base64-ng

base64-ng is a no_std-first Base64 crate focused on correctness, strict decoding, caller-owned buffers, and a security-heavy release process. The long-term goal is to provide modern hardware acceleration without making unsafe SIMD the foundation of trust.

The crate starts conservative: a small scalar implementation, strict RFC 4648 behavior, and a test/release system modeled after hardened Rust service projects. Streaming is available behind an explicit feature, fuzz harnesses are isolated from the published crate, and future SIMD and Kani work remain gated until they have evidence.

Current Status

The current public release is 0.4.1.

Implemented now:

• no_std core with optional alloc and std features.
• Zero external runtime or development dependencies in Cargo.toml.
• Standard and URL-safe alphabets.
• Padded and unpadded encoding into caller-provided output buffers.
• Stable compile-time encoding into caller-sized arrays.
• Strict decoding into caller-provided output buffers.
• In-place encoding when the caller provides enough spare capacity.
• Optional alloc vector and string helpers.
• In-place decode API built on the same strict scalar decoder.
• Explicit legacy decode APIs that ignore ASCII transport whitespace while keeping alphabet and padding validation strict.
• Separate ct scalar decode module for sensitive payloads that avoids secret-indexed lookup tables during Base64 symbol mapping.
• std::io streaming encoders and decoders behind the stream feature.
• Focused unit and integration tests.
• Isolated cargo-fuzz harnesses for decode, in-place decode, and stream chunk-boundary behavior.
• Local check scripts, release gate, dependency policy, audit config, CI, SBOM script, and reproducible build check.

Planned:

• AVX2, AVX-512, and ARM NEON fast paths.
• Async streaming wrappers.
• Kani proof harnesses.
• Criterion benchmarks against the established base64 crate.

Install

[dependencies]
base64-ng = "0.4.1"

The crate is dual-licensed:

license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"

Features

Disable defaults for embedded or freestanding use:

[dependencies]
base64-ng = { version = "0.4.1", default-features = false }

Example

use base64_ng::{STANDARD, checked_encoded_len};

let input = b"hello";
const ENCODED_CAPACITY: usize = match checked_encoded_len(5, true) {
    Some(len) => len,
    None => panic!("encoded length overflow"),
};
let mut encoded = [0u8; ENCODED_CAPACITY];
let written = STANDARD.encode_slice(input, &mut encoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&encoded[..written], b"aGVsbG8=");

let mut decoded = [0u8; 5];
let written = STANDARD.decode_slice(&encoded, &mut decoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&decoded[..written], input);

In-place encoding:

use base64_ng::STANDARD;

let mut buffer = [0u8; 8];
buffer[..5].copy_from_slice(b"hello");
let encoded = STANDARD.encode_in_place(&mut buffer, 5).unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded, b"aGVsbG8=");

For sensitive payloads, encode_slice_clear_tail and encode_in_place_clear_tail clear unused bytes after the encoded prefix and clear the caller-owned output buffer on encode error.

Compile-time encoding:

use base64_ng::{STANDARD, URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};

const HELLO: [u8; 8] = STANDARD.encode_array(b"hello");
const URL_BYTES: [u8; 3] = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode_array(b"\xfb\xff");

assert_eq!(&HELLO, b"aGVsbG8=");
assert_eq!(&URL_BYTES, b"-_8");

Stable Rust cannot yet express the encoded length as the return array length directly, so encode_array uses the destination array type supplied by the caller. A wrong output length fails during const evaluation.

For untrusted length metadata, use checked length calculation:

use base64_ng::{checked_encoded_len, decoded_len};

assert_eq!(checked_encoded_len(5, true), Some(8));
assert_eq!(decoded_len(b"aGVsbG8=", true).unwrap(), 5);

Legacy Whitespace Decoding

Strict decoding rejects whitespace. If an existing protocol allows line-wrapped or spaced Base64, use the explicit legacy APIs:

use base64_ng::STANDARD;

let mut output = [0u8; 5];
let written = STANDARD
    .decode_slice_legacy(b" aG\r\nVs\tbG8= ", &mut output)
    .unwrap();

assert_eq!(&output[..written], b"hello");

Legacy decoding only ignores ASCII space, tab, carriage return, and line feed. Alphabet selection, padding placement, trailing data after padding, and non-canonical trailing bits remain strict.

