auths-sdk 0.1.9

//! KEL-native commit-trust resolution — the single path that decides whether a
//! git commit is authorized by a pinned trusted root.
//!
//! Read the in-band `Auths-Id` / `Auths-Device` trailers, replay the device + root
//! KELs from the registry, and check the signature against the pinned `.auths/roots`
//! set. This is the successor to the `.auths/allowed_signers` SSH allowlist: trust is
//! rooted in the replayed KEL, never an out-of-band list of keys. The verdict logic
//! itself lives in `auths_verifier::verify_commit_against_kel`; this workflow owns the
//! orchestration (trailer parse → KEL resolution → verdict).

use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};

/// Extract `(root_did, device_did)` from a commit's `Auths-Id` / `Auths-Device`
/// trailers. One definition, in the verifier — the same parse the WASM/CLI
/// stateless paths use, re-exported here for workflow callers.
pub use auths_verifier::commit_signer_trailers;

// `verify_commit_local` resolves KELs through `KelResolverChain`, which is only
// compiled with the git registry backend; gate it and its imports accordingly so
// `auths-sdk` still builds without `backend-git` (the pure helpers below do not).
#[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
use crate::keri::KelResolverChain;
#[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
use crate::ports::RegistryBackend;
#[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
use auths_crypto::CryptoProvider;
#[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
use auths_verifier::freshness::FreshnessPolicy;
#[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
use auths_verifier::{CommitVerdict, verify_commit_against_kel};

/// Failure resolving commit trust before a verdict can be reached.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum CommitTrustError {
    /// The commit carries no `Auths-Id` / `Auths-Device` trailer pair.
    #[error(
        "commit carries no Auths-Id/Auths-Device trailer — it was not signed by `auths` \
         (or predates KEL-native signing)"
    )]
    MissingTrailers,

    /// A signer's KEL could not be resolved from the registry.
    #[error("{role} KEL for {did} could not be resolved: {reason}")]
    KelUnresolved {
        /// Which KEL failed to resolve — `"device"` or `"root"`.
        role: &'static str,
        /// The `did:keri:` / `did:key:` whose KEL could not be resolved.
        did: String,
        /// The underlying resolver error, rendered for display.
        reason: String,
    },

    /// Loading or evaluating the root's org policy failed.
    #[error("org policy evaluation failed: {0}")]
    Policy(#[from] crate::domains::org::error::OrgError),
}

/// The verifier's own root identity DID, implicitly trusted for its own
/// verifications.
///
/// Self-trust is the floor of the trust model: a verifier always trusts keys it
/// itself controls, so the signer can verify their own commits and artifacts with
/// zero pinning ceremony. Returns `None` when no local identity exists (behavior
/// is then unchanged — only explicit pins apply). The returned DID resolves
/// through the same KEL replay as any pinned root; this adds a root, never a
/// shortcut around verification.
///
/// Args:
/// * `ctx`: Auths context (identity storage).
///
/// Usage:
/// ```ignore
/// if let Some(own_root) = local_self_root(&ctx) {
///     pinned_roots.push(own_root);
/// }
/// ```
pub fn local_self_root(ctx: &crate::context::AuthsContext) -> Option<String> {
    ctx.identity_storage
        .load_identity()
        .ok()
        .map(|managed| managed.controller_did.into_inner())
}

