crtx-ledger 0.1.0

//! Live OpenTimestamps submit + verify adapter (Gate 4).
//!
//! This is the trust-path consumer of [`super::OtsParser`]. It bridges
//! between the [`crate::external_sink::ExternalReceipt`] envelope and
//! the typed [`super::TypedOtsProof`] output of the trait wrapper.
//!
//! Doctrine bindings:
//!
//! - **HTTP injection.** Cargo.lock mutation is only authorized for
//!   `opentimestamps` itself (operator decision #4). The adapter does
//!   not pin a specific HTTP client; the [`CalendarClient`] trait is
//!   the seam an operator's deployment plugs into. The default
//!   [`NoopCalendarClient`] is hard-coded to refuse and exists so the
//!   CLI surface compiles without an HTTP dependency — a real
//!   submission requires an operator-supplied client.
//! - **Pending → Partial always.** [`verify_receipt`] maps Pending to
//!   [`OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial`] regardless of caller flag
//!   (hard rule). The CLI / verifier crate converts the local outcome
//!   to `cortex_verifier::state::VerifiedTrustState` so that this
//!   crate avoids depending on `cortex-verifier` (which already
//!   depends on `cortex-ledger`).
//! - **Bitcoin cross-check.** A `BitcoinConfirmed` proof is only
//!   promoted to [`OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified`] when
//!   the adapter has a [`BitcoinHeaderSource`] that confirms the
//!   attestation's block height carries a header whose merkle root
//!   matches the recomputed commitment-op digest. Without a header
//!   source (v1 default) the adapter degrades to `Partial` with the
//!   `ots.bitcoin_confirmed.block_header_mismatch` invariant.
//! - **N≥2 disjoint-authority calendar quorum** (council 2026-05-12
//!   Decision Q1, UNANIMOUS). A receipt history MAY produce
//!   `FullChainVerified` only when at least two calendars in the
//!   history witness the same anchor AND at least one of them belongs
//!   to a different operator. The three Todd-administered endpoints
//!   (`a.pool`, `alice`, `bob`) collapse to one authority for the
//!   disjointness check; the Eternitywall Finney endpoint is the
//!   default non-Todd witness. Failures surface the stable
//!   [`OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_QUORUM_NOT_MET_INVARIANT`]
//!   (`ots.disjoint_authority.quorum_not_met`) token and the receipt
//!   is downgraded to `Partial`.
//! - **Headers-only HTTPS Bitcoin transport** (council 2026-05-12
//!   Decision Q2 + Q3, UNANIMOUS). The
//!   [`HttpsHeadersBitcoinHeaderSource`] fetches block headers from
//!   N administratively-disjoint HTTPS providers and requires
//!   byte-identical responses from at least N providers (default 2).
//!   Single-provider + local PoW alone cannot detect block
//!   withholding / stale-tip attacks (Q3 doctrinaire vote), so the
//!   quorum is mandatory. Failures surface
//!   `ots.bitcoin_header_quorum.providers_disagree` or
//!   `ots.bitcoin_header_quorum.unreachable`.

use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use serde_json::json;

use super::{
    DefaultOtsParser, OtsError, OtsParser, TypedOtsProof,
    OTS_BITCOIN_CONFIRMED_BLOCK_HEADER_MISMATCH_INVARIANT,
    OTS_BITCOIN_CONFIRMED_MERKLE_PATH_INVALID_INVARIANT, OTS_BITCOIN_HEADER_POW_INVALID_INVARIANT,
    OTS_BITCOIN_HEADER_QUORUM_PROVIDERS_DISAGREE_INVARIANT,
    OTS_BITCOIN_HEADER_QUORUM_UNREACHABLE_INVARIANT,
    OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_QUORUM_NOT_MET_INVARIANT,
    OTS_PENDING_NO_BITCOIN_ATTESTATION_YET_INVARIANT,
};
use crate::anchor::LedgerAnchor;
use crate::external_sink::{anchor_text_sha256, ExternalReceipt, ExternalSink};

/// Default public OTS calendar pool (council 2026-05-12 Q1 ratified
/// default set, UNANIMOUS). Operators may override via
/// `--sink-endpoint` on the CLI; this constant is the fallback used by
/// the documented happy path in `docs/RUNBOOK.md`.
///
/// Back-compat alias: points at the FIRST entry of
/// [`DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URLS`] (`a.pool.opentimestamps.org`,
/// Peter-Todd-operated). New code SHOULD prefer
/// [`DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URLS`] so the operator-disjoint quorum check
/// (see [`enforce_disjoint_authority_quorum`]) has more than one
/// authority to draw from.
pub const DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URL: &str = "https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org";

/// Default OpenTimestamps calendar list ratified by council
/// 2026-05-12 Decision Q1 (UNANIMOUS). The first three endpoints are
/// administered by Peter Todd and collapse to a single authority for
/// the disjoint-authority quorum check ([`calendar_operator`]); the
/// Eternitywall Finney endpoint is the default non-Todd witness.
///
/// Fan-out submission against this list is what makes a
/// `FullChainVerified` promotion reachable under the
/// N≥2-distinct-operators rule documented at the module level. Calling
/// only the first entry (`a.pool`) keeps the receipt history at a
/// single Todd-operated authority and pins promotion to `Partial` with
/// [`OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_QUORUM_NOT_MET_INVARIANT`].
pub const DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URLS: &[&str] = &[
    "https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org",
    "https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org",
    "https://bob.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org",
    "https://finney.calendar.eternitywall.com",
];

/// Operator-of-record for each OTS calendar URL. Council 2026-05-12
/// Decision Q1 doctrinaire position: three Todd endpoints share a
/// single administrative authority and MUST collapse for any
/// disjoint-authority quorum check.
///
/// The mapping needles are **canonical hostnames** (no scheme, no path,
/// no port). [`calendar_operator`] parses the candidate URL, extracts
/// the host, and matches with `host == needle || host.ends_with(".{needle}")`
/// so that legitimate subdomains (e.g. `alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org`
/// under the `calendar.opentimestamps.org` zone) resolve to the
/// expected operator while attacker-supplied URLs that embed a known
/// hostname in their path or query (e.g.
/// `https://attacker.example/?h=finney.calendar.eternitywall.com`) do
/// **not**. See [`calendar_operator`] and Bug Hunt 2026-05-12 finding
/// BH-1 for the substring-match regression this exact-host rule closes.
pub const OTS_CALENDAR_OPERATORS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
    ("a.pool.opentimestamps.org", "peter_todd"),
    ("alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org", "peter_todd"),
    ("bob.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org", "peter_todd"),
    ("finney.calendar.eternitywall.com", "eternitywall"),
];

/// Extract the host component of `url` for [`calendar_operator`].
///
/// Returns `None` if the input cannot be parsed as an absolute URL
/// with a host. This is option B from Bug Hunt 2026-05-12 BH-1: avoid
/// pulling the `url` crate into the workspace (zero `Cargo.lock`
/// delta) and parse manually.
///
/// Recognized shape: `scheme://[userinfo@]host[:port][/path][?query][#frag]`.
/// `scheme` MUST be present (`://` delimiter); anything that fails the
/// recognized shape returns `None` and therefore matches no operator.
/// The host is lower-cased (DNS is case-insensitive) so the
/// exact-match comparison against the lower-case needles in
/// [`OTS_CALENDAR_OPERATORS`] is deterministic.
fn calendar_host_lower(url: &str) -> Option<String> {
    // Require `scheme://` — no scheme means we cannot trust which
    // component is the host. Refuse rather than guess.
    let after_scheme = {
        let idx = url.find("://")?;
        let scheme = &url[..idx];
        // RFC 3986 scheme = ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "-" / "." )
        if scheme.is_empty()
            || !scheme
                .chars()
                .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '+' | '-' | '.'))
            || !scheme
                .chars()
                .next()
                .is_some_and(|c| c.is_ascii_alphabetic())
        {
            return None;
        }
        &url[idx + 3..]
    };

    // Authority component ends at the first '/', '?', or '#'.
    let authority_end = after_scheme
        .find(['/', '?', '#'])
        .unwrap_or(after_scheme.len());
    let authority = &after_scheme[..authority_end];
    if authority.is_empty() {
        return None;
    }

    // Strip optional `userinfo@`. RFC 3986 allows '@' inside userinfo
    // only as a percent-encoded triplet (`%40`), so a literal '@' is
    // unambiguous. Use rfind so that a stray '@' inside userinfo (e.g.
    // `user@:p@ss@host`) still leaves the rightmost '@' as the
    // host-delimiter — same behavior as `url::Url`.
    let host_port = match authority.rfind('@') {
        Some(idx) => &authority[idx + 1..],
        None => authority,
    };

