cellos-host-telemetry 0.5.1

//! F4b — supervisor-side signing of outbound guest-derived envelopes.
//!
//! Doctrine (ADR-0006 §5, channel-authenticity model):
//!
//! - The guest agent does NOT hold a signing key. It declares fields over
//!   vsock; the supervisor host-stamps the non-negotiable attribution fields
//!   ([`HostStamp`]) and signs the resulting [`CloudEventV1`] envelope.
//! - Signing payload is the canonical-JSON serialization of the FULL
//!   `CloudEventV1` (as established by I5 — `cellos_core::trust_keys::
//!   canonical_event_signing_payload`). Mutating any field after the signature
//!   is computed MUST cause verification to fail (O2 — observability that
//!   cannot be quietly retconned).
//!
//! ## Signing key material
//!
//! [`SigningKeyMaterial`] is the runtime knob. Three modes:
//!
//! - [`SigningKeyMaterial::Off`] — passthrough; outbound envelopes are emitted
//!   un-signed. This is the default when no env vars are set, matching the
//!   I5 doctrine that signing is OPT-IN.
//! - [`SigningKeyMaterial::Hmac`] — shared symmetric key (HMAC-SHA256, FIPS
//!   198). Verifier needs the same shared key in its `hmac_keys` map.
//! - [`SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519`] — asymmetric; verifier needs only the
//!   public key in its `verifying_keys` map.
//!
//! Loading is from environment variables (the supervisor crate is the
//! consumer; this module is location-agnostic so any future host-side wiring
//! can call [`SigningKeyMaterial::from_env`] without touching the supervisor).
//!
//! ### Env vars
//!
//! - `CELLOS_HOST_TELEMETRY_SIGN_ALG` — `"off"` (default), `"hmac-sha256"`,
//!   or `"ed25519"`.
//! - `CELLOS_HOST_TELEMETRY_SIGN_KID` — required when alg != off. The signer
//!   kid embedded in the [`SignedEventEnvelopeV1`].
//! - `CELLOS_HOST_TELEMETRY_SIGN_HMAC_KEY` — base64url (no-pad, padding
//!   tolerated) of the shared HMAC key. Required when alg=hmac-sha256.
//! - `CELLOS_HOST_TELEMETRY_SIGN_ED25519_SK` — base64url of the 32-byte
//!   Ed25519 seed. Required when alg=ed25519.
//!
//! Setting both `*_HMAC_KEY` and `*_ED25519_SK` is rejected: the operator
//! must pick one to avoid ambiguity over which key signed the stream.
//!
//! ## F3b interlock
//!
//! [`StampedDeclaration`] is defined locally as a `{guest, host}` pair so
//! F4b can be merged before F3b. When F3b lands, lift this struct to
//! `cellos-host-telemetry::lib` (or its own module); F4b's signer accepts it
//! by value/by-reference and is location-agnostic.

use std::env;
use std::time::UNIX_EPOCH;

use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
use base64::Engine as _;
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;

use cellos_core::trust_keys::{sign_event_ed25519, sign_event_hmac_sha256, SignedEventEnvelopeV1};
use cellos_core::CloudEventV1;

use crate::{GuestDeclaration, HostStamp};

// ── F3b interlock ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Pair of guest declaration + host stamp.
///
/// **F3b note:** F4b ships this struct here so the signer doesn't depend on
/// F3b having landed first. When F3b lands it should hoist this definition to
/// `cellos-host-telemetry::lib` (or a sibling `stamped` module) and re-export
/// it; the signer below stays unchanged because it consumes the inputs by
/// reference. This is the F3b/F4b boundary contract.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct StampedDeclaration {
    /// What the guest agent declared over vsock.
    pub guest: GuestDeclaration,
    /// What the supervisor stamped on receive (overrides anything the guest
    /// claimed about cell_id / run_id / timestamp / spec hash).
    pub host: HostStamp,
}

