cordance-core 0.1.1

//! `cordance-source-lock.v1` — every input source + every output's sha256.
//!
//! Drives `cordance check`: any source-anchor sha drift → fail.
//! Combined with fenced regions, this is how Cordance avoids
//! laundering hand-edits as authoritative output.

use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};

use camino::Utf8PathBuf;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

use crate::pack::CordancePack;

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SourceLock {
    pub schema: String,
    pub pack_id: String,
    pub doctrine_commit: Option<String>,
    pub axiom_algorithm_pin: Option<String>,
    pub sources: Vec<SourceLockEntry>,
    pub outputs: Vec<SourceLockEntry>,
}

impl SourceLock {
    #[must_use]
    pub fn empty() -> Self {
        Self {
            schema: crate::schema::CORDANCE_SOURCE_LOCK_V1.into(),
            pack_id: String::new(),
            doctrine_commit: None,
            axiom_algorithm_pin: None,
            sources: vec![],
            outputs: vec![],
        }
    }

    /// Compute a `SourceLock` from a `CordancePack`.
    ///
    /// `pack_id` is the sha256 of a deterministic byte stream that mixes:
    /// 1. project identity (`name`, a fixed `repo:.` placeholder, optional
    ///    `axiom_pin`), so that two unrelated empty projects can never
    ///    collide on the same id, and
    /// 2. every source's `id:sha256`, sorted by id, so the digest is stable
    ///    across runs that produce the same logical pack.
    ///
    /// `axiom_algorithm_pin` is propagated from `pack.project.axiom_pin` so
    /// that a downstream `cordance check` notices a doctrine-shaped drift in
    /// the axiom algorithm version (the cellos drift problem cordance exists
    /// to solve).
    ///
    /// # Cross-host determinism — Round-8 bughunt #4 (R8-bughunt-4)
    ///
    /// Earlier rounds (round-5 R5-bughunt-5 / round-5 R5-bughunt-8 / round-6
    /// LOW / round-7 R7-bughunt-6) hashed `pack.project.repo_root.as_str()`
    /// directly. That string was the operator's host-absolute path
    /// (`C:\\Users\\0ryant\\prj\\cordance` on Windows,
    /// `/home/op/projects/cordance` on Linux), so two clones of the same
    /// git commit on different hosts produced different `pack_id`s — and
    /// the cortex receipt that hashes `pack_id` then disagreed about pack
    /// identity across CI runners and developer machines. The cellos drift
    /// problem the receipt was supposed to detect was masked by a
    /// path-shape drift cordance itself was introducing.
    ///
    /// The mix now uses a fixed placeholder (`b"."`). Project distinction
    /// still comes from `name` and `axiom_pin`. `pack_cmd::run` writes the
    /// matching `"."` into `pack.project.repo_root` for the on-disk shape;
    /// the framing constant here is the second half of the same contract
    /// so any future code that builds a pack with a non-`"."` `repo_root`
    /// (test fixtures, MCP shims) still hashes identically.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn compute_from_pack(pack: &CordancePack) -> Self {
        // Build the set of paths that should NOT appear in the lock's
        // `sources` list:
        //   1. Every path Cordance emitted as a target artifact (lives in
        //      `pack.outputs`). On the first `cordance pack` the scanner
        //      doesn't see these because they don't exist yet, but a
        //      subsequent `cordance check` rescan picks them up — round-4
        //      bughunt #2's new-file detection then flags every one of them
        //      as an "ADDED" source. The output sha is already captured in
        //      `lock.outputs`, so the source-side entry is redundant noise.
        //   2. Cordance-internal metadata under `.cordance/` that no emitter
        //      claims (sources.lock itself, evidence-map.json, the optional
        //      llm-candidate.json). These never appear in `pack.outputs` but
        //      do appear in scans of a directory where `cordance pack` has
        //      already run.
        let mut excluded_paths: HashSet<String> = pack
            .outputs
            .iter()
            .map(|o| o.path.as_str().to_string())
            .collect();
        excluded_paths.insert(".cordance/sources.lock".into());
        excluded_paths.insert(".cordance/evidence-map.json".into());
        excluded_paths.insert(".cordance/llm-candidate.json".into());
        excluded_paths.insert(".cordance/cortex-receipt.json".into());

        let mut sorted_sources: Vec<_> = pack
            .sources
            .iter()
            .filter(|r| !excluded_paths.contains(r.path.as_str()))
            .cloned()
            .collect();
        sorted_sources.sort_by(|a, b| a.id.cmp(&b.id));

