commonware-coding 2026.10.0

use crate::{Config, Scheme};
use bytes::{BufMut, Bytes};
use commonware_codec::{
    Buf, BufsMut, EncodeSize, FixedSize, RangeCfg, Read, ReadExt, Write, util::max_items_size,
};
use commonware_cryptography::{
    Digest, Hasher,
    reed_solomon::{Decoder, Encoder, Error as RsError, Plan, SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES},
};
use commonware_parallel::{Batches, Strategy};
use commonware_storage::bmt::{self, Builder};
use commonware_utils::{Cached, MAX_ALLOCATION_BYTES, NZUsize, Widen};
use std::{marker::PhantomData, ops::Range};
use thiserror::Error;

// Thread-local caches for reusing `Encoder` and `Decoder`
// instances across calls. Constructing these objects is expensive because
// the underlying engine initializes GF lookup tables. The `reset()` method
// reconfigures the work buffers without rebuilding those tables.
commonware_utils::thread_local_cache!(static CACHED_ENCODER: Encoder);
commonware_utils::thread_local_cache!(static CACHED_DECODER: Decoder);

/// Minimum stripe width for amortizing encoder/decoder setup.
///
/// Batching operates in `SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES` units. This minimum is a positive
/// multiple of that width, so its stripe-count bound also guarantees at least
/// one complete block per stripe. The strategy further caps the stripe count
/// by available parallelism.
const MIN_STRIPE_BYTES: usize = 8 * 1024;

/// Target transform storage per tile within a stripe.
///
/// A tile's transform storage is at most twice this target. Every coder instance is configured
/// for a single tile, which also bounds the work that each thread's cached coders retain.
const MAX_TILE_WORK_BYTES: usize = 2 * 1024 * 1024;

/// Errors that can occur when interacting with the Reed-Solomon coder.
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
    #[error("reed-solomon error: {0}")]
    ReedSolomon(#[from] RsError),
    #[error("inconsistent")]
    Inconsistent,
    #[error("invalid proof")]
    InvalidProof,
    #[error("not enough chunks")]
    NotEnoughChunks,
    #[error("duplicate chunk index: {0}")]
    DuplicateIndex(u16),
    #[error("invalid data length: {0}")]
    InvalidDataLength(usize),
    #[error("invalid index: {0}")]
    InvalidIndex(u16),
    #[error("too many total shards: {0}")]
    TooManyTotalShards(u32),
    #[error("checked shard commitment does not match decode commitment")]
    CommitmentMismatch,
}

fn total_shards(config: &Config) -> Result<u16, Error> {
    let total = config.total_shards();
    total
        .try_into()
        .map_err(|_| Error::TooManyTotalShards(total))
}

/// Validate the requested shard index, embedded index, proof leaf count, and shard width before
/// hashing.
///
/// Every codeword has a positive, even shard width. Decode relies on this for checked shards.
fn check_metadata<D: Digest>(total: u16, index: u16, shard: &Chunk<D>) -> Result<(), Error> {
    if index >= total {
        return Err(Error::InvalidIndex(index));
    }
    let width = shard.shard.len();
    if width == 0 || !width.is_multiple_of(2) {
        return Err(RsError::InvalidShardSize { shard_bytes: width }.into());
    }
    if shard.proof.leaf_count != u32::from(total) {
        return Err(Error::InvalidProof);
    }
    if shard.index != index {
        return Err(Error::InvalidIndex(shard.index));
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Authenticate a shard at its requested position and cache its digest with the commitment.
/// The digest is evaluated only after the shard metadata is valid.
fn check_chunk<H: Hasher>(
    total: u16,
    commitment: &H::Digest,
    index: u16,
    shard: &Chunk<H::Digest>,
    digest: impl FnOnce() -> H::Digest,
) -> Result<CheckedChunk<H>, Error> {
    check_metadata(total, index, shard)?;

    // Bind the shard digest to its requested position and commitment.
    let digest = digest();
    shard
        .proof
        .verify_element_inclusion::<H>(&digest, u32::from(index), commitment)
        .map_err(|_| Error::InvalidProof)?;

    // Cache the verified digest with the commitment and shard it authenticates.
    Ok(CheckedChunk::new(
        *commitment,
        shard.shard.clone(),
        index,
        digest,
    ))
}

/// A piece of data from a Reed-Solomon encoded object.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Chunk<D: Digest> {
    /// The shard of encoded data.
    shard: Bytes,

    /// The index of [`Chunk`] in the original data.
    index: u16,

    /// The multi-proof of the shard in the [`bmt`] at the given index.
    proof: bmt::Proof<D>,
}

impl<D: Digest> Chunk<D> {
    /// Returns an upper bound on the encoded size of a chunk whose shard holds at most `shard`
    /// bytes and whose proof holds at most `siblings` sibling digests.
    pub fn max_encode_size(shard: usize, siblings: usize) -> usize {
        max_items_size(shard, u8::SIZE) + u16::SIZE + bmt::Proof::<D>::max_encode_size(siblings)
    }

    /// Create a new [`Chunk`] from the given shard, index, and proof.
    const fn new(shard: Bytes, index: u16, proof: bmt::Proof<D>) -> Self {
        Self {
            shard,
            index,
            proof,
        }
    }
}

/// A shard that has been checked against a commitment.
///
/// This stores the shard digest computed during [`Scheme::check`] and the
/// commitment root it was verified against. The root is checked at decode
/// time to prevent cross-commitment shard mixing.
///
/// Decoding trusts the stored digest and does not hash the shard again, so the type is
/// parameterized by the hasher that computed it. A shard checked with one hasher cannot be
/// decoded with another, even when both hashers produce the same digest type.
pub struct CheckedChunk<H: Hasher> {
    root: H::Digest,
    shard: Bytes,
    index: u16,
    digest: H::Digest,
}

impl<H: Hasher> CheckedChunk<H> {
    const fn new(root: H::Digest, shard: Bytes, index: u16, digest: H::Digest) -> Self {
        Self {
            root,
            shard,
            index,
            digest,
        }
    }
}

impl<H: Hasher> Clone for CheckedChunk<H> {
    fn clone(&self) -> Self {
        Self {
            root: self.root,
            shard: self.shard.clone(),
            index: self.index,
            digest: self.digest,
        }
    }
}

impl<H: Hasher> std::fmt::Debug for CheckedChunk<H> {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        f.debug_struct("CheckedChunk")
            .field("root", &self.root)
            .field("shard", &self.shard)
            .field("index", &self.index)
            .field("digest", &self.digest)
            .finish()
    }
}

impl<H: Hasher> PartialEq for CheckedChunk<H> {
    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
        self.root == other.root
            && self.shard == other.shard
            && self.index == other.index
            && self.digest == other.digest
    }
}

impl<H: Hasher> Eq for CheckedChunk<H> {}

impl<D: Digest> Write for Chunk<D> {
    fn write(&self, writer: &mut impl BufMut) {
        self.shard.write(writer);
        self.index.write(writer);
        self.proof.write(writer);
    }

    fn write_bufs(&self, buf: &mut impl BufsMut) {
        self.shard.write_bufs(buf);
        self.index.write(buf);
        self.proof.write(buf);
    }
}

impl<D: Digest> Read for Chunk<D> {
    /// The coding config and the maximum number of data bytes.
    ///
    /// A chunk decodes only if its shard is no wider than encoding that many bytes under the
    /// config would produce. The bound shrinks as `minimum_shards` grows and is widest at one,
    /// where a single shard holds the length prefix and all of the data.
    type Cfg = (Config, usize);

    fn read_cfg(
        reader: &mut impl Buf,
        (config, maximum): &Self::Cfg,
    ) -> Result<Self, commonware_codec::Error> {
        let width = canonical_shard_len(
            (*maximum).min(Widen::widen(u32::MAX)),
            config.minimum_shards.widen(),
        );
        let shard = Bytes::read_cfg(reader, &RangeCfg::new(..=width))?;
        let index = u16::read(reader)?;
        let proof = bmt::Proof::<D>::read_cfg(reader, &1)?;
        Ok(Self {
            shard,
            index,
            proof,
        })
    }
}

impl<D: Digest> EncodeSize for Chunk<D> {
    fn encode_size(&self) -> usize {
        self.shard.encode_size() + self.index.encode_size() + self.proof.encode_size()
    }

    fn encode_inline_size(&self) -> usize {
        self.shard.encode_inline_size() + self.index.encode_size() + self.proof.encode_size()
    }
}

impl<D: Digest> PartialEq for Chunk<D> {
    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
        self.shard == other.shard && self.index == other.index && self.proof == other.proof
    }
}

impl<D: Digest> Eq for Chunk<D> {}

#[cfg(feature = "arbitrary")]
impl<D: Digest> arbitrary::Arbitrary<'_> for Chunk<D>
where
    D: for<'a> arbitrary::Arbitrary<'a>,
{
    fn arbitrary(u: &mut arbitrary::Unstructured<'_>) -> arbitrary::Result<Self> {
        Ok(Self {
            shard: u.arbitrary::<Vec<u8>>()?.into(),
            index: u.arbitrary()?,
            proof: u.arbitrary()?,
        })
    }
}

/// Prepare data for encoding.
///
/// Returns a contiguous buffer of `k` padded shards of `shard_len` bytes each, where
/// `shard_len` is [`canonical_shard_len`] of the payload. The buffer layout is
/// `[length_prefix | data | zero_padding]`.
fn prepare_data(mut data: impl bytes::Buf, k: usize, shard_len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
    let data_len = data.remaining();
    let length_bytes = (data_len as u32).to_be_bytes();
    let mut padded = vec![0u8; k * shard_len];
    padded[..u32::SIZE].copy_from_slice(&length_bytes);
    data.copy_to_slice(&mut padded[u32::SIZE..u32::SIZE + data_len]);
    padded
}

/// Return the canonical shard width for a payload and shard count.
///
/// Encoding prefixes the payload with its length, splits the result across
/// `k` original shards, and rounds up to an even width required by the
/// Reed-Solomon implementation. Decode uses the same calculation to reject
/// commitments that decode to the same payload with a non-canonical shard width.
const fn canonical_shard_len(data_len: usize, k: usize) -> usize {
    let prefixed_len = data_len.saturating_add(u32::SIZE);
    let mut shard_len = prefixed_len.div_ceil(k);

    // Ensure shard length is even, as required by the Reed-Solomon implementation.
    if !shard_len.is_multiple_of(2) {
        shard_len = shard_len.saturating_add(1);
    }

    shard_len
}

/// Returns whether `n` shards of `shard_len` bytes fit in one allocation.
const fn codeword_fits(n: usize, shard_len: usize) -> bool {
    match n.checked_mul(shard_len) {
        Some(bytes) => bytes <= MAX_ALLOCATION_BYTES,
        None => false,
    }
}

/// Validate the length prefix, zero padding, and canonical width of the original shards.
/// Returns the payload length without allocating or copying it.
fn validate_data_layout(shards: &[&[u8]], expected_shard_len: usize) -> Result<usize, Error> {
    let data_len = read_data_len(shards)?;
    let mut data_end = u32::SIZE + data_len;
    for shard in shards {
        if data_end >= shard.len() {
            data_end -= shard.len();
            continue;
        }
        if !shard[data_end..].iter().all(|byte| *byte == 0) {
            return Err(Error::Inconsistent);
        }
        data_end = 0;
    }
    if canonical_shard_len(data_len, shards.len()) != expected_shard_len {
        return Err(Error::Inconsistent);
    }
    Ok(data_len)
}

/// Validate the first `k` original shards and copy their payload into an owned buffer.
fn extract_data(shards: &[&[u8]], k: usize, expected_shard_len: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
    let shards = shards.get(..k).ok_or(Error::NotEnoughChunks)?;
    let data_len = validate_data_layout(shards, expected_shard_len)?;
    let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(data_len);
    let mut prefix_bytes_left = u32::SIZE;
    let mut data_bytes_left = data_len;
    for shard in shards {
        // The length prefix may straddle shard boundaries, so ignore bytes until
        // we reach the first payload byte.
        if prefix_bytes_left >= shard.len() {
            prefix_bytes_left -= shard.len();
            continue;
        }

        // Copy only the live payload bytes from this shard.
        let payload = &shard[prefix_bytes_left..];
        let copy_len = data_bytes_left.min(payload.len());
        data.extend_from_slice(&payload[..copy_len]);
        data_bytes_left -= copy_len;

        prefix_bytes_left = 0;
    }
    Ok(data)
}

/// Read the 4-byte big-endian length prefix from `shards` and validate that
/// the decoded length fits in the post-prefix payload region.
fn read_data_len(shards: &[&[u8]]) -> Result<usize, Error> {
    let total_len: usize = shards.iter().map(|s| s.len()).sum();
    if total_len < u32::SIZE {
        return Err(Error::Inconsistent);
    }

    // Read the length prefix, which may span multiple shards.
    let mut prefix = [0u8; u32::SIZE];
    let mut prefix_len = 0usize;
    for shard in shards {
        if prefix_len == u32::SIZE {
            break;
        }
        let read = (u32::SIZE - prefix_len).min(shard.len());
        prefix[prefix_len..prefix_len + read].copy_from_slice(&shard[..read]);
        prefix_len += read;
    }

    let data_len = u32::from_be_bytes(prefix) as usize;
    let payload_len = total_len - u32::SIZE;
    if data_len > payload_len {
        return Err(Error::Inconsistent);
    }
    Ok(data_len)
}

/// Type alias for the internal encoding result.
type Encoding<D> = (D, Vec<Chunk<D>>);

/// Rejects shard counts the Reed-Solomon backend does not support.
fn validate_counts(k: usize, m: usize) -> Result<(), Error> {
    if Encoder::supports(k, m) {
        Ok(())
    } else {
        Err(Error::ReedSolomon(RsError::UnsupportedShardCount {
            original_count: k,
            recovery_count: m,
        }))
    }
}

/// Encode data using a Reed-Solomon coder and insert it into a [`bmt`].
///
/// # Parameters
///
/// - `total`: The total number of chunks to generate.
/// - `min`: The minimum number of chunks required to decode the data.
/// - `data`: The data to encode.
/// - `strategy`: The parallelism strategy to use.
///
/// # Returns
///
/// - `root`: The root of the [`bmt`].
/// - `chunks`: [`Chunk`]s of encoded data (that can be proven against `root`).
fn encode<H: Hasher, S: Strategy>(
    total: u16,
    min: u16,
    data: impl bytes::Buf,
    strategy: &S,
) -> Result<Encoding<H::Digest>, Error> {
    // Validate parameters
    assert!(total > min);
    assert!(min > 0);
    let n = total as usize;
    let k = min as usize;
    let m = n - k;
    let data_len = data.remaining();
    if data_len > Widen::widen(u32::MAX) {
        return Err(Error::InvalidDataLength(data_len));
    }