// ── Provenance constant (events::Provenance is a struct, not the enum we
//    want here) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// CloudEvent extension/data marker for "this fact was declared by the guest
/// agent, not directly observed host-side."
///
/// `cellos_core::events::Provenance` is a struct
/// `{ parent, parent_type }` describing parent-event lineage — not an
/// epistemic-status enum. The canonical `Declared` / `Observed` distinction
/// lives in `cellos_core::authority::EpistemicStatus`. F4b only needs the
/// literal token; we hard-code it here to avoid pulling the authority
/// surface into the host-telemetry crate.
pub const PROVENANCE_DECLARED: &str = "declared";

// ── Signing key material ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Env var: signing algorithm for outbound CloudEvents.
pub const ENV_SIGN_ALG: &str = "CELLOS_HOST_TELEMETRY_SIGN_ALG";
/// Env var: signer kid embedded in the envelope.
pub const ENV_SIGN_KID: &str = "CELLOS_HOST_TELEMETRY_SIGN_KID";
/// Env var: HMAC-SHA256 shared key (base64url).
pub const ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY: &str = "CELLOS_HOST_TELEMETRY_SIGN_HMAC_KEY";
/// Env var: Ed25519 32-byte seed (base64url).
pub const ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK: &str = "CELLOS_HOST_TELEMETRY_SIGN_ED25519_SK";

/// Errors returned by the F4b signer.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignOutboundError {
    /// Env-driven configuration was internally inconsistent (e.g. both HMAC
    /// and Ed25519 keys set, or alg set without kid).
    #[error("invalid signing config: {0}")]
    InvalidConfig(String),

    /// Underlying signer rejected the canonical payload.
    #[error("signer error: {0}")]
    Signer(String),

    /// Canonical-JSON serialization failed.
    #[error("serialize error: {0}")]
    Serialize(String),
}

/// Runtime signing key material.
///
/// Note: `Debug` is implemented manually so that key bytes never leak into
/// log output. We surface the variant + kid only.
pub enum SigningKeyMaterial {
    /// Signing disabled — passthrough, no envelope wrapping.
    Off,
    /// HMAC-SHA256 with a shared symmetric key.
    Hmac {
        /// Signer kid embedded in the [`SignedEventEnvelopeV1`].
        kid: String,
        /// Shared HMAC key bytes. Red-team wave-2 T1b: `Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>`
        /// so the secret key is wiped on drop instead of lingering in freed
        /// allocations.
        key: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
    },
    /// Ed25519 asymmetric signing.
    Ed25519 {
        /// Signer kid embedded in the [`SignedEventEnvelopeV1`].
        kid: String,
        /// Ed25519 signing key (private). Verifier holds the matching
        /// `VerifyingKey`.
        signing_key: SigningKey,
    },
}

impl std::fmt::Debug for SigningKeyMaterial {
    /// Custom `Debug` that NEVER prints key bytes — only variant + kid. This
    /// matters because operators sometimes pipe `tracing` output into log
    /// stores that retain forever; an accidental `{:?}` of a `SigningKeyMaterial`
    /// must not become a key-leak channel.
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        match self {
            SigningKeyMaterial::Off => f.debug_struct("SigningKeyMaterial::Off").finish(),
            SigningKeyMaterial::Hmac { kid, key } => f
                .debug_struct("SigningKeyMaterial::Hmac")
                .field("kid", kid)
                .field(
                    "key",
                    &format_args!("<redacted {}-byte hmac key>", key.len()),
                )
                .finish(),
            SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519 { kid, .. } => f
                .debug_struct("SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519")
                .field("kid", kid)
                .field("signing_key", &"<redacted ed25519 signing key>")
                .finish(),
        }
    }
}

impl SigningKeyMaterial {
    /// True iff this is the [`SigningKeyMaterial::Off`] variant.
    pub fn is_off(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, SigningKeyMaterial::Off)
    }

    /// Signer kid for the active variant; `None` for [`SigningKeyMaterial::Off`].
    pub fn kid(&self) -> Option<&str> {
        match self {
            SigningKeyMaterial::Off => None,
            SigningKeyMaterial::Hmac { kid, .. } => Some(kid.as_str()),
            SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519 { kid, .. } => Some(kid.as_str()),
        }
    }

