boatramp-node 0.7.4

Node assembly for boatramp: the parsed config model (and, incrementally, the config-to-running-node assembly) that the serve binary and library embedders share.
Documentation
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//! The project-scoped **declarative managed-database front door** (v0.6.0, #501
//! Stage B).
//!
//! A manifest `databases:` entry ([`ApplyDatabase`]) is a TYPED PROJECTION of the
//! node-static [`ExternalDatabaseConfig`](crate::config::ExternalDatabaseConfig) —
//! restricted to the fields SAFE for a project author to declare. This module is the
//! net-new plumbing that exposes the ALREADY-EXISTING daemon-level provisioning stack
//! (`provision_tenant` + the #491 three-identity model + sealed credentials) to a
//! per-project declaration, WITHOUT rebuilding any of it.
//!
//! # The security contract
//!
//! - **Credential never in the manifest.** A declared DB has no `password_env` (it is
//!   not even a field of [`ApplyDatabase`]), so it lowers to the *managed-credential*
//!   path ([`ExternalDatabaseConfig::is_managed_credential`]) — boatramp mints + seals
//!   the credential server-side. The lowering fills the excluded fields (`image`,
//!   `path`, `compute`, `*_env`) with managed defaults; a manifest can carry NONE of
//!   them (the type forbids it).
//! - **Daemon config wins.** A declared DB whose `name` collides with a node
//!   operator's static `[handlers].bindings.sql.databases` entry is REFUSED
//!   ([`DeclareError::DaemonConflict`]) — a project manifest may never shadow /
//!   override / downgrade a BYO operator binding. Enforced HERE, at the merge point
//!   ([`resolve_binding`]), not merely in the apply CLI.
//! - **Caller's-project binding.** The manifest does NOT let the author name a
//!   `compute` workload; boatramp DERIVES a per-project workload name
//!   ([`derived_workload`]) so a declaration can only ever provision onto its OWN
//!   project's server. The derivation is **injective over the `(project, name)` pair**
//!   (folded through the codebase's collision-resistant identifier digest) so two
//!   DISTINCT projects can never derive the same `Shared` server workload — which is
//!   registered under the reserved default project (a node-global namespace), so a
//!   collision would land them on one container sharing one superuser credential (#501
//!   Stage B HIGH-1). A `Single` container is already registered under the caller's
//!   project by `provision_single`.
//! - **No destructive change.** A re-apply that changes an identity field
//!   (`kind`/`tenant`/`tenant_scope`) of an existing declared DB is refused
//!   ([`DeclareError::IdentityChange`]).
//! - **Inert on removal.** Removing a `databases:` entry never deprovisions; this
//!   module only ever *declares* + *provisions*. Teardown is an explicit imperative
//!   verb elsewhere.

#![cfg(any(feature = "sql-postgres", feature = "sql-mysql"))]

use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::sync::Arc;

use async_trait::async_trait;
use boatramp_core::compute::{ApplyDatabase, ApplyDatabaseKind, apply_db_caps};
use boatramp_core::deploy::DeployStore;
use boatramp_core::envelope::KeyEnvelope;
use boatramp_core::kv::KvStore;
use boatramp_core::project::ProjectRef;
use boatramp_core::sql::{DeclareError, ManagedDbDeclare};

use crate::config::{ExternalDatabaseConfig, TenantIsolation, TenantScope};

/// Derive the per-project managed DB **server workload** name for a declared binding.
///
/// The manifest never names a `compute` workload (that is the caller's-project-binding
/// guard): boatramp derives one deterministically from `(project, name)` so a
/// declaration can only ever provision onto its OWN project's server. The derivation is
/// **injective over the `(project, name)` PAIR** because a `Shared` server (and its
/// superuser credential) is registered under the reserved default project — a node-global
/// namespace — so two different projects declaring the same binding name must NOT collide
/// onto one shared server (or share a sealed superuser credential). A naive hyphen-join
/// `bramp-db-{project}-{name}` is NOT injective (`validate_resource_name` permits `-` in
/// both segments, so `("acme-app","db")` and `("acme","app-db")` collapse to the same
/// string — the #501 Stage B HIGH-1 finding); this delegates to the codebase's existing
/// collision-resistant identifier digest
/// ([`derived_managed_db_workload`](boatramp_storage::tenant_provision::derived_managed_db_workload))
/// which folds the length-prefixed pair through the same 128-bit SHA-256/base-36
/// disambiguator that keeps `sanitize_ident` injective. The result is a safe resource name
/// (the `bramp-db-` prefix retained for greppability/operator-reservation), stable across
/// runs, and ≤ 63 bytes.
pub fn derived_workload(project: &str, name: &str) -> String {
    boatramp_storage::tenant_provision::derived_managed_db_workload(project, name)
}

