decdn-node 0.0.4

//! Node runtime: owns the iroh endpoint, metrics server, and protocol router.

mod addr_publish;
pub mod eviction;
mod reachability;
pub mod reload;

pub(crate) use reload::emit_config_notices;
pub use reload::{LogLevelApply, LogLevelSetter, ReloadSnapshot, RuntimeReloadState};

use crate::chain_events::boot_retry::{BOOT_CHAIN_RETRY_BUDGET, BootRetry};
use crate::chain_events::shared_head::{HeadSource, SharedHead};

use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4, SocketAddrV6};
use std::num::NonZeroUsize;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;

use anyhow::Context;
use decdn_cache::{
    CacheEngine, FilesystemOrigin, HttpOrigin, Origin, S3Credentials, S3Origin, S3OriginConfig,
};
use decdn_common::config::{ResolvedDiscovery, ResolvedOrigin, ResolvedS3Credentials};
use iroh::address_lookup::{DnsAddressLookup, MemoryLookup, PkarrPublisher};
use iroh::endpoint::{BindOpts, IdleTimeout, QuicTransportConfig, VarInt, presets};
use iroh::protocol::Router;
use iroh::{Endpoint, EndpointAddr, PublicKey, RelayMap, RelayMode, RelayUrl, SecretKey};

use addr_publish::node_publish_filter;
use noq_proto::congestion::Bbr3Config;
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tokio::task::JoinSet;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;

use crate::admin;
use crate::dht::{DhtRateLimiter, RecordStore, RecordStoreConfig, StakerSet};
use crate::dispatch::ConnectionLimiter;
use crate::handlers::client::{ClientHandler, ClientProtocol, MAX_CLIENT_STREAMS};
use crate::handlers::dht::DhtHandler;
use crate::handlers::probe::{ProbeHandler, StakeLanePolicy as ProbeStakeLanePolicy};
use crate::handlers::probe_rate_limit::ProbeRateLimiter;
use crate::metrics;
use crate::payment_settlement::PoolSettlementService;
use crate::pool_store::PersistentPoolStateStore;
use crate::stop_handle::StopHandle;
use alloy::network::EthereumWallet;
use alloy::primitives::U256;
use alloy::providers::{Provider, ProviderBuilder};
use alloy::signers::local::PrivateKeySigner;
use decdn_common::address::parse_nonzero_address;
use decdn_common::config::ResolvedConfig;
use decdn_common::redact::{
    redact_userinfo, sanitize_err_chain, sanitize_error_sources, sanitize_rpc_display,
};
use decdn_incentive::PoolStateStore;
use decdn_incentive::eth_identity;

/// Ceiling on each bounded shutdown stage: the router close ([`close_router`]),
/// the final redeem sweep, and the drain of spawned tasks after the endpoint and
/// metrics server have been signalled to stop. Sized comfortably larger than the
/// sum of the probe handler's accept + close timeouts (see
/// `handlers::probe::ACCEPT_BI_TIMEOUT` + `PROBE_READ_TIMEOUT` +
/// `PROBE_CLOSE_TIMEOUT`) so in-flight handlers finish naturally, and than an
/// endpoint close's `3 * PTO` wait; each stage's give-up branch only fires as a
/// safety net.
const SHUTDOWN_DEADLINE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);

/// Period between dispatch per-source rate-limiter GC sweeps (#440).
/// The acquire path already prunes opportunistically when the keyspace
/// exceeds `cap + cap/10`, but a node whose connection rate falls below
/// the over-cap threshold can carry millions of stale buckets
/// indefinitely. 60s is comfortably larger than the longest realistic
/// bucket refill window, so the sweep is essentially free when the
/// keyspace is empty.
const DISPATCH_GC_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(1);

/// Sampling period for the load-shed controller's egress-bytes EWMA. One
/// second keeps the `ResourcePressure` policy's egress-budget check
/// responsive to short bursts, without sampling so often that the EWMA
/// mostly reflects request-arrival jitter.
const EGRESS_EWMA_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(1);

/// Interval between periodic GC sweeps of the DHT rate-limiter's per-IP
/// and per-peer keyed maps (#645). 60s matches `DISPATCH_GC_INTERVAL` —
/// the two limiters share the same operator mental model for keyspace
/// cleanup cadence. Separate constant (rather than reusing
/// `DISPATCH_GC_INTERVAL`) so a future tune to one limiter doesn't drag
/// the other along.
const DHT_RATE_LIMIT_GC_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(1);

/// Interval between periodic GC sweeps of the probe rate-limiter's per-IP and
/// per-peer keyed maps (#645, #982). Matches `DHT_RATE_LIMIT_GC_INTERVAL` — the
/// probe and DHT keyed limiters share the same keyspace-cleanup mental model.
/// Separate constant so a future tune to one limiter doesn't drag the other.
const PROBE_RATE_LIMIT_GC_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(1);

/// Period between periodic sweeps of the local per-peer reputation store
/// (ADR 008 §Local Score Calculation). `LocalReputation::evict` drops
/// entries for peers that have been idle long enough that their EWMA is
/// no longer a useful ranking signal, so the store does not grow
/// unbounded with every peer ever observed. 1h matches the DHT
/// bucket-refresh cadence — reputation and routing-table hygiene share
/// the same operator mental model for peer-state cleanup.
const REPUTATION_EVICT_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_hours(1);

/// QUIC-level idle timeout: the transport closes a connection if no
/// packets arrive for this long. Set to match ADR 005's 30s
/// connection-lifetime ceiling.
///
/// Because [`QUIC_KEEP_ALIVE_INTERVAL`] (10s) is shorter than this
/// timeout, healthy peers keep refreshing it via PING ACKs and the QUIC
/// idle reaper rarely fires on its own — that is the spec's intent (see
/// ADR 005: "below the idle timeout to prevent NAT middleboxes from
/// dropping the mapping"). The QUIC timer is a defense-in-depth floor
/// for genuinely silent paths (e.g. peer crash / network partition); the
/// "close 30s after last stream and no unacked vouchers" rule is
/// application-layer and lives in the cdn/client/v1 handler's serve loop
/// (`handlers::client::APP_IDLE_TIMEOUT`), which reaps keep-alive'd-but-
/// streamless connections the transport timer cannot.
pub(crate) const QUIC_MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);

/// Interval between QUIC PING keep-alive frames. Per ADR 005 §Connection
/// lifetime, endpoints SHOULD send PINGs at 10s intervals — strictly
/// less than [`QUIC_MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT`] so a single dropped probe doesn't
/// trip the idle reaper, and well below the typical NAT mapping timeout
/// so middleboxes don't drop the path under quiet load. Quinn applies
/// this on every connection regardless of role, so this endpoint emits
/// keep-alives on both client- and server-initiated connections.
const QUIC_KEEP_ALIVE_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);

/// Maximum number of concurrent bidirectional streams a peer may open on
/// a single connection. Sized for `cdn/client/v1` (the largest cap in
/// ADR 005 §Concurrent stream limits: client=100, probe=1, dht=1).
/// `QuicTransportConfig` is per-endpoint, not per-ALPN, so the QUIC
/// layer can only enforce the union of these caps; tighter per-ALPN
/// limits are enforced inside each handler. The probe handler already
/// does this implicitly by calling `accept_bi()` exactly once per
/// connection and then closing.
const QUIC_MAX_CONCURRENT_BIDI_STREAMS: u32 = 100;

/// The `FeeRouter` contract's own `OPERATOR_BPS_FLOOR` (`contracts/src/FeeRouter.sol`):
/// the minimum operator share governance can configure. Used as the startup
/// fallback for the live operator fee-share seed (ADR 041) — a conservative
/// UNDER-estimate of the true operator share, which only makes the `margin`
/// serve-economics policy's buy ceiling more conservative (it assumes MORE
/// future serve revenue is skimmed by fees than governance has actually set),
/// never a griefing surface.
const FEE_ROUTER_OPERATOR_BPS_FLOOR: u16 = 4000;

/// The most of the boot deadline the best-effort fee-share reads may spend on
/// retries. It covers a short provider blip; a longer outage falls back to the
/// floor share and leaves the rest of the deadline to the fail-closed reads.
const FEE_SHARE_BOOT_BUDGET: Duration = Duration::from_mins(1);

/// Apply an explicit client poll interval to a freshly built provider,
/// overriding alloy's localhost-detected 250 ms default (#1011).
///
/// Despite the config knob's name, this does not touch event watching: the
/// multiplexed poller ticks on its own `poll_interval` and never reads the
/// client interval. The one consumer still reachable from this node is
/// `PendingTransactionBuilder::get_receipt`'s heartbeat (alloy-provider
/// `heart.rs`), which the node awaits in `payment_settlement` and
/// `buyer_pool` — so this bounds how fast a node awaiting a mined settlement /
/// pool tx re-polls for its receipt, and alloy's 250 ms localhost default
/// would otherwise hammer a dev anvil for the life of every pending tx.
///
/// `set_poll_interval` uses interior mutability, so this applies to the
/// already-constructed provider and returns it unchanged in type —
/// wallet/nonce-filler providers route through it too, because `client()` is a
/// default `Provider` trait method available on every provider. The interval
/// comes from `blockchain.event_poll_interval_ms`.
fn with_poll_interval<P: Provider>(provider: P, interval: Duration) -> P {
    provider.client().set_poll_interval(interval);
    provider
}

/// Keep every iroh ALPN listener closed until the blacklist watcher reports one
/// clean boot enumeration + operator-scope enforcement pass. The closure is the explicit seam
/// that makes it impossible to construct the `Router` on either pending or
/// failed readiness.
async fn gate_listener_on_blacklist_sync<T>(
    readiness: oneshot::Receiver<crate::blacklist_watcher::InitialSyncResult>,
    start_listener: impl FnOnce() -> T,
) -> anyhow::Result<T> {
    readiness
        .await
        .context("blacklist watcher exited before initial sync completed")?
        .map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)
        .context("initial ContentBlacklist sync unavailable")?;
    Ok(start_listener())
}

type HttpUrl = alloy::transports::http::reqwest::Url;

/// Construct the four HTTP-provider roles owned by the node runtime (#1252).
///
/// Keeping these constructors together makes the pending-transaction poll
/// interval and wallet nonce policy single-sourced while preserving separate
/// provider instances for every consumer. The shared-head provider is the one
/// deliberate exception to the poll override: it never creates pending
/// transactions and therefore keeps Alloy's transport default.
///
/// Every provider sends through [`crate::rpc_metrics::metered_http_client`],
/// so each JSON-RPC request the node makes counts on
/// `decdn_rpc_requests_total`.
#[derive(Clone)]
struct ProviderFactory {
    url: HttpUrl,
    metrics: Arc<metrics::Metrics>,
}

impl ProviderFactory {
    const fn new(url: HttpUrl, metrics: Arc<metrics::Metrics>) -> Self {
        Self { url, metrics }
    }

    fn client(&self) -> alloy::rpc::client::RpcClient {
        crate::rpc_metrics::metered_http_client(self.url.clone(), &self.metrics)
    }

    fn read_only(&self, interval: Duration) -> impl Provider + Clone + use<> {
        with_poll_interval(
            ProviderBuilder::new().connect_client(self.client()),
            interval,
        )
    }

    fn shared_head(&self) -> impl Provider + Clone + use<> {
        ProviderBuilder::new().connect_client(self.client())
    }

    fn seller_wallet(
        &self,
        signer: PrivateKeySigner,
        interval: Duration,
    ) -> impl Provider + Clone + use<> {
        self.wallet(signer, interval)
    }

    fn buyer_wallet(
        &self,
        signer: PrivateKeySigner,
        interval: Duration,
    ) -> impl Provider + Clone + use<> {
        self.wallet(signer, interval)
    }

    fn wallet(
        &self,
        signer: PrivateKeySigner,
        interval: Duration,
    ) -> impl Provider + Clone + use<> {
        with_poll_interval(
            ProviderBuilder::new()
                .with_simple_nonce_management()
                .wallet(EthereumWallet::from(signer))
                .connect_client(self.client()),
            interval,
        )
    }
}

/// Runtime [`QuicTransportConfig`]. Tests build their own config via
/// the same builder when they need to shorten the idle timeout to keep
/// the test runtime under a second.
fn quic_transport_config() -> anyhow::Result<QuicTransportConfig> {
    let idle_timeout: IdleTimeout = QUIC_MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT.try_into().map_err(|e| {
        anyhow::anyhow!(
            "BUG: QUIC_MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT={QUIC_MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT:?} not representable as IdleTimeout: {e}"
        )
    })?;
    Ok(QuicTransportConfig::builder()
        .max_idle_timeout(Some(idle_timeout))
        .keep_alive_interval(QUIC_KEEP_ALIVE_INTERVAL)
        .max_concurrent_bidi_streams(VarInt::from_u32(QUIC_MAX_CONCURRENT_BIDI_STREAMS))
        // BBR3 over the default Cubic. Congestion control lives at the sender, so
        // this governs the bytes the node serves to a downstream client or node.
        // BBR paces to the path's measured bandwidth and round trip instead of
        // treating loss as the sole congestion signal, so a high-latency,
        // lossy long-haul link — where a single Cubic flow backs off hard — keeps
        // the pipe full without needing many parallel flows to compensate.
        .congestion_controller_factory(Arc::new(Bbr3Config::default()))
        .build())
}

/// Spawn a periodic task onto `tasks`: burn the first tick, then run `tick`
/// every `interval` until the returned stop signal is sent (or its sender is
/// dropped). Every tick body here is synchronous, so `tick` is a plain
/// `FnMut()` run to completion inside the task.
///
/// The `biased; stop-before-tick` select keeps shutdown prompt: the stop arm is
/// polled first, so a signalled stop returns without waiting out the current
/// `interval`. A stop arm that failed to return would instead stall shutdown by
/// up to one full `interval`, which the runtime's normal path would mask as a
/// "task slow to drain" rather than a bug. `spawn_periodic_exits_promptly_on_shutdown`
/// pins that a signalled stop returns promptly and that the first tick is
/// burned; `spawn_periodic_fires_the_tick_body` pins that ticks otherwise run.
///
/// The first tick is burned so the first pass lands one interval after startup
/// rather than on the same tick as bring-up. `name` labels the shutdown log.
fn spawn_periodic<F>(
    tasks: &mut JoinSet<()>,
    name: &'static str,
    interval: Duration,
    mut tick: F,
) -> oneshot::Sender<()>
where
    F: FnMut() + Send + 'static,
{
    let (stop_tx, mut stop_rx) = oneshot::channel::<()>();
    tasks.spawn(async move {
        let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(interval);
        ticker.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
        ticker.tick().await;
        loop {
            tokio::select! {
                biased;
                _ = &mut stop_rx => {
                    tracing::debug!(task = name, "periodic task shutdown signal received");
                    return;
                }
                _ = ticker.tick() => tick(),
            }
        }
    });
    stop_tx
}

/// Warn when the pin set cannot fit under the cache ceiling (#1130).
///
/// Pinned hashes are LRU-exempt (`eviction_candidates` filters them out), so a
/// pin set larger than `cache.cache_size_mb` makes the eviction driver's
/// high-water mark permanently unreachable: it will starve every tick while the
/// disk keeps growing. The hazard applies to every node however the pinned
/// content arrived, so this runs unconditionally at startup and on reload.
///
/// Warn rather than fail or truncate. The operator's pin set is a deliberate
/// statement about what this node must serve, and silently warming only part of
/// it would be worse than warming all of it noisily. Sizes come from the
/// origin-held index, so a hash the index cannot size contributes nothing and
/// the total is a **lower bound**. That matters: an origin that blocks `HEAD`
/// leaves the index empty and this check silently never fires. It is a cheap
/// early hint, not the authoritative signal — that is
/// `decdn_cache_evictions_starved_total` with `decdn_cache_bytes` at
/// `decdn_cache_size_limit_bytes`.
fn warn_if_pins_exceed_cache(cache: &decdn_cache::CacheEngine, cache_size_mb: u64) {
    let pinned = cache.pinned_snapshot();
    let pinned_bytes: u64 = pinned
        .iter()
        .filter_map(|h| cache.origin_held_size(decdn_cache::Hash::from_bytes(*h.as_bytes())))
        .fold(0u64, u64::saturating_add);
    let limit_bytes = cache_size_mb.saturating_mul(1024 * 1024);
    if pinned_bytes > limit_bytes {
        tracing::warn!(
            pinned_count = pinned.len(),
            pinned_bytes,
            cache_size_mb,
            limit_bytes,
            "cache.pinned_hashes is larger than cache.cache_size_mb; pinned blobs are \
             LRU-exempt, so the eviction driver can never reach its high-water target and \
             disk use will exceed the configured ceiling. Raise cache_size_mb or trim the \
             pin set (#1130)"
        );
    }
}

/// Emit one `debug` line for a keyed rate-limiter GC sweep that pruned buckets.
/// Shared by the DHT and probe rate-limiter GC ticks, whose per-layer
/// (`per_ip` / `per_peer`) log arms are otherwise byte-identical.
fn log_keyspace_gc(kind: &'static str, layer: &'static str, sweep: Option<(usize, usize)>) {
    if let Some((before, after)) = sweep {
        tracing::debug!(
            layer,
            before,
            after,
            dropped = before.saturating_sub(after),
            "{kind} rate-limit GC sweep complete"
        );
    }
}

/// Runtime infrastructure built during the front bring-up phase of [`run`].
///
/// A plain by-value bundle of the long-lived handles the rest of `run` (and the
/// shutdown sequence) consumes. `run` destructures it immediately so every
/// downstream call site keeps referring to the same-named locals.
struct Infra {
    node_metrics: Arc<metrics::Metrics>,
    secret_key: SecretKey,
    eth_signer: Arc<PrivateKeySigner>,
    /// The `PaymentPool` deployment the lane store is stamped with. The voucher
    /// EIP-712 domain is derived from this same value, so the stamp and the
    /// signature domain can never disagree.
    payment_pool_deployment: crate::pool_store::Deployment,
    concrete_pool_store: Arc<PersistentPoolStateStore>,
    pool_state_store: Arc<dyn PoolStateStore>,
    watcher_checkpoint_store: Arc<dyn decdn_incentive::KeyedCheckpointStore>,
    receipt_sink: Arc<dyn crate::receipt_log::ReceiptSink>,
    /// Stop handle for the background receipt writer: cancelled after the
    /// router drains on shutdown, then awaited in the drain phase so the audit
    /// tail survives shutdown (#803).
    receipt_writer: StopHandle,
    /// Periodic lane-store flush timer (ADR 003 §Off-chain voucher state
    /// persistence). Aborted after one final durable flush on shutdown.
    lane_flush_task: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
    node_origin: Option<crate::node_origin::NodeOrigin>,
    pull_through_origin: Option<Arc<crate::node_origin::NodeOrigin>>,
    cache: CacheEngine,
    /// Cache eviction policy selected by `cache.eviction_policy` (ADR 040).
    /// Injected into the eviction driver at spawn time
    /// ([`spawn_background_tasks`]); the engine itself never chooses a policy.
    eviction_policy: Arc<dyn decdn_cache::EvictionPolicy>,
    /// Shared ADR 040 frequency estimator, when built (`cache.eviction_policy`
    /// / `cache.admission_policy` == `"tinylfu"`, or `cache.serve_economics.policy`
    /// == `"margin"`). `None` when no consumer needs it. Threaded into
    /// [`crate::node_origin::NodeOriginConfig`] at spawn time
    /// ([`spawn_background_tasks`]) as the ADR 041 `margin` policy's heat input.
    frequency_estimator: Option<Arc<dyn decdn_cache::FrequencyEstimator>>,
    ep: Endpoint,
    limiter: Arc<ConnectionLimiter>,
}

/// Front bring-up phase: RPC preflight, eth keystore load, voucher-state
/// and receipt stores, cache + origin chain, iroh endpoint, and the
/// connection limiter. The two `reload_state` attach side effects run inline,
/// at their points in the bring-up order, so a SIGHUP delivered mid-bring-up
/// still finds a target.
#[allow(clippy::cognitive_complexity, clippy::too_many_lines)]
async fn build_infra(
    cfg: &ResolvedConfig,
    secret_key: SecretKey,
    reload_state: &RuntimeReloadState,
    node_metrics: Arc<metrics::Metrics>,
) -> anyhow::Result<Infra> {
    // Preflight: verify RPC endpoint is reachable before committing to
    // port binding. A 5-second timeout keeps startup responsive on flaky
    // networks while still catching typos and dead endpoints early.
    check_rpc_reachability(&cfg.blockchain.rpc_url).await?;

    // Registry-mandatory `decdn_probe_hold_slots_max` (ADR
    // appendix-observability.md) — static, set once from config.
    node_metrics.probe_hold_slots_max(cfg.cache.max_probe_holds);

    // Issue #406: load the Ethereum keystore into a live `PrivateKeySigner`
    // before the rest of startup so any password-source error (env unset,
    // missing file, prompt aborted) fails fast with a clear message rather
    // than after the cache + endpoint have been built. `decrypt_keystore`
    // runs scrypt/argon2 (hundreds of milliseconds to multi-second under
    // hardened KDF params), so it must run on a blocking thread to avoid
    // stalling the tokio runtime.
    let eth_signer = Arc::new(load_eth_signer(cfg).await?);
    tracing::info!(address = %eth_signer.address(), "loaded eth keystore");