    /// Load signing material from env vars (see module docs).
    ///
    /// - Unset / `"off"` → [`SigningKeyMaterial::Off`].
    /// - `"hmac-sha256"` → requires kid + HMAC key, rejects ed25519 key.
    /// - `"ed25519"` → requires kid + ed25519 seed, rejects HMAC key.
    pub fn from_env() -> Result<Self, SignOutboundError> {
        let alg_raw = env::var(ENV_SIGN_ALG).unwrap_or_default();
        let alg = alg_raw.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();

        if alg.is_empty() || alg == "off" {
            // Even in Off mode, refuse to silently swallow stray key material.
            // Operator most likely meant to enable signing; surface the
            // misconfig instead of pretending Off.
            if env::var(ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY).is_ok() || env::var(ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK).is_ok() {
                return Err(SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                    "{ENV_SIGN_ALG} is off (or unset) but {ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY} \
                     or {ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK} is set — refuse to silently \
                     drop key material; set {ENV_SIGN_ALG} explicitly"
                )));
            }
            return Ok(SigningKeyMaterial::Off);
        }

        let kid = env::var(ENV_SIGN_KID).map_err(|_| {
            SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                "{ENV_SIGN_ALG}={alg_raw:?} requires {ENV_SIGN_KID} to be set"
            ))
        })?;
        if kid.trim().is_empty() {
            return Err(SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                "{ENV_SIGN_KID} must be a non-empty signer kid"
            )));
        }

        let hmac_set = env::var(ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY).is_ok();
        let ed_set = env::var(ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK).is_ok();
        if hmac_set && ed_set {
            return Err(SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                "mutual-exclusion violated: both {ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY} and \
                 {ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK} are set — pick exactly one"
            )));
        }

        match alg.as_str() {
            "hmac-sha256" | "hmac" => {
                let key_b64 = env::var(ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY).map_err(|_| {
                    SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                        "{ENV_SIGN_ALG}=hmac-sha256 requires {ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY}"
                    ))
                })?;
                let trimmed = key_b64.trim().trim_end_matches('=');
                // T1b: wrap decoded key in Zeroizing immediately so it wipes
                // on the is_empty() error path too.
                let key: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>> =
                    Zeroizing::new(URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(trimmed).map_err(|e| {
                        SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                            "{ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY} is not valid base64url: {e}"
                        ))
                    })?);
                if key.is_empty() {
                    return Err(SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                        "{ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY} decoded to zero bytes"
                    )));
                }
                Ok(SigningKeyMaterial::Hmac { kid, key })
            }
            "ed25519" => {
                let sk_b64 = env::var(ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK).map_err(|_| {
                    SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                        "{ENV_SIGN_ALG}=ed25519 requires {ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK}"
                    ))
                })?;
                let trimmed = sk_b64.trim().trim_end_matches('=');
                let bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(trimmed).map_err(|e| {
                    SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                        "{ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK} is not valid base64url: {e}"
                    ))
                })?;
                let seed: [u8; 32] = bytes.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
                    SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                        "{ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK} decoded to {} bytes, expected 32",
                        bytes.len()
                    ))
                })?;
                let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed);
                Ok(SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519 { kid, signing_key })
            }
            other => Err(SignOutboundError::InvalidConfig(format!(
                "unknown {ENV_SIGN_ALG}={other:?} (expected off, hmac-sha256, or ed25519)"
            ))),
        }
    }
}

// ── Outbound envelope construction ────────────────────────────────────────

/// Outcome of [`host_stamp_and_sign`]: either an unsigned passthrough or a
/// signed envelope, depending on the active [`SigningKeyMaterial`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum SigningOutcome {
    /// Signing was [`SigningKeyMaterial::Off`]; the bare envelope is emitted.
    Unsigned(CloudEventV1),
    /// Signing was active; the wrapped envelope is emitted.
    Signed(SignedEventEnvelopeV1),
}

impl SigningOutcome {
    /// Borrow the underlying CloudEvent regardless of variant.
    pub fn event(&self) -> &CloudEventV1 {
        match self {
            SigningOutcome::Unsigned(ev) => ev,
            SigningOutcome::Signed(env) => &env.event,
        }
    }
}

