c2pa 0.91.1

Rust SDK for C2PA (Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity) implementors
Documentation 
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// Copyright 2022 Adobe. All rights reserved.
// This file is licensed to you under the Apache License,
// Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0)
// or the MIT license (http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT),
// at your option.

// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
// this software is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
// WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or
// implied. See the LICENSE-MIT and LICENSE-APACHE files for the
// specific language governing permissions and limitations under
// each license.

use c2pa_raw_crypto::OpenSslMutex;
use openssl::{
    stack::Stack,
    x509::{verify::X509VerifyFlags, X509StoreContext, X509},
};

use crate::crypto::cose::{CertificateTrustError, CertificateTrustPolicy, TrustAnchorType};

pub(crate) fn check_certificate_trust(
    ctp: &CertificateTrustPolicy,
    chain_der: &[Vec<u8>],
    cert_der: &[u8],
    signing_time_epoch: Option<i64>,
) -> Result<(TrustAnchorType, String), CertificateTrustError> {
    let _openssl = OpenSslMutex::acquire()?;

    if ctp.anchor_sets().count() == 0 {
        return Err(CertificateTrustError::CertificateNotTrusted);
    }

    for anchor_set in ctp.anchor_sets() {
        // Process each anchor set

        let mut cert_chain = Stack::new()?;
        for cert_der in chain_der {
            let x509_cert = X509::from_der(cert_der)?;
            cert_chain.push(x509_cert)?;
        }

        let cert = X509::from_der(cert_der)?;

        let mut builder = openssl::x509::store::X509StoreBuilder::new()?;
        builder.set_flags(X509VerifyFlags::X509_STRICT)?;

        let mut verify_param = openssl::x509::verify::X509VerifyParam::new()?;
        verify_param.set_flags(X509VerifyFlags::X509_STRICT)?;
        verify_param.set_flags(X509VerifyFlags::PARTIAL_CHAIN)?; // allow intermediates to be on anchor list

        // Without a trusted timestamp, leave the check time unset so OpenSSL
        // checks the current time against every cert on the built path (not
        // just the leaf) - matching the leaf's own "no timestamp -> valid now"
        // fallback in certificate_profile.rs. `chain_der` is always the
        // signer's own linear x5chain (see verifier.rs), so the path OpenSSL
        // builds is the whole chain we supply. Previously this set
        // NO_CHECK_TIME, which disabled expiry checking for the whole chain,
        // including intermediates that have no other validity check anywhere.
        if let Some(st) = signing_time_epoch {
            verify_param.set_time(st);
        }

        builder.set_param(&verify_param)?;

        // add trust anchors.
        for der in &anchor_set.trust_anchor_ders {
            let root_cert = X509::from_der(der)?;
            builder.add_cert(root_cert)?;
        }

        let store = builder.build();

        // try trust anchors
        let mut store_ctx = X509StoreContext::new()?;
        if store_ctx.init(&store, cert.as_ref(), &cert_chain, |f| f.verify_cert())? {
            return Ok((
                anchor_set.trust_anchor_type,
                anchor_set.trust_anchor_uri.clone(),
            ));
        }
    }

    Err(CertificateTrustError::CertificateNotTrusted)
}