clm-kernel 0.0.1

Cubical Logic Model (CLM) sovereign execution engine, CPN-VM, and Cordis spatiotemporal substrate
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
//! Authenticated Noise Transport (`Noise_XX_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE3`)
//! Canonical Path: kernel/clm_rust_core/src/mesh/noise.rs
//!
//! Implements:
//! 1. SovereignNodeIdentity with Ed25519 signing and Curve25519 (X25519) key agreement.
//! 2. Noise_XX 3-message mutual authentication handshake state machine.
//! 3. ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD symmetric framing with 2-byte big-endian length prefix.
//! 4. BLAKE3 hash mixing, HMAC-BLAKE3, and HKDF key derivation matching TypeScript core.
//! 5. Zero-leak buffer wiping on MAC verification failures (`INV-257-01`).
//! 6. Forward secrecy via ephemeral Curve25519 key agreements (`INV-257-02`).

use chacha20poly1305::{
    aead::{Aead, KeyInit, Payload},
    ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce,
};
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey as X25519PublicKey, StaticSecret as X25519StaticSecret};
use zeroize::Zeroize;

pub const NOISE_PROTOCOL_NAME: &str = "Noise_XX_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE3";
pub const NOISE_HASHLEN: usize = 32;
pub const NOISE_BLOCKLEN: usize = 64;
pub const NOISE_KEYLEN: usize = 32;
pub const NOISE_TAGLEN: usize = 16;
pub const NOISE_NONCELEN: usize = 12;
pub const NOISE_FRAME_HEADER_LEN: usize = 2;

// ── BLAKE3 Cryptographic Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────

/// Compute 32-byte BLAKE3 hash.
pub fn blake3_digest(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
    let hash = blake3::hash(data);
    *hash.as_bytes()
}

/// HMAC using BLAKE3 with 64-byte block size.
pub fn hmac_blake3(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
    let mut k = [0u8; NOISE_BLOCKLEN];
    if key.len() > NOISE_BLOCKLEN {
        let digest = blake3_digest(key);
        k[..32].copy_from_slice(&digest);
    } else {
        k[..key.len()].copy_from_slice(key);
    }

    let mut ipad = [0u8; NOISE_BLOCKLEN];
    let mut opad = [0u8; NOISE_BLOCKLEN];
    for i in 0..NOISE_BLOCKLEN {
        ipad[i] = k[i] ^ 0x36;
        opad[i] = k[i] ^ 0x5c;
    }

    let mut inner_input = Vec::with_capacity(NOISE_BLOCKLEN + data.len());
    inner_input.extend_from_slice(&ipad);
    inner_input.extend_from_slice(data);
    let inner_hash = blake3_digest(&inner_input);

    let mut outer_input = Vec::with_capacity(NOISE_BLOCKLEN + 32);
    outer_input.extend_from_slice(&opad);
    outer_input.extend_from_slice(&inner_hash);
    blake3_digest(&outer_input)
}

/// HKDF-2 using BLAKE3.
pub fn hkdf2(ck: &[u8; 32], ikm: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
    let prk = hmac_blake3(ck, ikm);
    let out1 = hmac_blake3(&prk, &[0x01]);
    let mut info2 = Vec::with_capacity(33);
    info2.extend_from_slice(&out1);
    info2.push(0x02);
    let out2 = hmac_blake3(&prk, &info2);
    (out1, out2)
}

/// HKDF-3 using BLAKE3.
pub fn hkdf3(ck: &[u8; 32], ikm: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
    let prk = hmac_blake3(ck, ikm);
    let out1 = hmac_blake3(&prk, &[0x01]);
    let mut info2 = Vec::with_capacity(33);
    info2.extend_from_slice(&out1);
    info2.push(0x02);
    let out2 = hmac_blake3(&prk, &info2);
    let mut info3 = Vec::with_capacity(33);
    info3.extend_from_slice(&out2);
    info3.push(0x03);
    let out3 = hmac_blake3(&prk, &info3);
    (out1, out2, out3)
}