/// Build the host-stamped outbound `CloudEventV1` for a guest declaration.
///
/// The `data` payload contains both the guest-declared fields and the
/// host-stamped attribution fields, with a `provenance` marker (literal
/// `"declared"`) so consumers can distinguish guest-declared facts from
/// host-observed ones.
pub fn host_stamped_envelope(
    stamped: &StampedDeclaration,
    event_id: &str,
    source: &str,
    event_type: &str,
) -> Result<CloudEventV1, SignOutboundError> {
    let host_received_unix_secs = stamped
        .host
        .host_received_at
        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
        .map_err(|e| {
            SignOutboundError::Serialize(format!("host_received_at predates UNIX_EPOCH: {e}"))
        })?
        .as_secs();
    let host_received_at_rfc3339 = format_unix_secs_rfc3339(host_received_unix_secs);

    let data = serde_json::json!({
        "provenance": PROVENANCE_DECLARED,
        "guest": {
            "probeSource": stamped.guest.probe_source,
            "guestPid": stamped.guest.guest_pid,
            "guestComm": stamped.guest.guest_comm,
            "guestMonotonicNs": stamped.guest.guest_monotonic_ns,
        },
        "host": {
            "cellId": stamped.host.cell_id,
            "runId": stamped.host.run_id,
            "hostReceivedAt": host_received_at_rfc3339,
            "specSignatureHash": stamped.host.spec_signature_hash,
        },
    });

    Ok(CloudEventV1 {
        specversion: "1.0".into(),
        id: event_id.to_string(),
        source: source.to_string(),
        ty: event_type.to_string(),
        datacontenttype: Some("application/json".into()),
        data: Some(data),
        time: Some(host_received_at_rfc3339),
        traceparent: None,
    })
}

/// Sign a host-stamped envelope under the active [`SigningKeyMaterial`].
///
/// Returns [`SigningOutcome::Unsigned`] when key material is
/// [`SigningKeyMaterial::Off`], else [`SigningOutcome::Signed`].
pub fn sign_host_stamped_envelope(
    envelope: CloudEventV1,
    material: &SigningKeyMaterial,
) -> Result<SigningOutcome, SignOutboundError> {
    match material {
        SigningKeyMaterial::Off => Ok(SigningOutcome::Unsigned(envelope)),
        SigningKeyMaterial::Hmac { kid, key } => {
            let signed = sign_event_hmac_sha256(&envelope, kid, key)
                .map_err(|e| SignOutboundError::Signer(format!("{e}")))?;
            Ok(SigningOutcome::Signed(signed))
        }
        SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519 { kid, signing_key } => {
            let signed = sign_event_ed25519(&envelope, kid, signing_key)
                .map_err(|e| SignOutboundError::Signer(format!("{e}")))?;
            Ok(SigningOutcome::Signed(signed))
        }
    }
}

/// Composed: stamp + sign in one call. Most callers want this.
pub fn host_stamp_and_sign(
    stamped: &StampedDeclaration,
    event_id: &str,
    source: &str,
    event_type: &str,
    material: &SigningKeyMaterial,
) -> Result<SigningOutcome, SignOutboundError> {
    let envelope = host_stamped_envelope(stamped, event_id, source, event_type)?;
    sign_host_stamped_envelope(envelope, material)
}

// ── Self-contained RFC3339 formatter ──────────────────────────────────────
//
// We deliberately do NOT pull `chrono` for a single timestamp. The
// `host_received_at` field is `SystemTime`; for the outbound envelope we
// emit RFC3339 / ISO-8601 in UTC at second resolution (matching the
// `time` field convention used elsewhere in the codebase, e.g.
// `cellos_core::events::cloud_event_v1_*`).