Bounded Memory Use

For untrusted payloads, size buffers before decoding or encoding. The checked helpers let callers reject impossible or oversized metadata before allocating:

use base64_ng::{STANDARD, checked_encoded_len, decoded_capacity};

let input = b"hello";
let encoded_len = checked_encoded_len(input.len(), true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded_len, 8);

let mut encoded = vec![0u8; encoded_len];
let written = STANDARD.encode_slice(input, &mut encoded).unwrap();
encoded.truncate(written);

let max_decoded = decoded_capacity(encoded.len());
let mut decoded = vec![0u8; max_decoded];
let written = STANDARD.decode_slice(&encoded, &mut decoded).unwrap();
decoded.truncate(written);

assert_eq!(decoded, input);

decode_vec validates the complete input before allocating decoded output. Use decode_slice or decode_in_place when the caller needs hard memory limits and owns the output buffer.

For sensitive payloads, use decode_slice_clear_tail or decode_in_place_clear_tail to clear unused bytes after the decoded prefix. On decode error these variants clear the caller-owned output buffer before returning the error. The legacy whitespace profile also provides decode_slice_legacy_clear_tail and decode_in_place_legacy_clear_tail. The ct module provides the same clear-tail decode variants for callers using the constant-time-oriented scalar decoder.

With the default alloc feature, vector and string helpers are available:

use base64_ng::STANDARD;

let encoded = STANDARD.encode_vec(b"hello").unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded, b"aGVsbG8=");

let encoded_string = STANDARD.encode_string(b"hello").unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded_string, "aGVsbG8=");

let decoded = STANDARD.decode_vec(&encoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded, b"hello");

With the stream feature, std::io encoders are available:

use std::io::{Read, Write};
use base64_ng::{STANDARD, stream::{Decoder, DecoderReader, Encoder, EncoderReader}};

let mut encoder = Encoder::new(Vec::new(), STANDARD);
encoder.write_all(b"he").unwrap();
encoder.write_all(b"llo").unwrap();
let encoded = encoder.finish().unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded, b"aGVsbG8=");

let mut reader = EncoderReader::new(&b"hello"[..], STANDARD);
let mut encoded = String::new();
reader.read_to_string(&mut encoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded, "aGVsbG8=");

let mut decoder = Decoder::new(Vec::new(), STANDARD);
decoder.write_all(b"aGVs").unwrap();
decoder.write_all(b"bG8=").unwrap();
let decoded = decoder.finish().unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded, b"hello");

let mut reader = DecoderReader::new(&b"aGVsbG8="[..], STANDARD);
let mut decoded = Vec::new();
reader.read_to_end(&mut decoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded, b"hello");

URL-safe, no-padding encoding:

use base64_ng::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;

let mut encoded = [0u8; 7];
let written = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode_slice(b"hello", &mut encoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&encoded[..written], b"aGVsbG8");

Security Model

base64-ng treats Base64 as infrastructure code. Fast paths are never allowed to outrun evidence.

Security commitments:

• Stable Rust first. Current toolchain pin: Rust 1.95.0.
• no_std core by default.
• Scalar code denies unsafe.
• Future unsafe SIMD isolated under src/simd.rs.
• Local checks verify that allow(unsafe_code) is confined to the SIMD boundary.
• docs/UNSAFE.md inventories every current unsafe site and its safety invariants.
• runtime::backend_report() exposes the active backend, detected candidate, SIMD feature status, and scalar-only security posture for audit logging.
• runtime::require_backend_policy() lets deployments assert scalar execution, disabled SIMD features, or no detected SIMD candidate.
• BackendPolicy::HighAssuranceScalarOnly combines the scalar/no-SIMD deployment checks into one assertion.
• Runtime backend, posture, and policy enums expose stable string identifiers for CI artifacts, audit logs, and deployment evidence.
• Runtime backend reports and policy failures use stable key/value display output for log ingestion.
• Strict decoding rejects malformed padding and trailing data.
• Runtime scalar APIs are expected to return Result or Option for malformed input and size errors instead of panicking.
• Public encoded-length overflow is recoverable through Result or Option; untrusted length metadata should never require a panic.
• Scalar encode avoids input-derived alphabet table indexes, and scalar decode uses branch-minimized arithmetic. A separate ct module provides a constant-time-oriented scalar decode path for callers that need a narrower timing target. Its malformed-input errors are intentionally non-localized, clear-tail variants clear caller-owned buffers on error, and it is not documented as a formally verified cryptographic constant-time API.
• Clear-tail encode/decode variants are available for callers that want best-effort cleanup of unused caller-owned buffers without adding a runtime dependency.
• Streaming encoders clear internal pending plaintext staging buffers on drop.
• Legacy compatibility must be opt-in.
• Release gates include formatting, clippy, tests, Miri when installed, docs, dependency policy, audit, license review, isolated fuzz/perf dependency checks, SBOM, and reproducible build checks.
• Future Kani proofs target in-place decoding bounds and scalar decoder invariants.

See docs/PLAN.md, SECURITY.md, docs/RELEASE_EVIDENCE.md, and docs/CONSTANT_TIME.md. For the unsafe hardware acceleration gate, see docs/SIMD.md. For adoption guidance from the established base64 crate, see docs/MIGRATION.md. For performance evidence guidance, see docs/BENCHMARKS.md.

Local Checks

Run the standard gate:

scripts/checks.sh

Check the zero-external-crate policy directly:

scripts/validate-dependencies.sh

Run the release gate:

scripts/stable_release_gate.sh

Install cross-compilation targets used by the local and CI target checks:

rustup target add aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu x86_64-unknown-freebsd wasm32-unknown-unknown thumbv7em-none-eabihf

Required security tools:

cargo install --locked cargo-audit
cargo install --locked cargo-license
cargo install --locked cargo-deny
cargo install --locked cargo-sbom --version 0.10.0

Optional deep tools:

cargo install --locked cargo-nextest
cargo install --locked cargo-fuzz
cargo install --locked kani-verifier

Verify optional tool installation:

cargo nextest --version
cargo fuzz --version
cargo kani --version

Compile fuzz targets without running a campaign:

scripts/check_fuzz.sh

Compile and audit the isolated performance harness:

scripts/check_perf.sh

Run the scalar comparison benchmark:

cargo run --release --manifest-path perf/Cargo.toml

Run a target with cargo-fuzz:

cargo +nightly fuzz run decode
cargo +nightly fuzz run in_place
cargo +nightly fuzz run stream_chunks
cargo +nightly fuzz run differential

Miri is installed as a nightly Rust component, not as a Cargo package:

rustup toolchain install nightly --component miri
cargo +nightly miri setup
cargo +nightly miri test --no-default-features

Kani may need a one-time setup after installation:

cargo kani setup

On openSUSE Tumbleweed, install rustup first if it is not already present:

sudo zypper install rustup

The local release gate runs Miri automatically when cargo +nightly miri is available. The large deterministic sweep tests are ignored only under Miri because they are already covered by the normal release gate and are too slow for an interpreter.

Project Principles

• Keep external crates to the absolute minimum. The current crate dependency graph is only base64-ng.
• Correctness first, speed second, unsafe last.
• The scalar implementation is the reference behavior.
• SIMD must prove equivalence to scalar behavior across fuzzed and deterministic inputs.
• Compatibility modes must be visible in the type/API surface.
• Release evidence belongs in the repository and CI, not in memory.

Contributing And Releases

See CONTRIBUTING.md for contribution rules and docs/RELEASE.md for the maintainer release checklist.