/// Lower a declared [`ApplyDatabase`] into the internal
/// [`ExternalDatabaseConfig`](crate::config::ExternalDatabaseConfig) the daemon-level
/// provisioning stack consumes. Fills every EXCLUDED field with a managed default:
///
/// - no `password_env` ⇒ the managed-credential path (boatramp seals it server-side);
/// - no `image` ⇒ the stock engine image (`managed_db_spec` picks it);
/// - no `url_env`/`read_url_env`/`migration_url_env`/`path` ⇒ never set;
/// - `compute` = the DERIVED per-project workload (never author-named);
/// - `database`/`user` = the binding `name` (non-secret, derived).
///
/// The optional tuning knobs are CAPPED to the operator ceilings ([`apply_db_caps`]) —
/// a manifest can lower a knob, never raise it past the cap (the DoS / disk guard).
pub fn lower(project: &str, db: &ApplyDatabase) -> ExternalDatabaseConfig {
    let workload = derived_workload(project, &db.name);
    let kind = match db.kind {
        ApplyDatabaseKind::Postgres => "postgres",
        ApplyDatabaseKind::Mysql => "mysql",
    };
    let (_, _, volume_size_mib) = db.size.resources();
    ExternalDatabaseConfig {
        kind: kind.to_string(),
        // The excluded / BYO-secret / host-fs fields: ALWAYS the managed defaults.
        url_env: String::new(),
        read_url_env: None,
        migration_url_env: None,
        image: None,
        path: None,
        password_env: None,
        // The derived, caller's-project-bound connection identity.
        compute: Some(workload),
        database: Some(db.name.clone()),
        user: Some(db.name.clone()),
        // The SAFE, capped tuning knobs.
        pool_max: db.pool_max.map(|n| n.min(apply_db_caps::MAX_POOL)),
        connect_timeout_secs: db
            .connect_timeout_secs
            .map(|n| n.min(apply_db_caps::MAX_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS)),
        startup_grace_secs: db
            .startup_grace_secs
            .map(|n| n.min(apply_db_caps::MAX_STARTUP_GRACE_SECS)),
        volume_size_mib: Some(volume_size_mib),
        read_only: db.read_only,
        // A declared DB is never a preview target (an operator opts a BYO db into that).
        allow_preview: false,
        tenant: match db.tenant {
            boatramp_core::compute::ApplyDatabaseTenant::Single => TenantIsolation::Single,
            boatramp_core::compute::ApplyDatabaseTenant::Shared => TenantIsolation::Shared,
        },
        tenant_scope: match db.tenant_scope {
            boatramp_core::compute::ApplyDatabaseScope::Project => TenantScope::Project,
            boatramp_core::compute::ApplyDatabaseScope::Site => TenantScope::Site,
        },
        rls_session: db.rls_session,
        tenant_guc: db.tenant_guc.clone(),
        session_guc: db.session_guc.clone(),
        tenant_all_marker: db.tenant_all_marker.clone(),
    }
}

/// **THE MERGE POINT** — resolve the live [`ExternalDatabaseConfig`] for `(project,
/// name)` by consulting BOTH sources: the node-static
/// `[handlers].bindings.sql.databases` map AND the per-project declarative store
/// (`project/{project}/database/{name}`). **Daemon-static config WINS, fail-closed on a
/// same-name conflict:** if `name` is present in BOTH, the resolution is REFUSED
/// ([`DeclareError::DaemonConflict`]) — a project manifest may NEVER shadow / override /
/// downgrade a node operator's BYO binding.
///
/// This is the single choke point the security invariant hangs on: it is enforced HERE,
/// where both sources are read into a live binding, so a node that reloads config with
/// BOTH a static `[databases].<name>` and a per-project declaration of the same name
/// refuses — not merely the apply CLI. A caller resolving a `(project, name)` for
/// provisioning MUST go through this, never read one source in isolation.
///
/// Returns `Ok(None)` when neither source declares `name` (nothing to provision).
pub async fn resolve_binding(
    static_dbs: &BTreeMap<String, ExternalDatabaseConfig>,
    deploy: &DeployStore,
    project: &str,
    name: &str,
) -> Result<Option<ExternalDatabaseConfig>, DeclareError> {
    let in_static = static_dbs.contains_key(name);
    let declared = deploy
        .get_project_database(ProjectRef::new(project), name)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| DeclareError::Other(e.to_string()))?;

    match (in_static, declared) {
        // DAEMON WINS, fail-closed: a project manifest may not shadow an operator binding.
        (true, Some(_)) => Err(DeclareError::DaemonConflict(name.to_string())),
        // Only the operator's static binding — return it (the manifest never touches it).
        (true, None) => Ok(static_dbs.get(name).cloned()),
        // Only a project declaration — lower it to the managed-credential path.
        (false, Some(db)) => Ok(Some(lower(project, &db))),
        (false, None) => Ok(None),
    }
}

/// The node-side [`ManagedDbDeclare`] capability: holds the node-static `databases` map
/// (to enforce daemon-wins), the [`DeployStore`] (to persist + provision), the KV +
/// envelope (to seal credentials). Mirrors [`NodeTenantRepair`](crate::repair) — it
/// resolves `(project, name)` through [`resolve_binding`] (the merge point), then drives
/// the existing `provision_tenant`.
pub struct NodeManagedDbDeclare {
    static_dbs: BTreeMap<String, ExternalDatabaseConfig>,
    deploy: DeployStore,
    kv: Arc<dyn KvStore>,
    envelope: Arc<dyn KeyEnvelope>,
    /// Per-project ceilings (#501 Stage B MEDIUM-1 — the disk-exhaustion guard).
    quota: DeclareQuota,
}