// ── Sovereign Node Identity ────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct SovereignNodeIdentity {
    pub did: String,
    pub ed25519_public_key: [u8; 32],
    pub ed25519_private_key: [u8; 32],
    pub x25519_public_key: [u8; 32],
    pub x25519_private_key: [u8; 32],
    signing_key: SigningKey,
    x25519_secret: X25519StaticSecret,
}

impl SovereignNodeIdentity {
    /// Generate a random sovereign node identity.
    pub fn generate() -> Self {
        let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
        let mut rng = OsRng;
        rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rng, &mut seed);
        Self::from_seed(&seed)
    }

    /// Deterministically derive identity from a 32-byte seed.
    pub fn from_seed(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Self {
        let mut ed_input = Vec::with_capacity(44);
        ed_input.extend_from_slice(seed);
        ed_input.extend_from_slice(b"ed25519:seed");
        let ed_seed = blake3_digest(&ed_input);

        let mut x_input = Vec::with_capacity(42);
        x_input.extend_from_slice(seed);
        x_input.extend_from_slice(b"x25519:seed");
        let x_seed = blake3_digest(&x_input);

        let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&ed_seed);
        let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
        let ed_pub = verifying_key.to_bytes();

        let x_secret = X25519StaticSecret::from(x_seed);
        let x_pub = X25519PublicKey::from(&x_secret).to_bytes();

        let did = format!("did:pkc:{}", bs58::encode(&ed_pub).into_string());

        Self {
            did,
            ed25519_public_key: ed_pub,
            ed25519_private_key: ed_seed,
            x25519_public_key: x_pub,
            x25519_private_key: x_seed,
            signing_key,
            x25519_secret: x_secret,
        }
    }

    /// Sign data using Ed25519.
    pub fn sign(&self, message: &[u8]) -> [u8; 64] {
        let sig: Signature = self.signing_key.sign(message);
        sig.to_bytes()
    }

    /// Derives the Ed25519 public key bytes from a did:pkc:* identifier.
    pub fn did_to_public_key(did: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], String> {
        if !did.starts_with("did:pkc:") {
            return Err(format!("Invalid DID prefix for '{}'", did));
        }
        let rest = &did["did:pkc:".len()..];
        let bytes = if rest.starts_with('z') {
            let decoded = bs58::decode(&rest[1..]).into_vec().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
            if decoded.len() >= 2 && decoded[0] == 0xed && decoded[1] == 0x01 {
                decoded[2..].to_vec()
            } else {
                decoded
            }
        } else {
            bs58::decode(rest).into_vec().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
        };

        if bytes.len() != 32 {
            return Err(format!("Invalid public key length from DID: {}", bytes.len()));
        }
        let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
        arr.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
        Ok(arr)
    }

    /// Derives the did:pkc:* identifier from an Ed25519 public key.
    pub fn public_key_to_did(pubkey: &[u8; 32]) -> String {
        format!("did:pkc:{}", bs58::encode(pubkey).into_string())
    }


    /// Verify signature on data using Ed25519.
    pub fn verify(&self, message: &[u8], signature: &[u8; 64]) -> bool {
        Self::verify_signature(&self.ed25519_public_key, message, signature)
    }

    /// Static signature verification.
    pub fn verify_signature(public_key: &[u8; 32], message: &[u8], signature: &[u8; 64]) -> bool {
        if let Ok(vk) = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(public_key) {
            let sig = Signature::from_bytes(signature);
            vk.verify(message, &sig).is_ok()
        } else {
            false
        }
    }

    /// Diffie-Hellman against peer X25519 public key.
    pub fn diffie_hellman(&self, peer_x25519_public: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
        let peer_pub = X25519PublicKey::from(*peer_x25519_public);
        *self.x25519_secret.diffie_hellman(&peer_pub).as_bytes()
    }
}

// ── Noise CipherState ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct NoiseCipherState {
    pub key: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    pub nonce: u64,
}

impl NoiseCipherState {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self { key: None, nonce: 0 }
    }

    pub fn initialize_key(&mut self, key: Option<[u8; 32]>) {
        self.key = key;
        self.nonce = 0;
    }

    pub fn has_key(&self) -> bool {
        self.key.is_some()
    }

    pub fn encrypt_with_ad(&mut self, ad: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        let key_bytes = match self.key {
            Some(k) => k,
            None => return Ok(plaintext.to_vec()),
        };

        let key = Key::from(key_bytes);
        let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key);