    // Open the off-chain voucher-state store (issue #527, ADR 003
    // §Off-chain voucher state persistence) before any handler that could
    // accept a voucher comes online. `PersistentPoolStateStore::open`
    // performs disk I/O (file create + mode tighten + redb header read), so
    // run it on a blocking thread to avoid stalling the tokio runtime.
    // Failure here MUST abort startup: continuing with a fresh in-memory
    // map silently reopens the replay window the store exists to close.
    let pool_store_data_dir = cfg.identity.data_dir.clone();
    // The store binds to the configured `PaymentPool` deployment and drops the
    // seller-side rows another deployment wrote: pool ids repeat across
    // deployments, so a stale row would shadow a returning buyer's new pool.
    let pool_store_deployment = crate::pool_store::Deployment {
        chain_id: cfg.blockchain.chain_id,
        payment_pool: parse_nonzero_address(
            &cfg.blockchain.payment_pool_address,
            "blockchain.payment_pool_address",
        )?,
    };
    // Verify the configured deployment against the live chain BEFORE the store
    // opens: `bind_deployment` drops the seller lane state when the stamp
    // differs, so a typo'd chain id or contract address must abort bring-up
    // here, while the store is untouched, rather than trigger an irreversible
    // drop on a WARN.
    // The URL is not echoed on a parse failure: it can embed a provider API
    // key, and the reachability probe above has already reported unusable
    // endpoints with a sanitized display.
    let preflight_rpc_url: HttpUrl = cfg
        .blockchain
        .rpc_url
        .parse()
        .context("blockchain.rpc_url is not a valid URL (value redacted; check the config)")?;
    check_deployment_preflight(
        ProviderFactory::new(preflight_rpc_url, Arc::clone(&node_metrics)).shared_head(),
        pool_store_deployment,
        &BootRetry::new(DEPLOYMENT_PREFLIGHT_BUDGET, Arc::clone(&node_metrics)),
    )
    .await?;
    // Keep the concrete store `Arc` so it can back the seller
    // `PoolStateStore` (lane_state_v1 table), the pending-settle store
    // (pending_settle_v1 table, PR #743 review), and the buyer
    // `BuyerPoolStore` (buyer_pool_state_v1 table, #744) — redb forbids a
    // second `Database` handle to the same file, so one shared store owns all.
    let concrete_pool_store: Arc<PersistentPoolStateStore> = Arc::new(
        tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
            PersistentPoolStateStore::open(&pool_store_data_dir, pool_store_deployment)
        })
        .await
        .context("pool state store open task panicked")?
        .context("failed to open pool state store (issue #527 voucher replay guard)")?,
    );
    // The one redb-backed store implements the voucher-state trait (for the
    // handler + #527 replay guard), the pending-settle trait (for the on-chain
    // settlement sweep, PR #743 review), and the buyer-pool trait (#744).
    // Derive trait-object handles from the single concrete store so every write
    // family shares one open store and one fsync discipline (each family commits
    // on its own per-family redb file); `concrete_pool_store` stays bound for
    // the buyer handle built further below.
    let pool_state_store: Arc<dyn PoolStateStore> = concrete_pool_store.clone();
    // Debounce the scan-checkpoint writes (#784, keyed in #1092): the settlement
    // watcher, the only watcher that persists a cursor (`CheckpointKey::PoolOpened`),
    // advances it once per completed `eth_getLogs` window — on the live tail, once
    // per poll tick with new confirmed blocks — and the directly-durable store
    // fsyncs on each. The persisted value is only a *floor* for the resume backfill
    // (`resolve_persisted_start` rewinds it by the reorg margin; the sinks are
    // idempotent), so coarsening the write cadence is safe — and the settlement
    // service force-flushes its key on graceful shutdown, so steady-state progress
    // is not lost.
    // Wrapping here (the wiring layer) keeps the domain trait and the disk store
    // free of the debounce policy.
    let watcher_checkpoint_store: Arc<dyn decdn_incentive::KeyedCheckpointStore> = Arc::new(
        crate::payment_settlement::DebouncedCheckpointStore::new(concrete_pool_store.clone()),
    );
    // Boot-time smoke test: read every persisted record so startup fails
    // fast on corruption / forward-incompatible schema, well before the
    // `cdn/client/v1` handler is constructed further down the bring-up.
    // That handler calls `load_all` again to bootstrap its in-memory lane
    // map — the duplicate read is by design. Infra bring-up hands the handler
    // the *store*, not a snapshot: a pre-built map threaded through
    // `ClientHandlerDeps` would couple this stage to the handler's internal
    // lane representation. Cost: one extra `load_all` on startup.
    let persisted_count = tokio::task::spawn_blocking({
        let store = Arc::clone(&pool_state_store);
        move || store.load_all()
    })
    .await
    .context("pool state store load task panicked")?
    .context("failed to hydrate persisted lane state")?
    .len();
    tracing::info!(
        lanes = persisted_count,
        "pool state store ready (issue #527 replay guard active)",
    );

    // Open the append-only download-receipt audit log (issue #248). Unlike the
    // pool state store, a failure here is NON-fatal: the receipt log is an audit
    // artifact (revenue reconciliation, dispute evidence), not the replay
    // guard, so the node still serves paid delivery — falling back to a
    // discard-only log — rather than refusing to start. The open does a small
    // amount of disk I/O (create + chmod), so run it on the blocking pool.
    let receipt_log_data_dir = cfg.identity.data_dir.clone();
    let receipt_log_policy = crate::receipt_log::RotationPolicy::from(&cfg.receipts);
    let receipt_log: Arc<dyn crate::receipt_log::ReceiptLog> =
        match tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
            crate::receipt_log::JsonlReceiptLog::open(&receipt_log_data_dir, receipt_log_policy)
        })
        .await
        .context("download-receipt log open task panicked")?
        {
            Ok(log) => {
                tracing::info!(path = %log.path().display(), "download-receipt log ready");
                Arc::new(log)
            }
            Err(e) => {
                tracing::error!(
                    error = %e,
                    event = "download_receipt_log_open_failed",
                    "failed to open download-receipt log; continuing without the audit log \
                     (paid delivery is unaffected; revenue reconciliation will be incomplete)",
                );
                Arc::new(crate::receipt_log::NoopReceiptLog)
            }
        };

    // Decouple the audit write from the paid-delivery hot path (#803): a single
    // background task owns the receipt log and drains a bounded queue, so the
    // voucher-accept path only does a non-blocking enqueue before it continues
    // delivery and a slow/full disk can never back-pressure delivery. The
    // writer's stop handle is cancelled after the router drains on shutdown
    // (below) so the writer flushes its tail before exiting.
    let (receipt_sink, receipt_writer) =
        crate::receipt_log::spawn_receipt_writer(receipt_log, Arc::clone(&node_metrics));

    // Background lane-store flush (ADR 003 §Off-chain voucher state persistence):
    // mirror the in-memory voucher watermark to disk every
    // `payment.voucher_commit_interval_ms`. A failed flush retains the dirty set
    // for the next tick; it never blocks delivery.
    let flush_store = Arc::clone(&pool_state_store);
    let flush_metrics = Arc::clone(&node_metrics);
    let flush_interval =
        std::time::Duration::from_millis(cfg.payment.voucher_commit_interval_ms.max(1));
    let lane_flush_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
        let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(flush_interval);
        ticker.tick().await; // skip the immediate first tick
        loop {
            ticker.tick().await;
            let store = Arc::clone(&flush_store);
            let res = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.flush()).await;
            match res {
                Ok(Ok(())) => {}
                Ok(Err(err)) => {
                    flush_metrics.lane_flush_failure();
                    tracing::warn!(error = %err, "lane store background flush failed; retrying next tick");
                }
                Err(join_err) => {
                    flush_metrics.lane_flush_failure();
                    tracing::warn!(%join_err, "lane store flush task join failed");
                }
            }
        }
    });

    // Node-to-node pull-through origin (#831, ADR 001/022). Constructed empty up
    // front so it can be appended to the cache's origin chain here; its
    // dependencies (DHT, buyer pool, reputation handles) don't exist yet and
    // are injected via `provision` once bring-up completes (below). When the
    // feature is off it is never created and never enters the chain. The handle
    // is retained to provision later.
    let node_origin = cfg
        .cache
        .node_to_node_pull_through_enabled
        .then(crate::node_origin::NodeOrigin::new);
    // A shared `Arc<NodeOrigin>` handle for the window-paced serve path (#856).
    // `NodeOrigin` is `Clone` over an `Arc<OnceLock<deps>>`, so this clone sees
    // the dependencies `provision`ed (below) on the chain's copy. Held so the
    // client handler can drive progressive pulls directly, bypassing the buffered
    // `populate` for the serve-miss pull-through path.
    let pull_through_origin = node_origin.clone().map(Arc::new);
    let cache = build_cache(
        cfg,
        Arc::clone(&node_metrics),
        node_origin.clone().map(|o| Arc::new(o) as Arc<dyn Origin>),
    )
    .await?;
    // Attach the cache to the reload state so SIGHUP handlers can swap
    // the pinned-hashes set atomically (#276). Done immediately after
    // `build_cache` succeeds so a SIGHUP delivered during the rest of
    // startup will still find a target.
    reload_state.attach_cache(Some(cache.clone()));
    // `decdn_probe_hold_slots_used` samples this cache on every scrape.
    node_metrics.attach_probe_holds(cache.clone());

    // Admission/eviction policy selection (ADR 040) plus the ADR 041 estimator
    // decoupling (see `wire_cache_policies`).
    let (eviction_policy, estimator) = wire_cache_policies(&cfg.cache, &cache);

    let retry = cfg.cache.origin_retry;
    tracing::info!(
        cache_dir = %cfg.cache.cache_dir.display(),
        has_origin = !cfg.cache.origins.is_empty(),
        origin_count = cfg.cache.origins.len(),
        origin_kinds = %origin_kinds_label(&cfg.cache.origins),
        pinned_hashes = cfg.cache.pinned_hashes.len(),
        // Origin retry policy (#285). Logged once at startup so operators
        // can audit the active resilience budget without hitting an RPC.
        retry_max_retries = retry.max_retries,
        retry_initial_backoff_ms = retry.initial_backoff_ms,
        retry_max_backoff_ms = retry.max_backoff_ms,
        retry_jitter_ratio = retry.jitter_ratio,
        "cache engine ready",
    );

    let transport_config =
        quic_transport_config().context("failed to build QUIC transport config")?;
    let ep = build_endpoint(
        &secret_key,
        cfg.network.bind_port,
        &cfg.network.relay_urls,
        &cfg.network.discovery,
        transport_config,
    )
    .await
    .context("failed to build iroh endpoint")?;

    node_metrics
        .register_iroh_endpoint(&ep)
        .context("failed to register iroh metrics")?;

    let limiter = Arc::new(ConnectionLimiter::new(
        &cfg.security,
        Arc::clone(&node_metrics),
    ));
    // Attach the limiter to the reload state so SIGHUP / admin reloads
    // can forward `[security]` changes via `ConnectionLimiter::reload`
    // (#235). Done immediately after construction so a SIGHUP delivered
    // during the rest of startup still finds a target.
    reload_state.attach_limiter(Some(Arc::clone(&limiter)));
    reload_state.attach_metrics(Arc::clone(&node_metrics));

    Ok(Infra {
        node_metrics,
        secret_key,
        eth_signer,
        payment_pool_deployment: pool_store_deployment,
        concrete_pool_store,
        pool_state_store,
        watcher_checkpoint_store,
        receipt_sink,
        receipt_writer,
        lane_flush_task,
        node_origin,
        pull_through_origin,
        cache,
        eviction_policy,
        frequency_estimator: estimator,
        ep,
        limiter,
    })
}

/// By-value bundle of the endpoint, handlers, limiter, and blacklist
/// readiness receiver consumed when [`serve_until_shutdown`] builds the router.
/// Every field is moved into the router builder (or its gate), so none is
/// referenced by [`run`] after the serve call returns.
struct ServeInputs {
    ep: Endpoint,
    probe_handler: Arc<ProbeHandler>,
    client_handler: Arc<ClientHandler>,
    dht_handler: Arc<DhtHandler>,
    blacklist_ready_rx: oneshot::Receiver<crate::blacklist_watcher::InitialSyncResult>,
}

/// Serve phase of [`run`] (#1253): build the paid-delivery router behind the
/// fail-closed blacklist gate, install the signal + SIGHUP streams, and run the
/// select loop until a shutdown signal arrives. Returns the live [`Router`] and
/// the observed [`ShutdownSignal`] so [`run`] can drive the teardown sequence.
/// `drain_trigger` is borrowed, not consumed, because [`run`] still passes it to
/// [`shutdown`] afterwards.
#[allow(clippy::cognitive_complexity)]
async fn serve_until_shutdown(
    reload_state: &RuntimeReloadState,
    config_path: Option<&Path>,
    drain_trigger: &Arc<admin::DrainTrigger>,
    serve_in: ServeInputs,
) -> anyhow::Result<(Router, ShutdownSignal)> {
    let ServeInputs {
        ep,
        probe_handler,
        client_handler,
        dht_handler,
        blacklist_ready_rx,
    } = serve_in;

    // No Probe, Client, or DHT ALPN is registered before the mandatory first
    // global + operator-region blacklist enumeration and enforcement pass
    // succeeds. That pass runs inline in `build_chain_and_handlers`, before the
    // metrics and admin listeners bind, and has always resolved by the time
    // control reaches this gate; a boot that retries it has nothing listening
    // yet. The gate is the structural seam: the `Router` cannot be built on a
    // pending or failed sync. A *failed* initial sync is fail-closed the hard
    // way: the gate returns `Err`, `run` propagates it, and the process exits
    // rather than ever serving un-vetted content.
    let router = gate_listener_on_blacklist_sync(blacklist_ready_rx, || {
        Router::builder(ep.clone())
            .accept(ProbeHandler::ALPN, probe_handler)
            .accept(ClientProtocol::ALPN, ClientProtocol::new(client_handler))
            .accept(DhtHandler::ALPN, dht_handler)
            .spawn()
    })
    .await?;

    // Install signal streams once, before entering the select loop.
    // tokio docs are explicit that `Signal::recv` is the supported way
    // to await repeated signals, and re-creating the stream per signal
    // is not — see `tokio::signal::unix::signal` for the reasoning.
    let mut shutdown_streams = ShutdownStreams::install();
    let mut hup_stream = HupStream::install();

    let signal = loop {
        tokio::select! {
            sig = shutdown_streams.recv() => break sig,
            () = hup_stream.recv() => {
                match config_path {
                    Some(path) => {
                        if let Err(err) = reload_state.reload(path).await {
                            tracing::warn!(error = %err, "config reload error");
                        }
                    }
                    None => {
                        tracing::warn!(
                            "SIGHUP received but no config file path is in use; ignoring"
                        );
                    }
                }
            }
            () = drain_trigger.wait() => {
                tracing::info!("admin_v1_drain received; initiating graceful shutdown");
                break ShutdownSignal::AdminDrain;
            }
        }
    };
    tracing::info!(signal = %signal, "shutdown signal received; closing router");

    Ok((router, signal))
}

/// Chain providers, event watchers, and paid-delivery handlers built during the
/// middle phase of [`run`] (#1253). A by-value bundle of the long-lived handles
/// the background-task, serve, and shutdown phases consume, mirroring [`Infra`].
/// Generic over the seller-wallet provider `P` (an opaque `impl Provider`
/// threaded through [`PoolSettlementService`]); [`run`] infers `P` at the call
/// site and hands it to [`ShutdownHandles`].
struct ChainHandlers<P: Provider + Clone + 'static> {
    providers: ProviderFactory,
    event_poll_interval: Duration,
    slash_domain: alloy::dyn_abi::Eip712Domain,
    bind_domain: alloy::dyn_abi::Eip712Domain,
    staker_set: Arc<dyn StakerSet>,
    /// The single multiplexed chain-event poller driving every registered
    /// watcher route — six with the fee-shares route, which registers only
    /// when the startup `feeRouter()` read succeeds.
    /// Stopped once, late in shutdown (after `router.shutdown`), because the
    /// capacity-bond route's staker set gates DHT admission through drain.
    poller: crate::chain_events::resumable_watcher::WatcherHandle,
    slash_store: crate::slash_watcher::SlashStore,
    node_address_resolver: Option<Arc<dyn crate::dht::NodeAddressResolver>>,
    probe_rate_limiter: Arc<ProbeRateLimiter>,
    probe_handler: Arc<ProbeHandler>,
    dht_rate_limiter: Arc<DhtRateLimiter>,
    record_store: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<RecordStore>>,
    origin_directory: Arc<dyn crate::dht::origin::OriginDirectory>,
    dht_handler: Arc<DhtHandler>,
    dht_routing: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<crate::dht::RoutingTable>>,
    /// The `CapacityBond` registry's `NodeId → regionHint` projection (ADR 030),
    /// threaded to the node-origin pull path for the region-latency penalty.
    registry_regions: Arc<std::sync::RwLock<std::collections::HashMap<crate::dht::NodeId, String>>>,
    client_handler: Arc<ClientHandler>,
    /// Shared with the reload state (`attach_load_shed`) and the egress-EWMA
    /// sampling tick spawned in [`spawn_background_tasks`], so all three see
    /// the same live policy.
    shed_controller: Arc<crate::load_shed::LoadShedController>,
    payment_service: PoolSettlementService<P>,
    blacklist_ready_rx: oneshot::Receiver<crate::blacklist_watcher::InitialSyncResult>,
    /// Bring-up node-id binding self-check (#1034), carried through to
    /// `AdminState` so `admin_v1_health` can report it. A plain value, not a
    /// handle: the binding only moves by an explicit operator transaction, so
    /// there is nothing live to keep.
    binding_report: crate::binding_check::BindingReport,
    /// ADR 041 buy-side profitability gate policy, selected from
    /// `cache.serve_economics.policy`.
    serve_economics: Arc<dyn crate::serve_economics::ServeEconomicsPolicy>,
    /// Live operator fee-share (basis points) cell, seeded from chain at
    /// startup and kept current by the fee-shares watcher.
    operator_shares: crate::fee_shares::OperatorShares,
    /// ADR 041 per-source warming allowance. The SAME `Arc` the eviction path
    /// holds (to forget a dropped hash's tag) and the warming-credit aggregator
    /// applies serve credits to, threaded to
    /// [`crate::node_origin::NodeOriginConfig`] for the buy-side debit. The
    /// client handler reaches it only through a
    /// [`crate::warming_allowance::WarmingCreditSink`], never directly.
    warming: Arc<crate::warming_allowance::WarmingAllowance>,
    /// Stop handle for the ADR 041 warming-credit aggregator. Cancelled after
    /// the router drains on shutdown so the aggregator flushes the credits
    /// already queued by in-flight serves, then awaited — held rather than
    /// detached so a task that died shows up as a join error instead of as
    /// credits that quietly stop landing.
    warming_creditor: StopHandle,
}

/// The chain-event poller builder with its config-driven settings: the
/// `eth_getLogs` block-span ceiling (`blockchain.get_logs_max_block_span`) and
/// the span, range-rejection and window-retry metrics. Routes are added by the
/// caller.
fn chain_poller_builder(
    head: Arc<dyn HeadSource>,
    poll_interval: Duration,
    blockchain: &decdn_common::config::ResolvedBlockchain,
    node_metrics: &Arc<metrics::Metrics>,
) -> crate::chain_events::multiplexed_poller::MultiplexedPollerBuilder {
    let span_metrics = Arc::clone(node_metrics);
    crate::chain_events::multiplexed_poller::MultiplexedPollerBuilder::new(head, poll_interval)
        .max_backfill_span(blockchain.get_logs_max_block_span)
        .on_span_change(Box::new(move |span| span_metrics.chain_get_logs_span(span)))
        .on_range_rejection(metrics::metric_hook(
            node_metrics,
            metrics::Metrics::chain_get_logs_range_rejected,
        ))
        .on_window_retry(metrics::metric_hook(
            node_metrics,
            metrics::Metrics::chain_get_logs_retried,
        ))
        .on_window_deferred(metrics::metric_hook(
            node_metrics,
            metrics::Metrics::chain_get_logs_deferred,
        ))
}

/// Middle phase of [`run`] (#1253): parse the chain contract addresses and
/// EIP-712 domains, bootstrap the `CapacityBond` registry / slash / origin
/// watchers, and construct the probe, client, and DHT handlers plus the
/// seller-side [`PoolSettlementService`]. Borrows [`Infra`]; the buyer-side
/// provider/store construction and the background tasks belong to
/// `spawn_background_tasks`. Returns [`ChainHandlers`], whose seller-wallet provider `P` [`run`]
/// infers and threads into [`ShutdownHandles`].
#[allow(clippy::cognitive_complexity, clippy::too_many_lines)]
async fn build_chain_and_handlers(
    cfg: &ResolvedConfig,
    reload_state: &RuntimeReloadState,
    infra: &Infra,
) -> anyhow::Result<ChainHandlers<impl Provider + Clone + 'static>> {
    // SlashJudge EIP-712 domain for probe `slash_sig` (ADR 014 §1–2). Parsed
    // through the shared zero-address guard (#1219) for a uniform "every daemon
    // contract address is non-zero" invariant. `resolve_blockchain` already
    // rejects a zero or malformed `slash_judge_address` at config load, so here
    // the guard is defense-in-depth rather than the sole check.
    let slash_judge_addr = parse_nonzero_address(
        &cfg.blockchain.slash_judge_address,
        "blockchain.slash_judge_address",
    )?;
    let slash_domain =
        decdn_incentive::slash_judge_domain(cfg.blockchain.chain_id, slash_judge_addr);

    // Chain-backed active-staker set. Bootstrap failure is fatal on a
    // deterministic fault or once its retries are exhausted (see the boot
    // budget below): an
    // empty set silently rejects every inbound `Store`, and once the
    // iterative `FindValue` lookup filter exists it would drop every
    // responder. Built here (ahead of the probe handler) so the probe
    // handler can consult it for stake-lane probe-acceptance (#757); the
    // DHT handler below shares the same `Arc`.
    let rpc_url: HttpUrl = cfg.blockchain.rpc_url.parse().with_context(|| {
        format!(
            "blockchain.rpc_url {:?} is not a valid URL",
            cfg.blockchain.rpc_url
        )
    })?;
    let capacity_bond_addr = parse_nonzero_address(
        &cfg.blockchain.capacity_bond_address,
        "blockchain.capacity_bond_address",
    )?;
    // Mandatory for paid delivery. Config resolution rejects absence; this
    // runtime guard preserves fail-closed behavior for directly constructed
    // `ResolvedConfig` values as well.
    let content_blacklist_addr = parse_nonzero_address(
        cfg.blockchain
            .content_blacklist_address
            .as_deref()
            .context("missing mandatory blockchain.content_blacklist_address")?,
        "blockchain.content_blacklist_address",
    )?;
    let providers = ProviderFactory::new(rpc_url, Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics));
    // One value, two consumers (#1011/#1106): the multiplexed poller's merged
    // `eth_getLogs` tick cadence, and — through `with_poll_interval` below — the
    // pending-tx receipt heartbeat, overriding alloy's 250 ms localhost default
    // that would hammer a dev anvil.
    let event_poll_interval = Duration::from_millis(cfg.blockchain.event_poll_interval_ms);
    let chain_provider = providers.read_only(event_poll_interval);
    // One `eth_blockNumber` per TTL window for ALL watchers, instead of one per
    // watcher per tick. Plain read-only provider: a head read needs no wallet or
    // nonce filler, and coupling it to the signer stack would give every watcher's
    // head read a dependency on it. Deliberately NOT wrapped in
    // `with_poll_interval` — that only sets the pending-tx receipt heartbeat, and
    // this provider never builds a `PendingTransactionBuilder`.
    let head: Arc<dyn HeadSource> = Arc::new(SharedHead::new(
        providers.shared_head(),
        event_poll_interval,
    ));
    // Every on-chain watcher registers a `Route` on ONE shared multiplexed
    // poller instead of running its own `eth_getLogs` loop: six watchers scan
    // disjoint `(address, topic0)` slices of the same four contracts, so one
    // merged `get_logs` per tick — demuxed after the fact — replaces six. The
    // routes are collected as each watcher bootstraps below and spawned once (see
    // `build`/`spawn` near the end of this function). The poller mints one
    // shutdown token; the runtime drives graceful stop through the single handle.
    let mut poller_routes: Vec<crate::chain_events::multiplexed_poller::Route> = Vec::new();
    // One read-only provider for the poller's merged `get_logs` (each sink still
    // holds its own contract instance for its follow-up reads/writes).
    let poller_provider = providers.read_only(event_poll_interval);

