drep/analysis/code_quality.rs
1//! The code-quality analyzer: render a payload, ask the LLM, turn the
2//! response into findings — and never report an unanalyzed file as clean.
3//!
4//! The analyzer enforces these contracts:
5//!
6//! 1. No language, no analysis. drep has no opinion on a file type it does
7//! not claim, and silently returning an empty result is the correct
8//! behavior — *not* a failure. The CLI surfaces "no language" by simply
9//! not including the file in the work set.
10//! 2. Empty hunks → empty result, no LLM call.
11//! 3. Build the payload with `payload::render`. `None` → empty result.
12//! 4. Cache first. A hit is parsed exactly as a `Complete` response would
13//! be, and the duplicate is silent — the caller's view is identical. The
14//! explicitly live pass after cache-only preflight bypasses cache, because
15//! only a fresh provider response may consume a remediation round.
16//! 5. Concurrency. A limiter slot is acquired before the LLM call and held
17//! for the duration. A cache hit must not acquire a slot: the slot
18//! represents in-flight HTTP work, and a cache read is not in-flight.
19//! 6. `Ok(Extracted::Complete)` → parse, store in the cache.
20//! 7. `Ok(Extracted::Truncated)` → parse the partial result AND mark the
21//! file failed. Never cache a truncated response — caching it makes one
22//! truncation permanent for the whole TTL, and this layer does not know
23//! about `--fail-on` (a caller deciding otherwise would make
24//! `failed_files` depend on a CLI flag, which is the wrong layering).
25//! 8. `Err(LlmError::*)` → no findings, file in `failed_files` with the
26//! specific LLM layer that failed.
27//!
28//! The five rules around out-of-range lines, missing fields, unknown
29//! severities, and `issues` itself being absent are at the boundary between
30//! "model misreported" and "we could not understand the response". The first
31//! is a *finding* we drop; the others are *file-level failures*, because a
32//! file we did not fully understand must never be reported clean.
33
34use std::path::Path;
35
36use futures::future::join_all;
37use serde_json::Value;
38
39use crate::analysis::findings::{Finding, LlmSeverity};
40use crate::analysis::payload;
41use crate::analysis::prompt::build_analysis_prompt;
42use crate::analysis::response_contract::{
43 CATEGORY, COMPILE_FAILURE, ISSUES, LINE, MESSAGE, SEVERITY, SUGGESTION,
44};
45use crate::analysis::result::{AnalysisResult, FailureReason, ProviderFailure};
46use crate::diff::hunks::Hunk;
47use crate::diff::hunks::group_by_file;
48use crate::languages;
49use crate::llm::cache::Cache;
50use crate::llm::chain::{ChainError, ProviderChain};
51use crate::llm::error::LlmError;
52use crate::llm::json_parsing::Extracted;
53
54/// The code-quality analyzer.
55///
56/// Built once per process. The `chain` and the `cache` are both passed in
57/// rather than constructed here: they are process-wide resources. The chain in
58/// particular carries the concurrency limiter for each provider *and* the
59/// record of which providers have been demoted, so a second chain would both
60/// double the in-flight requests against one endpoint and re-discover a dead
61/// provider the first one already knew about.
62///
63/// The model and temperature are **not** duplicated onto this struct. They
64/// belong to the provider that ends up answering, which is not known until the
65/// chain has run, and a second copy is exactly what lets a request go to one
66/// model while the cache key names another.
67pub struct CodeQualityAnalyzer {
68 pub(crate) chain: ProviderChain,
69 pub(crate) cache: Cache,
70 cache_only: bool,
71}
72
73#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
74enum CacheMode {
75 Prefer,
76 Only,
77 Bypass,
78}
79
80impl CodeQualityAnalyzer {
81 /// Build from a provider chain and a shared cache.
82 ///
83 /// Infallible: `ProviderChain::new` has already rejected an empty or
84 /// misconfigured chain, so there is nothing left for this to validate.
85 /// `cache` is a parameter rather than constructed here so the key stays
86 /// independent of the `Cache` root (see [`Cache::key`]) and a test can
87 /// point it at a `TempDir`.