    // Reject unsupported shard counts before allocating any buffer. The buffers below are then
    // bounded by the shard counts and `data_len`.
    validate_counts(k, m)?;

    // The shard width is the length prefix of every chunk on the wire, and the codeword is
    // `n` shards of that width, so both must be representable before anything is allocated.
    let shard_len = canonical_shard_len(data_len, k);
    if shard_len > Widen::widen(u32::MAX) || !codeword_fits(n, shard_len) {
        return Err(Error::InvalidDataLength(data_len));
    }

    // Prepare data as a contiguous buffer of k shards
    let padded = prepare_data(data, k, shard_len);

    // Compute recovery shards, striping large shard widths across the strategy
    let recovery_buf = strategy.try_run_batches(
        shard_len / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES,
        NZUsize!(MIN_STRIPE_BYTES / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES),
        SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES * n,
        |batches| {
            let original_shards = padded.chunks(shard_len).collect::<Vec<_>>();
            let mut buf = vec![0u8; m * shard_len];
            batches.try_map_collect_vec(
                |ranges| {
                    let ranges = striped::byte_ranges(shard_len, ranges);
                    let groups = striped::stripe_columns(&mut buf, shard_len, &ranges);
                    ranges.into_iter().zip(groups)
                },
                |(range, out)| striped::encode_recovery_into(k, m, range, &original_shards, out),
            )?;
            Ok::<_, Error>(buf)
        },
    )?;

    // Create zero-copy Bytes views into the original and recovery buffers
    let originals: Bytes = padded.into();
    let recoveries: Bytes = recovery_buf.into();

    // Build Merkle tree
    let mut builder = Builder::<H>::new(n);
    let shard_slices: Vec<Bytes> = (0..k)
        .map(|i| originals.slice(i * shard_len..(i + 1) * shard_len))
        .chain((0..m).map(|i| recoveries.slice(i * shard_len..(i + 1) * shard_len)))
        .collect();
    let shard_hashes = H::hash_many(&shard_slices, strategy);
    for hash in &shard_hashes {
        builder.add(hash);
    }
    let tree = builder.build();
    let root = tree.root();

    // Generate chunks with zero-copy shard views
    let mut chunks = Vec::with_capacity(n);
    for (i, shard) in shard_slices.into_iter().enumerate() {
        let proof = tree.proof(i as u32).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidProof)?;
        chunks.push(Chunk::new(shard, i as u16, proof));
    }

    Ok((root, chunks))
}

/// Inputs shared by the decode helpers.
struct DecodeCtx<'a, H: Hasher, S: Strategy> {
    /// Total number of shards (`k + m`).
    n: usize,
    /// Minimum shards required to decode (the number of original shards).
    k: usize,
    /// Number of recovery shards (`n - k`).
    m: usize,
    /// Width of every shard, in bytes.
    shard_len: usize,
    /// Commitment that the reconstructed codeword must reproduce.
    root: &'a H::Digest,
    /// Caller strategy used for reconstruction and shard hashing.
    strategy: &'a S,
}

/// Striped Reed-Solomon: split every shard by byte range and run independent Reed-Solomon
/// operations over those ranges. A whole-input run codes one stripe that spans the whole shard.
///
/// ```text
///   originals:
///     O0: [ stripe 0 ][ stripe 1 ][ tail ]
///     O1: [ stripe 0 ][ stripe 1 ][ tail ]
///     O(k-1): [ stripe 0 ][ stripe 1 ][ tail ]
///
///   encode stripe 0 -> R0[0], R1[0], more recoveries
///   encode stripe 1 -> R0[1], R1[1], more recoveries
///   encode tail     -> R0[t], R1[t], more recoveries
///
///   recovery Ri = concat(Ri[0], Ri[1], Ri[t])
/// ```
///
/// Both decode paths reuse this per-stripe layout. With all originals present,
/// [`decode`](striped::decode) re-encodes the recovery stripes and verifies them against the
/// commitment. With an original missing, [`decode_reveal`](striped::decode_reveal)
/// feeds exactly `k` shards and recovers the missing original and recovery stripes from the same
/// Reed-Solomon decode (no re-encode).
///
/// Each stripe task codes its range in tiles that target [`MAX_TILE_WORK_BYTES`] of transform
/// storage. Tiles start on [`SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES`] boundaries, so tiling does not change the coded
/// bytes.
mod striped {
    use super::*;

    /// Split a stripe `range` into the tiles that code it.
    ///
    /// The transform holds at most `2 * (k + m).next_power_of_two()` shards, so the target tile
    /// width is the number of blocks whose transform storage fits in [`MAX_TILE_WORK_BYTES`],
    /// and at least one. A partial final block counts as a block, since the engine pads it to a
    /// whole one. A stripe with fewer than twice the target blocks is one tile. Otherwise its
    /// blocks spread over the fewest tiles within the target, with widths that differ by at most
    /// one block, and the partial final block ends the last tile. Every tile but the last ends
    /// on a symbol-block boundary (see [`byte_ranges`]).
    ///
    /// The decoder's sixteen-shard AVX-512 derivative leaf skips shards whose padded length is a
    /// multiple of 4 KiB. A split into several tiles therefore adds tiles until no tile has such
    /// a length.
    pub(super) fn tiles(
        k: usize,
        m: usize,
        range: Range<usize>,
    ) -> impl Iterator<Item = Range<usize>> {
        let work_count = 2 * (k + m).next_power_of_two();
        let target = (MAX_TILE_WORK_BYTES / (work_count * SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES)).max(1);
        let blocks = range.len().div_ceil(SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES);
        let mut count = if blocks < 2 * target {
            1
        } else {
            blocks.div_ceil(target)
        };
        let page = 4096 / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES;
        while count > 1 && count < blocks {
            let (width, extra) = (blocks / count, blocks % count);
            if !width.is_multiple_of(page) && (extra == 0 || !(width + 1).is_multiple_of(page)) {
                break;
            }
            count += 1;
        }

        // Tile `i` holds `width` blocks, plus one more for the first `extra` tiles. The last tile
        // ends at `end`, so its final block may be partial.
        let (width, extra) = (blocks / count, blocks % count);
        let (start, end) = (range.start, range.end);
        let edge = move |i: usize| start + (i * width + i.min(extra)) * SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES;
        (0..count).map(move |i| edge(i)..if i + 1 == count { end } else { edge(i + 1) })
    }

    /// Split a shard-major buffer (`num_shards * shard_len`) into one group of mutable column
    /// slices per stripe range: `groups[s][shard]` is bytes `ranges[s]` of shard `shard`. Using
    /// `chunks_mut` + `split_at_mut` hands each parallel stripe task genuine, provably-disjoint
    /// `&mut [u8]` slices, so the tasks fill the shared buffer without `unsafe`.
    pub(super) fn stripe_columns<'a>(
        buf: &'a mut [u8],
        shard_len: usize,
        ranges: &[Range<usize>],
    ) -> Vec<Vec<&'a mut [u8]>> {
        let mut groups: Vec<Vec<&'a mut [u8]>> = ranges.iter().map(|_| Vec::new()).collect();
        for shard in buf.chunks_mut(shard_len) {
            let mut rest = shard;
            for (group, range) in groups.iter_mut().zip(ranges) {
                let (head, tail) = rest.split_at_mut(range.len());
                group.push(head);
                rest = tail;
            }
        }
        groups
    }

    /// The output column slices a recover-all stripe task writes into: one mutable slice per
    /// missing original and per missing recovery (paired by position with [`Missing`]).
    struct StripeOut<'a> {
        originals: Vec<&'a mut [u8]>,
        recoveries: Vec<&'a mut [u8]>,
    }

    /// The shard indices a stripe task must reconstruct (paired by position with [`StripeOut`]).
    #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
    struct Missing<'a> {
        originals: &'a [usize],
        recoveries: &'a [usize],
    }

    /// The shards a recover-all stripe task decodes from, with the [`Plan`] built from
    /// their indices.
    #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
    struct Provided<'a> {
        originals: &'a [(usize, &'a [u8])],
        recoveries: &'a [(usize, &'a [u8])],
        plan: &'a Plan,
    }

    /// Convert batches of complete symbol blocks into byte ranges, attaching any partial
    /// final block to the last batch.
    ///
    /// Every non-final stripe ends on a [`SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES`] boundary: the engine lays
    /// shards out in symbol blocks of that width (a partial final block is padded
    /// internally), so a boundary in the middle of a block would change the bytes each
    /// sub-instance encodes.
    pub(super) fn byte_ranges(
        shard_len: usize,
        mut ranges: Vec<Range<usize>>,
    ) -> Vec<Range<usize>> {
        let full_blocks = shard_len / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES;
        for range in &mut ranges {
            range.start *= SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES;
            range.end = if range.end == full_blocks {
                shard_len
            } else {
                range.end * SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES
            };
        }
        ranges
    }

    /// Reconstruct a single stripe's missing shards from exactly `k` provided shards, reading
    /// both missing originals and missing recoveries straight out of the decoder (the decode
    /// reveals all positions), so no separate re-encode is needed. Writes each restored shard's
    /// stripe into the matching `out.originals` / `out.recoveries` column slice.
    ///
    /// Every tile decodes with `provided.plan`.
    fn recover_all_into(
        k: usize,
        m: usize,
        range: Range<usize>,
        provided: Provided<'_>,
        missing: Missing<'_>,
        mut out: StripeOut<'_>,
    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
        if range.is_empty() {
            return Ok(());
        }
        let offset = range.start;
        let mut tiles = tiles(k, m, range).peekable();
        let mut len = tiles.peek().expect("a nonempty stripe has a tile").len();
        let mut decoder = Cached::take(
            &CACHED_DECODER,
            || Decoder::new(k, m, len),
            |dec| dec.reset(k, m, len),
        )
        .map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?;

        // Dropping a decode result clears the received shards, so a tile of the configured length
        // reuses the decoder as is and a tile of another length resets it. The plan does not
        // depend on shard length, so every tile shares it.
        for tile in tiles {
            let local = tile.start - offset..tile.end - offset;
            if tile.len() != len {
                len = tile.len();
                decoder.reset(k, m, len).map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?;
            }

            for (idx, shard) in provided.originals {
                decoder
                    .add_original_shard(*idx, &shard[tile.clone()])
                    .map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?;
            }
            for (idx, shard) in provided.recoveries {
                decoder
                    .add_recovery_shard(*idx, &shard[tile.clone()])
                    .map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?;
            }
            let decoding = decoder
                .decode_with_recovery_plan(provided.plan)
                .map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?
                .expect("decode runs only when an original is missing");

            for (slot, &idx) in out.originals.iter_mut().zip(missing.originals) {
                let shard = decoding.original(idx).ok_or(Error::Inconsistent)?;
                slot[local.clone()].copy_from_slice(shard);
            }
            for (slot, &idx) in out.recoveries.iter_mut().zip(missing.recoveries) {
                let shard = decoding.recovery(idx).ok_or(Error::Inconsistent)?;
                slot[local.clone()].copy_from_slice(shard);
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Encode the recovery shards for a single stripe, writing each recovery shard's stripe
    /// into the matching `out` column slice (one slot per recovery shard, in index order).
    pub(super) fn encode_recovery_into(
        k: usize,
        m: usize,
        range: Range<usize>,
        originals: &[impl AsRef<[u8]>],
        mut out: Vec<&mut [u8]>,
    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
        if range.is_empty() {
            return Ok(());
        }
        let offset = range.start;
        let mut tiles = tiles(k, m, range).peekable();
        let mut len = tiles.peek().expect("a nonempty stripe has a tile").len();
        let mut encoder = Cached::take(
            &CACHED_ENCODER,
            || Encoder::new(k, m, len),
            |enc| enc.reset(k, m, len),
        )
        .map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?;

        // Dropping an encode result clears the added originals, so a tile of the configured length
        // reuses the encoder as is and a tile of another length resets it.
        for tile in tiles {
            let local = tile.start - offset..tile.end - offset;
            if tile.len() != len {
                len = tile.len();
                encoder.reset(k, m, len).map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?;
            }

            for shard in originals.iter().take(k) {
                let shard = shard.as_ref();
                encoder
                    .add_original_shard(&shard[tile.clone()])
                    .map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?;
            }
            let encoding = encoder.encode().map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?;
            for (slot, shard) in out.iter_mut().zip(encoding.recovery_iter()) {
                slot[local.clone()].copy_from_slice(shard);
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Decode when all `k` originals are present: re-encode the recovery shards (recovery with
    /// missing originals uses [`decode_reveal`]), confirm any provided recovery shards
    /// match the canonical re-encode, and verify the rebuilt commitment against `ctx.root`.
    pub(super) fn decode<'a, H: Hasher, S: Strategy>(
        ctx: &DecodeCtx<'_, H, S>,
        batches: Batches<'_, S>,
        shard_digests: Vec<Option<H::Digest>>,
        provided_originals: Vec<(usize, &'a [u8])>,
        provided_recoveries: Vec<(usize, &'a [u8])>,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
        let &DecodeCtx {
            k, m, shard_len, ..
        } = ctx;

        let mut original_refs: Vec<&[u8]> = vec![&[]; k];
        for &(idx, shard) in &provided_originals {
            original_refs[idx] = shard;
        }

        // Re-encode all recovery shards from the originals, one stripe per task.
        let mut recovery_buf = vec![0u8; m * shard_len];
        batches.try_map_collect_vec(
            |ranges| {
                let ranges = byte_ranges(shard_len, ranges);
                let groups = stripe_columns(&mut recovery_buf, shard_len, &ranges);
                ranges.into_iter().zip(groups)
            },
            |(range, out)| encode_recovery_into(k, m, range, &original_refs, out),
        )?;
        let recovery_refs: Vec<&[u8]> = recovery_buf.chunks_exact(shard_len).collect();
        verify_reencoded::<H, S>(
            ctx,
            shard_digests,
            &original_refs,
            &recovery_refs,
            &provided_recoveries,
        )
    }

    /// Decode when an original is missing: recover the missing originals AND read the missing
    /// recoveries straight out of the same decode (the decode reveals every position), so no
    /// separate re-encode is needed. The caller feeds exactly `k` shards (surplus recoveries
    /// were trimmed and their digests cleared), so the trimmed positions are reconstructed
    /// here and bound by the commitment root check like any other missing shard. No
    /// provided-recovery comparison is needed: every reconstructed shard is the unique RS
    /// output for the `k` inputs, and the root check alone binds it to the commitment.
    pub(super) fn decode_reveal<'a, H: Hasher, S: Strategy>(
        ctx: &DecodeCtx<'_, H, S>,
        batches: Batches<'_, S>,
        shard_digests: Vec<Option<H::Digest>>,
        provided_originals: Vec<(usize, &'a [u8])>,
        provided_recoveries: Vec<(usize, &'a [u8])>,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
        let &DecodeCtx {
            k, m, shard_len, ..
        } = ctx;

        let missing_originals = shard_digests
            .iter()
            .take(k)
            .enumerate()
            .filter_map(|(i, digest)| digest.is_none().then_some(i))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let missing_recoveries = shard_digests
            .iter()
            .skip(k)
            .enumerate()
            .filter_map(|(i, digest)| digest.is_none().then_some(i))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        let mut restored_originals = vec![0u8; missing_originals.len() * shard_len];
        let mut restored_recoveries = vec![0u8; missing_recoveries.len() * shard_len];

