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//! `boatramp project tenant-secrets set/ls/rm/rotate --tenant <t>` (task #493): manage a project's
//! **per-tenant** sealed secret store — each firm's OWN third-party credential (e.g. an OAuth
//! `client_secret`), sealed server-side under `(project, tenant, name)` with the operator's
//! `[secrets]` envelope.
//!
//! Like `boatramp secrets`, the value never leaves the store over the API — this command only ever
//! SENDS a plaintext to be sealed (`set`/`rotate`) or reads value-free metadata (`ls`). It is
//! DELIBERATELY nested under `project` (not the bare `boatramp secrets`, which is the per-project
//! `boatramp:<name>` env store): the two are different keyspaces, and the tenant dimension is
//! specific to this runtime store. The `--project` global flag selects the project; `--tenant`
//! names the firm within it.
use clap::Subcommand;
use crate::client::ControlPlane;
/// A failure in the `project tenant-secrets` subcommand.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
/// A control-plane request failed or was refused (the server's status + value-free body — e.g.
/// the no-envelope `501`, or an invalid-tenant/name `400`).
#[error(transparent)]
Client(#[from] crate::client::ClientError),
/// Reading the plaintext from a `--file` (or stdin) failed.
#[error("reading secret value: {0}")]
Read(#[source] std::io::Error),
}
type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
/// The three ways to supply a secret's plaintext, mutually exclusive (identical to `boatramp
/// secrets`). `--stdin`/`--file` are preferred; `--value` lands in shell history.
#[derive(Debug, clap::Args)]
struct ValueSource {
/// Read the plaintext from standard input (preferred: nothing hits argv/history).
#[arg(long, group = "value_source")]
stdin: bool,
/// Read the plaintext from a file.
#[arg(long, group = "value_source", value_name = "PATH")]
file: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
/// The plaintext inline. Convenient, but it lands in your shell history and the process table —
/// prefer `--stdin` or `--file` for anything sensitive.
#[arg(long, group = "value_source", value_name = "VALUE")]
value: Option<String>,
}
/// Arguments for `boatramp project tenant-secrets`.
#[derive(Debug, clap::Args)]
pub struct TenantSecretsArgs {
#[command(subcommand)]
command: TenantSecretsCommand,
}
#[derive(Debug, Subcommand)]
enum TenantSecretsCommand {
/// Set (or rotate) a per-tenant secret: seal `value` server-side under `(tenant, name)`.
/// Setting an existing name rotates it (a new revision, same `created_at`).
Set {
/// The tenant (firm) id the secret belongs to.
#[arg(long)]
tenant: String,
/// The secret name (what the guest names in a `tenant-secrets` `get`).
name: String,
#[command(flatten)]
source: ValueSource,
},
/// Rotate a per-tenant secret — an alias for `set` (overwrite in place), for intent-clarity.
Rotate {
/// The tenant (firm) id.
#[arg(long)]
tenant: String,
/// The secret name.
name: String,
#[command(flatten)]
source: ValueSource,
},
/// List one tenant's secrets: name / revision / last-updated. Never a value, and only this
/// tenant's names (never project-wide).
Ls {
/// The tenant (firm) id to list.
#[arg(long)]
tenant: String,
},
/// Remove a per-tenant secret by name.
Rm {
/// The tenant (firm) id.
#[arg(long)]
tenant: String,
/// The secret name.
name: String,
},
}
/// Entry point for `boatramp project tenant-secrets`, given a resolved [`ControlPlane`] (the
/// `project` command already resolved `--project` + the server + client).
pub async fn run(args: TenantSecretsArgs, cp: &ControlPlane) -> Result<()> {
match args.command {
TenantSecretsCommand::Set {
tenant,
name,
source,
}
| TenantSecretsCommand::Rotate {
tenant,
name,
source,
} => {
let value = read_value(source)?;
let meta = cp.tenant_secret_set(&tenant, &name, &value).await?;
// Never echo the value; confirm by metadata only.