88 pub fn new(chain: ProviderChain, cache: Cache) -> Self {
89 Self {
90 chain,
91 cache,
92 cache_only: false,
93 }
94 }
95
96 /// Select a cache-only pass. The analyzer keeps parsing cached responses
97 /// through the normal schema path; only the backend request is forbidden.
98 pub fn with_cache_only(mut self, cache_only: bool) -> Self {
99 self.cache_only = cache_only;
100 self
101 }
102
103 /// The provider chain, for a caller reporting which providers served.
104 pub fn chain(&self) -> &ProviderChain {
105 &self.chain
106 }
107
108 /// Analyze one file's hunks.
109 ///
110 /// Returns an [`AnalysisResult`] populated with whatever the file
111 /// produced: findings, a failure marker, or both. The result is never a
112 /// bare `Vec<Finding>`; the failure axis is part of the return type so
113 /// the caller cannot forget it.
114 pub async fn analyze_file(&self, hunks: &[Hunk]) -> AnalysisResult {
115 self.analyze_files_in_mode(std::iter::once(hunks), self.configured_cache_mode())
116 .await
117 }
118
119 async fn analyze_file_in_mode(&self, hunks: &[Hunk], cache_mode: CacheMode) -> AnalysisResult {
120 // Rule 1: no language, no analysis. `languages::detect` on the
121 // first hunk's file path is enough because every hunk in `by_file`
122 // shares a path (the diff module groups by file).
123 let Some(first) = hunks.first() else {
124 return AnalysisResult::default();
125 };
126 let Some(language) = languages::detect(&first.file_path) else {
127 return AnalysisResult::default();
128 };
129
130 // Rule 3: payload. `render` returns `None` only for an empty slice,
131 // which the `hunks.first()` guard above has already excluded - rule 2
132 // and rule 3 are the same check, so a second `hunks.is_empty()` here
133 // would be unreachable rather than defensive.
134 let Some(payload) = payload::render(language, hunks) else {
135 return AnalysisResult::default();
136 };
137
138 // The size ceiling is enforced on the *rendered payload*, so it holds
139 // for every input mode. Checking the file size during paths-mode input
140 // resolution - as this used to, and still does as a pre-filter - left
141 // `--staged` and `--diff` unguarded, which are the two modes a commit
142 // gate actually runs in: a newly-added 5 MB file reached the model
143 // whole. Too large is a *failure*, not a skip; a file drep declined to
144 // analyze is not clean.
145 let rendered = u64::try_from(payload.text.len()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX);
146 if rendered > payload::PAYLOAD_MAX_BYTES {
147 return AnalysisResult::failed(
148 first.file_path.clone(),
149 FailureReason::PayloadTooLarge {
150 bytes: rendered,
151 limit: payload::PAYLOAD_MAX_BYTES,
152 },
153 );
154 }
155
156 let system_prompt = build_analysis_prompt(language);
157
158 // Rules 4, 5 and the failover loop all live in the chain: the cache is
159 // consulted per provider (a hit costs no concurrency slot, because the
160 // slot represents in-flight HTTP work), and the key comes back naming
161 // whoever answered. Computing a key here would be computing it for a
162 // provider that may not be the one that serves the file.
163 let served = match cache_mode {
164 CacheMode::Only => {
165 match self
166 .chain
167 .cached_json(&system_prompt, &payload.text, &self.cache)
168 {
169 Some(served) => Ok(served),
170 None => {
171 return AnalysisResult::failed(
172 first.file_path.clone(),
173 FailureReason::CacheMiss,
174 );
175 }
176 }
177 }
178 CacheMode::Prefer => {
179 self.chain
180 .complete_json(&system_prompt, &payload.text, &self.cache)
181 .await
182 }
183 CacheMode::Bypass => {
184 self.chain
185 .complete_json_fresh(&system_prompt, &payload.text, &self.cache)
186 .await
187 }
188 };
189
190 match served {
191 // Rule 6: complete → parse, store in the cache.