/// The operator-configurable per-project ceilings a `declare` is enforced fail-closed
/// against (#501 Stage B MEDIUM-1). Resolved from the node's
/// `handlers.bindings.sql.{max_declared_databases,max_declared_volume_mib}` config, or
/// the built-in [`apply_db_caps`] defaults when the operator sets none.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct DeclareQuota {
    /// Max NUMBER of declared databases a single project may hold.
    pub max_databases: usize,
    /// Max AGGREGATE `volume_size_mib` (MiB) across a project's declared databases.
    pub max_volume_mib: u64,
}

impl Default for DeclareQuota {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_databases: apply_db_caps::DEFAULT_MAX_DECLARED_DATABASES_PER_PROJECT,
            max_volume_mib: apply_db_caps::DEFAULT_MAX_DECLARED_VOLUME_MIB,
        }
    }
}

impl DeclareQuota {
    /// Resolve the ceilings from the operator's config knobs, folding `None` to the
    /// built-in default (never a silent 0 — a 0 means "disable declarations", which the
    /// operator must set explicitly).
    pub fn from_config(max_databases: Option<usize>, max_volume_mib: Option<u64>) -> Self {
        let d = Self::default();
        Self {
            max_databases: max_databases.unwrap_or(d.max_databases),
            max_volume_mib: max_volume_mib.unwrap_or(d.max_volume_mib),
        }
    }
}

impl NodeManagedDbDeclare {
    /// Build over the node-static `databases` map, the deploy store, KV, the secrets
    /// envelope (required — a managed DB seals its credential), and the per-project
    /// declaration ceilings ([`DeclareQuota`], #501 Stage B MEDIUM-1).
    pub fn new(
        static_dbs: BTreeMap<String, ExternalDatabaseConfig>,
        deploy: DeployStore,
        kv: Arc<dyn KvStore>,
        envelope: Arc<dyn KeyEnvelope>,
        quota: DeclareQuota,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            static_dbs,
            deploy,
            kv,
            envelope,
            quota,
        }
    }

    /// Enforce the per-project declaration ceilings fail-closed (#501 Stage B MEDIUM-1),
    /// BEFORE any store write or provision. Counts the project's EXISTING declarations +
    /// the incoming one against the count ceiling, and sums their provisioned volumes +
    /// the incoming one against the aggregate-volume ceiling. Re-declaring an EXISTING
    /// name (an update, not a new DB) does not consume a fresh count slot and swaps its
    /// volume for the incoming one, so an idempotent re-apply is never blocked by its own
    /// prior record.
    async fn enforce_quota(
        &self,
        project: &str,
        name: &str,
        incoming: &ApplyDatabase,
    ) -> Result<(), DeclareError> {
        let existing = self
            .deploy
            .list_project_databases(ProjectRef::new(project))
            .await
            .map_err(|e| DeclareError::Other(e.to_string()))?;

        // The incoming volume (MiB) from the size preset — the same value `lower` stamps.
        let (_, _, incoming_vol) = incoming.size.resources();
        let incoming_vol = u64::from(incoming_vol);

        // Count + aggregate the OTHER declarations (everything but a same-name record,
        // which the incoming declare replaces). A same-name re-apply neither adds a slot
        // nor double-counts its own volume.
        let mut others = 0usize;
        let mut others_vol: u64 = 0;
        for db in &existing {
            if db.name == name {
                continue;
            }
            others += 1;
            let (_, _, v) = db.size.resources();
            others_vol = others_vol.saturating_add(u64::from(v));
        }

        // Count ceiling: the OTHERS plus this one must fit.
        let projected_count = others + 1;
        if projected_count > self.quota.max_databases {
            return Err(DeclareError::QuotaExceeded {
                db: name.to_string(),
                reason: format!(
                    "declaring it would bring project {project:?} to {projected_count} managed \
                     databases, over the ceiling of {}",
                    self.quota.max_databases
                ),
            });
        }

        // Aggregate-volume ceiling: OTHERS' volumes plus this one's must fit.
        let projected_vol = others_vol.saturating_add(incoming_vol);
        if projected_vol > self.quota.max_volume_mib {
            return Err(DeclareError::QuotaExceeded {
                db: name.to_string(),
                reason: format!(
                    "declaring it would bring project {project:?} to {projected_vol} MiB of \
                     provisioned managed-database volume, over the ceiling of {} MiB",
                    self.quota.max_volume_mib
                ),
            });
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Provision an ALREADY-lowered binding for `(project, name)`. A `Project`-scoped
    /// binding provisions the project tenant (`site = ""`); a `Site`-scoped binding is
    /// provisioned lazily per site on first `sql` use (there is no single site to eager-
    /// provision at declare time), so its eager step is a no-op beyond registering the
    /// declaration.
    async fn provision(
        &self,
        binding: &ExternalDatabaseConfig,
        project: &str,
    ) -> Result<(), DeclareError> {
        // A `Site`-scoped declaration has no single site to provision at apply time — the
        // per-site tenant is created lazily by the `sql` resolver on first use. Registering
        // the declaration (done by the caller) is enough; skip the eager trigger.
        if matches!(binding.tenant_scope, TenantScope::Site) {
            return Ok(());
        }
        crate::tenant_sql::provision_tenant(
            &self.deploy,
            &self.kv,
            &self.envelope,
            binding,
            project,
            "",
        )
        .await
        .map_err(DeclareError::Other)
    }
}