        // Erasure coefficients depend only on the shard counts and provided indices, so every
        // stripe shares one plan.
        let plan = Plan::new(
            k,
            m,
            provided_originals.iter().map(|&(index, _)| index),
            provided_recoveries.iter().map(|&(index, _)| index),
        )
        .map_err(Error::ReedSolomon)?;
        let provided = Provided {
            originals: &provided_originals,
            recoveries: &provided_recoveries,
            plan: &plan,
        };
        let missing = Missing {
            originals: &missing_originals,
            recoveries: &missing_recoveries,
        };
        batches.try_map_collect_vec(
            |ranges| {
                let ranges = byte_ranges(shard_len, ranges);
                let original_groups = stripe_columns(&mut restored_originals, shard_len, &ranges);
                let recovery_groups = stripe_columns(&mut restored_recoveries, shard_len, &ranges);
                ranges
                    .into_iter()
                    .zip(original_groups.into_iter().zip(recovery_groups))
                    .map(|(range, (originals, recoveries))| {
                        (
                            range,
                            StripeOut {
                                originals,
                                recoveries,
                            },
                        )
                    })
            },
            |(range, out)| recover_all_into(k, m, range, provided, missing, out),
        )?;

        let mut original_refs: Vec<&[u8]> = vec![&[]; k];
        for &(idx, shard) in &provided_originals {
            original_refs[idx] = shard;
        }
        for (pos, idx) in missing_originals.iter().enumerate() {
            let start = pos * shard_len;
            original_refs[*idx] = &restored_originals[start..start + shard_len];
        }
        let mut recovery_refs: Vec<&[u8]> = vec![&[]; m];
        for (pos, idx) in missing_recoveries.iter().enumerate() {
            let start = pos * shard_len;
            recovery_refs[*idx] = &restored_recoveries[start..start + shard_len];
        }

        if provided_originals.is_empty() {
            // Supplied originals fill their digest slots. With none supplied,
            // missing_originals covers 0..k in order, so the owned buffer is in shard
            // order. Verify the complete codeword before moving its payload.
            let data_len = validate_data_layout(&original_refs, shard_len)?;
            verify_commitment::<H, S>(ctx, shard_digests, &original_refs, &recovery_refs)?;
            restored_originals.copy_within(u32::SIZE..u32::SIZE + data_len, 0);
            restored_originals.truncate(data_len);
            Ok(restored_originals)
        } else {
            verify_root::<H, S>(ctx, shard_digests, &original_refs, &recovery_refs)
        }
    }
}

/// Extract and validate the payload from borrowed original shards, then verify the commitment
/// to the complete codeword.
fn verify_root<H: Hasher, S: Strategy>(
    ctx: &DecodeCtx<'_, H, S>,
    shard_digests: Vec<Option<H::Digest>>,
    originals: &[&[u8]],
    recoveries: &[&[u8]],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
    let data = extract_data(originals, ctx.k, ctx.shard_len)?;
    verify_commitment::<H, S>(ctx, shard_digests, originals, recoveries)?;
    Ok(data)
}

/// Hash reconstructed shards and verify the commitment to the complete codeword.
fn verify_commitment<H: Hasher, S: Strategy>(
    ctx: &DecodeCtx<'_, H, S>,
    mut shard_digests: Vec<Option<H::Digest>>,
    originals: &[&[u8]],
    recoveries: &[&[u8]],
) -> Result<(), Error> {
    let &DecodeCtx {
        n,
        k,
        root,
        strategy,
        ..
    } = ctx;
    let (missing_indices, missing_payloads): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = shard_digests
        .iter()
        .enumerate()
        .filter(|(_, digest)| digest.is_none())
        .map(|(i, _)| {
            (
                i,
                if i < k {
                    originals[i]
                } else {
                    recoveries[i - k]
                },
            )
        })
        .unzip();
    for (i, digest) in missing_indices
        .into_iter()
        .zip(H::hash_many(&missing_payloads, strategy))
    {
        shard_digests[i] = Some(digest);
    }

    let mut builder = Builder::<H>::new(n);
    shard_digests
        .into_iter()
        .map(|digest| digest.expect("digest must be present for every shard"))
        .for_each(|digest| {
            builder.add(&digest);
        });
    let tree = builder.build();
    if tree.root() != *root {
        return Err(Error::Inconsistent);
    }

    Ok(())
}

/// All-originals verification: confirm any provided recovery shards match the canonical re-encode
/// `recoveries` before their digests are trusted, then verify the commitment via [`verify_root`].
/// This compare is what rejects a malicious encoder's non-canonical recovery shard when every
/// original is present; with an original missing, the decode binds the recoveries instead.
fn verify_reencoded<H: Hasher, S: Strategy>(
    ctx: &DecodeCtx<'_, H, S>,
    shard_digests: Vec<Option<H::Digest>>,
    originals: &[&[u8]],
    recoveries: &[&[u8]],
    provided_recoveries: &[(usize, &[u8])],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
    // Provided originals are already bound to the commitment by their checked digests.
    for &(idx, shard) in provided_recoveries {
        if shard != recoveries[idx] {
            return Err(Error::Inconsistent);
        }
    }
    verify_root::<H, S>(ctx, shard_digests, originals, recoveries)
}

/// Decode data from a set of [`CheckedChunk`]s.
///
/// It is assumed that all chunks have already been verified against the given root using
/// [`Scheme::check`].
///
/// # Parameters
///
/// - `total`: The total number of chunks to generate.
/// - `min`: The minimum number of chunks required to decode the data.
/// - `root`: The root of the [`bmt`].
/// - `chunks`: [`CheckedChunk`]s of encoded data (that can be proven against `root`)
///
/// # Returns
///
/// - `data`: The decoded data.
fn decode<'a, H: Hasher, S: Strategy>(
    total: u16,
    min: u16,
    root: &H::Digest,
    chunks: impl Iterator<Item = &'a CheckedChunk<H>>,
    strategy: &S,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
    // Validate parameters
    assert!(total > min);
    assert!(min > 0);
    let n = total as usize;
    let k = min as usize;
    let m = n - k;

    // Reject unsupported shard counts before allocating any buffer.
    validate_counts(k, m)?;
    let mut chunks = chunks.peekable();
    let Some(first) = chunks.peek() else {
        return Err(Error::NotEnoughChunks);
    };

    // Process checked chunks
    let shard_len = first.shard.len();
    if !codeword_fits(n, shard_len) {
        return Err(RsError::InvalidShardSize {
            shard_bytes: shard_len,
        }
        .into());
    }
    let mut shard_digests: Vec<Option<H::Digest>> = vec![None; n];
    let mut provided_originals: Vec<(usize, &[u8])> = Vec::new();
    let mut provided_recoveries: Vec<(usize, &[u8])> = Vec::new();
    let mut provided = 0usize;
    for chunk in chunks {
        provided += 1;
        if &chunk.root != root {
            return Err(Error::CommitmentMismatch);
        }

        // Every shard must share the first shard's width. The striped decode path slices
        // each shard by stripe range, so a wrong-width shard would otherwise panic.
        if chunk.shard.len() != shard_len {
            return Err(Error::Inconsistent);
        }

        // Check for duplicate index
        let index = chunk.index;
        if index >= total {
            return Err(Error::InvalidIndex(index));
        }
        let digest_slot = &mut shard_digests[index as usize];
        if digest_slot.is_some() {
            return Err(Error::DuplicateIndex(index));
        }

        // Retain the checked digest and split provided bytes by shard type
        *digest_slot = Some(chunk.digest);
        if index < min {
            provided_originals.push((index as usize, chunk.shard.as_ref()));
        } else {
            provided_recoveries.push((index as usize - k, chunk.shard.as_ref()));
        }
    }
    if provided < k {
        return Err(Error::NotEnoughChunks);
    }

    // Feed the Reed-Solomon decoder exactly `k` shards. Only `k` original positions exist, so
    // originals are never redundant; when an original is missing, trim surplus recovery shards
    // beyond the `k - originals` needed to decode. Their checked digests are dropped and their
    // bytes forgotten, so the reconstruction rebuilds those positions and the commitment root
    // check binds them. This verifies extra shards without over-feeding the decoder or a
    // separate canonical re-encode/compare.
    let recovery_needed = provided_originals.len() < k;
    if recovery_needed {
        let keep = k - provided_originals.len();
        for &(idx, _) in &provided_recoveries[keep..] {
            shard_digests[k + idx] = None;
        }
        provided_recoveries.truncate(keep);
    }

    let ctx = DecodeCtx {
        n,
        k,
        m,
        shard_len,
        root,
        strategy,
    };

    // Distinct call sites keep the reconstruction algorithms' cost estimates separate.
    if recovery_needed {
        strategy.try_run_batches(
            shard_len / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES,
            NZUsize!(MIN_STRIPE_BYTES / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES),
            SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES * n,
            |batches| {
                striped::decode_reveal::<H, S>(
                    &ctx,
                    batches,
                    shard_digests,
                    provided_originals,
                    provided_recoveries,
                )
            },
        )
    } else {
        strategy.try_run_batches(
            shard_len / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES,
            NZUsize!(MIN_STRIPE_BYTES / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES),
            SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES * n,
            |batches| {
                striped::decode::<H, S>(
                    &ctx,
                    batches,
                    shard_digests,
                    provided_originals,
                    provided_recoveries,
                )
            },
        )
    }
}

/// A SIMD-optimized Reed-Solomon coder that emits chunks that can be proven against a [`bmt`].
///
/// # Behavior
///
/// The encoder takes input data, splits it into `k` data shards, and generates `m` recovery
/// shards using [Reed-Solomon encoding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reed%E2%80%93Solomon_error_correction).
/// All `n = k + m` shards are then used to build a [`bmt`], producing a single root hash. Each shard
/// is packaged as a chunk containing the shard data, its index, and a Merkle multi-proof against the [`bmt`] root.
///
/// ## Encoding
///
/// ```text
///               +--------------------------------------+
///               |         Original Data (Bytes)        |
///               +--------------------------------------+
///                                  |
///                                  v
///               +--------------------------------------+
///               | [Length Prefix | Original Data...]   |
///               +--------------------------------------+
///                                  |
///                                  v
///              +----------+ +----------+    +-----------+
///              |  Shard 0 | |  Shard 1 | .. | Shard k-1 |  (Data Shards)
///              +----------+ +----------+    +-----------+
///                     |            |             |
///                     |            |             |
///                     +------------+-------------+
///                                  |
///                                  v
///                        +------------------+
///                        | Reed-Solomon     |
///                        | Encoder (k, m)   |
///                        +------------------+
///                                  |
///                                  v
///              +----------+ +----------+    +-----------+
///              |  Shard k | | Shard k+1| .. | Shard n-1 |  (Recovery Shards)
///              +----------+ +----------+    +-----------+
/// ```
///
/// ## Merkle Tree Construction
///
/// All `n` shards (data and recovery) are hashed and used as leaves to build a [`bmt`].
///
/// ```text
/// Shards:    [Shard 0, Shard 1, ..., Shard n-1]
///             |        |              |
///             v        v              v
/// Hashes:    [H(S_0), H(S_1), ..., H(S_n-1)]
///             \       / \       /
///              \     /   \     /
///               +---+     +---+
///                 |         |
///                 \         /
///                  \       /
///                   +-----+
///                      |
///                      v
///                +----------+
///                |   Root   |
///                +----------+
/// ```
///
/// The final output is the [`bmt`] root and a set of `n` chunks.
///
/// `(Root, [Chunk 0, Chunk 1, ..., Chunk n-1])`
///
/// Each chunk contains:
/// - `shard`: The shard data (original or recovery).
/// - `index`: The shard's original index (0 to n-1).
/// - `proof`: A Merkle multi-proof of the shard's inclusion in the [`bmt`].
///
/// ## Decoding and Verification
///
/// The decoder requires any `k` chunks to reconstruct the original data.
/// 1. Each chunk's Merkle multi-proof is verified against the [`bmt`] root.
/// 2. Exactly `k` shards are fed to the Reed-Solomon decoder (any surplus chunks are
///    redundant), which reconstructs the full codeword: the missing data shards and the
///    missing recovery shards both come out of the same decode. When all `k` data shards are
///    already present there is nothing to decode, so the recovery shards are re-encoded
///    instead.
/// 3. To ensure consistency, a new [`bmt`] root is generated over the full reconstructed
///    codeword. This new root MUST match the original [`bmt`] root. This prevents attacks
///    where an adversary provides a valid set of chunks that decode to different data, and
///    binds any surplus chunks (which are rebuilt from the reconstruction, not trusted).
/// 4. If the roots match, the original data is extracted from the reconstructed data shards.
///
/// Decoding is all-or-nothing per commitment. A successful decode proves that the committed
/// codeword is the canonical encoding of the returned data under this [`Config`], so every set
/// of at least `k` shards checked against that commitment decodes to the same data. A
/// commitment that is not the canonical encoding of any payload fails for every such set.
///
/// ## Supported Configurations
///
/// With `k = minimum_shards` and `m = extra_shards`, the total `k + m` must fit in a `u16`, and
/// larger totals return [`Error::TooManyTotalShards`]. The coder works over GF(2^16) and also
/// requires `min(k, m).next_power_of_two() + max(k, m)` to be at most 65536. Totals that fit but
/// fail this condition return [`Error::ReedSolomon`] carrying
/// [`UnsupportedShardCount`](RsError::UnsupportedShardCount).
///
/// The canonical shard width is the payload length plus its four-byte prefix, divided by `k`
/// and rounded up to an even number of bytes. Encoding returns [`Error::InvalidDataLength`] when
/// the payload length or that width exceeds `u32::MAX` (with `k` of one, the five largest payload
/// lengths) or when `k + m` shards of that width exceed [`MAX_ALLOCATION_BYTES`].
///
/// ## Resource Usage
///
/// Encoding and decoding hold all `k + m` shards of the codeword in memory, along with the Merkle
/// tree over those shards and a bounded per-thread coding workspace. At the canonical width, the
/// codeword is about `(k + m) / k` times the payload. Encoding also returns a Merkle proof for
/// every shard.
///
/// Decoding reconstructs the `m` shards beyond the `k` it decodes from and rebuilds the
/// commitment over all of them, so even the minimum `k` shards cost the full codeword. With `k`
/// of one and `m` of 65,534, decoding a single shard reconstructs and hashes 65,534 shards of
/// its width.
///
/// Callers that accept a [`Config`] or shards from an untrusted source must bound the shard counts
/// and the maximum payload length before encoding or decoding. Reading a [`Scheme::Shard`] takes
/// the same maximum and rejects any shard wider than the canonical width of a maximum-length
/// payload.
pub struct ReedSolomon<H> {
    _marker: PhantomData<H>,
}

impl<H> Clone for ReedSolomon<H> {
    fn clone(&self) -> Self {
        *self
    }
}

impl<H> Copy for ReedSolomon<H> {}

impl<H> std::fmt::Debug for ReedSolomon<H> {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        f.debug_struct("ReedSolomon").finish()
    }
}

impl<H: Hasher> Scheme for ReedSolomon<H> {
    type Commitment = H::Digest;
    type Shard = Chunk<H::Digest>;
    type CheckedShard = CheckedChunk<H>;
    type Error = Error;

