encypher-c2pa 1.0.4

//! Unit tests for trust-list, EKU policy, chain validation, and revocation.

use super::*;
use der::Encode;
use rcgen::{
    BasicConstraints, CertificateParams, CustomExtension, DistinguishedName, DnType,
    ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose, IsCa, KeyPair, SerialNumber,
};
use time::macros::datetime;
use x509_cert::ext::pkix::ExtendedKeyUsage as X509Eku;

/// Build a self-signed certificate, returning `(der, pem)`.
fn make_cert(configure: impl FnOnce(&mut CertificateParams)) -> (Vec<u8>, String) {
    let key = KeyPair::generate().expect("keypair");
    let mut params = CertificateParams::new(vec!["test.example".to_string()]).expect("params");
    let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
    dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Encypher Test Root CA");
    params.distinguished_name = dn;
    params.not_before = datetime!(2025-01-01 0:00 UTC);
    params.not_after = datetime!(2027-01-01 0:00 UTC);
    params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
    configure(&mut params);
    let cert = params.self_signed(&key).expect("self-signed cert");
    (cert.der().as_ref().to_vec(), cert.pem())
}

fn make_named_ca(common_name: &str) -> (rcgen::Certificate, KeyPair) {
    let key = KeyPair::generate().expect("CA key");
    let mut params = CertificateParams::new(vec!["ca.example".to_string()]).expect("CA params");
    let mut name = DistinguishedName::new();
    name.push(DnType::CommonName, common_name);
    params.distinguished_name = name;
    params.not_before = datetime!(2025-01-01 0:00 UTC);
    params.not_after = datetime!(2030-01-01 0:00 UTC);
    params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
    params.key_usages = vec![
        rcgen::KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign,
        rcgen::KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
    ];
    let certificate = params.self_signed(&key).expect("self-signed CA");
    (certificate, key)
}

/// DER bytes of an EKU extension value containing a single OID.
fn eku_value(oid: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
    let oid = const_oid::ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap(oid);
    X509Eku(vec![oid]).to_der().expect("encode eku")
}

/// DER bytes of an EKU extension value containing several OIDs.
fn eku_value_multi(oids: &[&str]) -> Vec<u8> {
    X509Eku(
        oids.iter()
            .map(|oid| const_oid::ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap(oid))
            .collect(),
    )
    .to_der()
    .expect("encode eku")
}

/// Non-CA leaf with digitalSignature keyUsage carrying exactly the given EKUs.
fn leaf_with_ekus(oids: &[&str]) -> Vec<u8> {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|p| {
        p.is_ca = IsCa::ExplicitNoCa;
        p.key_usages = vec![rcgen::KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature];
        p.custom_extensions.push(CustomExtension::from_oid_content(
            &[2, 5, 29, 37],
            eku_value_multi(oids),
        ));
    });
    der
}

#[test]
fn claim_signer_profile_accepts_the_full_reference_eku_set() {
    // The reference validator's claim-signing EKU set: emailProtection,
    // both documentSigning OIDs, c2pa-kp-claimSigning, and Microsoft C2PA.
    for oid in [
        OID_C2PA_CLAIM_SIGNING,
        OID_ADOBE_DOCUMENT_SIGNING,
        OID_IETF_DOCUMENT_SIGNING,
        OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION,
        OID_MICROSOFT_C2PA,
    ] {
        assert!(
            leaf_acceptable_der(&leaf_with_ekus(&[oid])),
            "{oid} must be an acceptable claim-signer EKU"
        );
    }
    // ServerAuth alone stays rejected.
    assert!(!leaf_acceptable_der(&leaf_with_ekus(&[
        "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1"
    ])));
    // anyExtendedKeyUsage stays rejected, even combined with a permitted OID.
    assert!(!leaf_acceptable_der(&leaf_with_ekus(&[
        OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION,
        "2.5.29.37.0"
    ])));
}

#[test]
fn timestamping_and_ocsp_ekus_are_acceptable_only_when_sole() {
    // Sole timeStamping / OCSPSigning: acceptable (upstream combination rule).
    assert!(leaf_acceptable_der(&leaf_with_ekus(&[
        OID_KP_TIME_STAMPING
    ])));
    assert!(leaf_acceptable_der(&leaf_with_ekus(&[OID_KP_OCSP_SIGNING])));
    // Combined with any other EKU — even a permitted one — they are rejected.
    assert!(!leaf_acceptable_der(&leaf_with_ekus(&[
        OID_KP_TIME_STAMPING,
        OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION
    ])));
    assert!(!leaf_acceptable_der(&leaf_with_ekus(&[
        OID_KP_OCSP_SIGNING,
        OID_C2PA_CLAIM_SIGNING
    ])));
}

#[test]
fn trust_list_anchor_subjects() {
    let (_, pem) = make_cert(|_| {});
    let trust = TrustList::from_pem(&pem).expect("parse pem");
    assert_eq!(trust.anchors.len(), 1);
    assert_eq!(
        trust.anchor_subjects(),
        vec!["Encypher Test Root CA".to_string()]
    );
}

#[test]
fn from_pem_rejects_empty_input() {
    assert!(matches!(
        TrustList::from_pem("not a certificate"),
        Err(TrustError::NoCertificates) | Err(TrustError::Decode(_))
    ));
    // A zero-byte or whitespace-only bundle must be a clean error, never a
    // panic: x509-cert's load_pem_chain overflows on blockless input, and the
    // live IPTC VNPL anchor list is served as a legitimate empty file.
    assert!(matches!(
        TrustList::from_pem(""),
        Err(TrustError::NoCertificates)
    ));
    assert!(matches!(
        TrustList::from_pem("\n"),
        Err(TrustError::NoCertificates)
    ));
}

