Value::Text("/free".into())),
                (
                    "subset",
                    Value::Array(vec![subset_map; MAX_BMFF_EXCLUSION_SUBSETS + 1]),
                ),
            ])]),
        )]);
        assert!(bmff_exclusion_maps(&too_many).is_err());

        let overlapping = vmap(vec![(
            "exclusions",
            Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                ("xpath", Value::Text("/free".into())),
                (
                    "subset",
                    Value::Array(vec![
                        vmap(vec![
                            ("offset", Value::Integer(4)),
                            ("length", Value::Integer(4)),
                        ]),
                        vmap(vec![
                            ("offset", Value::Integer(7)),
                            ("length", Value::Integer(1)),
                        ]),
                    ]),
                ),
            ])]),
        )]);
        assert!(bmff_exclusion_maps(&overlapping).is_err());

        let overflowing_end = vmap(vec![(
            "exclusions",
            Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                ("xpath", Value::Text("/free".into())),
                (
                    "subset",
                    Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                        ("offset", Value::Integer(4)),
                        ("length", Value::Integer(usize::MAX as i128)),
                    ])]),
                ),
            ])]),
        )]);
        let exclusions = bmff_exclusion_maps(&overflowing_end).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(exclusions[0].subset[0].length, usize::MAX);
    }

    fn cose_with_ocsp_values(values: &[&[u8]]) -> Vec<u8> {
        let protected = enc(&Value::Map(Vec::new()));
        let unprotected = vmap(vec![(
            "rVals",
            vmap(vec![(
                "ocspVals",
                Value::Array(
                    values
                        .iter()
                        .map(|value| Value::Bytes(value.to_vec()))
                        .collect(),
                ),
            )]),
        )]);
        encode(
            &Value::Tag(
                18,
                Box::new(Value::Array(vec![
                    Value::Bytes(protected),
                    unprotected,
                    Value::Null,
                    Value::Bytes(vec![0x01]),
                ])),
            ),
            Profile::LegacyPipelineBDefinite,
        )
        .expect("encode COSE")
    }

    #[test]
    fn embedded_ocsp_visitor_preserves_rvals_and_assertion_order_without_cloning() {
        let signature = cose_with_ocsp_values(&[b"rval-1", b"rval-2"]);
        let first_assertion = enc(&vmap(vec![(
            "revocationValues",
            vmap(vec![(
                "ocspVals",
                Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(b"assertion-1".to_vec())]),
            )]),
        )]));
        let second_assertion = enc(&vmap(vec![(
            "ocspVals",
            Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(b"assertion-2".to_vec())]),
        )]));

        let mut visited = Vec::new();
        let evidence = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(
            &signature,
            &[first_assertion.as_slice(), second_assertion.as_slice()],
            |response| {
                visited.push(response.to_vec());
            },
        );
        assert!(!evidence.rejected);
        assert_eq!(evidence.responses, 4);
        assert_eq!(
            visited,
            vec![
                b"rval-1".to_vec(),
                b"rval-2".to_vec(),
                b"assertion-1".to_vec(),
                b"assertion-2".to_vec(),
            ]
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn embedded_ocsp_limits_accept_boundaries_and_reject_excess_before_evaluation() {
        let at_limit: Vec<Vec<u8>> = (0..MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_RESPONSES)
            .map(|index| vec![index as u8])
            .collect();
        let at_limit_refs: Vec<&[u8]> = at_limit.iter().map(Vec::as_slice).collect();
        let signature = cose_with_ocsp_values(&at_limit_refs);
        let mut visits = 0usize;
        let evidence = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(&signature, &[], |_| visits += 1);
        assert!(!evidence.rejected);
        assert_eq!(evidence.responses, MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_RESPONSES);
        assert_eq!(visits, MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_RESPONSES);

        let over_limit: Vec<Vec<u8>> = (0..=MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_RESPONSES)
            .map(|index| vec![index as u8])
            .collect();
        let over_limit_refs: Vec<&[u8]> = over_limit.iter().map(Vec::as_slice).collect();
        let signature = cose_with_ocsp_values(&over_limit_refs);
        let mut visits = 0usize;
        let evidence = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(&signature, &[], |_| visits += 1);
        assert!(evidence.rejected);
        assert_eq!(visits, 0);