println!("set {}/{} (revision {})", tenant, meta.name, meta.revision);
}
TenantSecretsCommand::Ls { tenant } => {
let secrets = cp.tenant_secret_list(&tenant).await?;
if secrets.is_empty() {
println!("no secrets for tenant {tenant}");
return Ok(());
}
println!("{:<32} {:>8} UPDATED", "NAME", "REVISION");
for s in secrets {
println!("{:<32} {:>8} {}", s.name, s.revision, s.updated_at);
}
}
TenantSecretsCommand::Rm { tenant, name } => {
if cp.tenant_secret_delete(&tenant, &name).await? {
println!("removed {tenant}/{name}");
} else {
println!("no matching secret {tenant}/{name}");
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Read the plaintext from exactly one of stdin / a file / an inline `--value` (identical to
/// `boatramp secrets`). Clap's `group` enforces mutual exclusion; this requires one is present.
fn read_value(source: ValueSource) -> Result<String> {
use std::io::Read as _;
if source.stdin {
let mut buf = String::new();
std::io::stdin()
.read_to_string(&mut buf)
.map_err(Error::Read)?;
Ok(buf.trim_end_matches('\n').to_string())
} else if let Some(path) = source.file {
let bytes = std::fs::read(&path).map_err(Error::Read)?;
String::from_utf8(bytes)
.map_err(|e| Error::Read(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e)))
.map(|s| s.trim_end_matches('\n').to_string())
} else if let Some(value) = source.value {
Ok(value)
} else {
Err(Error::Read(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"a value is required: pass one of --stdin, --file <path>, or --value <VALUE>",
)))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use clap::Parser;
/// A minimal parser mirroring `project`'s nesting: the global `--project` + a `tenant-secrets`
/// subcommand, so we can arg-parse `project tenant-secrets …` in isolation.
#[derive(Parser)]
struct Cli {
#[arg(long, global = true, env = "BOATRAMP_PROJECT")]
project: Option<String>,
#[command(subcommand)]
cmd: Cmd,
}
#[derive(Subcommand)]
enum Cmd {
TenantSecrets(TenantSecretsArgs),
}
fn parse(argv: &[&str]) -> std::result::Result<Cli, clap::Error> {
Cli::try_parse_from(std::iter::once("boatramp").chain(argv.iter().copied()))
}
#[test]
fn set_requires_tenant_and_exactly_one_value_source() {
assert!(parse(&[
"tenant-secrets",
"set",
"--tenant",
"firm-1",
"oauth",
"--value",
"s"
])
.is_ok());
assert!(parse(&[
"tenant-secrets",
"set",
"--tenant",
"firm-1",
"oauth",
"--stdin"
])
.is_ok());
// Missing --tenant is a parse error.
assert!(parse(&["tenant-secrets", "set", "oauth", "--value", "s"]).is_err());
// Two value sources are mutually exclusive.
assert!(parse(&[
"tenant-secrets",
"set",
"--tenant",
"firm-1",
"oauth",
"--stdin",
"--value",
"x"
])
.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn ls_rm_rotate_parse_with_tenant() {
assert!(parse(&["tenant-secrets", "ls", "--tenant", "firm-1"]).is_ok());
assert!(parse(&["tenant-secrets", "rm", "--tenant", "firm-1", "oauth"]).is_ok());
assert!(parse(&[
"tenant-secrets",
"rotate",
"--tenant",
"firm-1",
"oauth",
"--stdin"
])
.is_ok());
// ls without --tenant is refused (never project-wide).
assert!(parse(&["tenant-secrets", "ls"]).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn the_global_project_flag_reaches_the_subcommand() {
let cli = parse(&[
"tenant-secrets",
"--project",
"acme",
"ls",
"--tenant",
"firm-1",
])
.expect("parses");
assert_eq!(cli.project.as_deref(), Some("acme"));
}
}