192 // Rules 6 and 7 in one arm. Both never-cache rules live in the
193 // `if let` below rather than being split across two arms, where
194 // the `Complete` arm's guard could only ever be true.
195 Ok(served) => {
196 let result = parse_response(&payload, &first.file_path, &served.extracted);
197 // Cache only a `Complete` response we fully understood. A
198 // truncated one is a prefix, and a body can be valid JSON and
199 // still schema-invalid - a missing `issues` array, a record
200 // with an unknown severity - which yields a file-level
201 // failure. Caching either replays it for the whole TTL
202 // instead of letting the next run ask again.
203 //
204 // `served.key`, never a key computed here: the entry must be
205 // filed under the model that produced it, or a later run with
206 // the head restored gets a hit that never came from the head.
207 //
208 // The write itself is best-effort: a cache failure is a
209 // diagnostic, not a failure of the analysis.
210 if let Extracted::Complete(value) = &served.extracted
211 && !served.from_cache
212 && result.failed_files.is_empty()
213 {
214 let _ = self.cache.put(&served.key, value);
215 }
216 result
217 }
218 // Rule 8: no provider produced an answer → no findings, file in
219 // `failed_files` with every provider's reason. The detail is kept
220 // rather than discarded, so the CLI can render a line the user can
221 // act on.
222 Err(err) => AnalysisResult::failed(first.file_path.clone(), chain_failure_reason(err)),
223 }
224 }
225
226 /// Analyze many files concurrently, bounded by the limiter.
227 ///
228 /// Each entry of `by_file` is one file's hunks; the limiter bounds the
229 /// in-flight requests, so we spawn them all and let it queue. The
230 /// per-file results are merged with [`AnalysisResult::merge`].
231 pub async fn analyze_files(&self, by_file: &[Vec<Hunk>]) -> AnalysisResult {
232 self.analyze_files_in_mode(
233 by_file.iter().map(Vec::as_slice),
234 self.configured_cache_mode(),
235 )
236 .await
237 }
238
239 /// Analyze selected cache misses without rebuilding the provider chain.
240 ///
241 /// Push-gate and bounded-review modes use this after cache-only preflight.
242 /// It bypasses cache while preserving sticky demotion and backend
243 /// diagnostics, so another process cannot populate an entry between the
244 /// preflight and this call and make a cached verdict count as fresh.
245 pub async fn analyze_files_live(&self, by_file: &[&[Hunk]]) -> AnalysisResult {
246 self.analyze_files_in_mode(by_file.iter().copied(), CacheMode::Bypass)
247 .await
248 }
249
250 fn configured_cache_mode(&self) -> CacheMode {
251 if self.cache_only {
252 CacheMode::Only
253 } else {
254 CacheMode::Prefer
255 }
256 }
257
258 async fn analyze_files_in_mode<'a>(
259 &self,
260 by_file: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'a [Hunk]>,
261 cache_mode: CacheMode,
262 ) -> AnalysisResult {
263 let groups: Vec<HunkGroup<'a>> = by_file.into_iter().flat_map(partition_hunks).collect();
264 let futures = groups
265 .iter()
266 .map(|group| self.analyze_file_in_mode(group.as_slice(), cache_mode));
267 let results = join_all(futures).await;
268 let mut merged = AnalysisResult::default();
269 for result in results {
270 merged.merge(result);
271 }
272 merged
273 }
274}
275
276/// A correctly grouped borrowed slice, or owned groups recovered from a mixed one.
277enum HunkGroup<'a> {
278 Borrowed(&'a [Hunk]),
279 Owned(Vec<Hunk>),
280}
281
282impl HunkGroup<'_> {
283 fn as_slice(&self) -> &[Hunk] {
284 match self {
285 Self::Borrowed(hunks) => hunks,
286 Self::Owned(hunks) => hunks,
287 }
288 }
289}
290
291/// Preserve the zero-copy normal path and partition only malformed input.
