assay-cli 3.35.0

//! `assay.enforcement_health.v0` — the enforcement-truth artifact.
//!
//! Deliberately a SEPARATE carrier from `observation_health`. observation_health answers "how complete
//! was observation?"; this answers "was enforcement active, and did it block?". They are orthogonal: a
//! run can have complete observation and absent enforcement, or vice versa. Conflating them would let an
//! observation artifact claim something it never produced.
//!
//! Modelled as enforcement truth, not monitor output: an *enforcement run* produces it. Today the only
//! producer is `assay monitor` (the connect4 egress path), but the schema is producer-agnostic so future
//! enforcement paths (landlock, argument constraints, tool-decision) emit the same shape.
//!
//! Truth carrier, not a log derivative: it is written as an explicit artifact (`--enforcement-health
//! <path>`), never parsed back out of stdout. stdout stays diagnostic; this file is the contract.
//!
//! v0 is intentionally small. Rule IDs, policy refs, timestamps, provenance, and enforcement receipts
//! are follow-ups, not v0.

use std::path::Path;

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

pub const SCHEMA_V0: &str = "assay.enforcement_health.v0";

/// The enforcement domain this artifact reports on. For now the only producer is connect4 IPv4/TCP
/// egress. A second domain (e.g. landlock filesystem, argument constraints) is a new `scope` value, and
/// a multi-domain shape would be an explicit `v1` bump, never a silent reinterpretation of `v0`.
pub const SCOPE_IPV4_TCP_CONNECT: &str = "ipv4_tcp_connect";

/// The enforcement status. The carrier vocabulary is the full set; a given producer emits only the
/// states that can actually occur for it (the connect4 producer emits Active / Failed / Absent —
/// NotApplicable is reserved for scopes where the channel does not apply).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum NetworkEnforcement {
    /// Requested and installed (the program is attached and the deny rules are loaded).
    Active,
    /// Not requested (no network deny rules in the policy, or no policy).
    Absent,
    /// Requested but could NOT be installed (attach failed / no kernel support). Emitted on the
    /// fail-closed abort path BEFORE exit, so a requested-but-failed enforcement is never mistaken for
    /// an un-requested one.
    Failed,
    /// Network enforcement does not apply to this scope/producer (reserved; not emitted by connect4).
    NotApplicable,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct EnforcementHealth {
    pub schema: String,
    pub scope: String,
    pub network_enforcement: NetworkEnforcement,
    pub attach_confirmed: bool,
    pub blocked_count: u64,
    pub allowed_count: u64,
}

impl EnforcementHealth {
    fn new(scope: &str, status: NetworkEnforcement, attach_confirmed: bool) -> Self {
        Self {
            schema: SCHEMA_V0.to_string(),
            scope: scope.to_string(),
            network_enforcement: status,
            attach_confirmed,
            blocked_count: 0,
            allowed_count: 0,
        }
    }

    /// Enforcement was requested and installed; carries the observed block/allow counts.
    pub fn active(scope: &str, blocked_count: u64, allowed_count: u64) -> Self {
        Self {
            blocked_count,
            allowed_count,
            ..Self::new(scope, NetworkEnforcement::Active, true)
        }
    }

    /// Enforcement was requested but could not be installed (fail-closed abort).
    pub fn failed(scope: &str) -> Self {
        Self::new(scope, NetworkEnforcement::Failed, false)
    }

    /// Enforcement was not requested for this run.
    pub fn absent(scope: &str) -> Self {
        Self::new(scope, NetworkEnforcement::Absent, false)
    }

    pub fn write_to(&self, path: &Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
        let json = serde_json::to_string_pretty(self)
            .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e))?;
        std::fs::write(path, json)
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn active_carries_counts_and_confirmed_attach() {
        let h = EnforcementHealth::active(SCOPE_IPV4_TCP_CONNECT, 1, 1);
        assert_eq!(h.network_enforcement, NetworkEnforcement::Active);
        assert!(h.attach_confirmed);
        assert_eq!(h.blocked_count, 1);
        assert_eq!(h.allowed_count, 1);
        assert_eq!(h.schema, SCHEMA_V0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn failed_is_distinct_from_absent() {
        // The whole point of the artifact: requested-but-failed must not look like not-requested.
        let failed = EnforcementHealth::failed(SCOPE_IPV4_TCP_CONNECT);
        let absent = EnforcementHealth::absent(SCOPE_IPV4_TCP_CONNECT);
        assert_eq!(failed.network_enforcement, NetworkEnforcement::Failed);
        assert!(!failed.attach_confirmed);
        assert_eq!(absent.network_enforcement, NetworkEnforcement::Absent);
        assert_ne!(failed.network_enforcement, absent.network_enforcement);
    }

    #[test]
    fn serializes_snake_case_status() {
        let json = serde_json::to_string(&EnforcementHealth::active(SCOPE_IPV4_TCP_CONNECT, 2, 3))
            .unwrap();
        assert!(json.contains("\"schema\":\"assay.enforcement_health.v0\""));
        assert!(json.contains("\"network_enforcement\":\"active\""));
        assert!(json.contains("\"scope\":\"ipv4_tcp_connect\""));
        assert!(json.contains("\"blocked_count\":2"));
        assert!(json.contains("\"allowed_count\":3"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trips_through_json() {
        let h = EnforcementHealth::failed(SCOPE_IPV4_TCP_CONNECT);
        let back: EnforcementHealth =
            serde_json::from_str(&serde_json::to_string(&h).unwrap()).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(back.network_enforcement, NetworkEnforcement::Failed);
        assert!(!back.attach_confirmed);
    }

    // write_to failure modes use a directory-as-path and a missing parent: both are portable and
    // deterministic, unlike permission bits which differ per OS/CI. A requested artifact that cannot
    // be written must surface as an error so the caller can refuse exit 0 (a missing file would
    // otherwise be read as "not requested").
    #[test]
    fn write_to_fails_when_path_is_a_directory() {
        let h = EnforcementHealth::active(SCOPE_IPV4_TCP_CONNECT, 1, 1);
        assert!(h.write_to(&std::env::temp_dir()).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn write_to_fails_when_parent_dir_is_missing() {
        let h = EnforcementHealth::active(SCOPE_IPV4_TCP_CONNECT, 1, 1);
        let path = std::env::temp_dir()
            .join(format!("assay-eh-missing-{}", std::process::id()))
            .join("nested")
            .join("enforcement_health.json");
        assert!(h.write_to(&path).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn write_to_succeeds_and_round_trips_from_disk() {
        let h = EnforcementHealth::active(SCOPE_IPV4_TCP_CONNECT, 2, 3);
        let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("assay-eh-{}.json", std::process::id()));
        h.write_to(&path).unwrap();
        let back: EnforcementHealth =
            serde_json::from_str(&std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap()).unwrap();
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
        assert_eq!(back.network_enforcement, NetworkEnforcement::Active);
        assert_eq!(back.blocked_count, 2);
        assert_eq!(back.allowed_count, 3);
    }
}