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//! Workspace boundary enforcement and path extraction helpers.
use astrid_audit::{AuditAction, AuditOutcome, AuthorizationProof};
use astrid_core::{ApprovalOption, ApprovalRequest, Frontend, RiskLevel};
use astrid_llm::{LlmProvider, ToolCall, ToolCallResult};
use astrid_workspace::{EscapeDecision, EscapeRequest, PathCheck};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
use crate::session::AgentSession;
use super::AgentRuntime;
impl<P: LlmProvider + 'static> AgentRuntime<P> {
/// Check workspace boundaries for a tool call's file path arguments.
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if all paths are allowed, or a tool error result if blocked/denied.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)]
pub(super) async fn check_workspace_boundaries<F: Frontend>(
&self,
session: &mut AgentSession,
call: &ToolCall,
server: &str,
tool: &str,
frontend: &F,
) -> Result<(), ToolCallResult> {
let paths = extract_paths_from_args(&call.arguments);
if paths.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
for path in &paths {
// Check escape handler first (already approved paths)
if session.escape_handler.is_allowed(path) {
debug!(path = %path.display(), "Path already approved by escape handler");
continue;
}
let check = self.boundary.check(path);
match check {
PathCheck::Allowed | PathCheck::AutoAllowed => {},
PathCheck::NeverAllowed => {
warn!(
path = %path.display(),
tool = %format!("{server}:{tool}"),
"Access to protected path blocked"
);
// Audit the blocked access
{
let _ = self.audit.append(
session.id.clone(),
AuditAction::ApprovalDenied {
action: format!("{server}:{tool} -> {}", path.display()),
reason: Some("protected system path".to_string()),
},
AuthorizationProof::System {
reason: "workspace boundary: never-allowed path".to_string(),
},
AuditOutcome::failure("protected path"),
);
}
return Err(ToolCallResult::error(
&call.id,
format!(
"Access to {} is blocked — this is a protected system path",
path.display()
),
));
},
PathCheck::RequiresApproval => {
let escape_request = EscapeRequest::new(
path.clone(),
infer_operation(tool),
format!(
"Tool {server}:{tool} wants to access {} outside the workspace",
path.display()
),
)
.with_tool(tool)
.with_server(server);
// Bridge to frontend approval
let approval_request = ApprovalRequest::new(
format!("workspace-escape:{server}:{tool}"),
format!(
"Allow {} {} outside workspace?\n Path: {}",
tool,
escape_request.operation,
path.display()
),
)
.with_risk_level(risk_level_for_operation(escape_request.operation))
.with_resource(path.display().to_string());
let decision =
frontend
.request_approval(approval_request)
.await
.map_err(|_| {
ToolCallResult::error(
&call.id,
"Failed to request workspace escape approval",
)
})?;
// Convert ApprovalDecision to EscapeDecision
let escape_decision = match decision.decision {
ApprovalOption::AllowOnce => EscapeDecision::AllowOnce,
ApprovalOption::AllowSession | ApprovalOption::AllowWorkspace => {
EscapeDecision::AllowSession
},
ApprovalOption::AllowAlways => EscapeDecision::AllowAlways,
ApprovalOption::Deny => EscapeDecision::Deny,
};
// Record the decision in the escape handler
session
.escape_handler
.process_decision(&escape_request, escape_decision);
// Audit the decision
if escape_decision.is_allowed() {
let _ = self.audit.append(
session.id.clone(),
AuditAction::ApprovalGranted {
action: format!("{server}:{tool}"),
resource: Some(path.display().to_string()),
scope: match decision.decision {
ApprovalOption::AllowSession => {
astrid_audit::ApprovalScope::Session
},
ApprovalOption::AllowWorkspace => {
astrid_audit::ApprovalScope::Workspace
},
ApprovalOption::AllowAlways => {
astrid_audit::ApprovalScope::Always
},
ApprovalOption::AllowOnce | ApprovalOption::Deny => {
astrid_audit::ApprovalScope::Once
},
},
},
AuthorizationProof::UserApproval {
user_id: session.user_id,
approval_entry_id: None,
},
AuditOutcome::success(),
);
} else {
let _ = self.audit.append(
session.id.clone(),
AuditAction::ApprovalDenied {
action: format!("{server}:{tool} -> {}", path.display()),
reason: Some(
decision
.reason
.clone()
.unwrap_or_else(|| "user denied".to_string()),
),
},
AuthorizationProof::UserApproval {
user_id: session.user_id,
approval_entry_id: None,
},
AuditOutcome::failure("user denied workspace escape"),
);
}
if !escape_decision.is_allowed() {
return Err(ToolCallResult::error(
&call.id,
decision.reason.unwrap_or_else(|| {
format!("Access to {} denied — outside workspace", path.display())
}),
));
}
info!(
path = %path.display(),
decision = ?escape_decision,
"Workspace escape approved"
);
},
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Free functions
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Extract file paths from tool call JSON arguments.