292fn partition_hunks(hunks: &[Hunk]) -> Vec<HunkGroup<'_>> {
293 let mixed = hunks
294 .first()
295 .is_some_and(|first| hunks.iter().any(|hunk| hunk.file_path != first.file_path));
296 if !mixed {
297 return vec![HunkGroup::Borrowed(hunks)];
298 }
299 group_by_file(hunks.iter().cloned())
300 .into_iter()
301 .map(HunkGroup::Owned)
302 .collect()
303}
304
305/// Map an `LlmError` to the failure reason the caller carries in
306/// `AnalysisResult::failed_files`.
307///
308/// Distinct from the parsing-path reasons because the LLM layer's failure
309/// modes are a different axis. HTTP failures preserve a numeric status and
310/// process backends preserve a stable typed kind, so callers never have to
311/// recover policy from human-readable messages.
312pub(crate) fn into_failure_reason(err: LlmError) -> FailureReason {
313 match err {
314 LlmError::Transport { status, message } => FailureReason::Transport { status, message },
315 LlmError::Unparseable(message) => FailureReason::Unparseable(message),
316 LlmError::ModelStopped { finish, message } => {
317 FailureReason::ModelStopped { finish, message }
318 }
319 // `NotConfigured` is a configuration failure at the LLM boundary —
320 // not a connectivity failure, but indistinguishable from one to the
321 // gate, which only cares whether the file was analyzed. Mapping to
322 // `Transport { status: None }` keeps the exit code 2 path uniform
323 // without inventing a new variant the JSON output would have to
324 // distinguish.
325 LlmError::NotConfigured(message) => FailureReason::Transport {
326 status: None,
327 message,
328 },
329 LlmError::Backend { kind, message } => FailureReason::Backend { kind, message },
330 }
331}
332
333/// Map a whole-chain failure to the reason the caller carries.
334///
335/// **A one-provider chain collapses to that provider's own reason.** That keeps
336/// a single-provider config - what `drep init` writes - reporting exactly what
337/// it reported before failover existed, down to the JSON `kind`.
338///
339/// The trigger is the chain's *length*, not the number of providers that
340/// failed. Those differ precisely where it matters: a two-provider chain
341/// stopped at the head by a 401 produces one attempt, and collapsing it would
342/// discard the provider index and the model name just as the user is asking
343/// "I configured a fallback - why didn't it run?".
344fn chain_failure_reason(err: ChainError) -> FailureReason {
345 let mut attempts = err.attempts;
346 if err.chain_len == 1
347 && let Some(only) = attempts.pop()
348 {
349 // Move the attempt out so the error string is not cloned on the
350 // overwhelmingly common one-provider path.
351 return into_failure_reason(only.error);
352 }
353 FailureReason::ChainFailed(
354 attempts
355 .into_iter()
356 .map(|attempt| ProviderFailure {
357 provider: attempt.provider,
358 model: attempt.model,
359 reason: into_failure_reason(attempt.error),
360 skipped: attempt.skipped,
361 })
362 .collect(),
363 )
364}
365
366/// Turn an `Extracted` value into an [`AnalysisResult`].
367///
368/// A free function, not a method: it reads no analyzer state, and keeping it
369/// free means the whole parsing core is testable without a `MockServer`, a
370/// `Cache` and a `TempDir`.
371///
372/// The truncation flag is **read off the discriminant**, never passed in
373/// beside it. An earlier shape took `extracted` *and* a `truncated: bool`,
374/// which let `(Extracted::Truncated(v), false)` compile and report a
375/// truncated file as clean - the single outcome this module exists to
376/// prevent, resting on four call sites agreeing by convention.
377fn parse_response(
378 payload: &payload::Payload,
379 file_path: &Path,
380 extracted: &Extracted,
381) -> AnalysisResult {
382 let mut result = AnalysisResult::default();
383
384 let (value, truncated) = match extracted {
385 Extracted::Complete(value) => (value, false),
386 // Rule 7: a truncated response is a prefix of what the model meant,
387 // so the file is unanalyzed however good the partial findings look.
388 Extracted::Truncated(value) => (value, true),
389 };
390
391 // The response shape is `{"issues": [...], "summary": "..."}`. Anything
392 // else is malformed, and the whole file is unanalyzed.