        let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; NOISE_NONCELEN];
        nonce_bytes[4..12].copy_from_slice(&self.nonce.to_be_bytes());
        let nonce = Nonce::from(nonce_bytes);

        let payload = Payload { msg: plaintext, aad: ad };
        let ciphertext = cipher
            .encrypt(&nonce, payload)
            .map_err(|e| format!("ChaCha20Poly1305 encryption failed: {}", e))?;

        self.nonce += 1;
        Ok(ciphertext)
    }

    pub fn decrypt_with_ad(&mut self, ad: &[u8], ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        let key_bytes = match self.key {
            Some(k) => k,
            None => return Ok(ciphertext.to_vec()),
        };

        if ciphertext.len() < NOISE_TAGLEN {
            self.zeroize();
            return Err(format!("Ciphertext too short: {} < {}", ciphertext.len(), NOISE_TAGLEN));
        }

        let key = Key::from(key_bytes);
        let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key);

        let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; NOISE_NONCELEN];
        nonce_bytes[4..12].copy_from_slice(&self.nonce.to_be_bytes());
        let nonce = Nonce::from(nonce_bytes);

        let payload = Payload { msg: ciphertext, aad: ad };
        let plaintext = cipher
            .decrypt(&nonce, payload)
            .map_err(|e| {
                self.zeroize();
                format!("MAC verification failed: {} (INV-257-01)", e)
            })?;

        self.nonce += 1;
        Ok(plaintext)
    }

    pub fn zeroize(&mut self) {
        if let Some(ref mut k) = self.key {
            k.zeroize();
        }
        self.key = None;
        self.nonce = 0;
    }
}

// ── Noise SymmetricState ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct NoiseSymmetricState {
    pub cipher: NoiseCipherState,
    pub ck: [u8; 32],
    pub h: [u8; 32],
}

impl NoiseSymmetricState {
    pub fn new(protocol_name: &str) -> Self {
        let mut h = [0u8; 32];
        let name_bytes = protocol_name.as_bytes();
        if name_bytes.len() <= 32 {
            h[..name_bytes.len()].copy_from_slice(name_bytes);
        } else {
            h = blake3_digest(name_bytes);
        }
        let ck = h;
        Self {
            cipher: NoiseCipherState::new(),
            ck,
            h,
        }
    }

    pub fn mix_key(&mut self, ikm: &[u8]) {
        let (next_ck, temp_k) = hkdf2(&self.ck, ikm);
        self.ck = next_ck;
        self.cipher.initialize_key(Some(temp_k));
    }

    pub fn mix_hash(&mut self, data: &[u8]) {
        let mut input = Vec::with_capacity(self.h.len() + data.len());
        input.extend_from_slice(&self.h);
        input.extend_from_slice(data);
        self.h = blake3_digest(&input);
    }

    pub fn mix_key_and_hash(&mut self, ikm: &[u8]) {
        let (next_ck, temp_h, temp_k) = hkdf3(&self.ck, ikm);
        self.ck = next_ck;
        self.mix_hash(&temp_h);
        self.cipher.initialize_key(Some(temp_k));
    }

    pub fn encrypt_and_hash(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        let ciphertext = self.cipher.encrypt_with_ad(&self.h, plaintext)?;
        self.mix_hash(&ciphertext);
        Ok(ciphertext)
    }

    pub fn decrypt_and_hash(&mut self, ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        let plaintext = self.cipher.decrypt_with_ad(&self.h, ciphertext)?;
        self.mix_hash(ciphertext);
        Ok(plaintext)
    }

    pub fn split(&mut self) -> (NoiseCipherState, NoiseCipherState) {
        let (k1, k2) = hkdf2(&self.ck, &[]);
        let mut c1 = NoiseCipherState::new();
        c1.initialize_key(Some(k1));
        let mut c2 = NoiseCipherState::new();
        c2.initialize_key(Some(k2));
        (c1, c2)
    }

    pub fn zeroize(&mut self) {
        self.ck.zeroize();
        self.h.zeroize();
        self.cipher.zeroize();
    }
}