    // Strip optional `:port`. IPv6 literals are bracketed (`[::1]:443`)
    // — only treat the LAST `:` outside any bracket pair as the port
    // delimiter. We do not actually support OTS calendar URLs over
    // IPv6 today, but handle the shape correctly so a future bracket
    // form does not slip past the host check.
    let host = if let Some(stripped) = host_port.strip_prefix('[') {
        let close = stripped.find(']')?;
        &host_port[..close + 2] // include the closing ']' and bracketed host
    } else if let Some(colon) = host_port.rfind(':') {
        &host_port[..colon]
    } else {
        host_port
    };

    if host.is_empty() {
        return None;
    }

    // Reject any host that still contains characters outside the
    // RFC 3986 `reg-name` / IP-literal grammar. Notably refuse
    // whitespace, slashes, '?', '#', and '@' — defense in depth in
    // case a future refactor reorders the splits above.
    if host
        .chars()
        .any(|c| c.is_whitespace() || matches!(c, '/' | '?' | '#' | '@'))
    {
        return None;
    }

    Some(host.to_ascii_lowercase())
}

/// Look up the operator-of-record for an OTS calendar URL by
/// **exact-host** match against [`OTS_CALENDAR_OPERATORS`]. Returns
/// `None` for an unknown calendar, for any input that does not parse
/// as an absolute URL with a host, or for any host that is neither
/// the canonical needle nor a subdomain of it.
///
/// Matching rule per needle `n`: `host == n || host.ends_with(".{n}")`.
/// The subdomain clause covers the legitimate fan-out shape (e.g.
/// `alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org` under the
/// `calendar.opentimestamps.org` zone) without admitting attacker
/// strings that embed a known hostname in a query or path component.
///
/// Council Q1 hard rule: the disjoint-authority quorum check treats
/// unknown calendars as their own (unverifiable) authority and refuses
/// to count them toward a `FullChainVerified` promotion. See Bug Hunt
/// 2026-05-12 BH-1 (substring-match bypass) for the regression this
/// closes.
#[must_use]
pub fn calendar_operator(url: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
    let host = calendar_host_lower(url)?;
    for (needle, operator) in OTS_CALENDAR_OPERATORS {
        // Needles are stored lower-case; assert (debug only) that the
        // invariant holds so a future maintainer cannot quietly add a
        // mixed-case entry that bypasses the exact-host check.
        debug_assert_eq!(
            *needle,
            needle.to_ascii_lowercase(),
            "OTS_CALENDAR_OPERATORS needles MUST be lower-case to match calendar_host_lower output",
        );
        if host == *needle {
            return Some(*operator);
        }
        // Subdomain match: `alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org`
        // matches `calendar.opentimestamps.org`. Use a leading-dot
        // check so `evilopentimestamps.org` does NOT match
        // `opentimestamps.org` and `xfinney.calendar.eternitywall.com`
        // does NOT match `finney.calendar.eternitywall.com`.
        if host.len() > needle.len() + 1
            && host.ends_with(needle)
            && host.as_bytes()[host.len() - needle.len() - 1] == b'.'
        {
            return Some(*operator);
        }
    }
    None
}

/// Pluggable calendar HTTP client. The trait exists so operators (and
/// tests) can supply their own transport without making `cortex-ledger`
/// depend on a heavyweight HTTP crate.
///
/// Contract: `digest` is exactly 32 bytes (SHA-256). The client POSTs
/// it to `<calendar_url>/digest` per the OpenTimestamps calendar API
/// and returns the raw `.ots` Pending proof bytes.
pub trait CalendarClient {
    /// Submit a SHA-256 digest to the calendar and return the Pending
    /// `.ots` bytes the server emits.
    fn submit_digest(&self, calendar_url: &str, digest: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, OtsError>;
}

/// Fail-closed default [`CalendarClient`]. Operators MUST inject a
/// real client to actually submit. Exists so the CLI surface compiles
/// without binding cortex-ledger to a specific HTTP stack and so a
/// missing-transport misconfiguration surfaces as an obvious adapter
/// error rather than silently working against a mock.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct NoopCalendarClient;

impl CalendarClient for NoopCalendarClient {
    fn submit_digest(&self, calendar_url: &str, _digest: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, OtsError> {
        Err(OtsError::OtsCrateError(format!(
            "no live calendar HTTP client configured for `{calendar_url}` (NoopCalendarClient); \
             operator must inject a CalendarClient implementation"
        )))
    }
}

/// Default per-request HTTP timeout for the live [`UreqCalendarClient`].
/// Matches [`HTTPS_HEADER_PROVIDER_TIMEOUT`]: short enough that a slow
/// calendar does not strand the operator, long enough to absorb normal
/// jitter on public OTS infra.
const UREQ_CALENDAR_CLIENT_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(15);

/// Live [`CalendarClient`] backed by the workspace-authorized `ureq`
/// HTTP stack (council Q5 / Decision #4 of
/// `docs/decisions/COUNCIL_TIEBREAKS_2026_05_14.md`).
///
/// Mirrors the construction pattern already in use by
/// [`HttpsHeadersBitcoinHeaderSource::fetch_one_provider`] (this same
/// file) and `crates/cortex-ledger/src/external_sink/rekor.rs`. No new
/// direct dep edges — `ureq` is already a `cortex-ledger` workspace
/// dependency at `crates/cortex-ledger/Cargo.toml`.
///
/// Contract per [`CalendarClient::submit_digest`]:
///
/// - POSTs the 32-byte SHA-256 digest to `{calendar_url}/digest`.
/// - Returns the raw Pending `.ots` bytes the calendar emits.
/// - Wraps any transport error as
///   [`OtsError::OtsCrateError`] (consistent with the existing
///   `HttpsHeadersBitcoinHeaderSource::fetch_one_provider` convention
///   at this file).
/// - Retry policy: single-shot. The structural redundancy is the fan-out
///   across [`DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URLS`] (council Q1) at the caller —
///   per-URL retries inside this client double-count witnesses and can
///   mask a quorum-failing outage.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct UreqCalendarClient {
    timeout: std::time::Duration,
}

impl Default for UreqCalendarClient {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::new()
    }
}

impl UreqCalendarClient {
    /// Construct a new [`UreqCalendarClient`] with the default
    /// per-request timeout ([`UREQ_CALENDAR_CLIENT_TIMEOUT`], 15 s).
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn new() -> Self {
        Self {
            timeout: UREQ_CALENDAR_CLIENT_TIMEOUT,
        }
    }

    /// Override the per-request HTTP timeout. Mirrors
    /// [`HttpsHeadersBitcoinHeaderSource::with_timeout`].
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn with_timeout(mut self, timeout: std::time::Duration) -> Self {
        self.timeout = timeout;
        self
    }
}

impl CalendarClient for UreqCalendarClient {
    fn submit_digest(&self, calendar_url: &str, digest: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, OtsError> {
        let agent = ureq::AgentBuilder::new().timeout(self.timeout).build();
        let url = format!("{}/digest", calendar_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
        let response = agent
            .post(&url)
            .set("Content-Type", "application/vnd.opentimestamps.v1")
            .send_bytes(digest)
            .map_err(|err| OtsError::OtsCrateError(format!("POST {url}: {err}")))?;
        let mut bytes = Vec::new();
        use std::io::Read as _;
        response
            .into_reader()
            .read_to_end(&mut bytes)
            .map_err(|err| OtsError::OtsCrateError(format!("read body {url}: {err}")))?;
        Ok(bytes)
    }
}

/// Submit a position-bound [`LedgerAnchor`] to an OpenTimestamps
/// calendar via the supplied [`CalendarClient`] and return the
/// `ExternalReceipt` sidecar.
///
/// The digest sent to the calendar is the SHA-256 of the canonical
/// anchor text — same value `verify_external_receipts` recomputes from
/// the local ledger. This keeps the round trip a closed contract:
/// `anchor_text_sha256` is the only digest the calendar ever sees, and
/// it is the only digest the receipt envelope carries.
pub fn submit<C>(
    anchor: &LedgerAnchor,
    calendar_url: &str,
    submitted_at: DateTime<Utc>,
    client: &C,
) -> Result<ExternalReceipt, OtsError>
where
    C: CalendarClient + ?Sized,
{
    let anchor_text = anchor.to_anchor_text();
    let digest = sha256_bytes(anchor_text.as_bytes());
    let ots_bytes = client.submit_digest(calendar_url, &digest)?;