393 let Some(issues) = value.get(ISSUES).and_then(Value::as_array) else {
394 // Truncation wins over "no `issues` array": a response cut off before
395 // it reached `issues` has no array *because* it was truncated, and
396 // reporting that as a malformed record hides the real cause.
397 let reason = if truncated {
398 FailureReason::Truncated
399 } else {
400 FailureReason::MalformedFinding("response has no `issues` array".to_owned())
401 };
402 result.failed_files.insert(file_path.to_path_buf(), reason);
403 return result;
404 };
405
406 // Every finding carries the same path string. Allocate it only once the
407 // response has an issues array; the missing-array failure above does not
408 // need it.
409 let path_string = file_path.to_string_lossy().into_owned();
410 let mut failure = truncated.then_some(FailureReason::Truncated);
411
412 // `issues: []` is a legitimate clean result: empty findings, no failure.
413 for issue in issues {
414 match parse_issue(issue, payload, &path_string) {
415 IssueOutcome::Finding(finding) => result.findings.push(finding),
416 IssueOutcome::Dropped => result.dropped_out_of_range += 1,
417 // Do not return early: a malformed record in the middle of an
418 // otherwise-valid array should still let the well-formed records
419 // through. The failure class is "we do not fully understand the
420 // response", not "every record is wrong".
421 // First reason wins, matching `union_failures`: the reasons are not
422 // meaningfully combinable, and the last-writer version reported
423 // whichever malformed record happened to sit at the end of the
424 // array rather than the one that first told us the response was
425 // not understood.
426 IssueOutcome::Malformed(detail) => {
427 failure.get_or_insert(FailureReason::MalformedFinding(detail));
428 }
429 }
430 }
431
432 if let Some(reason) = failure {
433 result.failed_files.insert(file_path.to_path_buf(), reason);
434 }
435 result
436}
437
438/// Parse one issue record into a [`Finding`], a drop, or a malformed
439/// marker with a reason.
440///
441/// The three outcomes are deliberately distinct:
442///
443/// - `Finding`: a valid record attributed to a real line in the
444/// payload. The caller adds it to `findings`.
445/// - `Dropped`: a valid record whose line was not in
446/// `payload.valid_lines`. The caller increments
447/// `dropped_out_of_range`. The file is **not** marked failed: we
448/// understood the record perfectly, it was simply about code the
449/// model was never shown.
450/// - `Malformed`: an unparseable record (unknown severity, missing
451/// field, non-integer `line`). The caller adds the file to
452/// `failed_files`. We cannot know what the record meant, so we
453/// cannot trust the rest of the response either.
454fn parse_issue(issue: &Value, payload: &payload::Payload, file_path: &str) -> IssueOutcome {
455 // `line` must be a positive integer. A missing field, a string,
456 // a float, or a non-positive number are all malformed.
457 let Some(line) = issue.get(LINE).and_then(Value::as_u64) else {
458 return IssueOutcome::Malformed("missing or non-integer `line`".to_owned());
459 };
460 // `Value::as_u64` already rejects non-integers; the only
461 // remaining "not a positive integer" case is zero. A line of
462 // zero is a model artifact, not a real line.
463 if line == 0 {
464 return IssueOutcome::Malformed("`line` is zero".to_owned());
465 }
466 // A line beyond `u32` is a model artifact of exactly the same class as
467 // a line of zero, and this module's whole thesis is that we do not guess.
468 // Clamping to `u32::MAX` happened to land in `Dropped` because that value
469 // is never in `valid_lines` - correct by accident, via a silent clamp.
470 let Ok(line) = u32::try_from(line) else {
471 return IssueOutcome::Malformed("`line` is beyond u32".to_owned());
472 };
473
474 // `severity` must be one of the levels the prompt asked for. Anything
475 // else is malformed: we cannot map it to a `Severity`, and we do not
476 // silently coerce. The vocabulary lives on `LlmSeverity` so the prompt
477 // and this parser cannot list different levels.