/// Format `unix_secs` (seconds since UNIX epoch, UTC) as a Zulu-suffixed
/// RFC3339 timestamp (`"YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ"`). This is the minimal
/// formatter ADR-0006 needs; we avoid `chrono` because the supervisor's
/// existing time emitters already use this exact shape.
fn format_unix_secs_rfc3339(unix_secs: u64) -> String {
    // Algorithm from Howard Hinnant's "date" library / chrono: a closed-form
    // conversion from days-since-epoch to (year, month, day) using a shifted
    // calendar where March is month 1. Tested against std::time / chrono in
    // the unit tests below.
    let secs_per_day: u64 = 86_400;
    let days = (unix_secs / secs_per_day) as i64; // days since 1970-01-01
    let secs_of_day = unix_secs % secs_per_day;
    let hour = (secs_of_day / 3600) as u32;
    let minute = ((secs_of_day % 3600) / 60) as u32;
    let second = (secs_of_day % 60) as u32;

    // Shift epoch from 1970-01-01 to 0000-03-01 (Hinnant's reference).
    let z = days + 719_468;
    let era = if z >= 0 { z } else { z - 146_096 } / 146_097;
    let doe = (z - era * 146_097) as u64; // [0, 146096]
    let yoe = (doe - doe / 1460 + doe / 36524 - doe / 146_096) / 365; // [0, 399]
    let y = yoe as i64 + era * 400;
    let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100); // [0, 365]
    let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153; // [0, 11]
    let d = (doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1) as u32; // [1, 31]
    let m = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 } as u32; // [1, 12]
    let year = if m <= 2 { y + 1 } else { y };

    format!(
        "{:04}-{:02}-{:02}T{:02}:{:02}:{:02}Z",
        year, m, d, hour, minute, second
    )
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use std::collections::HashMap;
    use std::sync::Mutex;
    use std::time::Duration;

    use cellos_core::trust_keys::verify_signed_event_envelope;

    // Env-mutating tests are serialized via this module-level mutex so
    // parallel cargo-test runs don't race on the process-global env table.
    // Tests that don't touch env do NOT need to take the lock.
    static ENV_MUTEX: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());

    fn fixture_decl() -> StampedDeclaration {
        StampedDeclaration {
            guest: GuestDeclaration {
                probe_source: "process_spawned".into(),
                guest_pid: 4242,
                guest_comm: "curl".into(),
                guest_monotonic_ns: 1_234_567_890,
            },
            host: HostStamp {
                cell_id: "cell-abc".into(),
                run_id: "run-xyz".into(),
                // Arbitrary fixed instant; only used to exercise stamping.
                host_received_at: UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_762_348_800),
                spec_signature_hash: "sha256:deadbeef".into(),
            },
        }
    }

    fn signing_key(seed: u8) -> SigningKey {
        SigningKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32])
    }

    fn clear_sign_env() {
        // SAFETY: process-wide env mutation is guarded by ENV_MUTEX.
        std::env::remove_var(ENV_SIGN_ALG);
        std::env::remove_var(ENV_SIGN_KID);
        std::env::remove_var(ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY);
        std::env::remove_var(ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK);
    }

    // 1. HMAC round-trip ----------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn hmac_round_trip_verifies_via_projector_path() {
        let key = b"f4b-shared-symmetric-key-for-tests";
        let material = SigningKeyMaterial::Hmac {
            kid: "ops-host-telem-2026-q2".into(),
            key: Zeroizing::new(key.to_vec()),
        };
        let outcome = host_stamp_and_sign(
            &fixture_decl(),
            "ev-hmac-001",
            "/cellos-supervisor/host-telemetry",
            "dev.cellos.events.cell.observability.guest.process_spawned",
            &material,
        )
        .expect("sign ok");
        let envelope = match outcome {
            SigningOutcome::Signed(env) => env,
            SigningOutcome::Unsigned(_) => panic!("expected Signed"),
        };
        assert_eq!(envelope.algorithm, "hmac-sha256");
        assert_eq!(envelope.signer_kid, "ops-host-telem-2026-q2");

        let verifying_keys: HashMap<String, _> = HashMap::new();
        let mut hmac_keys: HashMap<String, Vec<u8>> = HashMap::new();
        hmac_keys.insert("ops-host-telem-2026-q2".into(), key.to_vec());
        let verified = verify_signed_event_envelope(&envelope, &verifying_keys, &hmac_keys)
            .expect("hmac round-trip must verify");
        assert_eq!(verified.id, "ev-hmac-001");
    }