    // One boot deadline for the four fail-closed chain bootstraps below — the
    // registry, slash, `usdc()` self-check and blacklist reads (#2159). Each
    // retries its reads on transient provider errors and fails only on a
    // deterministic fault or once the shared deadline passes. The best-effort
    // fee-share reads retry on a capped sub-budget of it and fall back to the
    // floor share instead of failing boot; the binding check does not use it.
    // Startup stays fail-closed: a retry delays readiness, and the ALPN router
    // waits on the blacklist enumeration and enforcement.
    let boot = BootRetry::new(BOOT_CHAIN_RETRY_BUDGET, Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics));

    // One CapacityBond enumeration + one route feeding both registry projections
    // (#1110). The bindings half is built only when pull-through is on; it derives
    // from page data already read here, so it has no RPC that can fail on its own.
    let registry = crate::dht::capacity_bond_registry::bootstrap(
        chain_provider,
        capacity_bond_addr,
        Arc::clone(&head),
        cfg.cache.node_to_node_pull_through_enabled,
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
        &boot,
    )
    .await
    .with_context(|| format!("CapacityBond registry bootstrap at {capacity_bond_addr}"))?;
    let staker_set: Arc<dyn StakerSet> = registry.staker_set;
    let registry_regions = Arc::clone(&registry.regions);
    // The shared `operator address → NodeId` reverse projection (#1110), kept
    // current by the same registry route. The lazy `ChainOriginDirectory`
    // resolves against it directly rather than maintaining its own binding cache.
    let operator_to_node = Arc::clone(&registry.operator_to_node);
    // Registry multiaddrs as an endpoint address lookup (ADR 001 § Node
    // Discovery): every bare-`NodeId` dial resolves the node's registry
    // addresses alongside its pkarr record, so a peer stays directly dialable
    // when the pkarr server is unreachable or its record is not yet published.
    // The same registry route keeps the lookup current.
    infra
        .ep
        .address_lookup()
        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("endpoint address lookup unavailable: {e}"))?
        .add(registry.dial_addrs.lookup());
    let own_id = crate::dht::routing::NodeId::from_bytes(*infra.ep.id().as_bytes());
    reachability::report(
        &infra.node_metrics,
        cfg.network.bind_port,
        &registry.dial_addrs.get(&own_id).unwrap_or_default(),
    );
    // The registry route MUST stay live through drain (its staker set gates DHT
    // admission), which forces the single poller stop to the LATE point below.
    poller_routes.push(registry.route);

    // Slash-detection watcher (#1032, G-NODE-05): enumerate this operator's
    // still-appealable slashes from `CapacityBond` and follow `SlashRecorded`, so
    // a slash surfaces over `admin_v1_slashes` (+ the `decdn_slashes_detected_total`
    // metric) and the operator can file `decdn appeal slash` in time. Read-only;
    // held to `run()`'s end so its background task lives as long as the daemon.
    // The boot enumeration retries on the shared boot budget, like the
    // CapacityBond registry bootstrap above; thereafter a tail blip retries and
    // the periodic resync heals drift, so detection is never disabled for the
    // daemon's lifetime.
    let (slash_store, slash_route) = crate::slash_watcher::bootstrap(
        providers.read_only(event_poll_interval),
        capacity_bond_addr,
        infra.eth_signer.address(),
        Arc::clone(&head),
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
        &boot,
    )
    .await
    .context("bootstrap the slash-detection watcher")?;
    poller_routes.push(slash_route);

    // NodeId → bonded operator address resolver for node-to-node pulls (#831),
    // produced by the same CapacityBond bootstrap as the staker set above and
    // `Some` exactly when pull-through is enabled. Held to provision the
    // `NodeOrigin` below.
    let node_address_resolver: Option<Arc<dyn crate::dht::NodeAddressResolver>> =
        if cfg.cache.node_to_node_pull_through_enabled {
            registry.node_addresses
        } else {
            None
        };

    // Stake-lane probe-acceptance reservation (#757, ADR 003 §Admission and
    // Priority). Strictly operator opt-in: a policy is built only for a
    // non-zero `cache.stake_lane_reserved_holds` (the `NonZeroUsize` gate
    // makes the "off" case unrepresentable in `StakeLanePolicy`), so the
    // default single-lane node passes `None` and the probe handler's hot
    // path is unchanged. A reservation paired with disabled holds
    // (`max_probe_holds == 0`) can never fire — surface that misconfig as a
    // warning and leave the lane off rather than wire a dead per-probe lookup.
    let stake_lane_policy =
        NonZeroUsize::new(cfg.cache.stake_lane_reserved_holds).and_then(|reserved| {
            if cfg.cache.max_probe_holds == 0 {
                tracing::warn!(
                    reserved_holds = reserved.get(),
                    "cache.stake_lane_reserved_holds is set but cache.max_probe_holds=0; \
                     the stake-lane reservation has no effect (probe holds are disabled)"
                );
                None
            } else {
                Some(ProbeStakeLanePolicy::new(
                    Arc::clone(&staker_set),
                    reserved,
                    cfg.cache.max_probe_holds,
                ))
            }
        });

    // ADR 005 §Probe rate limiting three-layer token-bucket limiter for
    // `cdn/probe/v1`. Built from `[probe.rate_limit]` and run *in addition* to
    // the shared `ConnectionLimiter` (see `probe_rate_limit` module docs); the
    // per-peer (NodeId) layer it adds is the gap #982 closed.
    // `from_resolved` rather than `new`: both limiter configs are aliases of
    // the same struct, so passing `&cfg.dht` here would compile (#1457).
    let probe_rate_limiter = Arc::new(ProbeRateLimiter::from_resolved(
        &cfg.probe,
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
    ));

    // Chain-read liveness (ADR 011 §Serving while chain-stale). One handle,
    // stamped by the blacklist watcher (boot enumeration + every successful poll
    // tick) and read by the probe and serve paths, which refuse once the node
    // has been unable to reach the chain for longer than the grace window. This
    // runtime path always wires the blacklist watcher — `content_blacklist_address`
    // is mandatory at node config resolution — so the gate is always live here;
    // the `Option` the handlers hold exists for the test paths that build a
    // handler with no chain.
    let chain_freshness = crate::chain_freshness::ChainFreshness::new(Duration::from_secs(
        cfg.blockchain.chain_staleness_grace_sec,
    ));

    let probe_handler = Arc::new(ProbeHandler::new(
        infra.secret_key.public(),
        cfg.payment.rate_per_mb,
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
        Arc::clone(&infra.limiter),
        Arc::clone(&probe_rate_limiter),
        infra.cache.clone(),
        Arc::clone(&infra.eth_signer),
        slash_domain.clone(),
        stake_lane_policy,
        cfg.cache.relay_foreign_namespaces,
        Some(chain_freshness.clone()),
    ));

    // `cdn/dht/v1` handler (ADR 022 / #320): serves FindNode, FindValue, and
    // Store. Bootstrap, bucket refresh, and the republish scheduler run as
    // background tasks below. Three-layer rate limiter operates at the full
    // ADR 022 spec.
    let dht_rate_limiter = Arc::new(DhtRateLimiter::from_resolved(
        &cfg.dht,
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
    ));
    // Record store sized from the ADR 022 defaults; per-publisher /
    // global / per-hash caps are pinned by the protocol and only the
    // TTL field is plausibly operator-tunable, but no knob is exposed
    // yet — operators with non-default needs should file a follow-up
    // rather than tune in TOML.
    let record_store = Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(RecordStore::new(
        RecordStoreConfig::default(),
    )));
    // Origin directory for the node-origin FIND_VALUE reads — the last-resort
    // fallback when the DHT returns no providers, and the supplement when a ranged
    // pull's probed holders do not span the blob (ADR 022 §FIND_VALUE Flow; #912,
    // #2195) — and for the reactive pull-through gate. When the operator configures the
    // OriginAssignment + PublisherRegistry addresses, use the chain-backed
    // `ChainOriginDirectory` — a lazy TTL cache resolving hash → namespace →
    // authorized origin → active NodeId on demand, reusing the
    // already-bootstrapped `staker_set` and `operator_to_node` reverse
    // projection for operator liveness and binding. No bootstrap RPC: the
    // cache populates on the first lookup miss per namespace.
    // Without those addresses this is an `EmptyOriginDirectory`: the FIND_VALUE
    // fallback resolves nothing.
    let origin_directory: Arc<dyn crate::dht::origin::OriginDirectory> =
        if let Some(origin_addr) = cfg.blockchain.origin_assignment_address.as_deref() {
            let origin_assignment_addr =
                parse_nonzero_address(origin_addr, "blockchain.origin_assignment_address")?;
            Arc::new(crate::dht::ChainOriginDirectory::new(
                providers.read_only(event_poll_interval),
                origin_assignment_addr,
                Arc::clone(&operator_to_node),
                Arc::clone(&staker_set),
                reload_state.content_denylist(),
                cfg.blockchain.origin_directory_cache_capacity,
                Duration::from_secs(cfg.blockchain.origin_directory_positive_ttl_sec),
                Duration::from_secs(cfg.blockchain.origin_directory_negative_ttl_sec),
                Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
            ))
        } else {
            Arc::new(crate::dht::origin::EmptyOriginDirectory)
        };
    let dht_handler = Arc::new(DhtHandler::new(
        infra.secret_key.public(),
        Arc::clone(&dht_rate_limiter),
        Arc::clone(&infra.limiter),
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
        Arc::clone(&staker_set),
        Arc::clone(&record_store),
    ));

    // The DHT handler builds its own routing table internally; grab a
    // shared handle so the bootstrap path + republish + bucket-refresh
    // tasks can all operate on the same instance.
    let dht_routing = dht_handler.routing_table();

    // `cdn/client/v1` paid-delivery handler (#317). The voucher EIP-712 domain
    // binds to the `PaymentPool` deployment the lane store is stamped with
    // (`infra.payment_pool_deployment` — one parse, one source of truth); the
    // ephemeral-binding domain to the `CapacityBond` deployment
    // (== `capacity_bond_addr`, which holds the NodeId↔address mappings). The
    // handler hydrates per-lane voucher state from `pool_state_store` so
    // a restart cannot replay an already-accepted voucher (#527).
    let payment_pool_addr = infra.payment_pool_deployment.payment_pool;

    // Live operator fee-share seed (ADR 041 / ADR 016 § Tunable Economics):
    // `PaymentPool.feeRouter()` resolves the router address, then
    // `FeeRouter.getShares()` reads the current 3-way split, narrowed to the
    // operator's bps. Unlike the fail-closed reads, NO leg of this chain is fatal
    // to boot: a failure falls back to `FEE_ROUTER_OPERATOR_BPS_FLOOR` and the
    // node still comes up. Both reads retry transient errors; the `feeRouter()`
    // retry matters most, because `feeRouter` is immutable and a missed read
    // leaves the `SharesUpdated` route below unregistered until restart. They
    // retry on a `FEE_SHARE_BOOT_BUDGET` sub-budget of the boot deadline, so a
    // flapping provider cannot spend the time the later `usdc()` and blacklist
    // reads need.
    let crate::fee_shares::FeeShareSeed {
        router: fee_router_addr,
        operator_bps: seed_operator_bps,
    } = crate::fee_shares::seed_from_chain(
        providers.read_only(event_poll_interval),
        payment_pool_addr,
        FEE_ROUTER_OPERATOR_BPS_FLOOR,
        &boot.capped(FEE_SHARE_BOOT_BUDGET),
    )
    .await;
    infra
        .node_metrics
        .fee_shares_watcher_unregistered(fee_router_addr.is_none());
    let operator_shares = crate::fee_shares::OperatorShares::new(seed_operator_bps);
    tracing::info!(
        bps = seed_operator_bps,
        "seeded live operator fee share for serve-economics"
    );

    // ADR 041 buy-side profitability gate for cache-miss relay legs. Node-local,
    // config-selectable; `off` disables the economic ceiling entirely.
    let serve_economics = crate::serve_economics::select_policy(&cfg.cache.serve_economics);

    // ADR 041 per-source warming allowance, bounding the loss from speculative
    // above-floor buys per upstream source. Built once and shared by the buy loop
    // (debit), the serve path (credit realized margin), and the eviction path
    // (forget a dropped hash's tag).
    let warming = Arc::new(crate::warming_allowance::WarmingAllowance::new(
        cfg.cache.serve_economics.warming_budget,
        cfg.cache.serve_economics.warming_refill,
    ));

    // Bring-up self-check: is the key we are about to serve under the one bound
    // to this operator on-chain? A node that answers "no" is UNSLASHABLE
    // (`SlashJudge` resolves the accused through `nodeIdOf`), and nothing else
    // in the runtime would notice — so the check is here rather than left to an
    // operator to think of. Advisory: it never blocks startup, because a daemon
    // that refused to boot on a transient RPC failure could not be used to run
    // the rotation that repairs the binding. See `crate::binding_check`.
    let binding_report = crate::binding_check::check(
        providers.read_only(event_poll_interval),
        capacity_bond_addr,
        infra.eth_signer.address(),
        *infra.secret_key.public().as_bytes(),
    )
    .await;

    let voucher_domain = infra.payment_pool_deployment.voucher_domain();
    let bind_domain =
        decdn_incentive::bind_node_id_domain(cfg.blockchain.chain_id, capacity_bond_addr);

    // Reactive LOCAL-origin pull-through (#1116). Arm a local-only populate on the
    // serve-miss path whenever the operator configured any origin (`[cache.origin]`),
    // INDEPENDENT of `node_to_node_pull_through_enabled`: a cache-only operator must
    // be able to reactively serve content it holds in its OWN fs/http/s3 origin, and
    // — with node→node on — that local origin is preferred over the paid peer window
    // path. The handler still gates it on proven lane authority
    // (`pull_authorized`), so it fronts no free egress, and `populate_local` never
    // consults the paid `Peer` node→node origin. The node→node
    // window/buffered/governor/gate paths below stay flag-gated.
    //
    // A single local origin-chain walk (fs/http/s3), NOT a provider fan-out — so
    // budget it at the per-attempt `node_pull_timeout_sec`, not `outer_pull_deadline`
    // (which budgets the sequential node→node pull). Using the outer deadline would
    // let a wedged local origin block many times longer (>7× at defaults) before
    // falling through to the node→node paths.
    let local_populate = (!cfg.cache.origins.is_empty())
        .then(|| Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.node_pull_timeout_sec));

    // Node→node pull-through deps (#831/#856/#821), all gated on
    // `node_to_node_pull_through_enabled`. Computed as `Option`s here so the handler's
    // wiring is one construction-time literal; the gates (and their nesting) are
    // preserved exactly.
    let mut pull_through = None;
    let mut pull_through_origin = None;
    if cfg.cache.node_to_node_pull_through_enabled {
        // The outer deadline bounds how long a miss blocks the delivery path before
        // falling back to `NotFound`. It is *derived* from the per-candidate budget
        // (`node_pull_timeout_sec`) rather than equal to it: the handler wraps the
        // whole `discover → probe → rank → pull` fetch in one `tokio::time::timeout`,
        // so an outer deadline equal to the per-candidate timeout would cancel the
        // fetch the instant candidate #1 stalls, before the `MAX_PROVIDER_ATTEMPTS`
        // fallback loop ever reaches candidates #2..N (#859). `outer_pull_deadline`
        // budgets all three of each candidate's sequential stages — pool open,
        // stream open, and one silent-streaming window — plus one-time discovery
        // slack. Whether the pull can actually succeed additionally depends on the
        // `NodeOrigin` being provisioned; an unprovisioned origin just makes the
        // `get` a fast miss.
        let per_candidate = Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.node_pull_timeout_sec);
        let stall = Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.node_pull_stall_window_sec);
        let outer_deadline = crate::selection::outer_pull_deadline(per_candidate, stall);
        pull_through = Some(outer_deadline);
        // Window-paced pull-through (#856, ADR 037): when the `NodeOrigin` is
        // available, serve cache misses by fusing the upstream pull with downstream
        // delivery, paced by the ramped credit window (ADR 003 §Credit window,
        // #1669) instead of the buffered `populate`.
        if let Some(origin) = &infra.pull_through_origin {
            pull_through_origin = Some(Arc::clone(origin));
        }
    }

    // ADR 011 deny-set. Taken from the reload state rather than built here, so
    // the handler and the SIGHUP / `decdn node reload` path hold the SAME `Arc`
    // — a denylist entry added to the config file takes effect on reload with no
    // handler rebuild and no restart, which is what makes it usable against a
    // one-hour statutory clock. It is a compliance gate, so the deps literal
    // below names it like every other field: a wiring site that drops it fails
    // to compile rather than silently degrading to "deny nothing".
    let content_denylist = reload_state.content_denylist();
    // Redeem-hint channel (#327), created outside `PoolSettlementService::bootstrap`
    // so the sender can be cloned into the handler deps below while the service
    // takes the receiver. `redeem_tx` is cloned into the handler deps and also
    // handed to the service (so `redeem_hint_sender()` keeps working); `redeem_rx`
    // drives the service's redeemer loop.
    let (redeem_tx, redeem_rx) =
        tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(crate::payment_settlement::REDEEM_HINT_CAPACITY);
    // Overload-protection gate (load-shed): sheds new serves under resource
    // pressure so in-flight streams stay fast. Bound to a named local, not
    // inlined into the deps literal, so the reload section (`[load_shed]`,
    // hot-reloadable via `RuntimeReloadState::attach_load_shed`) and the
    // egress-EWMA sampling tick spawned in `spawn_background_tasks` both
    // reach the SAME controller.
    let shed_controller = crate::load_shed::LoadShedController::from_config(&cfg.load_shed);
    reload_state.attach_load_shed(Some(Arc::clone(&shed_controller)));
    // Coarse wall clock (issue #1792 item 4): a background task refreshes an
    // atomic every 500 ms so the voucher-accept path's two under-lock reads — the
    // capability-expiry gate and the `last_voucher_at` liveness stamp — cost a
    // relaxed atomic load instead of a `SystemTime::now()` syscall inside the
    // per-lane critical section. The refresher holds only a `Weak`, so it
    // self-terminates when the handler (the clock's last owner) drops at
    // shutdown and needs no stop handle.
    let coarse_clock = Arc::new(crate::coarse_clock::CoarseClock::new());
    crate::coarse_clock::CoarseClock::spawn_refresher(
        &coarse_clock,
        std::time::Duration::from_millis(500),
    );
    // Event-fed pool view (owner + remaining) for the floor-`M` solvency gate and
    // the ADR 011 funder gate. The settlement watcher below folds every
    // `PaymentPool` event into this projection, so a serve request reads
    // `{owner, remaining}` in-memory — no per-serve `getPool` `eth_call`. The same
    // instance is handed to the settlement service (its watcher is the writer).
    let pool_view = crate::pool_view::PoolProjection::new();
    // Wallet-filled provider + `PaymentPool` binding, created here so the handler's
    // pool-view (below) can confirm a projection-miss pool with a `getPool` at
    // admission. The same provider is moved into the settlement service, which
    // builds its own binding from the same address; the buyer path builds its own
    // provider separately.
    let wallet_provider = providers.seller_wallet((*infra.eth_signer).clone(), event_poll_interval);
    // Admit-path pool-view: reads the event-fed projection first and, on a miss
    // (a pool opened before the watcher's `ColdStart::Head` anchor), does ONE
    // `getPool` to confirm the pool is live and solvent before a serve is admitted
    // — folding a servable pool into the projection and refusing an absent/closed/
    // errored one. The mid-stream re-check reads the projection only.
    let resolving_pool_view = crate::payment_settlement::ResolvingPoolView::new(
        decdn_incentive::payment_pool::PaymentPool::new(payment_pool_addr, wallet_provider.clone()),
        pool_view.clone(),
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
    );
    // ADR 041 serve-credit inputs: a non-blocking sink in front of the SAME warming
    // allowance the buy loop debits and the eviction path forgets, plus the live
    // operator fee-share cell. The background aggregator behind the sink is what
    // keeps a serve's final step off the bucket lock the buy loop takes. Eviction
    // shares the allowance but not that lock — `forget` touches the tag map only.
    let (warming_credit, warming_creditor) = crate::warming_allowance::spawn_warming_creditor(
        Arc::clone(&warming),
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
    );
    // One exhaustive literal, never a setter chain (#1254). Every field is named
    // here, so adding one to `ClientHandlerDeps` fails this call site rather than
    // defaulting silently, and deleting a wiring line is a missing-field error
    // instead of a live node that quietly runs the inert default. That matters
    // most for the economic hooks: a dropped `warming_credit` degrades to
    // `NoopWarmingCreditSink` and a dropped `operator_shares` to a zero share,
    // and both lose money on a real node while every test stays green.
    let client_deps = crate::handlers::client::ClientHandlerDeps {
        node_id: infra.secret_key.public(),
        metrics: Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
        limiter: Arc::clone(&infra.limiter),
        shed: Arc::clone(&shed_controller),
        cache: infra.cache.clone(),
        eth_signer: Arc::clone(&infra.eth_signer),
        slash_domain: slash_domain.clone(),
        voucher_domain: voucher_domain.clone(),
        bind_domain: bind_domain.clone(),
        pool_state_store: Arc::clone(&infra.pool_state_store),
        receipt_sink: Arc::clone(&infra.receipt_sink),
        pool_view: Some(Arc::new(resolving_pool_view) as Arc<dyn crate::pool_view::PoolView>),
        pool_min_remaining_deposit: U256::from(
            cfg.blockchain.pool_min_remaining_deposit_micro_usdc,
        ),
        rate_per_mb: cfg.payment.rate_per_mb,
        max_concurrent_streams: MAX_CLIENT_STREAMS,
        content_deny: Arc::clone(&content_denylist),
        chain_freshness: Some(chain_freshness.clone()),
        // Hint the settlement service on each accepted voucher so a lane's
        // accrued claim is planned into a chunk promptly rather than waiting the
        // self-tick.
        redeem_hint: Some(redeem_tx.clone()),
        pull_through,
        local_populate,
        pull_through_origin,
        // Downstream credit-window ramp (ADR 003 §Credit window, #1477, #1669).
        credit_max: cfg.payment.credit_max,
        credit_ramp_divisor: cfg.payment.credit_ramp_divisor,
        frame_target_bytes: cfg.payment.frame_target_bytes,
        idle_timeout: None,
        pool_recheck_interval: None,
        // Per-signer floor gate (ADR 003 §Pool solvency): the live concurrency cap
        // `k` underneath the per-pool `remaining − M` ceiling, which bounds how much
        // live un-vouchered floor one capability signer may hold at once.
        pool_floor_signer_live_windows: cfg.blockchain.pool_floor_signer_live_windows,
        warming_credit,
        operator_shares: operator_shares.clone(),
        // Origin-only policy (#1759): backend-authoritative own/foreign decision.
        relay_foreign_namespaces: cfg.cache.relay_foreign_namespaces,
        coarse_clock: Some(coarse_clock),
        // The capability-expiry margin covers one sweep of the redeemer below.
        redeem_interval_secs: cfg.blockchain.redeem_interval_secs,
    };
    let client_handler = Arc::new(ClientHandler::new(client_deps)?);