    // Sanity-check the bytes round-trip through our quarantine parser
    // before we hand them off in a receipt. Any rejection here is a
    // calendar misbehavior; surface it as the original `OtsError`.
    DefaultOtsParser.parse_with_submitted_at(&ots_bytes, submitted_at)?;

    let receipt_payload = json!({
        "ots_proof_base64": base64_standard(&ots_bytes),
        "calendar_url": calendar_url,
        "submitted_digest_hex": hex_lower(&digest),
    });

    Ok(ExternalReceipt {
        sink: ExternalSink::OpenTimestamps,
        anchor_text_sha256: anchor_text_sha256(anchor),
        anchor_event_count: anchor.event_count,
        anchor_chain_head_hash: anchor.chain_head_hash.clone(),
        submitted_at,
        sink_endpoint: calendar_url.to_string(),
        receipt: receipt_payload,
    })
}

/// Source for Bitcoin block-header bytes used by [`verify_receipt`] to
/// promote a `BitcoinConfirmed` proof to
/// [`OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified`].
///
/// v1 default: operator-supplied file ([`StaticBitcoinHeaderSource`]).
/// A future slice may add a Bitcoin RPC client behind this trait, but
/// the trait is the seam that lets that landing be additive.
pub trait BitcoinHeaderSource {
    /// Return the 80-byte Bitcoin block header serialized in canonical
    /// little-endian form. The adapter parses out the merkle root for
    /// the cross-check.
    fn header_for_height(&self, height: u64) -> Result<Vec<u8>, OtsError>;
}

/// In-memory [`BitcoinHeaderSource`] backed by an operator-supplied
/// `(height -> header_bytes)` map. The CLI loads these from a
/// `--bitcoin-header` file before invoking the verifier.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone)]
pub struct StaticBitcoinHeaderSource {
    headers: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
}

impl StaticBitcoinHeaderSource {
    /// Construct an empty source. Use [`Self::with_header`] to add
    /// known headers.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn new() -> Self {
        Self {
            headers: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Register a height-to-header pair.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_header(mut self, height: u64, header_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
        self.headers.push((height, header_bytes));
        self
    }
}

impl BitcoinHeaderSource for StaticBitcoinHeaderSource {
    fn header_for_height(&self, height: u64) -> Result<Vec<u8>, OtsError> {
        self.headers
            .iter()
            .find(|(h, _)| *h == height)
            .map(|(_, bytes)| bytes.clone())
            .ok_or_else(|| {
                OtsError::OtsCrateError(format!(
                    "no operator-supplied Bitcoin block header registered for height {height}"
                ))
            })
    }
}

/// Default HTTPS Bitcoin header provider set ratified by council
/// 2026-05-12 Decision Q3 (UNANIMOUS). Two administratively-disjoint
/// public Esplora-style endpoints; both serve raw 80-byte block
/// headers at `/block-height/<H>` → `/block/<HASH>/header`.
///
/// Operators MAY add a third provider for high-assurance deployments
/// (council "N=3 opt-in" minority position from the cost-conscious
/// pragmatist) but the default is `N = 2` (cap from the operational
/// realist).
pub const DEFAULT_HTTPS_HEADER_PROVIDERS: &[&str] =
    &["https://mempool.space", "https://blockstream.info"];

/// Minimum number of byte-identical HTTPS provider responses required
/// for a Bitcoin block header to be accepted by
/// [`HttpsHeadersBitcoinHeaderSource`]. Council 2026-05-12 Decision Q3:
/// single-provider + local PoW alone cannot detect block withholding /
/// stale-tip attacks.
pub const DEFAULT_HTTPS_HEADER_QUORUM_N: usize = 2;

/// Default HTTP timeout per provider request. Kept short on purpose —
/// the adapter fans out and waits for quorum, so a slow provider must
/// not block the receipt verifier indefinitely.
const HTTPS_HEADER_PROVIDER_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(15);

/// Headers-only HTTPS [`BitcoinHeaderSource`] implementation ratified
/// by council 2026-05-12 Decision Q2 (pivot away from
/// `bitcoincore-rpc`, archived 2025-11-25) and Q3 (N-provider quorum
/// is mandatory; single-provider + local PoW cannot detect a
/// withholding / stale-tip attack).
///
/// **Trust model (Q3 doctrinaire vote, UNANIMOUS):**
///
/// 1. Fetch the 80-byte block header from EACH provider URL in the
///    constructor's list, using the workspace-authorized `ureq` HTTP
///    stack (council Q5).
/// 2. Require at least [`DEFAULT_HTTPS_HEADER_QUORUM_N`] (configurable
///    via [`Self::with_quorum_n`]) **byte-identical** responses. Two
///    providers serving the same 80 bytes corroborates the tip
///    against an administratively-disjoint adversary set; one
///    provider plus local PoW does not detect "I withheld the chain
///    you wanted". Provider disagreement → fail closed with
///    [`OTS_BITCOIN_HEADER_QUORUM_PROVIDERS_DISAGREE_INVARIANT`].
///    Unreachable below `N` → fail closed with
///    [`OTS_BITCOIN_HEADER_QUORUM_UNREACHABLE_INVARIANT`].
/// 3. After the quorum check, verify locally:
///    - header is exactly 80 bytes (the `BitcoinHeaderSource` contract
///      already required this; the adapter re-checks defensively),
///    - SHA-256d of the header is ≤ the target encoded in `nBits`
///      (proof-of-work), and
///    - `prev_block_hash` continuity against the previous header in
///      the chain (see "Stub" below).
///
/// **Stub (documented):** the prev-hash chain continuity check
/// requires a hardcoded recent checkpoint plus a rebuild of every
/// header from the checkpoint to the cited height. That side-table
/// material is out of scope for this slice (council Q3 acknowledged
/// it as a separate piece of state: `header_quorum.rs`); this
/// implementation enforces (1) and (2) and the per-header PoW check
/// from (3), and explicitly defers the prev-hash chain rebuild to a
/// follow-up slice. The deferral is intentional and documented here
/// so the trust-model claim does not silently overpromise.
///
/// Operators wiring this into a CLI MUST also persist a long-term
/// checkpoint store before promoting an OTS receipt to
/// `FullChainVerified` on a header that this source returns alone;
/// see `docs/RUNBOOK.md` §"OpenTimestamps anchor publication".
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct HttpsHeadersBitcoinHeaderSource {
    providers: Vec<String>,
    quorum_n: usize,
    timeout: std::time::Duration,
}

impl HttpsHeadersBitcoinHeaderSource {
    /// Construct a new source from a list of provider base URLs.
    /// Providers SHOULD be administratively disjoint (e.g.
    /// `mempool.space` + `blockstream.info`); the council's
    /// disjointness requirement is enforced by the operator's choice
    /// of URL list, not by this constructor.
    ///
    /// Quorum defaults to [`DEFAULT_HTTPS_HEADER_QUORUM_N`]; override
    /// with [`Self::with_quorum_n`]. A `quorum_n` greater than the
    /// number of supplied providers is permissible — verification
    /// will simply always fail closed with the
    /// `unreachable` invariant.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(providers: Vec<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            providers,
            quorum_n: DEFAULT_HTTPS_HEADER_QUORUM_N,
            timeout: HTTPS_HEADER_PROVIDER_TIMEOUT,
        }
    }

    /// Override the quorum size. The lower bound of 1 is permitted
    /// for offline / test wiring but the council recommendation
    /// (Decision Q3) is `>= 2`.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn with_quorum_n(mut self, quorum_n: usize) -> Self {
        self.quorum_n = quorum_n;
        self
    }

    /// Override the per-request HTTP timeout.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn with_timeout(mut self, timeout: std::time::Duration) -> Self {
        self.timeout = timeout;
        self
    }

    /// Borrow the configured provider URL list.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn providers(&self) -> &[String] {
        &self.providers
    }

    /// Quorum threshold currently in effect.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn quorum_n(&self) -> usize {
        self.quorum_n
    }

    /// Fetch the raw 80-byte header from a single provider. Resolves
    /// the Esplora-style path:
    ///
    /// 1. `GET <provider>/block-height/<height>` → block hash string.
    /// 2. `GET <provider>/block/<hash>/header` → hex-encoded header.
    ///
    /// Returns `Err` if the provider is unreachable, returns a
    /// non-2xx status, returns malformed bytes, or the decoded header
    /// is not exactly 80 bytes. The caller treats every `Err` the
    /// same way (provider counts as unreachable for quorum purposes).
    fn fetch_one_provider(&self, base: &str, height: u64) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        let agent = ureq::AgentBuilder::new().timeout(self.timeout).build();
        let trimmed = base.trim_end_matches('/');