// ── Noise Handshake State Machine ──────────────────────────────────────────

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum HandshakeRole {
    Initiator,
    Responder,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum HandshakePhase {
    Initial,
    Msg1Sent,
    Msg1Received,
    Msg2Sent,
    Msg2Received,
    Completed,
    Terminated,
}

pub struct HandshakePayloadResult {
    pub remote_did: Option<String>,
    pub remote_ed25519_public: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    pub remote_x25519_public: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    pub extra_payload: Vec<u8>,
}

pub struct NoiseHandshakeState {
    pub role: HandshakeRole,
    pub local_identity: SovereignNodeIdentity,
    pub symmetric: NoiseSymmetricState,
    pub exchange_ed25519: bool,
    phase: HandshakePhase,
    local_ephemeral_secret: Option<X25519StaticSecret>,
    local_ephemeral_public: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    remote_ephemeral_public: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    remote_static_x25519: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    remote_static_ed25519: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    remote_did: Option<String>,
    session: Option<NoiseTransportSession>,
}

impl NoiseHandshakeState {
    pub fn new(role: HandshakeRole, local_identity: SovereignNodeIdentity, exchange_ed25519: bool) -> Self {
        Self {
            role,
            local_identity,
            symmetric: NoiseSymmetricState::new(NOISE_PROTOCOL_NAME),
            exchange_ed25519,
            phase: HandshakePhase::Initial,
            local_ephemeral_secret: None,
            local_ephemeral_public: None,
            remote_ephemeral_public: None,
            remote_static_x25519: None,
            remote_static_ed25519: None,
            remote_did: None,
            session: None,
        }
    }

    pub fn phase(&self) -> HandshakePhase {
        self.phase
    }

    pub fn remote_did(&self) -> Option<&str> {
        self.remote_did.as_deref()
    }

    pub fn write_message1(&mut self, extra_payload: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Initiator || self.phase != HandshakePhase::Initial {
            return Err("Cannot write message 1 in current phase".into());
        }

        let mut rng = OsRng;
        let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
        rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rng, &mut seed);
        let secret = X25519StaticSecret::from(seed);
        let pubkey = X25519PublicKey::from(&secret).to_bytes();

        self.symmetric.mix_hash(&pubkey);
        let payload_ct = self.symmetric.encrypt_and_hash(extra_payload)?;

        let mut msg1 = Vec::with_capacity(32 + payload_ct.len());
        msg1.extend_from_slice(&pubkey);
        msg1.extend_from_slice(&payload_ct);

        self.local_ephemeral_secret = Some(secret);
        self.local_ephemeral_public = Some(pubkey);
        self.phase = HandshakePhase::Msg1Sent;

        Ok(msg1)
    }

    pub fn read_message1(&mut self, msg1: &[u8]) -> Result<HandshakePayloadResult, String> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Responder || self.phase != HandshakePhase::Initial {
            self.terminate_and_zeroize();
            return Err("Cannot read message 1 in current phase".into());
        }
        if msg1.len() < 32 {
            self.terminate_and_zeroize();
            return Err("Message 1 too short".into());
        }

        let mut remote_e = [0u8; 32];
        remote_e.copy_from_slice(&msg1[..32]);
        self.symmetric.mix_hash(&remote_e);

        let extra_payload = match self.symmetric.decrypt_and_hash(&msg1[32..]) {
            Ok(pt) => pt,
            Err(e) => {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                return Err(e);
            }
        };

        self.remote_ephemeral_public = Some(remote_e);
        self.phase = HandshakePhase::Msg1Received;

        Ok(HandshakePayloadResult {
            remote_did: None,
            remote_ed25519_public: None,
            remote_x25519_public: None,
            extra_payload,
        })
    }

    pub fn write_message2(&mut self, extra_payload: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Responder || self.phase != HandshakePhase::Msg1Received {
            return Err("Cannot write message 2 in current phase".into());
        }
        let remote_e_bytes = match self.remote_ephemeral_public {
            Some(b) => b,
            None => return Err("Missing remote ephemeral public key".into()),
        };

        let mut rng = OsRng;
        let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
        rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rng, &mut seed);
        let secret = X25519StaticSecret::from(seed);
        let pubkey = X25519PublicKey::from(&secret).to_bytes();

        self.symmetric.mix_hash(&pubkey);

        let remote_e = X25519PublicKey::from(remote_e_bytes);
        let ee = secret.diffie_hellman(&remote_e);
        self.symmetric.mix_key(ee.as_bytes());