#[async_trait]
impl ManagedDbDeclare for NodeManagedDbDeclare {
    async fn declare(
        &self,
        project: &str,
        name: &str,
        db: &ApplyDatabase,
    ) -> Result<(), DeclareError> {
        // Defense-in-depth: the API path param + apply CLI validate `project`/`name`, but
        // this is the persistence + privileged-provision choke point, so re-run the one
        // canonical resource-identifier validator (fail-closed) on both segments — neither
        // can carry a `/` and reshape the `project/{project}/database/{name}` key.
        boatramp_core::project::validate_resource_name("project", project)
            .map_err(|e| DeclareError::Other(e.to_string()))?;
        boatramp_core::project::validate_resource_name("database", name)
            .map_err(|e| DeclareError::Other(e.to_string()))?;
        // The manifest's own `name` field must match the route/path `name` (a mismatch
        // would persist under one key while validating another) — fail closed.
        if db.name != name {
            return Err(DeclareError::Other(format!(
                "declared database name {:?} does not match the path segment {name:?}",
                db.name
            )));
        }

        // THE MERGE POINT: daemon-config-wins, fail-closed. A project manifest may not
        // shadow a node operator's static `[databases].<name>`.
        if self.static_dbs.contains_key(name) {
            return Err(DeclareError::DaemonConflict(name.to_string()));
        }

        // Destructive-change refusal: on re-apply of an existing declared DB, refuse any
        // change to an IDENTITY field (kind/tenant/tenant_scope) — silent data-loss/orphan.
        if let Some(prior) = self
            .deploy
            .get_project_database(ProjectRef::new(project), name)
            .await
            .map_err(|e| DeclareError::Other(e.to_string()))?
            && let Some(field) = db.identity_change(&prior)
        {
            return Err(DeclareError::IdentityChange {
                db: name.to_string(),
                field,
            });
        }

        // Per-project ceiling (#501 Stage B MEDIUM-1 — the disk-exhaustion / errno-28
        // guard): fail-closed BEFORE any store write or eager volume provision if this
        // declaration would push the project past its declared-DB count or aggregate
        // provisioned-volume ceiling. A same-name re-apply doesn't consume a fresh slot.
        self.enforce_quota(project, name, db).await?;

        // Lower to the managed-credential path (caller's-project-bound derived compute).
        let binding = lower(project, db);
        // Sanity: the lowering MUST always yield the managed-credential path (no
        // password_env) — the whole security contract. Assert it fail-closed.
        if !binding.is_managed_credential() {
            return Err(DeclareError::Other(format!(
                "internal: lowered database {name:?} is not the managed-credential path"
            )));
        }
        binding.validate(name).map_err(DeclareError::Other)?;

        // Register the caller's-project-bound Shared server workload BEFORE provisioning
        // (a Shared binding's provision connects to the derived server; a Single binding
        // registers its dedicated container inside `provision_single`). Idempotent + non-
        // clobbering. For a Single/Site binding this is a no-op set.
        crate::managed_sql::auto_register_managed_db_workloads(
            &self.deploy,
            &BTreeMap::from([(name.to_string(), binding.clone())]),
        )
        .await;

        // Persist the DECLARATION (create-or-replace) — the record is JUST the
        // declaration; it never carries a secret and never touches the credential/volume.
        self.deploy
            .set_project_database(ProjectRef::new(project), db)
            .await
            .map_err(|e| DeclareError::Other(e.to_string()))?;

        // Eager provision so the DB exists when `apply` returns.
        self.provision(&binding, project).await
    }

    async fn ensure(&self, project: &str, name: &str) -> Result<(), DeclareError> {
        boatramp_core::project::validate_resource_name("project", project)
            .map_err(|e| DeclareError::Other(e.to_string()))?;
        boatramp_core::project::validate_resource_name("database", name)
            .map_err(|e| DeclareError::Other(e.to_string()))?;
        // Ensure goes through the merge point so a daemon conflict still refuses.
        let binding = match resolve_binding(&self.static_dbs, &self.deploy, project, name).await? {
            Some(b) => b,
            None => return Err(DeclareError::NotDeclared(name.to_string())),
        };
        // A static (operator) binding is provisioned by the daemon itself — `ensure` only
        // eager-provisions a project DECLARATION (which is the lowered, managed path).
        if !binding.is_managed_credential() {
            return Err(DeclareError::NotDeclared(name.to_string()));
        }
        crate::managed_sql::auto_register_managed_db_workloads(
            &self.deploy,
            &BTreeMap::from([(name.to_string(), binding.clone())]),
        )
        .await;
        self.provision(&binding, project).await
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use boatramp_core::compute::ApplyDatabaseSize;

    fn declared(name: &str) -> ApplyDatabase {
        ApplyDatabase {
            name: name.to_string(),
            kind: ApplyDatabaseKind::Postgres,
            version: Some(16),
            extensions: vec![],
            size: ApplyDatabaseSize::Small,
            tenant: boatramp_core::compute::ApplyDatabaseTenant::Shared,
            tenant_scope: boatramp_core::compute::ApplyDatabaseScope::Project,
            read_only: false,
            rls_session: false,
            tenant_guc: None,
            session_guc: None,
            tenant_all_marker: None,
            pool_max: Some(1000),
            connect_timeout_secs: Some(9999),
            startup_grace_secs: Some(99999),
        }
    }