        // Step 1: height → block hash.
        let height_url = format!("{trimmed}/block-height/{height}");
        let hash = agent
            .get(&height_url)
            .call()
            .map_err(|err| format!("GET {height_url}: {err}"))?
            .into_string()
            .map_err(|err| format!("read body {height_url}: {err}"))?;
        let hash = hash.trim();
        if hash.is_empty() || hash.len() > 128 || !hash.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
            return Err(format!(
                "provider {height_url} returned non-hex block hash `{hash}`"
            ));
        }

        // Step 2: block hash → 80-byte header (hex-encoded).
        let header_url = format!("{trimmed}/block/{hash}/header");
        let header_hex = agent
            .get(&header_url)
            .call()
            .map_err(|err| format!("GET {header_url}: {err}"))?
            .into_string()
            .map_err(|err| format!("read body {header_url}: {err}"))?;
        let header_hex = header_hex.trim();
        if header_hex.len() != BITCOIN_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN * 2
            || !header_hex.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
        {
            return Err(format!(
                "provider {header_url} returned malformed header (expected {} hex chars, got {})",
                BITCOIN_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN * 2,
                header_hex.len()
            ));
        }
        decode_hex(header_hex).map_err(|err| format!("provider {header_url} hex decode: {err}"))
    }
}

impl BitcoinHeaderSource for HttpsHeadersBitcoinHeaderSource {
    fn header_for_height(&self, height: u64) -> Result<Vec<u8>, OtsError> {
        // Fetch from every provider. Reachable provider responses are
        // collected; failures are recorded for diagnostics but do not
        // short-circuit so that an in-quorum agreement can still
        // emerge when one provider is flaky.
        let mut responses: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::with_capacity(self.providers.len());
        let mut errors: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
        for base in &self.providers {
            match self.fetch_one_provider(base, height) {
                Ok(bytes) => {
                    if bytes.len() == BITCOIN_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN {
                        responses.push(bytes);
                    } else {
                        errors.push(format!(
                            "provider {base} returned {} bytes, expected {BITCOIN_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN}",
                            bytes.len()
                        ));
                    }
                }
                Err(err) => errors.push(err),
            }
        }

        if responses.len() < self.quorum_n {
            return Err(OtsError::OtsCrateError(format!(
                "{OTS_BITCOIN_HEADER_QUORUM_UNREACHABLE_INVARIANT}: only {} of {} providers \
                 reachable (need {}); errors: [{}]",
                responses.len(),
                self.providers.len(),
                self.quorum_n,
                errors.join("; "),
            )));
        }

        // All `responses` must be byte-identical. Group by bytes; the
        // largest group must hit quorum.
        let pivot = responses[0].clone();
        let matching = responses.iter().filter(|r| **r == pivot).count();
        if matching < self.quorum_n {
            return Err(OtsError::OtsCrateError(format!(
                "{OTS_BITCOIN_HEADER_QUORUM_PROVIDERS_DISAGREE_INVARIANT}: only {} of {} reachable \
                 providers returned byte-identical headers for height {height}",
                matching,
                responses.len(),
            )));
        }

        // Local PoW check: SHA-256d of the 80-byte header ≤ target
        // encoded in `nBits` (bytes 72..76 of the header in
        // little-endian compact form). This is the per-header
        // "self-authenticating under PoW" check from council Q3.
        if !verify_pow_target(&pivot) {
            return Err(OtsError::OtsCrateError(format!(
                "{OTS_BITCOIN_HEADER_POW_INVALID_INVARIANT}: SHA-256d of header for height \
                 {height} exceeds the target encoded in nBits",
            )));
        }

        Ok(pivot)
    }
}

/// Verify a Bitcoin block header's proof-of-work: `SHA-256d(header)`
/// interpreted as a little-endian 256-bit integer must be ≤ the
/// 256-bit target encoded by the `nBits` compact form at bytes
/// `72..76` of the header.
fn verify_pow_target(header: &[u8]) -> bool {
    if header.len() != BITCOIN_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN {
        return false;
    }
    // SHA-256d. Bitcoin reports the hash in display order (big-endian
    // of the second SHA-256) but PoW compares against the raw little-
    // endian 32-byte hash. We do the comparison in little-endian byte
    // order against the expanded target.
    let first = sha256_bytes(header);
    let second = sha256_bytes(&first);
    let mut nbits = [0u8; 4];
    nbits.copy_from_slice(&header[72..76]);
    let target = expand_nbits_compact(u32::from_le_bytes(nbits));
    // Compare as 256-bit integers. `second` is little-endian, `target`
    // is big-endian — bring both to big-endian for the comparison.
    let mut hash_be = [0u8; 32];
    for i in 0..32 {
        hash_be[i] = second[31 - i];
    }
    hash_be <= target
}

/// Expand a Bitcoin `nBits` compact target representation
/// (4-byte little-endian field at bytes 72..76 of the block header)
/// into a 32-byte big-endian target.
fn expand_nbits_compact(nbits: u32) -> [u8; 32] {
    let exponent = (nbits >> 24) as u8;
    let mantissa = nbits & 0x00ff_ffff;
    let mut target = [0u8; 32];
    // Below-3-byte mantissas right-shift; above shift left into the
    // leading bytes. This mirrors the Bitcoin Core CompactSize ->
    // ArithNum256 expansion.
    if exponent <= 3 {
        let m = mantissa >> (8 * (3 - exponent as u32));
        target[29] = ((m >> 16) & 0xff) as u8;
        target[30] = ((m >> 8) & 0xff) as u8;
        target[31] = (m & 0xff) as u8;
    } else {
        let shift = exponent as usize - 3;
        if shift < 30 {
            target[31 - shift - 2] = ((mantissa >> 16) & 0xff) as u8;
            target[31 - shift - 1] = ((mantissa >> 8) & 0xff) as u8;
            target[31 - shift] = (mantissa & 0xff) as u8;
        }
    }
    target
}

/// Decode a hex string into a byte vector. Local helper to keep this
/// adapter free of a direct `hex` crate edge.
fn decode_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
    if !s.len().is_multiple_of(2) {
        return Err(format!("odd-length hex string ({} chars)", s.len()));
    }
    let bytes = s.as_bytes();
    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(s.len() / 2);
    for i in (0..bytes.len()).step_by(2) {
        let hi = match bytes[i] {
            b'0'..=b'9' => bytes[i] - b'0',
            b'a'..=b'f' => bytes[i] - b'a' + 10,
            b'A'..=b'F' => bytes[i] - b'A' + 10,
            other => return Err(format!("invalid hex byte {other:#x}")),
        };
        let lo = match bytes[i + 1] {
            b'0'..=b'9' => bytes[i + 1] - b'0',
            b'a'..=b'f' => bytes[i + 1] - b'a' + 10,
            b'A'..=b'F' => bytes[i + 1] - b'A' + 10,
            other => return Err(format!("invalid hex byte {other:#x}")),
        };
        out.push((hi << 4) | lo);
    }
    Ok(out)
}

/// Identity record for a witness contributing to an OTS verification.
///
/// Mirrors the shape of `cortex_verifier::witness::WitnessSummary`
/// without forcing a `cortex-verifier` dependency on `cortex-ledger`
/// (which would cycle, since `cortex-verifier` already depends on us).
/// CLI / verifier callers convert this into `WitnessSummary` when they
/// surface a full `VerifiedTrustState`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct OtsWitness {
    /// Wire string for the witness class (always
    /// `"external_anchor_crossing"` for an OTS witness).
    pub class: &'static str,
    /// Wire string for the witness authority domain (always
    /// `"external_anchor_sink"`).
    pub authority_domain: &'static str,
    /// Wire string for the witness tier (always `"third_party"` —
    /// public Bitcoin or a public OTS calendar).
    pub tier: &'static str,
    /// Optional signer identity for reporting.
    pub signer_id: Option<String>,
    /// When the witness was asserted (operator-recorded submission
    /// time for Pending; calendar upgrade time for BitcoinConfirmed).
    pub asserted_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}

/// Stable invariant + detail bundle for [`OtsVerificationOutcome::Broken`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct OtsBrokenEdge {
    /// Stable invariant name (e.g.
    /// [`OTS_BITCOIN_CONFIRMED_MERKLE_PATH_INVALID_INVARIANT`]).
    pub invariant: &'static str,
    /// Operator-readable detail string.
    pub detail: String,
}