    // 2. Ed25519 round-trip -------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn ed25519_round_trip_verifies_via_projector_path() {
        let signer = signing_key(13);
        let material = SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519 {
            kid: "ops-host-telem-ed-2026-q2".into(),
            signing_key: signer.clone(),
        };
        let outcome = host_stamp_and_sign(
            &fixture_decl(),
            "ev-ed25519-001",
            "/cellos-supervisor/host-telemetry",
            "dev.cellos.events.cell.observability.guest.process_spawned",
            &material,
        )
        .expect("sign ok");
        let envelope = match outcome {
            SigningOutcome::Signed(env) => env,
            SigningOutcome::Unsigned(_) => panic!("expected Signed"),
        };
        assert_eq!(envelope.algorithm, "ed25519");

        let mut verifying_keys: HashMap<String, _> = HashMap::new();
        verifying_keys.insert("ops-host-telem-ed-2026-q2".into(), signer.verifying_key());
        let hmac_keys: HashMap<String, Vec<u8>> = HashMap::new();
        let verified = verify_signed_event_envelope(&envelope, &verifying_keys, &hmac_keys)
            .expect("ed25519 round-trip must verify");
        assert_eq!(verified.id, "ev-ed25519-001");
    }

    // 3. Mutation-post-sign rejected (O2 doctrine) -------------------------

    #[test]
    fn mutating_event_after_sign_breaks_verification() {
        let signer = signing_key(17);
        let material = SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519 {
            kid: "kid-mut".into(),
            signing_key: signer.clone(),
        };
        let outcome = host_stamp_and_sign(
            &fixture_decl(),
            "ev-mut-001",
            "/cellos-supervisor/host-telemetry",
            "dev.cellos.events.cell.observability.guest.process_spawned",
            &material,
        )
        .expect("sign ok");
        let mut envelope = match outcome {
            SigningOutcome::Signed(env) => env,
            SigningOutcome::Unsigned(_) => panic!("expected Signed"),
        };

        // O2: tampering with the host-stamped attribution must invalidate
        // the signature. Mutate the inner data.host.cellId.
        if let Some(serde_json::Value::Object(map)) = envelope.event.data.as_mut() {
            if let Some(serde_json::Value::Object(host)) = map.get_mut("host") {
                host.insert(
                    "cellId".into(),
                    serde_json::Value::String("cell-EVIL".into()),
                );
            }
        }

        let mut verifying_keys: HashMap<String, _> = HashMap::new();
        verifying_keys.insert("kid-mut".into(), signer.verifying_key());
        let hmac_keys: HashMap<String, Vec<u8>> = HashMap::new();
        let err = verify_signed_event_envelope(&envelope, &verifying_keys, &hmac_keys)
            .expect_err("post-sign mutation must be rejected");
        let msg = format!("{err}");
        assert!(
            msg.contains("ed25519 verify failed"),
            "expected ed25519 verify failure, got: {msg}"
        );
    }

    // 4. Off mode passthrough ----------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn off_mode_emits_unsigned_passthrough() {
        let outcome = host_stamp_and_sign(
            &fixture_decl(),
            "ev-off-001",
            "/cellos-supervisor/host-telemetry",
            "dev.cellos.events.cell.observability.guest.process_spawned",
            &SigningKeyMaterial::Off,
        )
        .expect("off-mode stamp ok");
        match outcome {
            SigningOutcome::Unsigned(ev) => {
                assert_eq!(ev.id, "ev-off-001");
                let data = ev.data.expect("data present");
                assert_eq!(data["provenance"], "declared");
                assert_eq!(data["host"]["cellId"], "cell-abc");
            }
            SigningOutcome::Signed(_) => panic!("Off must passthrough"),
        }
    }