/// Verify a commit against the locally-replayed KEL and the pinned trusted roots.
///
/// Local-only (no network, no witness gate): resolves the device and root KELs from
/// `registry`, then replays them to decide whether the commit's signer is a device
/// delegated under a root pinned in `pinned_roots`. This is the trust primitive the
/// artifact-provenance path uses for the human-signed commit an ephemeral attestation
/// is bound to. Witnessed verification (the `auths verify` command) layers
/// witness receipts on top of the same `auths_verifier` KEL primitive.
///
/// Args:
/// * `registry`: The registry backend holding identity KELs.
/// * `pinned_roots`: Trusted root `did:keri:` strings (from `.auths/roots`).
/// * `raw_commit`: The raw git commit object bytes (with the `gpgsig` signature).
/// * `provider`: Crypto provider for in-process signature verification.
///
/// Usage:
/// ```ignore
/// let verdict = verify_commit_local(&registry, &roots, commit_bytes, &provider).await?;
/// assert!(verdict.is_valid());
/// ```
#[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
pub async fn verify_commit_local(
    registry: &dyn RegistryBackend,
    pinned_roots: &[String],
    raw_commit: &[u8],
    provider: &dyn CryptoProvider,
) -> Result<CommitVerdict, CommitTrustError> {
    let commit_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(raw_commit);
    let (root_did, device_did) =
        commit_signer_trailers(&commit_str).ok_or(CommitTrustError::MissingTrailers)?;

    let chain = KelResolverChain::local(registry);
    let device_kel =
        chain
            .resolve_kel(&device_did)
            .map_err(|e| CommitTrustError::KelUnresolved {
                role: "device",
                did: device_did.clone(),
                reason: e.to_string(),
            })?;
    let root_kel = chain
        .resolve_kel(&root_did)
        .map_err(|e| CommitTrustError::KelUnresolved {
            role: "root",
            did: root_did.clone(),
            reason: e.to_string(),
        })?;

    Ok(verify_commit_against_kel(raw_commit, &device_kel, &root_kel, pinned_roots, provider).await)
}

/// The org-policy outcome layered on a cryptographically-valid commit verdict.
///
/// Policy is evaluated **after** the cryptographic verdict (fail-closed ordering: an
/// unverified commit never reaches policy). It is a sum, never a bool.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum PolicyOutcome {
    /// The cryptographic verdict was not `Valid`; policy was not evaluated (the commit
    /// is already rejected by the verdict).
    CryptoFailed,
    /// The commit's root anchored no org policy — legacy allow, recorded (not silently
    /// skipped). Pre-policy behavior is preserved for roots without a policy.
    NoPolicy,
    /// The org policy was evaluated; carries the typed [`auths_id::policy::Decision`].
    Evaluated(auths_id::policy::Decision),
}

/// A commit's cryptographic verdict plus the org-policy decision layered on it.
#[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct CommitDecision {
    /// The cryptographic commit verdict (signature + KEL delegation + revocation).
    pub verdict: CommitVerdict,
    /// The org-policy outcome (only meaningful when `verdict.is_valid()`).
    pub policy: PolicyOutcome,
}

#[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
impl CommitDecision {
    /// True iff the commit is cryptographically valid **and** org policy authorizes it
    /// (or the root anchored no policy). Fail-closed: any policy deny/indeterminate, a
    /// non-`Valid` verdict, **or a duplicitous (forked) root KEL** is unauthorized.
    pub fn is_authorized(&self) -> bool {
        // Fail-closed on a duplicitous root KEL is enforced by `verdict.is_trusted` below
        // (the shared trust primitive the CLI also consumes), not re-derived here.
        if !self.verdict.is_trusted(&FreshnessPolicy::default()) {
            return false;
        }
        match &self.policy {
            PolicyOutcome::CryptoFailed => false,
            PolicyOutcome::NoPolicy => true,
            PolicyOutcome::Evaluated(decision) => decision.is_allowed(),
        }
    }
}

/// Map a delegated identifier's role marker to a policy signer type: an agent is an
/// `Agent`; an unmarked device is the human's workstation (`Human`).
fn signer_type_of(
    ctx: &crate::context::AuthsContext,
    root_prefix: &auths_id::keri::types::Prefix,
    signer_prefix: &auths_id::keri::types::Prefix,
) -> Result<auths_id::policy::SignerType, CommitTrustError> {
    use auths_id::keri::delegation::{DelegatedRole, list_delegated_devices};
    let delegated = list_delegated_devices(ctx.registry.as_ref(), root_prefix).map_err(|e| {
        CommitTrustError::Policy(crate::domains::org::error::OrgError::Delegation(e))
    })?;
    let is_agent = delegated.iter().any(|d| {
        d.device_prefix.as_str() == signer_prefix.as_str() && d.role == DelegatedRole::Agent
    });
    Ok(if is_agent {
        auths_id::policy::SignerType::Agent
    } else {
        auths_id::policy::SignerType::Human
    })
}