        // Domain-separated framing keeps "project:name" from colliding with a
        // source whose id happens to start with that prefix.
        //
        // Round-8 bughunt #4 (R8-bughunt-4): the `repo:` mix is now a fixed
        // `b"."` placeholder rather than `pack.project.repo_root.as_str()`.
        // See the doc-comment above for the cross-host-determinism rationale;
        // we keep the framing line so the byte stream layout (and therefore
        // any historical re-derivation) is shape-compatible — only the
        // value-bytes changed from a host-absolute path to a single `.`.
        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
        hasher.update(b"project:");
        hasher.update(pack.project.name.as_bytes());
        hasher.update(b"\nrepo:");
        hasher.update(b".");
        if let Some(pin) = &pack.project.axiom_pin {
            hasher.update(b"\naxiom:");
            hasher.update(pin.as_bytes());
        }
        for r in &sorted_sources {
            hasher.update(b"\n");
            hasher.update(r.id.as_bytes());
            hasher.update(b":");
            hasher.update(r.sha256.as_bytes());
        }
        let pack_id = hex::encode(hasher.finalize());

        let sources = sorted_sources
            .iter()
            .map(|r| SourceLockEntry {
                id: r.id.clone(),
                path: r.path.clone(),
                sha256: r.sha256.clone(),
                bytes: r.size_bytes,
            })
            .collect();

        let outputs = pack
            .outputs
            .iter()
            .map(|o| SourceLockEntry {
                id: o.path.to_string(),
                path: o.path.as_str().into(),
                sha256: o.sha256.clone(),
                bytes: o.bytes,
            })
            .collect();

        let doctrine_commit = pack.doctrine_pins.first().map(|p| p.commit.clone());

        Self {
            schema: crate::schema::CORDANCE_SOURCE_LOCK_V1.into(),
            pack_id,
            doctrine_commit,
            axiom_algorithm_pin: pack.project.axiom_pin.clone(),
            sources,
            outputs,
        }
    }

    /// Diff `self` (the current/new state) against `previous`.
    ///
    /// `fenced_outputs` is the set of output paths (as `entry.path.as_str()`)
    /// that currently contain cordance fence markers on disk. The caller is
    /// responsible for computing this set; keeping the read out of `diff`
    /// preserves the modularity-and-ports-adapters boundary — `SourceLock`
    /// is a pure domain type and must not touch the filesystem.
    ///
    /// Output paths absent from `fenced_outputs` are treated as **fenced**
    /// when they are missing on disk (so a deleted managed region still
    /// counts as drift). This matches the previous behaviour exactly.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn diff(&self, previous: &Self, fenced_outputs: &HashSet<String>) -> DriftReport {
        let current_sources: HashMap<&str, &SourceLockEntry> =
            self.sources.iter().map(|e| (e.id.as_str(), e)).collect();
        let previous_sources: HashMap<&str, &SourceLockEntry> = previous
            .sources
            .iter()
            .map(|e| (e.id.as_str(), e))
            .collect();

        let mut source_drifts = Vec::new();

        // Pass 1: every previous entry that is gone or whose sha drifted.
        for entry in &previous.sources {
            match current_sources.get(entry.id.as_str()) {
                None => {
                    source_drifts.push(SourceDriftEntry {
                        id: entry.id.clone(),
                        path: entry.path.to_string(),
                        old_sha256: entry.sha256.clone(),
                        new_sha256: "DELETED".into(),
                    });
                }
                Some(current) if current.sha256 != entry.sha256 => {
                    source_drifts.push(SourceDriftEntry {
                        id: entry.id.clone(),
                        path: entry.path.to_string(),
                        old_sha256: entry.sha256.clone(),
                        new_sha256: current.sha256.clone(),
                    });
                }
                _ => {}
            }
        }

        // Pass 2: every CURRENT entry not in the previous lock — a newly-added
        // source. Round-4 bughunt #2: the previous diff was blind to new
        // files, so `cordance check` would report "clean" after `touch
        // newfile.md`. We mark new entries with `old_sha256 == "ADDED"` so the
        // formatter can surface them as additions rather than zero-byte
        // changes. The same flag also catches "a previously-blocked file is
        // now classified" and "a renamed file produces a fresh id" — both
        // were silently missed under the old single-pass loop.
        for entry in &self.sources {
            if !previous_sources.contains_key(entry.id.as_str()) {
                source_drifts.push(SourceDriftEntry {
                    id: entry.id.clone(),
                    path: entry.path.to_string(),
                    old_sha256: "ADDED".into(),
                    new_sha256: entry.sha256.clone(),
                });
            }
        }