    /// Returns an upper bound on the encoded size of any chunk [`Scheme::encode`] produces under
    /// `config` from at most `data` bytes.
    ///
    /// # Panics
    ///
    /// Panics if `config` cannot encode `data` bytes: its total exceeds `u16::MAX` shards, the
    /// backend does not support its shard counts, `data` or the shard width exceeds `u32::MAX`,
    /// or the codeword exceeds [`MAX_ALLOCATION_BYTES`].
    fn max_shard_size(config: &Config, data: usize) -> usize {
        // Reject the shard counts, payload lengths, and codeword sizes that `encode` rejects.
        let total = total_shards(config).expect("total shards must fit in u16");
        let n = usize::from(total);
        let k = usize::from(config.minimum_shards.get());
        validate_counts(k, n - k).expect("backend must support the shard counts");
        u32::try_from(data).expect("data must fit the u32 length prefix");
        let len = canonical_shard_len(data, k);
        assert!(
            codeword_fits(n, len),
            "codeword must fit the allocation bound"
        );

        // Every chunk carries a shard of the canonical width, and `Chunk::max_encode_size`
        // rejects a width too long for its length prefix, as `encode` does. Chunk 0 has a sibling
        // at every level of the tree, so its proof is the longest.
        let siblings: usize = Widen::widen(u32::from(total).next_power_of_two().trailing_zeros());
        Chunk::<H::Digest>::max_encode_size(len, siblings)
    }

    fn encode(
        config: &Config,
        data: impl bytes::Buf,
        strategy: &impl Strategy,
    ) -> Result<(Self::Commitment, Vec<Self::Shard>), Self::Error> {
        encode::<H, _>(
            total_shards(config)?,
            config.minimum_shards.get(),
            data,
            strategy,
        )
    }

    fn check(
        config: &Config,
        commitment: &Self::Commitment,
        index: u16,
        shard: &Self::Shard,
        strategy: &impl Strategy,
    ) -> Result<Self::CheckedShard, Self::Error> {
        let total = total_shards(config)?;
        check_chunk::<H>(total, commitment, index, shard, || {
            H::hash_across(&[&shard.shard], strategy)
        })
    }

    fn check_many(
        config: &Config,
        commitment: &Self::Commitment,
        shards: &[(u16, &Self::Shard)],
        strategy: &impl Strategy,
    ) -> Vec<Result<Self::CheckedShard, Self::Error>> {
        let Ok(total) = total_shards(config) else {
            return shards
                .iter()
                .map(|&(index, shard)| Self::check(config, commitment, index, shard, strategy))
                .collect();
        };

        // Per-shard checks reject invalid metadata before hashing and let the strategy
        // distribute uneven payloads independently.
        let width = shards.first().map_or(0, |(_, shard)| shard.shard.len());
        if shards.iter().any(|&(index, shard)| {
            shard.shard.len() != width || check_metadata(total, index, shard).is_err()
        }) {
            return strategy.map_collect_vec(shards, |&(index, shard)| {
                Self::check(config, commitment, index, shard, strategy)
            });
        }

        let payloads = shards
            .iter()
            .map(|(_, shard)| shard.shard.as_ref())
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let digests = H::hash_many(&payloads, strategy);
        strategy.map_collect_vec(
            shards.iter().copied().zip(digests),
            |((index, shard), digest)| check_chunk::<H>(total, commitment, index, shard, || digest),
        )
    }

    fn decode<'a>(
        config: &Config,
        commitment: &Self::Commitment,
        shards: impl Iterator<Item = &'a Self::CheckedShard>,
        strategy: &impl Strategy,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Self::Error> {
        decode::<H, _>(
            total_shards(config)?,
            config.minimum_shards.get(),
            commitment,
            shards,
            strategy,
        )
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use bytes::Buf as _;
    use commonware_codec::{Decode as _, Encode, MaxEncodeSize, varint::UInt};
    use commonware_cryptography::{Sha256, sha256::Digest as Sha256Digest};
    use commonware_invariants::minifuzz;
    use commonware_parallel::{
        Rayon, Sequential,
        mocks::{Explorer, explore, inline},
    };
    use commonware_runtime::iobuf::EncodeExt;
    use commonware_utils::{NZU16, NZUsize};
    use rstest::rstest;
    use std::{any::TypeId, cell::RefCell};

    type RS = ReedSolomon<Sha256>;
    type InstrumentedRS = ReedSolomon<InstrumentedSha256>;
    const STRATEGY: Sequential = Sequential;
    const FUZZ_MAX_MIN_SHARDS: u16 = 8;
    const FUZZ_MAX_EXTRA_SHARDS: u16 = 8;
    const FUZZ_MAX_DATA_LEN: usize = 256;
    const FUZZ_MAX_EXTRA_SHARD_WIDTH: usize = 16;

    std::thread_local! {
        static HASH_MANY_CALLS: RefCell<Vec<Vec<Vec<u8>>>> = const { RefCell::new(Vec::new()) };
        static HASH_INPUTS: RefCell<Vec<Vec<u8>>> = const { RefCell::new(Vec::new()) };
    }

    #[derive(Default)]
    struct InstrumentedSha256(Sha256);

    impl Hasher for InstrumentedSha256 {
        type Digest = <Sha256 as Hasher>::Digest;

        fn hash(parts: &[&[u8]]) -> Self::Digest {
            if let [message] = parts {
                HASH_INPUTS.with(|inputs| inputs.borrow_mut().push(message.to_vec()));
            }
            Sha256::hash(parts)
        }

        fn hash_pair(
            left: &[&[u8]],
            right: &[&[u8]],
            strategy: &impl Strategy,
        ) -> (Self::Digest, Self::Digest) {
            Sha256::hash_pair(left, right, strategy)
        }

        fn hash_many<M: AsRef<[u8]> + Sync>(
            messages: &[M],
            _strategy: &impl Strategy,
        ) -> Vec<Self::Digest> {
            HASH_INPUTS.with(|inputs| {
                inputs
                    .borrow_mut()
                    .extend(messages.iter().map(|message| message.as_ref().to_vec()));
            });
            HASH_MANY_CALLS.with(|calls| {
                calls.borrow_mut().push(
                    messages
                        .iter()
                        .map(|message| message.as_ref().to_vec())
                        .collect(),
                );
            });
            messages
                .iter()
                .map(|message| Sha256::hash(&[message.as_ref()]))
                .collect()
        }

        fn update(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) -> &mut Self {
            self.0.update(bytes);
            self
        }

        fn finalize(self) -> (Self, Self::Digest) {
            let (hasher, digest) = self.0.finalize();
            (Self(hasher), digest)
        }
    }

    fn reset_hash_many_calls() {
        HASH_INPUTS.with(|inputs| inputs.borrow_mut().clear());
        HASH_MANY_CALLS.with(|calls| calls.borrow_mut().clear());
    }

    fn take_hash_many_calls() -> Vec<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
        HASH_MANY_CALLS.with(|calls| std::mem::take(&mut *calls.borrow_mut()))
    }

    fn checked(
        root: <Sha256 as Hasher>::Digest,
        chunk: Chunk<<Sha256 as Hasher>::Digest>,
    ) -> CheckedChunk<Sha256> {
        let Chunk { shard, index, .. } = chunk;
        let digest = Sha256::hash(&[&shard]);
        CheckedChunk::new(root, shard, index, digest)
    }

    fn build_chunks(
        shards: &[Vec<u8>],
    ) -> (
        <Sha256 as Hasher>::Digest,
        Vec<Chunk<<Sha256 as Hasher>::Digest>>,
    ) {
        let mut builder = Builder::<Sha256>::new(shards.len());
        for shard in shards {
            builder.add(&Sha256::hash(&[shard]));
        }
        let tree = builder.build();
        let root = tree.root();
        let chunks = shards
            .iter()
            .enumerate()
            .map(|(i, shard)| {
                let proof = tree.proof(i as u32).unwrap();
                Chunk::new(shard.clone().into(), i as u16, proof)
            })
            .collect();

        (root, chunks)
    }

    /// Decoding trusts a checked shard's stored digest, so two hashers with the same digest type
    /// must have distinct checked shard types.
    #[test]
    fn test_checked_shard_type_is_bound_to_hasher() {
        assert_eq!(
            TypeId::of::<<RS as Scheme>::Commitment>(),
            TypeId::of::<<InstrumentedRS as Scheme>::Commitment>()
        );
        assert_ne!(
            TypeId::of::<<RS as Scheme>::CheckedShard>(),
            TypeId::of::<<InstrumentedRS as Scheme>::CheckedShard>()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_check_many_batches_payloads_in_input_order() {
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(4),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(4),
        };
        let (root, chunks) =
            RS::encode(&config, b"ordered batch checking".as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let requested = [3u16, 0, 6, 2];
        let shards = requested
            .iter()
            .map(|&index| (index, &chunks[usize::from(index)]))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let expected_payloads = requested
            .iter()
            .map(|&index| chunks[usize::from(index)].shard.to_vec())
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        reset_hash_many_calls();
        let checked = InstrumentedRS::check_many(&config, &root, &shards, &STRATEGY)
            .into_iter()
            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
            .unwrap();

        assert_eq!(take_hash_many_calls(), vec![expected_payloads]);
        assert_eq!(
            checked.iter().map(|chunk| chunk.index).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
            requested
        );
        for (checked, &index) in checked.iter().zip(&requested) {
            let scalar = InstrumentedRS::check(
                &config,
                &root,
                index,
                &chunks[usize::from(index)],
                &STRATEGY,
            )
            .unwrap();
            assert_eq!(checked, &scalar);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_instrumented_encode_matches_sha256_commitment_and_wire() {
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(5),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(7),
        };
        let data = (0..4096).map(|i| i as u8).collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let (expected_root, expected_chunks) =
            RS::encode(&config, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        reset_hash_many_calls();
        let (actual_root, actual_chunks) =
            InstrumentedRS::encode(&config, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(actual_root, expected_root);
        assert_eq!(actual_chunks, expected_chunks);
        assert_eq!(
            actual_chunks.iter().map(Encode::encode).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
            expected_chunks
                .iter()
                .map(Encode::encode)
                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        );
        let calls = take_hash_many_calls();
        assert_eq!(calls.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(calls[0].len(), config.total_shards() as usize);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_decode_reuses_checked_digests_and_rehashes_trimmed_surplus() {
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(3),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(3),
        };
        let data = (0..1024).map(|i| (i * 7) as u8).collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let (root, chunks) = InstrumentedRS::encode(&config, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let checked = InstrumentedRS::check_many(
            &config,
            &root,
            &(0..6u16)
                .map(|index| (index, &chunks[usize::from(index)]))
                .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
            &STRATEGY,
        )
        .into_iter()
        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
        .unwrap();
        let selected = [&checked[0], &checked[3], &checked[4], &checked[5]];

        reset_hash_many_calls();
        let decoded =
            InstrumentedRS::decode(&config, &root, selected.into_iter(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
        assert_eq!(
            take_hash_many_calls(),
            vec![vec![
                chunks[1].shard.to_vec(),
                chunks[2].shard.to_vec(),
                chunks[5].shard.to_vec(),
            ]]
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_check_many_rejects_metadata_before_hashing() {
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(3),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(3),
        };
        let data = (0..192).map(|i| i as u8).collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let (root, chunks) = RS::encode(&config, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let mut invalid_index = chunks[1].clone();
        invalid_index.index = 5;
        invalid_index.shard = vec![0xa1; chunks[1].shard.len()].into();
        let mut invalid_leaf_count = chunks[2].clone();
        invalid_leaf_count.proof.leaf_count -= 1;
        invalid_leaf_count.shard = vec![0xb2; chunks[2].shard.len()].into();
        let mut out_of_range = chunks[3].clone();
        out_of_range.shard = vec![0xc3; chunks[3].shard.len()].into();
        let mut invalid_proof = chunks[4].clone();
        invalid_proof.shard = vec![0xd4; chunks[4].shard.len()].into();
        let shards = [
            (1, &invalid_index),
            (0, &chunks[0]),
            (2, &invalid_leaf_count),
            (6, &out_of_range),
            (4, &invalid_proof),
        ];
        let expected = shards
            .iter()
            .map(|&(index, shard)| {
                format!("{:?}", RS::check(&config, &root, index, shard, &STRATEGY))
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        reset_hash_many_calls();
        let actual = InstrumentedRS::check_many(&config, &root, &shards, &STRATEGY)
            .into_iter()
            .map(|result| format!("{result:?}"))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        assert_eq!(actual, expected);
        let inputs = HASH_INPUTS.with(|inputs| std::mem::take(&mut *inputs.borrow_mut()));
        for rejected in [&invalid_index, &invalid_leaf_count, &out_of_range] {
            assert!(
                !inputs
                    .iter()
                    .any(|input| input.as_slice() == rejected.shard)
            );
        }
        for eligible in [&chunks[0], &invalid_proof] {
            assert!(
                inputs
                    .iter()
                    .any(|input| input.as_slice() == eligible.shard)
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_check_many_checks_mixed_widths_individually() {
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(32),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(32),
        };
        let payloads = (0..64)
            .map(|i| vec![i as u8; if i < 8 { 8192 - i * 64 } else { 2 }])
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let (root, chunks) = build_chunks(&payloads);
        let shards = chunks
            .iter()
            .enumerate()
            .map(|(index, chunk)| (index as u16, chunk))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let expected = shards
            .iter()
            .map(|&(index, shard)| {
                InstrumentedRS::check(&config, &root, index, shard, &STRATEGY).unwrap()
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        // Run the check on the pool's single worker, so the thread-local hash counters see every
        // hashing call while the strategy plans eight tasks.
        let strategy = Explorer::parallel(&inline(NZUsize!(8)));
        let (actual, calls) = strategy
            .join(
                || {
                    reset_hash_many_calls();
                    let actual = InstrumentedRS::check_many(&config, &root, &shards, &strategy)
                        .into_iter()
                        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
                        .unwrap();
                    (actual, take_hash_many_calls())
                },
                || (),
            )
            .0;
        assert_eq!(actual, expected);
        assert!(calls.is_empty());
        assert!(matches!(
            InstrumentedRS::decode(&config, &root, actual.iter(), &STRATEGY),
            Err(Error::Inconsistent)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_check_many_matches_scalar_errors() {
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(3),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(3),
        };
        let (root, chunks) =
            RS::encode(&config, b"mixed check errors".as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let mut invalid_leaf_count = chunks[1].clone();
        invalid_leaf_count.proof.leaf_count -= 1;
        let mut invalid_chunk_index = chunks[2].clone();
        invalid_chunk_index.index = 4;
        let mut invalid_payload = chunks[3].clone();
        let mut payload = invalid_payload.shard.to_vec();
        payload[0] ^= 0xff;
        invalid_payload.shard = payload.into();
        let shards = [
            (1, &invalid_leaf_count),
            (0, &chunks[0]),
            (6, &chunks[1]),
            (2, &invalid_chunk_index),
            (3, &invalid_payload),
        ];