/// Build the policy evaluation context for a verified commit signer.
///
/// Caps/role come from the signer's delegator-anchored grant; `revoked = false`
/// because a `Valid` verdict already certified the signer's authority was live at the
/// signing position (positional revocation yields a non-`Valid` verdict). `signer_type`
/// is read from the delegation role marker.
fn commit_policy_context(
    ctx: &crate::context::AuthsContext,
    root_prefix: &auths_id::keri::types::Prefix,
    signer_prefix: &auths_id::keri::types::Prefix,
    now: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<auths_id::policy::EvalContext, CommitTrustError> {
    use auths_id::policy::context_from_delegated_member;
    use auths_verifier::core::Role;

    let root_did = format!("did:keri:{}", root_prefix.as_str());
    let signer_did = format!("did:keri:{}", signer_prefix.as_str());

    let authority =
        crate::domains::org::delegation::resolve_member_authority(ctx, root_prefix, signer_prefix)?;
    let (role, caps, expires) = match &authority {
        Some(a) => (
            a.role.as_ref().map(Role::as_str),
            a.capabilities.clone(),
            a.expires_at,
        ),
        None => (None, Vec::new(), None),
    };
    let expires_dt = expires.and_then(|s| DateTime::from_timestamp(s, 0));

    let mut eval_ctx =
        context_from_delegated_member(&root_did, &signer_did, false, role, &caps, expires_dt, now)
            .map_err(|e| {
                CommitTrustError::Policy(crate::domains::org::error::OrgError::InvalidDid(
                    e.to_string(),
                ))
            })?;
    eval_ctx = eval_ctx.signer_type(signer_type_of(ctx, root_prefix, signer_prefix)?);
    Ok(eval_ctx)
}

/// Evaluate the commit signer against the root's org policy (if any).
///
/// Loads the policy anchored by `root_did` and evaluates a grant-based context for
/// `signer_did`. A root with no anchored policy yields [`PolicyOutcome::NoPolicy`]
/// (legacy allow, recorded). Pure over the registry + injected `now`.
///
/// Args:
/// * `ctx`: Auths context (registry).
/// * `root_did`: The commit's `Auths-Id` (the policy authority).
/// * `signer_did`: The commit's `Auths-Device` (the signer being gated).
/// * `now`: Current time, injected at the boundary.
pub fn evaluate_commit_policy(
    ctx: &crate::context::AuthsContext,
    root_did: &str,
    signer_did: &str,
    now: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<PolicyOutcome, CommitTrustError> {
    use auths_id::keri::types::Prefix;
    let root_prefix = Prefix::new_unchecked(
        root_did
            .strip_prefix("did:keri:")
            .unwrap_or(root_did)
            .to_string(),
    );
    let signer_prefix = Prefix::new_unchecked(
        signer_did
            .strip_prefix("did:keri:")
            .unwrap_or(signer_did)
            .to_string(),
    );

    let Some(policy) = crate::domains::org::policy::load_org_policy(ctx, &root_prefix)? else {
        return Ok(PolicyOutcome::NoPolicy);
    };
    let eval_ctx = commit_policy_context(ctx, &root_prefix, &signer_prefix, now)?;
    let decision = crate::domains::org::policy::evaluate_with_org_policy(&policy, &eval_ctx);
    // A5: record every enforcement decision (allow + deny) for the audit trail. The
    // gate stays pure; emission happens here at the caller.
    crate::audit::emit_policy_decision(ctx, "commit", signer_did, &decision);
    Ok(PolicyOutcome::Evaluated(decision))
}