        let at_response_limit = vec![0; MAX_OCSP_RESPONSE_BYTES];
        let signature = cose_with_ocsp_values(&[&at_response_limit]);
        let mut visits = 0usize;
        let evidence = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(&signature, &[], |_| visits += 1);
        assert!(!evidence.rejected);
        assert_eq!(evidence.total_bytes, MAX_OCSP_RESPONSE_BYTES);
        assert_eq!(visits, 1);

        assert_eq!(MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_TOTAL_BYTES % MAX_OCSP_RESPONSE_BYTES, 0);
        let total_response_count = MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_TOTAL_BYTES / MAX_OCSP_RESPONSE_BYTES;
        let responses: Vec<Vec<u8>> = (0..total_response_count)
            .map(|_| vec![0; MAX_OCSP_RESPONSE_BYTES])
            .collect();
        let response_refs: Vec<&[u8]> = responses.iter().map(Vec::as_slice).collect();
        let signature = cose_with_ocsp_values(&response_refs);
        let evidence = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(&signature, &[], |_| {});
        assert!(!evidence.rejected);
        assert_eq!(evidence.total_bytes, MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_TOTAL_BYTES);

        let oversized = vec![0; MAX_OCSP_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1];
        let signature = cose_with_ocsp_values(&[&oversized]);
        let mut visits = 0usize;
        let evidence = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(&signature, &[], |_| visits += 1);
        assert!(evidence.rejected);
        assert_eq!(visits, 0);

        let response_bytes = MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_TOTAL_BYTES / 5 + 1;
        assert!(response_bytes <= MAX_OCSP_RESPONSE_BYTES);
        let responses: Vec<Vec<u8>> = (0..5).map(|_| vec![0; response_bytes]).collect();
        let response_refs: Vec<&[u8]> = responses.iter().map(Vec::as_slice).collect();
        let signature = cose_with_ocsp_values(&response_refs);
        let evidence = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(&signature, &[], |_| {});
        assert!(evidence.rejected);

        let mut too_deep = vmap(vec![(
            "ocspVals",
            Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(b"hidden".to_vec())]),
        )]);
        for _ in 0..=MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_COLLECTION_DEPTH {
            too_deep = Value::Array(vec![too_deep]);
        }
        let assertion = enc(&too_deep);
        let evidence = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(
            &cose_with_ocsp_values(&[]),
            &[assertion.as_slice()],
            |_| {},
        );
        assert!(evidence.rejected);

        let excessive_nodes = enc(&Value::Array(
            (0..=MAX_EMBEDDED_OCSP_COLLECTION_NODES)
                .map(|_| Value::Null)
                .collect(),
        ));
        let evidence = scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(
            &cose_with_ocsp_values(&[]),
            &[excessive_nodes.as_slice()],
            |_| {},
        );
        assert!(evidence.rejected);
    }

    #[test]
    fn leaf_and_ca_revocation_emit_distinct_c2pa_status_codes() {
        let revoked = crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Revoked {
            revocation_time: OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH,
            reason: None,
        };
        let good = crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Good;
        let cases = [
            (
                vec![Some(revoked), Some(good)],
                EmbeddedOcspStatus::LeafRevoked,
                true,
                false,
                1usize,
            ),
            (
                vec![Some(good), Some(revoked)],
                EmbeddedOcspStatus::CaRevoked,
                false,
                true,
                1usize,
            ),
            (
                vec![Some(revoked), Some(revoked)],
                EmbeddedOcspStatus::LeafAndCaRevoked,
                true,
                true,
                2usize,
            ),
        ];
        for (statuses, expected_status, leaf_revoked, ca_untrusted, failure_count) in cases {
            let status = embedded_ocsp_status_from_certificate_statuses(&statuses);
            assert!(status == expected_status);
            let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
            record_embedded_ocsp_status(status, "self#jumbf=/c2pa/test", &mut results);
            assert_eq!(
                results.has_failure(SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_OCSP_REVOKED),
                leaf_revoked
            );
            assert_eq!(
                results.has_failure(SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNTRUSTED),
                ca_untrusted
            );
            assert_eq!(results.failure.len(), failure_count);
            assert!(status.blocks_trust());
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn good_before_revoked_evidence_blocks_trust() {
        let good = crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Good;
        let revoked = crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Revoked {
            revocation_time: OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH,
            reason: None,
        };
        let status = [Some(good), Some(revoked)]
            .into_iter()
            .fold(None, crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::merge);