        let encrypted_sr = self.symmetric.encrypt_and_hash(&self.local_identity.x25519_public_key)?;

        let es = self.local_identity.x25519_secret.diffie_hellman(&remote_e);
        self.symmetric.mix_key(es.as_bytes());

        let payload = if self.exchange_ed25519 {
            let sig = self.local_identity.sign(&self.symmetric.h);
            let mut p = Vec::with_capacity(32 + 64 + extra_payload.len());
            p.extend_from_slice(&self.local_identity.ed25519_public_key);
            p.extend_from_slice(&sig);
            p.extend_from_slice(extra_payload);
            p
        } else {
            extra_payload.to_vec()
        };

        let encrypted_payload = self.symmetric.encrypt_and_hash(&payload)?;

        let mut msg2 = Vec::with_capacity(32 + encrypted_sr.len() + encrypted_payload.len());
        msg2.extend_from_slice(&pubkey);
        msg2.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_sr);
        msg2.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_payload);

        self.local_ephemeral_secret = Some(secret);
        self.local_ephemeral_public = Some(pubkey);
        self.phase = HandshakePhase::Msg2Sent;

        Ok(msg2)
    }

    pub fn read_message2(&mut self, msg2: &[u8]) -> Result<HandshakePayloadResult, String> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Initiator || self.phase != HandshakePhase::Msg1Sent {
            self.terminate_and_zeroize();
            return Err("Cannot read message 2 in current phase".into());
        }
        if msg2.len() < 32 + 32 + NOISE_TAGLEN {
            self.terminate_and_zeroize();
            return Err("Message 2 too short".into());
        }

        let local_e_secret = match self.local_ephemeral_secret.as_ref() {
            Some(s) => s,
            None => return Err("Missing local ephemeral secret".into()),
        };

        let mut remote_e = [0u8; 32];
        remote_e.copy_from_slice(&msg2[..32]);
        self.symmetric.mix_hash(&remote_e);

        let remote_e_pub = X25519PublicKey::from(remote_e);
        let ee = local_e_secret.diffie_hellman(&remote_e_pub);
        self.symmetric.mix_key(ee.as_bytes());

        let sr_pub = match self.symmetric.decrypt_and_hash(&msg2[32..32 + 48]) {
            Ok(pt) => pt,
            Err(e) => {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                return Err(e);
            }
        };

        let mut sr_arr = [0u8; 32];
        sr_arr.copy_from_slice(&sr_pub);
        let sr_xpub = X25519PublicKey::from(sr_arr);
        let es = local_e_secret.diffie_hellman(&sr_xpub);
        self.symmetric.mix_key(es.as_bytes());

        let h_snapshot = self.symmetric.h;

        let payload_pt = match self.symmetric.decrypt_and_hash(&msg2[80..]) {
            Ok(pt) => pt,
            Err(e) => {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                return Err(e);
            }
        };

        let mut remote_did = None;
        let mut remote_ed25519 = None;
        

        let extra_payload = if self.exchange_ed25519 {
            if payload_pt.len() < 96 {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                return Err("Missing Ed25519 authentication in payload".into());
            }
            let mut ed_pub = [0u8; 32];
            ed_pub.copy_from_slice(&payload_pt[..32]);
            let mut sig = [0u8; 64];
            sig.copy_from_slice(&payload_pt[32..96]);

            if !SovereignNodeIdentity::verify_signature(&ed_pub, &h_snapshot, &sig) {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                return Err("Responder Ed25519 signature verification failed (INV-257-01)".into());
            }

            let did_str = format!("did:pkc:{}", bs58::encode(&ed_pub).into_string());
            remote_did = Some(did_str.clone());
            self.remote_did = Some(did_str);
            remote_ed25519 = Some(ed_pub);
            self.remote_static_ed25519 = Some(ed_pub);
            payload_pt[96..].to_vec()
        } else {
            payload_pt
        };

        self.remote_ephemeral_public = Some(remote_e);
        self.remote_static_x25519 = Some(sr_arr);
        self.phase = HandshakePhase::Msg2Received;

