auths-cli 0.1.13

//! CLI e2e for the property the whole product rests on: **someone who is not the
//! signer can verify.**
//!
//! Every other verification test in this suite runs as the signer, with a populated
//! `~/.auths`. That is exactly why a total failure of this property shipped
//! undetected: `auths init` wrote `<repo>/.auths/roots` but never staged it, so the
//! trust pin never reached a cloner. A fresh clone failed with "KEL not found"
//! while the engine itself was correct the whole time. The KEL travels the same
//! way the pin does: committed in the clone, as `.auths/ci-bundle.json`
//! (`auths id export-bundle`) — no side-channel ref mirror, no network fetch.
//!
//! These tests play the *second person*: a machine with no auths identity, a plain
//! `git clone`, and no flags. They must keep failing closed when trust is absent.
//!
//! Runs hermetically — `TestEnv`'s keychain is file-backed with `AUTHS_PASSPHRASE`,
//! so signing is non-interactive (no macOS keychain / SIP gate).

use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use super::helpers::TestEnv;

/// An identity that has signed HEAD and pushed it to a bare origin.
///
/// Returns the signer's env and the origin path. The signer's KEL travels inside
/// the committed `.auths/ci-bundle.json` — the same clone that carries the code
/// and the trust pin carries the evidence, so verification needs no network.
fn signer_with_pushed_commit() -> (TestEnv, PathBuf) {
    let alice = TestEnv::new();
    alice.init_identity();

    let origin = alice.home.path().join("origin.git");
    let init_bare = std::process::Command::new("git")
        .args(["init", "-q", "--bare"])
        .arg(&origin)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(init_bare.status.success(), "git init --bare failed");

    std::fs::write(alice.repo_path.join("main.rs"), "fn main() {}").unwrap();

    let bundle = alice.repo_path.join(".auths").join("ci-bundle.json");
    let export = alice
        .cmd("auths")
        .args([
            "id",
            "export-bundle",
            "--alias",
            "main",
            "--output",
            bundle.to_str().unwrap(),
            "--max-age-secs",
            "3600",
        ])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        export.status.success(),
        "id export-bundle failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&export.stderr)
    );

    let add = alice
        .git_cmd()
        .args(["add", "main.rs", ".auths/ci-bundle.json"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(add.status.success(), "git add failed");

    // A plain signed commit — no `auths sign`. The pin must ride along on its own.
    let commit = alice
        .git_cmd()
        .args(["commit", "-m", "feat: add main"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        commit.status.success(),
        "git commit failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&commit.stderr)
    );

    let branch = alice
        .git_cmd()
        .args(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    let branch = String::from_utf8_lossy(&branch.stdout).trim().to_string();

    let push = alice
        .git_cmd()
        .arg("push")
        .arg(&origin)
        .arg(&branch)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        push.status.success(),
        "git push failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&push.stderr)
    );

    // Point the bare repo's HEAD at the branch we pushed, as any real origin does.
    // Without this the clone checks out a branch that does not exist and lands empty.
    let head = std::process::Command::new("git")
        .arg("--git-dir")
        .arg(&origin)
        .args(["symbolic-ref", "HEAD"])
        .arg(format!("refs/heads/{branch}"))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(head.status.success(), "could not set origin HEAD");

    (alice, origin)
}

/// A machine with **no auths identity**, holding a plain clone of `origin`.
fn observer_cloning(origin: &Path) -> TestEnv {
    // `TestEnv::new()` never creates an identity — only `init_identity()` does.
    let mut bob = TestEnv::new();
    let clone = bob.home.path().join("clone");
    let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
        .arg("clone")
        .arg("-q")
        .arg(origin)
        .arg(&clone)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        out.status.success(),
        "git clone failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
    bob.repo_path = clone;
    bob
}

/// The headline property. No identity, no flags, no setup.
#[test]
fn a_second_person_verifies_a_plain_clone_with_no_identity_and_no_flags() {
    let (_alice, origin) = signer_with_pushed_commit();
    let bob = observer_cloning(&origin);

    let out = bob.cmd("auths").args(["verify", "HEAD"]).output().unwrap();

    assert!(
        out.status.success(),
        "a second person must be able to verify a clone with no flags.\n\
         stdout: {}\nstderr: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout),
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
    assert!(
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).contains("verified"),
        "expected a verified verdict, got: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout)
    );
}

/// The pin must be *in the clone* — that is what makes it a trust declaration the
/// repo carries rather than a file on the signer's laptop.
#[test]
fn the_trust_pin_travels_with_the_repository() {
    let (_alice, origin) = signer_with_pushed_commit();
    let bob = observer_cloning(&origin);

    let pin = bob.repo_path.join(".auths").join("roots");
    assert!(
        pin.is_file(),
        ".auths/roots must be committed, or a cloner has nothing to anchor trust to"
    );
    let content = std::fs::read_to_string(&pin).unwrap();
    assert!(
        content.contains("did:keri:"),
        "pin must name a did:keri root, got: {content:?}"
    );
}

/// The KEL must be *in the clone* — the committed bundle, like the pin, travels
/// with the code instead of over a side-channel ref mirror.
#[test]
fn the_committed_bundle_carries_the_kel_in_the_clone() {
    let (_alice, origin) = signer_with_pushed_commit();
    let bob = observer_cloning(&origin);

    let bundle = bob.repo_path.join(".auths").join("ci-bundle.json");
    assert!(
        bundle.is_file(),
        ".auths/ci-bundle.json must be committed, or a cloner has no KEL to verify against"
    );
    let content = std::fs::read_to_string(&bundle).unwrap();
    assert!(
        content.contains("kel_attachments"),
        "the bundle must carry signature attachments, got: {}",
        &content[..content.len().min(200)]
    );
}

/// Fail closed: strip the pin and the same clone must refuse. An `Auths-Id` trailer
/// is attacker-controllable — it may *select* among pinned roots, never *establish*
/// one — so an unpinned root is untrusted no matter how good the signature is.
#[test]
fn an_unpinned_root_still_fails_closed() {
    let (_alice, origin) = signer_with_pushed_commit();
    let bob = observer_cloning(&origin);

    std::fs::remove_file(bob.repo_path.join(".auths").join("roots")).unwrap();

    let out = bob.cmd("auths").args(["verify", "HEAD"]).output().unwrap();

    assert!(
        !out.status.success(),
        "an unpinned root must not verify — this is the TOFU-on-the-root guard.\n\
         stdout: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout)
    );
}