        let current_outputs: HashMap<&str, &SourceLockEntry> =
            self.outputs.iter().map(|e| (e.id.as_str(), e)).collect();

        let mut fenced_output_drifts = Vec::new();
        let mut unfenced_output_drifts = Vec::new();

        for entry in &previous.outputs {
            // Output gone from lock entirely → treat as fenced drift (managed region gone).
            let drifted = current_outputs
                .get(entry.id.as_str())
                .is_none_or(|current| current.sha256 != entry.sha256);

            if !drifted {
                continue;
            }

            // A missing file is still a managed-region drift (fenced) — the
            // caller signals that by leaving the path out of
            // `fenced_outputs`. Only outputs that the caller explicitly
            // observed without fence markers are classified as unfenced.
            // Said another way: "fenced or missing" == fenced drift,
            // "observed and unfenced" == user-owned drift.
            let path_key = entry.path.as_str();
            let observed_unfenced =
                current_outputs.contains_key(path_key) && !fenced_outputs.contains(path_key);

            let drift_entry = OutputDriftEntry {
                path: entry.path.to_string(),
                old_sha256: entry.sha256.clone(),
                new_sha256: current_outputs
                    .get(entry.id.as_str())
                    .map_or_else(|| "DELETED".into(), |e| e.sha256.clone()),
            };

            if observed_unfenced {
                unfenced_output_drifts.push(drift_entry);
            } else {
                fenced_output_drifts.push(drift_entry);
            }
        }

        DriftReport {
            source_drifts,
            fenced_output_drifts,
            unfenced_output_drifts,
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SourceLockEntry {
    pub id: String,
    pub path: Utf8PathBuf,
    pub sha256: String,
    pub bytes: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DriftReport {
    pub source_drifts: Vec<SourceDriftEntry>,
    pub fenced_output_drifts: Vec<OutputDriftEntry>,
    pub unfenced_output_drifts: Vec<OutputDriftEntry>,
}

impl DriftReport {
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn is_clean(&self) -> bool {
        self.source_drifts.is_empty() && self.fenced_output_drifts.is_empty()
    }

    /// Exit code: 0=clean, 1=source drift, 2=fenced output drift, 3=both.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn exit_code(&self) -> i32 {
        match (
            !self.source_drifts.is_empty(),
            !self.fenced_output_drifts.is_empty(),
        ) {
            (false, false) => 0,
            (true, false) => 1,
            (false, true) => 2,
            (true, true) => 3,
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SourceDriftEntry {
    pub id: String,
    pub path: String,
    pub old_sha256: String,
    pub new_sha256: String,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct OutputDriftEntry {
    pub path: String,
    pub old_sha256: String,
    pub new_sha256: String,
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::advise::AdviseReport;
    use crate::pack::{CordancePack, PackTargets, ProjectIdentity};
    use crate::schema;

    fn minimal_empty_pack(name: &str) -> CordancePack {
        CordancePack {
            schema: schema::CORDANCE_PACK_V1.into(),
            project: ProjectIdentity {
                name: name.into(),
                repo_root: format!("/tmp/{name}").into(),
                kind: "test".into(),
                host_os: "linux".into(),
                axiom_pin: None,
            },
            sources: vec![],
            doctrine_pins: vec![],
            targets: PackTargets::default(),
            outputs: vec![],
            source_lock: SourceLock::empty(),
            advise: AdviseReport::empty(),
            residual_risk: vec!["test".into()],
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_lock_has_v1_schema() {
        let l = SourceLock::empty();
        assert_eq!(l.schema, crate::schema::CORDANCE_SOURCE_LOCK_V1);
    }

    /// Two unrelated empty projects must never share a `pack_id`; the cellos
    /// drift problem (HIGH bughunt #5) is precisely the false-equality this
    /// guards against.
    #[test]
    fn empty_packs_with_different_names_have_different_pack_ids() {
        let p1 = minimal_empty_pack("project_a");
        let p2 = minimal_empty_pack("project_b");
        let l1 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p1);
        let l2 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p2);
        assert_ne!(l1.pack_id, l2.pack_id);
    }

    /// `pack_id` is stable across re-computation on the same logical pack.
    #[test]
    fn same_empty_pack_yields_same_pack_id() {
        let p = minimal_empty_pack("project_a");
        let l1 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p);
        let l2 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p);
        assert_eq!(l1.pack_id, l2.pack_id);
    }