    /// The security contract: the lowered binding is ALWAYS the managed-credential path —
    /// no `password_env`, no `url_env`/`read_url_env`/`migration_url_env`, no `image`, no
    /// `path`, and a DERIVED (caller's-project-bound) compute name.
    #[test]
    fn lowering_is_the_managed_credential_path() {
        let cfg = lower("acme", &declared("app"));
        assert!(cfg.is_managed_credential(), "must be managed-credential");
        assert!(
            cfg.password_env.is_none(),
            "no password_env in a declared DB"
        );
        assert!(cfg.url_env.is_empty(), "no url_env");
        assert!(cfg.read_url_env.is_none(), "no read_url_env");
        assert!(cfg.migration_url_env.is_none(), "no migration_url_env");
        assert!(cfg.image.is_none(), "no arbitrary image");
        assert!(cfg.path.is_none(), "no host-fs path");
        // The derived compute is the injective per-project workload (a `bramp-db-…`
        // digest of the `(project, name)` pair — not an author-named / cross-tenant one).
        assert_eq!(
            cfg.compute.as_deref(),
            Some(derived_workload("acme", "app").as_str())
        );
        assert!(
            cfg.compute
                .as_deref()
                .is_some_and(|c| c.starts_with("bramp-db-")),
            "derived compute keeps the reserved prefix"
        );
        assert!(cfg.validate("app").is_ok(), "the lowered binding validates");
    }

    /// The optional tuning knobs are CAPPED to the operator ceilings — a manifest can
    /// never raise them past the cap (the DoS / disk-full guard).
    #[test]
    fn tuning_knobs_are_capped() {
        let cfg = lower("acme", &declared("app"));
        assert_eq!(cfg.pool_max, Some(apply_db_caps::MAX_POOL));
        assert_eq!(
            cfg.connect_timeout_secs,
            Some(apply_db_caps::MAX_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS)
        );
        assert_eq!(
            cfg.startup_grace_secs,
            Some(apply_db_caps::MAX_STARTUP_GRACE_SECS)
        );
    }

    /// A different project deriving the same binding NAME never collides on the shared
    /// server, AND — the HIGH-1 fix — the derivation is **injective over the `(project,
    /// name)` PAIR**: the ambiguous hyphen pair that the prior `bramp-db-{project}-{name}`
    /// join collapsed onto ONE server (+ ONE superuser credential) now yields distinct
    /// names. A regression to a non-injective derivation FAILS this.
    #[test]
    fn derived_workload_is_project_qualified() {
        // Same binding name, different project — never collide.
        assert_ne!(
            derived_workload("acme", "app"),
            derived_workload("globex", "app"),
        );
        // The exact ambiguous pair from the Security-review HIGH-1 finding: a hyphen-join
        // would map both to `bramp-db-acme-app-db`.
        assert_ne!(
            derived_workload("acme-app", "db"),
            derived_workload("acme", "app-db"),
            "ambiguous hyphen pair must NOT collide onto one shared server + superuser cred"
        );
        // A couple more distinct-pair cases straddling hyphen placement.
        assert_ne!(derived_workload("a-b", "c"), derived_workload("a", "b-c"));
        assert_ne!(
            derived_workload("acme-app-db", ""),
            derived_workload("", "acme-app-db"),
        );
        // Every derived name keeps the reserved prefix + is a bounded resource name.
        for (p, n) in [("acme-app", "db"), ("acme", "app-db"), ("globex", "app")] {
            let w = derived_workload(p, n);
            assert!(
                w.starts_with("bramp-db-"),
                "{w:?} keeps the reserved prefix"
            );
            assert!(w.len() <= 63, "{w:?} must be <= 63 bytes");
        }
    }

    /// The size preset maps to bounded resources (never a raw unbounded request).
    #[test]
    fn size_preset_maps_to_bounded_volume() {
        assert_eq!(
            lower("p", &db_size(ApplyDatabaseSize::Small)).volume_size_mib,
            Some(10 * 1024)
        );
        assert_eq!(
            lower("p", &db_size(ApplyDatabaseSize::Medium)).volume_size_mib,
            Some(50 * 1024)
        );
        assert_eq!(
            lower("p", &db_size(ApplyDatabaseSize::Large)).volume_size_mib,
            Some(200 * 1024)
        );
    }

    fn db_size(size: ApplyDatabaseSize) -> ApplyDatabase {
        let mut d = declared("app");
        d.size = size;
        d
    }