    // On-chain seller-settlement service (#327). A wallet-filled provider
    // (the staker-set provider above is read-only) signs the `redeemMany`
    // transactions with the same eth keystore signer. The bootstrap
    // self-checks the contract via `usdc()`; the watcher folds `PaymentPool`
    // events so the serve path reads pool solvency in-memory, and forgets a
    // reclaimed pool's lanes. Redemption is purely periodic: a self-tick
    // flushes the lane store then sweeps every above-threshold lane.
    // Simple (re-fetch-each-send) nonce management, not alloy's default cached
    // manager (#904). The cached manager advances its in-memory nonce when it
    // *prepares* a tx; if that send then fails (e.g. its `eth_estimateGas`
    // reverts on an always-reverting settlement under contention), the tx never
    // lands but the cached nonce stays advanced, so every subsequent tx from
    // this wallet carries a gapped nonce, sits unmined, and wedges the lane
    // until restart. `SimpleNonceManager` stores nothing — each send re-reads
    // the pending nonce — so a failed send can't gap the lane. The buyer
    // provider below relies on this same property for the retried `reclaim`.
    // `wallet_provider` was built above (the handler's admit-path pool-view shares
    // it); it moves into the service here.
    let (payment_service, settlement_route) = PoolSettlementService::bootstrap(
        wallet_provider,
        payment_pool_addr,
        infra.eth_signer.address(),
        Arc::clone(&infra.pool_state_store),
        Arc::clone(&infra.watcher_checkpoint_store),
        Arc::clone(&client_handler),
        U256::from(cfg.blockchain.redeem_threshold_micro_usdc),
        usize::try_from(cfg.blockchain.redeem_max_vouchers_per_tx).unwrap_or(usize::MAX),
        Duration::from_secs(cfg.blockchain.redeem_interval_secs),
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
        &boot,
        pool_view,
        redeem_tx,
        redeem_rx,
    )
    .await
    .context("PaymentPool settlement service bootstrap")?;
    poller_routes.push(settlement_route);

    // Blacklist compliance watcher (ADR 011/031, issue #1031). Its boot pass
    // ENUMERATES the current on-chain deny-set at one pinned block
    // (`blacklistedAddresses` ∪ per-region `blacklistedHashes`) rather than
    // replaying logs, then follows the live tail seeded at that block. It evicts
    // held blobs whose hash is blacklisted in scope for this operator, which
    // cascades to DHT-announce suppression (the republisher's `is_evicted` gate),
    // probe `has_blob:false`, and delivery refusal — the node's only local
    // protection against the slash for serving blacklisted content.
    // `blacklist_ready_rx` gates the ALPN router below on that first enumeration.
    // The route carries a shutdown-token-observing sink factory (its re-scope
    // polls the poller's token, #1236); the tail carries no durable cursor, so
    // teardown has no scan checkpoint to flush.
    let (blacklist_ready_tx, blacklist_ready_rx) = oneshot::channel();
    let blacklist_route = crate::blacklist_watcher::bootstrap(
        providers.read_only(event_poll_interval),
        content_blacklist_addr,
        infra.eth_signer.address(),
        infra.cache.clone(),
        Arc::clone(&warming),
        Arc::clone(&head),
        Duration::from_secs(cfg.blockchain.content_blacklist_poll_interval_sec),
        blacklist_ready_tx,
        &infra.node_metrics,
        Arc::clone(&content_denylist),
        chain_freshness,
        &boot,
    )
    .await
    .context("blacklist compliance watcher boot enumeration")?;
    poller_routes.push(blacklist_route);

    // Fee-shares route (ADR 041 / ADR 016 § Tunable Economics): follows
    // `SharesUpdated` on the shared poller and re-reads `getShares()`
    // authoritatively every `fee_shares_poll_interval_sec` as a safety net,
    // storing into the same shared `operator_shares` cell seeded by the startup
    // read above. Only registered when the startup `feeRouter()` read succeeded
    // — with no router address there is nothing to watch, and the seed already
    // fell back to `FEE_ROUTER_OPERATOR_BPS_FLOOR`. Read-only, no durable cursor.
    if let Some(addr) = fee_router_addr {
        let fee_shares_route = crate::fee_shares_watcher::route(
            providers.read_only(event_poll_interval),
            addr,
            operator_shares.clone(),
            Duration::from_secs(cfg.blockchain.fee_shares_poll_interval_sec),
            &infra.node_metrics,
        );
        poller_routes.push(fee_shares_route);
    }

    // Assemble and spawn the ONE poller for all routes. `build` fails fast if
    // two routes claim the same `(address, topic0)` — a wiring bug, not a
    // runtime condition — surfacing it at boot. Up to four contract addresses
    // (payment_pool, capacity_bond, content_blacklist, fee_router) with
    // disjoint topic0s per (address, topic0).
    let poller = chain_poller_builder(
        Arc::clone(&head),
        event_poll_interval,
        &cfg.blockchain,
        &infra.node_metrics,
    );
    let poller = poller_routes
        .into_iter()
        .fold(
            poller,
            crate::chain_events::multiplexed_poller::MultiplexedPollerBuilder::route,
        )
        .build()
        .context("assemble the multiplexed chain-event poller")?;
    let poller = crate::chain_events::multiplexed_poller::spawn(poller_provider, poller);

    // Bootstrap (ADR 022 §Bootstrap): seed the routing table from the
    // active-staker set + parallel `FindNode(self.node_id)` against a
    // fan-out of seeds. Best-effort — failures here log but don't
    // abort startup.
    let bootstrap_outcome = crate::dht::bootstrap::bootstrap(
        &infra.ep,
        infra.secret_key.public(),
        &dht_routing,
        &staker_set,
    )
    .await;
    tracing::info!(
        seeds = bootstrap_outcome.seeds_seen,
        inserted = bootstrap_outcome.seeds_inserted,
        find_node_ok = bootstrap_outcome.find_node_ok,
        find_node_err = bootstrap_outcome.find_node_err,
        closer_added = bootstrap_outcome.closer_peers_inserted,
        "dht bootstrap complete"
    );
    infra.node_metrics.dht_bootstrap_find_node_failures(
        u64::try_from(bootstrap_outcome.find_node_err).unwrap_or(u64::MAX),
    );
    infra
        .node_metrics
        .dht_routing_table_size(crate::dht::chain_projection::with_lock(
            &dht_routing,
            "dht routing table",
            |table| table.len(),
        ));

    Ok(ChainHandlers {
        providers,
        event_poll_interval,
        slash_domain,
        bind_domain,
        staker_set,
        poller,
        slash_store,
        node_address_resolver,
        probe_rate_limiter,
        probe_handler,
        dht_rate_limiter,
        record_store,
        origin_directory,
        dht_handler,
        dht_routing,
        registry_regions,
        client_handler,
        shed_controller,
        payment_service,
        blacklist_ready_rx,
        binding_report,
        serve_economics,
        operator_shares,
        warming,
        warming_creditor,
    })
}

/// Owned handle bundle produced by [`spawn_background_tasks`]: every local born
/// in the background region that [`run`] still needs after it returns — the
/// stop signals, task handles, and drain trigger that flow into
/// [`serve_until_shutdown`] and [`ShutdownHandles`]. Non-generic: the buyer
/// provider is consumed inside the region and the settlement indexer stores a
/// concrete watcher handle, so no opaque provider type escapes.
struct Background {
    metrics_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    dispatch_gc_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    egress_ewma_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    /// Origin-held-index periodic rescan (#1130). `None` when
    /// `cache.fs_rescan_interval_sec == 0` disables it.
    origin_rescan_stop_tx: Option<oneshot::Sender<()>>,
    record_store_gc_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    eviction_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    dht_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    probe_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    reputation_evict_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    republish_stop: CancellationToken,
    bucket_refresh_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    buyer_bootstrap_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    rpc_watchdog: Option<(oneshot::Sender<()>, tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>)>,
    admin_stop_tx: Option<oneshot::Sender<()>>,
    drain_trigger: Arc<admin::DrainTrigger>,
    tasks: JoinSet<()>,
}

/// Background-tasks phase of [`run`] (#1253): construct the buyer-side
/// provider/stores, spawn every periodic GC / DHT / metrics / admin task, and
/// emit the startup banner. Borrows [`Infra`] and [`ChainHandlers`]; the buyer
/// provider is built from `ch.providers`, and the three EIP-712 domains are
/// cloned out of the shared `ch` reference,
/// and each clone is consumed exactly once. Returns the [`Background`] handles
/// [`run`] threads into the serve call and [`ShutdownHandles`].
#[allow(clippy::cognitive_complexity, clippy::too_many_lines)]
async fn spawn_background_tasks<P: Provider + Clone + 'static>(
    cfg: &ResolvedConfig,
    config_path: Option<&PathBuf>,
    reload_state: &Arc<RuntimeReloadState>,
    infra: &Infra,
    ch: &ChainHandlers<P>,
    started_at: std::time::Instant,
) -> anyhow::Result<Background> {
    // On-chain buyer-side service (#744). When this node pulls content from an
    // upstream provider on a cache miss it pays via the same pool mechanism,
    // acting as the client: a separate wallet-filled provider signs `approve` /
    // `openPool` / `topUp` / `closePool` / `reclaim`. It shares the persistent
    // store (a distinct `buyer_pool_state_v1` table in `buyer.redb`) and re-derives
    // the voucher domain the handler consumed above. The cache-miss hook that
    // *calls* `open_or_reuse_pool` is the `NodeOrigin` provisioned below (#831), gated
    // on `cache.node_to_node_pull_through_enabled`; the service is also held for
    // the process lifetime so its reclaim sweep keeps running even when
    // pull-through is off. The backgrounded bootstrap task (#1109, below) owns
    // that binding via its `let _service` hold — and thus keeps the service's
    // `AbortOnDropHandle` reclaim task alive to shutdown.
    //
    // Unlike the seller service, a buyer-bootstrap failure is NON-fatal: buying
    // is opportunistic cost-recovery, so a failed startup `approve` tx (e.g.
    // insufficient gas) must not block the node's core seller function. Log and
    // continue with the buyer path disabled (and thus pull-through disabled).
    // Simple nonce management, for the reason given on the seller
    // `wallet_provider` above (#904). It matters most here: `reclaim` can revert —
    // the sweep submits it optimistically when its chain-head read fails, and
    // `reclaim` is permissionless, so another caller can land first — and the next
    // sweep re-evaluates the pool, so a reverting send must not leak a cached nonce
    // and wedge the buyer lane. This provider is shared across
    // `approve`/`openPool`/`topUp`/`reclaim` and the reclaim sweep runs
    // concurrently with opens, so correctness relies on `SimpleNonceManager`
    // re-reading the pending nonce each send (a transient racing collision just
    // gets a fresh nonce on the next attempt), not on the sends being strictly
    // serialized.
    let buyer_wallet_provider = ch
        .providers
        .buyer_wallet((*infra.eth_signer).clone(), ch.event_poll_interval);
    let buyer_pool_store: Arc<dyn decdn_incentive::BuyerPoolStore> = Arc::new(
        crate::pool_store::BuyerPoolStoreHandle::new(Arc::clone(&infra.concrete_pool_store)),
    );
    // `admin_v1_pools` reads the SAME store the bootstrap below writes adoptions
    // and top-ups into. It has to be the same handle, not a second open of
    // `buyer.redb`: redb holds a process-exclusive lock on that file for the
    // daemon's lifetime, which is why no CLI can read it from disk (#2078).
    let buyer_pool_store_for_admin = Arc::clone(&buyer_pool_store);
    // The buyer-side PaymentPool bootstrap (whose on-chain round-trips —
    // notably the one-time USDC `approve` receipt — can block for many
    // minutes on a stuck tx, bounded by `APPROVE_RECEIPT_TIMEOUT`) and
    // the node-origin pull-through provisioning it feeds are BOTH deferred to a
    // background task spawned below (#1109), so the metrics/admin listeners and
    // the "node runtime ready" banner come up independent of any chain RPC. The
    // provider/store/pending handles built just above are moved into that task.

    let metrics_addr = std::net::SocketAddr::new(
        cfg.observability.metrics_bind,
        cfg.observability.metrics_port,
    );
    let metrics_listener =
        metrics::bind(metrics_addr).context("failed to bind metrics listener")?;

    let (metrics_stop_tx, metrics_stop_rx) = oneshot::channel::<()>();

    let metrics_handle = Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics);
    let mut tasks = JoinSet::new();
    tasks.spawn(async move {
        if let Err(err) = metrics::serve(metrics_listener, metrics_handle, metrics_stop_rx).await {
            tracing::error!(error = %err, "metrics server exited with error");
        }
    });

    // Periodic dispatch-limiter GC (#440). The acquire path only prunes
    // under flood (when the keyspace exceeds `cap + cap/10`); a node
    // with bursty short-lived clients can otherwise accumulate stale
    // per-source buckets between bursts and never reclaim them until
    // restart. The sweep is `O(n)` over the live keyspace; on an idle
    // limiter `n = 0` so the steady-state cost is one mutex acquire
    // per minute. Stops on its own oneshot — same pattern as the
    // metrics and admin servers.
    let dispatch_gc_stop_tx = {
        let limiter = Arc::clone(&infra.limiter);
        spawn_periodic(&mut tasks, "dispatch_gc", DISPATCH_GC_INTERVAL, move || {
            if let Some((before, after)) = limiter.gc_per_source() {
                tracing::debug!(
                    before,
                    after,
                    dropped = before.saturating_sub(after),
                    "dispatch GC sweep complete"
                );
            }
        })
    };

    // Periodic load-shed egress-EWMA sample: folds the last interval's served
    // bytes into the controller's smoothed rate and republishes it as the
    // gauges the `ResourcePressure` policy's egress-budget check reads live
    // from `try_admit`, and that operators watch via metrics.
    let egress_ewma_stop_tx = {
        let shed = Arc::clone(&ch.shed_controller);
        let warming = Arc::clone(&ch.warming);
        let metrics = Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics);
        spawn_periodic(&mut tasks, "egress_ewma", EGRESS_EWMA_INTERVAL, move || {
            let bps = shed.sample_egress(EGRESS_EWMA_INTERVAL.as_secs());
            metrics.load_shed_egress_bps(i64::try_from(bps).unwrap_or(i64::MAX));
            metrics.load_shed_pressure_active(shed.pressure_active());
            // Live concurrency against the shed high-water mark (#load-shed
            // telemetry), and how many upstream sources warming has cut off
            // (ADR 041), sampled on the same interval as the egress EWMA.
            metrics.load_shed_streams_in_flight(shed.node_in_flight());
            metrics.warming_sources_blocked(warming.blocked_source_count());
        })
    };

    // Periodic DHT record-store GC (ADR 022 §Content Records and TTL).
    // `RecordStore::providers_at` lazily scrubs expired records for the hash it
    // is queried about, but a hash nobody queries again keeps its expired
    // entries — they keep counting against the publisher's per-publisher quota
    // and against the global cap until this sweep fires. Without it a node that
    // publishes a one-shot blob can exhaust its 200-record quota and reject
    // every future `Store`. The sweep is `O(expired × log N)` over the global
    // LRU (front-walk in `RecordStore::gc`); default 60s is well below the
    // 1-hour record TTL.
    let record_store_gc_stop_tx = {
        let records = Arc::clone(&ch.record_store);
        spawn_periodic(
            &mut tasks,
            "record_store_gc",
            DISPATCH_GC_INTERVAL,
            move || {
                let now_us = std::time::SystemTime::now()
                    .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
                    .map_or(0, |d| u64::try_from(d.as_micros()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX));
                let removed = if let Ok(mut store) = records.lock() {
                    store.gc(now_us)
                } else {
                    tracing::error!("dht record-store mutex poisoned; skipping GC sweep this tick");
                    0
                };
                if removed > 0 {
                    tracing::debug!(removed, "dht record-store GC sweep complete");
                }
            },
        )
    };

    // Cache-eviction driver (#1173, ADR 040). Async
    // (the sweep does `total_bytes()`/`release_for_eviction().await`), so it
    // cannot ride `spawn_periodic`'s sync `FnMut`; it spawns directly into the
    // JoinSet with its own oneshot stop, mirroring the metrics server. Enforces
    // the `cache.cache_size_mb` ceiling the write path leaves unbounded.
    let eviction_stop_tx = {
        // The driver's actuator is `release_for_eviction`, which only drops GC
        // protection — the iroh-blobs GC sweep is what actually reclaims disk.
        // With the sweep disabled the ceiling is unenforceable, and the symptom
        // (a cache pinned at 100% while the driver reports work) points at
        // pinning/probe-holds rather than at the real cause. Say so at boot.
        if cfg.cache.gc_interval_sec == 0 {
            tracing::warn!(
                cache_size_mb = cfg.cache.cache_size_mb,
                "eviction driver is running but cache.gc_interval_sec = 0: released blobs are \
                 never reclaimed, so cache.cache_size_mb cannot be enforced. Set a nonzero \
                 gc_interval_sec (default 300) to make eviction reclaim disk."
            );
        }
        let (eviction_stop_tx, eviction_stop_rx) = oneshot::channel::<()>();
        let params = eviction::EvictionParams {
            cache_size_mb: cfg.cache.cache_size_mb,
            disk_headroom_mb: cfg.cache.disk_headroom_mb,
            high_water_pct: cfg.cache.eviction_high_water_pct,
            target_pct: cfg.cache.eviction_target_pct,
            per_sweep_budget: cfg.cache.eviction_per_sweep_budget,
            tick: Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.eviction_tick_secs),
        };
        tasks.spawn(eviction::run(
            infra.cache.clone(),
            infra.node_metrics.cache_metrics(),
            params,
            cfg.cache.cache_dir.clone(),
            infra.eviction_policy.clone(),
            // ADR 041: the SAME warming allowance the buy loop debits and the serve
            // path credits — the driver forgets an evicted hash's tag.
            Arc::clone(&ch.warming),
            eviction_stop_rx,
        ));
        eviction_stop_tx
    };

    // Periodic DHT rate-limiter GC (#645). The acquire path opportunistically
    // prunes when the per-IP / per-peer keyed maps exceed `cap + cap/10`, but a
    // node whose DHT traffic falls below that threshold can carry millions of
    // stale buckets indefinitely — the same DoS shape the dispatch-limiter GC
    // prevents at the connection layer. `gc_per_ip` / `gc_per_peer` use
    // independent single-flight flags, so the two sequential sweeps here never
    // block a concurrent lazy prune from `check`.
    //
    // Panic contract: a panic inside `retain_recent` (governor arithmetic bug,
    // allocator OOM during the walk) unwinds out of the sweep and kills this
    // task. `PruneGuard`'s Drop still releases the single-flight flag, so the
    // lazy-prune path in `check` keeps working — but the periodic sweep is dead
    // until restart, surfacing only via `JoinSet::join_next` at shutdown.
    // Operators wanting earlier notice should alert on the
    // `decdn_dht_rate_limit_tracked_{per_ip,per_peer}` gauges failing to drop on
    // a quiet node (there the periodic sweep is their only writer). A map already
    // empty when the sweep died sits at `0` legitimately — indistinguishable
    // from a healthy sweep over an empty map.
    let dht_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx = {
        let limiter = Arc::clone(&ch.dht_rate_limiter);
        spawn_periodic(
            &mut tasks,
            "dht_rate_limit_gc",
            DHT_RATE_LIMIT_GC_INTERVAL,
            move || {
                log_keyspace_gc("dht", "per_ip", limiter.gc_per_ip());
                log_keyspace_gc("dht", "per_peer", limiter.gc_per_peer());
            },
        )
    };

    // Probe rate-limiter keyspace GC (#982) — same DoS-shape rationale and panic
    // contract as the DHT GC above, for the `cdn/probe/v1` per-IP / per-peer
    // keyed maps.
    let probe_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx = {
        let limiter = Arc::clone(&ch.probe_rate_limiter);
        spawn_periodic(
            &mut tasks,
            "probe_rate_limit_gc",
            PROBE_RATE_LIMIT_GC_INTERVAL,
            move || {
                log_keyspace_gc("probe", "per_ip", limiter.gc_per_ip());
                log_keyspace_gc("probe", "per_peer", limiter.gc_per_peer());
            },
        )
    };

    // DHT republish scheduler (ADR 022 §STORE Flow). The subscribe
    // handle is taken before the cold-start seed so an announcement racing
    // with seed-time lands in the channel backlog rather than the
    // gap between the snapshot and the spawn.
    let republish_scheduler = Arc::new(crate::dht::RepublishScheduler::new());
    // A token rather than a `oneshot`: the republisher's detached lag sweep
    // selects against the same signal, and shutdown must cancel it *before*
    // `cache.shutdown()` flushes the store. A signal the republisher forwards
    // only once it is next polled cannot give that ordering.
    let republish_stop = CancellationToken::new();
    let cache_inserts_rx = infra.cache.subscribe_inserts();
    // Walk the on-disk store (NOT `access_times_snapshot`, which is
    // eviction-recency state rather than the on-disk set) so every held (complete or
    // partial), non-evicted blob gets a `uniform(0, 40 min)` republish entry
    // per ADR 022 §Bootstrap AC 15. On a transient list-error we degrade: the
    // steady-state `subscribe_inserts` path catches only blobs newly fetched
    // or blocks newly completed post-boot — blobs already on disk that get
    // cache-HIT requests are NOT re-scheduled until the next lag sweep or
    // successful restart.
    // Populate the origin-held index before seeding announces (#1130) so cold
    // origin content (fs directory entries + present pins) is advertised from
    // the first republish, not only after a warm pulls it into the store.
    infra.cache.rescan_origins().await;

