Struct RevocationView 

pub struct RevocationView { /* private fields */ }

Which keys of which projects are certified or revoked, merged from the user chain, the identity journal and the certificate files. Built only by Self::build; there is no way to add an unverified certificate.

Implementations

impl RevocationView

pub fn build( user_pubkey: &[u8; 32], events: &[ChainEvent], journal: &[JournalRecord], cert_files: &[ProjectCert], ) -> Self

Merge events (only SOURCE events count), journal records and cert_files into one view. Every certificate must verify against user_pubkey or it is dropped (see Self::rejected).

pub fn build_with( trust: &UserKeyHistory, events: &[ChainEvent], journal: &[JournalRecord], cert_files: &[ProjectCert], ) -> Self

Self::build under a user-key rotation history: a certificate sealed by a retired user key counts when it is dated at or before that key’s rotation point (ADR-103 A13); one dated after it is dropped.

pub fn all_project_ids(&self) -> Vec<String>

Every project id the view knows (certified, rekeyed or revoked).

pub fn key_history(&self, project_id: &str) -> Vec<&ProjectCert>

Every certificate ever issued for project_id whose key was not revoked for compromise: the current key and keys replaced by a rekey. A key removed by project.revoke is excluded. Statements the project signed with these keys are history, not forgeries.

pub fn is_compromised(&self, project_id: &str, key_id: &str) -> bool

Was key_id removed by project.revoke (not replaced by a rekey)?

pub fn all_certs(&self, project_id: &str) -> Vec<&ProjectCert>

Every certificate ever issued for project_id, compromised keys included. For re-verifying records the daemon itself accepted while the key was valid.

pub fn export_records(&self) -> Vec<JournalRecord>

The state as journal records, for rebuilding a lost journal: every verified certificate, then every revocation this view knows. A revocation that only the lost journal remembered cannot be recovered.

pub fn rejected(&self) -> usize

Certificates dropped because they did not verify against the user key.

pub fn is_revoked(&self, project_id: &str, key_id: &str) -> bool

Is this key revoked for this project?

pub fn was_revoked(&self, project_id: &str) -> bool

True when project.revoke revoked a key of this project (a key only replaced by project.rekey does not count).

pub fn current_cert(&self, project_id: &str) -> Option<&ProjectCert>

The certificate in force: the highest-serial one whose key is not revoked.

pub fn bound_key_id(&self, project_id: &str) -> Option<&str>

The key_id currently certified for project_id.

pub fn last_serial(&self, project_id: &str) -> u64

Highest serial ever issued for project_id (0 when none).

pub fn key_owner(&self, key_id: &str) -> Option<&str>

The project that first claimed key_id, certified or revoked.

pub fn check_cert(&self, cert: &ProjectCert) -> Result<(), IdentityError>

Refuse a certificate whose key was revoked or replaced.

pub fn plan_registration( &self, project_id: &str, project_pubkey: &[u8; 32], ) -> Result<Registration, IdentityError>

TOFU decision for project.register of project_pubkey.

pub fn plan_rekey( &self, project_id: &str, new_pubkey: &[u8; 32], ) -> Result<(String, u64), IdentityError>

Rekey decision: the project must have a certified key, and the new one must differ from it, never have been revoked and not belong to another project. Returns the old key_id and the next serial.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for RevocationView

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for RevocationView

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.