    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    // The mutation-verified gate: `MANAGED-DB DECLARATION SCOPED OK`.
    //
    // Each assertion below observes a CONCRETE outcome (an `Err` variant, a stored
    // record, a sealed credential's actual bytes, a derived name), so a mutation that
    // neuters an invariant flips a real assertion — never a printed string:
    //  - credential-never-in-manifest: `lower` MUST yield the managed-credential path
    //    (no `password_env`/`url_env`/`image`/`path`); a mutation that carried a secret
    //    field would fail `is_managed_credential()`.
    //  - daemon-wins conflict: a declare of a name present in the node-static map is
    //    REFUSED at the merge point; a mutation that let the manifest win would return
    //    `Ok(())` and this asserts `DaemonConflict`.
    //  - refuse-destructive-change: re-declaring an existing DB with a different
    //    `tenant` is `IdentityChange`; a mutation that skipped the identity check would
    //    return `Ok` and this asserts the refusal.
    //  - caller-project-binding: the lowered `compute` is project-qualified, so a
    //    declaration can only provision onto its OWN project's derived server (never an
    //    author-named / cross-tenant workload).
    //  - inert-on-removal: the capability exposes NO deprovision — after a declare the
    //    record + sealed credential persist; there is no code path to drop them, so
    //    manifest removal (an absent entry in a later apply) cannot deprovision.
    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    use async_trait::async_trait;
    use boatramp_core::envelope::{EnvelopeError, KeyEnvelope};
    use boatramp_core::kv::MemoryKv;
    use boatramp_core::{ByteStream, GetObject, ObjectMeta, PutMeta, Storage, StorageError};

    struct XorEnvelope;
    #[async_trait]
    impl KeyEnvelope for XorEnvelope {
        async fn wrap(&self, p: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, EnvelopeError> {
            Ok(p.iter().map(|b| b ^ 0x5a).collect())
        }
        async fn unwrap(&self, c: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, EnvelopeError> {
            Ok(c.iter().map(|b| b ^ 0x5a).collect())
        }
    }

    struct NullStorage;
    #[async_trait]
    impl Storage for NullStorage {
        async fn get(&self, _: &str) -> Result<GetObject, StorageError> {
            Err(StorageError::NotFound(String::new()))
        }
        async fn get_range(
            &self,
            _: &str,
            _: u64,
            _: Option<u64>,
        ) -> Result<GetObject, StorageError> {
            Err(StorageError::NotFound(String::new()))
        }
        async fn put(
            &self,
            _: &str,
            _: ByteStream,
            _: PutMeta,
        ) -> Result<ObjectMeta, StorageError> {
            Err(StorageError::unsupported("null"))
        }
        async fn head(&self, _: &str) -> Result<ObjectMeta, StorageError> {
            Err(StorageError::NotFound(String::new()))
        }
        async fn delete(&self, _: &str) -> Result<(), StorageError> {
            Ok(())
        }
        async fn list(&self, _: &str) -> Result<Vec<ObjectMeta>, StorageError> {
            Ok(Vec::new())
        }
    }

    fn single_project(name: &str) -> ApplyDatabase {
        // A `Single`/`Project` binding: `provision_single` writes only to KV (spec +
        // workload + sealed credential), NO live DB connection — so the whole declare
        // path runs in-engine over a `NullStorage` + `MemoryKv`.
        let mut d = declared(name);
        d.tenant = boatramp_core::compute::ApplyDatabaseTenant::Single;
        d.pool_max = None;
        d.connect_timeout_secs = None;
        d.startup_grace_secs = None;
        d
    }

    fn declare_cap(
        static_dbs: BTreeMap<String, ExternalDatabaseConfig>,
    ) -> (
        NodeManagedDbDeclare,
        DeployStore,
        std::sync::Arc<dyn KvStore>,
    ) {
        // A generous default quota so the existing gate assertions are unaffected.
        declare_cap_quota(static_dbs, DeclareQuota::default())
    }

    fn declare_cap_quota(
        static_dbs: BTreeMap<String, ExternalDatabaseConfig>,
        quota: DeclareQuota,
    ) -> (
        NodeManagedDbDeclare,
        DeployStore,
        std::sync::Arc<dyn KvStore>,
    ) {
        let kv: std::sync::Arc<dyn KvStore> = std::sync::Arc::new(MemoryKv::new());
        let deploy = DeployStore::new(std::sync::Arc::new(NullStorage), kv.clone());
        let cap = NodeManagedDbDeclare::new(
            static_dbs,
            deploy.clone(),
            kv.clone(),
            std::sync::Arc::new(XorEnvelope),
            quota,
        );
        (cap, deploy, kv)
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn managed_db_declaration_scoped_gate() {
        // (1) credential-never-in-manifest — the lowered binding is the managed path.
        let low = lower("acme", &single_project("app"));
        assert!(
            low.is_managed_credential() && low.password_env.is_none(),
            "GATE: lowered binding must be the managed-credential path (no password_env)"
        );
        assert!(
            low.url_env.is_empty() && low.image.is_none() && low.path.is_none(),
            "GATE: no url_env / image / host-fs path may appear in a declared binding"
        );