        let scalar = shards
            .iter()
            .map(|&(index, shard)| {
                format!(
                    "{:?}",
                    InstrumentedRS::check(&config, &root, index, shard, &STRATEGY)
                )
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let batched = InstrumentedRS::check_many(&config, &root, &shards, &STRATEGY)
            .into_iter()
            .map(|result| format!("{result:?}"))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        assert_eq!(batched, scalar);

        let invalid_config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(u16::MAX),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(1),
        };
        let scalar = shards
            .iter()
            .map(|&(index, shard)| {
                format!(
                    "{:?}",
                    InstrumentedRS::check(&invalid_config, &root, index, shard, &STRATEGY)
                )
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        reset_hash_many_calls();
        let batched = InstrumentedRS::check_many(&invalid_config, &root, &shards, &STRATEGY)
            .into_iter()
            .map(|result| format!("{result:?}"))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        assert_eq!(batched, scalar);
        assert!(take_hash_many_calls().is_empty());
    }

    fn selected_indices(
        u: &mut arbitrary::Unstructured<'_>,
        total: u16,
        minimum: u16,
    ) -> arbitrary::Result<Vec<u16>> {
        let to_use = u.int_in_range(minimum..=total)?;
        let mut selected = (0..total).collect::<Vec<_>>();
        for i in 0..usize::from(to_use) {
            let remaining = usize::from(total) - i;
            let j = i + u.choose_index(remaining)?;
            selected.swap(i, j);
        }
        selected.truncate(usize::from(to_use));
        Ok(selected)
    }

    fn assert_decode_unique_commitment(
        total: u16,
        min: u16,
        root: <Sha256 as Hasher>::Digest,
        chunks: &[Chunk<<Sha256 as Hasher>::Digest>],
        selected: &[u16],
    ) {
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(min),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(total - min),
        };
        let pieces = selected
            .iter()
            .map(|&i| RS::check(&config, &root, i, &chunks[usize::from(i)], &STRATEGY).unwrap())
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        let Ok(decoded) = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY) else {
            return;
        };
        let (canonical_root, _) =
            encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, decoded.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            root, canonical_root,
            "decode accepted a root not produced by canonical encode"
        );
    }

    fn fuzz_arbitrary_codeword(u: &mut arbitrary::Unstructured<'_>) -> arbitrary::Result<()> {
        let min = u.int_in_range(1..=FUZZ_MAX_MIN_SHARDS)?;
        let extra = u.int_in_range(1..=FUZZ_MAX_EXTRA_SHARDS)?;
        let total = min + extra;
        let k = usize::from(min);
        let m = usize::from(extra);

        let data_len = u.int_in_range(0..=FUZZ_MAX_DATA_LEN)?;
        let data = u.bytes(data_len)?.to_vec();
        let canonical = canonical_shard_len(data.len(), k);
        let extra_width = u.int_in_range(0..=FUZZ_MAX_EXTRA_SHARD_WIDTH / 2)? * 2;
        let shard_len = canonical + extra_width;

        let mut padded = vec![0u8; k * shard_len];
        padded[..u32::SIZE].copy_from_slice(&(data.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
        padded[u32::SIZE..u32::SIZE + data.len()].copy_from_slice(&data);

        let payload_end = u32::SIZE + data.len();
        if payload_end < padded.len() && u.int_in_range(0..=3)? == 0 {
            let offset = payload_end + u.choose_index(padded.len() - payload_end)?;
            padded[offset] ^= u.arbitrary::<u8>()? | 1;
        }

        let mut encoder = Encoder::new(k, m, shard_len).unwrap();
        for shard in padded.chunks(shard_len) {
            encoder.add_original_shard(shard).unwrap();
        }
        let recovery = encoder.encode().unwrap();

        let mut shards = padded
            .chunks(shard_len)
            .map(|shard| shard.to_vec())
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        shards.extend(recovery.recovery_iter().map(|shard| shard.to_vec()));

        let (root, chunks) = build_chunks(&shards);
        let selected = selected_indices(u, total, min)?;
        assert_decode_unique_commitment(total, min, root, &chunks, &selected);

        Ok(())
    }

    fn fuzz_mixed_codeword(u: &mut arbitrary::Unstructured<'_>) -> arbitrary::Result<()> {
        let min = u.int_in_range(1..=FUZZ_MAX_MIN_SHARDS)?;
        let extra = u.int_in_range(1..=FUZZ_MAX_EXTRA_SHARDS)?;
        let total = min + extra;

        let data_len = u.int_in_range(0..=FUZZ_MAX_DATA_LEN)?;
        let data = u.bytes(data_len)?.to_vec();
        let (_canonical_root, chunks) =
            encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let mut shards = chunks
            .iter()
            .map(|chunk| chunk.shard.to_vec())
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        let mutated = usize::from(min + u.int_in_range(0..=extra - 1)?);
        let offset = u.choose_index(shards[mutated].len())?;
        shards[mutated][offset] ^= u.arbitrary::<u8>()? | 1;

        let (root, chunks) = build_chunks(&shards);
        let mut selected = (0..min).collect::<Vec<_>>();
        selected.push(mutated as u16);
        assert_decode_unique_commitment(total, min, root, &chunks, &selected);

        Ok(())
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_recovery() {
        let data = b"Testing recovery pieces";
        let total = 8u16;
        let min = 3u16;

        // Encode the data
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // Use a mix of original and recovery pieces
        let pieces: Vec<_> = vec![
            checked(root, chunks[0].clone()), // original
            checked(root, chunks[4].clone()), // recovery
            checked(root, chunks[6].clone()), // recovery
        ];

        // Try to decode with a mix of original and recovery pieces
        let decoded = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_not_enough_pieces() {
        let data = b"Test insufficient pieces";
        let total = 6u16;
        let min = 4u16;

        // Encode data
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // Try with fewer than min
        let pieces: Vec<_> = chunks
            .into_iter()
            .take(2)
            .map(|c| checked(root, c))
            .collect();

        // Fail to decode
        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::NotEnoughChunks)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_duplicate_index() {
        let data = b"Test duplicate detection";
        let total = 5u16;
        let min = 3u16;

        // Encode data
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // Include duplicate index by cloning the first chunk
        let pieces = [
            checked(root, chunks[0].clone()),
            checked(root, chunks[0].clone()),
            checked(root, chunks[1].clone()),
        ];

        // Fail to decode
        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::DuplicateIndex(0))));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_invalid_index() {
        let data = b"Test invalid index";
        let total = 5u16;
        let min = 3u16;
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(min),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(total - min),
        };

        // Encode data
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // Verify all proofs at invalid index
        for i in 0..total {
            assert!(RS::check(&config, &root, i + 1, &chunks[i as usize], &STRATEGY).is_err());
        }
    }

    #[test]
    #[should_panic(expected = "assertion failed: total > min")]
    fn test_invalid_total() {
        let data = b"Test parameter validation";

        // The total shard count must exceed the recovery threshold.
        encode::<Sha256, _>(3, 3, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    #[should_panic(expected = "assertion failed: min > 0")]
    fn test_invalid_min() {
        let data = b"Test parameter validation";

        // The recovery threshold must be non-zero.
        encode::<Sha256, _>(5, 0, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_empty_data() {
        let data = b"";
        let total = 100u16;
        let min = 30u16;

        // Encode data
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // Try to decode with min
        let minimal = chunks
            .into_iter()
            .take(min as usize)
            .map(|c| checked(root, c))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let decoded = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, minimal.iter(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_large_data() {
        let data = vec![42u8; 1000]; // 1KB of data
        let total = 7u16;
        let min = 4u16;

        // Encode data
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // Try to decode with min
        let minimal = chunks
            .into_iter()
            .take(min as usize)
            .map(|c| checked(root, c))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let decoded = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, minimal.iter(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_parallel_encode_matches_sequential() {
        let total = 24u16;
        let min = 8u16;
        for shard_len in [
            MIN_STRIPE_BYTES - 2,
            MIN_STRIPE_BYTES,
            2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES - 2,
            2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES,
            2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 2,
            4 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 62,
        ] {
            let data = vec![42u8; min as usize * shard_len - u32::SIZE];
            explore(|strategy| encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), strategy).unwrap());
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_parallel_recovery_decode() {
        let strategy = Rayon::new(NZUsize!(4)).unwrap();
        let data = vec![42u8; 256 * 1024];
        let total = 24u16;
        let min = 8u16;

        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &strategy).unwrap();

        let minimal = chunks
            .into_iter()
            .skip(min as usize)
            .take(min as usize)
            .map(|c| checked(root, c))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let decoded = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, minimal.iter(), &strategy).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
    }

    /// Multi-stripe recovery decode must be byte-identical to the single-stripe path.
    ///
    /// The multi-stripe path requires shards of at least `2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES`, so the test
    /// sweeps payload sizes and shard counts that land on several stripe-count boundaries in the
    /// parallel shapes. Each case decodes a set with as many recoveries as possible in serial,
    /// parallel, and mixed shapes and checks the result against the original data. Larger
    /// payloads also split stripes into multiple cache-sized tiles.
    #[test]
    fn test_striped_recovery_matches_sequential() {
        for &data_len in &[
            128 * 1024usize,
            257 * 1024,
            512 * 1024,
            1024 * 1024,
            4 * 1024 * 1024 + 14,
        ] {
            for &(total, min) in &[(12u16, 4u16), (24, 8), (33, 11), (20, 13)] {
                let data: Vec<u8> = (0..data_len)
                    .map(|i| (i as u8) ^ ((i >> 7) as u8))
                    .collect();
                let (root, chunks) =
                    encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &Sequential).unwrap();
                let originals_needed = min.saturating_sub(total - min) as usize;
                let selected = chunks
                    .into_iter()
                    .enumerate()
                    .filter(|&(index, _)| index < originals_needed || index >= min as usize)
                    .map(|(_, chunk)| chunk)
                    .take(min as usize)
                    .map(|c| checked(root, c))
                    .collect::<Vec<_>>();
                let decoded = explore(|strategy| {
                    decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, selected.iter(), strategy).unwrap()
                });
                assert_eq!(
                    decoded, data,
                    "striped decode must return the original data (len={data_len} total={total} min={min})"
                );
            }
        }
    }

    /// All `k` originals must round-trip through the re-encode-and-verify path (`striped::decode`)
    /// in every execution shape, the multi-stripe ones included.
    #[test]
    fn test_striped_all_originals_decode() {
        let data = vec![42u8; 256 * 1024];
        let total = 24u16;
        let min = 8u16;

        // The parallel shapes need enough complete blocks for at least two stripes.
        let shard_len = canonical_shard_len(data.len(), min as usize);
        assert!(
            shard_len >= 2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES,
            "test must exercise >= 2 stripes (shard_len={shard_len})"
        );

        // Provide exactly the `k` original chunks (indices 0..min), so decode takes the
        // all-originals re-encode path rather than reconstructing.
        let decoded = explore(|strategy| {
            let (root, chunks) =
                encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), strategy).unwrap();
            let originals = chunks
                .into_iter()
                .take(usize::from(min))
                .map(|c| checked(root, c))
                .collect::<Vec<_>>();
            decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, originals.iter(), strategy).unwrap()
        });
        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
    }

    /// Splitting a shard into stripes, and stripes into cache-sized tiles, must reproduce a
    /// single full-width `Encoder` pass byte-for-byte. `(32, 64)` at `17 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 2`
    /// splits stripes into multiple tiles.
    #[test]
    fn test_striped_encode_into_matches_full_width() {
        let strategy = Explorer::parallel(&Rayon::new(NZUsize!(4)).unwrap());
        let mut tiled = false;
        for (k, m) in [(2usize, 2usize), (32, 64)] {
            for shard_len in [
                2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES,
                2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 2,
                3 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 62,
                5 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 64,
                17 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 2,
            ] {
                let mut originals_buf = vec![0u8; k * shard_len];
                for (i, byte) in originals_buf.iter_mut().enumerate() {
                    *byte = (i % 251) as u8;
                }
                let originals: Vec<&[u8]> = originals_buf.chunks(shard_len).collect();

                // Encode each stripe into its column slices of the shared buffer.
                let mut striped_recovery = vec![0u8; m * shard_len];
                let results = strategy
                    .try_run_batches(
                        shard_len / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES,
                        NZUsize!(MIN_STRIPE_BYTES / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES),
                        SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES * (k + m),
                        |batches| {
                            batches.try_map_collect_vec(
                                |ranges| {
                                    let ranges = striped::byte_ranges(shard_len, ranges);
                                    tiled |= ranges.iter().any(|range| {
                                        striped::tiles(k, m, range.clone()).count() > 1
                                    });
                                    let groups = striped::stripe_columns(
                                        &mut striped_recovery,
                                        shard_len,
                                        &ranges,
                                    );
                                    ranges.into_iter().zip(groups)
                                },
                                |(range, out)| {
                                    striped::encode_recovery_into(k, m, range, &originals, out)
                                },
                            )
                        },
                    )
                    .unwrap();
                assert!(results.len() >= 2, "must split into stripes");

                // A single full-width encode must produce the identical recovery buffer.
                let mut encoder = Encoder::new(k, m, shard_len).unwrap();
                for original in &originals {
                    encoder.add_original_shard(original).unwrap();
                }
                let encoding = encoder.encode().unwrap();
                for (actual, expected) in striped_recovery
                    .chunks_exact(shard_len)
                    .zip(encoding.recovery_iter())
                {
                    assert_eq!(actual, expected);
                }
            }
        }
        assert!(tiled, "no case splits a stripe into tiles");
    }