    // Union stored blobs (complete or partial) with origin-held content — the
    // same snapshot the republisher's lag sweep re-seeds from, so the two
    // cannot drift apart.
    // The union coalesces a hash that is both stored and origin-held into one
    // jitter draw, and on a store list-error the origin-held half still seeds:
    // announce degrades only for the store half. See `holder_snapshot` for why
    // the store half is skipped under the origin-only policy.
    let snapshot =
        crate::dht::publish::holder_snapshot(&infra.cache, cfg.cache.relay_foreign_namespaces)
            .await;
    // Same counters and lines as the lag sweep's degradation: both are this one
    // derivation coming up short, and the boot case is the worse of the two —
    // it lasts the whole process lifetime rather than until the next lag
    // (ADR 022 §Bootstrap AC 15 degraded).
    snapshot.report_degradation(&infra.node_metrics, "cold start");
    let cold_start_count = republish_scheduler.seed_cold_start(
        snapshot
            .hashes
            .into_iter()
            .map(|h| decdn_protocol::ContentHash::from_bytes(*h.as_bytes())),
    );
    tracing::info!(
        cold_start_count,
        "republish scheduler seeded from existing cache + origin-held index (ADR 022 §Bootstrap cold-start, #1130)"
    );
    tasks.spawn(crate::dht::publish::run_republish(
        infra.ep.clone(),
        infra.secret_key.public(),
        Arc::clone(&ch.dht_routing),
        Arc::clone(&republish_scheduler),
        infra.cache.clone(),
        cfg.cache.relay_foreign_namespaces,
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
        cache_inserts_rx,
        republish_stop.clone(),
    ));

    // Periodic origin rescan (#1130): re-walk the fs origin + re-check pins so a
    // file added after boot becomes discoverable within one interval, then push
    // newly-found hashes into the republish scheduler — origin content never
    // generates a store-insert event, so this is its only steady-state announce
    // trigger. `fs_rescan_interval_sec == 0` disables it (startup + reload still
    // rescan). The tick body offloads the async rescan to a detached task
    // (`spawn_periodic` bodies are synchronous); scheduling is idempotent, so an
    // already-announced hash coalesces rather than double-drawing jitter.
    let origin_rescan_stop_tx = if cfg.cache.fs_rescan_interval_sec > 0 {
        let cache = infra.cache.clone();
        let scheduler = Arc::clone(&republish_scheduler);
        Some(spawn_periodic(
            &mut tasks,
            "origin_rescan",
            Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.fs_rescan_interval_sec),
            move || {
                let cache = cache.clone();
                let scheduler = Arc::clone(&scheduler);
                tokio::spawn(async move {
                    cache.rescan_origins().await;
                    let report = cache.origin_held_snapshot();
                    // The steady-state announce trigger reports a short set the
                    // same way the boot seed and the lag sweep do. It runs far
                    // more often than either, so leaving it silent would make the
                    // most common truncation the least visible one.
                    if report.probe_faults > 0 || report.enumerate_failures > 0 {
                        tracing::warn!(
                            faults = report.probe_faults,
                            enumerate_failures = report.enumerate_failures,
                            "origin rescan could not resolve every candidate; the announce set omits anything it could not confirm and no earlier pass had indexed"
                        );
                    }
                    scheduler.seed_cold_start(
                        report
                            .hashes
                            .into_iter()
                            .map(|h| decdn_protocol::ContentHash::from_bytes(*h.as_bytes())),
                    );
                });
            },
        ))
    } else {
        None
    };

    // Oversized pin set starves the eviction driver on EVERY node, because
    // pinned blobs are LRU-exempt however they arrived. Runs unconditionally at
    // startup (and again on reload).
    warn_if_pins_exceed_cache(&infra.cache, cfg.cache.cache_size_mb);

    // DHT bucket-refresh (ADR 022 §Routing Table). Once per hour
    // picks the bucket with the oldest last-refresh timestamp and
    // runs `FindNode(random_id_in_bucket)` against the bucket's
    // freshest peer to repopulate it. Best-effort hygiene — a failed
    // refresh is silently retried on the next tick.
    let (bucket_refresh_stop_tx, bucket_refresh_stop_rx) = oneshot::channel::<()>();
    // Shared "last bucket-refresh completed at" clock (wall-clock µs, 0 =
    // never). The refresh task stamps it each pass; `admin_v1_status`
    // reads it for the routing-table health view (issue #741).
    let bucket_refresh_clock = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(0));
    tasks.spawn(crate::dht::bucket_refresh::run_bucket_refresh(
        infra.ep.clone(),
        infra.secret_key.public(),
        Arc::clone(&ch.dht_routing),
        bucket_refresh_stop_rx,
        crate::dht::bucket_refresh::BUCKET_REFRESH_TICK,
        Arc::clone(&bucket_refresh_clock),
        Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
    ));

    // RPC connectivity watchdog (issue #283). Updates `decdn_rpc_healthy`
    // each tick; a sustained transition fires an alert. `interval == 0`
    // disables the watchdog entirely (operators can opt out for offline
    // dev). Spawned outside the `JoinSet` because we drive it via its own
    // `oneshot` and an explicit `await` during drain, since `JoinSet::abort_all`
    // cancels eagerly and we'd rather let the watchdog observe its `shutdown`
    // arm.
    //
    // Seed the gauge to `1` here unconditionally: the startup
    // `check_rpc_reachability` above already established the endpoint is
    // reachable, and registered Prometheus gauges otherwise default to 0
    // — which alerts would (correctly, by their own logic) read as an
    // outage. Seeding before the watchdog-spawn branch covers the
    // `interval == 0` case too.
    infra.node_metrics.rpc_healthy(true);
    let rpc_watchdog = if cfg.blockchain.rpc_watchdog_interval_sec > 0 {
        let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
            .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5))
            .build()
            .context("failed to build HTTP client for RPC watchdog")?;
        let interval = Duration::from_secs(cfg.blockchain.rpc_watchdog_interval_sec);
        let (tx, rx) = oneshot::channel::<()>();
        let handle = spawn_rpc_watchdog(
            client,
            cfg.blockchain.rpc_url.clone(),
            interval,
            Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
            rx,
        );
        Some((tx, handle))
    } else {
        tracing::info!("RPC watchdog disabled (blockchain.rpc_watchdog_interval_sec = 0)");
        None
    };

    // Admin HTTP surface (`appendix-local-admin-http.md`). Bind here so startup fails fast on a port
    // collision rather than after side-effectful subscriptions have
    // registered. The `serve` task itself is spawned later, once the rest of
    // the runtime state it reads is wired.
    let admin_listener = if let Some(admin_port) = cfg.observability.admin_port {
        let admin_addr = std::net::SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], admin_port));
        Some(admin::bind(admin_addr).context("failed to bind admin listener")?)
    } else {
        tracing::info!("admin server disabled (observability.admin_port = 0)");
        None
    };

    // Local per-peer EWMA reputation score store (ADR 008 §Local Score
    // Calculation). Reputation is local-only: a node ranks its peers solely from
    // its own delivery observations — there is no cross-node aggregation. The
    // store feeds node selection via the `NodeOrigin` pull path (provisioned
    // below).
    // Opt into ADR 008 §Score Clamping's ±0.05 per-report clamp (the library
    // default is a no-op cap) so one bad interaction cannot over-penalize an
    // otherwise good peer (#1176).
    let local_reputation = Arc::new(
        decdn_reputation::LocalReputation::new(
            decdn_reputation::LocalReputationConfig::default()
                .with_max_delta_per_update(decdn_reputation::LOCAL_SCORE_MAX_DELTA_PER_REPORT),
        )
        .context("local reputation config invalid")?,
    );

    // Periodic local-reputation eviction (ADR 008 §Local Score Calculation).
    // The store is written by the node-origin pull path; without this sweep
    // it would retain an entry for every peer ever ranked. `evict` is
    // synchronous and cheap (a bounded walk of idle entries), so it rides
    // `spawn_periodic`'s sync `FnMut` like the other GC sweeps.
    let reputation_evict_stop_tx = {
        let rep = Arc::clone(&local_reputation);
        spawn_periodic(
            &mut tasks,
            "reputation_evict",
            REPUTATION_EVICT_INTERVAL,
            move || {
                rep.evict();
            },
        )
    };

    // Buyer-side PaymentPool bootstrap + node-to-node pull-through
    // provisioning (#831), fully backgrounded off the startup critical path
    // (#1109). The USDC `approve` receipt that `bootstrap` awaits could hang for
    // many minutes on a stuck tx (capped by `APPROVE_RECEIPT_TIMEOUT`);
    // running it inline would gate the metrics/admin binds and the
    // "node runtime ready" banner below. The origin shares its `OnceLock` with
    // the clone already in the cache's origin chain, so a later `provision` from
    // this task arms pull-through; reads before it land as clean misses (no
    // spend, no panic). Bootstrap failure stays NON-fatal — buying is
    // opportunistic cost-recovery.
    //
    // Precompute every cfg/secret-derived value the task needs: the closure is
    // `'static` so it can't borrow `cfg`/`secret_key`, and those are used later.
    let (buyer_bootstrap_stop_tx, buyer_bootstrap_stop_rx) = oneshot::channel::<()>();
    let buyer_working_deposit = U256::from(cfg.blockchain.buyer_working_deposit_micro_usdc);
    let buyer_ensure_max_approval = cfg.blockchain.buyer_max_approve;
    let buyer_signer_address = infra.eth_signer.address();
    let pull_through_enabled = cfg.cache.node_to_node_pull_through_enabled;
    let node_origin_self_id = crate::dht::NodeId::from_bytes(*infra.secret_key.public().as_bytes());
    let node_origin_slash_domain = ch.slash_domain.clone();
    // #1117: the `CapacityBond` bind domain this node signs its node→node client
    // identity binding under — reuses the serving-side `bind_domain` constructed
    // once above so an upstream verifies against an identical domain.
    let node_origin_bind_domain = ch.bind_domain.clone();
    let node_origin_config = crate::node_origin::NodeOriginConfig {
        probe_fanout: cfg.cache.node_pull_probe_fanout,
        pull_timeout: std::time::Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.node_pull_timeout_sec),
        stall_window: std::time::Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.node_pull_stall_window_sec),
        min_throughput_bps: cfg.cache.node_pull_min_throughput_bps,
        max_blob_size_bytes: cfg
            .cache
            .max_blob_size_mb
            .saturating_mul(decdn_protocol::MB_BYTES),
        max_rate_per_mb: cfg.cache.max_rate_per_mb,
        event_poll_interval: std::time::Duration::from_millis(
            cfg.blockchain.event_poll_interval_ms,
        ),
        lookup: crate::dht::LookupConfig::default(),
        // Own self-attested region for the ADR 030 latency-vs-claim penalty
        // (#1177); `None` disables it (nothing to compare a peer's claim against).
        own_region: cfg.identity.region.clone(),
        // ADR 041 buy-side profitability gate + its inputs: the policy object
        // itself, the live operator fee-share cell, the shared ADR 040
        // frequency estimator (when built), and this node's configured sell rate
        // `P_sell` (`payment.rate_per_mb`).
        serve_economics: ch.serve_economics.clone(),
        operator_shares: ch.operator_shares.clone(),
        frequency_estimator: infra.frequency_estimator.clone(),
        sell_rate_base: cfg.payment.rate_per_mb,
        warming: Arc::clone(&ch.warming),
    };
    // Arc/handle clones for the task — the originals are used later in `run()`.
    let ep_for_buyer = infra.ep.clone();
    let eth_signer_for_buyer = Arc::clone(&infra.eth_signer);
    let resolver_opt = ch.node_address_resolver.clone();
    let node_origin_opt = infra.node_origin.clone();
    let dht_routing_c = Arc::clone(&ch.dht_routing);
    let staker_set_c = Arc::clone(&ch.staker_set);
    let origin_directory_c = Arc::clone(&ch.origin_directory);
    let local_reputation_c = Arc::clone(&local_reputation);
    let registry_regions_c = Arc::clone(&ch.registry_regions);
    let node_metrics_for_buyer = Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics);
    let node_metrics_for_origin = Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics);
    let node_origin_engine = infra.cache.clone();
    let mut buyer_bootstrap_stop_rx = buyer_bootstrap_stop_rx;
    let buyer_deployment = infra.payment_pool_deployment;
    let payment_pool_addr_for_buyer = buyer_deployment.payment_pool;
    tasks.spawn(async move {
        let service = tokio::select! {
            biased;
            // A shutdown that races a slow bootstrap unwinds cleanly here.
            _ = &mut buyer_bootstrap_stop_rx => return,
            res = crate::buyer_pool::BuyerPoolService::bootstrap(
                buyer_wallet_provider,
                buyer_deployment,
                buyer_signer_address,
                buyer_pool_store,
                eth_signer_for_buyer,
                buyer_working_deposit,
                buyer_ensure_max_approval,
                node_metrics_for_buyer,
            ) => match res {
                Ok(service) => Arc::new(service),
                Err(err) => {
                    tracing::warn!(
                        error = %sanitize_err_chain(&err),
                        payment_pool_addr = %payment_pool_addr_for_buyer,
                        "buyer-side PaymentPool bootstrap failed; node→node paid cache-miss \
                         pulls are DISABLED for this process (seller settlement is unaffected). \
                         This condition is sticky — restart the node to retry. Check: (1) \
                         blockchain.payment_pool_address is correct, (2) the RPC endpoint is \
                         reachable, (3) the wallet holds gas for the one-time USDC approve."
                    );
                    if pull_through_enabled {
                        tracing::warn!(
                            "cache.node_to_node_pull_through_enabled is set, but the buyer service \
                             failed to bootstrap; pull-through stays DISABLED this process \
                             (restart to retry)"
                        );
                    }
                    return;
                }
            }
        };

        // Provision the node-to-node pull origin now that the buyer service is
        // up (#831). `node_origin_opt` is `Some` iff the feature is on; the
        // buyer is always present at this point, so the remaining gate is the
        // address resolver. The origin's `OnceLock` is shared with the cache
        // chain's clone, so this set is what actually arms pull-through.
        if let Some(origin) = node_origin_opt.as_ref() {
            if let Some(resolver) = resolver_opt.as_ref() {
                origin.provision(crate::node_origin::NodeOriginDeps {
                    endpoint: ep_for_buyer.clone(),
                    dial_runtime: tokio::runtime::Handle::current(),
                    routing_table: dht_routing_c,
                    staker_set: staker_set_c,
                    // FIND_VALUE directory reads: the last-resort fallback when
                    // the DHT returns no providers, and the supplement when a
                    // ranged pull's probed holders do not span the blob (ADR 022
                    // §FIND_VALUE Flow; #912, #2195). Shares the single origin
                    // directory built above with the reactive pull-through gate,
                    // so a configured `ChainOriginDirectory` backs both reads for
                    // every node. Absent chain addresses it is empty, and both
                    // reads find no origin.
                    origin_directory: origin_directory_c,
                    addr_resolver: Arc::clone(resolver),
                    buyer: Arc::clone(&service) as Arc<dyn crate::buyer_pool::PoolOpener>,
                    self_id: node_origin_self_id,
                    slash_domain: node_origin_slash_domain,
                    bind_domain: node_origin_bind_domain,
                    local_rep: local_reputation_c,
                    negative_cache: crate::dht::NegativeProbeCache::new(),
                    probe_cache: crate::dht::PositiveProbeCache::new(),
                    metrics: node_metrics_for_origin,
                    registry_regions: registry_regions_c,
                    config: node_origin_config,
                    // One voucher ledger per provider lane, shared by every concurrent
                    // pull on it (#1145 review). Built here, at the single place the pull
                    // paths' deps are assembled, so both paths necessarily share it —
                    // which is the point: a per-pull ledger makes concurrent pulls collide
                    // on the same cumulative amount. See `buyer_ledgers::BuyerLedgers`.
                    ledgers: Arc::new(crate::buyer_ledgers::BuyerLedgers::default()),
                    // Providers suppressed after a lane-terminal voucher rejection, skipped in
                    // ranking for a fixed window (#1145 review). In-memory, like the negative
                    // cache beside it.
                    wedged_providers: Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(
                        std::collections::HashMap::new(),
                    )),
                    engine: node_origin_engine.clone(),
                });
                tracing::info!(
                    "node-to-node cache-miss pull-through provisioned and enabled (#831)"
                );
            } else {
                tracing::warn!(
                    "cache.node_to_node_pull_through_enabled is set, but the node-address \
                     resolver failed to bootstrap; pull-through stays DISABLED this process \
                     (restart to retry)"
                );
            }
        }

        // Hold the service (and thus its `AbortOnDropHandle` reclaim sweep)
        // alive until shutdown — reclaim must keep running even when
        // pull-through is off (`node_origin_opt` is `None`).
        let _service = service;
        let _ = buyer_bootstrap_stop_rx.await;
    });

    // Drain trigger for `admin_v1_drain` (issue #244). Constructed
    // unconditionally so the admin handler always has a live target —
    // there is no "drain disabled" state analogous to "no region" or
    // "no config path". The `Arc` is shared with the admin state (via
    // `Arc::clone`) and the select loop arm below.
    let drain_trigger = Arc::new(admin::DrainTrigger::new());

    // Spawn the admin serve task with the full state. Bind happened
    // earlier (see `admin_listener` above) so a port collision would
    // have failed startup before any side-effectful subscribes ran.
    let admin_stop_tx = if let Some(listener) = admin_listener {
        let (tx, rx) = oneshot::channel::<()>();
        // Build the reload hook only when a config file path was passed
        // (CLI-only invocation has nothing on disk to re-read). The
        // hook hands `admin_v1_reload` the same `RuntimeReloadState` and
        // file path the SIGHUP arm uses, so both paths converge on a
        // single mutex-serialised reload — see `admin::AdminRpcImpl::reload`
        // and the SIGHUP arm of the select loop below.
        let reload_hook = config_path.map(|path| admin::ReloadHook {
            reload_state: Arc::clone(reload_state),
            config_path: path.clone(),
        });
        let state = admin::AdminState::new(
            *infra.secret_key.public().as_bytes(),
            started_at,
            infra.cache.clone(),
            reload_hook,
            Arc::clone(&drain_trigger),
            Arc::clone(&infra.node_metrics),
        )
        // DHT introspection for `admin_v1_status` (issue #741). All handles
        // are clones of state the DHT tasks already share — read-only here.
        .with_dht(admin::DhtStatusHandles {
            routing: Arc::clone(&ch.dht_routing),
            staker_set: Arc::clone(&ch.staker_set),
            record_store: Arc::clone(&ch.record_store),
            republish: Arc::clone(&republish_scheduler),
            refresh_clock: Arc::clone(&bucket_refresh_clock),
            refresh_interval: crate::dht::bucket_refresh::BUCKET_REFRESH_TICK,
        })
        // Lane introspection for `admin_v1_lanes` (issue #749). Shares the
        // same persistent lane-state store the client handler and settlement
        // service use, plus a read handle over the handler's live lane
        // registry for the last-voucher clock (issue #1733) — read-only here.
        .with_lanes(admin::LaneStatusHandles {
            pool_store: Arc::clone(&infra.pool_state_store),
            lane_activity: ch.client_handler.lane_activity_clock(),
            redeem_threshold_micro_usdc: cfg.blockchain.redeem_threshold_micro_usdc,
        })
        // Buyer-pool introspection for `admin_v1_pools` (#2078). The SAME store
        // handle `BuyerPoolService` records into, so the admin surface reports
        // what the daemon believes — the only read path to `buyer.redb` while
        // this process holds redb's exclusive lock on it.
        .with_buyer_pools(Arc::clone(&buyer_pool_store_for_admin))
        // Slash-detection introspection for `admin_v1_slashes` (#1032). Shares
        // the in-memory store the watcher appends to — read-only here.
        .with_slash_detection(admin::SlashStatusHandles {
            store: Arc::clone(&ch.slash_store),
        })
        // Bring-up node-id binding check (#1034), already logged during
        // `build_chain_and_handlers`. Surfacing it here too is what lets an
        // operator (or the G-NODE-07 journey) detect the unslashable state
        // without scraping the daemon's log for a WARN line.
        .with_binding(ch.binding_report)
        // Operator eth address for `admin_v1_status` (#1906). The loaded eth
        // signer's address — the same value the binding check above derives —
        // so an operator can read the wallet the node runs under without
        // grepping the bring-up log.
        .with_operator_address(infra.eth_signer.address())
        // ADR 041: the SAME warming allowance the buy loop debits, the serve
        // path credits, and the eviction driver forgets from, so
        // `admin_v1_evict` can also drop a hash's provenance tag on removal.
        .with_warming(Arc::clone(&ch.warming))
        // Live ADR 019 §Phase 4 registry state (#1030). The same `Arc` the serve
        // gate reads, so `decdn node health` cannot report a node as servable
        // while `serve_stream` is refusing it — and an operator who has just run
        // `decdn setup` sees `registry_active` flip without a restart.
        .with_staker_set(Arc::clone(&ch.staker_set))
        // Live content denylist for `admin_v1_status`'s
        // `chain_denied_origins` (ADR 011). The SAME `Arc` the client
        // handler and blacklist watcher hold, so the reported on-chain
        // origin deny-set size is always current.
        .with_denylist(reload_state.content_denylist());
        tasks.spawn(async move {
            if let Err(err) = admin::serve(listener, state, rx).await {
                tracing::error!(error = %err, "admin server exited with error");
            }
        });
        Some(tx)
    } else {
        None
    };

    // Startup banner (#274). One structured INFO event per restart lets
    // operators correlate log streams across a fleet and across restarts
    // without stitching multiple lines together. Field names are stable —
    // log aggregators key on them.
    tracing::info!(
        event = "startup_banner",
        node_id = %infra.secret_key.public(),
        version = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
        region = cfg.identity.region.as_deref().unwrap_or(""),
        bind_port = cfg.network.bind_port,
        metrics_addr = %metrics_addr,
        admin_port = ?cfg.observability.admin_port,
        rate_per_mb = cfg.payment.rate_per_mb,
        cache_dir = %cfg.cache.cache_dir.display(),
        has_origin = !cfg.cache.origins.is_empty(),
        origin_count = cfg.cache.origins.len(),
        origin_kinds = %origin_kinds_label(&cfg.cache.origins),
        "node runtime ready"
    );

