cratefield-module-device-auth 0.3.0

Cratefield module: the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant (RFC 8628) — a client shows a code, a signed-in person approves it, and the venture's issuer mints the credential
Documentation

cratefield-module-device-auth

The OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant (RFC 8628) for a Cratefield venture: the flow for a client that has no browser and no keyboard — a CLI, a TV app, an appliance. It shows a short code, a signed-in person approves it in a browser, and the venture mints the credential.

Most OAuth flows hand the browser a redirect. This one hands the client a pair of codes and a URL, because there is no browser to redirect:

  1. The client posts to /v1/device-auth/code and gets back a device_code (long, secret, for the client), a user_code (short, for the person) and the URL to visit.
  2. The client shows the person the code and the URL, then starts polling /v1/device-auth/token.
  3. The person opens the URL, signs in if they have not, types the code, and presses Approve.
  4. The next poll that has waited out its interval is answered with the credential the venture's issuer minted.

Composition

use cratefield_core::{RandomBytes, RandomError};
use cratefield_module_device_auth::{DeviceAuth, DeviceClient, IssueRequest, Issuer, IssuerError};

// The two hooks a venture supplies: what a credential is, and where the
// entropy for the codes comes from. `docs/DEVICE-AUTH.md` works the first
// one through `ApiKeys`.
struct SealbKeys;
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl Issuer for SealbKeys {
    async fn issue(&self, request: IssueRequest) -> Result<serde_json::Value, IssuerError> {
        // In a venture this calls the key-minting you already have.
        Ok(serde_json::json!({ "api_key": "sealb_live_…", "subject": request.subject }))
    }
}
struct OsEntropy;
impl RandomBytes for OsEntropy {
    fn fill(&self, dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), RandomError> {
        // In a venture this is the platform CSPRNG (e.g. `getrandom`).
        for byte in dest.iter_mut() {
            *byte = 0x2a;
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

let module = DeviceAuth::builder()
    .client(DeviceClient::new("sealb-cli").scopes(["read", "write"]))
    .issuer(SealbKeys)
    .random(OsEntropy)
    .sign_in_url("/login")           // where CallerApprover sends anonymous visitors
    .expires_in(time::Duration::seconds(600))
    .interval(time::Duration::seconds(5))
    .max_wrong_entries(5)
    .build();

.approver(..) overrides the approver. Left unset, the module uses CallerApprover, which reads the Auth port's caller and sends an anonymous browser to the sign-in URL with return_to appended, so the person comes straight back to the code.

self_check refuses a composition that cannot work: no clients, no issuer, no entropy source, or a client whose id or scopes are malformed.

The two hooks

  • Approver answers who is asking to approve. CallerApprover is the stock one over the Auth port; a venture with its own session scheme implements the trait directly.
  • Issuer answers what credential does this client get. It is called exactly once per approved request and returns the JSON body the client receives. docs/DEVICE-AUTH.md shows an issuer built on ApiKeys::issue.

The endpoints

Route Who calls it What it answers
POST /v1/device-auth/code the client the code pair and the verification URL
POST /v1/device-auth/token the client the credential, or an OAuth error while pending
GET /v1/device-auth the browser the code form, or the Approve/Deny page
POST /v1/device-auth/approve the browser an approval page
POST /v1/device-auth/deny the browser a denial page

The two machine routes take their parameters as a JSON body or an application/x-www-form-urlencoded form, and answer RFC 6749 §5.2 errors ({"error": ..., "error_description": ...}) with a 400. slow_down and authorization_pending are normal parts of the flow, not failures.

Storage

One table, device_auth_codes, in the venture's own database. Both codes are stored only as SHA-256 hashes — there is no clear-text column — so a dump, a backup or a query log cannot be replayed as a code. The migration is crates/module-device-auth/migrations/sqlite/0001_init.sql.

The client side

cratefield_oauth_client::device is the client half: it runs the request-code / poll / handle-slow_down loop for a binary that is already using the OAuth client crate.

Ports

Port How
Database required — the codes, their state and their expiry live here
RateLimiter required — the abuse control the public routes have (issue #562)
Clock optional — what makes expiry and the poll interval deterministic
Auth optional — what CallerApprover identifies callers with

Documentation

  • docs/DEVICE-AUTH.md — the flow, the endpoints, the hooks, and the at-most-once credential rule.