    /// Tiles cover a stripe contiguously with balanced widths. A split into several tiles uses
    /// the fewest tiles within the target that leave no tile whose padded length is a multiple
    /// of 4 KiB.
    #[test]
    fn test_striped_tiles() {
        let page = 4096 / SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES;
        let start = 3 * SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES;
        for (k, m) in [(4usize, 8usize), (32, 64), (100, 100), (512, 512)] {
            let target =
                MAX_TILE_WORK_BYTES / (2 * (k + m).next_power_of_two() * SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES);
            for blocks in 1..3000 {
                for tail in [0, 2, SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES - 2] {
                    let range = start..start + blocks * SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES + tail;
                    let tiles: Vec<_> = striped::tiles(k, m, range.clone()).collect();

                    // Tiles run from start to end, and every inner edge is block aligned.
                    assert_eq!(tiles[0].start, range.start);
                    assert_eq!(tiles.last().unwrap().end, range.end);
                    for pair in tiles.windows(2) {
                        assert_eq!(pair[0].end, pair[1].start);
                        assert!((pair[0].end - start).is_multiple_of(SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES));
                    }

                    // Padded widths differ by at most one block. A stripe under twice the target is
                    // one tile, and a split keeps every width within the target and off 4 KiB.
                    let widths: Vec<_> = tiles
                        .iter()
                        .map(|tile| tile.len().div_ceil(SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES))
                        .collect();
                    let narrow = *widths.iter().min().unwrap();
                    let wide = *widths.iter().max().unwrap();
                    assert!(narrow >= 1 && wide - narrow <= 1);
                    let padded = range.len().div_ceil(SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES);
                    if padded < 2 * target {
                        assert_eq!(tiles.len(), 1);
                    } else {
                        assert!(wide <= target);
                        assert!(widths.iter().all(|width| !width.is_multiple_of(page)));

                        // Every smaller count exceeds the target or lands a width on 4 KiB.
                        for fewer in 1..tiles.len() {
                            let (width, extra) = (padded / fewer, padded % fewer);
                            assert!(
                                padded.div_ceil(fewer) > target
                                    || width.is_multiple_of(page)
                                    || (extra > 0 && (width + 1).is_multiple_of(page))
                            );
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // Each tamper mutates a canonical codeword in place before a (malicious) commitment is
    // rebuilt over the tampered shards. `k` is the original-shard count, `shard_len` the
    // per-shard width.
    fn tamper_flip_recovery(shards: &mut [Vec<u8>], k: usize, _shard_len: usize) {
        shards[k][0] ^= 0xFF;
    }

    fn tamper_flip_original_data(shards: &mut [Vec<u8>], _k: usize, shard_len: usize) {
        // First payload byte sits right after the 4-byte length prefix.
        let offset = u32::SIZE;
        shards[offset / shard_len][offset % shard_len] ^= 0xFF;
    }

    fn tamper_corrupt_padding(shards: &mut [Vec<u8>], k: usize, shard_len: usize) {
        // Final byte of the last original shard is canonical zero padding for the data
        // sizes used by the adversarial tests below.
        shards[k - 1][shard_len - 1] = 0xAA;
    }

    /// Encode `data` canonically, apply `tamper`, rebuild a (malicious) commitment over the
    /// tampered shards, and decode the `selected` shard indices with `strategy`. Generic over
    /// [`Strategy`] so the same attack drives both the single-stripe and multi-stripe decode paths.
    fn decode_tampered_codeword<S: Strategy>(
        total: u16,
        min: u16,
        data: &[u8],
        selected: &[u16],
        tamper: fn(&mut [Vec<u8>], usize, usize),
        strategy: &S,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
        let (_root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data, &Sequential).unwrap();
        let mut shards = chunks.iter().map(|c| c.shard.to_vec()).collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let shard_len = shards[0].len();
        tamper(&mut shards, min as usize, shard_len);
        let (root, chunks) = build_chunks(&shards);
        let pieces = selected
            .iter()
            .map(|&i| checked(root, chunks[i as usize].clone()))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), strategy)
    }

    // (name, selected shard indices, tamper). With total=12/min=4, indices 0..4 are
    // originals and 4..12 are recoveries.
    #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
    const ADVERSARIAL_SCENARIOS: &[(&str, &[u16], fn(&mut [Vec<u8>], usize, usize))] = &[
        // Tampered recovery that is NOT provided: caught when the root is rebuilt from the
        // re-encoded recoveries.
        (
            "tampered_recovery_unprovided",
            &[0, 1, 2, 3],
            tamper_flip_recovery,
        ),
        // Tampered recovery that IS provided and forces RS reconstruction of a missing
        // original (exercises the striped `decode_reveal` path).
        (
            "tampered_recovery_provided",
            &[0, 1, 2, 4],
            tamper_flip_recovery,
        ),
        // Non-canonical (non-zero) trailing padding in an original shard (extract_data).
        (
            "non_canonical_padding",
            &[0, 1, 2, 3],
            tamper_corrupt_padding,
        ),
        // Tampered original payload byte: detected by the rebuilt commitment.
        (
            "tampered_original_data",
            &[0, 1, 2, 3],
            tamper_flip_original_data,
        ),
        // Recovery-only decode where one provided recovery is tampered.
        (
            "recovery_only_tampered",
            &[4, 5, 6, 7],
            tamper_flip_recovery,
        ),
    ];

    /// Every adversarial scenario must be rejected as [`Error::Inconsistent`] on whichever
    /// decode path `strategy` + `data` selects.
    fn assert_adversarial_rejected<S: Strategy>(total: u16, min: u16, data: &[u8], strategy: &S) {
        for &(name, selected, tamper) in ADVERSARIAL_SCENARIOS {
            let result = decode_tampered_codeword(total, min, data, selected, tamper, strategy);
            assert!(
                matches!(result, Err(Error::Inconsistent)),
                "scenario {name} not rejected as Inconsistent: {result:?}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_adversarial_rejection_sequential_small() {
        // Small payload: striping never engages, so this exercises the single-stripe path
        // (matching the rest of the small-data adversarial tests).
        assert_adversarial_rejected(12, 4, &[0xCDu8; 30], &Sequential);
    }

    /// Splitting a decode into stripes must not change any consensus-critical rejection. Drive
    /// each malicious scenario through the single-stripe and multi-stripe paths on the same large
    /// payload and require identical (Inconsistent) verdicts.
    #[test]
    fn test_adversarial_rejection_striped_matches_sequential() {
        let total = 12u16;
        let min = 4u16;

        // Give the parallel shapes enough complete blocks for at least two stripes.
        let data = vec![0xABu8; 64 * 1024];
        let shard_len = canonical_shard_len(data.len(), min as usize);
        assert!(
            shard_len >= 2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES,
            "test must exercise >= 2 stripes (shard_len={shard_len})"
        );

        // Every shape, the multi-stripe ones included, must reject each attack on the same data as
        // inconsistent. An untampered mixed set (some originals and a recovery) still decodes, and
        // decoding it reconstructs a missing original.
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &Sequential).unwrap();
        let mixed = [0u16, 1, 2, 4]
            .into_iter()
            .map(|i| checked(root, chunks[i as usize].clone()))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let decoded = explore(|strategy| {
            assert_adversarial_rejected(total, min, &data, strategy);
            decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, mixed.iter(), strategy).unwrap()
        });
        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
    }

    /// Pin the exact vendored Reed-Solomon recovery output for a fixed `(k, m, shard_len)` with a
    /// partial final block (`shard_len % SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES != 0`). The striped coder assumes this
    /// crate's internal block layout and tail packing (see [`SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES`]); if the
    /// implementation changes its produced bytes this fixture trips, signalling that the striping
    /// assumption must be re-verified before the new output is accepted.
    ///
    /// The cases take one shape per branch of the backend's rate selection, with more originals
    /// (high rate), more recoveries (low rate), and counts that round to the same power of two.
    #[rstest]
    #[case::high_rate(
        5,
        3,
        "e38bb9dbba4a102c4bd8447e212957742dab0af0c4148d4660c671f2f33d3df2"
    )]
    #[case::low_rate(
        4,
        6,
        "9f55e86ae11f9de757087e9052810b6359ed7c3a107ccde5a6b304fa54bd72fa"
    )]
    #[case::equal_powers(
        3,
        4,
        "aaaeebde791afabb30dc98356130ddd196e600c5a8c33882a8404539df795823"
    )]
    fn test_recovery_output_format_pinned(
        #[case] k: usize,
        #[case] m: usize,
        #[case] expected: &str,
    ) {
        // Two full blocks plus a 2-byte partial tail.
        let shard_len = 2 * SHARD_CHUNK_BYTES + 2;

        let mut encoder = Encoder::new(k, m, shard_len).unwrap();
        for i in 0..k {
            let shard: Vec<u8> = (0..shard_len)
                .map(|j| ((i * 31 + j * 7) & 0xFF) as u8)
                .collect();
            encoder.add_original_shard(&shard).unwrap();
        }
        let encoding = encoder.encode().unwrap();

        let recovery: Vec<&[u8]> = encoding.recovery_iter().collect();
        let digest = Sha256::hash(&recovery);
        assert_eq!(
            format!("{digest}"),
            expected,
            "vendored Reed-Solomon recovery output changed for ({k}, {m}); re-verify the \
             striping assumption before updating this fixture"
        );
    }

    /// Commitments are part of the consensus format, so every node, on every architecture and
    /// engine, must derive these exact roots. The configurations cover each branch of the
    /// backend's rate selection. The payloads include empty input and inputs that produce short
    /// and multi-block shards.
    #[rstest]
    #[case::k2_m2_len0(
        2,
        2,
        0,
        "87d6a38f0987af00691b75fbfb710b7a50df08115c15254e09f109a1b74170c3"
    )]
    #[case::k2_m2_len1000(
        2,
        2,
        1000,
        "b90ea02e9b2eb25cc04f92c80b4f0dc8f68b154feff5a24495a8f090918b10d7"
    )]
    #[case::k2_m2_len70000(
        2,
        2,
        70_000,
        "b55ebdadfe51a23ab3a3ee8200a07dded9e10b8226abe34cbad171a11c070189"
    )]
    #[case::k3_m4_len0(
        3,
        4,
        0,
        "85a86686f0c01d863dde8f994dc3c9e063fa4458ff9458e218f5f260ed225c60"
    )]
    #[case::k3_m4_len1000(
        3,
        4,
        1000,
        "1fef0811649ed7f925bbc915ec3bf6d97509682e513f595881b2462e5ef1da8e"
    )]
    #[case::k3_m4_len70000(
        3,
        4,
        70_000,
        "a460ad1f30a8518a4e91de264deefbed57622c1ee6cf44c8e32573f437df8ba0"
    )]
    #[case::k4_m6_len0(
        4,
        6,
        0,
        "dd18f239803d542063c6dfebc9618c716406b299d1fd84d88476344b05e09d7b"
    )]
    #[case::k4_m6_len1000(
        4,
        6,
        1000,
        "e18fcc7b41a8b4ed1ca2420df986787f84452e1fb4d3d294827ebd325bcaaa7d"
    )]
    #[case::k4_m6_len70000(
        4,
        6,
        70_000,
        "18e9301ae82f44bf2ce2a16e44bd8901c33f357149a26b7981c6474b1fbd95dd"
    )]
    #[case::k5_m3_len0(
        5,
        3,
        0,
        "dd24cc230c717006fbdea807fe8d14a8e95e34d8b3efb40d8300711c3d1b03f5"
    )]
    #[case::k5_m3_len1000(
        5,
        3,
        1000,
        "90cdb8c92a13b9b2d2040f861df5ea24dbc9e27e8d0f10295aec80b93a8397b2"
    )]
    #[case::k5_m3_len70000(
        5,
        3,
        70_000,
        "a33bcd6552d8cc593363c994ed4113b59a6da32234846ee0bc1c570ec75f1e7b"
    )]
    #[case::k9_m16_len0(
        9,
        16,
        0,
        "84082dbcb47449967323f8b4893592d1361392387ad0371ee8faf5caad795bd8"
    )]
    #[case::k9_m16_len1000(
        9,
        16,
        1000,
        "b7a717d37d93331142139f14a14e61029bc0fac8a2dd3b1b78362d5091f5923f"
    )]
    #[case::k9_m16_len70000(
        9,
        16,
        70_000,
        "2f1b1764b12669a09362bfe0dd19e0a5ec1862f81ff67148f4413cfc7ca75cfc"
    )]
    fn test_commitment_pinned(
        #[case] k: u16,
        #[case] m: u16,
        #[case] len: usize,
        #[case] expected: &str,
    ) {
        let data: Vec<u8> = (0..len).map(|i| ((i * 31 + 7) % 251) as u8).collect();
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(k),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(m),
        };
        let (commitment, _) = RS::encode(&config, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            format!("{commitment}"),
            expected,
            "commitment changed for ({k}, {m}, {len} bytes); this is a consensus format change"
        );
    }

    /// A payload is rejected before any allocation when its canonical shard width would not fit
    /// the `u32` length prefix every chunk carries, or when the codeword could not be allocated.
    #[test]
    fn test_encode_rejects_unrepresentable_widths() {
        /// A `Buf` of `remaining` zero bytes that never allocates its claimed length. Encoding must
        /// reject the lengths below before reading any of them.
        struct Claimed(usize);

        impl bytes::Buf for Claimed {
            fn remaining(&self) -> usize {
                self.0
            }

            fn chunk(&self) -> &[u8] {
                static ZEROS: [u8; 64] = [0; 64];
                &ZEROS[..self.0.min(ZEROS.len())]
            }

            fn advance(&mut self, cnt: usize) {
                assert!(cnt <= self.0);
                self.0 -= cnt;
            }
        }

        let max = Widen::widen(u32::MAX);
        let single = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(1),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(1),
        };
        let pair = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(2),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(1),
        };

        // Any configuration rejects a payload longer than the length prefix can express.
        for config in [single, pair] {
            assert!(matches!(
                RS::encode(&config, Claimed(max + 1), &STRATEGY),
                Err(Error::InvalidDataLength(len)) if len == max + 1
            ));
        }

        // With one original shard, the width is the prefixed payload rounded up to even bytes,
        // so the five largest payload lengths push it past `u32::MAX`.
        for len in max - 4..=max {
            assert!(canonical_shard_len(len, 1) > max);
            assert!(matches!(
                RS::encode(&single, Claimed(len), &STRATEGY),
                Err(Error::InvalidDataLength(got)) if got == len
            ));
        }
        assert!(canonical_shard_len(max - 5, 1) <= max);
        assert!(canonical_shard_len(max, 2) <= max);