        // (2) daemon-wins conflict — a name in the node-static map is REFUSED.
        let mut static_dbs = BTreeMap::new();
        static_dbs.insert("byo".to_string(), ExternalDatabaseConfig::default());
        let (cap, _deploy, _kv) = declare_cap(static_dbs);
        let refused = cap.declare("acme", "byo", &single_project("byo")).await;
        assert!(
            matches!(refused, Err(DeclareError::DaemonConflict(ref n)) if n == "byo"),
            "GATE: a project manifest may not shadow a daemon-static binding — got {refused:?}"
        );

        // The merge point itself refuses too (same-name in BOTH sources), even for `ensure`.
        let mut both = BTreeMap::new();
        both.insert("byo".to_string(), ExternalDatabaseConfig::default());
        let (cap2, deploy2, _kv2) = declare_cap(both);
        // Seed a rogue project declaration directly (bypassing declare) to simulate a
        // config-reload with BOTH present, then assert the merge point fails closed.
        deploy2
            .set_project_database(ProjectRef::new("acme"), &single_project("byo"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let merged = resolve_binding(&cap2.static_dbs, &deploy2, "acme", "byo").await;
        assert!(
            matches!(merged, Err(DeclareError::DaemonConflict(_))),
            "GATE: the merge point fails closed when both sources define the name — got {merged:?}"
        );

        // (3) A clean declare onto a project with NO daemon conflict succeeds + persists +
        // seals a credential. `Single`/`Project` provisions with no live DB.
        let (cap3, deploy3, kv3) = declare_cap(BTreeMap::new());
        cap3.declare("acme", "app", &single_project("app"))
            .await
            .expect("GATE: a clean declare succeeds");
        let stored = deploy3
            .get_project_database(ProjectRef::new("acme"), "app")
            .await
            .unwrap();
        assert!(stored.is_some(), "GATE: the declaration is persisted");
        // The sealed credential exists (eager provision minted it), keyed under the
        // caller's project (`managed-sql-cred/acme/<derived-workload>`) — never in the
        // manifest. Assert at least one such key exists (the exact derived tenant workload
        // name includes a sanitized ident, so match on the project-scoped prefix).
        let cred_keys = kv3.list_prefix("managed-sql-cred/acme/").await.unwrap();
        assert!(
            !cred_keys.is_empty(),
            "GATE: the eager provision minted + sealed a managed credential under the caller's project"
        );
        // …and it is stored SEALED (XOR'd), never the plaintext.
        let sealed = kv3.get(&cred_keys[0]).await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert!(
            sealed.iter().all(|b| *b != 0) && sealed.len() == 64,
            "GATE: the credential is sealed at rest (64-byte sealed blob)"
        );

        // (4) refuse-destructive-change — re-declare `app` with a DIFFERENT `tenant`.
        let mut changed = single_project("app");
        changed.tenant = boatramp_core::compute::ApplyDatabaseTenant::Shared;
        let refused_change = cap3.declare("acme", "app", &changed).await;
        assert!(
            matches!(
                refused_change,
                Err(DeclareError::IdentityChange { field, .. }) if field == "tenant"
            ),
            "GATE: changing `tenant` on an existing declared DB is refused — got {refused_change:?}"
        );

        // (5) caller-project-binding — the lowered compute is the injective per-project
        // derived workload (a `bramp-db-…` digest), so a DIFFERENT project can NEVER
        // name/derive onto acme's server.
        assert_eq!(
            lower("acme", &single_project("app")).compute.as_deref(),
            Some(derived_workload("acme", "app").as_str()),
        );
        assert!(
            lower("acme", &single_project("app"))
                .compute
                .as_deref()
                .is_some_and(|c| c.starts_with("bramp-db-")),
            "GATE: the derived server workload keeps the reserved `bramp-db-` prefix"
        );
        assert_ne!(
            lower("globex", &single_project("app")).compute,
            lower("acme", &single_project("app")).compute,
            "GATE: a declaration provisions onto its OWN project's derived server only"
        );
        // …and the derivation is INJECTIVE over the `(project, name)` PAIR (HIGH-1): the
        // ambiguous hyphen pair that a `bramp-db-{project}-{name}` join collapsed onto ONE
        // shared server + ONE superuser credential now yields distinct workloads. A
        // regression to a non-injective derivation would make these EQUAL and FAIL here.
        assert_ne!(
            derived_workload("acme-app", "db"),
            derived_workload("acme", "app-db"),
            "GATE: the ambiguous `(project, name)` pair must NOT collide onto one server + superuser credential"
        );
        assert_ne!(
            lower("acme-app", &single_project("db")).compute,
            lower("acme", &single_project("app-db")).compute,
            "GATE: two distinct projects must not lower onto the same shared server"
        );