#[test]
fn self_signed_cert_chains_to_itself_as_anchor() {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|_| {});
    let trust = TrustList {
        anchors: vec![der.clone()],
    };
    // Validate within the cert's validity window.
    let at = Some(datetime!(2026-01-01 0:00 UTC));
    let result = validate_chain(&der, &[], &trust, at);
    assert!(
        result.trusted,
        "self-signed anchor should be trusted: {:?}",
        result.reason
    );
    assert!(result.reason.is_none());
}

#[test]
fn untrusted_when_anchor_not_present() {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|_| {});
    let empty = TrustList::default();
    let at = Some(datetime!(2026-01-01 0:00 UTC));
    let result = validate_chain(&der, &[], &empty, at);
    assert!(!result.trusted);
    assert!(result.reason.unwrap().contains("does not chain"));
}

#[test]
fn chain_builder_skips_same_subject_ca_with_wrong_key() {
    let (wrong_issuer, _) = make_named_ca("Shared Test CA");
    let (issuer, issuer_key) = make_named_ca("Shared Test CA");
    let leaf_key = KeyPair::generate().expect("leaf key");
    let mut params = CertificateParams::new(vec!["leaf.example".to_string()]).expect("leaf params");
    params.not_before = datetime!(2025-01-01 0:00 UTC);
    params.not_after = datetime!(2027-01-01 0:00 UTC);
    params.is_ca = IsCa::NoCa;
    params.key_usages = vec![rcgen::KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature];
    let leaf = params
        .signed_by(&leaf_key, &issuer, &issuer_key)
        .expect("issued leaf");
    let trust = TrustList {
        anchors: vec![
            wrong_issuer.der().as_ref().to_vec(),
            issuer.der().as_ref().to_vec(),
        ],
    };

    let result = validate_chain(
        leaf.der().as_ref(),
        &[],
        &trust,
        Some(datetime!(2026-01-01 0:00 UTC)),
    );
    assert!(result.trusted, "{:?}", result.reason);
}

#[test]
fn validation_time_before_not_before_is_untrusted() {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|_| {});
    let trust = TrustList {
        anchors: vec![der.clone()],
    };
    // 2020 is before the cert's notBefore (2025) -> not valid at that instant.
    let before = Some(datetime!(2020-06-01 0:00 UTC));
    let result = validate_chain(&der, &[], &trust, before);
    assert!(!result.trusted);
    assert!(result
        .reason
        .unwrap()
        .contains("outside its validity window"));
    assert_eq!(result.validated_at, datetime!(2020-06-01 0:00 UTC));
}

#[test]
fn validation_time_within_window_is_trusted() {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|_| {});
    let trust = TrustList {
        anchors: vec![der.clone()],
    };
    let within = Some(datetime!(2026-06-01 0:00 UTC));
    let result = validate_chain(&der, &[], &trust, within);
    assert!(
        result.trusted,
        "should be trusted within validity: {:?}",
        result.reason
    );
    assert_eq!(result.validated_at, datetime!(2026-06-01 0:00 UTC));
}

#[test]
fn validation_time_after_not_after_is_untrusted() {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|_| {});
    let trust = TrustList {
        anchors: vec![der.clone()],
    };
    let after = Some(datetime!(2030-01-01 0:00 UTC));
    let result = validate_chain(&der, &[], &trust, after);
    assert!(!result.trusted);
    assert!(result
        .reason
        .unwrap()
        .contains("outside its validity window"));
}

#[test]
fn eku_policy_accepts_claim_signing_oid() {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|p| {
        p.custom_extensions.push(CustomExtension::from_oid_content(
            &[2, 5, 29, 37],
            eku_value(OID_C2PA_CLAIM_SIGNING),
        ));
    });
    let policy = EkuPolicy::default();
    assert!(policy.cert_has_required_eku(&der));
}

#[test]
fn eku_policy_rejects_cert_without_allowed_oid() {
    // ServerAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) is not in the default allowed set.
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|p| {
        p.extended_key_usages = vec![ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose::ServerAuth];
    });
    let policy = EkuPolicy::default();
    assert!(!policy.cert_has_required_eku(&der));
}

#[test]
fn eku_policy_rejects_cert_without_eku_extension() {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|_| {});
    let policy = EkuPolicy::default();
    assert!(!policy.cert_has_required_eku(&der));
}

#[test]
fn revocation_denylist_matches_by_serial() {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|p| {
        p.serial_number = Some(SerialNumber::from(0x1234u64));
    });
    let denylist = RevocationDenylist::new(["1234".to_string()], std::iter::empty());
    assert!(denylist.is_revoked(&der));

    let empty = RevocationDenylist::default();
    assert!(!empty.is_revoked(&der));

    let other = RevocationDenylist::new(["dead".to_string()], std::iter::empty());
    assert!(!other.is_revoked(&der));
}

#[test]
fn revocation_denylist_matches_by_fingerprint() {
    let (der, _) = make_cert(|_| {});
    let fp = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(&der));
    let denylist = RevocationDenylist::new(std::iter::empty(), [fp.to_uppercase()]);
    // Normalization lowercases tokens, so an uppercase fingerprint still matches.
    assert!(denylist.is_revoked(&der));
}