    Ok(Background {
        metrics_stop_tx,
        dispatch_gc_stop_tx,
        egress_ewma_stop_tx,
        origin_rescan_stop_tx,
        record_store_gc_stop_tx,
        eviction_stop_tx,
        dht_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx,
        probe_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx,
        reputation_evict_stop_tx,
        republish_stop,
        bucket_refresh_stop_tx,
        buyer_bootstrap_stop_tx,
        rpc_watchdog,
        admin_stop_tx,
        drain_trigger,
        tasks,
    })
}

/// Build the endpoint, register handlers on a `Router`, spawn the metrics
/// server and other background tasks, and run until a shutdown signal is
/// received.
///
/// SIGHUP triggers a hot-reload of mutable config fields via
/// [`RuntimeReloadState`] (see issue #236). Other signals
/// (SIGINT/SIGTERM) trigger graceful shutdown.
///
/// The signal streams (SIGHUP, SIGTERM) are registered **once** before
/// the select loop and reused on every iteration. Re-creating
/// `tokio::signal::unix::Signal` each iteration would race with signal
/// delivery: a SIGHUP that arrives while `reload_runtime_config(..)` is
/// running would have nowhere to land if the future holding the
/// `Signal` had already been dropped, and would be silently lost. The
/// persistent stream queues the signal until the next `recv()` call
/// (kernel-managed, with coalescing) so concurrent or rapidly-repeated
/// signals are observed deterministically.
///
/// `node_metrics` is the registry `/metrics` serves. The caller builds it
/// so that pre-runtime components (the OTLP exporter) count into the same
/// registry.
///
/// `secret_key` is the node's iroh identity. The caller loads it, so that the
/// daemon entry point can build its JSON log formatter, which writes
/// `node_id` on every event, before bring-up starts.
pub async fn run(
    cfg: ResolvedConfig,
    secret_key: SecretKey,
    config_path: Option<PathBuf>,
    reload_state: Arc<RuntimeReloadState>,
    node_metrics: Arc<metrics::Metrics>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    // Captured at the very top of `run()`, before any `await` or I/O,
    // so `admin_v1_health.uptime_s` covers the whole runtime — including
    // the RPC reachability preflight below (which can spend up to its 5s
    // timeout on flaky networks). Only `commands::run`'s config resolution,
    // node key load and tracing bring-up come before it. Operators reasoning
    // about "how long has this node been up?" want every second since
    // `decdn-node run` started, not just everything after the admin server
    // bound.
    let started_at = std::time::Instant::now();

    let infra = build_infra(&cfg, secret_key, &reload_state, node_metrics).await?;

    let ch = build_chain_and_handlers(&cfg, &reload_state, &infra).await?;

    let bg = spawn_background_tasks(
        &cfg,
        config_path.as_ref(),
        &reload_state,
        &infra,
        &ch,
        started_at,
    )
    .await?;

    let (router, signal) = serve_until_shutdown(
        &reload_state,
        config_path.as_deref(),
        &bg.drain_trigger,
        ServeInputs {
            ep: infra.ep,
            probe_handler: ch.probe_handler,
            client_handler: ch.client_handler,
            dht_handler: ch.dht_handler,
            blacklist_ready_rx: ch.blacklist_ready_rx,
        },
    )
    .await?;

    let handles = ShutdownHandles {
        metrics_stop_tx: bg.metrics_stop_tx,
        dispatch_gc_stop_tx: bg.dispatch_gc_stop_tx,
        egress_ewma_stop_tx: bg.egress_ewma_stop_tx,
        buyer_bootstrap_stop_tx: bg.buyer_bootstrap_stop_tx,
        origin_rescan_stop_tx: bg.origin_rescan_stop_tx,
        record_store_gc_stop_tx: bg.record_store_gc_stop_tx,
        eviction_stop_tx: bg.eviction_stop_tx,
        dht_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx: bg.dht_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx,
        probe_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx: bg.probe_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx,
        reputation_evict_stop_tx: bg.reputation_evict_stop_tx,
        republish_stop: bg.republish_stop,
        bucket_refresh_stop_tx: bg.bucket_refresh_stop_tx,
        admin_stop_tx: bg.admin_stop_tx,
        rpc_watchdog: bg.rpc_watchdog,
        poller: ch.poller,
        payment_service: ch.payment_service,
        receipt_writer: infra.receipt_writer,
        warming_creditor: ch.warming_creditor,
        lane_flush_task: infra.lane_flush_task,
        pool_state_store: infra.pool_state_store,
        node_metrics: infra.node_metrics,
        tasks: bg.tasks,
    };
    shutdown(handles, router, signal, &bg.drain_trigger, infra.cache).await
}

/// Owned teardown state handed from [`run`] to [`shutdown`]. Every field is a
/// stop signal, watcher handle, or task handle that the graceful-shutdown
/// sequence consumes exactly once; the exhaustive destructure at the top of
/// [`shutdown`] (no `..` rest) is a deliberate safety net — a field left
/// unconsumed raises an `unused_variables` warning, which CI and the pre-commit
/// hook make fatal, proving no stop signal was dropped on the floor.
struct ShutdownHandles<P: Provider + Clone + 'static> {
    metrics_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    dispatch_gc_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    egress_ewma_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    buyer_bootstrap_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    /// Origin-held-index periodic rescan (#1130). `None` when
    /// `cache.fs_rescan_interval_sec == 0` disables it.
    origin_rescan_stop_tx: Option<oneshot::Sender<()>>,
    record_store_gc_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    eviction_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    dht_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    probe_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    reputation_evict_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    republish_stop: CancellationToken,
    bucket_refresh_stop_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>,
    admin_stop_tx: Option<oneshot::Sender<()>>,
    rpc_watchdog: Option<(oneshot::Sender<()>, tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>)>,
    /// The single multiplexed chain-event poller. Stopped once, late (after
    /// `router.shutdown`), because its capacity-bond route gates DHT admission
    /// through drain — see the cancel site in [`shutdown`].
    poller: crate::chain_events::resumable_watcher::WatcherHandle,
    payment_service: PoolSettlementService<P>,
    /// The background receipt writer, cancelled once the router has drained
    /// and awaited in the drain phase so the audit tail survives shutdown
    /// (#803).
    receipt_writer: StopHandle,
    /// The ADR 041 warming-credit aggregator, cancelled beside the receipt
    /// writer and awaited in the drain phase so the serve credits already
    /// queued land in the ledger before the runtime returns.
    warming_creditor: StopHandle,
    /// Periodic lane-store flush timer, aborted below after one final durable
    /// flush of `pool_state_store`.
    lane_flush_task: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
    pool_state_store: Arc<dyn PoolStateStore>,
    node_metrics: Arc<metrics::Metrics>,
    tasks: JoinSet<()>,
}

/// Shut `router` down, giving up after `deadline`. Returns whether the router
/// task ran to completion.
///
/// The router's shutdown cancels its handlers, then calls
/// [`iroh::Endpoint::close`], which waits for every open connection to reach
/// QUIC's draining state. A connection whose QUIC driver died with the runtime
/// that dialled it never does, and the close then waits forever. The teardown
/// after this call redeems lanes, flushes the lane store and the receipt tail,
/// and closes the cache, so a stuck close must not cost that settlement state.
///
/// Past `deadline` this drops the shutdown future, which aborts the router's
/// task, and logs an error: every upstream dial runs on the main runtime, so a
/// close that does not finish is a defect, not load. The handlers are already
/// cancelled by then, so no serve outlives the give-up. The endpoint is left
/// closing rather than closed, so nothing after this call may wait on
/// [`iroh::Endpoint::closed`]. A router task that panicked also counts as not
/// finished: its endpoint close may never have run.
async fn close_router(router: &Router, deadline: Duration) -> bool {
    match tokio::time::timeout(deadline, router.shutdown()).await {
        Ok(Ok(())) => true,
        Ok(Err(err)) => {
            tracing::error!(
                error = %err,
                "router shutdown task failed; the endpoint may not have closed"
            );
            false
        }
        Err(_) => {
            tracing::error!(
                ?deadline,
                "router shutdown did not finish within the deadline, most likely because the \
                 endpoint close waits on a connection whose QUIC driver is gone; continuing \
                 with redeem and flush"
            );
            false
        }
    }
}

/// Graceful teardown of [`run`] (#1253). Consumes every field of
/// [`ShutdownHandles`] via an exhaustive destructure — see that type's docs for
/// why the `..`-free binding is load-bearing. The teardown ordering here is
/// itself load-bearing (metrics accept-loop stop first; the multiplexed `poller`
/// stops after `router.shutdown`) and must not be reordered.
#[allow(clippy::cognitive_complexity, clippy::too_many_lines)]
async fn shutdown<P: Provider + Clone + 'static>(
    handles: ShutdownHandles<P>,
    router: Router,
    signal: ShutdownSignal,
    drain_trigger: &Arc<admin::DrainTrigger>,
    cache: CacheEngine,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let ShutdownHandles {
        metrics_stop_tx,
        dispatch_gc_stop_tx,
        egress_ewma_stop_tx,
        buyer_bootstrap_stop_tx,
        origin_rescan_stop_tx,
        record_store_gc_stop_tx,
        eviction_stop_tx,
        dht_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx,
        probe_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx,
        reputation_evict_stop_tx,
        republish_stop,
        bucket_refresh_stop_tx,
        mut admin_stop_tx,
        rpc_watchdog,
        poller,
        payment_service,
        receipt_writer,
        warming_creditor,
        lane_flush_task,
        pool_state_store,
        node_metrics,
        mut tasks,
    } = handles;

    // Signal the HTTP accept loops to stop *before* closing the router.
    // The router close can take up to `SHUTDOWN_DEADLINE`, and while it runs
    // the metrics/admin servers would otherwise keep accepting fresh loopback
    // connections — wasting that budget and emitting misleading
    // "still serving" signals. The accept loops are cheap to unwind, so
    // stopping them first is strictly cleaner.
    if metrics_stop_tx.send(()).is_err() {
        // Receiver dropped → the metrics server task already exited on
        // its own. The spawn closure logs its own error on abnormal exit
        // (see `metrics server exited with error` above), so this branch
        // is purely informational: under a healthy shutdown we'd have
        // been the ones signaling it.
        tracing::warn!("metrics server exited before shutdown signal was sent");
    }
    // Best-effort: silently ignore the dispatch GC stop send failure.
    // The task only exits early on a panic, and its panic surfaces
    // through `JoinSet::join_next` during the drain phase below — no
    // operator-actionable signal to log at this seam.
    let _ = dispatch_gc_stop_tx.send(());
    // Best-effort, same rationale as the dispatch-GC stop above: the egress
    // EWMA tick only exits early on a panic, which surfaces through
    // `JoinSet::join_next` during the drain phase below.
    let _ = egress_ewma_stop_tx.send(());
    // Cancel a still-running buyer bootstrap and release the task's
    // process-lifetime hold on the service (#1109). Best-effort: on the
    // bootstrap-failed path the task already returned and dropped the receiver,
    // so this send errors harmlessly.
    let _ = buyer_bootstrap_stop_tx.send(());
    // origin-held-index periodic rescan (#1130)
    if let Some(tx) = origin_rescan_stop_tx {
        let _ = tx.send(());
    }
    let _ = record_store_gc_stop_tx.send(());
    // Eviction driver (#1173): best-effort stop, same shape as the GC sweeps.
    // The task also drains via `JoinSet::join_next` below.
    let _ = eviction_stop_tx.send(());
    let _ = dht_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx.send(());
    let _ = probe_rate_limit_gc_stop_tx.send(());
    // Best-effort, same rationale as the GC sweeps above: the reputation
    // evict tick exits on this stop signal (or a panic, which surfaces
    // through `JoinSet::join_next` during the drain phase below).
    let _ = reputation_evict_stop_tx.send(());
    // Cancels the republisher AND any lag sweep it left detached. The cancel is
    // ordered strictly before the `cache.shutdown()` flush below, which is what
    // the sweep needs: its `select!` is `biased` on this token, so a worker
    // polled any time after the flush takes the cancel arm instead of observing
    // the store it was walking disappear and reporting that as a store-walk
    // failure. The sweeps are detached and not joined, so one may outlive the
    // flush by a poll — it just cannot report anything once cancelled.
    republish_stop.cancel();
    let _ = bucket_refresh_stop_tx.send(());
    // The chain watchers are one multiplexed poller with one shutdown token, so
    // they stop together in a SINGLE `poller.shutdown()` at the LATE point below
    // (after `router.shutdown`). For the blacklist and rate-bounds routes the
    // late stop is harmless — neither carries a durable cursor to flush, and
    // neither is consulted for a drain-time decision (unlike the capacity-bond
    // route's staker set), so they only keep applying compliance/rate updates a
    // little longer.
    // Admin server shutdown is ordered per `admin_stop_order`:
    //
    //   - `Early` (the default, including SIGTERM/SIGINT and plain
    //     `admin_v1_drain`): stop admin *before* `router.shutdown` so
    //     admin doesn't keep accepting fresh loopback connections
    //     during drain. This is the original ordering (see
    //     `appendix-local-admin-http`).
    //   - `AfterRouter` (only when an `admin_v1_drain` call carried
    //     `wait_admin: true`, i.e. `decdn node drain --wait`): keep
    //     admin alive *through* `router.shutdown` so a polling client
    //     can observe `admin_v1_health.in_flight_streams` reach 0. The
    //     admin stop signal fires below, after `router.shutdown`
    //     returns.
    //
    // `wait_admin` is sampled once into a local; the two `if` blocks
    // below are mutually exclusive, so the single `Option<Sender>` is
    // consumed by exactly one branch. The signal-gating on
    // `AdminDrain` means a sticky `wait_admin=true` from an in-flight
    // RPC that was racing a SIGTERM does *not* flip the runtime onto
    // the AfterRouter path when SIGTERM actually won the select (the
    // operator's stated intent wins; the RPC's request becomes a
    // no-op since drain is already in progress).
    let stop_order = admin_stop_order(signal, drain_trigger);
    if matches!(stop_order, AdminStopOrder::Early)
        && let Some(tx) = admin_stop_tx.take()
        && tx.send(()).is_err()
    {
        tracing::warn!("admin server exited before shutdown signal was sent");
    }
    let rpc_watchdog_handle = if let Some((tx, handle)) = rpc_watchdog {
        if tx.send(()).is_err() {
            tracing::warn!("RPC watchdog exited before shutdown signal was sent");
        }
        Some(handle)
    } else {
        None
    };

    // Router::shutdown waits for ProtocolHandler::shutdown on each handler,
    // then closes the endpoint. Bounded, so every step below still runs.
    close_router(&router, SHUTDOWN_DEADLINE).await;
    // The ONE multiplexed poller driving all registered watcher routes stops here,
    // once. It exits cooperatively — cancelling its loop at the next await
    // boundary and flushing every persisting route's checkpoint (settlement's
    // `PoolOpened`) before returning — with its `WatcherHandle`'s `AbortOnDropHandle`
    // as the backstop.
    //
    // *After* `router.shutdown` deliberately, and the capacity-bond route is why:
    // its projection is the cached active-staker set, which gates DHT `Store`
    // admission and decides which probes the stake-lane reservation sheds.
    // Cancelling it before the drain would freeze that set while the router is
    // still serving, so a membership change landing mid-drain would be missed by
    // exactly the requests still in flight. This binding constraint forces the
    // single stop late; the other four routes (slash, settlement, blacklist,
    // rate-bounds) are not drain-consulted and could stop earlier, but one shared
    // token means they stop here too. `shutdown` only cancels the token — it is
    // not awaited — so settlement's checkpoint flush races the redeem sweep just
    // below rather than completing before it; that is fine because the flush is
    // best-effort and the checkpoint is independent of, and idempotent with
    // respect to, the redeem sweep.
    poller.shutdown();
    // The router has drained, so no further vouchers — and therefore no further
    // receipts — will be produced. Signal the receipt writer to flush whatever
    // is already enqueued and exit; it is awaited in the drain phase below so
    // the audit tail survives shutdown (#803). The early cancel overlaps the
    // tail flush with the settlement and store teardown between here and the
    // drain; the `shutdown().await` there cancels again as a no-op.
    receipt_writer.cancel();
    // Same reasoning for the ADR 041 warming-credit aggregator: no further
    // serves complete, so no further credits are produced. Let it apply what is
    // already queued and exit; it is awaited in the drain phase below so a
    // completed serve's credit is not lost to shutdown timing.
    warming_creditor.cancel();

    // Redeem on shutdown (#327): now that the router has drained, no further
    // vouchers arrive and the persisted lane state is final. A pool is
    // owner-closed only, so there is nothing to close here. The poller cancel
    // above triggers settlement's tail stop and checkpoint flush asynchronously
    // (best-effort, not awaited before this point), so this quiesces the redeemer
    // and runs one final best-effort redeem sweep so an above-threshold lane is
    // not left un-redeemed. The redeem sweep does not depend on the checkpoint
    // flush having completed — the scan checkpoint is independent lane state and
    // idempotent to re-scan. Bounded by the deadline
    // so a slow RPC cannot hang shutdown.
    payment_service.shutdown(SHUTDOWN_DEADLINE).await;

    // Final durable flush before stop, so the last interval of frontier lands.
    // The router has drained and the redeem sweep above already ran, so the
    // in-memory lane state is final; this is the last write before the
    // background flush task is aborted below.
    let flush_result = match tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || pool_state_store.flush()).await {
        Ok(result) => result,
        Err(join_err) => Err(decdn_incentive::StoreError::Backend(format!(
            "flush join: {join_err}"
        ))),
    };
    if let Err(err) = flush_result {
        node_metrics.lane_flush_failure();
        tracing::warn!(error = %err, "final lane store flush on shutdown failed");
    }
    lane_flush_task.abort();

    // Late admin stop (issue #604 `AfterRouter` path). The polling
    // client (`decdn node drain --wait`) needed admin to stay open
    // while `router.shutdown` awaited the last in-flight client
    // streams; now that it's returned, tear admin down so the polling
    // client either sees `in_flight_streams == 0` on its next tick or
    // observes ECONNREFUSED — both of which it treats as "drain
    // complete".
    //
    // If the receiver has already dropped (i.e. the admin task
    // crashed/panicked between the Early skip and this point), that's
    // a violated invariant — `decdn node drain --wait` clients may
    // have misread the ECONNREFUSED as drain completion while
    // in-flight streams were still draining. Log at `error!`
    // accordingly so post-mortems surface it.
    //
    // A router close that gave up at its deadline still reaches here: its
    // handlers were cancelled first, so no stream is in flight, and
    // `close_router` has already logged the stuck endpoint close.
    if matches!(stop_order, AdminStopOrder::AfterRouter)
        && let Some(tx) = admin_stop_tx.take()
        && tx.send(()).is_err()
    {
        tracing::error!(
            "admin server exited while runtime was awaiting router.shutdown; \
             `decdn node drain --wait` clients may have observed ECONNREFUSED \
             before in-flight streams completed (false drain-complete)"
        );
    }

    // Flush the cache store before the drain deadline so in-flight writes
    // hit disk. Intentionally *not* gated by `SHUTDOWN_DEADLINE`: a slow
    // flush is preferable to a lost write, and the watchdog at the outer
    // process level catches a truly stuck shutdown. On failure we still
    // finish the task drain cleanly (so metrics/dispatch don't leak) and
    // then bubble the error out of `run()` — supervisors need a non-zero
    // exit to know the store may be inconsistent.
    let cache_shutdown_err = cache.shutdown().await.err();
    if let Some(err) = cache_shutdown_err.as_ref() {
        tracing::error!(error = %err.display_chain(), "cache shutdown failed; store state may be inconsistent");
    }

    // Last-resort abort handle for the RPC watchdog, which lives *outside* the
    // `JoinSet`. On the normal path the watchdog oneshot drains it cleanly;
    // this is fired only if `drain` overruns `SHUTDOWN_DEADLINE`, because
    // dropping the timed-out `drain` future would otherwise merely *detach*
    // a wedged task (a dropped `JoinHandle` keeps running), not stop it.
    // `tasks.abort_all()` covers the `JoinSet` (reaped + logged per task
    // below); this covers the watchdog as a fire-and-forget abort — we do NOT
    // await it past the deadline, since `abort()` only lands at a poll point
    // and a truly non-yielding loop would re-hang the shutdown the timeout
    // escaped.
    let watchdog_abort = rpc_watchdog_handle
        .as_ref()
        .map(tokio::task::JoinHandle::abort_handle);
    // The receipt writer also lives outside `tasks`; same fire-and-forget abort
    // backstop if the drain overruns the deadline (#803).
    let receipt_writer_abort = receipt_writer.abort_handle();
    // The warming-credit aggregator is in the same position: outside `tasks`,
    // cancelled above, awaited in the drain, aborted if the drain overruns.
    let warming_creditor_abort = warming_creditor.abort_handle();

    let drain = async {
        while let Some(result) = tasks.join_next().await {
            log_join_result(result, "shutdown");
        }
        // Stop-and-await the receipt writer so the runtime doesn't return while
        // it's still flushing its tail. `StopHandle::shutdown` cancels before
        // it joins (a no-op after the early cancel above), so the join cannot
        // hang on the sinks the client handler holds; a panic surfaces at
        // `warn` and a cancellation at `debug`, matching how every other
        // drained task is logged.
        log_join_result(receipt_writer.shutdown().await, "receipt-writer-shutdown");
        // Stop-and-await the aggregator for the same reason, and so that a task
        // that died earlier in the run surfaces here as a join error rather
        // than as credits that silently stopped landing.
        log_join_result(
            warming_creditor.shutdown().await,
            "warming-creditor-shutdown",
        );
        // Await the RPC watchdog. We signalled it via oneshot above, so
        // a healthy run resolves cleanly here. A panic surfaces as a
        // warning; cancellation is silent (same as the receipt writer).
        if let Some(handle) = rpc_watchdog_handle
            && let Err(err) = handle.await
            && !err.is_cancelled()
        {
            tracing::warn!(error = %err, "RPC watchdog task panicked during shutdown");
        }
    };
    if tokio::time::timeout(SHUTDOWN_DEADLINE, drain).await.is_ok() {
        tracing::info!("graceful shutdown complete");
    } else {
        tracing::warn!(
            deadline = ?SHUTDOWN_DEADLINE,
            out_of_joinset_aborts = usize::from(watchdog_abort.is_some()) + 2,
            "graceful shutdown timed out; aborting remaining tasks",
        );
        tasks.abort_all();
        // The RPC watchdog lives outside `tasks`; dropping the timed-out
        // `drain` only detached it, so abort explicitly. Unlike the
        // `JoinSet`, it is not reaped/awaited afterwards (see the rationale
        // where the abort handle is collected) — the count above is its
        // only per-shutdown record.
        if let Some(abort) = &watchdog_abort {
            abort.abort();
        }
        // Aborting the writer mid-tail-drain discards any still-enqueued audit
        // receipts. This only happens once shutdown has already blown its
        // deadline (an abnormal, already-warned event), but name it specifically
        // so a post-mortem can correlate a gap in `download_receipts.jsonl` with
        // the overrun — the drop counter does not cover this path (#803).
        tracing::warn!(
            event = "receipt_writer_aborted",
            "receipt writer aborted at shutdown deadline; enqueued audit receipts may be lost"
        );
        receipt_writer_abort.abort();
        // Aborting the aggregator mid-drain discards the still-queued warming
        // credits. Conservative in the same direction as a `Full` drop — the
        // affected sources stay more negative than reality until the time refill
        // catches up — and the allowance is in-memory bookkeeping a restart
        // rebuilds anyway.
        tracing::warn!(
            event = "warming_creditor_aborted",
            "warming-credit aggregator aborted at shutdown deadline; \
             queued serve credits are lost"
        );
        warming_creditor_abort.abort();
        while let Some(result) = tasks.join_next().await {
            log_join_result(result, "abort");
        }
    }

    tracing::info!("node stopped");
    match cache_shutdown_err {
        None => Ok(()),
        Some(err) => Err(anyhow::Error::from(err).context("cache shutdown failed")),
    }
}