    // 5. Env load HMAC ------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn env_load_hmac_round_trips_a_signed_envelope() {
        let _guard = ENV_MUTEX.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
        clear_sign_env();
        let key = b"env-hmac-key-for-from_env-test";
        std::env::set_var(ENV_SIGN_ALG, "hmac-sha256");
        std::env::set_var(ENV_SIGN_KID, "kid-from-env");
        std::env::set_var(ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY, URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(key));

        let material = SigningKeyMaterial::from_env().expect("from_env hmac ok");
        clear_sign_env();

        assert!(!material.is_off());
        assert_eq!(material.kid(), Some("kid-from-env"));

        let outcome = host_stamp_and_sign(
            &fixture_decl(),
            "ev-env-hmac",
            "/cellos-supervisor/host-telemetry",
            "dev.cellos.events.cell.observability.guest.process_spawned",
            &material,
        )
        .expect("sign ok");
        let envelope = match outcome {
            SigningOutcome::Signed(env) => env,
            SigningOutcome::Unsigned(_) => panic!("expected Signed"),
        };
        assert_eq!(envelope.algorithm, "hmac-sha256");

        let mut hmac_keys: HashMap<String, Vec<u8>> = HashMap::new();
        hmac_keys.insert("kid-from-env".into(), key.to_vec());
        let verifying: HashMap<String, _> = HashMap::new();
        verify_signed_event_envelope(&envelope, &verifying, &hmac_keys)
            .expect("env-loaded hmac must verify");
    }

    // 6. Env load Off -------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn env_load_unset_yields_off() {
        let _guard = ENV_MUTEX.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
        clear_sign_env();
        let material = SigningKeyMaterial::from_env().expect("unset env -> Off");
        assert!(material.is_off());
        assert_eq!(material.kid(), None);

        // Explicit "off" is also accepted.
        std::env::set_var(ENV_SIGN_ALG, "off");
        let material2 = SigningKeyMaterial::from_env().expect("explicit off");
        clear_sign_env();
        assert!(material2.is_off());
    }

    // 7. Env mutual-exclusion rejection ------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn env_load_rejects_both_hmac_and_ed25519_keys_set() {
        let _guard = ENV_MUTEX.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
        clear_sign_env();
        std::env::set_var(ENV_SIGN_ALG, "ed25519");
        std::env::set_var(ENV_SIGN_KID, "kid-conflict");
        std::env::set_var(ENV_SIGN_HMAC_KEY, URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(b"hmac"));
        std::env::set_var(ENV_SIGN_ED25519_SK, URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode([0u8; 32]));

        let err = SigningKeyMaterial::from_env().expect_err("both keys set must be rejected");
        clear_sign_env();
        let msg = format!("{err}");
        assert!(
            msg.contains("mutual-exclusion"),
            "expected mutual-exclusion error, got: {msg}"
        );
    }

    // 8. Debug never prints key bytes --------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn debug_format_does_not_leak_key_bytes() {
        let secret_pattern = b"NEVER-EVER-LOG-THIS-SECRET-XYZZY";
        let hmac = SigningKeyMaterial::Hmac {
            kid: "kid-redact".into(),
            key: Zeroizing::new(secret_pattern.to_vec()),
        };
        let dbg = format!("{:?}", hmac);
        assert!(
            !dbg.contains("NEVER-EVER-LOG-THIS-SECRET"),
            "Debug for Hmac MUST NOT print key bytes: {dbg}"
        );
        assert!(dbg.contains("kid-redact"));
        assert!(dbg.contains("redacted"));

        // Ed25519 — also redact.
        let signer = signing_key(99);
        let ed = SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519 {
            kid: "kid-ed-redact".into(),
            signing_key: signer.clone(),
        };
        let dbg_ed = format!("{:?}", ed);
        // Bytes 0x99 (decimal 153) repeated 32 times — check the seed string
        // representation never appears in debug.
        let seed_hex: String = signer
            .to_bytes()
            .iter()
            .map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b))
            .collect();
        assert!(
            !dbg_ed.contains(&seed_hex),
            "Debug for Ed25519 MUST NOT print key bytes: {dbg_ed}"
        );
        assert!(dbg_ed.contains("kid-ed-redact"));
        assert!(dbg_ed.contains("redacted"));

