Clatter 🔊
no_std
compatible, pure Rust implementation of the Noise protocol framework
with support for Post Quantum (PQ) extensions as presented by
Yawning Angel, Benjamin Dowling, Andreas Hülsing, Peter Schwabe, and Fiona Johanna Weber.
Main targets of this crate are correctness, extensibility, and strict no_std
compatibility
and those come with the small drawback of more verbose user experience with some boilerplate.
If you don't need PQ functionality and are developing for a regular target, you probably are better
off using these instead:
Basis of this implementation relies heavily on the abovementioned crates and I'm extending huge thanks to the developers for their effort!
⚠️ Warning ⚠️
- This library has not received any formal audit
- While we enable some cryptographic providers by default, it is up to you to get familiar with those and decide if they meet your security and integrity requirements
- Post-Quantum cryptography generally is not as established and mature as classical cryptography. Users are encouraged to implement hybrid encryption schemes with classical
crypto primitives incorporated to provide additional security in case of a catastrophic flaw in the post-quantum algorithms.
Clatter provides
DualLayerHandshake
for this purpose.
📖 Documentation 📖
Noise Protocol
This crate tracks Noise protocol framework revision 34. As of now we omit support for the following features:
- Handshake pattern parsing support - Handshakes have to be instantiated with the correct primitives compile-time
- Curve 448 DH support - No suitable Rust implementation exists for our requirements
- Deferred pattern support - Can be implemented by the user
- Fallback pattern support - Can be implemented by the user
PQ? NQ? Why should I care?
This crate refers to classical Noise handshakes as NQ handshakes (non-post-quantum). But what does a PQ (post-quantum) handshake actually mean?
Key encapsulation mechanism or KEM is a public-key encryption system that allows a sender to securely transmit a short shared secret to a receiver using the receivers public key. This shared secret can then be used as a basis for further symmetric encrypted communication.
Classical Noise uses Diffie-Hellman or DH key exchanges to establish a shared secret between the parties. During a DH key exchange the shared secret is generated by both parties through mutual computations on the publicly transmitted data - whereas KEMs are used to transmit the shared secret directly.
The motivation to use KEMs lies in the fact that there are KEM algorithms that are currently thought to be secure against cryptoanalytic attacks by quantum computers. The DH algorithms used by Noise rely on the difficulty of mathematical problems that can be easily solved on a powerful quantum computer. Such quantum computers do not exist yet, but the world is already shifting towards quantum-safe cryptography.
Post Quantum Noise by Yawning Angel et al. introduced methods and rules for substituting DH key exchanges from classical Noise with KEMs, while maintaining a similar level of secrecy. This crate provides a safe Rust based implementation for the post-quantum handshakes proposed by PQNoise - so that we can keep on benefitting from the clarity and formal security guarantees of Noise even in post-quantum era.
PQ Handshake Notation
Noise uses a simple pattern language for defining the handshake patterns. PQ patterns follow these same
rules, only substituting DH tokens with ekem
and skem
operations, which indicate sending of a ciphertext
that was encapsulated to the ephemeral/static key of the receiving party.
Differences to PQNoise paper
- PQNoise presents the possibility to use different KEMs for ephemeral, initiator, and responder. With Clatter the same KEM is used for both initiator and responder operations, while it is still possible to configure a separate KEM for ephemeral use.
- PQNoise presents SEEC, a method for improving RNG security in bad randomness settings. Clatter does not currently implement SEEC.
Protocol Naming and Interoperability
Noise uses the protocol name as a basis for the handshake hash and for this reason it is important for cross-implementation compatibility to have consistent naming schemes for the crypto primitives. For all the classical ones Noise spec defines the naming but there is no absolute source for naming the PQ ones.
On top of this, there's also the fact that Kyber KEM was renamed to "ML-KEM" during the selection process and some crypto crates still use the term "Kyber" while others have migrated to "ML-KEM". Clatter uses whichever name the underlying crate has chosen to use.
Thus Clatter proposes and uses the following naming scheme:
Primitive | Protocol Name |
---|---|
Kyber 512 | Kyber512 |
Kyber 768 | Kyber768 |
Kyber 1024 | Kyber1024 |
ML-KEM-512 | MLKEM512 |
ML-KEM-768 | MLKEM768 |
ML-KEM-1024 | MLKEM1024 |
Clatter also includes the possibility to pick different KEMs for ehpemeral and static operations. If the same KEM is used for both, the name of the KEM is simply placed in the protocol name in place of the DH algorithm.
Examples:
Noise_pqNN_Kyber512_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s
Noise_pqNN_MLKEM512_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s
If, however, a different KEM is used for ephemeral and static operations, the resulting name will include both
KEMs joined together with a +
symbol - ephemeral KEM first.
Examples:
Noise_pqNN_Kyber512+Kyber1024_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s
Noise_pqNN_MLKEM512+Kyber768_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s
Verification
Caltter is verified by:
- Unit tests
- Integration tests
- Fuzzing
- Cacophony and Snow test vectors
- Supported pre-made handshake patterns verified
- Test harness in vectors/
Changelog
Please see the releases page