/// Verify a commit cryptographically **and** against the root's org policy.
///
/// Runs [`verify_commit_local`] then, only on a `Valid` verdict, layers the root's org
/// policy ([`evaluate_commit_policy`]). The result is a typed [`CommitDecision`]: the
/// crypto verdict + the policy outcome. Fail-closed throughout — crypto gates policy,
/// and policy is a sum, never a bool.
///
/// Args:
/// * `ctx`: Auths context (registry, clock).
/// * `pinned_roots`: Trusted root `did:keri:` strings.
/// * `raw_commit`: The raw git commit object bytes.
/// * `provider`: Crypto provider for in-process signature verification.
/// * `now`: Current time, injected at the boundary.
///
/// Usage:
/// ```ignore
/// let decision = verify_commit_with_policy(&ctx, &roots, commit, &provider, now).await?;
/// assert!(decision.is_authorized());
/// ```
#[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
pub async fn verify_commit_with_policy(
    ctx: &crate::context::AuthsContext,
    pinned_roots: &[String],
    raw_commit: &[u8],
    provider: &dyn CryptoProvider,
    now: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<CommitDecision, CommitTrustError> {
    let verdict =
        verify_commit_local(ctx.registry.as_ref(), pinned_roots, raw_commit, provider).await?;
    let policy = match &verdict {
        CommitVerdict::Valid {
            signer_did,
            root_did,
            ..
        } => evaluate_commit_policy(ctx, root_did, signer_did, now)?,
        _ => PolicyOutcome::CryptoFailed,
    };
    Ok(CommitDecision { verdict, policy })
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    const ROOT: &str = "did:keri:Eroot00000000000000000000000000000000000000";
    const DEVICE: &str = "did:key:z6MkDevice000000000000000000000000000000000";

    fn commit_with_trailers(root: &str, device: &str) -> String {
        format!(
            "tree abc\nauthor T <t@e.com> 0 +0000\n\nsubject\n\nAuths-Id: {root}\nAuths-Device: {device}\n"
        )
    }

    #[test]
    fn extracts_both_trailers() {
        let commit = commit_with_trailers(ROOT, DEVICE);
        assert_eq!(
            commit_signer_trailers(&commit),
            Some((ROOT.to_string(), DEVICE.to_string()))
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn missing_device_trailer_yields_none() {
        let commit = "tree abc\n\nsubject\n\nAuths-Id: did:keri:Eroot\n";
        assert!(commit_signer_trailers(commit).is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn no_trailers_yields_none() {
        assert!(commit_signer_trailers("tree abc\n\njust a message\n").is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn last_trailer_wins_on_duplicates() {
        let commit = format!(
            "tree abc\n\nsubject\n\nAuths-Id: did:keri:Eold\nAuths-Device: {DEVICE}\nAuths-Id: {ROOT}\n"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            commit_signer_trailers(&commit),
            Some((ROOT.to_string(), DEVICE.to_string()))
        );
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "backend-git")]
    #[test]
    fn duplicitous_root_is_not_authorized_even_when_valid_and_fresh() {
        use auths_verifier::freshness::Freshness;
        let decision = |duplicitous_root: bool| CommitDecision {
            verdict: CommitVerdict::Valid {
                signer_did: DEVICE.to_string(),
                root_did: ROOT.to_string(),
                duplicitous_root,
                as_of: 1,
                freshness: Freshness::Fresh,
            },
            policy: PolicyOutcome::NoPolicy,
        };
        // Fail-closed: a forked (duplicitous) root KEL is not trustworthy even with a valid,
        // fresh signature and no org policy to deny it — the relying party cannot tell which
        // branch is real.
        assert!(
            !decision(true).is_authorized(),
            "a duplicitous root must fail closed"
        );
        // Control: the same commit without divergence is authorized.
        assert!(
            decision(false).is_authorized(),
            "a clean, valid, fresh, policy-clear commit is authorized"
        );
    }
}