        // Off variant has nothing to leak — but ensure Debug does not panic.
        let off = SigningKeyMaterial::Off;
        let dbg_off = format!("{:?}", off);
        assert!(dbg_off.contains("Off"));
    }

    // 9. End-to-end guest -> host-stamp -> sign -> projector-verify --------

    #[test]
    fn end_to_end_guest_to_projector_verify() {
        // Producer side: build the full pipeline as the supervisor will.
        let signer = signing_key(23);
        let material = SigningKeyMaterial::Ed25519 {
            kid: "kid-e2e".into(),
            signing_key: signer.clone(),
        };
        let stamped = fixture_decl();

        let outcome = host_stamp_and_sign(
            &stamped,
            "ev-e2e-001",
            "/cellos-supervisor/host-telemetry",
            "dev.cellos.events.cell.observability.guest.process_spawned",
            &material,
        )
        .expect("e2e sign ok");
        let signed = match outcome {
            SigningOutcome::Signed(env) => env,
            SigningOutcome::Unsigned(_) => panic!("expected Signed"),
        };

        // Wire the signed envelope through serde to mimic JetStream transit.
        let wire = serde_json::to_vec(&signed).expect("serialize");
        let arrived: SignedEventEnvelopeV1 = serde_json::from_slice(&wire).expect("deserialize");

        // Projector side: verify with the public key.
        let mut verifying: HashMap<String, _> = HashMap::new();
        verifying.insert("kid-e2e".into(), signer.verifying_key());
        let hmac_keys: HashMap<String, Vec<u8>> = HashMap::new();
        let event = verify_signed_event_envelope(&arrived, &verifying, &hmac_keys)
            .expect("projector verify");

        // Confirm the host-stamped attribution survived the round trip
        // intact AND is still the source of truth (overrode any guest-claimed
        // values per ADR-0006 §6).
        assert_eq!(event.id, "ev-e2e-001");
        assert_eq!(
            event.ty,
            "dev.cellos.events.cell.observability.guest.process_spawned"
        );
        let data = event.data.as_ref().expect("data");
        assert_eq!(data["provenance"], "declared");
        assert_eq!(data["host"]["cellId"], "cell-abc");
        assert_eq!(data["host"]["runId"], "run-xyz");
        assert_eq!(data["host"]["specSignatureHash"], "sha256:deadbeef");
        assert_eq!(data["guest"]["probeSource"], "process_spawned");
    }

    // ── Bonus coverage for the self-contained RFC3339 formatter ──────────

    #[test]
    fn rfc3339_formatter_matches_known_anchors() {
        // Epoch zero — definitionally fixed.
        assert_eq!(format_unix_secs_rfc3339(0), "1970-01-01T00:00:00Z");

        // One day later — exercises the day-rollover path.
        assert_eq!(format_unix_secs_rfc3339(86_400), "1970-01-02T00:00:00Z");

        // Time-of-day component: 1h1m1s past epoch.
        assert_eq!(format_unix_secs_rfc3339(3_661), "1970-01-01T01:01:01Z");

        // 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z is a well-known anchor (946684800 = 30 years
        // of seconds with 7 leap days: 30*365*86400 + 7*86400 = 946684800).
        assert_eq!(
            format_unix_secs_rfc3339(946_684_800),
            "2000-01-01T00:00:00Z"
        );

        // Leap-year edge: 2020-01-01 anchor = 50*365*86400 + 12*86400 leap
        // days (1972/76/80/84/88/92/96/2000/04/08/12/16) = 1577836800. Feb 29
        // is day index 59 from Jan 1 → +59*86400 + 12*3600 + 34*60 + 56
        // = 1582934400 + 45296 = 1582979696.
        assert_eq!(
            format_unix_secs_rfc3339(1_582_979_696),
            "2020-02-29T12:34:56Z"
        );
    }
}