cellos-host-windows
A Windows CellBackend for CellOS. It isolates a
cell inside a Windows Job Object — the closest native analogue to a Linux
cgroup-v2 leaf — for hosts that cannot run the Linux-only backends (Firecracker,
gVisor).
Select it at runtime with:
$env:CELLOS_CELL_BACKEND = "windows"
On a non-Windows host this value fails closed at supervisor startup.
What it does
For each cell the backend creates a Job Object and uses it to:
| Concern | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Process-tree containment | the workload + every descendant are job members |
| Memory cap | spec.run.limits.memoryMaxBytes → JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_JOB_MEMORY |
| CPU cap | spec.run.limits.cpuMax → hard JOBOBJECT_CPU_RATE_CONTROL_INFORMATION |
| Residue-free teardown | JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE + TerminateJobObject |
The backend owns execution: when the spec declares run.argv it spawns the
workload itself (cleared environment, fixed PATH), assigns it to the job, and
surfaces the exit code through wait_for_in_vm_exit — the same posture as the
gVisor backend. A cell with no run.argv still gets a job (containment +
teardown) and defers execution to the supervisor.
Honest scope (v1)
A Job Object is process-level containment, not a virtualization boundary. It
has no separate kernel, no syscall emulation, no filesystem mount namespace, and
no network-egress enforcement. Its isolation tier matches the Linux proprietary
(cgroup-only) backend — weaker than gVisor, far weaker than a Firecracker
microVM. For a hardware/syscall boundary, run the cell on Linux with
CELLOS_CELL_BACKEND=firecracker (or gvisor).
Two gaps are enforced fail-closed rather than ignored:
- Network egress is not enforced. A spec that declares
authority.egressRulesgets a per-celltracing::warn.nft_rules_appliedis alwaysNone. secretDelivery: env+secretRefsis refused. Because the backend owns execution, the supervisor's env secret-injection path is bypassed;createreturnsInvalidSpecinstead of running the workload without its secrets. Use a broker-socket delivery mode (the defaultruntimeLeasedBroker), where the child fetches secrets over a socket.
Known limitation: spawn→assign race
The workload is assigned to its job immediately after spawn, leaving a
sub-millisecond window in which the child could spawn a grandchild outside the
job. TerminateJobObject plus kill-on-close still bound the tree, and the
assigned child's own descendants are always contained. A future revision can
close the window with CREATE_SUSPENDED + resume once the supervisor exposes a
thread handle.
Platform gating
The real implementation (backend.rs, job.rs) compiles only on Windows; the
windows crate dependency is pinned to cfg(windows). On other targets the
crate exposes a stub WindowsCellBackend whose methods return a Host error,
so cargo check --workspace stays green on Linux/macOS CI.