        Ok(HandshakePayloadResult {
            remote_did,
            remote_ed25519_public: remote_ed25519,
            remote_x25519_public: Some(sr_arr),
            extra_payload,
        })
    }

    pub fn write_message3(&mut self, extra_payload: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Initiator || self.phase != HandshakePhase::Msg2Received {
            return Err("Cannot write message 3 in current phase".into());
        }
        let remote_e_bytes = match self.remote_ephemeral_public {
            Some(b) => b,
            None => return Err("Missing remote ephemeral public key".into()),
        };

        let encrypted_si = self.symmetric.encrypt_and_hash(&self.local_identity.x25519_public_key)?;

        let remote_e = X25519PublicKey::from(remote_e_bytes);
        let se = self.local_identity.x25519_secret.diffie_hellman(&remote_e);
        self.symmetric.mix_key(se.as_bytes());

        let payload = if self.exchange_ed25519 {
            let sig = self.local_identity.sign(&self.symmetric.h);
            let mut p = Vec::with_capacity(32 + 64 + extra_payload.len());
            p.extend_from_slice(&self.local_identity.ed25519_public_key);
            p.extend_from_slice(&sig);
            p.extend_from_slice(extra_payload);
            p
        } else {
            extra_payload.to_vec()
        };

        let encrypted_payload = self.symmetric.encrypt_and_hash(&payload)?;

        let mut msg3 = Vec::with_capacity(encrypted_si.len() + encrypted_payload.len());
        msg3.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_si);
        msg3.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_payload);

        let (c1, c2) = self.symmetric.split();
        let remote_pub = self.remote_static_x25519.unwrap_or([0u8; 32]);
        let remote_did = self.remote_did.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| {
            format!("did:pkc:{}", bs58::encode(&remote_pub).into_string())
        });

        self.session = Some(NoiseTransportSession::new(
            c1,
            c2,
            self.symmetric.h,
            self.local_identity.clone(),
            remote_pub,
            remote_did,
        ));

        self.phase = HandshakePhase::Completed;
        Ok(msg3)
    }

    pub fn read_message3(&mut self, msg3: &[u8]) -> Result<HandshakePayloadResult, String> {
        if self.role != HandshakeRole::Responder || self.phase != HandshakePhase::Msg2Sent {
            self.terminate_and_zeroize();
            return Err("Cannot read message 3 in current phase".into());
        }
        if msg3.len() < 48 {
            self.terminate_and_zeroize();
            return Err("Message 3 too short".into());
        }

        let local_e_secret = match self.local_ephemeral_secret.as_ref() {
            Some(s) => s,
            None => return Err("Missing local ephemeral secret".into()),
        };

        let si_pub = match self.symmetric.decrypt_and_hash(&msg3[..48]) {
            Ok(pt) => pt,
            Err(e) => {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                return Err(e);
            }
        };

        let mut si_arr = [0u8; 32];
        si_arr.copy_from_slice(&si_pub);
        let si_xpub = X25519PublicKey::from(si_arr);
        let se = local_e_secret.diffie_hellman(&si_xpub);
        self.symmetric.mix_key(se.as_bytes());

        let h_snapshot = self.symmetric.h;

        let payload_pt = match self.symmetric.decrypt_and_hash(&msg3[48..]) {
            Ok(pt) => pt,
            Err(e) => {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                return Err(e);
            }
        };

        let mut remote_did = None;
        let mut remote_ed25519 = None;
        

        let extra_payload = if self.exchange_ed25519 {
            if payload_pt.len() < 96 {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                return Err("Missing Ed25519 authentication in payload".into());
            }
            let mut ed_pub = [0u8; 32];
            ed_pub.copy_from_slice(&payload_pt[..32]);
            let mut sig = [0u8; 64];
            sig.copy_from_slice(&payload_pt[32..96]);

            if !SovereignNodeIdentity::verify_signature(&ed_pub, &h_snapshot, &sig) {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                return Err("Initiator Ed25519 signature verification failed (INV-257-01)".into());
            }

            let did_str = format!("did:pkc:{}", bs58::encode(&ed_pub).into_string());
            remote_did = Some(did_str.clone());
            self.remote_did = Some(did_str);
            remote_ed25519 = Some(ed_pub);
            self.remote_static_ed25519 = Some(ed_pub);
            payload_pt[96..].to_vec()
        } else {
            payload_pt
        };

        self.remote_static_x25519 = Some(si_arr);

        let (c1, c2) = self.symmetric.split();
        let remote_pub = si_arr;
        let final_remote_did = self.remote_did.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| {
            format!("did:pkc:{}", bs58::encode(&remote_pub).into_string())
        });

        self.session = Some(NoiseTransportSession::new(
            c2, // Responder sends with c2
            c1, // Responder receives with c1
            self.symmetric.h,
            self.local_identity.clone(),
            remote_pub,
            final_remote_did,
        ));

        self.phase = HandshakePhase::Completed;