    /// Empty pack must never produce the trivial `sha256("")` digest — that
    /// is the exact symptom of CRITICAL #5 from the bughunt review.
    #[test]
    fn empty_pack_id_is_not_sha256_of_empty_string() {
        let p = minimal_empty_pack("any");
        let lock = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p);
        let empty_sha = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(b""));
        assert_ne!(lock.pack_id, empty_sha);
    }

    /// `axiom_pin` on the pack must round-trip through to
    /// `lock.axiom_algorithm_pin`.
    #[test]
    fn axiom_pin_propagates_to_lock() {
        let mut pack = minimal_empty_pack("test");
        pack.project.axiom_pin = Some("v3.1.1-axiom".into());
        let lock = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&pack);
        assert_eq!(lock.axiom_algorithm_pin.as_deref(), Some("v3.1.1-axiom"));
    }

    /// Two empty packs that differ only in `axiom_pin` must produce different
    /// `pack_id`s — otherwise an axiom version bump silently looks identical
    /// to the previous lock.
    #[test]
    fn axiom_pin_affects_pack_id() {
        let mut p1 = minimal_empty_pack("same_name");
        let mut p2 = minimal_empty_pack("same_name");
        p1.project.axiom_pin = Some("v3.1.0-axiom".into());
        p2.project.axiom_pin = Some("v3.1.1-axiom".into());
        let l1 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p1);
        let l2 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p2);
        assert_ne!(l1.pack_id, l2.pack_id);
    }

    /// Round-8 bughunt #4 (R8-bughunt-4): the cross-host-determinism pin.
    /// Two operators on different machines cloning the same git commit
    /// produce historical `repo_root` values like `/tmp/foo` and
    /// `C:\Users\op\foo`. Under the old shape, those host-absolute paths
    /// were mixed into the `pack_id` sha and the two operators' receipts
    /// disagreed about pack identity for the same logical commit — masking
    /// the cellos drift problem the receipt was meant to surface.
    ///
    /// With the placeholder mix, `compute_from_pack` ignores `repo_root`
    /// entirely. Identical name + identical `axiom_pin` + identical sources
    /// MUST yield identical `pack_id`, even if a caller passed two
    /// different `repo_root` values (legacy test fixtures, MCP shims that
    /// haven't been migrated yet). This test pins the contract on the
    /// hash side; the construction-site fix in `pack_cmd::run` writes
    /// `"."` for all real packs.
    #[test]
    fn pack_id_ignores_repo_root_across_hosts() {
        let mut p1 = minimal_empty_pack("cordance");
        let mut p2 = minimal_empty_pack("cordance");
        p1.project.axiom_pin = Some("v3.1.1-axiom".into());
        p2.project.axiom_pin = Some("v3.1.1-axiom".into());
        // Simulate the same logical project cloned to different hosts.
        p1.project.repo_root = "/tmp/foo".into();
        p2.project.repo_root = r"C:\Users\op\foo".into();
        let l1 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p1);
        let l2 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p2);
        assert_eq!(
            l1.pack_id, l2.pack_id,
            "pack_id must be host-independent: identical name+axiom_pin+sources \
             must yield identical pack_id regardless of repo_root \
             (l1={}, l2={})",
            l1.pack_id, l2.pack_id
        );
    }

    /// Round-8 bughunt #4 (R8-bughunt-4) companion: the placeholder mix
    /// must not collapse the existing name-distinction guarantee. Two
    /// packs with different names must still produce different `pack_id`s
    /// even when they share an (identical) `repo_root` value. This is the
    /// negative bound on the previous test: removing `repo_root` from the
    /// hash must not strengthen collisions, just align cross-host.
    #[test]
    fn pack_id_still_differs_by_name_when_repo_root_matches() {
        let p1 = minimal_empty_pack("project_a");
        let p2 = minimal_empty_pack("project_b");
        // `minimal_empty_pack` already sets repo_root from the name, so
        // overwrite both with an identical placeholder to isolate the
        // name-distinction signal.
        let mut p1 = p1;
        let mut p2 = p2;
        p1.project.repo_root = ".".into();
        p2.project.repo_root = ".".into();
        let l1 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p1);
        let l2 = SourceLock::compute_from_pack(&p2);
        assert_ne!(
            l1.pack_id, l2.pack_id,
            "different project names must still yield different pack_ids \
             even when repo_root is identical"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn drift_report_clean_exit_code() {
        let report = DriftReport::default();
        assert!(report.is_clean());
        assert_eq!(report.exit_code(), 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn drift_report_source_only_exit_code() {
        let report = DriftReport {
            source_drifts: vec![SourceDriftEntry {
                id: "x".into(),
                path: "x.md".into(),
                old_sha256: "aa".into(),
                new_sha256: "bb".into(),
            }],
            fenced_output_drifts: vec![],
            unfenced_output_drifts: vec![],
        };
        assert!(!report.is_clean());
        assert_eq!(report.exit_code(), 1);
    }