        // The allocation bound accepts the largest allocation and rejects both a product that
        // overflows and a representable product beyond that limit.
        assert!(codeword_fits(3, 1 << 20));
        assert!(codeword_fits(1, MAX_ALLOCATION_BYTES));
        assert!(!codeword_fits(1, MAX_ALLOCATION_BYTES + 1));
        assert!(!codeword_fits(2, MAX_ALLOCATION_BYTES));
        assert!(!codeword_fits(2, usize::MAX));
    }

    /// Returns the shard width this thread's cached decoder was last configured for.
    fn cached_decoder_width() -> usize {
        CACHED_DECODER.with(|cell| {
            let mut slot = cell.borrow_mut();
            let decoder = slot.1.as_mut().expect("decoder must be cached");
            match decoder.add_original_shard(0, [0u8; 0]) {
                Err(RsError::DifferentShardSize {
                    shard_bytes,
                    got: 0,
                }) => shard_bytes,
                other => panic!("unexpected decoder state: {other:?}"),
            }
        })
    }

    /// Returns the shard width this thread's cached encoder was last configured for.
    fn cached_encoder_width() -> usize {
        CACHED_ENCODER.with(|cell| {
            let mut slot = cell.borrow_mut();
            let encoder = slot.1.as_mut().expect("encoder must be cached");
            match encoder.add_original_shard([0u8; 0]) {
                Err(RsError::DifferentShardSize {
                    shard_bytes,
                    got: 0,
                }) => shard_bytes,
                other => panic!("unexpected encoder state: {other:?}"),
            }
        })
    }

    /// Single-stripe coding configures the thread-local coders for one tile at a time, so a wide
    /// shard never leaves full-width work cached, whether coding succeeds or fails.
    #[test]
    fn test_single_stripe_coding_caches_tile_width() {
        let total = 96u16;
        let min = 32u16;
        let (k, m) = (min as usize, (total - min) as usize);

        // The shard spans several tiles, so its last tile is narrower than the shard.
        let shard_len = 17 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 2;
        let tile = striped::tiles(k, m, 0..shard_len)
            .last()
            .expect("a nonempty shard has a tile")
            .len();
        assert!(striped::tiles(k, m, 0..shard_len).count() > 1);
        assert!(tile < shard_len);
        let data: Vec<u8> = (0..k * shard_len - u32::SIZE)
            .map(|i| (i % 251) as u8)
            .collect();

        // Encoding leaves the encoder configured for the last tile.
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &Sequential).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(chunks[0].shard.len(), shard_len);
        assert_eq!(cached_encoder_width(), tile);

        // Recovering every original leaves the decoder configured for the last tile.
        let recoveries = chunks[k..2 * k]
            .iter()
            .map(|chunk| checked(root, chunk.clone()))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let decoded =
            decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, recoveries.iter(), &Sequential).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
        assert_eq!(cached_decoder_width(), tile);

        // Re-encoding from every original leaves the encoder configured for the last tile.
        let originals = chunks[..k]
            .iter()
            .map(|chunk| checked(root, chunk.clone()))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let decoded =
            decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, originals.iter(), &Sequential).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
        assert_eq!(cached_encoder_width(), tile);

        // A recovery that fails the commitment check leaves the decoder configured for the
        // last tile.
        let selected = (min..2 * min).collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let result = decode_tampered_codeword(
            total,
            min,
            &data,
            &selected,
            tamper_flip_recovery,
            &Sequential,
        );
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::Inconsistent)), "{result:?}");
        assert_eq!(cached_decoder_width(), tile);
    }

    /// A chunk decodes when it is no wider than the maximum data produces, and a wider chunk is
    /// rejected.
    #[test]
    fn test_read_cfg_bounds_chunk_width() {
        type TestChunk = Chunk<<Sha256 as Hasher>::Digest>;
        for (min, extra) in [(1u16, 1u16), (2, 2), (4, 6), (34, 66)] {
            let config = Config {
                minimum_shards: NZU16!(min),
                extra_shards: NZU16!(extra),
            };
            for data_len in [0, 1, 2 * usize::from(min), 1000, 4099] {
                // Encoding exactly the maximum data produces a chunk that decodes.
                let cfg = (config, data_len);
                let (_, chunks) =
                    RS::encode(&config, vec![0; data_len].as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
                assert!(TestChunk::decode_cfg(chunks[0].encode(), &cfg).is_ok());

                // Enough extra data to widen the chunk is rejected.
                let width = chunks[0].shard.len();
                let wider = (data_len..)
                    .find(|&len| canonical_shard_len(len, usize::from(min)) > width)
                    .unwrap();
                let (_, chunks) =
                    RS::encode(&config, vec![0; wider].as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
                assert!(TestChunk::decode_cfg(chunks[0].encode(), &cfg).is_err());
            }

            // A maximum beyond what encoding accepts decodes without overflow.
            let (_, chunks) = RS::encode(&config, [0u8; 8].as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
            assert!(TestChunk::decode_cfg(chunks[0].encode(), &(config, usize::MAX)).is_ok());
        }
    }

    /// Shards of zero or odd width are rejected at admission, individually and in batches.
    #[test]
    fn test_check_rejects_invalid_shard_width() {
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(4),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(8),
        };
        for width in [0, 3, 2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 1] {
            let (root, chunks) = build_chunks(&vec![vec![0u8; width]; 12]);
            let invalid = |result: &Result<_, Error>| {
                matches!(
                    result,
                    Err(Error::ReedSolomon(RsError::InvalidShardSize { shard_bytes }))
                        if *shard_bytes == width
                )
            };

            // Each shard is rejected individually.
            for chunk in &chunks {
                assert!(invalid(&RS::check(
                    &config,
                    &root,
                    chunk.index,
                    chunk,
                    &STRATEGY
                )));
            }

            // The same shards are rejected as a batch.
            let batch = chunks
                .iter()
                .map(|chunk| (chunk.index, chunk))
                .collect::<Vec<_>>();
            assert!(
                RS::check_many(&config, &root, &batch, &STRATEGY)
                    .iter()
                    .all(invalid)
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_parallel_decode_rejects_mismatched_shard_lengths() {
        let strategy = Rayon::new(NZUsize!(4)).unwrap();
        let data = vec![42u8; 256 * 1024];
        let total = 24u16;
        let min = 8u16;

        let (_root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &strategy).unwrap();
        let mut shards = chunks
            .iter()
            .map(|chunk| chunk.shard.to_vec())
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        shards[min as usize].pop();

        let mut builder = Builder::<Sha256>::new(total as usize);
        for shard in &shards {
            builder.add(&Sha256::hash(&[shard]));
        }
        let tree = builder.build();
        let root = tree.root();

        let pieces = [9u16, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
            .into_iter()
            .map(|i| {
                let proof = tree.proof(i as u32).unwrap();
                checked(
                    root,
                    Chunk::new(shards[i as usize].clone().into(), i, proof),
                )
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), &strategy);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::Inconsistent)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_malicious_root_detection() {
        let data = b"Original data that should be protected";
        let total = 7u16;
        let min = 4u16;
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(min),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(total - min),
        };

        // Encode data correctly to get valid chunks
        let (_correct_root, chunks) =
            encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // Create a malicious/fake root (simulating a malicious encoder)
        let malicious_root = Sha256::hash(&[b"malicious_data_that_wasnt_actually_encoded"]);

        // Verify all proofs at incorrect root
        for i in 0..total {
            assert!(
                RS::check(&config, &malicious_root, i, &chunks[i as usize], &STRATEGY).is_err()
            );
        }

        // Collect valid pieces (these are legitimate fragments checked against
        // the correct root).
        let minimal = chunks
            .into_iter()
            .take(min as usize)
            .map(|c| checked(_correct_root, c))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        // Decoding with a malicious root fails because the checked chunks
        // are bound to a different commitment.
        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &malicious_root, minimal.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::CommitmentMismatch)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_mismatched_config_rejected_during_check() {
        let config_expected = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(2),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(2),
        };
        let config_actual = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(3),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(3),
        };

        let data = b"leaf_count mismatch proof";
        let (commitment, shards) = RS::encode(&config_actual, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // A proof generated under a different shard configuration is invalid
        // for this commitment.
        let check_result = RS::check(&config_expected, &commitment, 0, &shards[0], &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(check_result, Err(Error::InvalidProof)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_manipulated_chunk_detection() {
        let data = b"Data integrity must be maintained";
        let total = 6u16;
        let min = 3u16;

        // Encode data
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let mut pieces: Vec<_> = chunks.into_iter().map(|c| checked(root, c)).collect();

        // Tamper with one of the checked chunks by modifying the shard data.
        if !pieces[1].shard.is_empty() {
            let mut shard = pieces[1].shard.to_vec();
            shard[0] ^= 0xFF; // Flip bits in first byte
            pieces[1].shard = shard.into();
        }

        // Try to decode with the tampered chunk
        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::Inconsistent)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_inconsistent_shards() {
        let data = b"Test data for malicious encoding";
        let total = 5u16;
        let min = 3u16;
        let m = total - min;

        // Compute original data encoding
        let shard_size = canonical_shard_len(data.len(), min as usize);
        let padded = prepare_data(data.as_slice(), min as usize, shard_size);

        // Re-encode the data
        let mut encoder = Encoder::new(min as usize, m as usize, shard_size).unwrap();
        for shard in padded.chunks(shard_size) {
            encoder.add_original_shard(shard).unwrap();
        }
        let recovery_result = encoder.encode().unwrap();
        let mut recovery_shards: Vec<Vec<u8>> = recovery_result
            .recovery_iter()
            .map(|s| s.to_vec())
            .collect();

        // Tamper with one recovery shard
        if !recovery_shards[0].is_empty() {
            recovery_shards[0][0] ^= 0xFF;
        }

        // Build malicious shards
        let mut malicious_shards: Vec<Vec<u8>> =
            padded.chunks(shard_size).map(|s| s.to_vec()).collect();
        malicious_shards.extend(recovery_shards);

        // Build malicious tree
        let mut builder = Builder::<Sha256>::new(total as usize);
        for shard in &malicious_shards {
            builder.add(&Sha256::hash(&[shard]));
        }
        let malicious_tree = builder.build();
        let malicious_root = malicious_tree.root();

        // Generate chunks for min pieces, including the tampered recovery
        let selected_indices = vec![0, 1, 3]; // originals 0,1 and recovery 0 (index 3)
        let mut pieces = Vec::new();
        for &i in &selected_indices {
            let merkle_proof = malicious_tree.proof(i as u32).unwrap();
            let shard = malicious_shards[i].clone();
            let chunk = Chunk::new(shard.into(), i as u16, merkle_proof);
            pieces.push(chunk);
        }
        let pieces: Vec<_> = pieces
            .into_iter()
            .map(|c| checked(malicious_root, c))
            .collect();

        // Fail to decode
        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &malicious_root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::Inconsistent)));
    }

    // Regression: a commitment built from shards with non-zero trailing padding
    // used to pass decode(), even though canonical re-encoding (zero padding)
    // produces a different root. decode() must reject such non-canonical shards.
    #[test]
    fn test_non_canonical_padding_rejected() {
        let data = b"X";
        let total = 6u16;
        let min = 3u16;
        let k = min as usize;
        let m = total as usize - k;

        let shard_len = canonical_shard_len(data.len(), k);
        let mut padded = prepare_data(data.as_slice(), k, shard_len);
        let payload_end = u32::SIZE + data.len();
        let total_original_len = k * shard_len;
        assert!(payload_end < total_original_len, "test requires padding");

        // Corrupt one canonical padding byte while keeping payload unchanged.
        let pad_shard = payload_end / shard_len;
        let pad_offset = payload_end % shard_len;
        padded[pad_shard * shard_len + pad_offset] = 0xAA;

        let mut encoder = Encoder::new(k, m, shard_len).unwrap();
        for shard in padded.chunks(shard_len) {
            encoder.add_original_shard(shard).unwrap();
        }
        let recovery = encoder.encode().unwrap();
        let mut shards: Vec<Vec<u8>> = padded.chunks(shard_len).map(|s| s.to_vec()).collect();
        shards.extend(recovery.recovery_iter().map(|s| s.to_vec()));

        let mut builder = Builder::<Sha256>::new(total as usize);
        for shard in &shards {
            builder.add(&Sha256::hash(&[shard]));
        }
        let tree = builder.build();
        let non_canonical_root = tree.root();

        let mut pieces = Vec::with_capacity(k);
        for (i, shard) in shards.iter().take(k).enumerate() {
            let proof = tree.proof(i as u32).unwrap();
            pieces.push(checked(
                non_canonical_root,
                Chunk::new(shard.clone().into(), i as u16, proof),
            ));
        }

        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &non_canonical_root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::Inconsistent)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn minifuzz_decode_unique_commitment() {
        minifuzz::Builder::default()
            .with_search_limit(2048)
            .test(|u| {
                fuzz_arbitrary_codeword(u)?;
                fuzz_mixed_codeword(u)?;
                Ok(())
            });
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_oversized_zero_padded_shards_rejected() {
        let data = b"X";
        let total = 6u16;
        let min = 3u16;
        let k = min as usize;
        let m = total as usize - k;

        let oversized_shard_len = 4usize;
        let mut padded = vec![0u8; k * oversized_shard_len];
        padded[..u32::SIZE].copy_from_slice(&(data.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
        padded[u32::SIZE..u32::SIZE + data.len()].copy_from_slice(data);

        let mut encoder = Encoder::new(k, m, oversized_shard_len).unwrap();
        for shard in padded.chunks(oversized_shard_len) {
            encoder.add_original_shard(shard).unwrap();
        }
        let recovery = encoder.encode().unwrap();

        let mut oversized_shards: Vec<Vec<u8>> = padded
            .chunks(oversized_shard_len)
            .map(|shard| shard.to_vec())
            .collect();
        oversized_shards.extend(recovery.recovery_iter().map(|shard| shard.to_vec()));

        let mut builder = Builder::<Sha256>::new(total as usize);
        for shard in &oversized_shards {
            builder.add(&Sha256::hash(&[shard]));
        }
        let oversized_tree = builder.build();
        let oversized_root = oversized_tree.root();

        let (canonical_root, _) =
            encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        assert_ne!(oversized_root, canonical_root);

        let pieces = [0u16, 1u16, 4u16]
            .into_iter()
            .map(|i| {
                let proof = oversized_tree.proof(i as u32).unwrap();
                checked(
                    oversized_root,
                    Chunk::new(oversized_shards[i as usize].clone().into(), i, proof),
                )
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &oversized_root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::Inconsistent)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_extra_non_canonical_recovery_rejected() {
        let data = b"canonical originals with bad recovery";
        let total = 6u16;
        let min = 3u16;

        let (_root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let mut shards = chunks
            .iter()
            .map(|chunk| chunk.shard.to_vec())
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        shards[min as usize][0] ^= 0xFF;

        let mut builder = Builder::<Sha256>::new(total as usize);
        for shard in &shards {
            builder.add(&Sha256::hash(&[shard]));
        }
        let tree = builder.build();
        let root = tree.root();

        let pieces = (0u16..=3u16)
            .map(|i| {
                let proof = tree.proof(i as u32).unwrap();
                checked(
                    root,
                    Chunk::new(shards[i as usize].clone().into(), i, proof),
                )
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::Inconsistent)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_reconstructed_original_with_extra_non_canonical_recovery_rejected() {
        let data = b"canonical reconstructed originals with bad extra recovery";
        let total = 6u16;
        let min = 3u16;

        let (_root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let mut shards = chunks
            .iter()
            .map(|chunk| chunk.shard.to_vec())
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        shards[4][0] ^= 0xFF;

        let mut builder = Builder::<Sha256>::new(total as usize);
        for shard in &shards {
            builder.add(&Sha256::hash(&[shard]));
        }
        let tree = builder.build();
        let root = tree.root();

        let pieces = [0u16, 1u16, 3u16, 4u16]
            .into_iter()
            .map(|i| {
                let proof = tree.proof(i as u32).unwrap();
                checked(
                    root,
                    Chunk::new(shards[i as usize].clone().into(), i, proof),
                )
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();

