Crate dao_proposal_single

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§dao-proposal-single

dao-proposal-single on crates.io docs.rs

A proposal module for a DAO DAO DAO which supports simple “yes”, “no”, “abstain” voting. Proposals may have associated messages which will be executed by the core module upon the proposal being passed and executed.

Votes can be cast for as long as the proposal is not expired. In cases where the proposal is no longer being evaluated (e.g. met the quorum and been rejected), this allows voters to reflect their opinion even though it has no effect on the final proposal’s status.

For more information about how these modules fit together see this wiki page.

For information about how this module counts votes and handles passing thresholds see this wiki page.

§Undesired behavior

The undesired behavior of this contract is tested under testing/adversarial_tests.rs.

In general, it should cover:

  • Executing unpassed proposals
  • Executing proposals more than once
  • Social engineering proposals for financial benefit
  • Convincing proposal modules to spend someone else’s allowance

§Proposal deposits

Proposal deposits for this module are handled by the dao-pre-propose-single contract.

§Hooks

This module supports hooks for voting and proposal status changes. One may register a contract to receive these hooks with the AddVoteHook and AddProposalHook methods. Upon registration the contract will receive messages whenever a vote is cast and a proposal’s status changes (for example, when the proposal passes).

The format for these hook messages can be located in the proposal-hooks and vote-hooks packages located in packages/proposal-hooks and packages/vote-hooks respectively.

To stop an invalid hook receiver from locking the proposal module receivers will be removed from the hook list if they error when handling a hook.

§Revoting

The proposals may be configured to allow revoting. In such cases, users are able to change their vote as long as the proposal is still open. Revoting for the currently cast option will return an error.

§Veto

Proposals may be configured with an optional VetoConfig - a configuration describing the veto flow.

VetoConfig timelock period enables a party (such as an oversight committee DAO) to hold the main DAO accountable by vetoing proposals once (and potentially before) they are passed for a given timelock period.

No actions from DAO members are allowed during the timelock period.

After the timelock expires, the proposal can be executed normally.

VetoConfig contains the following fields:

§timelock_duration

Timelock duration (cw_utils::Duration) describes the duration of timelock in blocks or seconds.

The delay duration is added to the proposal’s expiration to get the timelock expiration (Expiration) used for the new proposal state of VetoTimelock { expiration: Expiration }.

If the vetoer address is another DAO, this duration should be carefully considered based on of the vetoer DAO’s voting period.

§vetoer

Vetoer (String) is the address of the account allowed to veto the proposals that are in VetoTimelock state.

Vetoer address can be updated via a regular proposal config update.

If you want the vetoer role to be shared between multiple organizations or individuals, a cw1-whitelist contract address can be used to allow multiple accounts to veto the prop.

§early_execute

Early execute (bool) is a flag used to indicate whether the vetoer can execute the proposals before the timelock period is expired. The proposals still need to be passed and in the VetoTimelock state in order for this to be possible. This may prevent the veto flow from consistently lengthening the governance process.

§veto_before_passed

Veto before passed (bool) is a flag used to indicate whether the vetoer can veto a proposal before it passes. Votes may still be cast until the specified proposal expiration, even once vetoed.

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