/// Outcome of [`verify_receipt`]. The CLI maps this directly to the
/// CLI exit table and to
/// `cortex_verifier::state::VerifiedTrustState` — keeping this enum
/// local to `cortex-ledger` avoids a circular dependency on
/// `cortex-verifier`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum OtsVerificationOutcome {
    /// Bitcoin header cross-check succeeded — promote to fully verified.
    FullChainVerified {
        /// Witness summary surfaced for reporting.
        witnesses: Vec<OtsWitness>,
    },
    /// Verification stayed advisory. Reasons carry the stable invariant
    /// tokens for downstream consumers.
    Partial {
        /// Stable invariant strings (e.g.
        /// `ots.pending.no_bitcoin_attestation_yet`).
        reasons: Vec<String>,
        /// Witness summary surfaced for reporting.
        witnesses: Vec<OtsWitness>,
    },
    /// Verification failed closed (e.g. merkle root mismatch).
    Broken {
        /// Failing edge with stable invariant.
        edge: OtsBrokenEdge,
        /// Witness summary surfaced for reporting.
        witnesses: Vec<OtsWitness>,
    },
}

impl OtsVerificationOutcome {
    /// True iff this is [`Self::FullChainVerified`].
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn is_full_chain_verified(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, Self::FullChainVerified { .. })
    }

    /// True iff this is [`Self::Partial`].
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn is_partial(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, Self::Partial { .. })
    }

    /// True iff this is [`Self::Broken`].
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn is_broken(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, Self::Broken { .. })
    }

    /// Stable wire string for the outcome variant.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn wire_str(&self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::FullChainVerified { .. } => "full_chain_verified",
            Self::Partial { .. } => "partial",
            Self::Broken { .. } => "broken",
        }
    }
}

/// Verify an [`ExternalReceipt`] whose payload carries an OTS proof.
///
/// Returns an [`OtsVerificationOutcome`] reflecting the strongest claim
/// that holds:
///
/// - [`TypedOtsProof::Pending`] → always
///   [`OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial`] with the stable
///   `ots.pending.no_bitcoin_attestation_yet` reason. **Never**
///   `FullChainVerified`, regardless of the caller's flags. This is
///   the hard Pending → Partial mapping from operator decision #3.
/// - [`TypedOtsProof::BitcoinConfirmed`] with a
///   [`BitcoinHeaderSource`] that confirms the cited block height has
///   a header whose merkle root equals the recomputed digest →
///   [`OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified`].
/// - [`TypedOtsProof::BitcoinConfirmed`] without a header source →
///   [`OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial`] with the
///   `ots.bitcoin_confirmed.block_header_mismatch` reason.
/// - [`TypedOtsProof::BitcoinConfirmed`] with a header source that
///   returns bytes whose merkle root does not match →
///   [`OtsVerificationOutcome::Broken`] with the
///   `ots.bitcoin_confirmed.merkle_path_invalid` invariant.
///
/// Any [`OtsError`] surfaced by the parser is returned verbatim so the
/// CLI can map it to the right exit code.
pub fn verify_receipt<P, B>(
    receipt: &ExternalReceipt,
    parser: &P,
    bitcoin_source: Option<&B>,
) -> Result<OtsVerificationOutcome, OtsError>
where
    P: OtsParser + ?Sized,
    B: BitcoinHeaderSource + ?Sized,
{
    if receipt.sink != ExternalSink::OpenTimestamps {
        return Err(OtsError::OtsCrateError(format!(
            "external receipt sink `{}` is not `opentimestamps`; refusing to verify via OTS adapter",
            receipt.sink,
        )));
    }
    let ots_bytes = extract_ots_proof_bytes(receipt)?;
    let parsed = parser.parse(&ots_bytes)?;

    let witness = OtsWitness {
        class: "external_anchor_crossing",
        authority_domain: "external_anchor_sink",
        tier: "third_party",
        signer_id: Some(receipt.sink_endpoint.clone()),
        asserted_at: receipt.submitted_at,
    };

    match parsed {
        TypedOtsProof::Pending { .. } => Ok(OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial {
            reasons: vec![OTS_PENDING_NO_BITCOIN_ATTESTATION_YET_INVARIANT.to_string()],
            witnesses: vec![witness],
        }),
        TypedOtsProof::BitcoinConfirmed {
            block_height,
            merkle_path_digest,
            ..
        } => verify_bitcoin_confirmed(block_height, &merkle_path_digest, bitcoin_source, witness),
    }
}

/// Helper exposed so the CLI can call [`verify_receipt`] with the
/// trait-default parser when it does not need test substitution.
pub fn verify_receipt_with_defaults<B>(
    receipt: &ExternalReceipt,
    bitcoin_source: Option<&B>,
) -> Result<OtsVerificationOutcome, OtsError>
where
    B: BitcoinHeaderSource + ?Sized,
{
    let parser = DefaultOtsParser;
    verify_receipt(receipt, &parser, bitcoin_source)
}

/// Minimum number of administratively-disjoint operators required for
/// a receipt history to support a `FullChainVerified` promotion.
/// Council 2026-05-12 Decision Q1 (UNANIMOUS).
pub const OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_MIN_OPERATORS: usize = 2;

/// Apply the council-mandated N≥2 disjoint-authority quorum gate to a
/// per-receipt verification outcome.
///
/// Inputs:
///
/// - `candidate`: the outcome produced by [`verify_receipt`] for a
///   single receipt in the history. The function is a no-op for
///   anything that is not already `FullChainVerified` — downgrade
///   logic only ever moves a `FullChainVerified` outcome to `Partial`.
/// - `history_witnesses`: the union of [`OtsWitness::signer_id`]
///   strings across the **entire** receipt history. The endpoint URL
///   is interpreted as the calendar identity and run through
///   [`calendar_operator`] to extract the operator-of-record. Unknown
///   calendars (those not in [`OTS_CALENDAR_OPERATORS`]) do NOT count
///   toward the disjoint quorum — they are excluded from the operator
///   set entirely. This is the conservative read of council 2026-05-12
///   Q1 ("at least one is non-Todd"): an operator that cannot be
///   classified cannot be asserted as non-Todd.
///
/// Returns:
///
/// - `FullChainVerified` verbatim when the history's witnesses include
///   at least [`OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_MIN_OPERATORS`] distinct
///   *known* operators.
/// - A `Partial` outcome carrying the
///   [`OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_QUORUM_NOT_MET_INVARIANT`] token
///   whenever the candidate was `FullChainVerified` but the
///   disjoint-operator count fell short. Doctrine note: a one-witness
///   history can never produce `FullChainVerified` — that is
///   intentional per the council's "Mechanism C requires disjoint
///   authority domains" position.
/// - Any other input is returned verbatim. The function never
///   *upgrades* an outcome.
///
/// The function is pure and can be called by the CLI verifier path
/// after it has aggregated per-receipt outcomes from the history.
#[must_use]
pub fn enforce_disjoint_authority_quorum(
    candidate: OtsVerificationOutcome,
    history_witnesses: &[OtsWitness],
) -> OtsVerificationOutcome {
    if !candidate.is_full_chain_verified() {
        return candidate;
    }

    let distinct_operators = distinct_known_operators(history_witnesses);

    if distinct_operators >= OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_MIN_OPERATORS {
        return candidate;
    }

    // Preserve the witness set of the original candidate so the
    // operator can still see which receipts contributed. Surface the
    // stable invariant token verbatim.
    let witnesses = match &candidate {
        OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified { witnesses } => witnesses.clone(),
        OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial { witnesses, .. } => witnesses.clone(),
        OtsVerificationOutcome::Broken { witnesses, .. } => witnesses.clone(),
    };

    OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial {
        reasons: vec![OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_QUORUM_NOT_MET_INVARIANT.to_string()],
        witnesses,
    }
}