        assert!(matches!(
            status,
            Some(crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Revoked { .. })
        ));
        assert!(
            embedded_ocsp_status_from_certificate_statuses(&[status])
                == EmbeddedOcspStatus::LeafRevoked
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn revoked_before_good_evidence_blocks_trust() {
        let good = crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Good;
        let revoked = crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Revoked {
            revocation_time: OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH,
            reason: None,
        };
        let status = [Some(revoked), Some(good)]
            .into_iter()
            .fold(None, crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::merge);

        assert!(matches!(
            status,
            Some(crate::c2pa_trust::OcspStatus::Revoked { .. })
        ));
        assert!(
            embedded_ocsp_status_from_certificate_statuses(&[status])
                == EmbeddedOcspStatus::LeafRevoked
        );
    }

    fn run_primary_multi_binding(
        data: &[u8],
        primary_expected: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> (ValidationResults, &'static str) {
        let primary = vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(primary_expected)),
        ]);
        let fallback = multi_asset(&[(0, data.len(), "c2pa.hash.data.part", false)]);
        let part = part_assertion(&sha(data));
        let encoded = [
            ("c2pa.hash.data", enc(&primary)),
            ("c2pa.hash.multi-asset", enc(&fallback)),
            ("c2pa.hash.data.part", enc(&part)),
        ];
        let assertions = encoded
            .iter()
            .map(|(label, bytes)| ((*label).to_string(), bytes.as_slice()))
            .collect();
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:test".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions,
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let claim = vmap(vec![(
            "created_assertions",
            Value::Array(vec![
                hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data"),
                hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.multi-asset"),
                hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data.part"),
            ]),
        )]);
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifest, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let operative_binding = verify_data_hash(
            &claim,
            &claim_refs,
            data,
            AssetFormat::Jpeg,
            &[],
            "urn:test",
            &mut results,
        );
        let kind = match operative_binding {
            Some(OperativeBinding::Primary(_)) => "primary",
            Some(OperativeBinding::MultiAsset(_)) => "multi-asset",
            None => "none",
        };
        (results, kind)
    }

    #[test]
    fn primary_and_multi_asset_are_one_plan_and_fallback_only_after_mismatch() {
        let data = fixture_data();
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "claim_generator_info",
                vmap(vec![("name", Value::Text("test".into()))]),
            ),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![
                    hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data"),
                    hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.multi-asset"),
                ]),
            ),
        ]);
        let (fatal, structure) = run_structure(&claim);
        assert!(!fatal);
        assert!(!structure.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTIPLE_HARD_BINDINGS));
        assert!(!structure.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));

        let (primary_match, primary_kind) = run_primary_multi_binding(&data, sha(&data));
        assert_eq!(primary_kind, "primary");
        assert!(primary_match.has_success(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(!primary_match.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));

        let (fallback_match, fallback_kind) = run_primary_multi_binding(&data, vec![0; 32]);
        assert_eq!(fallback_kind, "multi-asset");
        assert!(!fallback_match.has_failure(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!fallback_match.has_success(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(fallback_match.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn prehashed_verification_uses_primary_when_multi_asset_parts_are_unavailable() {
        let expected = sha(b"asset");
        let primary = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(expected.clone())),
        ]));
        let fallback = enc(&multi_asset(&[(0, 5, "c2pa.hash.data.part", false)]));
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:test".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![
                ("c2pa.hash.data".into(), primary.as_slice()),
                ("c2pa.hash.multi-asset".into(), fallback.as_slice()),
            ],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let claim = vmap(vec![(
            "created_assertions",
            Value::Array(vec![
                hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data"),
                hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.multi-asset"),
            ]),
        )]);
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifest, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);

        let mut matched = ValidationResults::default();
        let operative =
            verify_prehashed_hard_binding(&claim, &claim_refs, &expected, "urn:test", &mut matched);
        assert!(matches!(operative, Some(OperativeBinding::Primary(_))));
        assert!(matched.has_success(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH));
        assert!(!matched.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));

        let mut mismatched = ValidationResults::default();
        let operative = verify_prehashed_hard_binding(
            &claim,
            &claim_refs,
            &[0; 32],
            "urn:test",
            &mut mismatched,
        );
        assert!(operative.is_none());
        assert!(mismatched.has_failure(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!mismatched.has_success(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn two_multi_asset_fallbacks_are_malformed_not_multiple_primary_bindings() {
        let duplicate = hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.multi-asset");
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![
                    hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data"),
                    duplicate.clone(),
                    duplicate,
                ]),
            ),
        ]);
        let (fatal, results) = run_structure(&claim);
        assert!(fatal);
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTI_ASSET_HASH_MALFORMED));
        assert!(!results.has_failure(ASSERTION_MULTIPLE_HARD_BINDINGS));
    }