        Ok(HandshakePayloadResult {
            remote_did,
            remote_ed25519_public: remote_ed25519,
            remote_x25519_public: Some(si_arr),
            extra_payload,
        })
    }

    pub fn into_session(mut self) -> Result<NoiseTransportSession, String> {
        self.session.take().ok_or_else(|| "Session not established".into())
    }

    pub fn terminate_and_zeroize(&mut self) {
        self.phase = HandshakePhase::Terminated;
        self.symmetric.zeroize();
        self.local_ephemeral_secret = None;
        self.local_ephemeral_public = None;
        if let Some(ref mut sess) = self.session {
            sess.terminate_and_zeroize();
        }
    }
}

// ── Noise Transport Session ────────────────────────────────────────────────

pub struct NoiseTransportSession {
    pub send_cipher: NoiseCipherState,
    pub recv_cipher: NoiseCipherState,
    pub handshake_hash: [u8; 32],
    pub local_identity: SovereignNodeIdentity,
    pub remote_static_public: [u8; 32],
    pub remote_did: String,
    pub is_terminated: bool,
}

impl NoiseTransportSession {
    pub fn new(
        send_cipher: NoiseCipherState,
        recv_cipher: NoiseCipherState,
        handshake_hash: [u8; 32],
        local_identity: SovereignNodeIdentity,
        remote_static_public: [u8; 32],
        remote_did: String,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            send_cipher,
            recv_cipher,
            handshake_hash,
            local_identity,
            remote_static_public,
            remote_did,
            is_terminated: false,
        }
    }

    /// Encrypt plaintext into an authenticated framed message:
    /// `[2B big-endian length] [12B nonce] [ciphertext] [16B tag]`
    pub fn encrypt_frame(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        if self.is_terminated {
            return Err("Cannot operate on terminated Noise transport session".into());
        }

        let current_nonce = self.send_cipher.nonce;
        let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; NOISE_NONCELEN];
        nonce_bytes[4..12].copy_from_slice(&current_nonce.to_be_bytes());

        let ciphertext_with_tag = self.send_cipher.encrypt_with_ad(&[], plaintext)?;
        let payload_len = NOISE_NONCELEN + ciphertext_with_tag.len();
        if payload_len > 0xffff {
            return Err(format!("Frame payload exceeds 65535 bytes: {}", payload_len));
        }

        let mut frame = Vec::with_capacity(NOISE_FRAME_HEADER_LEN + payload_len);
        frame.extend_from_slice(&(payload_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
        frame.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
        frame.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext_with_tag);

        Ok(frame)
    }

    /// Decrypt an authenticated framed message into plaintext.
    /// Terminates session and zeroizes keys on MAC verification failure (`INV-257-01`).
    pub fn decrypt_frame(&mut self, frame: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
        if self.is_terminated {
            return Err("Cannot operate on terminated Noise transport session".into());
        }

        if frame.len() < NOISE_FRAME_HEADER_LEN + NOISE_NONCELEN + NOISE_TAGLEN {
            self.terminate_and_zeroize();
            return Err(format!("Frame too short: {} < 30 (INV-257-01)", frame.len()));
        }

        let payload_len = u16::from_be_bytes([frame[0], frame[1]]) as usize;
        if frame.len() < NOISE_FRAME_HEADER_LEN + payload_len {
            self.terminate_and_zeroize();
            return Err(format!("Truncated frame: expected {}, got {}", NOISE_FRAME_HEADER_LEN + payload_len, frame.len()));
        }