478 let Some(severity_str) = issue.get(SEVERITY).and_then(Value::as_str) else {
479 return IssueOutcome::Malformed("missing `severity`".to_owned());
480 };
481 let Ok(severity) = severity_str.parse::<LlmSeverity>() else {
482 return IssueOutcome::Malformed(format!("unknown severity `{severity_str}`"));
483 };
484 let severity = severity.to_severity();
485
486 // `message` is the only remaining required field. Missing or
487 // non-string is malformed.
488 let Some(message) = issue.get(MESSAGE).and_then(Value::as_str) else {
489 return IssueOutcome::Malformed("missing or non-string `message`".to_owned());
490 };
491
492 // `category` is optional, but a *present* non-string one is malformed, not
493 // a missing one. `.get().and_then(as_str).unwrap_or("unknown")` collapses
494 // the two, so `"category": 7` was reported as the finding kind "unknown" -
495 // a response we demonstrably did not understand, recorded as understood and
496 // then cached for the whole TTL. Same rule `severity` and `message` follow.
497 let kind = match issue.get(CATEGORY) {
498 None => "unknown".to_owned(),
499 Some(Value::String(text)) => text.clone(),
500 Some(_) => return IssueOutcome::Malformed("non-string `category`".to_owned()),
501 };
502 let message = message.to_owned();
503 let asserts_compile_failure = match issue.get(COMPILE_FAILURE) {
504 None => false,
505 Some(Value::Bool(value)) => *value,
506 Some(_) => return IssueOutcome::Malformed("non-boolean `compile_failure`".to_owned()),
507 };
508
509 // `suggestion` is optional on the same terms. Absent or empty → `None`, not
510 // `Some("")`: an empty suggestion is not a suggestion. A present non-string
511 // one is malformed rather than silently absent.
512 let suggestion = match issue.get(SUGGESTION) {
513 None => None,
514 Some(Value::String(text)) if text.is_empty() => None,
515 Some(Value::String(text)) => Some(text.clone()),
516 Some(_) => return IssueOutcome::Malformed("non-string `suggestion`".to_owned()),
517 };
518
519 // Membership is checked LAST, after the record's shape.
520 //
521 // Shape asks "did the model answer in our schema"; membership asks "did it
522 // talk about code we sent". A record with an unknown severity is evidence
523 // the response's vocabulary is wrong, and that contaminates the records we
524 // did accept - so it must fail the file even when the record also cites a
525 // line we never sent. Checking membership first would let a demonstrably
526 // schema-violating response be reported as fully understood.
527 //
528 // A well-formed record about code we did not send is different: we
529 // understood it perfectly, it is simply out of scope. It is dropped and
530 // counted, never clamped onto the nearest valid line, which would attach a
531 // real-looking finding to arbitrary code. Pinned by
532 // `out_of_range_line_is_dropped_not_clamped`.
533 if !payload.valid_lines.contains(&line) {
534 return IssueOutcome::Dropped;
535 }
536
537 IssueOutcome::Finding(Finding {
538 kind,
539 severity,
540 file_path: file_path.to_owned(),
541 line,
542 column: None,
543 message,
544 suggestion,
545 asserts_compile_failure,
546 fingerprint: None,
547 })
548}
549
550/// What one issue record became after parsing.
551enum IssueOutcome {
552 /// A valid record attributed to a real line in the payload.
553 Finding(Finding),
554 /// A valid record whose line was not in `payload.valid_lines`.
555 Dropped,
556 /// An unparseable record, with a reason naming what was wrong.
557 Malformed(String),
558}
559
560#[cfg(test)]
561mod partition_tests {
562 use super::{HunkGroup, partition_hunks};
563 use crate::diff::hunks::Hunk;
564 use std::path::PathBuf;
565
566 #[test]
567 fn already_grouped_hunks_remain_borrowed() {
568 let hunks = [Hunk::whole_file(PathBuf::from("same.rs"), "one\ntwo\n")];
569 let groups = partition_hunks(&hunks);
570 let [HunkGroup::Borrowed(group)] = groups.as_slice() else {
571 panic!("an already-grouped slice must stay on the zero-copy path");
572 };
573 assert!(std::ptr::eq(group.as_ptr(), hunks.as_ptr()));
574 }
575}