    #[test]
    fn appended_bytes_fail_whole_asset_hash_despite_region_metadata() {
        let carrier = "signed text";
        let signed = padded_text_with_wrapper(carrier);
        let mut modified = signed.as_bytes().to_vec();
        modified.extend_from_slice(b" appended");
        let primary = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(sha(signed.as_bytes()))),
        ]));
        let region = enc(&vmap(vec![(
            "length",
            Value::Integer(carrier.len() as i128),
        )]));
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:test".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![
                ("c2pa.hash.data".into(), primary.as_slice()),
                ("com.encypher.region".into(), region.as_slice()),
            ],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let claim = vmap(vec![(
            "created_assertions",
            Value::Array(vec![
                hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data"),
                hashed_uri_for_assertion("com.encypher.region"),
            ]),
        )]);
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifest, &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let operative_binding = verify_data_hash(
            &claim,
            &claim_refs,
            &modified,
            AssetFormat::TextUnstructured,
            &[],
            "urn:test",
            &mut results,
        );
        assert!(operative_binding.is_none());
        assert!(results.has_failure(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!results.has_success(ASSERTION_DATA_HASH_MATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn claim_signature_uri_rejects_cross_manifest_and_deeper_targets() {
        let current = "urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001";
        assert!(claim_signature_uri_is_local(
            "self#jumbf=c2pa.signature",
            current
        ));
        assert!(claim_signature_uri_is_local(
            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001/c2pa.signature",
            current
        ));
        assert!(!claim_signature_uri_is_local(
            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002/c2pa.signature",
            current
        ));
        assert!(!claim_signature_uri_is_local(
            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001/child/c2pa.signature",
            current
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn cross_manifest_signature_reference_reports_claim_signature_missing() {
        let current = "urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001";
        let primary = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])),
        ]));
        let claim = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data")]),
            ),
            (
                "signature",
                Value::Text(
                    "self#jumbf=/c2pa/urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002/c2pa.signature"
                        .into(),
                ),
            ),
        ]));
        let dummy_signature = [0xa0];
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: current.into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![("c2pa.hash.data".into(), primary.as_slice())],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: Some(&claim),
            signature_cose: Some(&dummy_signature),
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let manifests = [manifest];
        let hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        let input = VerifyInput {
            data: b"asset",
            mime: "image/jpeg",
            claim_signer_trust: None,
            tsa_trust: None,
            allowed_certs: None,
            validation_time: None,
            profile: EngineProfile::GENEROUS,
        };
        let mut report_decode_nodes = MAX_REPORT_DECODED_VALUE_NODES;
        let output = verify_manifest(
            &manifests[0],
            StoreContext {
                manifests: &manifests,
                manifest_hashes: &hashes,
            },
            &input,
            AssetFormat::Jpeg,
            &[],
            None,
            CawgTrustInputs::default(),
            &mut report_decode_nodes,
        );
        assert!(output.results.has_failure(CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISSING));
        assert!(!output.results.has_failure(CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH));
    }

    #[test]
    fn ingredient_manifest_digests_are_cached_once_per_child_and_algorithm() {
        let child_bytes = b"child manifest content";
        let child = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:child".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: child_bytes,
            assertions: Vec::new(),
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: None,
        };
        let manifests = [child];
        let mut sha256_hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        sha256_hashes.insert("urn:c2pa:child".to_string(), sha(child_bytes));
        let mut cache = IngredientManifestDigestCache::new(StoreContext {
            manifests: &manifests,
            manifest_hashes: &sha256_hashes,
        });
        let sha384 = Sha384::digest(child_bytes).to_vec();
        let sha512 = Sha512::digest(child_bytes).to_vec();