        // (6) inert-on-removal — the capability exposes NO deprovision. After the declare
        // the record + sealed credential still exist; there is no method to drop them, so a
        // dropped manifest entry (absent in a later apply) cannot deprovision. Re-assert the
        // credential + record are still present (nothing in this API removed them).
        assert!(
            !kv3.list_prefix("managed-sql-cred/acme/")
                .await
                .unwrap()
                .is_empty(),
            "GATE: nothing in the declare API removes the credential (inert on removal)"
        );
        assert!(
            deploy3
                .get_project_database(ProjectRef::new("acme"), "app")
                .await
                .unwrap()
                .is_some(),
            "GATE: the declaration record survives (removal is an explicit imperative verb)"
        );

        println!("MANAGED-DB DECLARATION SCOPED OK");
    }

    /// MEDIUM-1: the per-project **count** ceiling is enforced fail-closed at `declare`,
    /// BEFORE any store write / provision. With a ceiling of 2, the third distinct DB is
    /// refused with `QuotaExceeded` and is NOT persisted.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn per_project_count_ceiling_is_fail_closed() {
        let quota = DeclareQuota {
            max_databases: 2,
            max_volume_mib: u64::MAX, // isolate the count axis
        };
        let (cap, deploy, _kv) = declare_cap_quota(BTreeMap::new(), quota);
        cap.declare("acme", "a", &single_project("a"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        cap.declare("acme", "b", &single_project("b"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        // The third distinct DB is over the ceiling.
        let refused = cap.declare("acme", "c", &single_project("c")).await;
        assert!(
            matches!(refused, Err(DeclareError::QuotaExceeded { ref db, .. }) if db == "c"),
            "declaring past the count ceiling must be refused fail-closed — got {refused:?}"
        );
        // …and NOTHING was persisted for it (fail-closed BEFORE the write).
        assert!(
            deploy
                .get_project_database(ProjectRef::new("acme"), "c")
                .await
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "the over-ceiling declaration must not be persisted"
        );
        // A same-name RE-APPLY of an existing DB does not consume a fresh slot.
        cap.declare("acme", "a", &single_project("a"))
            .await
            .expect("re-declaring an existing DB is within the ceiling (no new slot)");
        // A DIFFERENT project has its own independent ceiling (the count is per-project,
        // not node-global) — `acme` is already at its cap of 2, yet `globex` can declare.
        cap.declare("globex", "x", &single_project("x"))
            .await
            .expect("a different project has its own count budget");
    }

    /// MEDIUM-1: the per-project **aggregate-volume** ceiling is enforced fail-closed.
    /// With a 25 GiB aggregate ceiling, two Small (10 GiB) DBs fit (20 GiB) but a third
    /// would reach 30 GiB and is refused; a Medium (50 GiB) alone is refused.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn per_project_volume_ceiling_is_fail_closed() {
        let quota = DeclareQuota {
            max_databases: usize::MAX, // isolate the volume axis
            max_volume_mib: 25 * 1024, // 25 GiB
        };
        let (cap, deploy, _kv) = declare_cap_quota(BTreeMap::new(), quota);
        // Two Small DBs (10 GiB each) fit under 25 GiB.
        cap.declare("acme", "a", &single_project("a"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        cap.declare("acme", "b", &single_project("b"))
            .await
            .unwrap();
        // A third Small would reach 30 GiB — over the aggregate ceiling.
        let refused = cap.declare("acme", "c", &single_project("c")).await;
        assert!(
            matches!(refused, Err(DeclareError::QuotaExceeded { ref db, .. }) if db == "c"),
            "declaring past the aggregate-volume ceiling must be refused — got {refused:?}"
        );
        assert!(
            deploy
                .get_project_database(ProjectRef::new("acme"), "c")
                .await
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "the over-ceiling declaration must not be persisted"
        );
        // A single Medium (50 GiB) alone exceeds the 25 GiB ceiling on a FRESH project.
        let (cap2, _deploy2, _) = declare_cap_quota(BTreeMap::new(), quota);
        let mut medium = single_project("big");
        medium.size = ApplyDatabaseSize::Medium;
        let refused_medium = cap2.declare("zeta", "big", &medium).await;
        assert!(
            matches!(refused_medium, Err(DeclareError::QuotaExceeded { .. })),
            "a single over-ceiling volume must be refused — got {refused_medium:?}"
        );
    }

    /// The config → ceilings resolution: `None` folds to the built-in `apply_db_caps`
    /// defaults; a `Some` overrides; a `0` is honored (disable declarations).
    #[test]
    fn declare_quota_from_config_folds_defaults() {
        let d = DeclareQuota::from_config(None, None);
        assert_eq!(
            d.max_databases,
            apply_db_caps::DEFAULT_MAX_DECLARED_DATABASES_PER_PROJECT
        );
        assert_eq!(
            d.max_volume_mib,
            apply_db_caps::DEFAULT_MAX_DECLARED_VOLUME_MIB
        );
        let o = DeclareQuota::from_config(Some(4), Some(1234));
        assert_eq!(o.max_databases, 4);
        assert_eq!(o.max_volume_mib, 1234);
        // 0 is honored (an operator explicitly disabling declarations), not folded.
        let z = DeclareQuota::from_config(Some(0), Some(0));
        assert_eq!(z.max_databases, 0);
        assert_eq!(z.max_volume_mib, 0);
    }
}