///
/// Scans for common path-like keys and string values that look like file paths.
pub(super) fn extract_paths_from_args(args: &serde_json::Value) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
/// Keys commonly used for file path arguments in MCP tools.
const PATH_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
"path",
"file",
"file_path",
"filepath",
"filename",
"directory",
"dir",
"target",
"source",
"destination",
"src",
"dst",
"input",
"output",
"uri",
"url",
"cwd",
"working_directory",
];
let mut paths = Vec::new();
if let Some(obj) = args.as_object() {
for (key, value) in obj {
let key_lower = key.to_lowercase();
if let Some(s) = value.as_str()
&& PATH_KEYS.contains(&key_lower.as_str())
&& let Some(path) = try_extract_path(s)
{
paths.push(path);
}
}
}
paths
}
/// Try to interpret a string value as a file path.
fn try_extract_path(value: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
// Handle file:// URIs
if let Some(stripped) = value.strip_prefix("file://") {
return Some(PathBuf::from(stripped));
}
// Skip non-file URIs
if value.contains("://") {
return None;
}
// Check if it looks like an absolute or relative file path
if value.starts_with('/')
|| value.starts_with("~/")
|| value.starts_with("./")
|| value.starts_with("../")
{
return Some(PathBuf::from(value));
}
None
}
/// Infer the operation type from a tool name.
pub(super) fn infer_operation(tool: &str) -> astrid_workspace::escape::EscapeOperation {
use astrid_workspace::escape::EscapeOperation;
let tool_lower = tool.to_lowercase();
if tool_lower.contains("read") || tool_lower.contains("get") || tool_lower.contains("cat") {
EscapeOperation::Read
} else if tool_lower.contains("write")
|| tool_lower.contains("set")
|| tool_lower.contains("put")
|| tool_lower.contains("edit")
|| tool_lower.contains("update")
{
EscapeOperation::Write
} else if tool_lower.contains("create")
|| tool_lower.contains("mkdir")
|| tool_lower.contains("touch")
|| tool_lower.contains("new")
{
EscapeOperation::Create
} else if tool_lower.contains("delete")
|| tool_lower.contains("remove")
|| tool_lower.contains("rm")
{
EscapeOperation::Delete
} else if tool_lower.contains("exec")
|| tool_lower.contains("run")
|| tool_lower.contains("launch")
{
EscapeOperation::Execute
} else if tool_lower.contains("list") || tool_lower.contains("ls") || tool_lower.contains("dir")
{
EscapeOperation::List
} else {
// Default to Read for unknown operations (least destructive assumption)
EscapeOperation::Read
}
}
/// Determine risk level based on the escape operation.
pub(super) fn risk_level_for_operation(
operation: astrid_workspace::escape::EscapeOperation,
) -> RiskLevel {
use astrid_workspace::escape::EscapeOperation;
match operation {
EscapeOperation::Read | EscapeOperation::List => RiskLevel::Medium,
EscapeOperation::Write | EscapeOperation::Create => RiskLevel::High,
EscapeOperation::Delete | EscapeOperation::Execute => RiskLevel::Critical,
}
}