disk-forensic
Point disk4n6 at any disk image or forensic container — E01, VMDK, VHDX, VHD, QCOW2, DMG, raw dd, or an ISO — and it decodes the wrapper, identifies the partitioning scheme (MBR / GPT / APM), and runs the right forensic parser. No carving out a raw image first, no guessing which tool to reach for.
See it work in 30 seconds
$ cargo install disk-forensic # crate: disk-forensic, binary: disk4n6
$ disk4n6 evidence.E01 # an EnCase image straight off the shelf
Scheme: Gpt
MBR Forensic Analysis
disk signature : 0x00000000
boot code : AllZeros
partitioning : Unknown
Partition table (1 entries):
[0] GPT Protective MBR LBA 1..=409599 fs=Unknown
GPT cross-check: 131 GPT partition entries
GPT Forensic Analysis
================================================================================
Disk GUID: 9D71FE48-F2FB-43F1-9326-36644D4D4E70
Revision: 1.0
That E01 was decoded, the protective MBR cross-checked, and the GPT parsed — one
command, no intermediate files. Exit code is 0 when clean and 1 when any
anomaly is present, so it drops straight into a triage pipeline. Add --json
(build with --features serde) for machine-readable output.
Feed it almost any image — the wrapper is detected by content, not extension
disk4n6 sniffs the container magic, decodes it to a Read + Seek view of the
raw disk, and analyses that. Rename a .vmdk to .bin and it still works.
| Input | Handling |
|---|---|
Raw / dd |
analysed in place |
| E01 / EWF (EnCase) | decoded |
| VMDK (VMware) | decoded — follows snapshot/delta extent chains to the base image |
| VHDX (Hyper-V) | decoded |
| VHD (Virtual PC, fixed + dynamic) | decoded (built-in) |
| QCOW2 (QEMU/KVM) | decoded |
| DMG (Apple UDIF) | decoded |
| ISO 9660 (optical) | routed to filesystem analysis (see below) |
| AFF4 | recognised, but decode to raw first — decoder not yet wired |
A corrupt or unsupported-variant container fails loud with a clear decode error rather than silently producing wrong output.
Optical media gets a filesystem report
An ISO is a filesystem, not a partitioned disk, so disk4n6 routes it to
iso9660-forensic and
renders the same normalized findings / provenance / timeline view — volume
identity, mastering-tool fingerprint, Rock Ridge authoring owners, structural
anomalies, and the reconstructed authoring window:
$ disk4n6 image.iso
Filesystem: ISO 9660
Findings: none (clean)
Provenance:
volume label: DFTEST (iso9660-forensic)
system identifier: APPLE INC., TYPE: 0002 (iso9660-forensic)
sector mode: Iso2048 (iso9660-forensic)
extensions: Rock Ridge: true, Joliet: true (iso9660-forensic)
sessions: 1 (iso9660-forensic)
Rock Ridge owners: uids [501], gids [0] (iso9660-forensic)
A Timeline section then reconstructs the volume's authoring window from the PVD and file-recorded times — on real media these diverge into a span you can reason about (a file dated after its own volume, or in the future, becomes a finding).
Rust library
[]
= "0.5"
use File;
// Decode whatever container the evidence arrived in, then analyse the disk.
let opened = open?;
let mut img = opened.reader;
match analyse_disk?
# Ok::
analyse_disk takes any Read + Seek, so you can also feed it a raw image
directly. A disk with no recognised scheme (e.g. a filesystem written straight to
the media) returns [Error::UnknownScheme] rather than mis-parsing. Each
analyzer normalizes into the shared
forensicnomicon::report
model, so findings and provenance render uniformly across every scheme and the
ISO filesystem layer.
The scheme parsers
disk-forensic is pure orchestration — it classifies the scheme using the cited
magics in forensicnomicon
and delegates every real parse to a focused, dependency-light sibling. Use them
directly when you already know the scheme, or through this crate when you don't:
| Crate | Scheme |
|---|---|
mbr-partition-forensic |
Master Boot Record — boot-code fingerprinting, gap/slack carving, per-partition VBR filesystem fingerprinting, protective-MBR/GPT detection |
gpt-partition-forensic |
GUID Partition Table — CRC32 integrity, primary/backup reconciliation |
apm-partition-forensic |
Apple Partition Map — classic Mac and hybrid optical media |
Design
- Secure by default — one auto-detecting entry point: a caller cannot pick the wrong decoder or parser for a disk, and the zero-config path is the correct one.
- Fails loud — a corrupt container or unknown scheme returns a typed error; it never emits silently wrong output.
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]and fuzz-tested (cargo fuzz) against crafted/corrupted input.- Validated against real images, not just synthetic fixtures — real EnCase/qemu/hdiutil containers and a genuine NTFS volume from a public CTF disk. See
docs/VALIDATION.md.
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