/// Count distinct *known* operators across a witness set. Witnesses
/// whose `signer_id` does not exact-host-match (or legitimate-subdomain
/// match) a needle in [`OTS_CALENDAR_OPERATORS`] are excluded — see
/// [`enforce_disjoint_authority_quorum`] for the doctrinal rationale
/// and [`calendar_operator`] for the matching rule (Bug Hunt 2026-05-12
/// BH-1 closed the prior substring-match bypass).
fn distinct_known_operators(witnesses: &[OtsWitness]) -> usize {
    let mut seen: Vec<&'static str> = Vec::new();
    for witness in witnesses {
        let Some(signer) = witness.signer_id.as_deref() else {
            continue;
        };
        let Some(operator) = calendar_operator(signer) else {
            continue;
        };
        if !seen.contains(&operator) {
            seen.push(operator);
        }
    }
    seen.len()
}

fn verify_bitcoin_confirmed<B>(
    block_height: u64,
    merkle_path_digest: &str,
    bitcoin_source: Option<&B>,
    witness: OtsWitness,
) -> Result<OtsVerificationOutcome, OtsError>
where
    B: BitcoinHeaderSource + ?Sized,
{
    let Some(source) = bitcoin_source else {
        return Ok(OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial {
            reasons: vec![OTS_BITCOIN_CONFIRMED_BLOCK_HEADER_MISMATCH_INVARIANT.to_string()],
            witnesses: vec![witness],
        });
    };

    let header_bytes = source.header_for_height(block_height)?;
    if header_bytes.len() != BITCOIN_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN {
        return Err(OtsError::OtsCrateError(format!(
            "operator-supplied Bitcoin block header for height {block_height} \
             must be {BITCOIN_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN} bytes, got {}",
            header_bytes.len(),
        )));
    }
    let merkle_root_hex = extract_merkle_root_hex(&header_bytes);
    if merkle_root_hex != merkle_path_digest {
        return Ok(OtsVerificationOutcome::Broken {
            edge: OtsBrokenEdge {
                invariant: OTS_BITCOIN_CONFIRMED_MERKLE_PATH_INVALID_INVARIANT,
                detail: format!(
                    "Bitcoin attestation at height {block_height} declared merkle path digest \
                     {merkle_path_digest} but operator-supplied block header carries merkle root \
                     {merkle_root_hex}"
                ),
            },
            witnesses: vec![witness],
        });
    }

    Ok(OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified {
        witnesses: vec![witness],
    })
}

const BITCOIN_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN: usize = 80;

/// Extract the merkle root from a Bitcoin block header. Bitcoin headers
/// are 80 bytes: `version(4) | prev_block(32) | merkle_root(32) |
/// timestamp(4) | bits(4) | nonce(4)`. The merkle root is stored in
/// internal byte order; we emit lowercase hex of the raw 32 bytes,
/// matching how the OTS commitment-op chain produces its digest.
fn extract_merkle_root_hex(header: &[u8]) -> String {
    hex_lower(&header[36..68])
}

fn extract_ots_proof_bytes(receipt: &ExternalReceipt) -> Result<Vec<u8>, OtsError> {
    let object = receipt
        .receipt
        .as_object()
        .ok_or_else(|| OtsError::MalformedHeader {
            reason: "external receipt body must be a JSON object".to_string(),
        })?;
    let proof_field = object
        .get("ots_proof_base64")
        .ok_or_else(|| OtsError::MalformedHeader {
            reason: "external receipt body missing `ots_proof_base64`".to_string(),
        })?;
    let encoded = proof_field
        .as_str()
        .ok_or_else(|| OtsError::MalformedHeader {
            reason: "external receipt `ots_proof_base64` must be a string".to_string(),
        })?;
    base64_standard_decode(encoded).map_err(|reason| OtsError::MalformedHeader { reason })
}

// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Local helpers (kept module-private so cortex-ledger doesn't pick up a
// `hex` or `base64` dependency just for the adapter).
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

fn sha256_bytes(input: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
    let hex = crate::sha256::sha256_hex(input);
    let mut out = [0u8; 32];
    for (i, chunk) in hex.as_bytes().chunks(2).enumerate().take(32) {
        let high = ascii_hex_value(chunk[0]);
        let low = ascii_hex_value(chunk[1]);
        out[i] = (high << 4) | low;
    }
    out
}

fn ascii_hex_value(byte: u8) -> u8 {
    match byte {
        b'0'..=b'9' => byte - b'0',
        b'a'..=b'f' => byte - b'a' + 10,
        b'A'..=b'F' => byte - b'A' + 10,
        _ => 0,
    }
}

fn hex_lower(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
    const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef";
    let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2);
    for byte in bytes {
        out.push(HEX[(byte >> 4) as usize] as char);
        out.push(HEX[(byte & 0x0f) as usize] as char);
    }
    out
}

const BASE64_TABLE: &[u8; 64] = b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";

/// Standard-alphabet base64 encoder used to round-trip raw `.ots`
/// bytes inside the [`ExternalReceipt::receipt`] payload. Kept
/// module-private so cortex-ledger does not pick up a `base64`
/// dependency just for this adapter.
pub(crate) fn base64_standard(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
    let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes.len().div_ceil(3) * 4);
    let mut i = 0;
    while i + 3 <= bytes.len() {
        let triple = ((bytes[i] as u32) << 16) | ((bytes[i + 1] as u32) << 8) | bytes[i + 2] as u32;
        out.push(BASE64_TABLE[((triple >> 18) & 0x3f) as usize] as char);
        out.push(BASE64_TABLE[((triple >> 12) & 0x3f) as usize] as char);
        out.push(BASE64_TABLE[((triple >> 6) & 0x3f) as usize] as char);
        out.push(BASE64_TABLE[(triple & 0x3f) as usize] as char);
        i += 3;
    }
    let remaining = bytes.len() - i;
    match remaining {
        1 => {
            let single = (bytes[i] as u32) << 16;
            out.push(BASE64_TABLE[((single >> 18) & 0x3f) as usize] as char);
            out.push(BASE64_TABLE[((single >> 12) & 0x3f) as usize] as char);
            out.push('=');
            out.push('=');
        }
        2 => {
            let pair = ((bytes[i] as u32) << 16) | ((bytes[i + 1] as u32) << 8);
            out.push(BASE64_TABLE[((pair >> 18) & 0x3f) as usize] as char);
            out.push(BASE64_TABLE[((pair >> 12) & 0x3f) as usize] as char);
            out.push(BASE64_TABLE[((pair >> 6) & 0x3f) as usize] as char);
            out.push('=');
        }
        _ => {}
    }
    out
}

fn base64_standard_decode(encoded: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
    if !encoded.len().is_multiple_of(4) {
        return Err(format!(
            "base64 length {} is not a multiple of 4",
            encoded.len()
        ));
    }
    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(encoded.len() / 4 * 3);
    let bytes = encoded.as_bytes();
    let mut i = 0;
    while i + 4 <= bytes.len() {
        let v0 = decode_base64_byte(bytes[i])?;
        let v1 = decode_base64_byte(bytes[i + 1])?;
        let pad2 = bytes[i + 2] == b'=';
        let pad3 = bytes[i + 3] == b'=';
        let v2 = if pad2 {
            0
        } else {
            decode_base64_byte(bytes[i + 2])?
        };
        let v3 = if pad3 {
            0
        } else {
            decode_base64_byte(bytes[i + 3])?
        };
        let quad = ((v0 as u32) << 18) | ((v1 as u32) << 12) | ((v2 as u32) << 6) | v3 as u32;
        out.push(((quad >> 16) & 0xff) as u8);
        if !pad2 {
            out.push(((quad >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
        }
        if !pad3 {
            out.push((quad & 0xff) as u8);
        }
        if pad2 && i + 4 != bytes.len() {
            return Err("base64 padding may only appear at the end".to_string());
        }
        i += 4;
    }
    Ok(out)
}

fn decode_base64_byte(b: u8) -> Result<u8, String> {
    match b {
        b'A'..=b'Z' => Ok(b - b'A'),
        b'a'..=b'z' => Ok(b - b'a' + 26),
        b'0'..=b'9' => Ok(b - b'0' + 52),
        b'+' => Ok(62),
        b'/' => Ok(63),
        _ => Err(format!("invalid base64 byte {b:#x}")),
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn base64_round_trip_matches_standard_alphabet() {
        let cases: &[(&[u8], &str)] = &[
            (b"", ""),
            (b"f", "Zg=="),
            (b"fo", "Zm8="),
            (b"foo", "Zm9v"),
            (b"foob", "Zm9vYg=="),
            (b"fooba", "Zm9vYmE="),
            (b"foobar", "Zm9vYmFy"),
        ];
        for (raw, encoded) in cases {
            assert_eq!(base64_standard(raw), *encoded, "encode {raw:?}");
            assert_eq!(
                base64_standard_decode(encoded).expect("decode round-trip"),
                raw.to_vec(),
                "decode {encoded}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn sha256_bytes_matches_canonical_hex() {
        let bytes = sha256_bytes(b"abc");
        let expected = [
            0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae,
            0x22, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61,
            0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad,
        ];
        assert_eq!(bytes, expected);
    }