    /// Round-4 bughunt #2: `cordance check` was blind to NEW source files
    /// because `SourceLock::diff` iterated only `previous.sources`. A `touch
    /// newfile.md` between two packs must show up as an ADDED entry.
    #[test]
    fn diff_reports_newly_added_sources() {
        let prev = SourceLock::empty();
        let mut current = SourceLock::empty();
        current.sources.push(SourceLockEntry {
            id: "project_readme:README.md".into(),
            path: "README.md".into(),
            sha256: "newhash".into(),
            bytes: 100,
        });
        let report = current.diff(&prev, &HashSet::new());
        assert_eq!(report.source_drifts.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(report.source_drifts[0].old_sha256, "ADDED");
        assert_eq!(report.source_drifts[0].new_sha256, "newhash");
        assert_eq!(report.source_drifts[0].path, "README.md");
        assert!(!report.is_clean());
    }

    /// Symmetric: a previously-present source that is gone in the current
    /// lock is reported as DELETED — same as before the bughunt fix.
    #[test]
    fn diff_reports_deleted_sources() {
        let mut prev = SourceLock::empty();
        prev.sources.push(SourceLockEntry {
            id: "project_readme:README.md".into(),
            path: "README.md".into(),
            sha256: "oldhash".into(),
            bytes: 100,
        });
        let current = SourceLock::empty();
        let report = current.diff(&prev, &HashSet::new());
        assert_eq!(report.source_drifts.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(report.source_drifts[0].old_sha256, "oldhash");
        assert_eq!(report.source_drifts[0].new_sha256, "DELETED");
    }

    /// Mixed: one entry drifts in place, one is added, one is deleted.
    /// All three must appear in `source_drifts`.
    #[test]
    fn diff_handles_mixed_drift_added_deleted() {
        let mut prev = SourceLock::empty();
        prev.sources.push(SourceLockEntry {
            id: "a".into(),
            path: "a.md".into(),
            sha256: "aaa".into(),
            bytes: 1,
        });
        prev.sources.push(SourceLockEntry {
            id: "b".into(),
            path: "b.md".into(),
            sha256: "bbb".into(),
            bytes: 1,
        });
        let mut current = SourceLock::empty();
        current.sources.push(SourceLockEntry {
            id: "a".into(),
            path: "a.md".into(),
            sha256: "aaa_drifted".into(),
            bytes: 1,
        });
        // 'b' removed, 'c' added.
        current.sources.push(SourceLockEntry {
            id: "c".into(),
            path: "c.md".into(),
            sha256: "ccc".into(),
            bytes: 1,
        });
        let report = current.diff(&prev, &HashSet::new());
        assert_eq!(report.source_drifts.len(), 3);
        let by_id: std::collections::HashMap<String, &SourceDriftEntry> = report
            .source_drifts
            .iter()
            .map(|d| (d.id.clone(), d))
            .collect();
        assert_eq!(by_id["a"].new_sha256, "aaa_drifted");
        assert_eq!(by_id["b"].new_sha256, "DELETED");
        assert_eq!(by_id["c"].old_sha256, "ADDED");
    }

    /// Round-4 bughunt #1: `SourceLock` must not embed a wall-clock so
    /// `sources.lock` is byte-deterministic across runs.
    #[test]
    fn source_lock_does_not_serialise_generated_at() {
        let lock = SourceLock::empty();
        let s = serde_json::to_string(&lock).expect("ser");
        assert!(
            !s.contains("generated_at"),
            "sources.lock must not embed a wall-clock timestamp: {s}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn drift_report_both_exit_code() {
        let report = DriftReport {
            source_drifts: vec![SourceDriftEntry {
                id: "x".into(),
                path: "x.md".into(),
                old_sha256: "aa".into(),
                new_sha256: "bb".into(),
            }],
            fenced_output_drifts: vec![OutputDriftEntry {
                path: "out.md".into(),
                old_sha256: "cc".into(),
                new_sha256: "dd".into(),
            }],
            unfenced_output_drifts: vec![],
        };
        assert!(!report.is_clean());
        assert_eq!(report.exit_code(), 3);
    }
}