        for _ in 0..2 {
            assert!(cache.matches(&manifests[0], 0, &sha(child_bytes)));
            assert!(cache.matches(&manifests[0], 1, &sha384));
            assert!(cache.matches(&manifests[0], 2, &sha512));
        }
        assert_eq!(cache.digests.len(), 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn ingredient_semantic_hashing_is_deferred_until_signature_is_usable() {
        let primary = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])),
        ]));
        let ingredient = enc(&vmap(vec![(
            "activeManifest",
            ingredient_reference(
                "self#jumbf=/c2pa/urn:c2pa:missing-child".into(),
                vec![0; 32],
            ),
        )]));
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:test".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![
                    hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.hash.data"),
                    hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.ingredient.v3"),
                ]),
            ),
            ("signature", Value::Text("self#jumbf=c2pa.signature".into())),
        ]);
        let claim_cbor = enc(&claim);
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![
                ("c2pa.hash.data".into(), primary.as_slice()),
                ("c2pa.ingredient.v3".into(), ingredient.as_slice()),
            ],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: Some(&claim_cbor),
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let manifests = [manifest];
        let hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        let input = VerifyInput {
            data: b"asset",
            mime: "image/jpeg",
            claim_signer_trust: None,
            tsa_trust: None,
            allowed_certs: None,
            validation_time: None,
            profile: EngineProfile::GENEROUS,
        };
        let mut report_decode_nodes = MAX_REPORT_DECODED_VALUE_NODES;
        let output = verify_manifest(
            &manifests[0],
            StoreContext {
                manifests: &manifests,
                manifest_hashes: &hashes,
            },
            &input,
            AssetFormat::Jpeg,
            &[],
            None,
            CawgTrustInputs::default(),
            &mut report_decode_nodes,
        );
        assert!(output.results.has_failure(CLAIM_SIGNATURE_MISSING));
        assert!(!output.results.has_failure(INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_MISSING));
        assert!(!output.results.has_failure(INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_MISMATCH));
        assert!(!output.results.has_success(INGREDIENT_MANIFEST_VALIDATED));
    }

    #[test]
    fn assertion_raw_work_is_preflighted_before_payload_decoding() {
        let half_plus_one = MAX_ASSERTION_HASH_WORK_BYTES / 2 + 1;
        assert!(checked_hash_work_total([half_plus_one, half_plus_one]).is_none());
    }
    #[test]
    fn assertion_value_nodes_share_one_claim_wide_budget() {
        let mut wide_payload = vec![0x99, 0x01, 0x00]; // definite array(256)
        wide_payload.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(0xf6, 256));
        let primary_payload = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
            ("hash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])),
        ]));
        let mut labels = Vec::with_capacity(MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES);
        labels.push("c2pa.hash.data".to_string());
        labels.extend(
            (1..MAX_CLAIM_ASSERTION_REFERENCES).map(|index| format!("com.example.custom__{index}")),
        );
        let assertions = labels
            .iter()
            .map(|label| {
                let payload = if label == "c2pa.hash.data" {
                    primary_payload.as_slice()
                } else {
                    wide_payload.as_slice()
                };
                (label.clone(), payload)
            })
            .collect();
        let claim = vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:node-budget".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(
                    labels
                        .iter()
                        .map(|label| hashed_uri_for_assertion(label))
                        .collect(),
                ),
            ),
        ]);
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:node-budget".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions,
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: None,
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let manifests = [manifest];
        let claim_refs = ClaimAssertionRefs::build(&manifests[0], &claim, ClaimGeneration::V2);
        assert!(claim_refs.decode_budget_exhausted);
        assert_eq!(
            claim_refs.decoded_value_nodes,
            MAX_ASSERTION_DECODED_VALUE_NODES
        );
        assert!(
            claim_refs
                .assertions
                .values()
                .filter(|assertion| assertion.decoded.is_some())
                .count()
                < labels.len()
        );