        let mut nonce_counter_bytes = [0u8; 8];
        nonce_counter_bytes.copy_from_slice(&frame[NOISE_FRAME_HEADER_LEN + 4..NOISE_FRAME_HEADER_LEN + 12]);
        let frame_nonce = u64::from_be_bytes(nonce_counter_bytes);

        if frame_nonce != self.recv_cipher.nonce {
            self.terminate_and_zeroize();
            return Err(format!(
                "Replay or out-of-order frame: expected nonce {}, got {} (INV-257-01)",
                self.recv_cipher.nonce, frame_nonce
            ));
        }

        let ct_with_tag = &frame[NOISE_FRAME_HEADER_LEN + NOISE_NONCELEN..NOISE_FRAME_HEADER_LEN + payload_len];
        match self.recv_cipher.decrypt_with_ad(&[], ct_with_tag) {
            Ok(pt) => Ok(pt),
            Err(e) => {
                self.terminate_and_zeroize();
                Err(e)
            }
        }
    }

    pub fn terminate_and_zeroize(&mut self) {
        self.is_terminated = true;
        self.send_cipher.zeroize();
        self.recv_cipher.zeroize();
    }
}

// ── Tests ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_sovereign_identity_generation_and_signing() {
        let alice = SovereignNodeIdentity::generate();
        assert!(alice.did.starts_with("did:pkc:"));
        let msg = b"test rust signature";
        let sig = alice.sign(msg);
        assert!(alice.verify(msg, &sig));

        let mut bad_msg = msg.to_vec();
        bad_msg[0] ^= 0xff;
        assert!(!alice.verify(&bad_msg, &sig));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_x25519_diffie_hellman_symmetric() {
        let alice = SovereignNodeIdentity::generate();
        let bob = SovereignNodeIdentity::generate();

        let s1 = alice.diffie_hellman(&bob.x25519_public_key);
        let s2 = bob.diffie_hellman(&alice.x25519_public_key);
        assert_eq!(s1, s2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_noise_xx_handshake_and_transport_framing() {
        let alice = SovereignNodeIdentity::generate();
        let bob = SovereignNodeIdentity::generate();

        let mut initiator = NoiseHandshakeState::new(HandshakeRole::Initiator, alice.clone(), true);
        let mut responder = NoiseHandshakeState::new(HandshakeRole::Responder, bob.clone(), true);

        // 1. Initiator -> Responder
        let msg1 = initiator.write_message1(b"ping-1").expect("msg1 write");
        let res1 = responder.read_message1(&msg1).expect("msg1 read");
        assert_eq!(res1.extra_payload, b"ping-1");

        // 2. Responder -> Initiator
        let msg2 = responder.write_message2(b"pong-2").expect("msg2 write");
        let res2 = initiator.read_message2(&msg2).expect("msg2 read");
        assert_eq!(res2.remote_did.as_deref(), Some(bob.did.as_str()));
        assert_eq!(res2.extra_payload, b"pong-2");

        // 3. Initiator -> Responder
        let msg3 = initiator.write_message3(b"ack-3").expect("msg3 write");
        let res3 = responder.read_message3(&msg3).expect("msg3 read");
        assert_eq!(res3.remote_did.as_deref(), Some(alice.did.as_str()));
        assert_eq!(res3.extra_payload, b"ack-3");

        // Transport
        let mut alice_session = initiator.into_session().expect("alice session");
        let mut bob_session = responder.into_session().expect("bob session");

        assert_eq!(alice_session.handshake_hash, bob_session.handshake_hash);

        // Alice -> Bob frame
        let frame = alice_session.encrypt_frame(b"secure conversational payload").expect("encrypt");
        let pt = bob_session.decrypt_frame(&frame).expect("decrypt");
        assert_eq!(pt, b"secure conversational payload");

        // Bob -> Alice frame
        let reply_frame = bob_session.encrypt_frame(b"response payload").expect("encrypt reply");
        let reply_pt = alice_session.decrypt_frame(&reply_frame).expect("decrypt reply");
        assert_eq!(reply_pt, b"response payload");

        // Tampering test (INV-257-01)
        let mut bad_frame = alice_session.encrypt_frame(b"tamper test").expect("enc");
        bad_frame[20] ^= 0xaa;
        assert!(bob_session.decrypt_frame(&bad_frame).is_err());
        assert!(bob_session.is_terminated);
    }
}