        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::Inconsistent)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_striped_surplus_recovery_tampered_rejected() {
        // Striped decode-reveal with more than `k` shards provided and an original missing,
        // where a surplus recovery shard is committed but non-canonical. The decoder is fed
        // exactly `k`; the trimmed surplus is reconstructed and rejected by the root check
        // (there is no separate provided-recovery comparison on this path).
        let data = vec![0xABu8; 64 * 1024];
        let total = 12u16;
        let min = 4u16;
        let shard_len = canonical_shard_len(data.len(), min as usize);
        assert!(
            shard_len >= 2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES,
            "test must exercise >= 2 stripes (shard_len={shard_len})"
        );

        // Provide originals 0,1 and recoveries 4,5,6 (5 > k=4, originals 2,3 missing). The
        // decoder is fed originals 0,1 + recoveries 4,5; recovery 6 is the trimmed surplus.
        let selected = [0u16, 1, 4, 5, 6];
        let tamper: fn(&mut [Vec<u8>], usize, usize) = |shards, _, _| shards[6][0] ^= 0xFF;
        let rejected = explore(|strategy| {
            matches!(
                decode_tampered_codeword(total, min, &data, &selected, tamper, strategy),
                Err(Error::Inconsistent)
            )
        });
        assert!(rejected);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_decode_invalid_index() {
        let data = b"Testing recovery pieces";
        let total = 8u16;
        let min = 3u16;

        // Encode the data
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // Use a mix of original and recovery pieces
        let mut invalid = checked(root, chunks[1].clone());
        invalid.index = 8;
        let pieces: Vec<_> = vec![
            checked(root, chunks[0].clone()), // original
            invalid,                          // recovery with invalid index
            checked(root, chunks[6].clone()), // recovery
        ];

        // Fail to decode
        let result = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::InvalidIndex(8))));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_max_chunks() {
        let data = vec![42u8; 1000]; // 1KB of data
        let total = u16::MAX;
        let min = u16::MAX / 2;

        // Encode data
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();

        // Try to decode with min
        let minimal = chunks
            .into_iter()
            .take(min as usize)
            .map(|c| checked(root, c))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let decoded = decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, minimal.iter(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded, data);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_too_many_chunks() {
        let data = vec![42u8; 1000]; // 1KB of data
        let total = u16::MAX;
        let min = u16::MAX / 2 - 1;

        // Encode data
        let result = encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            Err(Error::ReedSolomon(RsError::UnsupportedShardCount {
                original_count: _,
                recovery_count: _,
            }))
        ));
    }

    /// Decoding rejects unsupported shard counts before inspecting any chunk.
    #[test]
    fn test_decode_rejects_unsupported_shard_counts() {
        let data = vec![42u8; 1000];
        let (root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(10, 4, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let checked = chunks
            .into_iter()
            .map(|c| checked(root, c))
            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        let result =
            decode::<Sha256, _>(u16::MAX, u16::MAX / 2 - 1, &root, checked.iter(), &STRATEGY);
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            Err(Error::ReedSolomon(RsError::UnsupportedShardCount { .. }))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_too_many_total_shards() {
        assert!(
            RS::encode(
                &Config {
                    minimum_shards: NZU16!(u16::MAX / 2 + 1),
                    extra_shards: NZU16!(u16::MAX),
                },
                [].as_slice(),
                &STRATEGY,
            )
            .is_err()
        )
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_max_shard_size() {
        let config = |min, extra| Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(min),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(extra),
        };

        // Chunk 0 has the longest proof, since totals that are not powers of two give some later
        // chunks shorter proofs. The bound is chunk 0's shard and proof with both length prefixes
        // at their widest, and it never decreases as data grows.
        for (min, extra) in [(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 4), (171, 342), (342, 682)] {
            let config = config(min, extra);
            let mut previous = 0;
            for len in [0, 1, 2, 3, 333, 612, 4096, 1 << 20] {
                let data = vec![0x67; len];
                let (_, chunks) = RS::encode(&config, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
                let sizes: Vec<_> = chunks.iter().map(|chunk| chunk.encode().len()).collect();
                let bound = RS::max_shard_size(&config, len);
                assert_eq!(sizes.iter().max(), Some(&sizes[0]));
                assert!(sizes[0] <= bound);
                assert_eq!(
                    bound,
                    chunks[0].shard.len()
                        + u16::SIZE
                        + u32::SIZE
                        + chunks[0].proof.siblings.len() * Sha256Digest::SIZE
                        + 2 * UInt::<u32>::MAX_ENCODE_SIZE
                );
                assert!(bound >= previous);
                previous = bound;
            }
        }

        // With 16385 original shards, the backend supports at most 32768 recovery shards. The
        // bound covers `encode` at that limit, and `encode` rejects one more.
        let (_, chunks) = RS::encode(&config(16385, 32768), [].as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let bound = RS::max_shard_size(&config(16385, 32768), 0);
        assert!(chunks[0].encode().len() <= bound);
        assert_eq!(
            bound,
            2 + u16::SIZE + u32::SIZE + 16 * Sha256Digest::SIZE + 2 * UInt::<u32>::MAX_ENCODE_SIZE
        );
        assert!(RS::encode(&config(16385, 32769), [].as_slice(), &STRATEGY).is_err());

        // Data up to `u32::MAX` bytes has a bound.
        let max: usize = Widen::widen(u32::MAX);
        RS::max_shard_size(&config(2, 1), max);
    }

    #[test]
    #[should_panic(expected = "backend must support the shard counts")]
    fn test_max_shard_size_unsupported_counts() {
        // With 16385 original shards, the backend supports at most 32768 recovery shards.
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(16385),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(32769),
        };
        RS::max_shard_size(&config, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    #[should_panic(expected = "total shards must fit in u16")]
    fn test_max_shard_size_too_many_shards() {
        // 65535 original shards and one recovery shard exceed `u16::MAX` in total.
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(u16::MAX),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(1),
        };
        RS::max_shard_size(&config, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    #[should_panic(expected = "data must fit the u32 length prefix")]
    fn test_max_shard_size_data_beyond_prefix() {
        // One byte above `u32::MAX` does not fit the payload's length prefix.
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(2),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(1),
        };
        let max: usize = Widen::widen(u32::MAX);
        RS::max_shard_size(&config, max + 1);
    }

    #[test]
    #[should_panic(expected = "len must fit the u32 length prefix")]
    fn test_max_shard_size_shard_beyond_prefix() {
        // A single original shard of the largest payload is too wide for its length prefix.
        let config = Config {
            minimum_shards: NZU16!(1),
            extra_shards: NZU16!(1),
        };
        let max: usize = Widen::widen(u32::MAX);
        RS::max_shard_size(&config, max);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_chunk_encode_iobufs_matches_encode() {
        let data = b"iobufs encoding test";
        let (_root, chunks) = encode::<Sha256, _>(5, 3, data.as_slice(), &STRATEGY).unwrap();
        let chunk = &chunks[0];

        let encoded = chunk.encode();
        let mut encoded_iobufs = chunk.encode_iobufs();
        let mut encoded_iobufs_bytes = vec![0u8; encoded_iobufs.remaining()];
        encoded_iobufs.copy_to_slice(&mut encoded_iobufs_bytes);
        assert_eq!(encoded_iobufs_bytes, encoded.as_ref());
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "arbitrary")]
    mod conformance {
        use super::*;
        use commonware_codec::conformance::CodecConformance;
        use commonware_cryptography::sha256::Digest as Sha256Digest;

        commonware_conformance::conformance_tests! {
            CodecConformance<Chunk<Sha256Digest>>,
        }
    }

    fn owned_output_codeword(padded: &[u8], k: usize, m: usize) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
        assert_eq!(padded.len() % k, 0);
        let width = padded.len() / k;
        let mut encoder = Encoder::new(k, m, width).unwrap();
        for shard in padded.chunks_exact(width) {
            encoder.add_original_shard(shard).unwrap();
        }
        let encoded = encoder.encode().unwrap();
        let mut shards: Vec<_> = padded.chunks_exact(width).map(<[u8]>::to_vec).collect();
        shards.extend(encoded.recovery_iter().map(<[u8]>::to_vec));
        shards
    }

    fn owned_output_reconstructed(shards: &[Vec<u8>], k: usize) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
        let mut decoder = Decoder::new(k, shards.len() - k, shards[0].len()).unwrap();
        for (index, shard) in shards[k..2 * k].iter().enumerate() {
            decoder.add_recovery_shard(index, shard).unwrap();
        }
        let decoded = decoder.decode_with_recovery().unwrap().unwrap();
        let mut reconstructed = shards.to_vec();
        for (index, shard) in decoded.original_iter() {
            reconstructed[index] = shard.to_vec();
        }
        for (index, shard) in decoded.recovery_iter() {
            reconstructed[k + index] = shard.to_vec();
        }
        reconstructed
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_owned_output_authenticated_rejections() {
        let k = 4usize;
        let m = 8usize;
        let total = u16::try_from(k + m).expect("k + m must fit in u16");
        let min = u16::try_from(k).expect("k must fit in u16");
        let width = 2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 2;
        let data = vec![0x5A; k * width - u32::SIZE - 1];
        let canonical_width = canonical_shard_len(data.len(), k);
        let base = prepare_data(data.as_slice(), k, canonical_width);
        assert_eq!(canonical_width, width);
        assert_eq!(base.last(), Some(&0));
        for scenario in ["length_too_large", "length_max", "padding", "width", "root"] {
            let mut padded = base.clone();
            match scenario {
                "length_too_large" => {
                    let length = (padded.len() - u32::SIZE + 1) as u32;
                    padded[..u32::SIZE].copy_from_slice(&length.to_be_bytes());
                }
                "length_max" => padded[..u32::SIZE].copy_from_slice(&u32::MAX.to_be_bytes()),
                "padding" => *padded.last_mut().unwrap() = 1,
                "width" => padded.resize(padded.len() + 2 * k, 0),
                "root" => {}
                _ => unreachable!(),
            }
            let mut shards = owned_output_codeword(&padded, k, m);
            if scenario == "root" {
                // Supplied recoveries still reconstruct the canonical payload. Only an
                // unprovided original leaf differs from that reconstruction.
                shards[0][u32::SIZE] ^= 1;
            }
            assert!(shards[0].len() >= 2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES);
            let (root, chunks) = build_chunks(&shards);
            let pieces: Vec<_> = chunks[k..2 * k]
                .iter()
                .map(|chunk| {
                    check_chunk::<Sha256>(total, &root, chunk.index, chunk, || {
                        Sha256::hash(&[chunk.shard.as_ref()])
                    })
                    .unwrap()
                })
                .collect();

            // Establish that RS reconstruction and authentication succeed independently
            // of the format or commitment check under test.
            let reconstructed = owned_output_reconstructed(&shards, k);
            assert_eq!(reconstructed[..k].concat(), padded, "{scenario}");
            let originals: Vec<_> = reconstructed[..k].iter().map(Vec::as_slice).collect();
            if scenario == "root" {
                assert_eq!(extract_data(&originals, k, width).unwrap(), data);
                assert_ne!(build_chunks(&reconstructed).0, root);
            } else {
                assert_eq!(build_chunks(&reconstructed).0, root, "{scenario}");
                match scenario {
                    "length_too_large" | "length_max" => {
                        assert!(matches!(
                            read_data_len(&originals),
                            Err(Error::Inconsistent)
                        ));
                    }
                    "padding" => {
                        let len = read_data_len(&originals).unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(canonical_shard_len(len, k), shards[0].len());
                        assert_eq!(len, data.len());
                        assert_eq!(&padded[u32::SIZE..u32::SIZE + len], data);
                        assert_eq!(&padded[u32::SIZE + len..], &[1]);
                    }
                    "width" => {
                        let len = read_data_len(&originals).unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(len, data.len());
                        assert!(padded[u32::SIZE + len..].iter().all(|byte| *byte == 0));
                        assert_ne!(canonical_shard_len(len, k), shards[0].len());
                    }
                    _ => unreachable!(),
                }
            }
            let rejected = explore(|strategy| {
                matches!(
                    decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), strategy),
                    Err(Error::Inconsistent)
                )
            });
            assert!(rejected, "{scenario}");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_owned_output_recovery_and_mixed_roundtrip() {
        let total = 12u16;
        let min = 4u16;
        for width in [
            2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES,
            2 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 2,
            3 * MIN_STRIPE_BYTES + 62,
        ] {
            let data: Vec<_> = (0..min as usize * width - u32::SIZE - 1)
                .map(|index| (index ^ (index >> 8)) as u8)
                .collect();
            let (root, chunks) =
                encode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, data.as_slice(), &Sequential).unwrap();
            assert_eq!(chunks[0].shard.len(), width);
            for selected in [[4usize, 5, 6, 7], [0, 4, 5, 6]] {
                let pieces: Vec<_> = selected
                    .into_iter()
                    .map(|index| {
                        let chunk = &chunks[index];
                        check_chunk::<Sha256>(total, &root, chunk.index, chunk, || {
                            Sha256::hash(&[chunk.shard.as_ref()])
                        })
                        .unwrap()
                    })
                    .collect();
                assert_eq!(
                    explore(|strategy| {
                        decode::<Sha256, _>(total, min, &root, pieces.iter(), strategy).unwrap()
                    }),
                    data
                );
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_read_data_len_prefix_bounds() {
        let prefix = [0u8; u32::SIZE];
        for len in 0..u32::SIZE {
            assert!(matches!(
                read_data_len(&[&prefix[..len]]),
                Err(Error::Inconsistent)
            ));
        }
        assert_eq!(read_data_len(&[&prefix[..1], &prefix[1..]]).unwrap(), 0);
    }
}