/// Build an iroh `Endpoint` bound to `bind_port` on both address families:
/// `0.0.0.0:bind_port` and `[::]:bind_port`. ALPNs are set by the `Router`
/// when it spawns. The bind addresses are included in the error message so a
/// port collision surfaces as a config-level diagnostic (matching
/// `metrics::bind` and `admin::bind`), rather than an opaque "endpoint bind
/// failed".
///
/// The IPv6 bind replaces iroh's default `[::]:0` socket, so a dual-stack node
/// listens on one stable port per family and an operator can register an
/// `/ip6/<addr>/udp/<bind_port>/quic-v1` multiaddr. The two sockets do not
/// collide: netwatch sets `IPV6_V6ONLY` on every IPv6 socket. The IPv4 bind is
/// required. The IPv6 bind is not: a host without IPv6 (disabled by sysctl, or
/// a container without a v6 stack) or with `[::]:bind_port` taken still starts
/// on IPv4 only, and [`warn_if_no_ipv6_socket`] logs the degraded state.
///
/// No transient pre-bind probe: it would introduce a TOCTOU window
/// between the probe and the real bind, and iroh's
/// `Endpoint::builder().bind_addr(...).bind()` owns its UDP socket
/// internally — there is nothing to hand off. Single-bind matches the
/// existing TCP listeners.
async fn build_endpoint(
    secret_key: &SecretKey,
    bind_port: u16,
    relay_urls: &[String],
    discovery: &ResolvedDiscovery,
    transport_config: QuicTransportConfig,
) -> anyhow::Result<Endpoint> {
    let bind_v4 = SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, bind_port);
    let bind_v6 = SocketAddrV6::new(Ipv6Addr::UNSPECIFIED, bind_port, 0, 0);

    // Discovery selection is the discovery-provider seam (#818, see
    // adr/appendix-poc-production-seams.md). Both branches start from
    // `presets::Minimal` (crypto provider only) and compose the lookup legs
    // explicitly, so the node's own pkarr publisher carries
    // `node_publish_filter` (relay URL plus public IPs) rather than iroh's
    // relay-only default (ADR 001 § Node Discovery). With no `network.discovery`
    // keys the legs are the n0-hosted pkarr publisher and DNS lookup that
    // `presets::N0` wires; with operator discovery configured they are exactly
    // the configured legs. Discovery and relay are independent legs: `Minimal`
    // sets NO relay mode, so the n0 relay default is restored here, and a custom
    // `network.relay_urls` map (if any) replaces it below.
    let mut builder = if discovery.is_empty() {
        Endpoint::builder(presets::Minimal)
            .address_lookup(PkarrPublisher::n0_dns().addr_filter(node_publish_filter()))
            .address_lookup(DnsAddressLookup::n0_dns())
    } else {
        add_discovery_lookups(Endpoint::builder(presets::Minimal), discovery)?
    };
    builder = builder.relay_mode(RelayMode::Default);

    builder = builder
        .secret_key(secret_key.clone())
        .transport_config(transport_config);

    // A configured `network.relay_urls` list swaps the n0 default relay map for
    // the operator's self-hosted relays (`RelayMode::Custom`). The relay leg is
    // independent of the discovery leg selected above: a custom relay map routes
    // connectivity through the operator's relays while NodeId→address discovery
    // uses whichever provider the base-preset branch wired (n0 pkarr/DNS, or the
    // operator's `network.discovery` providers). Multiple entries give
    // redundancy/failover.
    if !relay_urls.is_empty() {
        let relays = parse_relay_urls(relay_urls)?;
        builder = builder.relay_mode(RelayMode::Custom(RelayMap::from_iter(relays)));
    }

    let ep = builder
        .bind_addr(bind_v4)
        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid bind addr {bind_v4}: {e}"))?
        .bind_addr_with_opts(bind_v6, BindOpts::default().set_is_required(false))
        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid bind addr {bind_v6}: {e}"))?
        .bind()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("endpoint bind {bind_v4} + {bind_v6} failed: {e}"))?;
    warn_if_no_ipv6_socket(&ep.bound_sockets(), bind_v6);
    // A relay sits on the NAT-traversal critical path, so bring-up reports
    // whether one connected. The check is advisory and runs in the background:
    // a transient relay outage during a rolling restart must not delay or
    // wedge startup, and iroh keeps retrying the relay on its own.
    tokio::spawn(report_home_relay(ep.home_relay_status(), HOME_RELAY_GRACE));
    Ok(ep)
}

/// How long after bind the node waits for a home relay connection before
/// [`report_home_relay`] warns.
const HOME_RELAY_GRACE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);

/// Wait up to `grace` for any home relay to connect, and warn with each
/// relay's last connection error when none does. Returns whether a relay
/// connected in time.
///
/// The status comes from iroh's relay client, so it reflects relay-protocol
/// health end to end: a fronting load balancer that accepts TCP while the
/// relay behind it is down reports as not connected. A relay that denies this
/// node's authentication is called out separately, since iroh's retries
/// present the same credentials and never recover from it. Relay URLs and
/// error chains are logged without credentials.
async fn report_home_relay(
    mut status: impl iroh::Watcher<Value = Vec<iroh::endpoint::RelayStatus>>,
    grace: Duration,
) -> bool {
    let deadline = tokio::time::sleep(grace);
    tokio::pin!(deadline);
    let mut relays = status.get();
    loop {
        if let Some(up) = relays.iter().find(|relay| relay.is_connected()) {
            tracing::info!(
                relay = %redact_userinfo(up.url().as_str()),
                "home relay connected"
            );
            return true;
        }
        tokio::select! {
            () = &mut deadline => break,
            next = status.updated() => match next {
                Ok(value) => relays = value,
                // The last endpoint handle is gone; nothing left to report on.
                Err(_) => return false,
            },
        }
    }
    warn_no_home_relay(&relays, grace);
    false
}

/// The warning half of [`report_home_relay`]: one line per home relay with
/// its last error, or one line when iroh has not selected a relay at all.
fn warn_no_home_relay(relays: &[iroh::endpoint::RelayStatus], grace: Duration) {
    if relays.is_empty() {
        tracing::warn!(
            ?grace,
            "no home relay selected after bring-up; relay-assisted connectivity is down \
             while iroh keeps retrying. Check network.relay_urls and outbound HTTPS"
        );
    }
    for relay in relays {
        let url = redact_userinfo(relay.url().as_str());
        if let Some(reason) = relay.auth_denied_reason() {
            tracing::warn!(
                relay = %url,
                reason = %sanitize_rpc_display(reason),
                "home relay denied this node's authentication; retries will not recover \
                 until the relay's access policy changes"
            );
        } else {
            tracing::warn!(
                relay = %url,
                ?grace,
                error = relay.last_error().map(|e| sanitize_error_sources(e)),
                "home relay not connected after bring-up; iroh keeps retrying in the \
                 background. Check the relay URL and that the relay is up"
            );
        }
    }
}

/// Log a warning when the endpoint holds no IPv6 socket. `build_endpoint`
/// binds `[::]:bind_port` as optional, so iroh drops a failed IPv6 bind with
/// only an info-level note. This warning tells the operator that the node is
/// IPv4-only and that an `/ip6/...` multiaddr does not reach it. Returns
/// whether an IPv6 socket is bound.
fn warn_if_no_ipv6_socket(bound: &[SocketAddr], bind_v6: SocketAddrV6) -> bool {
    let has_v6 = bound.iter().any(SocketAddr::is_ipv6);
    if !has_v6 {
        tracing::warn!(
            %bind_v6,
            "IPv6 bind failed; the node listens on IPv4 only — an /ip6/ multiaddr does not \
             reach it. Enable IPv6 on the host or free the port, or register /ip4/ \
             multiaddrs only"
        );
    }
    has_v6
}

/// Compose the operator-configured `network.discovery` address-lookup legs onto
/// `builder` (#818 scope 1) — the `node`-side half of the discovery-provider
/// seam: config resolution holds plain shape-validated Strings, and this is
/// where they become iroh providers.
///
/// - `pkarr_url` + `dns_origin` wire a `PkarrPublisher` (this node publishes its
///   signed address record, filtered by `node_publish_filter`) and a
///   `DnsAddressLookup` (it resolves peers via DNS TXT). The endpoint builder pulls this node's secret key and TLS config into
///   the publisher automatically, so we do not pass the key here.
/// - `peers` seed a `MemoryLookup` static address book.
///
/// The `pkarr_url` (parsed as `url::Url`) and peer `node_id` (parsed as
/// `iroh::PublicKey`) are re-parsed here with the exact parsers config
/// resolution used, so a failure on those legs is an internal invariant break.
/// A peer `relay_url` is parsed as the stricter `iroh::RelayUrl` here while
/// resolution only checked it as a generic `url::Url` (mirroring the top-level
/// `network.relay_urls` path, where bring-up's `RelayUrl` parse is the
/// authoritative relay-shape gate) — so that leg can legitimately fail here on a
/// relay-specific shape issue. Every failure is surfaced as a bring-up error
/// (never a panic), and any echoed URL is `redact_userinfo`'d, upholding the
/// same no-credentials-in-errors invariant as the relay path.
fn add_discovery_lookups(
    mut builder: iroh::endpoint::Builder,
    discovery: &ResolvedDiscovery,
) -> anyhow::Result<iroh::endpoint::Builder> {
    if let Some(pkarr) = &discovery.pkarr_url {
        let url = pkarr.parse::<url::Url>().map_err(|e| {
            anyhow::anyhow!(
                "invalid network.discovery.pkarr_url {:?}: {e}",
                redact_userinfo(pkarr)
            )
        })?;
        builder =
            builder.address_lookup(PkarrPublisher::builder(url).addr_filter(node_publish_filter()));
    }
    if let Some(origin) = &discovery.dns_origin {
        builder = builder.address_lookup(DnsAddressLookup::builder(origin.clone()));
    }
    if !discovery.peers.is_empty() {
        let mut infos = Vec::with_capacity(discovery.peers.len());
        for peer in &discovery.peers {
            let id = peer.node_id.parse::<PublicKey>().map_err(|e| {
                anyhow::anyhow!("invalid network.discovery peer id {}: {e}", peer.node_id)
            })?;
            let mut addr = EndpointAddr::new(id);
            if let Some(relay) = &peer.relay_url {
                let relay_url = relay.parse::<RelayUrl>().map_err(|e| {
                    anyhow::anyhow!(
                        "invalid relay_url {:?} for network.discovery peer {}: {e}",
                        redact_userinfo(relay),
                        peer.node_id
                    )
                })?;
                addr = addr.with_relay_url(relay_url);
            }
            for a in &peer.addrs {
                let sock = a.parse::<std::net::SocketAddr>().map_err(|e| {
                    anyhow::anyhow!(
                        "invalid addr {a:?} for network.discovery peer {}: {e}",
                        peer.node_id
                    )
                })?;
                addr = addr.with_ip_addr(sock);
            }
            infos.push(addr);
        }
        builder = builder.address_lookup(MemoryLookup::from_endpoint_info(infos));
    }
    Ok(builder)
}

/// Parse the configured relay URL strings into `RelayUrl`s, surfacing the
/// offending entry on a parse failure. The entry is `redact_userinfo`'d first:
/// a malformed URL can still carry `user:pass@` credentials, and this node
/// never lets relay userinfo reach the logs (same invariant
/// [`report_home_relay`] upholds).
fn parse_relay_urls(urls: &[String]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<RelayUrl>> {
    urls.iter()
        .map(|u| {
            u.parse::<RelayUrl>().map_err(|e| {
                anyhow::anyhow!(
                    "invalid network.relay_urls entry {:?}: {e}",
                    redact_userinfo(u)
                )
            })
        })
        .collect()
}

/// Resolve the keystore password, then decrypt the keystore JSON via alloy's
/// KDF on a blocking thread.
///
/// Sources in precedence order: the `DECDN_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD` env var, then
/// `blockchain.keystore_password_file`, then an interactive prompt on a TTY.
/// Presence decides at each step (see [`eth_identity::read_password`]): a
/// variable that is set and a file that exists each supply their value, the
/// empty string included, so a headless host reaches one of the first two or
/// the startup fails. The list comes from
/// [`eth_identity::standard_sources`], the single builder every binary shares.
///
/// The Arbitrum Sepolia
/// chain id is bound on the signer so EIP-712 signers and any
/// `eth_sendTransaction` paths inherit a deterministic value. To target a
/// different chain, thread the value through `ResolvedBlockchain` next to
/// `rpc_url` (chain-id-keyed config is already a seam pattern; see
/// `appendix-poc-production-seams.md` §Seam 8).
async fn load_eth_signer(cfg: &ResolvedConfig) -> anyhow::Result<PrivateKeySigner> {
    use alloy::signers::Signer;

    let sources = eth_identity::standard_sources(
        cfg.blockchain.keystore_password_file.clone(),
        eth_identity::PasswordUse::Unlock,
    );
    let resolved = eth_identity::read_password(&sources, "eth keystore password")?;
    // Surface a configured-but-unused password source (a typo'd or shadowed
    // password file). The daemon has a `tracing` subscriber, so unlike the CLI
    // it logs rather than printing.
    for warning in resolved.warnings() {
        tracing::warn!(%warning, "keystore password source ignored");
    }
    let password = resolved.into_secret();

    let path = cfg.blockchain.eth_keystore.clone();
    // `spawn_blocking` because alloy's `decrypt_keystore` runs scrypt /
    // argon2 (synchronous, CPU-bound). Calling it on the runtime's worker
    // thread would stall every other task for the duration of the KDF.
    let signer = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || eth_identity::load_signer(&path, &password))
        .await
        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("keystore decrypt task panicked: {e}"))??;
    // Bind the signer to the *configured* chain id, not a hardcoded
    // constant, so the signer's chain id and the `slash_sig` EIP-712 domain
    // chain id (also `cfg.blockchain.chain_id`, see the slash domain build)
    // can never silently diverge — e.g. when the chain target changes via
    // the seam in `appendix-poc-production-seams.md` §Seam 8. Note: raw
    // EIP-712 `sign_hash_sync` does not consult the signer's bound chain
    // id, so this binding only matters for any future `eth_sendTransaction`
    // path; keeping it single-sourced is defensive against that future code.
    Ok(signer.with_chain_id(Some(cfg.blockchain.chain_id)))
}

/// Log a `JoinError` from a shutdown-drained task with a phase label.
fn log_join_result(result: Result<(), tokio::task::JoinError>, phase: &'static str) {
    if let Err(err) = result {
        if err.is_cancelled() {
            tracing::debug!(phase, "task cancelled during shutdown");
        } else {
            tracing::warn!(phase, error = %err, "task failed during shutdown");
        }
    }
}

/// Admission/eviction policy selection (ADR 040) plus the ADR 041 estimator
/// decoupling. One shared frequency estimator feeds both the engine's
/// hit-signal sink and whichever policy objects need it; the engine itself
/// owns no policy knowledge beyond the estimator handle. The ADR 041 `margin`
/// serve-economics policy also consumes the estimator's heat signal (as its
/// buy-ceiling `n_hat` input), independent of which cache eviction/admission
/// policy is selected — so a node running plain `lru`/`always` cache policy
/// with `margin` serve economics still needs the estimator built and wired
/// into the cache. Returns the selected eviction policy and the estimator
/// itself (`None` when no consumer requested one) — callers thread the latter
/// on to `Infra::frequency_estimator` for the ADR 041 buy-side gate.
fn wire_cache_policies(
    cache_cfg: &decdn_common::config::resolved::ResolvedCache,
    cache: &CacheEngine,
) -> (
    Arc<dyn decdn_cache::EvictionPolicy>,
    Option<Arc<dyn decdn_cache::FrequencyEstimator>>,
) {
    let want_estimator = cache_cfg.eviction_policy == "tinylfu"
        || cache_cfg.admission_policy == "tinylfu"
        || cache_cfg.serve_economics.policy == "margin";
    let estimator: Option<Arc<dyn decdn_cache::FrequencyEstimator>> = want_estimator.then(|| {
        Arc::new(decdn_cache::policy::tinylfu::TinyLfuEstimator::new(
            cache_cfg.tinylfu.sketch_bytes,
        )) as Arc<dyn decdn_cache::FrequencyEstimator>
    });
    if let Some(est) = &estimator {
        cache.set_frequency_estimator(est.clone());
    }
    if cache_cfg.admission_policy == "tinylfu"
        && let Some(est) = &estimator
    {
        cache.set_admission_policy(Arc::new(decdn_cache::policy::tinylfu::ProbationAdmission {
            freq: est.clone(),
            promotion_threshold: cache_cfg.tinylfu.promotion_threshold,
        }));
    }
    // promotion_threshold + probation_target_pct live entirely on the policy
    // object, not on the engine or the eviction driver's `EvictionParams`.
    let eviction_policy: Arc<dyn decdn_cache::EvictionPolicy> =
        match cache_cfg.eviction_policy.as_str() {
            "tinylfu" => match &estimator {
                Some(est) => Arc::new(decdn_cache::policy::tinylfu::TinyLfuEviction::new(
                    est.clone(),
                    cache_cfg.tinylfu.promotion_threshold,
                    cache_cfg.tinylfu.probation_target_pct,
                )),
                // Unreachable: `want_estimator` is true whenever eviction_policy
                // == "tinylfu", so `estimator` is always `Some` here.
                None => Arc::new(decdn_cache::policy::LruEviction),
            },
            _ => Arc::new(decdn_cache::policy::LruEviction),
        };

    // `tinylfu` admission only does useful work paired with `tinylfu` eviction:
    // promotion out of probation and the probation cap both live in
    // `TinyLfuEviction::plan`. With `lru` eviction the probation labels are set
    // but never promoted or capped, and the estimator pays a per-serve cost for
    // no effect. Warn rather than silently no-op (the resolver already rejects
    // typos; this valid-but-inert combination deserves a heads-up).
    if cache_cfg.admission_policy == "tinylfu" && cache_cfg.eviction_policy != "tinylfu" {
        tracing::warn!(
            admission_policy = %cache_cfg.admission_policy,
            eviction_policy = %cache_cfg.eviction_policy,
            "cache.admission_policy = \"tinylfu\" is inert unless cache.eviction_policy is \
             also \"tinylfu\": probation admission relies on the tinylfu eviction policy to \
             promote and cap probation members; under lru eviction the labels do nothing and \
             the frequency estimator runs for no effect",
        );
    }

    (eviction_policy, estimator)
}

/// Construct the cache engine from resolved config. The
/// `[cache.origins]` array picks an ordered list of backends — HTTP,
/// filesystem, or S3 (#437, #284). The singular `[cache.origin]` TOML
/// form is collapsed by the resolver into a single-element vec, so
/// this function sees one canonical representation. An empty vec means
/// no pull-through is configured; the engine then serves only
/// already-cached content and cache misses surface as
/// `CacheError::NoOrigin`.
///
/// Init failure is fail-fast: if origin #i can't be constructed (bad
/// path, S3 auth failure, etc.) the node refuses to start and the
/// context chain identifies which entry. Skip-and-warn would let a
/// misconfigured fallback rot silently until the primary fails — the
/// opposite of operator intent.
///
/// `node_metrics` provides the shared `Arc<CacheMetrics>` that the
/// engine bumps on origin fetches, retry exhaustions (#285), and
/// chain-walk fallback advances (#284).
async fn build_cache(
    cfg: &ResolvedConfig,
    node_metrics: Arc<metrics::Metrics>,
    node_origin: Option<Arc<dyn Origin>>,
) -> anyhow::Result<CacheEngine> {
    // HTTP and S3 origins capture the runtime they are built on and run every
    // request send there, so their pooled connections outlive the pull-leg
    // runtimes that call them. This runs on the node's main runtime.
    let mut origins: Vec<Arc<dyn Origin>> = Vec::with_capacity(cfg.cache.origins.len());
    for (idx, resolved) in cfg.cache.origins.iter().enumerate() {
        let backend: Arc<dyn Origin> = match resolved {
            ResolvedOrigin::Http { url, decompress } => Arc::new(
                HttpOrigin::new_with_user_agent(url.clone(), &cfg.cache.user_agent)
                    .with_context(|| {
                        format!("failed to build HTTP origin client for cache.origins[{idx}]")
                    })?
                    .with_decompress_mode(*decompress),
            ),
            ResolvedOrigin::Fs { path } => {
                Arc::new(FilesystemOrigin::new(path.clone()).await.with_context(|| {
                    format!("failed to open filesystem origin for cache.origins[{idx}]")
                })?)
            }
            // S3-compatible origin (#437). Conversion from the resolved-
            // config form to the cache-crate's runtime form happens here
            // because `decdn-cache` deliberately doesn't depend on
            // `decdn-common` (#578); `node` is the crate that sees both.
            ResolvedOrigin::S3(s3_cfg) => Arc::new(
                S3Origin::new(&s3_origin_config_from_resolved(s3_cfg))
                    .await
                    .with_context(|| {
                        format!("failed to construct S3 origin client for cache.origins[{idx}]")
                    })?
                    .with_decompress_mode(s3_cfg.decompress),
            ),
        };
        origins.push(backend);
    }
    // Append the node-to-node pull origin LAST so configured HTTP/FS/S3 origins
    // are tried first and the paid network pull is the final fallback (#831).
    if let Some(node_origin) = node_origin {
        origins.push(node_origin);
    }
    let engine = CacheEngine::open_full(
        &cfg.cache.cache_dir,
        origins,
        cfg.cache.max_blob_size_mb,
        cfg.cache.pinned_hashes.clone(),
        cfg.cache.origin_retry,
        cfg.cache.circuit_breaker,
        Some(node_metrics.cache_metrics()),
        std::time::Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.gc_interval_sec),
    )
    .await
    .context("failed to open cache engine")?;
    // `cache.*` is restart-required (not hot-reloaded), so applying the
    // probe-hold budget once here is sufficient (ADR 005 §Hold budget, #318).
    engine.set_max_probe_holds(cfg.cache.max_probe_holds);
    // One origin read on the range-pull path (an outboard fetch or one data
    // window) gets the streaming stage's throughput floor: the stall window as a
    // head start, plus the read size at the minimum throughput. The budget
    // scales with the read, so it never caps the blob size, and a stuck origin
    // ends the fill rather than parking it until the client gives up (ADR 037).
    engine.set_origin_read_budget(
        std::time::Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.node_pull_stall_window_sec),
        cfg.cache.node_pull_min_throughput_bps,
    );
    // Live-origin probe memo (#1130 pt3) — likewise restart-configured once.
    engine.set_origin_probe_config(decdn_cache::origin_probe::OriginProbePolicy {
        positive_ttl: std::time::Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.origin_probe_ttl_sec),
        negative_ttl: std::time::Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.origin_probe_negative_ttl_sec),
        fault_ttl: std::time::Duration::from_secs(cfg.cache.origin_probe_fault_ttl_sec),
        timeout: std::time::Duration::from_millis(cfg.cache.origin_probe_timeout_ms),
        capacity: usize::try_from(cfg.cache.origin_probe_memo_capacity).unwrap_or(usize::MAX),
    });
    Ok(engine)
}