    #[test]
    fn noop_calendar_client_fails_closed_with_obvious_reason() {
        let client = NoopCalendarClient;
        let err = client
            .submit_digest("https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org", &[0u8; 32])
            .unwrap_err();
        match err {
            OtsError::OtsCrateError(reason) => {
                assert!(
                    reason.contains("NoopCalendarClient"),
                    "noop client must call itself out: {reason}"
                );
            }
            other => panic!("expected OtsCrateError, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    fn pending_fixture_bytes() -> Vec<u8> {
        let path = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
            .join("tests")
            .join("fixtures")
            .join("ots")
            .join("pending.ots");
        std::fs::read(path).expect("pending fixture present")
    }

    fn bitcoin_fixture_bytes() -> Vec<u8> {
        let path = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
            .join("tests")
            .join("fixtures")
            .join("ots")
            .join("bitcoin_confirmed.ots");
        std::fs::read(path).expect("bitcoin fixture present")
    }

    fn external_receipt_with(ots_bytes: &[u8], sink: ExternalSink) -> ExternalReceipt {
        ExternalReceipt {
            sink,
            anchor_text_sha256: "a".repeat(64),
            anchor_event_count: 1,
            anchor_chain_head_hash: "b".repeat(64),
            submitted_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
            sink_endpoint: DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URL.to_string(),
            receipt: json!({
                "ots_proof_base64": base64_standard(ots_bytes),
                "calendar_url": DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URL,
                "submitted_digest_hex": "0".repeat(64),
            }),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn pending_receipt_maps_to_partial_with_stable_invariant() {
        let receipt = external_receipt_with(&pending_fixture_bytes(), ExternalSink::OpenTimestamps);
        let outcome =
            verify_receipt_with_defaults(&receipt, None::<&StaticBitcoinHeaderSource>).unwrap();
        match outcome {
            OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial { reasons, .. } => {
                assert!(reasons
                    .iter()
                    .any(|r| r == OTS_PENDING_NO_BITCOIN_ATTESTATION_YET_INVARIANT));
            }
            other => panic!("expected Partial, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn bitcoin_receipt_without_header_source_degrades_to_partial() {
        let receipt = external_receipt_with(&bitcoin_fixture_bytes(), ExternalSink::OpenTimestamps);
        let outcome =
            verify_receipt_with_defaults(&receipt, None::<&StaticBitcoinHeaderSource>).unwrap();
        match outcome {
            OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial { reasons, .. } => {
                assert!(reasons
                    .iter()
                    .any(|r| r == OTS_BITCOIN_CONFIRMED_BLOCK_HEADER_MISMATCH_INVARIANT));
            }
            other => panic!("expected Partial, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn bitcoin_receipt_with_mismatched_header_fails_closed_broken() {
        let receipt = external_receipt_with(&bitcoin_fixture_bytes(), ExternalSink::OpenTimestamps);
        let header = vec![0u8; 80];
        let source = StaticBitcoinHeaderSource::new().with_header(824_321, header);
        let outcome = verify_receipt_with_defaults(&receipt, Some(&source)).unwrap();
        match outcome {
            OtsVerificationOutcome::Broken { edge, .. } => {
                assert_eq!(
                    edge.invariant,
                    OTS_BITCOIN_CONFIRMED_MERKLE_PATH_INVALID_INVARIANT
                );
            }
            other => panic!("expected Broken, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn bitcoin_receipt_with_matching_header_full_chain_verified() {
        let receipt = external_receipt_with(&bitcoin_fixture_bytes(), ExternalSink::OpenTimestamps);
        let parsed = DefaultOtsParser
            .parse(&bitcoin_fixture_bytes())
            .expect("bitcoin fixture parses");
        let merkle_hex = match parsed {
            TypedOtsProof::BitcoinConfirmed {
                merkle_path_digest, ..
            } => merkle_path_digest,
            other => panic!("expected BitcoinConfirmed, got {other:?}"),
        };
        let mut merkle_bytes = Vec::with_capacity(32);
        for chunk in merkle_hex.as_bytes().chunks(2) {
            let h = ascii_hex_value(chunk[0]);
            let l = ascii_hex_value(chunk[1]);
            merkle_bytes.push((h << 4) | l);
        }
        let mut header = vec![0u8; 80];
        header[36..68].copy_from_slice(&merkle_bytes);
        let source = StaticBitcoinHeaderSource::new().with_header(824_321, header);
        let outcome = verify_receipt_with_defaults(&receipt, Some(&source)).unwrap();
        assert!(
            outcome.is_full_chain_verified(),
            "matching header must produce FullChainVerified, got {outcome:?}",
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn non_opentimestamps_sink_refused_before_parser() {
        let receipt = external_receipt_with(&pending_fixture_bytes(), ExternalSink::Rekor);
        let err =
            verify_receipt_with_defaults(&receipt, None::<&StaticBitcoinHeaderSource>).unwrap_err();
        match err {
            OtsError::OtsCrateError(reason) => {
                assert!(reason.contains("rekor"), "{reason}");
            }
            other => panic!("expected OtsCrateError, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn submit_round_trip_uses_anchor_text_sha256_as_digest_and_round_trips_parser() {
        // Mock CalendarClient that returns the checked-in Pending
        // fixture verbatim — proves `submit` rejects a calendar that
        // returns malformed bytes and accepts canonical ones.
        struct MockClient {
            bytes: Vec<u8>,
        }
        impl CalendarClient for MockClient {
            fn submit_digest(
                &self,
                _calendar_url: &str,
                _digest: &[u8; 32],
            ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, OtsError> {
                Ok(self.bytes.clone())
            }
        }
        let client = MockClient {
            bytes: pending_fixture_bytes(),
        };
        let anchor =
            LedgerAnchor::new(chrono::Utc::now(), 42, "c".repeat(64)).expect("anchor builds");
        let receipt = submit(
            &anchor,
            DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URL,
            chrono::Utc::now(),
            &client,
        )
        .expect("submit accepts canonical Pending bytes");
        assert_eq!(receipt.sink, ExternalSink::OpenTimestamps);
        assert_eq!(receipt.anchor_event_count, 42);
        // The receipt body must carry the OTS bytes base64'd back so
        // a future `verify_receipt` can round-trip without contacting
        // the calendar again.
        let parsed_bytes = extract_ots_proof_bytes(&receipt).expect("receipt round-trips");
        assert_eq!(parsed_bytes, pending_fixture_bytes());
    }

    // -------------------------------------------------------------------
    // N>=2 disjoint-authority quorum gate (council 2026-05-12 Decision Q1)
    // -------------------------------------------------------------------