        let hashes = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        let mut results = ValidationResults::default();
        let fatal = verify_claim_structure(
            &manifests[0],
            StoreContext {
                manifests: &manifests,
                manifest_hashes: &hashes,
            },
            &claim,
            ClaimGeneration::V2,
            &claim_refs,
            AssetFormat::Jpeg,
            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/urn:c2pa:node-budget/c2pa.signature",
            &mut results,
        );
        assert!(fatal);
        assert!(results.failure.iter().any(|status| {
            status.code == CLAIM_MALFORMED
                && status
                    .explanation
                    .contains("aggregate decoded assertion values")
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn store_wide_declared_sibling_status_survives_unrelated_malformed_reference() {
        let active_claim = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:active".into())),
            ("created_assertions", Value::Array(Vec::new())),
        ]));
        let sibling_claim = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:sibling".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![
                    hashed_uri_for_assertion("c2pa.certificate-status"),
                    vmap(vec![(
                        "url",
                        Value::Text("self#jumbf=c2pa.assertions/com.example.unrelated".into()),
                    )]),
                ]),
            ),
        ]));
        let status = enc(&vmap(vec![(
            "ocspVals",
            Value::Array(vec![Value::Bytes(b"sibling-revoked".to_vec())]),
        )]));
        let unrelated_malformed = [0xff];
        let active = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:active".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: Vec::new(),
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: Some(&active_claim),
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let sibling = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:sibling".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![
                ("c2pa.certificate-status".into(), status.as_slice()),
                (
                    "com.example.unrelated".into(),
                    unrelated_malformed.as_slice(),
                ),
            ],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: Some(&sibling_claim),
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let manifests = [active, sibling];
        let view = certificate_status_payloads(&manifests);
        assert!(!view.rejected);
        assert_eq!(view.payloads, vec![status.as_slice()]);

        let mut visited = Vec::new();
        let evidence =
            scan_embedded_ocsp_evidence(&cose_with_ocsp_values(&[]), &view.payloads, |response| {
                visited.push(response.to_vec())
            });
        assert!(!evidence.rejected);
        assert_eq!(visited, vec![b"sibling-revoked".to_vec()]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn store_wide_status_excludes_undeclared_and_cross_manifest_sources() {
        let empty_claim = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:empty".into())),
            ("created_assertions", Value::Array(Vec::new())),
        ]));
        let cross_claim = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:cross".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(vec![vmap(vec![
                    (
                        "url",
                        Value::Text(
                            "self#jumbf=/c2pa/urn:c2pa:other/c2pa.assertions/c2pa.certificate-status"
                                .into(),
                        ),
                    ),
                    ("alg", Value::Text("sha256".into())),
                    ("hash", Value::Bytes(vec![0; 32])),
                ])]),
            ),
        ]));
        let status = enc(&vmap(vec![("ocspVals", Value::Array(Vec::new()))]));
        let undeclared = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:undeclared".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![("c2pa.certificate-status".into(), status.as_slice())],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: Some(&empty_claim),
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let cross = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:cross".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions: vec![("c2pa.certificate-status".into(), status.as_slice())],
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: Some(&cross_claim),
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let manifests = [undeclared, cross];
        let view = certificate_status_payloads(&manifests);
        assert!(!view.rejected);
        assert!(view.payloads.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn store_wide_status_count_is_capped_before_payload_collection() {
        let labels: Vec<String> = (0..=MAX_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_ASSERTIONS)
            .map(|index| {
                if index == 0 {
                    "c2pa.certificate-status".into()
                } else {
                    format!("c2pa.certificate-status__{index}")
                }
            })
            .collect();
        let claim = enc(&vmap(vec![
            ("instanceID", Value::Text("xmp:iid:status-cap".into())),
            (
                "created_assertions",
                Value::Array(
                    labels
                        .iter()
                        .map(|label| hashed_uri_for_assertion(label))
                        .collect(),
                ),
            ),
        ]));
        let status = enc(&vmap(vec![("ocspVals", Value::Array(Vec::new()))]));
        let assertions = labels
            .iter()
            .map(|label| (label.clone(), status.as_slice()))
            .collect();
        let manifest = ParsedManifest {
            label: "urn:c2pa:status-cap".into(),
            manifest_jumbf: &[],
            assertions,
            assertion_jumbf: Vec::new(),
            claim_cbor: Some(&claim),
            signature_cose: None,
            claim_count: 1,
            claim_box_label: Some("c2pa.claim.v2".into()),
        };
        let view = certificate_status_payloads(std::slice::from_ref(&manifest));
        assert!(view.rejected);
        assert!(view.payloads.is_empty());
    }
}