/// Translate the `decdn-common` resolved-config S3 form into the
/// `decdn-cache` runtime form. The two types carry the same data —
/// they exist as separate types only because `decdn-cache` deliberately
/// doesn't pull `decdn-common` (the dep direction is `common -> cache`).
///
/// Credential redaction (`SecretString::expose`) happens here, at the
/// crate boundary: the SDK call site gets plain `String`s, and the
/// `Debug`-redacted wrapper stays inside the config layer where it
/// guards against incidental log leaks.
fn s3_origin_config_from_resolved(cfg: &decdn_common::config::ResolvedS3Config) -> S3OriginConfig {
    let credentials = cfg.credentials.as_ref().map(|c| match c {
        ResolvedS3Credentials::Static {
            access_key_id,
            secret_access_key,
            session_token,
        } => S3Credentials::Static {
            access_key_id: access_key_id.expose().to_string(),
            secret_access_key: secret_access_key.expose().to_string(),
            session_token: session_token.as_ref().map(|t| t.expose().to_string()),
        },
        ResolvedS3Credentials::DefaultChain { profile } => S3Credentials::DefaultChain {
            profile: profile.clone(),
        },
    });
    S3OriginConfig {
        bucket: cfg.bucket.clone(),
        region: cfg.region.clone(),
        endpoint_url: cfg.endpoint_url.clone(),
        path_style: cfg.path_style,
        prefix: cfg.prefix.clone(),
        credentials,
    }
}

/// Stable comma-separated label for the resolved-origin chain, used
/// in startup logs so operators can grep for `origin_kinds=http,s3`
/// without parsing the structured fields back out. Returns `"none"`
/// when the chain is empty (rather than emitting an empty string) so
/// the field is always present and machine-parseable.
fn origin_kinds_label(origins: &[ResolvedOrigin]) -> String {
    if origins.is_empty() {
        return "none".to_string();
    }
    origins
        .iter()
        .map(|o| match o {
            ResolvedOrigin::Http { .. } => "http",
            ResolvedOrigin::Fs { .. } => "fs",
            ResolvedOrigin::S3(_) => "s3",
        })
        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        .join(",")
}

/// Which OS signal (or admin RPC call) triggered shutdown. Returned by
/// [`ShutdownStreams::recv`] or synthesised by the `drain_trigger` arm so
/// the "shutdown signal received" log line records the cause (SIGINT,
/// SIGTERM, or admin drain) — operators grep that field for post-incident
/// analysis. `Sigterm` is unreachable on non-unix targets.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
enum ShutdownSignal {
    Sigint,
    #[cfg(unix)]
    Sigterm,
    /// Graceful shutdown requested via `admin_v1_drain` (issue #244).
    AdminDrain,
}

impl std::fmt::Display for ShutdownSignal {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        match self {
            Self::Sigint => f.write_str("SIGINT"),
            #[cfg(unix)]
            Self::Sigterm => f.write_str("SIGTERM"),
            Self::AdminDrain => f.write_str("admin-drain"),
        }
    }
}

/// Whether the admin server's stop signal fires before or after
/// `router.shutdown()` for this drain (issue #604). `Early` is the
/// SIGTERM-equivalent default; `AfterRouter` opts in to keeping the
/// admin port alive so `decdn node drain --wait` can poll
/// `admin_v1_health.in_flight_streams` until it reaches 0.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum AdminStopOrder {
    Early,
    AfterRouter,
}

/// Decide the admin shutdown ordering for a drain.
///
/// `AfterRouter` is selected **only** when the drain originated from
/// the admin RPC (`AdminDrain`) *and* the in-flight RPC asked for
/// `wait_admin: true`. Signal-driven shutdowns (SIGINT/SIGTERM)
/// always pick `Early` — even if an `admin_v1_drain { wait_admin:
/// true }` call was in-flight when the signal landed, the operator's
/// stated intent wins. This prevents a "sticky `wait_admin`" race
/// where an RPC stored the flag, SIGTERM won the select, and the
/// runtime would otherwise take the `AfterRouter` path against the
/// operator's signal (issue #604 review).
fn admin_stop_order(signal: ShutdownSignal, drain_trigger: &admin::DrainTrigger) -> AdminStopOrder {
    if matches!(signal, ShutdownSignal::AdminDrain) && drain_trigger.wait_admin() {
        AdminStopOrder::AfterRouter
    } else {
        AdminStopOrder::Early
    }
}

/// Persistent SIGHUP stream, installed once at startup. The
/// `Signal` instance lives on `self` for the lifetime of the runtime
/// so successive SIGHUPs delivered while a reload is in progress are
/// queued by tokio (kernel-coalesced) rather than dropped. Re-creating
/// the `Signal` per iteration of the select loop would race signal
/// delivery — that's the bug this struct exists to prevent.
///
/// On non-Unix targets `recv` returns a `pending` future since SIGHUP
/// doesn't exist there.
struct HupStream {
    #[cfg(unix)]
    hup: Option<tokio::signal::unix::Signal>,
}

impl HupStream {
    fn install() -> Self {
        #[cfg(unix)]
        {
            use tokio::signal::unix::{SignalKind, signal};
            let hup = match signal(SignalKind::hangup()) {
                Ok(s) => Some(s),
                Err(err) => {
                    tracing::warn!(error = %err, "failed to install SIGHUP handler; hot-reload disabled");
                    None
                }
            };
            Self { hup }
        }
        #[cfg(not(unix))]
        {
            Self {}
        }
    }

    /// Wait for the next SIGHUP on the persistent stream. If
    /// installation failed (`None`) or the platform isn't Unix, this
    /// future never resolves.
    ///
    /// `Signal::recv` resolves to `Option<()>`. `None` indicates the
    /// underlying stream has been closed (the driver dropped, signal
    /// handler torn down) — once that happens the future would resolve
    /// *immediately, forever*, and the runtime select-loop would
    /// hot-spin. Park on `pending` in that branch instead so hot-reload
    /// is silently disabled rather than turning into a spin-loop.
    async fn recv(&mut self) {
        #[cfg(unix)]
        {
            // Three cases:
            //   1. install succeeded + stream yielded a real signal →
            //      return so the caller runs the reload arm.
            //   2. install succeeded but the stream is now closed →
            //      `recv()` returns `None`, which would otherwise
            //      resolve *immediately, forever* and hot-spin the
            //      runtime's select. Take ownership, log once, and park
            //      on `pending` for the rest of the process.
            //   3. install failed at startup (`self.hup` is `None`) →
            //      already logged a warning at install time; just park
            //      on `pending`.
            if let Some(stream) = self.hup.as_mut() {
                if stream.recv().await.is_some() {
                    return;
                }
                self.hup = None;
                tracing::warn!("SIGHUP stream closed; hot-reload disabled for this process");
            }
            std::future::pending::<()>().await;
        }
        #[cfg(not(unix))]
        {
            std::future::pending::<()>().await
        }
    }
}

/// Persistent SIGINT/SIGTERM streams. Installed once at startup so
/// rapid-fire shutdown signals (e.g. operator pressing Ctrl-C twice)
/// are coalesced by the kernel rather than potentially lost between
/// re-registrations of `Signal`.
struct ShutdownStreams {
    /// `tokio::signal::ctrl_c` is itself a one-shot future that
    /// re-registers internally — but `tokio::signal::unix::signal`
    /// (used for SIGTERM) is not. We park `ctrl_c()` inside `recv`
    /// directly and rely on tokio's own implementation for SIGINT.
    #[cfg(unix)]
    term: Option<tokio::signal::unix::Signal>,
}

impl ShutdownStreams {
    fn install() -> Self {
        #[cfg(unix)]
        {
            use tokio::signal::unix::{SignalKind, signal};
            let term = match signal(SignalKind::terminate()) {
                Ok(s) => Some(s),
                Err(err) => {
                    tracing::warn!(
                        error = %err,
                        "failed to install SIGTERM handler; falling back to SIGINT only",
                    );
                    None
                }
            };
            Self { term }
        }
        #[cfg(not(unix))]
        {
            Self {}
        }
    }

    /// Wait for the next SIGINT or (on Unix) SIGTERM and report which
    /// one fired. The persistent SIGTERM stream lives on `self`, so
    /// successive calls observe successive signals — there's no
    /// race window between iterations of the runtime's select loop.
    ///
    /// `Signal::recv` resolves to `Option<()>`. A `None` from the
    /// SIGTERM arm would otherwise resolve immediately forever and
    /// short-circuit the select to a spurious shutdown; demote that
    /// branch to a `pending` future so we wait for a real SIGINT
    /// instead. (`tokio::signal::ctrl_c` re-registers internally and
    /// is safe to await directly.)
    async fn recv(&mut self) -> ShutdownSignal {
        #[cfg(unix)]
        {
            if let Some(term) = self.term.as_mut() {
                let race = tokio::select! {
                    _ = tokio::signal::ctrl_c() => Some(ShutdownSignal::Sigint),
                    res = term.recv() => res.map(|()| ShutdownSignal::Sigterm),
                };
                if let Some(sig) = race {
                    return sig;
                }
                // SIGTERM arm closed (`None`). Drop the stream so we
                // don't keep racing a future that resolves immediately
                // forever, then wait for a real SIGINT.
                tracing::warn!("SIGTERM stream closed; falling back to SIGINT only");
                self.term = None;
            }
            let _ = tokio::signal::ctrl_c().await;
            ShutdownSignal::Sigint
        }
        #[cfg(not(unix))]
        {
            let _ = tokio::signal::ctrl_c().await;
            ShutdownSignal::Sigint
        }
    }
}

/// Classification of an RPC preflight/watchdog probe (#1106/#1108). A
/// rate-limited (`429`) or server-side (`5xx`) response — and any
/// timeout/connection error — is [`Transient`](RpcProbe::Transient): the startup
/// preflight retries it with backoff rather than aborting the process, so a
/// commodity endpoint that throttles the startup burst does not crash-loop the
/// node. Any other non-2xx (a `4xx` such as a bad path/auth) is
/// [`Fatal`](RpcProbe::Fatal) — retrying will not help.
enum RpcProbe {
    Healthy,
    Transient(String),
    Fatal(String),
}

/// Retry budget for [`check_deployment_preflight`]'s chain reads. Its own
/// [`BootRetry`] budget, independent of the shared boot deadline the chain
/// bootstraps below share: the RPC endpoint has just passed
/// [`check_rpc_reachability`], so a transient hiccup clears fast, and a real
/// outage should not hold the lane store hostage for long.
const DEPLOYMENT_PREFLIGHT_BUDGET: Duration = Duration::from_mins(1);

/// Verify the configured `PaymentPool` deployment against the live chain:
/// the RPC's `eth_chainId` must equal `blockchain.chain_id`, the configured
/// address must have code, and that code must answer
/// `PaymentPool.getRateBounds()` — a code-presence check alone would pass a
/// sibling contract pasted from the same deploy manifest (`CapacityBond`,
/// `FeeRouter`, `BuybackBurner`, `DecdnGovernor`, the USDC token), and that is
/// the likeliest wrong-address typo. `getRateBounds()` is the probe because
/// only `PaymentPool` declares it: `usdc()` is also a view on `FeeRouter` and
/// `BuybackBurner`, and `feeRouter()` is also a view on `DecdnGovernor`. The
/// probe holds only while that stays true: no other contract in the deployment
/// may declare a function with the `getRateBounds()` selector, and
/// `contracts/src/PaymentPool.sol` carries the same warning on the view. The
/// `deployment_preflight_guard` e2e boots against every contract in the deploy
/// manifest to catch a collision, and the `payment_pool_probe_selector` e2e
/// fails if any contract in `contracts/src` other than `PaymentPool` exposes
/// the selector, deployed or not. Runs BEFORE the lane store opens, because
/// the store's deployment binding
/// ([`crate::pool_store::Deployment`]) drops the seller lane state when
/// the stamp differs — a typo in either field must abort bring-up while the
/// store is untouched, not destroy unredeemed lane state on a WARN. The
/// reads retry transient RPC errors on `retry`; the mismatch verdicts are
/// deterministic and fail at once, and a non-`PaymentPool` target surfaces
/// from `getRateBounds()` as a permanent contract error, not a retry spin.
async fn check_deployment_preflight<P: Provider + Clone>(
    provider: P,
    deployment: crate::pool_store::Deployment,
    retry: &BootRetry,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let (rpc_chain_id, code_len) = retry
        .run(
            "deployment preflight (eth_chainId + PaymentPool code)",
            || {
                let provider = provider.clone();
                async move {
                    let chain_id = provider.get_chain_id().await.context("eth_chainId")?;
                    let code = provider
                        .get_code_at(deployment.payment_pool)
                        .await
                        .context("eth_getCode(payment_pool)")?;
                    Ok((chain_id, code.len()))
                }
            },
        )
        .await?;
    anyhow::ensure!(
        rpc_chain_id == deployment.chain_id,
        "blockchain.chain_id is {} but the RPC endpoint serves chain {rpc_chain_id}; a \
         mismatched chain id would rebind the lane store and drop its seller state — fix \
         blockchain.chain_id or blockchain.rpc_url",
        deployment.chain_id,
    );
    anyhow::ensure!(
        code_len > 0,
        "blockchain.payment_pool_address {} has no code on chain {rpc_chain_id}; a wrong \
         address would rebind the lane store and drop its seller state — fix \
         blockchain.payment_pool_address",
        deployment.payment_pool,
    );
    // Contract-identity probe: `getRateBounds()` is a cheap view every
    // `PaymentPool` answers and no sibling contract declares. A contract
    // without it reverts (or, with no code path at all, returns no data), and
    // either answer is a permanent contract error that aborts at once.
    let contract =
        decdn_incentive::payment_pool::PaymentPool::new(deployment.payment_pool, provider);
    retry
        .run(
            "deployment preflight (PaymentPool.getRateBounds())",
            || async {
                contract.getRateBounds().call().await.with_context(|| {
                    format!(
                        "blockchain.payment_pool_address {} does not answer \
                     PaymentPool.getRateBounds() on chain {rpc_chain_id}; the address hosts \
                     some other contract, and a wrong address would rebind the lane store and \
                     drop its seller state — fix blockchain.payment_pool_address",
                        deployment.payment_pool,
                    )
                })
            },
        )
        .await?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Number of preflight attempts before a persistent transient failure is treated
/// as fatal (a real outage still aborts bring-up). Backoff caps at 8s, so the
/// worst-case wait is bounded (~5×5s request timeouts + 1+2+4+8s backoff).
const RPC_PREFLIGHT_MAX_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 5;

/// Verify that the JSON-RPC endpoint is reachable by sending a lightweight
/// `net_version` request with a short timeout, retrying a transient (429/5xx/
/// timeout) response with bounded backoff (#1108) — a rate-limited endpoint must
/// not crash-loop the node at startup. A fatal (other 4xx) response, or an
/// exhausted retry budget, aborts bring-up so operators still catch typos and
/// dead endpoints before the node binds ports and starts serving.
async fn check_rpc_reachability(rpc_url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5))
        .build()
        .context("failed to build HTTP client for RPC check")?;
    preflight_retry(&client, rpc_url, Duration::from_secs(1)).await
}

/// Retry loop behind [`check_rpc_reachability`], split out so the retry/classify
/// policy is testable with a small `initial_backoff` (the production caller
/// passes 1s). Retries a [`RpcProbe::Transient`] with doubling backoff (capped at
/// 8s) up to [`RPC_PREFLIGHT_MAX_ATTEMPTS`]; a [`RpcProbe::Fatal`] bails at once.
async fn preflight_retry(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    rpc_url: &str,
    initial_backoff: Duration,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let mut backoff = initial_backoff;
    for attempt in 1..=RPC_PREFLIGHT_MAX_ATTEMPTS {
        match probe_rpc_classified(client, rpc_url).await {
            RpcProbe::Healthy => {
                tracing::info!("RPC endpoint reachable");
                return Ok(());
            }
            RpcProbe::Fatal(msg) => anyhow::bail!("blockchain.rpc_url {msg}"),
            RpcProbe::Transient(msg) if attempt == RPC_PREFLIGHT_MAX_ATTEMPTS => {
                anyhow::bail!(
                    "blockchain.rpc_url {msg}; still failing after {RPC_PREFLIGHT_MAX_ATTEMPTS} attempts"
                );
            }
            RpcProbe::Transient(msg) => {
                tracing::warn!(
                    attempt,
                    backoff_secs = backoff.as_secs(),
                    "RPC preflight transient failure ({msg}); retrying after backoff"
                );
                tokio::time::sleep(backoff).await;
                backoff = (backoff * 2).min(Duration::from_secs(8));
            }
        }
    }
    // The loop returns or bails on every path; this is unreachable but keeps the
    // signature total without an `unwrap`/`unreachable!` (anti-panic policy).
    anyhow::bail!("blockchain.rpc_url preflight exhausted retries")
}

/// Issue a single `net_version` JSON-RPC probe and classify the outcome (see
/// [`RpcProbe`]). Shared by the startup preflight and the watchdog so their
/// health verdict can never diverge.
async fn probe_rpc_classified(client: &reqwest::Client, rpc_url: &str) -> RpcProbe {
    let body = serde_json::json!({
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "method": "net_version",
        "params": [],
        "id": 1
    });

    let resp = match client.post(rpc_url).json(&body).send().await {
        Ok(resp) => resp,
        // A timeout or connection error is transient — the endpoint may be
        // momentarily overloaded (the #1108 startup-burst 429 arrives here as a
        // reset on some gateways) rather than misconfigured.
        Err(err) => {
            return RpcProbe::Transient(format!(
                "is not reachable (timeout or connection error): {}",
                sanitize_error_sources(&err)
            ));
        }
    };

    let status = resp.status();
    if status.is_success() {
        RpcProbe::Healthy
    } else if status.as_u16() == 429 || status.is_server_error() {
        RpcProbe::Transient(format!(
            "returned status {status} (rate-limited or server error)"
        ))
    } else {
        RpcProbe::Fatal(format!(
            "returned unexpected status {status}; verify the endpoint is a valid JSON-RPC server"
        ))
    }
}

/// Issue a single `net_version` JSON-RPC probe against `rpc_url`. Returns
/// `Ok(())` on a healthy (2xx) response, an error otherwise — a thin adapter over
/// [`probe_rpc_classified`] preserving the watchdog's original pass/fail
/// semantics (it treats any non-2xx as unhealthy for the gauge, transient or not).
pub(crate) async fn probe_rpc(client: &reqwest::Client, rpc_url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    match probe_rpc_classified(client, rpc_url).await {
        RpcProbe::Healthy => Ok(()),
        RpcProbe::Transient(msg) | RpcProbe::Fatal(msg) => {
            anyhow::bail!("blockchain.rpc_url {msg}")
        }
    }
}

/// Spawn the RPC connectivity watchdog. On each tick of `interval`, calls
/// [`probe_rpc`] and updates `metrics.rpc_healthy(...)`. Logs a `warn`
/// when health transitions down and an `info` when it transitions back
/// up; steady-state ticks are silent. Stops when `shutdown` resolves.
///
/// The caller is responsible for seeding the gauge before this is
/// spawned — `run()` does so right after the successful
/// `check_rpc_reachability` startup probe. The watchdog only writes the
/// gauge on tick boundaries. The previous-state tracking starts
/// assuming the endpoint is healthy for the same reason, which prevents
/// a spurious "recovered" log on the first tick.
fn spawn_rpc_watchdog(
    client: reqwest::Client,
    rpc_url: String,
    interval: Duration,
    metrics: Arc<metrics::Metrics>,
    mut shutdown: oneshot::Receiver<()>,
) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        // Caller seeded the gauge from the startup probe; see fn docs.
        let mut prev_healthy = true;
        loop {
            tokio::select! {
                biased;
                _ = &mut shutdown => {
                    tracing::debug!("RPC watchdog shutdown signal received");
                    return;
                }
                () = tokio::time::sleep(interval) => {}
            }

            let now_healthy = match probe_rpc(&client, &rpc_url).await {
                Ok(()) => {
                    if !prev_healthy {
                        // Deliberately omit the URL: the node configures one
                        // RPC endpoint, and it may carry basic-auth credentials
                        // in the userinfo component.
                        tracing::info!("RPC endpoint healthy");
                    }
                    true
                }
                Err(err) => {
                    if prev_healthy {
                        // `probe_rpc_classified` already strips the URL from the
                        // transport error before `probe_rpc` wraps it. Strip again
                        // here as a backstop: an `rpc_url` can hold an API key in
                        // its path or query, not only in userinfo.
                        tracing::warn!(error = %sanitize_err_chain(&err), "RPC endpoint unhealthy");
                    }
                    false
                }
            };
            metrics.rpc_healthy(now_healthy);
            prev_healthy = now_healthy;
        }
    })
}

#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(
    clippy::unwrap_used,
    clippy::expect_used,
    clippy::panic,
    clippy::indexing_slicing
)]
mod tests;