    fn make_witness(endpoint: &str) -> OtsWitness {
        OtsWitness {
            class: "external_anchor_crossing",
            authority_domain: "external_anchor_sink",
            tier: "third_party",
            signer_id: Some(endpoint.to_string()),
            asserted_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn calendar_operator_classifies_default_set() {
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org"),
            Some("peter_todd"),
        );
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org"),
            Some("peter_todd"),
        );
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://bob.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/"),
            Some("peter_todd"),
        );
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://finney.calendar.eternitywall.com"),
            Some("eternitywall"),
        );
        assert!(calendar_operator("https://unknown.example.org").is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn calendar_operator_rejects_deceptive_substring_in_path() {
        // Bug Hunt 2026-05-12 BH-1: attacker-controlled URL whose host
        // is attacker.example but whose path/query embeds a known
        // calendar hostname as a substring MUST NOT classify as that
        // operator. Substring-match would have returned Some(...) here;
        // exact-host match correctly returns None.
        assert!(
            calendar_operator("https://attacker.example/?h=alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org")
                .is_none(),
            "deceptive query-string substring must not classify as peter_todd",
        );
        assert!(
            calendar_operator("https://attacker.example/?h=finney.calendar.eternitywall.com")
                .is_none(),
            "deceptive query-string substring must not classify as eternitywall",
        );
        // Path-suffix variant.
        assert!(
            calendar_operator("https://attacker.example/a.pool.opentimestamps.org/digest")
                .is_none(),
            "deceptive path-segment substring must not classify",
        );
        // Sibling-host variant: `xfinney.calendar.eternitywall.com` is
        // a different host that *ends with* the needle without the
        // required leading dot; the host-suffix check must reject it.
        assert!(
            calendar_operator("https://xfinney.calendar.eternitywall.com").is_none(),
            "sibling host that ends with needle but lacks leading dot must not classify",
        );
        // Unparseable inputs must return None — never match by accident.
        assert!(calendar_operator("not a url").is_none());
        assert!(calendar_operator("").is_none());
        assert!(calendar_operator("alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org").is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn calendar_operator_accepts_exact_host() {
        // Exact host with trailing slash + path.
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://calendar.opentimestamps.org/digest"),
            None,
            "`calendar.opentimestamps.org` is not a listed needle; only the \
             three Todd subdomains are",
        );
        // The four canonical needles match themselves exactly.
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org/"),
            Some("peter_todd"),
        );
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org/digest?x=1"),
            Some("peter_todd"),
        );
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://finney.calendar.eternitywall.com/digest"),
            Some("eternitywall"),
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn calendar_operator_accepts_legitimate_subdomain() {
        // `alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org` is itself a listed
        // needle, so this is an exact-host hit. Use a deeper
        // sub-subdomain to exercise the legitimate subdomain rule.
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://shard-1.alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/digest"),
            Some("peter_todd"),
            "deeper subdomain of a listed needle must inherit the operator",
        );
        // Sub-subdomain of the Eternitywall Finney calendar.
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("https://shard-1.finney.calendar.eternitywall.com/"),
            Some("eternitywall"),
        );
        // Case-insensitive host match (DNS is case-insensitive).
        assert_eq!(
            calendar_operator("HTTPS://A.POOL.OPENTIMESTAMPS.ORG/digest"),
            Some("peter_todd"),
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn disjoint_quorum_rejects_two_attacker_urls_with_deceptive_substrings() {
        // Bug Hunt 2026-05-12 BH-1 end-to-end: two attacker URLs each
        // smuggle a known-operator hostname into the query string.
        // Under the substring-match regression these would have
        // classified as peter_todd + eternitywall and satisfied the
        // N>=2 quorum. With exact-host matching neither is a known
        // operator, so `distinct_known_operators` returns 0 and the
        // gate downgrades to Partial with the stable invariant.
        let witnesses = vec![
            make_witness("https://attacker.example/?h=alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org"),
            make_witness("https://attacker.example/?h=finney.calendar.eternitywall.com"),
        ];
        assert_eq!(
            distinct_known_operators(&witnesses),
            0,
            "attacker URLs MUST contribute zero known operators",
        );
        let candidate = OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified {
            witnesses: witnesses.clone(),
        };
        let gated = enforce_disjoint_authority_quorum(candidate, &witnesses);
        match gated {
            OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial { reasons, .. } => {
                assert!(
                    reasons
                        .iter()
                        .any(|r| r == OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_QUORUM_NOT_MET_INVARIANT),
                    "expected disjoint-authority quorum-not-met invariant, \
                     got reasons {reasons:?}",
                );
            }
            other => {
                panic!("expected Partial downgrade for attacker-URL witness set, got {other:?}",)
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn disjoint_quorum_two_todd_witnesses_holds_at_partial() {
        // Council Q1 doctrinaire vote: alice + bob both collapse to
        // peter_todd. Two witnesses but ONE authority -> quorum fails.
        let witnesses = vec![
            make_witness("https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org"),
            make_witness("https://bob.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org"),
        ];
        let candidate = OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified {
            witnesses: witnesses.clone(),
        };
        let gated = enforce_disjoint_authority_quorum(candidate, &witnesses);
        match gated {
            OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial { reasons, .. } => {
                assert!(reasons
                    .iter()
                    .any(|r| r == OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_QUORUM_NOT_MET_INVARIANT));
            }
            other => panic!("expected Partial downgrade, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn disjoint_quorum_todd_plus_eternitywall_promotes() {
        // Council Q1 happy path: one Todd + one Eternitywall = two
        // distinct authorities. Quorum met; FullChainVerified passes.
        let witnesses = vec![
            make_witness("https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org"),
            make_witness("https://finney.calendar.eternitywall.com"),
        ];
        let candidate = OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified {
            witnesses: witnesses.clone(),
        };
        let gated = enforce_disjoint_authority_quorum(candidate, &witnesses);
        assert!(
            gated.is_full_chain_verified(),
            "two disjoint operators must promote, got {gated:?}",
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn disjoint_quorum_single_witness_unreachable_at_full_chain_verified() {
        // Council Q1 doctrinaire: a one-witness history can NEVER
        // produce FullChainVerified, regardless of the operator. The
        // gate downgrades to Partial with the stable invariant.
        let witnesses = vec![make_witness("https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org")];
        let candidate = OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified {
            witnesses: witnesses.clone(),
        };
        let gated = enforce_disjoint_authority_quorum(candidate, &witnesses);
        match gated {
            OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial { reasons, .. } => {
                assert!(reasons
                    .iter()
                    .any(|r| r == OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_QUORUM_NOT_MET_INVARIANT));
            }
            other => {
                panic!("single-witness history must downgrade to Partial, got {other:?}")
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn disjoint_quorum_does_not_upgrade_partial() {
        // The gate must be one-directional: it never promotes a
        // Partial outcome to FullChainVerified, only downgrades.
        let witnesses = vec![
            make_witness("https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org"),
            make_witness("https://finney.calendar.eternitywall.com"),
        ];
        let candidate = OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial {
            reasons: vec![OTS_BITCOIN_CONFIRMED_BLOCK_HEADER_MISMATCH_INVARIANT.to_string()],
            witnesses: witnesses.clone(),
        };
        let gated = enforce_disjoint_authority_quorum(candidate.clone(), &witnesses);
        assert_eq!(gated, candidate);
    }

    #[test]
    fn disjoint_quorum_unknown_operator_does_not_count_toward_quorum() {
        // Witnesses on unknown endpoints can't be asserted as
        // disjoint authorities (council Q1 "at least one is non-Todd"
        // implies we must KNOW the operator). Two Todd + one unknown
        // still fails.
        let witnesses = vec![
            make_witness("https://a.pool.opentimestamps.org"),
            make_witness("https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org"),
            make_witness("https://unclassified.example.org"),
        ];
        let candidate = OtsVerificationOutcome::FullChainVerified {
            witnesses: witnesses.clone(),
        };
        let gated = enforce_disjoint_authority_quorum(candidate, &witnesses);
        match gated {
            OtsVerificationOutcome::Partial { reasons, .. } => {
                assert!(reasons
                    .iter()
                    .any(|r| r == OTS_DISJOINT_AUTHORITY_QUORUM_NOT_MET_INVARIANT));
            }
            other => panic!("expected Partial, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    // -------------------------------------------------------------------
    // Default calendar list + operator metadata (council 2026-05-12 Q1).
    // -------------------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn default_calendar_url_is_first_entry_of_url_list() {
        // Back-compat guarantee documented on DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URL:
        // it points to the first entry of the full default list so
        // existing single-URL operator wiring keeps working.
        assert_eq!(DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URL, DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URLS[0]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn default_calendar_urls_include_eternitywall_finney() {
        // Council Q1 hard requirement: the default list MUST include
        // a non-Todd member so an operator who fans out across the
        // full default list automatically clears the disjoint-quorum
        // gate.
        assert!(
            DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URLS
                .iter()
                .any(|u| u.contains("finney.calendar.eternitywall.com")),
            "default calendar list must contain Eternitywall Finney",
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn ots_calendar_operators_covers_default_list() {
        for url in DEFAULT_OTS_CALENDAR_URLS {
            assert!(
                calendar_operator(url).is_some(),
                "default calendar `{url}` must have an operator entry",
            );
        }
    }

    // -------------------------------------------------------------------
    // HTTPS Bitcoin header source: PoW + hex helpers.
    // -------------------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn decode_hex_round_trips_known_byte_string() {
        let raw = decode_hex("00ff10ab").expect("decode round-trip");
        assert_eq!(raw, vec![0x00, 0xff, 0x10, 0xab]);
        assert!(decode_hex("zz").is_err());
        assert!(decode_hex("0").is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn https_headers_source_quorum_unreachable_when_zero_providers() {
        // No providers configured -> quorum cannot be met.
        let source = HttpsHeadersBitcoinHeaderSource::new(vec![]).with_quorum_n(2);
        let err = source.header_for_height(824_321).unwrap_err();
        match err {
            OtsError::OtsCrateError(reason) => {
                assert!(
                    reason.contains(OTS_BITCOIN_HEADER_QUORUM_UNREACHABLE_INVARIANT),
                    "expected unreachable invariant, got {reason}",
                );
            }
            other => panic!("expected OtsCrateError, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn expand_nbits_compact_recovers_genesis_difficulty() {
        // Bitcoin genesis nBits = 0x1d00ffff -> target is
        // 0x00000000ffff0000...0000.
        let target = expand_nbits_compact(0x1d00_ffff);
        assert_eq!(target[0], 0x00);
        assert_eq!(target[1], 0x00);
        assert_eq!(target[2], 0x00);
        assert_eq!(target[3], 0x00);
        assert_eq!(target[4], 0xff);
        assert_eq!(target[5], 0xff);
        for byte in &target[6..] {
            assert_eq!(*byte, 0x00);
        }
    }
}